Generalize selinux_skb_sk() added in commit 212cd08953
("selinux: fix random read in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()")
so that we can use it other contexts.
Use it right away in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a
notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a
maintainer of that"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits)
apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency
selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct
selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static
selinux: use sprintf return value
selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools()
selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core()
selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity()
selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid
selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call
selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default
KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature
KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file
keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used
certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list
KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key
Smack: limited capability for changing process label
TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion
vTPM: support little endian guests
char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver
...
In commit e446f9dfe1 ("net: synack packets can be attached to request
sockets"), I missed one remaining case of invalid skb->sk->sk_security
access.
Dmitry Vyukov got a KASan report pointing to it.
Add selinux_skb_sk() helper that is responsible to get back to the
listener if skb is attached to a request socket, instead of
duplicating the logic.
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The size of struct file_security_struct is 16byte at my setup.
But, the real allocation size for per each file_security_struct
is 64bytes in my setup that kmalloc min size is 64bytes
because ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN is 64.
This allocation is called every times at file allocation(alloc_file()).
So, the total slack memory size(allocated size - request size)
is increased exponentially.
E.g) Min Kmalloc Size : 64bytes, Unit : bytes
Allocated Size | Request Size | Slack Size | Allocation Count
---------------------------------------------------------------
770048 | 192512 | 577536 | 12032
At the result, this change reduce memory usage 42bytes per each
file_security_struct
Signed-off-by: Sangwoo <sangwoo2.park@lge.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: removed extra subject prefix]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Fixes the following sparse warning:
security/selinux/hooks.c:3242:5: warning: symbol 'ioctl_has_perm' was
not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
sprintf returns the number of characters printed (excluding '\0'), so
we can use that and avoid duplicating the length computation.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This is much simpler.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
security_context_to_sid() expects a const char* argument, so there's
no point in casting away the const qualifier of value.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
There seems to be a little confusion as to whether the scontext_len
parameter of security_context_to_sid() includes the nul-byte or
not. Reading security_context_to_sid_core(), it seems that the
expectation is that it does not (both the string copying and the test
for scontext_len being zero hint at that).
Introduce the helper security_context_str_to_sid() to do the strlen()
call and fix all callers.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Use the ATTR_FILE attribute to distinguish between truncate()
and ftruncate() system calls. The two other cases where
do_truncate is called with a filp (and therefore ATTR_FILE is set)
are for coredump files and for open(O_TRUNC). In both of those cases
the open permission has already been checked during file open and
therefore does not need to be repeated.
Commit 95dbf73931 ("SELinux: check OPEN on truncate calls")
fixed a major issue where domains were allowed to truncate files
without the open permission. However, it introduced a new bug where
a domain with the write permission can no longer ftruncate files
without the open permission, even when they receive an already open
file.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Change the SELinux checkreqprot default value to 0 so that SELinux
performs access control checking on the actual memory protections
used by the kernel and not those requested by the application.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This merge resolves conflicts with 75aec9df3a ("bridge: Remove
br_nf_push_frag_xmit_sk") as part of Eric Biederman's effort to improve
netns support in the network stack that reached upstream via David's
net-next tree.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Conflicts:
net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
since commit 8405a8fff3 ("netfilter: nf_qeueue: Drop queue entries on
nf_unregister_hook") all pending queued entries are discarded.
So we can simply remove all of the owner handling -- when module is
removed it also needs to unregister all its hooks.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
selinux needs few changes to accommodate fact that SYNACK messages
can be attached to a request socket, lacking sk_security pointer
(Only syncookies are still attached to a TCP_LISTEN socket)
Adds a new sk_listener() helper, and use it in selinux and sch_fq
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported by: kernel test robot <ying.huang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Only pass the void *priv parameter out of the nf_hook_ops. That is
all any of the functions are interested now, and by limiting what is
passed it becomes simpler to change implementation details.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
With two exceptions (drm/qxl and drm/radeon) all vm_operations_struct
structs should be constant.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for
module signing. See comments in 3f1e1bea.
** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which
must be installed, e.g. the openssl-devel on Fedora **
- Smack
- add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads
- support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data
- SELinux:
- add ioctl whitelisting (see
http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf)
- fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change
- Seccomp:
- add ptrace options for suspend/resume"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits)
PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them
Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing
scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore
modsign: Handle signing key in source tree
modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key
Move certificate handling to its own directory
sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value
PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module
Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured
sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries
PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type
KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7
PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder
modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file
sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7
PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652]
X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer
PKCS#7: Check content type and versions
MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved
...
Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly
escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g. new
lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files. This
could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like
systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what
else. This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on
themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or
in other situations with delegated mount privileges.
Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the
contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink). Imagine the use
of "sudo" is something more sneaky:
$ BASE="ovl"
$ MNT="$BASE/mnt"
$ LOW="$BASE/lower"
$ UP="$BASE/upper"
$ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0
none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000"
$ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK"
$ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt
$ cat /proc/mounts
none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0
none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0
$ fusermount -u /proc
$ cat /proc/mounts
cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory
This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and
seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option
handlers to use them as needed. Some, like SELinux, need to be open
coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees]
[keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05g@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Create a common helper function to determine the label for a new inode.
This is then used by:
- may_create()
- selinux_dentry_init_security()
- selinux_inode_init_security()
This will change the behaviour of the functions slightly, bringing them
all into line.
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Initialize the security class of sock security structures
to the generic socket class. This is similar to what is
already done in inode_alloc_security for files. Generally
the sclass field will later by set by socket_post_create
or sk_clone or sock_graft, but for protocol implementations
that fail to call any of these for newly accepted sockets,
we want some sane default that will yield a legitimate
avc denied message with non-garbage values for class and
permission.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
The inode_free_security() function just took the superblock's isec_lock
before checking and trying to remove the inode security struct from the
linked list. In many cases, the list was empty and so the lock taking
is wasteful as no useful work is done. On multi-socket systems with
a large number of CPUs, there can also be a fair amount of spinlock
contention on the isec_lock if many tasks are exiting at the same time.
This patch changes the code to check the state of the list first before
taking the lock and attempting to dequeue it. The list_del_init()
can be called more than once on the same list with no harm as long
as they are properly serialized. It should not be possible to have
inode_free_security() called concurrently with list_add(). For better
safety, however, we use list_empty_careful() here even though it is
still not completely safe in case that happens.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions
provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the
generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for
per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl
permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example:
allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds
auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds
Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros
representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands.
When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked.
This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl
permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver
may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as
driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such
as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or
access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism
to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications
to the subset of commands required.
The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl
commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to
POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format
change.
The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow
components to be reused e.g. netlink filters
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
commit 66fc130394 ("mm: shmem_zero_setup
skip security check and lockdep conflict with XFS") caused a regression
for SELinux by disabling any SELinux checking of mprotect PROT_EXEC on
shared anonymous mappings. However, even before that regression, the
checking on such mprotect PROT_EXEC calls was inconsistent with the
checking on a mmap PROT_EXEC call for a shared anonymous mapping. On a
mmap, the security hook is passed a NULL file and knows it is dealing
with an anonymous mapping and therefore applies an execmem check and no
file checks. On a mprotect, the security hook is passed a vma with a
non-NULL vm_file (as this was set from the internally-created shmem
file during mmap) and therefore applies the file-based execute check
and no execmem check. Since the aforementioned commit now marks the
shmem zero inode with the S_PRIVATE flag, the file checks are disabled
and we have no checking at all on mprotect PROT_EXEC. Add a test to
the mprotect hook logic for such private inodes, and apply an execmem
check in that case. This makes the mmap and mprotect checking
consistent for shared anonymous mappings, as well as for /dev/zero and
ashmem.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.1.x
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
At present we don't create efficient ebitmaps when importing NetLabel
category bitmaps. This can present a problem when comparing ebitmaps
since ebitmap_cmp() is very strict about these things and considers
these wasteful ebitmaps not equal when compared to their more
efficient counterparts, even if their values are the same. This isn't
likely to cause problems on 64-bit systems due to a bit of luck on
how NetLabel/CIPSO works and the default ebitmap size, but it can be
a problem on 32-bit systems.
This patch fixes this problem by being a bit more intelligent when
importing NetLabel category bitmaps by skipping over empty sections
which should result in a nice, efficient ebitmap.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized
that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace
permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide
if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all.
Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could
be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of
proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and
sysfs. Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced.
There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement. Only filesystems
mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but
the test for empty directories was insufficient. So in my tree
directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are
created specially. Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary
directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and
shows that the directory is empty. Special creation of directories
for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about
it's purpose. I asked container developers from the various container
projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount
points on proc and sysfs that are created specially.
This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh
mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of
proc and sysfs. I expected this to be the boring part of the work but
unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of
proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags
on the previous mount of proc and sysfs. So for now only the atime,
read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep
consistent are enforced. Dealing with the noexec and nosuid
attributes remains for another time.
This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file
descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed. Recently readlink of
/proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been
meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was
converted) and is not now actively wrong.
There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that
I will mention briefly.
It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount.
At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can
be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem. With user
namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created
allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename
to outside of the bind mount. This is challenging to fix and doubly
so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the
performance part of pathname resolution.
As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that
developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable
files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions
in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as
such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once
they are recognized"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path
mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories
sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point
sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points.
kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.
proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points
sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.
fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories.
vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible
mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime
mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
This allows for better documentation in the code and
it allows for a simpler and fully correct version of
fs_fully_visible to be written.
The mount points converted and their filesystems are:
/sys/hypervisor/s390/ s390_hypfs
/sys/kernel/config/ configfs
/sys/kernel/debug/ debugfs
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/ efivarfs
/sys/fs/fuse/connections/ fusectl
/sys/fs/pstore/ pstore
/sys/kernel/tracing/ tracefs
/sys/fs/cgroup/ cgroup
/sys/kernel/security/ securityfs
/sys/fs/selinux/ selinuxfs
/sys/fs/smackfs/ smackfs
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking
work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking,
allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default
monolithic module (e.g. SELinux, Smack, AppArmor).
See
https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/
This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the
mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users. Also, this is a
useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add()
vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq
tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level.
ima: update builtin policies
ima: extend "mask" policy matching support
ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()
Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj()
selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS
selinux: Remove unused permission definitions
selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files
selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.
selinux: update netlink socket classes
signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds()
selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs
Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap
Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs
ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation()
ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure
integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter
...
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Add TX fast path in mac80211, from Johannes Berg.
2) Add TSO/GRO support to ibmveth, from Thomas Falcon
3) Move away from cached routes in ipv6, just like ipv4, from Martin
KaFai Lau.
4) Lots of new rhashtable tests, from Thomas Graf.
5) Run ingress qdisc lockless, from Alexei Starovoitov.
6) Allow servers to fetch TCP packet headers for SYN packets of new
connections, for fingerprinting. From Eric Dumazet.
7) Add mode parameter to pktgen, for testing receive. From Alexei
Starovoitov.
8) Cache access optimizations via simplifications of build_skb(), from
Alexander Duyck.
9) Move page frag allocator under mm/, also from Alexander.
10) Add xmit_more support to hv_netvsc, from KY Srinivasan.
11) Add a counter guard in case we try to perform endless reclassify
loops in the packet scheduler.
12) Extern flow dissector to be programmable and use it in new "Flower"
classifier. From Jiri Pirko.
13) AF_PACKET fanout rollover fixes, performance improvements, and new
statistics. From Willem de Bruijn.
14) Add netdev driver for GENEVE tunnels, from John W Linville.
15) Add ingress netfilter hooks and filtering, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
16) Fix handling of epoll edge triggers in TCP, from Eric Dumazet.
17) Add an ECN retry fallback for the initial TCP handshake, from Daniel
Borkmann.
18) Add tail call support to BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
19) Add several pktgen helper scripts, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
20) Add zerocopy support to AF_UNIX, from Hannes Frederic Sowa.
21) Favor even port numbers for allocation to connect() requests, and
odd port numbers for bind(0), in an effort to help avoid
ip_local_port_range exhaustion. From Eric Dumazet.
22) Add Cavium ThunderX driver, from Sunil Goutham.
23) Allow bpf programs to access skb_iif and dev->ifindex SKB metadata,
from Alexei Starovoitov.
24) Add support for T6 chips in cxgb4vf driver, from Hariprasad Shenai.
25) Double TCP Small Queues default to 256K to accomodate situations
like the XEN driver and wireless aggregation. From Wei Liu.
26) Add more entropy inputs to flow dissector, from Tom Herbert.
27) Add CDG congestion control algorithm to TCP, from Kenneth Klette
Jonassen.
28) Convert ipset over to RCU locking, from Jozsef Kadlecsik.
29) Track and act upon link status of ipv4 route nexthops, from Andy
Gospodarek.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1670 commits)
bridge: vlan: flush the dynamically learned entries on port vlan delete
bridge: multicast: add a comment to br_port_state_selection about blocking state
net: inet_diag: export IPV6_V6ONLY sockopt
stmmac: troubleshoot unexpected bits in des0 & des1
net: ipv4 sysctl option to ignore routes when nexthop link is down
net: track link-status of ipv4 nexthops
net: switchdev: ignore unsupported bridge flags
net: Cavium: Fix MAC address setting in shutdown state
drivers: net: xgene: fix for ACPI support without ACPI
ip: report the original address of ICMP messages
net/mlx5e: Prefetch skb data on RX
net/mlx5e: Pop cq outside mlx5e_get_cqe
net/mlx5e: Remove mlx5e_cq.sqrq back-pointer
net/mlx5e: Remove extra spaces
net/mlx5e: Avoid TX CQE generation if more xmit packets expected
net/mlx5e: Avoid redundant dev_kfree_skb() upon NOP completion
net/mlx5e: Remove re-assignment of wq type in mlx5e_enable_rq()
net/mlx5e: Use skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs rather than counting them
net/mlx5e: Static mapping of netdev priv resources to/from netdev TX queues
net/mlx4_en: Use HW counters for rx/tx bytes/packets in PF device
...
While testing my netfilter changes I noticed several files where
recompiling unncessarily because they unncessarily included
netfilter.h.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Before calling into the filesystem, vfs_setxattr calls
security_inode_setxattr, which ends up calling selinux_inode_setxattr in
our case. That returns -EOPNOTSUPP whenever SBLABEL_MNT is not set.
SBLABEL_MNT was supposed to be set by sb_finish_set_opts, which sets it
only if selinux_is_sblabel_mnt returns true.
The selinux_is_sblabel_mnt logic was broken by eadcabc697 "SELinux: do
all flags twiddling in one place", which didn't take into the account
the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior that had been introduced for nfs
with eb9ae68650 "SELinux: Add new labeling type native labels".
This caused setxattr's of security labels over NFSv4.2 to fail.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 3.13
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: David Quigley <dpquigl@davequigley.com>
Reported-by: Richard Chan <rc556677@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: added the stable dependency]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Remove unused permission definitions from SELinux.
Many of these were only ever used in pre-mainline
versions of SELinux, prior to Linux 2.6.0. Some of them
were used in the legacy network or compat_net=1 checks
that were disabled by default in Linux 2.6.18 and
fully removed in Linux 2.6.30.
Permissions never used in mainline Linux:
file swapon
filesystem transition
tcp_socket { connectto newconn acceptfrom }
node enforce_dest
unix_stream_socket { newconn acceptfrom }
Legacy network checks, removed in 2.6.30:
socket { recv_msg send_msg }
node { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }
netif { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Support per-file labeling of sysfs and pstore files based on
genfscon policy entries. This is safe because the sysfs
and pstore directory tree cannot be manipulated by userspace,
except to unlink pstore entries.
This provides an alternative method of assigning per-file labeling
to sysfs or pstore files without needing to set the labels from
userspace on each boot. The advantages of this approach are that
the labels are assigned as soon as the dentry is first instantiated
and userspace does not need to walk the sysfs or pstore tree and
set the labels on each boot. The limitations of this approach are
that the labels can only be assigned based on pathname prefix matching.
You can initially assign labels using this mechanism and then change
them at runtime via setxattr if allowed to do so by policy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Suggested-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add support for per-file labeling of debugfs files so that
we can distinguish them in policy. This is particularly
important in Android where certain debugfs files have to be writable
by apps and therefore the debugfs directory tree can be read and
searched by all.
Since debugfs is entirely kernel-generated, the directory tree is
immutable by userspace, and the inodes are pinned in memory, we can
simply use the same approach as with proc and label the inodes from
policy based on pathname from the root of the debugfs filesystem.
Generalize the existing labeling support used for proc and reuse it
for debugfs too.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Update the set of SELinux netlink socket class definitions to match
the set of netlink protocols implemented by the kernel. The
ip_queue implementation for the NETLINK_FIREWALL and NETLINK_IP6_FW protocols
was removed in d16cf20e2f, so we can remove
the corresponding class definitions as this is dead code. Add new
classes for NETLINK_ISCSI, NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP, NETLINK_CONNECTOR,
NETLINK_NETFILTER, NETLINK_GENERIC, NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT, NETLINK_RDMA,
and NETLINK_CRYPTO so that we can distinguish among sockets created
for each of these protocols. This change does not define the finer-grained
nlsmsg_read/write permissions or map specific nlmsg_type values to those
permissions in the SELinux nlmsgtab; if finer-grained control of these
sockets is desired/required, that can be added as a follow-on change.
We do not define a SELinux class for NETLINK_ECRYPTFS as the implementation
was removed in 624ae52845.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
selinux_bprm_committed_creds()->__flush_signals() is not right, we
shouldn't clear TIF_SIGPENDING unconditionally. There can be other
reasons for signal_pending(): freezing(), JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK, and
potentially more.
Also change this code to check fatal_signal_pending() rather than
SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT, it looks a bit better.
Now we can kill __flush_signals() before it finds another buggy user.
Note: this code looks racy, we can flush a signal which was sent after
the task SID has been updated.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This prints the 'sclass' field as string instead of index in unrecognized netlink message.
The textual representation makes it easier to distinguish the right class.
Signed-off-by: Marek Milkovic <mmilkovi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: 80-char width fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.
The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.
The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.
The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add a list header for each security hook. They aren't used until
later in the patch series. They are grouped together in a structure
so that there doesn't need to be an external address for each.
Macro-ize the initialization of the security_operations
for each security module in anticipation of changing out
the security_operations structure.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The security.h header file serves two purposes,
interfaces for users of the security modules and
interfaces for security modules. Users of the
security modules don't need to know about what's
in the security_operations structure, so pull it
out into it's own header, lsm_hooks.h
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
inode_follow_link now takes an inode and rcu flag as well as the
dentry.
inode is used in preference to d_backing_inode(dentry), particularly
in RCU-walk mode.
selinux_inode_follow_link() gets dentry_has_perm() and
inode_has_perm() open-coded into it so that it can call
avc_has_perm_flags() in way that is safe if LOOKUP_RCU is set.
Calling avc_has_perm_flags() with rcu_read_lock() held means
that when avc_has_perm_noaudit calls avc_compute_av(), the attempt
to rcu_read_unlock() before calling security_compute_av() will not
actually drop the RCU read-lock.
However as security_compute_av() is completely in a read_lock()ed
region, it should be safe with the RCU read-lock held.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This allows MAY_NOT_BLOCK to be passed, in RCU-walk mode, through
the new avc_has_perm_flags() to avc_audit() and thence the slow_avc_audit.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
No ->inode_follow_link() methods use the nameidata arg, and
it is about to become private to namei.c.
So remove from all inode_follow_link() functions.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro:
"d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before
the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something
fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition
direct-io: only inc/dec inode->i_dio_count for file systems
fs/9p: fix readdir()
VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations
VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: Fix up some ->d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver
VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only
VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
... except where that code acts as a filesystem driver, rather than
working with dentries given to it.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights for this window:
- improved AVC hashing for SELinux by John Brooks and Stephen Smalley
- addition of an unconfined label to Smack
- Smack documentation update
- TPM driver updates"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
lsm: copy comm before calling audit_log to avoid race in string printing
tomoyo: Do not generate empty policy files
tomoyo: Use if_changed when generating builtin-policy.h
tomoyo: Use bin2c to generate builtin-policy.h
selinux: increase avtab max buckets
selinux: Use a better hash function for avtab
selinux: convert avtab hash table to flex_array
selinux: reconcile security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid() and mls_import_netlbl_cat()
selinux: remove unnecessary pointer reassignment
Smack: Updates for Smack documentation
tpm/st33zp24/spi: Add missing device table for spi phy.
tpm/st33zp24: Add proper wait for ordinal duration in case of irq mode
smack: Fix gcc warning from unused smack_syslog_lock mutex in smackfs.c
Smack: Allow an unconfined label in bringup mode
Smack: getting the Smack security context of keys
Smack: Assign smack_known_web as default smk_in label for kernel thread's socket
tpm/tpm_infineon: Use struct dev_pm_ops for power management
MAINTAINERS: Add Jason as designated reviewer for TPM
tpm: Update KConfig text to include TPM2.0 FIFO chips
tpm/st33zp24/dts/st33zp24-spi: Add dts documentation for st33zp24 spi phy
...
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Add BQL support to via-rhine, from Tino Reichardt.
2) Integrate SWITCHDEV layer support into the DSA layer, so DSA drivers
can support hw switch offloading. From Floria Fainelli.
3) Allow 'ip address' commands to initiate multicast group join/leave,
from Madhu Challa.
4) Many ipv4 FIB lookup optimizations from Alexander Duyck.
5) Support EBPF in cls_bpf classifier and act_bpf action, from Daniel
Borkmann.
6) Remove the ugly compat support in ARP for ugly layers like ax25,
rose, etc. And use this to clean up the neigh layer, then use it to
implement MPLS support. All from Eric Biederman.
7) Support L3 forwarding offloading in switches, from Scott Feldman.
8) Collapse the LOCAL and MAIN ipv4 FIB tables when possible, to speed
up route lookups even further. From Alexander Duyck.
9) Many improvements and bug fixes to the rhashtable implementation,
from Herbert Xu and Thomas Graf. In particular, in the case where
an rhashtable user bulk adds a large number of items into an empty
table, we expand the table much more sanely.
10) Don't make the tcp_metrics hash table per-namespace, from Eric
Biederman.
11) Extend EBPF to access SKB fields, from Alexei Starovoitov.
12) Split out new connection request sockets so that they can be
established in the main hash table. Much less false sharing since
hash lookups go direct to the request sockets instead of having to
go first to the listener then to the request socks hashed
underneath. From Eric Dumazet.
13) Add async I/O support for crytpo AF_ALG sockets, from Tadeusz Struk.
14) Support stable privacy address generation for RFC7217 in IPV6. From
Hannes Frederic Sowa.
15) Hash network namespace into IP frag IDs, also from Hannes Frederic
Sowa.
16) Convert PTP get/set methods to use 64-bit time, from Richard
Cochran.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1816 commits)
fm10k: Bump driver version to 0.15.2
fm10k: corrected VF multicast update
fm10k: mbx_update_max_size does not drop all oversized messages
fm10k: reset head instead of calling update_max_size
fm10k: renamed mbx_tx_dropped to mbx_tx_oversized
fm10k: update xcast mode before synchronizing multicast addresses
fm10k: start service timer on probe
fm10k: fix function header comment
fm10k: comment next_vf_mbx flow
fm10k: don't handle mailbox events in iov_event path and always process mailbox
fm10k: use separate workqueue for fm10k driver
fm10k: Set PF queues to unlimited bandwidth during virtualization
fm10k: expose tx_timeout_count as an ethtool stat
fm10k: only increment tx_timeout_count in Tx hang path
fm10k: remove extraneous "Reset interface" message
fm10k: separate PF only stats so that VF does not display them
fm10k: use hw->mac.max_queues for stats
fm10k: only show actual queues, not the maximum in hardware
fm10k: allow creation of VLAN on default vid
fm10k: fix unused warnings
...
Pull vfs update from Al Viro:
"Part one:
- struct filename-related cleanups
- saner iov_iter_init() replacements (and switching the syscalls to
use of those)
- ntfs switch to ->write_iter() (Anton)
- aio cleanups and splitting iocb into common and async parts
(Christoph)
- assorted fixes (me, bfields, Andrew Elble)
There's a lot more, including the completion of switchover to
->{read,write}_iter(), d_inode/d_backing_inode annotations, f_flags
race fixes, etc, but that goes after #for-davem merge. David has
pulled it, and once it's in I'll send the next vfs pull request"
* 'for-linus-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (35 commits)
sg_start_req(): use import_iovec()
sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
blk_rq_map_user(): use import_single_range()
sg_io(): use import_iovec()
process_vm_access: switch to {compat_,}import_iovec()
switch keyctl_instantiate_key_common() to iov_iter
switch {compat_,}do_readv_writev() to {compat_,}import_iovec()
aio_setup_vectored_rw(): switch to {compat_,}import_iovec()
vmsplice_to_user(): switch to import_iovec()
kill aio_setup_single_vector()
aio: simplify arguments of aio_setup_..._rw()
aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
lift iov_iter into {compat_,}do_readv_writev()
NFS: fix BUG() crash in notify_change() with patch to chown_common()
dcache: return -ESTALE not -EBUSY on distributed fs race
NTFS: Version 2.1.32 - Update file write from aio_write to write_iter.
VFS: Add iov_iter_fault_in_multipages_readable()
drop bogus check in file_open_root()
switch security_inode_getattr() to struct path *
constify tomoyo_realpath_from_path()
...
When a new rtnl or xfrm command is added, this part of the code is frequently
missing. Let's help the developer with a build time test.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This command is missing.
Fixes: 3a2dfbe8ac ("xfrm: Notify changes in UDP encapsulation via netlink")
CC: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This command is missing.
Fixes: 5c79de6e79 ("[XFRM]: User interface for handling XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE")
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This command is missing.
Fixes: 97a64b4577 ("[XFRM]: Introduce XFRM_MSG_REPORT.")
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
These commands are missing.
Fixes: 28d8909bc7 ("[XFRM]: Export SAD info.")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This command is missing.
Fixes: ecfd6b1837 ("[XFRM]: Export SPD info")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This new command is missing.
Fixes: 880a6fab8f ("xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink")
Reported-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This new command is missing.
Fixes: 9a9634545c ("netns: notify netns id events")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
These new commands are missing.
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bd ("netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Now that we can safely increase the avtab max buckets without
triggering high order allocations and have a hash function that
will make better use of the larger number of buckets, increase
the max buckets to 2^16.
Original:
101421 entries and 2048/2048 buckets used, longest chain length 374
With new hash function:
101421 entries and 2048/2048 buckets used, longest chain length 81
With increased max buckets:
101421 entries and 31078/32768 buckets used, longest chain length 12
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This function, based on murmurhash3, has much better distribution than
the original. Using the current default of 2048 buckets, there are many
fewer collisions:
Before:
101421 entries and 2048/2048 buckets used, longest chain length 374
After:
101421 entries and 2048/2048 buckets used, longest chain length 81
The difference becomes much more significant when buckets are increased.
A naive attempt to expand the current function to larger outputs doesn't
yield any significant improvement; so this function is a prerequisite
for increasing the bucket size.
sds: Adapted from the original patches for libsepol to the kernel.
Signed-off-by: John Brooks <john.brooks@jolla.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Previously we shrank the avtab max hash buckets to avoid
high order memory allocations, but this causes avtab lookups to
degenerate to very long linear searches for the Fedora policy. Convert to
using a flex_array instead so that we can increase the buckets
without such limitations.
This change does not alter the max hash buckets; that is left to a
separate follow-on change.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Move the NetLabel secattr MLS category import logic into
mls_import_netlbl_cat() where it belongs, and use the
mls_import_netlbl_cat() function in security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid().
Reported-by: Rickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Commit f01e1af445 ("selinux: don't pass in NULL avd to avc_has_perm_noaudit")
made this pointer reassignment unnecessary. Avd should continue to reference
the stack-based copy.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: tweaked subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c
drivers/net/usb/sr9800.c
drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c
include/linux/usb/usbnet.h
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
The TCP conflicts were overlapping changes. In 'net' we added a
READ_ONCE() to the socket cached RX route read, whilst in 'net-next'
Eric Dumazet touched the surrounding code dealing with how mini
sockets are handled.
With USB, it's a case of the same bug fix first going into net-next
and then I cherry picked it back into net.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Return a negative error value like the rest of the entries in this function.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: tweaked subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This reverts commit ca10b9e9a8.
No longer needed after commit eb8895debe
("tcp: tcp_make_synack() should use sock_wmalloc")
When under SYNFLOOD, we build lot of SYNACK and hit false sharing
because of multiple modifications done on sk_listener->sk_wmem_alloc
Since tcp_make_synack() uses sock_wmalloc(), there is no need
to call skb_set_owner_w() again, as this adds two atomic operations.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Convert the following where appropriate:
(1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry).
(2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry).
(3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry). This is actually more
complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to
d_can_lookup() instead. The difference is whether the directory in
question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with
a ->d_automount op.
In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being
NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects
d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to
use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer).
Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than
DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS
manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer. In such a
case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the
type of the lower dentry.
However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use
the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem.
There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled
DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE. Strictly, this was
intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes.
The following perl+coccinelle script was used:
use strict;
my @callers;
open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') ||
die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers";
@callers = <$fd>;
close($fd);
unless (@callers) {
print "No matches\n";
exit(0);
}
my @cocci = (
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_symlink(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_dir(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_reg(E)' );
my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci";
open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile;
print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci);
close($fd);
foreach my $file (@callers) {
chomp $file;
print "Processing ", $file, "\n";
system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 ||
die "spatch failed";
}
[AV: overlayfs parts skipped]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use d_is_positive() rather than testing dentry->d_inode in SELinux to get rid
of direct references to d_inode outside of the VFS.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull misc VFS updates from Al Viro:
"This cycle a lot of stuff sits on topical branches, so I'll be sending
more or less one pull request per branch.
This is the first pile; more to follow in a few. In this one are
several misc commits from early in the cycle (before I went for
separate branches), plus the rework of mntput/dput ordering on umount,
switching to use of fs_pin instead of convoluted games in
namespace_unlock()"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
switch the IO-triggering parts of umount to fs_pin
new fs_pin killing logics
allow attaching fs_pin to a group not associated with some superblock
get rid of the second argument of acct_kill()
take count and rcu_head out of fs_pin
dcache: let the dentry count go down to zero without taking d_lock
pull bumping refcount into ->kill()
kill pin_put()
mode_t whack-a-mole: chelsio
file->f_path.dentry is pinned down for as long as the file is open...
get rid of lustre_dump_dentry()
gut proc_register() a bit
kill d_validate()
ncpfs: get rid of d_validate() nonsense
selinuxfs: don't open-code d_genocide()
Here's the big char/misc driver update for 3.20-rc1.
Lots of little things in here, all described in the changelog. Nothing
major or unusual, except maybe the binder selinux stuff, which was all
acked by the proper selinux people and they thought it best to come
through this tree.
All of this has been in linux-next with no reported issues for a while.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'char-misc-3.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char / misc patches from Greg KH:
"Here's the big char/misc driver update for 3.20-rc1.
Lots of little things in here, all described in the changelog.
Nothing major or unusual, except maybe the binder selinux stuff, which
was all acked by the proper selinux people and they thought it best to
come through this tree.
All of this has been in linux-next with no reported issues for a while"
* tag 'char-misc-3.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (90 commits)
coresight: fix function etm_writel_cp14() parameter order
coresight-etm: remove check for unknown Kconfig macro
coresight: fixing CPU hwid lookup in device tree
coresight: remove the unnecessary function coresight_is_bit_set()
coresight: fix the debug AMBA bus name
coresight: remove the extra spaces
coresight: fix the link between orphan connection and newly added device
coresight: remove the unnecessary replicator property
coresight: fix the replicator subtype value
pdfdocs: Fix 'make pdfdocs' failure for 'uio-howto.tmpl'
mcb: Fix error path of mcb_pci_probe
virtio/console: verify device has config space
ti-st: clean up data types (fix harmless memory corruption)
mei: me: release hw from reset only during the reset flow
mei: mask interrupt set bit on clean reset bit
extcon: max77693: Constify struct regmap_config
extcon: adc-jack: Release IIO channel on driver remove
extcon: Remove duplicated include from extcon-class.c
Drivers: hv: vmbus: hv_process_timer_expiration() can be static
Drivers: hv: vmbus: serialize Offer and Rescind offer
...
If hashtab_create() returns a NULL pointer then we should return -ENOMEM
but instead the current code returns success.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
- add "pstore" and "debugfs" to list of in-core exceptions
- change fstype checks to boolean equation
- change from strncmp to strcmp for checking
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: tweaked the subject line prefix to "selinux"]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
While the filesystem labeling method is only printed at the KERN_DEBUG
level, this still appears in dmesg and on modern Linux distributions
that create a lot of tmpfs mounts for session handling, the dmesg can
easily be filled with a lot of "SELinux: initialized (dev X ..."
messages. This patch removes this notification for the normal case
but leaves the error message intact (displayed when mounting a
filesystem with an unknown labeling behavior).
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Remove the function avc_sidcmp() that is not used anywhere.
This was partially found by using a static code analysis program called cppcheck.
Signed-off-by: Rickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se>
[PM: rewrite the patch subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.
The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement
controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for
controlling what process can become the binder context manager
(binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process
to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction),
controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to
another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability
of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file).
These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3.
(Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver,
changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and
to add inline documentation for the hooks).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
SELinux, and integrity code.
The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures. Support for reading
keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: Remove security_ops extern
security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
VFS: refactor vfs_read()
ima: require signature based appraisal
integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
ima: added error messages to template-related functions
ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
ima: report policy load status
ima: use path names cache
...
Convert WARN_ONCE() to printk() in selinux_nlmsg_perm().
After conversion from audit_log() in commit e173fb26, WARN_ONCE() was
deemed too alarmist, so switch it to printk().
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: Changed to printk(WARNING) so we catch all of the different
invalid netlink messages. In Richard's defense, he brought this
point up earlier, but I didn't understand his point at the time.]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
sb_finish_set_opts() can race with inode_free_security()
when initializing inode security structures for inodes
created prior to initial policy load or by the filesystem
during ->mount(). This appears to have always been
a possible race, but commit 3dc91d4 ("SELinux: Fix possible
NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()")
made it more evident by immediately reusing the unioned
list/rcu element of the inode security structure for call_rcu()
upon an inode_free_security(). But the underlying issue
was already present before that commit as a possible use-after-free
of isec.
Shivnandan Kumar reported the list corruption and proposed
a patch to split the list and rcu elements out of the union
as separate fields of the inode_security_struct so that setting
the rcu element would not affect the list element. However,
this would merely hide the issue and not truly fix the code.
This patch instead moves up the deletion of the list entry
prior to dropping the sbsec->isec_lock initially. Then,
if the inode is dropped subsequently, there will be no further
references to the isec.
Reported-by: Shivnandan Kumar <shivnandan.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris.
Mostly ima, selinux, smack and key handling updates.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
integrity: do zero padding of the key id
KEYS: output last portion of fingerprint in /proc/keys
KEYS: strip 'id:' from ca_keyid
KEYS: use swapped SKID for performing partial matching
KEYS: Restore partial ID matching functionality for asymmetric keys
X.509: If available, use the raw subjKeyId to form the key description
KEYS: handle error code encoded in pointer
selinux: normalize audit log formatting
selinux: cleanup error reporting in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
KEYS: Check hex2bin()'s return when generating an asymmetric key ID
ima: detect violations for mmaped files
ima: fix race condition on ima_rdwr_violation_check and process_measurement
ima: added ima_policy_flag variable
ima: return an error code from ima_add_boot_aggregate()
ima: provide 'ima_appraise=log' kernel option
ima: move keyring initialization to ima_init()
PKCS#7: Handle PKCS#7 messages that contain no X.509 certs
PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys
KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling
...
Restructure to keyword=value pairs without spaces. Drop superfluous words in
text. Make invalid_context a keyword. Change result= keyword to seresult=.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[Minor rewrite to the patch subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Convert audit_log() call to WARN_ONCE().
Rename "type=" to nlmsg_type=" to avoid confusion with the audit record
type.
Added "protocol=" to help track down which protocol (NETLINK_AUDIT?) was used
within the netlink protocol family.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[Rewrote the patch subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
While SELinux largely ignores namespaces, for good reason, there are
some places where it needs to at least be aware of namespaces in order
to function correctly. Network namespaces are one example. Basic
awareness of network namespaces are necessary in order to match a
network interface's index number to an actual network device.
This patch corrects a problem with network interfaces added to a
non-init namespace, and can be reproduced with the following commands:
[NOTE: the NetLabel configuration is here only to active the dynamic
networking controls ]
# netlabelctl unlbl add default address:0.0.0.0/0 \
label:system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0
# netlabelctl unlbl add default address:::/0 \
label:system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0
# netlabelctl cipsov4 add pass doi:100 tags:1
# netlabelctl map add domain:lspp_test_netlabel_t \
protocol:cipsov4,100
# ip link add type veth
# ip netns add myns
# ip link set veth1 netns myns
# ip a add dev veth0 10.250.13.100/24
# ip netns exec myns ip a add dev veth1 10.250.13.101/24
# ip l set veth0 up
# ip netns exec myns ip l set veth1 up
# ping -c 1 10.250.13.101
# ip netns exec myns ping -c 1 10.250.13.100
Reported-by: Jiri Jaburek <jjaburek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and
__f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the
callers.
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Push ipv4 and ipv6 nf hooks into single array and register/unregister
them via single call.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
A previous commit c0828e5048 ("selinux:
process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in
selinux_ip_postroute()") mistakenly left out a 'break' from a switch
statement which caused problems with IPv6 traffic.
Thanks to Florian Westphal for reporting and debugging the issue.
Reported-by: Florian Westphal <fwestpha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
If the callee SID is bounded by the caller SID, then allowing
the transition to occur poses no risk of privilege escalation and we can
therefore safely allow the transition to occur. Add this exemption
for both the case where a transition was explicitly requested by the
application and the case where an automatic transition is defined in
policy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull SElinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small patches to fix a couple of build warnings in SELinux and
NetLabel. The patches are obvious enough that I don't think any
additional explanation is necessary, but it basically boils down to
the usual: I was stupid, and these patches fix some of the stupid.
Both patches were posted earlier this week to the SELinux list, and
that is where they sat as I didn't think there were noteworthy enough
to go upstream at this point in time, but DaveM would rather see them
upstream now so who am I to argue. As the patches are both very
small"
* 'stable-3.17' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: remove unused variabled in the netport, netnode, and netif caches
netlabel: fix the netlbl_catmap_setlong() dummy function
This patch removes the unused return code variable in the netport,
netnode, and netif initialization functions.
Reported-by: fengguang.wu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Historically the NetLabel LSM secattr catmap functions and data
structures have had very long names which makes a mess of the NetLabel
code and anyone who uses NetLabel. This patch renames the catmap
functions and structures from "*_secattr_catmap_*" to just "*_catmap_*"
which improves things greatly.
There are no substantial code or logic changes in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The NetLabel secattr catmap functions, and the SELinux import/export
glue routines, were broken in many horrible ways and the SELinux glue
code fiddled with the NetLabel catmap structures in ways that we
probably shouldn't allow. At some point this "worked", but that was
likely due to a bit of dumb luck and sub-par testing (both inflicted
by yours truly). This patch corrects these problems by basically
gutting the code in favor of something less obtuse and restoring the
NetLabel abstractions in the SELinux catmap glue code.
Everything is working now, and if it decides to break itself in the
future this code will be much easier to debug than the code it
replaces.
One noteworthy side effect of the changes is that it is no longer
necessary to allocate a NetLabel catmap before calling one of the
NetLabel APIs to set a bit in the catmap. NetLabel will automatically
allocate the catmap nodes when needed, resulting in less allocations
when the lowest bit is greater than 255 and less code in the LSMs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christian Evans <frodox@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This reverts commit 4da6daf4d3.
Unfortunately, the commit in question caused problems with Bluetooth
devices, specifically it caused them to get caught in the newly
created BUG_ON() check. The AF_ALG problem still exists, but will be
addressed in a future patch.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
The sock_graft() hook has special handling for AF_INET, AF_INET, and
AF_UNIX sockets as those address families have special hooks which
label the sock before it is attached its associated socket.
Unfortunately, the sock_graft() hook was missing a default approach
to labeling sockets which meant that any other address family which
made use of connections or the accept() syscall would find the
returned socket to be in an "unlabeled" state. This was recently
demonstrated by the kcrypto/AF_ALG subsystem and the newly released
cryptsetup package (cryptsetup v1.6.5 and later).
This patch preserves the special handling in selinux_sock_graft(),
but adds a default behavior - setting the sock's label equal to the
associated socket - which resolves the problem with AF_ALG and
presumably any other address family which makes use of accept().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
When flushing the AVC, such as during a policy load, the various
network caches are also flushed, with each making a call to
synchronize_net() which has shown to be expensive in some cases.
This patch consolidates the network cache flushes into a single AVC
callback which only calls synchronize_net() once for each AVC cache
flush.
Reported-by: Jaejyn Shin <flagon22bass@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
With the introduction of fair queued rwlock, recursive read_lock()
may hang the offending process if there is a write_lock() somewhere
in between.
With recursive read_lock checking enabled, the following error was
reported:
=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.16.0-rc1 #2 Tainted: G E
---------------------------------------------
load_policy/708 is trying to acquire lock:
(policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b32a>]
security_genfs_sid+0x3a/0x170
but task is already holding lock:
(policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b48c>]
security_fs_use+0x2c/0x110
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(policy_rwlock);
lock(policy_rwlock);
This patch fixes the occurrence of recursive read_lock() of
policy_rwlock by adding a helper function __security_genfs_sid()
which requires caller to take the lock before calling it. The
security_fs_use() was then modified to call the new helper function.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
The cond_read_node() should free the given node on error path as it's
not linked to p->cond_list yet. This is done via cond_node_destroy()
but it's not called when next_entry() fails before the expr loop.
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
The node->cur_state and len can be read in a single call of next_entry().
And setting len before reading is a dead write so can be eliminated.
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
(Minor tweak to the length parameter in the call to next_entry())
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
To increase compiler portability there is <linux/compiler.h> which
provides convenience macros for various gcc constructs. Eg: __packed
for __attribute__((packed)).
This patch is part of a large task I've taken to clean the gcc
specific attributes and use the the macros instead.
Signed-off-by: Gideon Israel Dsouza <gidisrael@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
There're some code duplication for reading a string value during
policydb_read(). Add str_read() helper to fix it.
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
ARRAY_SIZE is more concise to use when the size of an array is divided
by the size of its type or the size of its first element.
The Coccinelle semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
// <smpl>
@@
type T;
T[] E;
@@
- (sizeof(E)/sizeof(E[...]))
+ ARRAY_SIZE(E)
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Himangi Saraogi <himangi774@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Seccomp BPF filters can now be JIT'd, from Alexei Starovoitov.
2) Multiqueue support in xen-netback and xen-netfront, from Andrew J
Benniston.
3) Allow tweaking of aggregation settings in cdc_ncm driver, from Bjørn
Mork.
4) BPF now has a "random" opcode, from Chema Gonzalez.
5) Add more BPF documentation and improve test framework, from Daniel
Borkmann.
6) Support TCP fastopen over ipv6, from Daniel Lee.
7) Add software TSO helper functions and use them to support software
TSO in mvneta and mv643xx_eth drivers. From Ezequiel Garcia.
8) Support software TSO in fec driver too, from Nimrod Andy.
9) Add Broadcom SYSTEMPORT driver, from Florian Fainelli.
10) Handle broadcasts more gracefully over macvlan when there are large
numbers of interfaces configured, from Herbert Xu.
11) Allow more control over fwmark used for non-socket based responses,
from Lorenzo Colitti.
12) Do TCP congestion window limiting based upon measurements, from Neal
Cardwell.
13) Support busy polling in SCTP, from Neal Horman.
14) Allow RSS key to be configured via ethtool, from Venkata Duvvuru.
15) Bridge promisc mode handling improvements from Vlad Yasevich.
16) Don't use inetpeer entries to implement ID generation any more, it
performs poorly, from Eric Dumazet.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1522 commits)
rtnetlink: fix userspace API breakage for iproute2 < v3.9.0
tcp: fixing TLP's FIN recovery
net: fec: Add software TSO support
net: fec: Add Scatter/gather support
net: fec: Increase buffer descriptor entry number
net: fec: Factorize feature setting
net: fec: Enable IP header hardware checksum
net: fec: Factorize the .xmit transmit function
bridge: fix compile error when compiling without IPv6 support
bridge: fix smatch warning / potential null pointer dereference
via-rhine: fix full-duplex with autoneg disable
bnx2x: Enlarge the dorq threshold for VFs
bnx2x: Check for UNDI in uncommon branch
bnx2x: Fix 1G-baseT link
bnx2x: Fix link for KR with swapped polarity lane
sctp: Fix sk_ack_backlog wrap-around problem
net/core: Add VF link state control policy
net/fsl: xgmac_mdio is dependent on OF_MDIO
net/fsl: Make xgmac_mdio read error message useful
net_sched: drr: warn when qdisc is not work conserving
...
Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
"This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to
yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in
linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi"
* 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy
selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy
selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
selinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.
Warning in scanf string typing
Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd
Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3
security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table
Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check
Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute
SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr
bugfix patch for SMACK
Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface
Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme()
Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount'
smack: fix key permission verification
KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h
After silencing the sleeping warning in mls_convert_context() I started
seeing similar traces from hashtab_insert. Do a cond_resched there too.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the
security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by
returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when
exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem. This patch makes things
a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid
case.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
After silencing the sleeping warning in mls_convert_context() I started
seeing similar traces from hashtab_insert. Do a cond_resched there too.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the
security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by
returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when
exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem. This patch makes things
a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid
case.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_sgdma.c
net/netlink/af_netlink.c
net/sched/cls_api.c
net/sched/sch_api.c
The netlink conflict dealt with moving to netlink_capable() and
netlink_ns_capable() in the 'net' tree vs. supporting 'tc' operations
in non-init namespaces. These were simple transformations from
netlink_capable to netlink_ns_capable.
The Altera driver conflict was simply code removal overlapping some
void pointer cast cleanups in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Register a netlink per-protocol bind fuction for audit to check userspace
process capabilities before allowing a multicast group connection.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
File-private locks have been merged into Linux for v3.15, and *now*
people are commenting that the name and macro definitions for the new
file-private locks suck.
...and I can't even disagree. The names and command macros do suck.
We're going to have to live with these for a long time, so it's
important that we be happy with the names before we're stuck with them.
The consensus on the lists so far is that they should be rechristened as
"open file description locks".
The name isn't a big deal for the kernel, but the command macros are not
visually distinct enough from the traditional POSIX lock macros. The
glibc and documentation folks are recommending that we change them to
look like F_OFD_{GETLK|SETLK|SETLKW}. That lessens the chance that a
programmer will typo one of the commands wrong, and also makes it easier
to spot this difference when reading code.
This patch makes the following changes that I think are necessary before
v3.15 ships:
1) rename the command macros to their new names. These end up in the uapi
headers and so are part of the external-facing API. It turns out that
glibc doesn't actually use the fcntl.h uapi header, but it's hard to
be sure that something else won't. Changing it now is safest.
2) make the the /proc/locks output display these as type "OFDLCK"
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Frank Filz <ffilzlnx@mindspring.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Pull file locking updates from Jeff Layton:
"Highlights:
- maintainership change for fs/locks.c. Willy's not interested in
maintaining it these days, and is OK with Bruce and I taking it.
- fix for open vs setlease race that Al ID'ed
- cleanup and consolidation of file locking code
- eliminate unneeded BUG() call
- merge of file-private lock implementation"
* 'locks-3.15' of git://git.samba.org/jlayton/linux:
locks: make locks_mandatory_area check for file-private locks
locks: fix locks_mandatory_locked to respect file-private locks
locks: require that flock->l_pid be set to 0 for file-private locks
locks: add new fcntl cmd values for handling file private locks
locks: skip deadlock detection on FL_FILE_PVT locks
locks: pass the cmd value to fcntl_getlk/getlk64
locks: report l_pid as -1 for FL_FILE_PVT locks
locks: make /proc/locks show IS_FILE_PVT locks as type "FLPVT"
locks: rename locks_remove_flock to locks_remove_file
locks: consolidate checks for compatible filp->f_mode values in setlk handlers
locks: fix posix lock range overflow handling
locks: eliminate BUG() call when there's an unexpected lock on file close
locks: add __acquires and __releases annotations to locks_start and locks_stop
locks: remove "inline" qualifier from fl_link manipulation functions
locks: clean up comment typo
locks: close potential race between setlease and open
MAINTAINERS: update entry for fs/locks.c
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Apart from reordering the SELinux mmap code to ensure DAC is called
before MAC, these are minor maintenance updates"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded
selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controls
selinux: fix the output of ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl for SELinux
evm: enable key retention service automatically
ima: skip memory allocation for empty files
evm: EVM does not use MD5
ima: return d_name.name if d_path fails
integrity: fix checkpatch errors
ima: fix erroneous removal of security.ima xattr
security: integrity: Use a more current logging style
MAINTAINERS: email updates and other misc. changes
ima: reduce memory usage when a template containing the n field is used
ima: restore the original behavior for sending data with ima template
Integrity: Pass commname via get_task_comm()
fs: move i_readcount
ima: use static const char array definitions
security: have cap_dentry_init_security return error
ima: new helper: file_inode(file)
kernel: Mark function as static in kernel/seccomp.c
capability: Use current logging styles
...
Due to some unfortunate history, POSIX locks have very strange and
unhelpful semantics. The thing that usually catches people by surprise
is that they are dropped whenever the process closes any file descriptor
associated with the inode.
This is extremely problematic for people developing file servers that
need to implement byte-range locks. Developers often need a "lock
management" facility to ensure that file descriptors are not closed
until all of the locks associated with the inode are finished.
Additionally, "classic" POSIX locks are owned by the process. Locks
taken between threads within the same process won't conflict with one
another, which renders them useless for synchronization between threads.
This patchset adds a new type of lock that attempts to address these
issues. These locks conflict with classic POSIX read/write locks, but
have semantics that are more like BSD locks with respect to inheritance
and behavior on close.
This is implemented primarily by changing how fl_owner field is set for
these locks. Instead of having them owned by the files_struct of the
process, they are instead owned by the filp on which they were acquired.
Thus, they are inherited across fork() and are only released when the
last reference to a filp is put.
These new semantics prevent them from being merged with classic POSIX
locks, even if they are acquired by the same process. These locks will
also conflict with classic POSIX locks even if they are acquired by
the same process or on the same file descriptor.
The new locks are managed using a new set of cmd values to the fcntl()
syscall. The initial implementation of this converts these values to
"classic" cmd values at a fairly high level, and the details are not
exposed to the underlying filesystem. We may eventually want to push
this handing out to the lower filesystem code but for now I don't
see any need for it.
Also, note that with this implementation the new cmd values are only
available via fcntl64() on 32-bit arches. There's little need to
add support for legacy apps on a new interface like this.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/micrel-ks8851.txt
net/core/netpoll.c
The net/core/netpoll.c conflict is a bug fix in 'net' happening
to code which is completely removed in 'net-next'.
In micrel-ks8851.txt we simply have overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
the problem below:
"If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy
load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes
in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:
/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
if (opt_dentry) {
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
isec->sclass,
&sid);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
isec->sid = sid;
}
}
Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look
for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the
inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."
On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
/proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
accessed early in the boot), for example:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the
DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches
as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the
memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by
the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).
Example:
# cat mmap_test.c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int rc;
void *mem;
mem = mmap(0x0, 4096,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
if (mem == MAP_FAILED)
return errno;
printf("mem = %p\n", mem);
munmap(mem, 4096);
return 0;
}
# gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c
# ./mmap_test
mem = (nil)
# ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero
type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc: denied { mmap_zero }
for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test"
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=memprotect
This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a
user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as
the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm
parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the
permissions mask flags used in key->perm.
Whilst we're at it:
(1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions
with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h.
(2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit
it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related
directly to that.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)
Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.
CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Conflicts:
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/recv.c
drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/pcie.c
net/ipv6/sit.c
The SIT driver conflict consists of a bug fix being done by hand
in 'net' (missing u64_stats_init()) whilst in 'net-next' a helper
was created (netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats()) which takes care of this.
The two wireless conflicts were overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
the problem below:
"If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy
load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes
in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:
/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
if (opt_dentry) {
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
isec->sclass,
&sid);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
isec->sid = sid;
}
}
Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look
for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the
inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."
On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
/proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
accessed early in the boot), for example:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the
DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches
as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the
memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by
the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).
Example:
# cat mmap_test.c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int rc;
void *mem;
mem = mmap(0x0, 4096,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
if (mem == MAP_FAILED)
return errno;
printf("mem = %p\n", mem);
munmap(mem, 4096);
return 0;
}
# gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c
# ./mmap_test
mem = (nil)
# ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero
type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc: denied { mmap_zero }
for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test"
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=memprotect
This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a
user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as
the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
When writing policy via /sys/fs/selinux/policy I wrote the type and class
of filename trans rules in CPU endian instead of little endian. On
x86_64 this works just fine, but it means that on big endian arch's like
ppc64 and s390 userspace reads the policy and converts it from
le32_to_cpu. So the values are all screwed up. Write the values in le
format like it should have been to start.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Inserting a entry into flowcache, or flushing flowcache should be based
on per net scope. The reason to do so is flushing operation from fat
netns crammed with flow entries will also making the slim netns with only
a few flow cache entries go away in original implementation.
Since flowcache is tightly coupled with IPsec, so it would be easier to
put flow cache global parameters into xfrm namespace part. And one last
thing needs to do is bumping flow cache genid, and flush flow cache should
also be made in per net style.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because
strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be
used.
Signed-off-by: Jingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'v3.13' into stable-3.14
Linux 3.13
Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.c
Trivial merge issue in selinux_inet_conn_request() likely due to me
including patches that I sent to the stable folks in my next tree
resulting in the patch hitting twice (I think). Thankfully it was an
easy fix this time, but regardless, lesson learned, I will not do that
again.
Pull audit update from Eric Paris:
"Again we stayed pretty well contained inside the audit system.
Venturing out was fixing a couple of function prototypes which were
inconsistent (didn't hurt anything, but we used the same value as an
int, uint, u32, and I think even a long in a couple of places).
We also made a couple of minor changes to when a couple of LSMs called
the audit system. We hoped to add aarch64 audit support this go
round, but it wasn't ready.
I'm disappearing on vacation on Thursday. I should have internet
access, but it'll be spotty. If anything goes wrong please be sure to
cc rgb@redhat.com. He'll make fixing things his top priority"
* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (50 commits)
audit: whitespace fix in kernel-parameters.txt
audit: fix location of __net_initdata for audit_net_ops
audit: remove pr_info for every network namespace
audit: Modify a set of system calls in audit class definitions
audit: Convert int limit uses to u32
audit: Use more current logging style
audit: Use hex_byte_pack_upper
audit: correct a type mismatch in audit_syscall_exit()
audit: reorder AUDIT_TTY_SET arguments
audit: rework AUDIT_TTY_SET to only grab spin_lock once
audit: remove needless switch in AUDIT_SET
audit: use define's for audit version
audit: documentation of audit= kernel parameter
audit: wait_for_auditd rework for readability
audit: update MAINTAINERS
audit: log task info on feature change
audit: fix incorrect set of audit_sock
audit: print error message when fail to create audit socket
audit: fix dangling keywords in audit_log_set_loginuid() output
audit: log on errors from filter user rules
...
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Merge tag 'v3.13' into next
Linux 3.13
Minor fixup needed in selinux_inet_conn_request()
Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.c
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"Changes for this kernel include maintenance updates for Smack, SELinux
(and several networking fixes), IMA and TPM"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
tpm/tpm-sysfs: active_show() can be static
tpm: tpm_tis: Fix compile problems with CONFIG_PM_SLEEP/CONFIG_PNP
tpm: Make tpm-dev allocate a per-file structure
tpm: Use the ops structure instead of a copy in tpm_vendor_specific
tpm: Create a tpm_class_ops structure and use it in the drivers
tpm: Pull all driver sysfs code into tpm-sysfs.c
tpm: Move sysfs functions from tpm-interface to tpm-sysfs
tpm: Pull everything related to /dev/tpmX into tpm-dev.c
char: tpm: nuvoton: remove unused variable
tpm: MAINTAINERS: Cleanup TPM Maintainers file
tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel: fix coccinelle warnings
tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm: fix unreachable code warning (smatch warning)
tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Check return code of get_burstcount
tpm/tpm_ppi: Check return value of acpi_get_name
tpm/tpm_ppi: Do not compare strcmp(a,b) == -1
ima: remove unneeded size_limit argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common()
ima: update IMA-templates.txt documentation
ima: pass HASH_ALGO__LAST as hash algo in ima_eventdigest_init()
ima: change the default hash algorithm to SHA1 in ima_eventdigest_ng_init()
...
Two of the conditions in selinux_audit_rule_match() should never happen and
the third indicates a race that should be retried. Remove the calls to
audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with the errors in the
caller, logging only once if the condition is met. Calling audit_log_start()
in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more complicated in the
calling tree (audit_filter_user()).
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>] [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
Call Trace:
security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
__inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
inode_permission+0x18/0x50
link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
RIP selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
CR2: 0000000000000020
Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.
in selinux_inode_permission():
isec = inode->i_security;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files. I was not able to recreate this via normal files. But I'm not
sure they are safe. It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.
What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().
The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct. Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here. (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).
Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand. A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback. But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work. For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Hello.
I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 .
[ 681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)
Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing
ebitmap_set_bit() call.
----------
>>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not
check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks
memory if hashtab_insert() returns error.
unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8):
comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5 W...kkk.
backtrace:
[<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360
[<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70
[<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500
[<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750
[<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0
[<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will
show below message and the boot sequence freezes.
systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().
And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().
And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull SELinux fixes from James Morris.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in selinux_ip_postroute()
selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packets
selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()
selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()
selinux: fix possible memory leak
This reverts commit 102aefdda4.
Tom London reports that it causes sync() to hang on Fedora rawhide:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1033965
and Josh Boyer bisected it down to this commit. Reverting the commit in
the rawhide kernel fixes the problem.
Eric Paris root-caused it to incorrect subtype matching in that commit
breaking fuse, and has a tentative patch, but by now we're better off
retrying this in 3.14 rather than playing with it any more.
Reported-by: Tom London <selinux@gmail.com>
Bisected-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"
This reverts commit 102aefdda4.
Explanation from Eric Paris:
SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's
xattrs or not. In current policy we have a specification that
fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use
xattrs. This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs
filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should
use xattrs. If both fuse and the particular filesystem in
question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount
command, they will deadlock.
I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a
revert is still the correct solution. The reason I believe
that is because the code still does not work. The s_subtype is
not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on
the ".gluster" portion of the rule. So we cannot match on the
rule in question. The code is useless.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.
See the inline comments for more explanation.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.
Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
We don't need to inspect the packet to determine if the packet is an
IPv4 packet arriving on an IPv6 socket when we can query the
request_sock directly.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid() we leverage a cached NetLabel
secattr whenever possible. However, we never check to ensure that
the desired SID matches the cached NetLabel secattr. This patch
checks the SID against the secattr before use and only uses the
cached secattr when the SID values match.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.
See the inline comments for more explanation.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.
Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Free 'ctx_str' when necessary.
Signed-off-by: Geyslan G. Bem <geyslan@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this patchset, we finally get an SELinux update, with Paul Moore
taking over as maintainer of that code.
Also a significant update for the Keys subsystem, as well as
maintenance updates to Smack, IMA, TPM, and Apparmor"
and since I wanted to know more about the updates to key handling,
here's the explanation from David Howells on that:
"Okay. There are a number of separate bits. I'll go over the big bits
and the odd important other bit, most of the smaller bits are just
fixes and cleanups. If you want the small bits accounting for, I can
do that too.
(1) Keyring capacity expansion.
KEYS: Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for key access
KEYS: Introduce a search context structure
KEYS: Search for auth-key by name rather than target key ID
Add a generic associative array implementation.
KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring
Several of the patches are providing an expansion of the capacity of a
keyring. Currently, the maximum size of a keyring payload is one page.
Subtract a small header and then divide up into pointers, that only gives
you ~500 pointers on an x86_64 box. However, since the NFS idmapper uses
a keyring to store ID mapping data, that has proven to be insufficient to
the cause.
Whatever data structure I use to handle the keyring payload, it can only
store pointers to keys, not the keys themselves because several keyrings
may point to a single key. This precludes inserting, say, and rb_node
struct into the key struct for this purpose.
I could make an rbtree of records such that each record has an rb_node
and a key pointer, but that would use four words of space per key stored
in the keyring. It would, however, be able to use much existing code.
I selected instead a non-rebalancing radix-tree type approach as that
could have a better space-used/key-pointer ratio. I could have used the
radix tree implementation that we already have and insert keys into it by
their serial numbers, but that means any sort of search must iterate over
the whole radix tree. Further, its nodes are a bit on the capacious side
for what I want - especially given that key serial numbers are randomly
allocated, thus leaving a lot of empty space in the tree.
So what I have is an associative array that internally is a radix-tree
with 16 pointers per node where the index key is constructed from the key
type pointer and the key description. This means that an exact lookup by
type+description is very fast as this tells us how to navigate directly to
the target key.
I made the data structure general in lib/assoc_array.c as far as it is
concerned, its index key is just a sequence of bits that leads to a
pointer. It's possible that someone else will be able to make use of it
also. FS-Cache might, for example.
(2) Mark keys as 'trusted' and keyrings as 'trusted only'.
KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key
KEYS: Make the system 'trusted' keyring viewable by userspace
KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag
KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing
These patches allow keys carrying asymmetric public keys to be marked as
being 'trusted' and allow keyrings to be marked as only permitting the
addition or linkage of trusted keys.
Keys loaded from hardware during kernel boot or compiled into the kernel
during build are marked as being trusted automatically. New keys can be
loaded at runtime with add_key(). They are checked against the system
keyring contents and if their signatures can be validated with keys that
are already marked trusted, then they are marked trusted also and can
thus be added into the master keyring.
Patches from Mimi Zohar make this usable with the IMA keyrings also.
(3) Remove the date checks on the key used to validate a module signature.
X.509: Remove certificate date checks
It's not reasonable to reject a signature just because the key that it was
generated with is no longer valid datewise - especially if the kernel
hasn't yet managed to set the system clock when the first module is
loaded - so just remove those checks.
(4) Make it simpler to deal with additional X.509 being loaded into the kernel.
KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring
KEYS: Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509 certs better to deduplicate
The builder of the kernel now just places files with the extension ".x509"
into the kernel source or build trees and they're concatenated by the
kernel build and stuffed into the appropriate section.
(5) Add support for userspace kerberos to use keyrings.
KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches
KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfs
Fedora went to, by default, storing kerberos tickets and tokens in tmpfs.
We looked at storing it in keyrings instead as that confers certain
advantages such as tickets being automatically deleted after a certain
amount of time and the ability for the kernel to get at these tokens more
easily.
To make this work, two things were needed:
(a) A way for the tickets to persist beyond the lifetime of all a user's
sessions so that cron-driven processes can still use them.
The problem is that a user's session keyrings are deleted when the
session that spawned them logs out and the user's user keyring is
deleted when the UID is deleted (typically when the last log out
happens), so neither of these places is suitable.
I've added a system keyring into which a 'persistent' keyring is
created for each UID on request. Each time a user requests their
persistent keyring, the expiry time on it is set anew. If the user
doesn't ask for it for, say, three days, the keyring is automatically
expired and garbage collected using the existing gc. All the kerberos
tokens it held are then also gc'd.
(b) A key type that can hold really big tickets (up to 1MB in size).
The problem is that Active Directory can return huge tickets with lots
of auxiliary data attached. We don't, however, want to eat up huge
tracts of unswappable kernel space for this, so if the ticket is
greater than a certain size, we create a swappable shmem file and dump
the contents in there and just live with the fact we then have an
inode and a dentry overhead. If the ticket is smaller than that, we
slap it in a kmalloc()'d buffer"
* 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (121 commits)
KEYS: Fix keyring content gc scanner
KEYS: Fix error handling in big_key instantiation
KEYS: Fix UID check in keyctl_get_persistent()
KEYS: The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB
ima: define '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring
ima: extend the measurement list to include the file signature
kernel/system_certificate.S: use real contents instead of macro GLOBAL()
KEYS: fix error return code in big_key_instantiate()
KEYS: Fix keyring quota misaccounting on key replacement and unlink
KEYS: Fix a race between negating a key and reading the error set
KEYS: Make BIG_KEYS boolean
apparmor: remove the "task" arg from may_change_ptraced_domain()
apparmor: remove parent task info from audit logging
apparmor: remove tsk field from the apparmor_audit_struct
apparmor: fix capability to not use the current task, during reporting
Smack: Ptrace access check mode
ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr
ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms
ima: define kernel parameter 'ima_template=' to change configured default
ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template
...
Pull audit updates from Eric Paris:
"Nothing amazing. Formatting, small bug fixes, couple of fixes where
we didn't get records due to some old VFS changes, and a change to how
we collect execve info..."
Fixed conflict in fs/exec.c as per Eric and linux-next.
* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (28 commits)
audit: fix type of sessionid in audit_set_loginuid()
audit: call audit_bprm() only once to add AUDIT_EXECVE information
audit: move audit_aux_data_execve contents into audit_context union
audit: remove unused envc member of audit_aux_data_execve
audit: Kill the unused struct audit_aux_data_capset
audit: do not reject all AUDIT_INODE filter types
audit: suppress stock memalloc failure warnings since already managed
audit: log the audit_names record type
audit: add child record before the create to handle case where create fails
audit: use given values in tty_audit enable api
audit: use nlmsg_len() to get message payload length
audit: use memset instead of trying to initialize field by field
audit: fix info leak in AUDIT_GET requests
audit: update AUDIT_INODE filter rule to comparator function
audit: audit feature to set loginuid immutable
audit: audit feature to only allow unsetting the loginuid
audit: allow unsetting the loginuid (with priv)
audit: remove CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
audit: loginuid functions coding style
selinux: apply selinux checks on new audit message types
...
Dynamically allocate a couple of the larger stack variables in order to
reduce the stack footprint below 1024. gcc-4.8
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function 'security_load_policy':
security/selinux/ss/services.c:1964:1: warning: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
}
Also silence a couple of checkpatch warnings at the same time.
WARNING: sizeof policydb should be sizeof(policydb)
+ memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
WARNING: sizeof policydb should be sizeof(policydb)
+ memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Update the policy version (POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) to allow
holding of policy source info for constraints.
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
We use the read check to get the feature set (like AUDIT_GET) and the
write check to set the features (like AUDIT_SET).
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
include/net/dst.h
Trivial merge conflicts, both were overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pass the hook ops to the hookfn to allow for generic hook
functions. This change is required by nf_tables.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
.. so get rid of it. The only indirect users were all the
avc_has_perm() callers which just expanded to have a zero flags
argument.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Every single user passes in '0'. I think we had non-zero users back in
some stone age when selinux_inode_permission() was implemented in terms
of inode_has_perm(), but that complicated case got split up into a
totally separate code-path so that we could optimize the much simpler
special cases.
See commit 2e33405785 ("SELinux: delay initialization of audit data in
selinux_inode_permission") for example.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- Move sysctl_local_ports from a global variable into struct netns_ipv4.
- Modify inet_get_local_port_range to take a struct net, and update all
of the callers.
- Move the initialization of sysctl_local_ports into
sysctl_net_ipv4.c:ipv4_sysctl_init_net from inet_connection_sock.c
v2:
- Ensure indentation used tabs
- Fixed ip.h so it applies cleanly to todays net-next
v3:
- Compile fixes of strange callers of inet_get_local_port_range.
This patch now successfully passes an allmodconfig build.
Removed manual inlining of inet_get_local_port_range in ipv4_local_port_range
Originally-by: Samya <samya@twitter.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.c
Pull Eric's existing SELinux tree as there are a number of patches in
there that are not yet upstream. There was some minor fixup needed to
resolve a conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_set_mnt_opts()
between the labeled NFS patches and Eric's security_fs_use()
simplification patch.
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Nothing major for this kernel, just maintenance updates"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (21 commits)
apparmor: add the ability to report a sha1 hash of loaded policy
apparmor: export set of capabilities supported by the apparmor module
apparmor: add the profile introspection file to interface
apparmor: add an optional profile attachment string for profiles
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces
apparmor: allow setting any profile into the unconfined state
apparmor: make free_profile available outside of policy.c
apparmor: rework namespace free path
apparmor: update how unconfined is handled
apparmor: change how profile replacement update is done
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once
apparmor: add a features/policy dir to interface
apparmor: enable users to query whether apparmor is enabled
apparmor: remove minimum size check for vmalloc()
Smack: parse multiple rules per write to load2, up to PAGE_SIZE-1 bytes
Smack: network label match fix
security: smack: add a hash table to quicken smk_find_entry()
security: smack: fix memleak in smk_write_rules_list()
xattr: Constify ->name member of "struct xattr".
...
This reverts commit 308ab70c46.
It breaks my FC6 test box. /dev/pts is not mounted. dmesg says
SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different security settings
for (dev devpts, type devpts)
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Not considering sub filesystem has the following limitation. Support
for SELinux in FUSE is dependent on the particular userspace
filesystem, which is identified by the subtype. For e.g, GlusterFS,
a FUSE based filesystem supports SELinux (by mounting and processing
FUSE requests in different threads, avoiding the mount time
deadlock), whereas other FUSE based filesystems (identified by a
different subtype) have the mount time deadlock.
By considering the subtype of the filesytem in the SELinux policies,
allows us to specify a filesystem subtype, in the following way:
fs_use_xattr fuse.glusterfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0);
This way not all FUSE filesystems are put in the same bucket and
subjected to the limitations of the other subtypes.
Signed-off-by: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Current net name space has only one genid for both IPv4 and IPv6, it has below
drawbacks:
- Add/delete an IPv4 address will invalidate all IPv6 routing table entries.
- Insert/remove XFRM policy will also invalidate both IPv4/IPv6 routing table
entries even when the policy is only applied for one address family.
Thus, this patch attempt to split one genid for two to cater for IPv4 and IPv6
separately in a fine granularity.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no
SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables. Some systems
prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system
should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules
were maliciously flushed.
Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats
SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules and
treats peer labeling as enabled, even if there is no Netlabel or
labeled IPSEC configuration.
Includes definition of "redhat1" SELinux policy capability, which
exists in the SELinux userpace library, to keep ordering correct.
The SELinux userpace portion of this was merged last year, but this kernel
change fell on the floor.
Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
When the BUG() macro is disabled at compile time it can cause some
problems in the SELinux netnode code: invalid return codes and
uninitialized variables. This patch fixes this by making sure we take
some corrective action after the BUG() macro.
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Use a helper to determine if a superblock should have the seclabel flag
rather than doing it in the function. I'm going to use this in the
security server as well.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Rather than passing pointers to memory locations, strings, and other
stuff just give up on the separation and give security_fs_use the
superblock. It just makes the code easier to read (even if not easier to
reuse on some other OS)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Instead of having special code around the 'non-mount' seclabel mount option
just handle it like the mount options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We only have 6 options, so char is good enough, but use a short as that
packs nicely. This shrinks the superblock_security_struct just a little
bit.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Just to make it clear that we have mount time options and flags,
separate them. Since I decided to move the non-mount options above
above 0x10, we need a short instead of a char. (x86 padding says
this takes up no additional space as we have a 3byte whole in the
structure)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Currently we set the initialize and seclabel flag in one place. Do some
unrelated printk then we unset the seclabel flag. Eww. Instead do the flag
twiddling in one place in the code not seperated by unrelated printk. Also
don't set and unset the seclabel flag. Only set it if we need to.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We had this random hard coded value of '8' in the code (I put it there)
for the number of bits to check for mount options. This is stupid. Instead
use the #define we already have which tells us the number of mount
options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We check if the fsname is proc and if so set the proc superblock security
struct flag. We then check if the flag is set and use the string 'proc'
for the fsname instead of just using the fsname. What's the point? It's
always proc... Get rid of the useless conditional.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The /sys/fs/selinux/policy file is not valid on big endian systems like
ppc64 or s390. Let's see why:
static int hashtab_cnt(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
{
int *cnt = ptr;
*cnt = *cnt + 1;
return 0;
}
static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
size_t nel;
[...]
/* count the number of entries in the hashtab */
nel = 0;
rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, hashtab_cnt, &nel);
if (rc)
return rc;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
So size_t is 64 bits. But then we pass a pointer to it as we do to
hashtab_cnt. hashtab_cnt thinks it is a 32 bit int and only deals with
the first 4 bytes. On x86_64 which is little endian, those first 4
bytes and the least significant, so this works out fine. On ppc64/s390
those first 4 bytes of memory are the high order bits. So at the end of
the call to hashtab_map nel has a HUGE number. But the least
significant 32 bits are all 0's.
We then pass that 64 bit number to cpu_to_le32() which happily truncates
it to a 32 bit number and does endian swapping. But the low 32 bits are
all 0's. So no matter how many entries are in the hashtab, big endian
systems always say there are 0 entries because I screwed up the
counting.
The fix is easy. Use a 32 bit int, as the hashtab_cnt expects, for nel.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
rootfs (ramfs) can support setting of security contexts
by userspace due to the vfs fallback behavior of calling
the security module to set the in-core inode state
for security.* attributes when the filesystem does not
provide an xattr handler. No xattr handler required
as the inodes are pinned in memory and have no backing
store.
This is useful in allowing early userspace to label individual
files within a rootfs while still providing a policy-defined
default via genfs.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Currently, the ebitmap_node structure has a fixed size of 32 bytes. On
a 32-bit system, the overhead is 8 bytes, leaving 24 bytes for being
used as bitmaps. The overhead ratio is 1/4.
On a 64-bit system, the overhead is 16 bytes. Therefore, only 16 bytes
are left for bitmap purpose and the overhead ratio is 1/2. With a
3.8.2 kernel, a boot-up operation will cause the ebitmap_get_bit()
function to be called about 9 million times. The average number of
ebitmap_node traversal is about 3.7.
This patch increases the size of the ebitmap_node structure to 64
bytes for 64-bit system to keep the overhead ratio at 1/4. This may
also improve performance a little bit by making node to node traversal
less frequent (< 2) as more bits are available in each node.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
While running the high_systime workload of the AIM7 benchmark on
a 2-socket 12-core Westmere x86-64 machine running 3.10-rc4 kernel
(with HT on), it was found that a pretty sizable amount of time was
spent in the SELinux code. Below was the perf trace of the "perf
record -a -s" of a test run at 1500 users:
5.04% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] ebitmap_get_bit
1.96% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] mls_level_isvalid
1.95% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] find_next_bit
The ebitmap_get_bit() was the hottest function in the perf-report
output. Both the ebitmap_get_bit() and find_next_bit() functions
were, in fact, called by mls_level_isvalid(). As a result, the
mls_level_isvalid() call consumed 8.95% of the total CPU time of
all the 24 virtual CPUs which is quite a lot. The majority of the
mls_level_isvalid() function invocations come from the socket creation
system call.
Looking at the mls_level_isvalid() function, it is checking to see
if all the bits set in one of the ebitmap structure are also set in
another one as well as the highest set bit is no bigger than the one
specified by the given policydb data structure. It is doing it in
a bit-by-bit manner. So if the ebitmap structure has many bits set,
the iteration loop will be done many times.
The current code can be rewritten to use a similar algorithm as the
ebitmap_contains() function with an additional check for the
highest set bit. The ebitmap_contains() function was extended to
cover an optional additional check for the highest set bit, and the
mls_level_isvalid() function was modified to call ebitmap_contains().
With that change, the perf trace showed that the used CPU time drop
down to just 0.08% (ebitmap_contains + mls_level_isvalid) of the
total which is about 100X less than before.
0.07% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] ebitmap_contains
0.05% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] ebitmap_get_bit
0.01% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] mls_level_isvalid
0.01% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] find_next_bit
The remaining ebitmap_get_bit() and find_next_bit() functions calls
are made by other kernel routines as the new mls_level_isvalid()
function will not call them anymore.
This patch also improves the high_systime AIM7 benchmark result,
though the improvement is not as impressive as is suggested by the
reduction in CPU time spent in the ebitmap functions. The table below
shows the performance change on the 2-socket x86-64 system (with HT
on) mentioned above.
+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
| Workload | mean % change | mean % change | mean % change |
| | 10-100 users | 200-1000 users | 1100-2000 users |
+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
| high_systime | +0.1% | +0.9% | +2.6% |
+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Remove the BUG_ON() from selinux_skb_xfrm_sid() and propogate the
error code up to the caller. Also check the return values in the
only caller function, selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid().
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Remove the unused get_sock_isec() function and do some formatting
fixes.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The SELinux labeled IPsec code state management functions have been
long neglected and could use some cleanup and consolidation.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a
multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the
arguments passed to it by the caller. This patch splits the LSM hook
implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the
LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel:
* xfrm_state_alloc
* xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
Also included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux
code; no other LSMs are affected.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"->name but
nobody modifies "struct xattr"->name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure
checking by constifying ->name member of "struct xattr".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> [ocfs2]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"This is a re-do of the net-next pull request for the current merge
window. The only difference from the one I made the other day is that
this has Eliezer's interface renames and the timeout handling changes
made based upon your feedback, as well as a few bug fixes that have
trickeled in.
Highlights:
1) Low latency device polling, eliminating the cost of interrupt
handling and context switches. Allows direct polling of a network
device from socket operations, such as recvmsg() and poll().
Currently ixgbe, mlx4, and bnx2x support this feature.
Full high level description, performance numbers, and design in
commit 0a4db187a9 ("Merge branch 'll_poll'")
From Eliezer Tamir.
2) With the routing cache removed, ip_check_mc_rcu() gets exercised
more than ever before in the case where we have lots of multicast
addresses. Use a hash table instead of a simple linked list, from
Eric Dumazet.
3) Add driver for Atheros CQA98xx 802.11ac wireless devices, from
Bartosz Markowski, Janusz Dziedzic, Kalle Valo, Marek Kwaczynski,
Marek Puzyniak, Michal Kazior, and Sujith Manoharan.
4) Support reporting the TUN device persist flag to userspace, from
Pavel Emelyanov.
5) Allow controlling network device VF link state using netlink, from
Rony Efraim.
6) Support GRE tunneling in openvswitch, from Pravin B Shelar.
7) Adjust SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF and SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF for modern times, from
Daniel Borkmann and Eric Dumazet.
8) Allow controlling of TCP quickack behavior on a per-route basis,
from Cong Wang.
9) Several bug fixes and improvements to vxlan from Stephen
Hemminger, Pravin B Shelar, and Mike Rapoport. In particular,
support receiving on multiple UDP ports.
10) Major cleanups, particular in the area of debugging and cookie
lifetime handline, to the SCTP protocol code. From Daniel
Borkmann.
11) Allow packets to cross network namespaces when traversing tunnel
devices. From Nicolas Dichtel.
12) Allow monitoring netlink traffic via AF_PACKET sockets, in a
manner akin to how we monitor real network traffic via ptype_all.
From Daniel Borkmann.
13) Several bug fixes and improvements for the new alx device driver,
from Johannes Berg.
14) Fix scalability issues in the netem packet scheduler's time queue,
by using an rbtree. From Eric Dumazet.
15) Several bug fixes in TCP loss recovery handling, from Yuchung
Cheng.
16) Add support for GSO segmentation of MPLS packets, from Simon
Horman.
17) Make network notifiers have a real data type for the opaque
pointer that's passed into them. Use this to properly handle
network device flag changes in arp_netdev_event(). From Jiri
Pirko and Timo Teräs.
18) Convert several drivers over to module_pci_driver(), from Peter
Huewe.
19) tcp_fixup_rcvbuf() can loop 500 times over loopback, just use a
O(1) calculation instead. From Eric Dumazet.
20) Support setting of explicit tunnel peer addresses in ipv6, just
like ipv4. From Nicolas Dichtel.
21) Protect x86 BPF JIT against spraying attacks, from Eric Dumazet.
22) Prevent a single high rate flow from overruning an individual cpu
during RX packet processing via selective flow shedding. From
Willem de Bruijn.
23) Don't use spinlocks in TCP md5 signing fast paths, from Eric
Dumazet.
24) Don't just drop GSO packets which are above the TBF scheduler's
burst limit, chop them up so they are in-bounds instead. Also
from Eric Dumazet.
25) VLAN offloads are missed when configured on top of a bridge, fix
from Vlad Yasevich.
26) Support IPV6 in ping sockets. From Lorenzo Colitti.
27) Receive flow steering targets should be updated at poll() time
too, from David Majnemer.
28) Fix several corner case regressions in PMTU/redirect handling due
to the routing cache removal, from Timo Teräs.
29) We have to be mindful of ipv4 mapped ipv6 sockets in
upd_v6_push_pending_frames(). From Hannes Frederic Sowa.
30) Fix L2TP sequence number handling bugs, from James Chapman."
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1214 commits)
drivers/net: caif: fix wrong rtnl_is_locked() usage
drivers/net: enic: release rtnl_lock on error-path
vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
net: mv643xx_eth: do not use port number as platform device id
net: sctp: confirm route during forward progress
virtio_net: fix race in RX VQ processing
virtio: support unlocked queue poll
net/cadence/macb: fix bug/typo in extracting gem_irq_read_clear bit
Documentation: Fix references to defunct linux-net@vger.kernel.org
net/fs: change busy poll time accounting
net: rename low latency sockets functions to busy poll
bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
sfc: Fix memory leak when discarding scattered packets
sit: fix tunnel update via netlink
dt:net:stmmac: Add dt specific phy reset callback support.
dt:net:stmmac: Add support to dwmac version 3.610 and 3.710
dt:net:stmmac: Allocate platform data only if its NULL.
net:stmmac: fix memleak in the open method
ipv6: rt6_check_neigh should successfully verify neigh if no NUD information are available
net: ipv6: fix wrong ping_v6_sendmsg return value
...
Feature highlights include:
- Add basic client support for NFSv4.2
- Add basic client support for Labeled NFS (selinux for NFSv4.2)
- Fix the use of credentials in NFSv4.1 stateful operations, and
add support for NFSv4.1 state protection.
Bugfix highlights:
- Fix another NFSv4 open state recovery race
- Fix an NFSv4.1 back channel session regression
- Various rpc_pipefs races
- Fix another issue with NFSv3 auth negotiation
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Merge tag 'nfs-for-3.11-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs
Pull NFS client updates from Trond Myklebust:
"Feature highlights include:
- Add basic client support for NFSv4.2
- Add basic client support for Labeled NFS (selinux for NFSv4.2)
- Fix the use of credentials in NFSv4.1 stateful operations, and add
support for NFSv4.1 state protection.
Bugfix highlights:
- Fix another NFSv4 open state recovery race
- Fix an NFSv4.1 back channel session regression
- Various rpc_pipefs races
- Fix another issue with NFSv3 auth negotiation
Please note that Labeled NFS does require some additional support from
the security subsystem. The relevant changesets have all been
reviewed and acked by James Morris."
* tag 'nfs-for-3.11-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs: (54 commits)
NFS: Set NFS_CS_MIGRATION for NFSv4 mounts
NFSv4.1 Refactor nfs4_init_session and nfs4_init_channel_attrs
nfs: have NFSv3 try server-specified auth flavors in turn
nfs: have nfs_mount fake up a auth_flavs list when the server didn't provide it
nfs: move server_authlist into nfs_try_mount_request
nfs: refactor "need_mount" code out of nfs_try_mount
SUNRPC: PipeFS MOUNT notification optimization for dying clients
SUNRPC: split client creation routine into setup and registration
SUNRPC: fix races on PipeFS UMOUNT notifications
SUNRPC: fix races on PipeFS MOUNT notifications
NFSv4.1 use pnfs_device maxcount for the objectlayout gdia_maxcount
NFSv4.1 use pnfs_device maxcount for the blocklayout gdia_maxcount
NFSv4.1 Fix gdia_maxcount calculation to fit in ca_maxresponsesize
NFS: Improve legacy idmapping fallback
NFSv4.1 end back channel session draining
NFS: Apply v4.1 capabilities to v4.2
NFSv4.1: Clean up layout segment comparison helper names
NFSv4.1: layout segment comparison helpers should take 'const' parameters
NFSv4: Move the DNS resolver into the NFSv4 module
rpc_pipefs: only set rpc_dentry_ops if d_op isn't already set
...
Create a file_path_has_perm() function that is like path_has_perm() but
instead takes a file struct that is the source of both the path and the
inode (rather than getting the inode from the dentry in the path). This
is then used where appropriate.
This will be useful for situations like unionmount where it will be
possible to have an apparently-negative dentry (eg. a fallthrough) that is
open with the file struct pointing to an inode on the lower fs.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch implements the client transport and handling support for labeled
NFS. The patch adds two functions to encode and decode the security label
recommended attribute which makes use of the LSM hooks added earlier. It also
adds code to grab the label from the file attribute structures and encode the
label to be sent back to the server.
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
There currently doesn't exist a labeling type that is adequate for use with
labeled NFS. Since NFS doesn't really support xattrs we can't use the use xattr
labeling behavior. For this we developed a new labeling type. The native
labeling type is used solely by NFS to ensure NFS inodes are labeled at runtime
by the NFS code instead of relying on the SELinux security server on the client
end.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
There is no way to differentiate if a text mount option is passed from user
space or the kernel. A flags field is being added to the
security_sb_set_mnt_opts hook to allow for in kernel security flags to be sent
to the LSM for processing in addition to the text options received from mount.
This patch also updated existing code to fix compilation errors.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr
interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is
important to make sure the requested xattr actually is a MAC label. This allows
us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of
something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
There is a time where we need to calculate a context without the
inode having been created yet. To do this we take the negative dentry and
calculate a context based on the process and the parent directory contexts.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Merge 'net' bug fixes into 'net-next' as we have patches
that will build on top of them.
This merge commit includes a change from Emil Goode
(emilgoode@gmail.com) that fixes a warning that would
have been introduced by this merge. Specifically it
fixes the pingv6_ops method ipv6_chk_addr() to add a
"const" to the "struct net_device *dev" argument and
likewise update the dummy_ipv6_chk_addr() declaration.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The SELinux labeled IPsec code was improperly handling its reference
counting, dropping a reference on a delete operation instead of on a
free/release operation.
Reported-by: Ondrej Moris <omoris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
So far, only net_device * could be passed along with netdevice notifier
event. This patch provides a possibility to pass custom structure
able to provide info that event listener needs to know.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
v2->v3: fix typo on simeth
shortened dev_getter
shortened notifier_info struct name
v1->v2: fix notifier_call parameter in call_netdevice_notifier()
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights (1721 non-merge commits, this has to be a record of some
sort):
1) Add 'random' mode to team driver, from Jiri Pirko and Eric
Dumazet.
2) Make it so that any driver that supports configuration of multiple
MAC addresses can provide the forwarding database add and del
calls by providing a default implementation and hooking that up if
the driver doesn't have an explicit set of handlers. From Vlad
Yasevich.
3) Support GSO segmentation over tunnels and other encapsulating
devices such as VXLAN, from Pravin B Shelar.
4) Support L2 GRE tunnels in the flow dissector, from Michael Dalton.
5) Implement Tail Loss Probe (TLP) detection in TCP, from Nandita
Dukkipati.
6) In the PHY layer, allow supporting wake-on-lan in situations where
the PHY registers have to be written for it to be configured.
Use it to support wake-on-lan in mv643xx_eth.
From Michael Stapelberg.
7) Significantly improve firewire IPV6 support, from YOSHIFUJI
Hideaki.
8) Allow multiple packets to be sent in a single transmission using
network coding in batman-adv, from Martin Hundebøll.
9) Add support for T5 cxgb4 chips, from Santosh Rastapur.
10) Generalize the VXLAN forwarding tables so that there is more
flexibility in configurating various aspects of the endpoints.
From David Stevens.
11) Support RSS and TSO in hardware over GRE tunnels in bxn2x driver,
from Dmitry Kravkov.
12) Zero copy support in nfnelink_queue, from Eric Dumazet and Pablo
Neira Ayuso.
13) Start adding networking selftests.
14) In situations of overload on the same AF_PACKET fanout socket, or
per-cpu packet receive queue, minimize drop by distributing the
load to other cpus/fanouts. From Willem de Bruijn and Eric
Dumazet.
15) Add support for new payload offset BPF instruction, from Daniel
Borkmann.
16) Convert several drivers over to mdoule_platform_driver(), from
Sachin Kamat.
17) Provide a minimal BPF JIT image disassembler userspace tool, from
Daniel Borkmann.
18) Rewrite F-RTO implementation in TCP to match the final
specification of it in RFC4138 and RFC5682. From Yuchung Cheng.
19) Provide netlink socket diag of netlink sockets ("Yo dawg, I hear
you like netlink, so I implemented netlink dumping of netlink
sockets.") From Andrey Vagin.
20) Remove ugly passing of rtnetlink attributes into rtnl_doit
functions, from Thomas Graf.
21) Allow userspace to be able to see if a configuration change occurs
in the middle of an address or device list dump, from Nicolas
Dichtel.
22) Support RFC3168 ECN protection for ipv6 fragments, from Hannes
Frederic Sowa.
23) Increase accuracy of packet length used by packet scheduler, from
Jason Wang.
24) Beginning set of changes to make ipv4/ipv6 fragment handling more
scalable and less susceptible to overload and locking contention,
from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
25) Get rid of using non-type-safe NLMSG_* macros and use nlmsg_*()
instead. From Hong Zhiguo.
26) Optimize route usage in IPVS by avoiding reference counting where
possible, from Julian Anastasov.
27) Convert IPVS schedulers to RCU, also from Julian Anastasov.
28) Support cpu fanouts in xt_NFQUEUE netfilter target, from Holger
Eitzenberger.
29) Network namespace support for nf_log, ebt_log, xt_LOG, ipt_ULOG,
nfnetlink_log, and nfnetlink_queue. From Gao feng.
30) Implement RFC3168 ECN protection, from Hannes Frederic Sowa.
31) Support several new r8169 chips, from Hayes Wang.
32) Support tokenized interface identifiers in ipv6, from Daniel
Borkmann.
33) Use usbnet_link_change() helper in USB net driver, from Ming Lei.
34) Add 802.1ad vlan offload support, from Patrick McHardy.
35) Support mmap() based netlink communication, also from Patrick
McHardy.
36) Support HW timestamping in mlx4 driver, from Amir Vadai.
37) Rationalize AF_PACKET packet timestamping when transmitting, from
Willem de Bruijn and Daniel Borkmann.
38) Bring parity to what's provided by /proc/net/packet socket dumping
and the info provided by netlink socket dumping of AF_PACKET
sockets. From Nicolas Dichtel.
39) Fix peeking beyond zero sized SKBs in AF_UNIX, from Benjamin
Poirier"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1722 commits)
filter: fix va_list build error
af_unix: fix a fatal race with bit fields
bnx2x: Prevent memory leak when cnic is absent
bnx2x: correct reading of speed capabilities
net: sctp: attribute printl with __printf for gcc fmt checks
netlink: kconfig: move mmap i/o into netlink kconfig
netpoll: convert mutex into a semaphore
netlink: Fix skb ref counting.
net_sched: act_ipt forward compat with xtables
mlx4_en: fix a build error on 32bit arches
Revert "bnx2x: allow nvram test to run when device is down"
bridge: avoid OOPS if root port not found
drivers: net: cpsw: fix kernel warn on cpsw irq enable
sh_eth: use random MAC address if no valid one supplied
3c509.c: call SET_NETDEV_DEV for all device types (ISA/ISAPnP/EISA)
tg3: fix to append hardware time stamping flags
unix/stream: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue
unix/dgram: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue
unix/dgram: peek beyond 0-sized skbs
openvswitch: Remove unneeded ovs_netdev_get_ifindex()
...
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"Just some minor updates across the subsystem"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: eliminate passing d_name.name to process_measurement()
TPM: Retry SaveState command in suspend path
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Add small comment about return value of __i2c_transfer
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c: Add OF attributes type and name to the of_device_id table entries
tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Remove duplicate inclusion of header files
tpm: Add support for new Infineon I2C TPM (SLB 9645 TT 1.2 I2C)
char/tpm: Convert struct i2c_msg initialization to C99 format
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi: use strlcpy instead of strncpy
tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: formatting and white space changes
Smack: include magic.h in smackfs.c
selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch
seccomp: allow BPF_XOR based ALU instructions.
Fix NULL pointer dereference in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir()
Smack: add support for modification of existing rules
smack: SMACK_MAGIC to include/uapi/linux/magic.h
Smack: add missing support for transmute bit in smack_str_from_perm()
Smack: prevent revoke-subject from failing when unseen label is written to it
tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c
drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmsmac/mac80211_if.c
include/net/scm.h
net/batman-adv/routing.c
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
The e{uid,gid} --> {uid,gid} credentials fix conflicted with the
cleanup in net-next to now pass cred structs around.
The be2net driver had a bug fix in 'net' that overlapped with the VLAN
interface changes by Patrick McHardy in net-next.
An IGB conflict existed because in 'net' the build_skb() support was
reverted, and in 'net-next' there was a comment style fix within that
code.
Several batman-adv conflicts were resolved by making sure that all
calls to batadv_is_my_mac() are changed to have a new bat_priv first
argument.
Eric Dumazet's TS ECR fix in TCP in 'net' conflicted with the F-RTO
rewrite in 'net-next', mostly overlapping changes.
Thanks to Stephen Rothwell and Antonio Quartulli for help with several
of these merge resolutions.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Commit 90ba9b1986 (tcp: tcp_make_synack() can use alloc_skb())
broke certain SELinux/NetLabel configurations by no longer correctly
assigning the sock to the outgoing SYNACK packet.
Cost of atomic operations on the LISTEN socket is quite big,
and we would like it to happen only if really needed.
This patch introduces a new security_ops->skb_owned_by() method,
that is a void operation unless selinux is active.
Reported-by: Miroslav Vadkerti <mvadkert@redhat.com>
Diagnosed-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the
same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the
second context= option is ignored. For instance:
# mount server:/export /mnt/test1
# mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
# ls -dZ /mnt/test1
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test1
# ls -dZ /mnt/test2
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test2
When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock,
it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an
existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and
presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from
the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this
case cannot take effect.
This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int
return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has
been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on
the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return
success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the
admin why the second mount failed.
Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on
being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount
filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts,
then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways.
For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the
server:
# mount server:/ /mnt/test1
# mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified
...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually
walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch.
The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already
present with the wrong context.
OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work,
because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is
discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into
that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons:
# cd /mnt/test1/scratch/
-bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy
The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that
this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data
under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one.
Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The call tree here is:
sk_clone_lock() <- takes bh_lock_sock(newsk);
xfrm_sk_clone_policy()
__xfrm_sk_clone_policy()
clone_policy() <- uses GFP_ATOMIC for allocations
security_xfrm_policy_clone()
security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security()
selinux_xfrm_policy_clone()
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull more VFS bits from Al Viro:
"Unfortunately, it looks like xattr series will have to wait until the
next cycle ;-/
This pile contains 9p cleanups and fixes (races in v9fs_fid_add()
etc), fixup for nommu breakage in shmem.c, several cleanups and a bit
more file_inode() work"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
constify path_get/path_put and fs_struct.c stuff
fix nommu breakage in shmem.c
cache the value of file_inode() in struct file
9p: if v9fs_fid_lookup() gets to asking server, it'd better have hashed dentry
9p: make sure ->lookup() adds fid to the right dentry
9p: untangle ->lookup() a bit
9p: double iput() in ->lookup() if d_materialise_unique() fails
9p: v9fs_fid_add() can't fail now
v9fs: get rid of v9fs_dentry
9p: turn fid->dlist into hlist
9p: don't bother with private lock in ->d_fsdata; dentry->d_lock will do just fine
more file_inode() open-coded instances
selinux: opened file can't have NULL or negative ->f_path.dentry
(In the meantime, the hlist traversal macros have changed, so this
required a semantic conflict fixup for the newly hlistified fid->dlist)
