mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2025-02-20 14:26:49 +07:00
proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener
commit bfb819ea20ce8bbeeba17e1a6418bf8bda91fc28 upstream.
Fix another "confused deputy" weakness[1]. Writes to /proc/$pid/attr/
files need to check the opener credentials, since these fds do not
transition state across execve(). Without this, it is possible to
trick another process (which may have different credentials) to write
to its own /proc/$pid/attr/ files, leading to unexpected and possibly
exploitable behaviors.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html?highlight=confused#open-file-credentials
Fixes: 1da177e4c3
("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
03b777ce8d
commit
fb003a1bd6
@ -2704,6 +2704,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
|
||||
void *page;
|
||||
int rv;
|
||||
|
||||
/* A task may only write when it was the opener. */
|
||||
if (file->f_cred != current_real_cred())
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
|
||||
rcu_read_lock();
|
||||
task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
|
||||
if (!task) {
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user