diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h index f4265039a94c..2296e6b2f690 100644 --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h @@ -95,4 +95,15 @@ static inline void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk) return; } #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) +extern long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long filter_off, void __user *data); +#else +static inline long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long n, void __user *data) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER && CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ #endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h index a7a697986614..fb8106509000 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args { #define PTRACE_GETSIGMASK 0x420a #define PTRACE_SETSIGMASK 0x420b +#define PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER 0x420c + /* Read signals from a shared (process wide) queue */ #define PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED (1 << 0) diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 787320de68e0..b760bae64cf1 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -1016,6 +1016,11 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request, break; } #endif + + case PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER: + ret = seccomp_get_filter(child, addr, datavp); + break; + default: break; } diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 06858a74bb9c..580ac2d4024f 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) { struct seccomp_filter *sfilter; int ret; + const bool save_orig = config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE); if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); @@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ret = bpf_prog_create_from_user(&sfilter->prog, fprog, - seccomp_check_filter, false); + seccomp_check_filter, save_orig); if (ret < 0) { kfree(sfilter); return ERR_PTR(ret); @@ -867,3 +868,76 @@ long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter) /* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */ return do_seccomp(op, 0, uargs); } + +#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) +long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long filter_off, + void __user *data) +{ + struct seccomp_filter *filter; + struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog; + long ret; + unsigned long count = 0; + + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + current->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) { + return -EACCES; + } + + spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock); + if (task->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + filter = task->seccomp.filter; + while (filter) { + filter = filter->prev; + count++; + } + + if (filter_off >= count) { + ret = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + count -= filter_off; + + filter = task->seccomp.filter; + while (filter && count > 1) { + filter = filter->prev; + count--; + } + + if (WARN_ON(count != 1 || !filter)) { + /* The filter tree shouldn't shrink while we're using it. */ + ret = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + fprog = filter->prog->orig_prog; + if (!fprog) { + /* This must be a new non-cBPF filter, since we save every + * every cBPF filter's orig_prog above when + * CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is enabled. + */ + ret = -EMEDIUMTYPE; + goto out; + } + + ret = fprog->len; + if (!data) + goto out; + + get_seccomp_filter(task); + spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock); + + if (copy_to_user(data, fprog->filter, bpf_classic_proglen(fprog))) + ret = -EFAULT; + + put_seccomp_filter(task); + return ret; + +out: + spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock); + return ret; +} +#endif