crypto: ecdh_helper - Ensure 'len >= secret.len' in decode_key()

[ Upstream commit a53ab94eb6850c3657392e2d2ce9b38c387a2633 ]

The length ('len' parameter) passed to crypto_ecdh_decode_key() is never
checked against the length encoded in the passed buffer ('buf'
parameter). This could lead to an out-of-bounds access when the passed
length is less than the encoded length.

Add a check to prevent that.

Fixes: 3c4b23901a ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support")
Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Daniele Alessandrelli 2021-02-03 11:28:37 +00:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent bebfe70c4d
commit ea914be6de

View File

@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ int crypto_ecdh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len,
if (secret.type != CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_ECDH) if (secret.type != CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_ECDH)
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(len < secret.len))
return -EINVAL;
ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(&params->curve_id, ptr, sizeof(params->curve_id)); ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(&params->curve_id, ptr, sizeof(params->curve_id));
ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(&params->key_size, ptr, sizeof(params->key_size)); ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(&params->key_size, ptr, sizeof(params->key_size));
if (secret.len != crypto_ecdh_key_len(params)) if (secret.len != crypto_ecdh_key_len(params))