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Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf
Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf 2020-05-22 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree. We've added 3 non-merge commits during the last 3 day(s) which contain a total of 5 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) Fix to reject mmap()'ing read-only array maps as writable since BPF verifier relies on such map content to be frozen, from Andrii Nakryiko. 2) Fix breaking audit from secid_to_secctx() LSM hook by avoiding to use call_int_hook() since this hook is not stackable, from KP Singh. 3) Fix BPF flow dissector program ref leak on netns cleanup, from Jakub Sitnicki. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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commit
d3b968bc2d
@ -623,9 +623,20 @@ static int bpf_map_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
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mutex_lock(&map->freeze_mutex);
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if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) && map->frozen) {
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err = -EPERM;
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goto out;
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if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) {
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if (map->frozen) {
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err = -EPERM;
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goto out;
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}
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/* map is meant to be read-only, so do not allow mapping as
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* writable, because it's possible to leak a writable page
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* reference and allows user-space to still modify it after
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* freezing, while verifier will assume contents do not change
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*/
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if (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) {
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err = -EACCES;
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goto out;
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}
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}
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/* set default open/close callbacks */
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@ -160,12 +160,10 @@ int skb_flow_dissector_bpf_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr,
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return ret;
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}
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int skb_flow_dissector_bpf_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr)
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static int flow_dissector_bpf_prog_detach(struct net *net)
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{
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struct bpf_prog *attached;
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struct net *net;
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net = current->nsproxy->net_ns;
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mutex_lock(&flow_dissector_mutex);
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attached = rcu_dereference_protected(net->flow_dissector_prog,
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lockdep_is_held(&flow_dissector_mutex));
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@ -179,6 +177,24 @@ int skb_flow_dissector_bpf_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr)
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return 0;
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}
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int skb_flow_dissector_bpf_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr)
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{
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return flow_dissector_bpf_prog_detach(current->nsproxy->net_ns);
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}
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static void __net_exit flow_dissector_pernet_pre_exit(struct net *net)
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{
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/* We're not racing with attach/detach because there are no
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* references to netns left when pre_exit gets called.
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*/
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if (rcu_access_pointer(net->flow_dissector_prog))
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flow_dissector_bpf_prog_detach(net);
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}
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static struct pernet_operations flow_dissector_pernet_ops __net_initdata = {
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.pre_exit = flow_dissector_pernet_pre_exit,
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};
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/**
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* __skb_flow_get_ports - extract the upper layer ports and return them
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* @skb: sk_buff to extract the ports from
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@ -1836,7 +1852,7 @@ static int __init init_default_flow_dissectors(void)
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skb_flow_dissector_init(&flow_keys_basic_dissector,
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flow_keys_basic_dissector_keys,
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ARRAY_SIZE(flow_keys_basic_dissector_keys));
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return 0;
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}
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return register_pernet_subsys(&flow_dissector_pernet_ops);
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}
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core_initcall(init_default_flow_dissectors);
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@ -1965,8 +1965,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
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int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
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{
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return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
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seclen);
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struct security_hook_list *hp;
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int rc;
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/*
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* Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
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* LSM hook is not "stackable").
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*/
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hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
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rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
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if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
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return rc;
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}
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return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
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@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ void test_mmap(void)
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const size_t map_sz = roundup_page(sizeof(struct map_data));
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const int zero = 0, one = 1, two = 2, far = 1500;
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const long page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
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int err, duration = 0, i, data_map_fd, data_map_id, tmp_fd;
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int err, duration = 0, i, data_map_fd, data_map_id, tmp_fd, rdmap_fd;
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struct bpf_map *data_map, *bss_map;
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void *bss_mmaped = NULL, *map_mmaped = NULL, *tmp1, *tmp2;
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struct test_mmap__bss *bss_data;
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@ -37,6 +37,17 @@ void test_mmap(void)
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data_map = skel->maps.data_map;
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data_map_fd = bpf_map__fd(data_map);
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rdmap_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.rdonly_map);
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tmp1 = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, rdmap_fd, 0);
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if (CHECK(tmp1 != MAP_FAILED, "rdonly_write_mmap", "unexpected success\n")) {
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munmap(tmp1, 4096);
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goto cleanup;
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}
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/* now double-check if it's mmap()'able at all */
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tmp1 = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, rdmap_fd, 0);
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if (CHECK(tmp1 == MAP_FAILED, "rdonly_read_mmap", "failed: %d\n", errno))
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goto cleanup;
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/* get map's ID */
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memset(&map_info, 0, map_info_sz);
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err = bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd(data_map_fd, &map_info, &map_info_sz);
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@ -7,6 +7,14 @@
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char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
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struct {
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__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
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__uint(max_entries, 4096);
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__uint(map_flags, BPF_F_MMAPABLE | BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG);
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__type(key, __u32);
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__type(value, char);
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} rdonly_map SEC(".maps");
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struct {
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__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
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__uint(max_entries, 512 * 4); /* at least 4 pages of data */
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