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ima: Rename internal filter rule functions

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Rename IMA's internal filter rule functions from security_filter_rule_*()
to ima_filter_rule_*(). This avoids polluting the security_* namespace,
which is typically reserved for general security subsystem
infrastructure.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: reword using the term "filter", not "audit"]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tyler Hicks 2020-07-10 15:37:50 -05:00 committed by Mimi Zohar
parent a068d9371f
commit b8867eedcf
2 changed files with 21 additions and 25 deletions
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12
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
View File

@ -413,23 +413,23 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */ /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init #define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
#define security_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free #define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match #define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
#else #else
static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule) void **lsmrule)
{ {
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
} }
static inline void security_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
{ {
} }
static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
void *lsmrule) void *lsmrule)
{ {
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;

14
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
View File

@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
int i; int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
security_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule); ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p); kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
} }
} }
@ -308,8 +308,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
*/ */
entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL; entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p, nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
&nentry->lsm[i].rule); &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
@ -495,16 +494,14 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal, Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule); rule->lsm[i].rule);
break; break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid, rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal, Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule); rule->lsm[i].rule);
default: default:
@ -901,8 +898,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
return -ENOMEM; return -ENOMEM;
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {