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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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Revert "mac80211: Skip tailroom reservation for full HW-crypto devices"
This reverts commit aac6af5534
.
Conflicts:
net/mac80211/key.c
That commit has a race that causes a warning, as documented in the thread
here:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-wireless&m=130717684914101&w=2
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
d2ac49fe3c
commit
ab6a44ce1d
@ -775,9 +775,6 @@ struct ieee80211_local {
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int tx_headroom; /* required headroom for hardware/radiotap */
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/* count for keys needing tailroom space allocation */
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int crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt;
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/* Tasklet and skb queue to process calls from IRQ mode. All frames
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* added to skb_queue will be processed, but frames in
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* skb_queue_unreliable may be dropped if the total length of these
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@ -101,11 +101,6 @@ static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
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if (!ret) {
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key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
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if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) ||
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(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)))
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key->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--;
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return 0;
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}
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@ -161,10 +156,6 @@ static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
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key->conf.keyidx, sta ? sta->addr : bcast_addr, ret);
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key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
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if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) ||
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(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)))
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key->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++;
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}
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void ieee80211_key_removed(struct ieee80211_key_conf *key_conf)
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@ -403,10 +394,8 @@ static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key)
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ieee80211_aes_key_free(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
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if (key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC)
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ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm);
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if (key->local) {
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if (key->local)
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ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key);
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key->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--;
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}
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kfree(key);
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}
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@ -468,8 +457,6 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
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ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(key);
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key->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++;
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ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
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mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
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@ -511,12 +498,8 @@ void ieee80211_enable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
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mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
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sdata->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
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list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
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sdata->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++;
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list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list)
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ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
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}
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mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
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}
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@ -1480,7 +1480,12 @@ static int ieee80211_skb_resize(struct ieee80211_local *local,
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{
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int tail_need = 0;
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if (may_encrypt && local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt) {
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/*
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* This could be optimised, devices that do full hardware
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* crypto (including TKIP MMIC) need no tailroom... But we
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* have no drivers for such devices currently.
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*/
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if (may_encrypt) {
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tail_need = IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM;
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tail_need -= skb_tailroom(skb);
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tail_need = max_t(int, tail_need, 0);
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