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stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE option, which provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl. It can be used in runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK. Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
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- shmmni
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- softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace
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- soft_watchdog
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- stack_erasing
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- stop-a [ SPARC only ]
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- sysrq ==> Documentation/admin-guide/sysrq.rst
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- sysctl_writes_strict
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@ -987,6 +988,23 @@ detect a hard lockup condition.
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==============================================================
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stack_erasing
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This parameter can be used to control kernel stack erasing at the end
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of syscalls for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
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That erasing reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs
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can reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
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The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel
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compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary.
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0: kernel stack erasing is disabled, STACKLEAK_METRICS are not updated.
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1: kernel stack erasing is enabled (default), it is performed before
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returning to the userspace at the end of syscalls.
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==============================================================
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tainted:
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Non-zero if the kernel has been tainted. Numeric values, which can be
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@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t)
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t->prev_lowest_stack = t->lowest_stack;
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# endif
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
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int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
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void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
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#endif
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#else /* !CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK */
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static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t) { }
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#endif
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@ -12,6 +12,41 @@
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#include <linux/stackleak.h>
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#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
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#include <linux/jump_label.h>
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#include <linux/sysctl.h>
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static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass);
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int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
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void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass);
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int prev_state = state;
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table->data = &state;
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table->maxlen = sizeof(int);
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ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
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state = !!state;
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if (ret || !write || state == prev_state)
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return ret;
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if (state)
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static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
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else
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static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
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pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n",
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state ? "enabled" : "disabled");
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return ret;
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}
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#define skip_erasing() static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass)
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#else
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#define skip_erasing() false
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#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
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asmlinkage void stackleak_erase(void)
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{
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/* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
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@ -20,6 +55,9 @@ asmlinkage void stackleak_erase(void)
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unsigned int poison_count = 0;
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const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
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if (skip_erasing())
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return;
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/* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */
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if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE))
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kstack_ptr = boundary;
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@ -91,7 +91,9 @@
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#ifdef CONFIG_CHR_DEV_SG
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#include <scsi/sg.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
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#include <linux/stackleak.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
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#include <linux/nmi.h>
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#endif
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@ -1232,6 +1234,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
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.extra1 = &zero,
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.extra2 = &one,
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},
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
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{
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.procname = "stack_erasing",
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.data = NULL,
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.maxlen = sizeof(int),
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.mode = 0600,
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.proc_handler = stack_erasing_sysctl,
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.extra1 = &zero,
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.extra2 = &one,
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},
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#endif
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{ }
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};
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@ -182,4 +182,12 @@ config STACKLEAK_METRICS
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can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
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your workloads.
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config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
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bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
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depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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help
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This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
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runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
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CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
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endif
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