mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-04 09:56:53 +07:00
bpf: btf: Fix a missing check bug
In btf_parse_hdr(), the length of the btf data header is firstly copied from the user space to 'hdr_len' and checked to see whether it is larger than 'btf_data_size'. If yes, an error code EINVAL is returned. Otherwise, the whole header is copied again from the user space to 'btf->hdr'. However, after the second copy, there is no check between 'btf->hdr->hdr_len' and 'hdr_len' to confirm that the two copies get the same value. Given that the btf data is in the user space, a malicious user can race to change the data between the two copies. By doing so, the user can provide malicious data to the kernel and cause undefined behavior. This patch adds a necessary check after the second copy, to make sure 'btf->hdr->hdr_len' has the same value as 'hdr_len'. Otherwise, an error code EINVAL will be returned. Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
071a234ad7
commit
8af03d1ae2
@ -2114,6 +2114,9 @@ static int btf_parse_hdr(struct btf_verifier_env *env, void __user *btf_data,
|
||||
|
||||
hdr = &btf->hdr;
|
||||
|
||||
if (hdr->hdr_len != hdr_len)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
btf_verifier_log_hdr(env, btf_data_size);
|
||||
|
||||
if (hdr->magic != BTF_MAGIC) {
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user