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Bluetooth: Add simple SMP pairing negotiation

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This implementation only exchanges SMP messages between the Host and the
Remote. No keys are being generated. TK and STK generation will be
provided in further patches.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
This commit is contained in:
Anderson Briglia 2011-06-09 18:50:42 -03:00 committed by Gustavo F. Padovan
parent b501d6a1dc
commit 88ba43b662
2 changed files with 119 additions and 5 deletions
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17
include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
View File

@ -38,6 +38,23 @@ struct smp_cmd_pairing {
__u8 resp_key_dist;
} __packed;
#define SMP_IO_DISPLAY_ONLY 0x00
#define SMP_IO_DISPLAY_YESNO 0x01
#define SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_ONLY 0x02
#define SMP_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT 0x03
#define SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY 0x04
#define SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT 0x00
#define SMP_OOB_PRESENT 0x01
#define SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY 0x01
#define SMP_DIST_ID_KEY 0x02
#define SMP_DIST_SIGN 0x04
#define SMP_AUTH_NONE 0x00
#define SMP_AUTH_BONDING 0x01
#define SMP_AUTH_MITM 0x04
#define SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM 0x03
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm {
__u8 confirm_val[16];

107
net/bluetooth/smp.c
View File

@ -64,6 +64,94 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
hci_send_acl(conn->hcon, skb, 0);
}
static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
rp->io_capability = 0x00;
rp->oob_flag = 0x00;
rp->max_key_size = 16;
rp->init_key_dist = 0x00;
rp->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
rp->auth_req &= (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp);
}
static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
static void smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
if (conn->hcon->out) {
struct smp_cmd_pairing_random random;
memset(&random, 0, sizeof(random));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random),
&random);
} else {
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm confirm;
memset(&confirm, 0, sizeof(confirm));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(confirm),
&confirm);
}
}
static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_pairing_random cp;
BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(cp));
if (conn->hcon->out) {
/* FIXME: start encryption */
} else {
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
}
static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
cp.io_capability = 0x00;
cp.oob_flag = 0x00;
cp.max_key_size = 16;
cp.init_key_dist = 0x00;
cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00;
cp.auth_req = rp->auth_req & (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
{
__u8 authreq;
@ -114,24 +202,33 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
switch (code) {
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
&reason);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
break;
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
break;
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
break;
case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
break;
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
break;
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
break;
case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
default:
BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);