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synced 2024-11-24 18:20:52 +07:00
perf/core: Fix perf_event_open() vs. execve() race
Jann reported that the ptrace_may_access() check in find_lively_task_by_vpid() is racy against exec(). Specifically: perf_event_open() execve() ptrace_may_access() commit_creds() ... if (get_dumpable() != SUID_DUMP_USER) perf_event_exit_task(); perf_install_in_context() would result in installing a counter across the creds boundary. Fix this by wrapping lots of perf_event_open() in cred_guard_mutex. This should be fine as perf_event_exit_task() is already called with cred_guard_mutex held, so all perf locks already nest inside it. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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@ -1106,6 +1106,7 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
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* function.
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*
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* Lock order:
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* cred_guard_mutex
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* task_struct::perf_event_mutex
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* perf_event_context::mutex
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* perf_event::child_mutex;
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@ -3421,7 +3422,6 @@ static struct task_struct *
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find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
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{
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struct task_struct *task;
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int err;
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rcu_read_lock();
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if (!vpid)
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@ -3435,16 +3435,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
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if (!task)
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return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
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/* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */
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err = -EACCES;
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if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
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goto errout;
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return task;
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errout:
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put_task_struct(task);
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return ERR_PTR(err);
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}
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/*
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@ -8414,6 +8405,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
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get_online_cpus();
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if (task) {
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err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
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if (err)
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goto err_cpus;
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/*
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* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
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*
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* We must hold cred_guard_mutex across this and any potential
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* perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
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* serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
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* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
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*/
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err = -EACCES;
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if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
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goto err_cred;
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}
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if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP)
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cgroup_fd = pid;
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@ -8421,7 +8430,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
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NULL, NULL, cgroup_fd);
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if (IS_ERR(event)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(event);
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goto err_cpus;
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goto err_cred;
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}
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if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
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@ -8480,11 +8489,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
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goto err_context;
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}
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if (task) {
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put_task_struct(task);
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task = NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it):
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*/
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@ -8582,6 +8586,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
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WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
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/*
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* This is the point on no return; we cannot fail hereafter. This is
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* where we start modifying current state.
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*/
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if (move_group) {
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/*
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* See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
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@ -8653,6 +8662,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
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mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
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mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
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if (task) {
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mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
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put_task_struct(task);
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}
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put_online_cpus();
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mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
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@ -8685,6 +8699,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
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*/
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if (!event_file)
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free_event(event);
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err_cred:
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if (task)
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mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
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err_cpus:
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put_online_cpus();
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err_task:
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@ -8969,6 +8986,9 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
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/*
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* When a child task exits, feed back event values to parent events.
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*
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* Can be called with cred_guard_mutex held when called from
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* install_exec_creds().
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*/
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void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child)
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{
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