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Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
The decision whether we can trace a process is made in the following functions: smack_ptrace_traceme() smack_ptrace_access_check() smack_bprm_set_creds() (in case the proces is traced) This patch unifies all those decisions by introducing one function that checks whether ptrace is allowed: smk_ptrace_rule_check(). This makes possible to actually trace with TRACEME where first the TRACEME itself must be allowed and then exec() on a traced process. Additional bugs fixed: - The decision is made according to the mode parameter that is now correctly translated from PTRACE_MODE_* to MAY_* instead of being treated 1:1. PTRACE_MODE_READ requires MAY_READ. PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH requires MAY_READWRITE. - Add a smack audit log in case of exec() refused by bprm_set_creds(). - Honor the PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT flag and don't put smack audit info in case this flag is set. Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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@ -157,6 +157,54 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
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return rc;
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}
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/**
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* smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
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* @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
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*
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* Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
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*/
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static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
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{
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switch (mode) {
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case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
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return MAY_READ;
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case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
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return MAY_READWRITE;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
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* @tracer: tracer process
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* @tracee_label: label of the process that's about to be traced
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* @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
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* @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
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*
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* Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
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*/
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static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, char *tracee_label,
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unsigned int mode, const char *func)
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{
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int rc;
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struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
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struct task_smack *tsp;
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struct smack_known *skp;
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if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
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smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
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smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
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saip = &ad;
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}
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tsp = task_security(tracer);
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skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
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rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_label, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
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return rc;
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}
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/*
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* LSM hooks.
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* We he, that is fun!
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@ -165,16 +213,15 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
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/**
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* smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
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* @ctp: child task pointer
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* @mode: ptrace attachment mode
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* @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
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*
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* Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
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*
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* Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
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* Do the capability checks.
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*/
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static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
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{
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int rc;
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struct smk_audit_info ad;
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struct smack_known *skp;
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rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
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@ -182,10 +229,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
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return rc;
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skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
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smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
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smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
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rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, mode, &ad);
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rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp->smk_known, mode, __func__);
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return rc;
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}
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@ -195,12 +240,11 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
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*
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* Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
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*
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* Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
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* Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
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*/
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static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
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{
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int rc;
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struct smk_audit_info ad;
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struct smack_known *skp;
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rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
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@ -208,10 +252,9 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
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return rc;
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skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
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smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
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smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
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rc = smk_tskacc(ptp, skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
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rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp->smk_known,
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PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
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return rc;
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}
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@ -455,7 +498,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
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* smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
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* @bprm: the exec information
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*
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* Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
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* Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
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*/
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static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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{
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@ -475,7 +518,22 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
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return 0;
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if (bprm->unsafe)
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if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
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struct task_struct *tracer;
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rc = 0;
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rcu_read_lock();
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tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
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if (likely(tracer != NULL))
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rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
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isp->smk_task->smk_known,
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PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
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__func__);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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if (rc != 0)
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return rc;
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} else if (bprm->unsafe)
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return -EPERM;
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bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
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