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crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret()
commit 0aa171e9b267ce7c52d3a3df7bc9c1fc0203dec5 upstream. Pavel reports that commit 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") fixes one problem but introduces another: the unconditional memcpy() introduced by that commit may overflow the target buffer if the source data is invalid, which could be the result of intentional tampering. So check params.key_size explicitly against the size of the target buffer before validating the key further. Fixes: 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ static int ecdh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
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struct ecdh params;
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unsigned int ndigits;
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if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0)
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if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0 ||
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params.key_size > sizeof(ctx->private_key))
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return -EINVAL;
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ndigits = ecdh_supported_curve(params.curve_id);
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