RDMA/ucma: Do not miss ctx destruction steps in some cases

[ Upstream commit 8ae291cc95e49011b736b641b0cfad502b7a1526 ]

The destruction flow is very complicated here because the cm_id can be
destroyed from the event handler at any time if the device is
hot-removed. This leaves behind a partial ctx with no cm_id in the
xarray, and will let user space leak memory.

Make everything consistent in this flow in all places:

 - Return the xarray back to XA_ZERO_ENTRY before beginning any
   destruction. The thread that reaches this first is responsible to
   kfree, everyone else does nothing.

 - Test the xarray during the special hot-removal case to block the
   queue_work, this has much simpler locking and doesn't require a
   'destroying'

 - Fix the ref initialization so that it is only positive if cm_id !=
   NULL, then rely on that to guide the destruction process in all cases.

Now the new ucma_destroy_private_ctx() can be called in all places that
want to free the ctx, including all the error unwinds, and none of the
details are missed.

Fixes: a1d33b70db ("RDMA/ucma: Rework how new connections are passed through event delivery")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105111327.230270-1-leon@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jason Gunthorpe 2021-01-05 13:13:27 +02:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 1e00ef8a5d
commit 1f54a26bdb

View File

@ -95,8 +95,6 @@ struct ucma_context {
u64 uid;
struct list_head list;
/* sync between removal event and id destroy, protected by file mut */
int destroying;
struct work_struct close_work;
};
@ -122,7 +120,7 @@ static DEFINE_XARRAY_ALLOC(ctx_table);
static DEFINE_XARRAY_ALLOC(multicast_table);
static const struct file_operations ucma_fops;
static int __destroy_id(struct ucma_context *ctx);
static int ucma_destroy_private_ctx(struct ucma_context *ctx);
static inline struct ucma_context *_ucma_find_context(int id,
struct ucma_file *file)
@ -179,19 +177,14 @@ static void ucma_close_id(struct work_struct *work)
/* once all inflight tasks are finished, we close all underlying
* resources. The context is still alive till its explicit destryoing
* by its creator.
* by its creator. This puts back the xarray's reference.
*/
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
wait_for_completion(&ctx->comp);
/* No new events will be generated after destroying the id. */
rdma_destroy_id(ctx->cm_id);
/*
* At this point ctx->ref is zero so the only place the ctx can be is in
* a uevent or in __destroy_id(). Since the former doesn't touch
* ctx->cm_id and the latter sync cancels this, there is no races with
* this store.
*/
/* Reading the cm_id without holding a positive ref is not allowed */
ctx->cm_id = NULL;
}
@ -204,7 +197,6 @@ static struct ucma_context *ucma_alloc_ctx(struct ucma_file *file)
return NULL;
INIT_WORK(&ctx->close_work, ucma_close_id);
refcount_set(&ctx->ref, 1);
init_completion(&ctx->comp);
/* So list_del() will work if we don't do ucma_finish_ctx() */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->list);
@ -218,6 +210,13 @@ static struct ucma_context *ucma_alloc_ctx(struct ucma_file *file)
return ctx;
}
static void ucma_set_ctx_cm_id(struct ucma_context *ctx,
struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id)
{
refcount_set(&ctx->ref, 1);
ctx->cm_id = cm_id;
}
static void ucma_finish_ctx(struct ucma_context *ctx)
{
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->file->mut);
@ -303,7 +302,7 @@ static int ucma_connect_event_handler(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id,
ctx = ucma_alloc_ctx(listen_ctx->file);
if (!ctx)
goto err_backlog;
ctx->cm_id = cm_id;
ucma_set_ctx_cm_id(ctx, cm_id);
uevent = ucma_create_uevent(listen_ctx, event);
if (!uevent)
@ -321,8 +320,7 @@ static int ucma_connect_event_handler(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id,
return 0;
err_alloc:
xa_erase(&ctx_table, ctx->id);
kfree(ctx);
ucma_destroy_private_ctx(ctx);
err_backlog:
atomic_inc(&listen_ctx->backlog);
/* Returning error causes the new ID to be destroyed */
@ -356,8 +354,12 @@ static int ucma_event_handler(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id,
wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->file->poll_wait);
}
if (event->event == RDMA_CM_EVENT_DEVICE_REMOVAL && !ctx->destroying)
if (event->event == RDMA_CM_EVENT_DEVICE_REMOVAL) {
xa_lock(&ctx_table);
if (xa_load(&ctx_table, ctx->id) == ctx)
queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &ctx->close_work);
xa_unlock(&ctx_table);
}
return 0;
}
@ -461,13 +463,12 @@ static ssize_t ucma_create_id(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
ret = PTR_ERR(cm_id);
goto err1;
}
ctx->cm_id = cm_id;
ucma_set_ctx_cm_id(ctx, cm_id);
resp.id = ctx->id;
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd.response),
&resp, sizeof(resp))) {
xa_erase(&ctx_table, ctx->id);
__destroy_id(ctx);
ucma_destroy_private_ctx(ctx);
return -EFAULT;
}
@ -477,8 +478,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_create_id(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
return 0;
err1:
xa_erase(&ctx_table, ctx->id);
kfree(ctx);
ucma_destroy_private_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
@ -516,68 +516,73 @@ static void ucma_cleanup_mc_events(struct ucma_multicast *mc)
rdma_unlock_handler(mc->ctx->cm_id);
}
/*
* ucma_free_ctx is called after the underlying rdma CM-ID is destroyed. At
* this point, no new events will be reported from the hardware. However, we
* still need to cleanup the UCMA context for this ID. Specifically, there
* might be events that have not yet been consumed by the user space software.
* mutex. After that we release them as needed.
*/
static int ucma_free_ctx(struct ucma_context *ctx)
static int ucma_cleanup_ctx_events(struct ucma_context *ctx)
{
int events_reported;
struct ucma_event *uevent, *tmp;
LIST_HEAD(list);
ucma_cleanup_multicast(ctx);
/* Cleanup events not yet reported to the user. */
/* Cleanup events not yet reported to the user.*/
mutex_lock(&ctx->file->mut);
list_for_each_entry_safe(uevent, tmp, &ctx->file->event_list, list) {
if (uevent->ctx == ctx || uevent->conn_req_ctx == ctx)
if (uevent->ctx != ctx)
continue;
if (uevent->resp.event == RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST &&
xa_cmpxchg(&ctx_table, uevent->conn_req_ctx->id,
uevent->conn_req_ctx, XA_ZERO_ENTRY,
GFP_KERNEL) == uevent->conn_req_ctx) {
list_move_tail(&uevent->list, &list);
continue;
}
list_del(&uevent->list);
kfree(uevent);
}
list_del(&ctx->list);
events_reported = ctx->events_reported;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->mut);
/*
* If this was a listening ID then any connections spawned from it
* that have not been delivered to userspace are cleaned up too.
* Must be done outside any locks.
* If this was a listening ID then any connections spawned from it that
* have not been delivered to userspace are cleaned up too. Must be done
* outside any locks.
*/
list_for_each_entry_safe(uevent, tmp, &list, list) {
list_del(&uevent->list);
if (uevent->resp.event == RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST &&
uevent->conn_req_ctx != ctx)
__destroy_id(uevent->conn_req_ctx);
ucma_destroy_private_ctx(uevent->conn_req_ctx);
kfree(uevent);
}
mutex_destroy(&ctx->mutex);
kfree(ctx);
return events_reported;
}
static int __destroy_id(struct ucma_context *ctx)
{
/*
* If the refcount is already 0 then ucma_close_id() has already
* destroyed the cm_id, otherwise holding the refcount keeps cm_id
* valid. Prevent queue_work() from being called.
/*
* When this is called the xarray must have a XA_ZERO_ENTRY in the ctx->id (ie
* the ctx is not public to the user). This either because:
* - ucma_finish_ctx() hasn't been called
* - xa_cmpxchg() succeed to remove the entry (only one thread can succeed)
*/
if (refcount_inc_not_zero(&ctx->ref)) {
rdma_lock_handler(ctx->cm_id);
ctx->destroying = 1;
rdma_unlock_handler(ctx->cm_id);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
}
static int ucma_destroy_private_ctx(struct ucma_context *ctx)
{
int events_reported;
/*
* Destroy the underlying cm_id. New work queuing is prevented now by
* the removal from the xarray. Once the work is cancled ref will either
* be 0 because the work ran to completion and consumed the ref from the
* xarray, or it will be positive because we still have the ref from the
* xarray. This can also be 0 in cases where cm_id was never set
*/
cancel_work_sync(&ctx->close_work);
/* At this point it's guaranteed that there is no inflight closing task */
if (ctx->cm_id)
if (refcount_read(&ctx->ref))
ucma_close_id(&ctx->close_work);
return ucma_free_ctx(ctx);
events_reported = ucma_cleanup_ctx_events(ctx);
ucma_cleanup_multicast(ctx);
WARN_ON(xa_cmpxchg(&ctx_table, ctx->id, XA_ZERO_ENTRY, NULL,
GFP_KERNEL) != NULL);
mutex_destroy(&ctx->mutex);
kfree(ctx);
return events_reported;
}
static ssize_t ucma_destroy_id(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
@ -596,14 +601,17 @@ static ssize_t ucma_destroy_id(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
xa_lock(&ctx_table);
ctx = _ucma_find_context(cmd.id, file);
if (!IS_ERR(ctx))
__xa_erase(&ctx_table, ctx->id);
if (!IS_ERR(ctx)) {
if (__xa_cmpxchg(&ctx_table, ctx->id, ctx, XA_ZERO_ENTRY,
GFP_KERNEL) != ctx)
ctx = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
}
xa_unlock(&ctx_table);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
resp.events_reported = __destroy_id(ctx);
resp.events_reported = ucma_destroy_private_ctx(ctx);
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd.response),
&resp, sizeof(resp)))
ret = -EFAULT;
@ -1777,15 +1785,16 @@ static int ucma_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
* prevented by this being a FD release function. The list_add_tail() in
* ucma_connect_event_handler() can run concurrently, however it only
* adds to the list *after* a listening ID. By only reading the first of
* the list, and relying on __destroy_id() to block
* the list, and relying on ucma_destroy_private_ctx() to block
* ucma_connect_event_handler(), no additional locking is needed.
*/
while (!list_empty(&file->ctx_list)) {
struct ucma_context *ctx = list_first_entry(
&file->ctx_list, struct ucma_context, list);
xa_erase(&ctx_table, ctx->id);
__destroy_id(ctx);
WARN_ON(xa_cmpxchg(&ctx_table, ctx->id, ctx, XA_ZERO_ENTRY,
GFP_KERNEL) != ctx);
ucma_destroy_private_ctx(ctx);
}
kfree(file);
return 0;