mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-02 11:46:45 +07:00
iscsi-target: Reject mutual authentication with reflected CHAP_C
This patch adds an explicit check in chap_server_compute_md5() to ensure the CHAP_C value received from the initiator during mutual authentication does not match the original CHAP_C provided by the target. This is in line with RFC-3720, section 8.2.1: Originators MUST NOT reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication. Responders MUST check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP connection if it occurs. Reported-by: Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@calsoftinc.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.1+ Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
5256ffdbdc
commit
1d2b60a554
@ -351,6 +351,16 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
|
||||
pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n");
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the
|
||||
* initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by
|
||||
* the target.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!memcmp(challenge_binhex, chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) {
|
||||
pr_err("initiator CHAP_C matches target CHAP_C, failing"
|
||||
" login attempt\n");
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Generate CHAP_N and CHAP_R for mutual authentication.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user