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bpf: correct slot_type marking logic to allow more stack slot sharing
Verifier is supposed to support sharing stack slot allocated to ptr with SCALAR_VALUE for privileged program. However this doesn't happen for some cases. The reason is verifier is not clearing slot_type STACK_SPILL for all bytes, it only clears part of them, while verifier is using: slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL as a convention to check one slot is ptr type. So, the consequence of partial clearing slot_type is verifier could treat a partially overridden ptr slot, which should now be a SCALAR_VALUE slot, still as ptr slot, and rejects some valid programs. Before this patch, test_xdp_noinline.o under bpf selftests, bpf_lxc.o and bpf_netdev.o under Cilium bpf repo, when built with -mattr=+alu32 are rejected due to this issue. After this patch, they all accepted. There is no processed insn number change before and after this patch on Cilium bpf programs. Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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@ -1286,6 +1286,10 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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/* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */
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state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
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/* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr. */
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if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL)
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for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
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state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_MISC;
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/* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written
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* otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon
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@ -1303,6 +1307,7 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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register_is_null(&cur->regs[value_regno]))
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type = STACK_ZERO;
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/* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */
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for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
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state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] =
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type;
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@ -1001,13 +1001,43 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
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BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
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/* mess up with R1 pointer on stack */
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BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_10, -7, 0x23),
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/* fill back into R0 should fail */
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/* fill back into R0 is fine for priv.
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* R0 now becomes SCALAR_VALUE.
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*/
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BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8),
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/* Load from R0 should fail. */
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BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 8),
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
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},
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.errstr_unpriv = "attempt to corrupt spilled",
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.errstr = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv",
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.result = REJECT,
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},
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{
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"check corrupted spill/fill, LSB",
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.insns = {
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BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
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BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0xcafe),
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BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8),
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
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},
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.errstr_unpriv = "attempt to corrupt spilled",
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.errstr = "corrupted spill",
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.result = REJECT,
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.result_unpriv = REJECT,
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.result = ACCEPT,
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.retval = POINTER_VALUE,
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},
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{
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"check corrupted spill/fill, MSB",
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.insns = {
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BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
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BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -4, 0x12345678),
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BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8),
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
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},
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.errstr_unpriv = "attempt to corrupt spilled",
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.result_unpriv = REJECT,
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.result = ACCEPT,
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.retval = POINTER_VALUE,
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},
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{
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"invalid src register in STX",
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