2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#include <linux/atomic.h>
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#include <linux/bug.h>
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#include <linux/delay.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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2020-02-05 00:21:10 +07:00
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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2020-02-08 01:59:10 +07:00
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#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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#include <linux/percpu.h>
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#include <linux/preempt.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include "atomic.h"
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#include "encoding.h"
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#include "kcsan.h"
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2020-02-08 01:59:10 +07:00
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static bool kcsan_early_enable = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_EARLY_ENABLE);
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static unsigned int kcsan_udelay_task = CONFIG_KCSAN_UDELAY_TASK;
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static unsigned int kcsan_udelay_interrupt = CONFIG_KCSAN_UDELAY_INTERRUPT;
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static long kcsan_skip_watch = CONFIG_KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH;
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#ifdef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
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#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
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#endif
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#define MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX "kcsan."
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module_param_named(early_enable, kcsan_early_enable, bool, 0);
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module_param_named(udelay_task, kcsan_udelay_task, uint, 0644);
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module_param_named(udelay_interrupt, kcsan_udelay_interrupt, uint, 0644);
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module_param_named(skip_watch, kcsan_skip_watch, long, 0644);
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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bool kcsan_enabled;
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/* Per-CPU kcsan_ctx for interrupts */
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static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kcsan_ctx, kcsan_cpu_ctx) = {
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2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
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.disable_count = 0,
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.atomic_next = 0,
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.atomic_nest_count = 0,
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.in_flat_atomic = false,
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2020-02-11 23:04:22 +07:00
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.access_mask = 0,
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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};
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/*
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* Helper macros to index into adjacent slots slots, starting from address slot
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* itself, followed by the right and left slots.
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*
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* The purpose is 2-fold:
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*
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* 1. if during insertion the address slot is already occupied, check if
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* any adjacent slots are free;
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* 2. accesses that straddle a slot boundary due to size that exceeds a
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* slot's range may check adjacent slots if any watchpoint matches.
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*
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* Note that accesses with very large size may still miss a watchpoint; however,
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* given this should be rare, this is a reasonable trade-off to make, since this
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* will avoid:
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*
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* 1. excessive contention between watchpoint checks and setup;
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* 2. larger number of simultaneous watchpoints without sacrificing
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* performance.
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*
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* Example: SLOT_IDX values for KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT=1, where i is [0, 1, 2]:
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*
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* slot=0: [ 1, 2, 0]
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* slot=9: [10, 11, 9]
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* slot=63: [64, 65, 63]
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*/
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2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
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#define NUM_SLOTS (1 + 2*KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT)
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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#define SLOT_IDX(slot, i) (slot + ((i + KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT) % NUM_SLOTS))
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/*
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2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
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* SLOT_IDX_FAST is used in the fast-path. Not first checking the address's primary
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kcsan: Introduce KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type
The KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type may be used to introduce dummy reads
and writes to assert certain properties of concurrent code, where bugs
could not be detected as normal data races.
For example, a variable that is only meant to be written by a single
CPU, but may be read (without locking) by other CPUs must still be
marked properly to avoid data races. However, concurrent writes,
regardless if WRITE_ONCE() or not, would be a bug. Using
kcsan_check_access(&x, sizeof(x), KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) would allow
catching such bugs.
To support KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT the following notable changes were made:
* If an access is of type KCSAN_ASSERT_ACCESS, disable various filters
that only apply to data races, so that all races that KCSAN observes are
reported.
* Bug reports that involve an ASSERT access type will be reported as
"KCSAN: assert: race in ..." instead of "data-race"; this will help
more easily distinguish them.
* Update a few comments to just mention 'races' where we do not always
mean pure data races.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-02-06 22:46:24 +07:00
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* slot (middle) is fine if we assume that races occur rarely. The set of
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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* indices {SLOT_IDX(slot, i) | i in [0, NUM_SLOTS)} is equivalent to
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* {SLOT_IDX_FAST(slot, i) | i in [0, NUM_SLOTS)}.
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*/
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#define SLOT_IDX_FAST(slot, i) (slot + i)
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/*
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* Watchpoints, with each entry encoded as defined in encoding.h: in order to be
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* able to safely update and access a watchpoint without introducing locking
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* overhead, we encode each watchpoint as a single atomic long. The initial
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* zero-initialized state matches INVALID_WATCHPOINT.
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*
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* Add NUM_SLOTS-1 entries to account for overflow; this helps avoid having to
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2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
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* use more complicated SLOT_IDX_FAST calculation with modulo in the fast-path.
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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*/
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2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
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static atomic_long_t watchpoints[CONFIG_KCSAN_NUM_WATCHPOINTS + NUM_SLOTS-1];
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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/*
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* Instructions to skip watching counter, used in should_watch(). We use a
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* per-CPU counter to avoid excessive contention.
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*/
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static DEFINE_PER_CPU(long, kcsan_skip);
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2020-01-07 23:31:04 +07:00
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static __always_inline atomic_long_t *find_watchpoint(unsigned long addr,
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size_t size,
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bool expect_write,
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long *encoded_watchpoint)
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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{
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const int slot = watchpoint_slot(addr);
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const unsigned long addr_masked = addr & WATCHPOINT_ADDR_MASK;
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atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
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unsigned long wp_addr_masked;
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size_t wp_size;
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bool is_write;
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int i;
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BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_KCSAN_NUM_WATCHPOINTS < NUM_SLOTS);
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for (i = 0; i < NUM_SLOTS; ++i) {
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watchpoint = &watchpoints[SLOT_IDX_FAST(slot, i)];
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*encoded_watchpoint = atomic_long_read(watchpoint);
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if (!decode_watchpoint(*encoded_watchpoint, &wp_addr_masked,
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&wp_size, &is_write))
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continue;
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if (expect_write && !is_write)
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continue;
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/* Check if the watchpoint matches the access. */
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if (matching_access(wp_addr_masked, wp_size, addr_masked, size))
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return watchpoint;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
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static inline atomic_long_t *
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insert_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write)
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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{
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const int slot = watchpoint_slot(addr);
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const long encoded_watchpoint = encode_watchpoint(addr, size, is_write);
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atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
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int i;
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/* Check slot index logic, ensuring we stay within array bounds. */
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BUILD_BUG_ON(SLOT_IDX(0, 0) != KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT);
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2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
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BUILD_BUG_ON(SLOT_IDX(0, KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT+1) != 0);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(SLOT_IDX(CONFIG_KCSAN_NUM_WATCHPOINTS-1, KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT) != ARRAY_SIZE(watchpoints)-1);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(SLOT_IDX(CONFIG_KCSAN_NUM_WATCHPOINTS-1, KCSAN_CHECK_ADJACENT+1) != ARRAY_SIZE(watchpoints) - NUM_SLOTS);
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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for (i = 0; i < NUM_SLOTS; ++i) {
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long expect_val = INVALID_WATCHPOINT;
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/* Try to acquire this slot. */
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watchpoint = &watchpoints[SLOT_IDX(slot, i)];
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2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
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if (atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(watchpoint, &expect_val, encoded_watchpoint))
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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return watchpoint;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Return true if watchpoint was successfully consumed, false otherwise.
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*
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* This may return false if:
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*
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* 1. another thread already consumed the watchpoint;
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* 2. the thread that set up the watchpoint already removed it;
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* 3. the watchpoint was removed and then re-used.
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*/
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2020-01-07 23:31:04 +07:00
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static __always_inline bool
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2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
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try_consume_watchpoint(atomic_long_t *watchpoint, long encoded_watchpoint)
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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{
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2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
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return atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(watchpoint, &encoded_watchpoint, CONSUMED_WATCHPOINT);
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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}
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/*
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* Return true if watchpoint was not touched, false if consumed.
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*/
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static inline bool remove_watchpoint(atomic_long_t *watchpoint)
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{
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2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
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return atomic_long_xchg_relaxed(watchpoint, INVALID_WATCHPOINT) != CONSUMED_WATCHPOINT;
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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}
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2020-01-07 23:31:04 +07:00
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static __always_inline struct kcsan_ctx *get_ctx(void)
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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{
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/*
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2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
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* In interrupts, use raw_cpu_ptr to avoid unnecessary checks, that would
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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* also result in calls that generate warnings in uaccess regions.
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*/
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return in_task() ? ¤t->kcsan_ctx : raw_cpu_ptr(&kcsan_cpu_ctx);
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}
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2020-02-05 00:21:10 +07:00
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static __always_inline bool
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is_atomic(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type)
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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{
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2020-02-05 00:21:10 +07:00
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struct kcsan_ctx *ctx;
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if ((type & KCSAN_ACCESS_ATOMIC) != 0)
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return true;
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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kcsan: Introduce KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type
The KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type may be used to introduce dummy reads
and writes to assert certain properties of concurrent code, where bugs
could not be detected as normal data races.
For example, a variable that is only meant to be written by a single
CPU, but may be read (without locking) by other CPUs must still be
marked properly to avoid data races. However, concurrent writes,
regardless if WRITE_ONCE() or not, would be a bug. Using
kcsan_check_access(&x, sizeof(x), KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) would allow
catching such bugs.
To support KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT the following notable changes were made:
* If an access is of type KCSAN_ASSERT_ACCESS, disable various filters
that only apply to data races, so that all races that KCSAN observes are
reported.
* Bug reports that involve an ASSERT access type will be reported as
"KCSAN: assert: race in ..." instead of "data-race"; this will help
more easily distinguish them.
* Update a few comments to just mention 'races' where we do not always
mean pure data races.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-02-06 22:46:24 +07:00
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/*
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* Unless explicitly declared atomic, never consider an assertion access
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* as atomic. This allows using them also in atomic regions, such as
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* seqlocks, without implicitly changing their semantics.
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*/
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if ((type & KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) != 0)
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return false;
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2020-02-05 00:21:10 +07:00
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_ASSUME_PLAIN_WRITES_ATOMIC) &&
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(type & KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE) != 0 && size <= sizeof(long) &&
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IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)ptr, size))
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return true; /* Assume aligned writes up to word size are atomic. */
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ctx = get_ctx();
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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if (unlikely(ctx->atomic_next > 0)) {
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/*
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* Because we do not have separate contexts for nested
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* interrupts, in case atomic_next is set, we simply assume that
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* the outer interrupt set atomic_next. In the worst case, we
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* will conservatively consider operations as atomic. This is a
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* reasonable trade-off to make, since this case should be
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* extremely rare; however, even if extremely rare, it could
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* lead to false positives otherwise.
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*/
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if ((hardirq_count() >> HARDIRQ_SHIFT) < 2)
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--ctx->atomic_next; /* in task, or outer interrupt */
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return true;
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}
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if (unlikely(ctx->atomic_nest_count > 0 || ctx->in_flat_atomic))
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return true;
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return kcsan_is_atomic(ptr);
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}
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2020-02-05 00:21:10 +07:00
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static __always_inline bool
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should_watch(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type)
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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{
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/*
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* Never set up watchpoints when memory operations are atomic.
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*
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* Need to check this first, before kcsan_skip check below: (1) atomics
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* should not count towards skipped instructions, and (2) to actually
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* decrement kcsan_atomic_next for consecutive instruction stream.
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*/
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2020-02-05 00:21:10 +07:00
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if (is_atomic(ptr, size, type))
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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return false;
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if (this_cpu_dec_return(kcsan_skip) >= 0)
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return false;
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/*
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* NOTE: If we get here, kcsan_skip must always be reset in slow path
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* via reset_kcsan_skip() to avoid underflow.
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*/
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/* this operation should be watched */
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return true;
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}
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static inline void reset_kcsan_skip(void)
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{
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2020-02-08 01:59:10 +07:00
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long skip_count = kcsan_skip_watch -
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH_RANDOMIZE) ?
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2020-02-08 01:59:10 +07:00
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prandom_u32_max(kcsan_skip_watch) :
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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0);
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this_cpu_write(kcsan_skip, skip_count);
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}
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2020-01-07 23:31:04 +07:00
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static __always_inline bool kcsan_is_enabled(void)
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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{
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return READ_ONCE(kcsan_enabled) && get_ctx()->disable_count == 0;
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}
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static inline unsigned int get_delay(void)
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{
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2020-02-08 01:59:10 +07:00
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unsigned int delay = in_task() ? kcsan_udelay_task : kcsan_udelay_interrupt;
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2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
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return delay - (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_DELAY_RANDOMIZE) ?
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prandom_u32_max(delay) :
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0);
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}
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/*
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* Pull everything together: check_access() below contains the performance
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|
* critical operations; the fast-path (including check_access) functions should
|
|
|
|
* all be inlinable by the instrumentation functions.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The slow-path (kcsan_found_watchpoint, kcsan_setup_watchpoint) are
|
|
|
|
* non-inlinable -- note that, we prefix these with "kcsan_" to ensure they can
|
|
|
|
* be filtered from the stacktrace, as well as give them unique names for the
|
|
|
|
* UACCESS whitelist of objtool. Each function uses user_access_save/restore(),
|
|
|
|
* since they do not access any user memory, but instrumentation is still
|
|
|
|
* emitted in UACCESS regions.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static noinline void kcsan_found_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr,
|
2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
|
|
|
size_t size,
|
2020-01-11 01:48:33 +07:00
|
|
|
int type,
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
atomic_long_t *watchpoint,
|
|
|
|
long encoded_watchpoint)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
|
|
|
bool consumed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!kcsan_is_enabled())
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2020-02-11 23:04:22 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The access_mask check relies on value-change comparison. To avoid
|
|
|
|
* reporting a race where e.g. the writer set up the watchpoint, but the
|
|
|
|
* reader has access_mask!=0, we have to ignore the found watchpoint.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (get_ctx()->access_mask != 0)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Consume the watchpoint as soon as possible, to minimize the chances
|
|
|
|
* of !consumed. Consuming the watchpoint must always be guarded by
|
|
|
|
* kcsan_is_enabled() check, as otherwise we might erroneously
|
|
|
|
* triggering reports when disabled.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
consumed = try_consume_watchpoint(watchpoint, encoded_watchpoint);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* keep this after try_consume_watchpoint */
|
|
|
|
flags = user_access_save();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (consumed) {
|
2020-01-11 01:48:33 +07:00
|
|
|
kcsan_report(ptr, size, type, true, raw_smp_processor_id(),
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
KCSAN_REPORT_CONSUMED_WATCHPOINT);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The other thread may not print any diagnostics, as it has
|
|
|
|
* already removed the watchpoint, or another thread consumed
|
|
|
|
* the watchpoint before this thread.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_REPORT_RACES);
|
|
|
|
}
|
kcsan: Introduce KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type
The KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type may be used to introduce dummy reads
and writes to assert certain properties of concurrent code, where bugs
could not be detected as normal data races.
For example, a variable that is only meant to be written by a single
CPU, but may be read (without locking) by other CPUs must still be
marked properly to avoid data races. However, concurrent writes,
regardless if WRITE_ONCE() or not, would be a bug. Using
kcsan_check_access(&x, sizeof(x), KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) would allow
catching such bugs.
To support KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT the following notable changes were made:
* If an access is of type KCSAN_ASSERT_ACCESS, disable various filters
that only apply to data races, so that all races that KCSAN observes are
reported.
* Bug reports that involve an ASSERT access type will be reported as
"KCSAN: assert: race in ..." instead of "data-race"; this will help
more easily distinguish them.
* Update a few comments to just mention 'races' where we do not always
mean pure data races.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-02-06 22:46:24 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((type & KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) != 0)
|
|
|
|
kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_ASSERT_FAILURES);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_DATA_RACES);
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
user_access_restore(flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
|
|
|
static noinline void
|
2020-01-11 01:48:33 +07:00
|
|
|
kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type)
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-01-11 01:48:33 +07:00
|
|
|
const bool is_write = (type & KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE) != 0;
|
kcsan: Introduce KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type
The KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type may be used to introduce dummy reads
and writes to assert certain properties of concurrent code, where bugs
could not be detected as normal data races.
For example, a variable that is only meant to be written by a single
CPU, but may be read (without locking) by other CPUs must still be
marked properly to avoid data races. However, concurrent writes,
regardless if WRITE_ONCE() or not, would be a bug. Using
kcsan_check_access(&x, sizeof(x), KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) would allow
catching such bugs.
To support KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT the following notable changes were made:
* If an access is of type KCSAN_ASSERT_ACCESS, disable various filters
that only apply to data races, so that all races that KCSAN observes are
reported.
* Bug reports that involve an ASSERT access type will be reported as
"KCSAN: assert: race in ..." instead of "data-race"; this will help
more easily distinguish them.
* Update a few comments to just mention 'races' where we do not always
mean pure data races.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-02-06 22:46:24 +07:00
|
|
|
const bool is_assert = (type & KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) != 0;
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
|
|
|
|
union {
|
|
|
|
u8 _1;
|
|
|
|
u16 _2;
|
|
|
|
u32 _4;
|
|
|
|
u64 _8;
|
|
|
|
} expect_value;
|
2020-02-11 23:04:22 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long access_mask;
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
enum kcsan_value_change value_change = KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_MAYBE;
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save();
|
|
|
|
unsigned long irq_flags;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Always reset kcsan_skip counter in slow-path to avoid underflow; see
|
|
|
|
* should_watch().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
reset_kcsan_skip();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!kcsan_is_enabled())
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!check_encodable((unsigned long)ptr, size)) {
|
|
|
|
kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_UNENCODABLE_ACCESSES);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Disable interrupts & preemptions to avoid another thread on the same
|
|
|
|
* CPU accessing memory locations for the set up watchpoint; this is to
|
|
|
|
* avoid reporting races to e.g. CPU-local data.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* An alternative would be adding the source CPU to the watchpoint
|
|
|
|
* encoding, and checking that watchpoint-CPU != this-CPU. There are
|
|
|
|
* several problems with this:
|
|
|
|
* 1. we should avoid stealing more bits from the watchpoint encoding
|
|
|
|
* as it would affect accuracy, as well as increase performance
|
|
|
|
* overhead in the fast-path;
|
|
|
|
* 2. if we are preempted, but there *is* a genuine data race, we
|
|
|
|
* would *not* report it -- since this is the common case (vs.
|
|
|
|
* CPU-local data accesses), it makes more sense (from a data race
|
|
|
|
* detection point of view) to simply disable preemptions to ensure
|
|
|
|
* as many tasks as possible run on other CPUs.
|
2020-01-15 23:25:12 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Use raw versions, to avoid lockdep recursion via IRQ flags tracing.
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-01-15 23:25:12 +07:00
|
|
|
raw_local_irq_save(irq_flags);
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
watchpoint = insert_watchpoint((unsigned long)ptr, size, is_write);
|
|
|
|
if (watchpoint == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-11-20 16:41:43 +07:00
|
|
|
* Out of capacity: the size of 'watchpoints', and the frequency
|
|
|
|
* with which should_watch() returns true should be tweaked so
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
* that this case happens very rarely.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_NO_CAPACITY);
|
|
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_SETUP_WATCHPOINTS);
|
|
|
|
kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_USED_WATCHPOINTS);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Read the current value, to later check and infer a race if the data
|
|
|
|
* was modified via a non-instrumented access, e.g. from a device.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
expect_value._8 = 0;
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
switch (size) {
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
expect_value._1 = READ_ONCE(*(const u8 *)ptr);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
|
|
|
expect_value._2 = READ_ONCE(*(const u16 *)ptr);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
|
|
|
expect_value._4 = READ_ONCE(*(const u32 *)ptr);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 8:
|
|
|
|
expect_value._8 = READ_ONCE(*(const u64 *)ptr);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break; /* ignore; we do not diff the values */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_DEBUG)) {
|
|
|
|
kcsan_disable_current();
|
|
|
|
pr_err("KCSAN: watching %s, size: %zu, addr: %px [slot: %d, encoded: %lx]\n",
|
|
|
|
is_write ? "write" : "read", size, ptr,
|
|
|
|
watchpoint_slot((unsigned long)ptr),
|
|
|
|
encode_watchpoint((unsigned long)ptr, size, is_write));
|
|
|
|
kcsan_enable_current();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Delay this thread, to increase probability of observing a racy
|
|
|
|
* conflicting access.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
udelay(get_delay());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Re-read value, and check if it is as expected; if not, we infer a
|
|
|
|
* racy access.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-02-11 23:04:22 +07:00
|
|
|
access_mask = get_ctx()->access_mask;
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
switch (size) {
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
expect_value._1 ^= READ_ONCE(*(const u8 *)ptr);
|
2020-02-11 23:04:22 +07:00
|
|
|
if (access_mask)
|
|
|
|
expect_value._1 &= (u8)access_mask;
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
expect_value._2 ^= READ_ONCE(*(const u16 *)ptr);
|
2020-02-11 23:04:22 +07:00
|
|
|
if (access_mask)
|
|
|
|
expect_value._2 &= (u16)access_mask;
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
expect_value._4 ^= READ_ONCE(*(const u32 *)ptr);
|
2020-02-11 23:04:22 +07:00
|
|
|
if (access_mask)
|
|
|
|
expect_value._4 &= (u32)access_mask;
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 8:
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
expect_value._8 ^= READ_ONCE(*(const u64 *)ptr);
|
2020-02-11 23:04:22 +07:00
|
|
|
if (access_mask)
|
|
|
|
expect_value._8 &= (u64)access_mask;
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break; /* ignore; we do not diff the values */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Were we able to observe a value-change? */
|
|
|
|
if (expect_value._8 != 0)
|
|
|
|
value_change = KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_TRUE;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Check if this access raced with another. */
|
|
|
|
if (!remove_watchpoint(watchpoint)) {
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Depending on the access type, map a value_change of MAYBE to
|
2020-02-11 23:04:22 +07:00
|
|
|
* TRUE (always report) or FALSE (never report).
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-02-11 23:04:22 +07:00
|
|
|
if (value_change == KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_MAYBE) {
|
|
|
|
if (access_mask != 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For access with access_mask, we require a
|
|
|
|
* value-change, as it is likely that races on
|
|
|
|
* ~access_mask bits are expected.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
value_change = KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_FALSE;
|
|
|
|
} else if (size > 8 || is_assert) {
|
|
|
|
/* Always assume a value-change. */
|
|
|
|
value_change = KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_TRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* No need to increment 'data_races' counter, as the racing
|
|
|
|
* thread already did.
|
kcsan: Introduce KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type
The KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type may be used to introduce dummy reads
and writes to assert certain properties of concurrent code, where bugs
could not be detected as normal data races.
For example, a variable that is only meant to be written by a single
CPU, but may be read (without locking) by other CPUs must still be
marked properly to avoid data races. However, concurrent writes,
regardless if WRITE_ONCE() or not, would be a bug. Using
kcsan_check_access(&x, sizeof(x), KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) would allow
catching such bugs.
To support KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT the following notable changes were made:
* If an access is of type KCSAN_ASSERT_ACCESS, disable various filters
that only apply to data races, so that all races that KCSAN observes are
reported.
* Bug reports that involve an ASSERT access type will be reported as
"KCSAN: assert: race in ..." instead of "data-race"; this will help
more easily distinguish them.
* Update a few comments to just mention 'races' where we do not always
mean pure data races.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-02-06 22:46:24 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Count 'assert_failures' for each failed ASSERT access,
|
|
|
|
* therefore both this thread and the racing thread may
|
|
|
|
* increment this counter.
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
if (is_assert && value_change == KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_TRUE)
|
kcsan: Introduce KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type
The KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type may be used to introduce dummy reads
and writes to assert certain properties of concurrent code, where bugs
could not be detected as normal data races.
For example, a variable that is only meant to be written by a single
CPU, but may be read (without locking) by other CPUs must still be
marked properly to avoid data races. However, concurrent writes,
regardless if WRITE_ONCE() or not, would be a bug. Using
kcsan_check_access(&x, sizeof(x), KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) would allow
catching such bugs.
To support KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT the following notable changes were made:
* If an access is of type KCSAN_ASSERT_ACCESS, disable various filters
that only apply to data races, so that all races that KCSAN observes are
reported.
* Bug reports that involve an ASSERT access type will be reported as
"KCSAN: assert: race in ..." instead of "data-race"; this will help
more easily distinguish them.
* Update a few comments to just mention 'races' where we do not always
mean pure data races.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-02-06 22:46:24 +07:00
|
|
|
kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_ASSERT_FAILURES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kcsan_report(ptr, size, type, value_change, smp_processor_id(),
|
|
|
|
KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_SIGNAL);
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
} else if (value_change == KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_TRUE) {
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Inferring a race, since the value should not have changed. */
|
kcsan: Introduce KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type
The KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type may be used to introduce dummy reads
and writes to assert certain properties of concurrent code, where bugs
could not be detected as normal data races.
For example, a variable that is only meant to be written by a single
CPU, but may be read (without locking) by other CPUs must still be
marked properly to avoid data races. However, concurrent writes,
regardless if WRITE_ONCE() or not, would be a bug. Using
kcsan_check_access(&x, sizeof(x), KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) would allow
catching such bugs.
To support KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT the following notable changes were made:
* If an access is of type KCSAN_ASSERT_ACCESS, disable various filters
that only apply to data races, so that all races that KCSAN observes are
reported.
* Bug reports that involve an ASSERT access type will be reported as
"KCSAN: assert: race in ..." instead of "data-race"; this will help
more easily distinguish them.
* Update a few comments to just mention 'races' where we do not always
mean pure data races.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-02-06 22:46:24 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_RACES_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN);
|
kcsan: Introduce KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type
The KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type may be used to introduce dummy reads
and writes to assert certain properties of concurrent code, where bugs
could not be detected as normal data races.
For example, a variable that is only meant to be written by a single
CPU, but may be read (without locking) by other CPUs must still be
marked properly to avoid data races. However, concurrent writes,
regardless if WRITE_ONCE() or not, would be a bug. Using
kcsan_check_access(&x, sizeof(x), KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) would allow
catching such bugs.
To support KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT the following notable changes were made:
* If an access is of type KCSAN_ASSERT_ACCESS, disable various filters
that only apply to data races, so that all races that KCSAN observes are
reported.
* Bug reports that involve an ASSERT access type will be reported as
"KCSAN: assert: race in ..." instead of "data-race"; this will help
more easily distinguish them.
* Update a few comments to just mention 'races' where we do not always
mean pure data races.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-02-06 22:46:24 +07:00
|
|
|
if (is_assert)
|
|
|
|
kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_ASSERT_FAILURES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN) || is_assert)
|
2020-02-11 23:04:21 +07:00
|
|
|
kcsan_report(ptr, size, type, KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_TRUE,
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
smp_processor_id(),
|
|
|
|
KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kcsan_counter_dec(KCSAN_COUNTER_USED_WATCHPOINTS);
|
|
|
|
out_unlock:
|
2020-01-15 23:25:12 +07:00
|
|
|
raw_local_irq_restore(irq_flags);
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
user_access_restore(ua_flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static __always_inline void check_access(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size,
|
|
|
|
int type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const bool is_write = (type & KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE) != 0;
|
|
|
|
atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
|
|
|
|
long encoded_watchpoint;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-05 17:14:19 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Do nothing for 0 sized check; this comparison will be optimized out
|
|
|
|
* for constant sized instrumentation (__tsan_{read,write}N).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(size == 0))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Avoid user_access_save in fast-path: find_watchpoint is safe without
|
|
|
|
* user_access_save, as the address that ptr points to is only used to
|
|
|
|
* check if a watchpoint exists; ptr is never dereferenced.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
watchpoint = find_watchpoint((unsigned long)ptr, size, !is_write,
|
|
|
|
&encoded_watchpoint);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* It is safe to check kcsan_is_enabled() after find_watchpoint in the
|
kcsan: Introduce KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type
The KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access type may be used to introduce dummy reads
and writes to assert certain properties of concurrent code, where bugs
could not be detected as normal data races.
For example, a variable that is only meant to be written by a single
CPU, but may be read (without locking) by other CPUs must still be
marked properly to avoid data races. However, concurrent writes,
regardless if WRITE_ONCE() or not, would be a bug. Using
kcsan_check_access(&x, sizeof(x), KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) would allow
catching such bugs.
To support KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT the following notable changes were made:
* If an access is of type KCSAN_ASSERT_ACCESS, disable various filters
that only apply to data races, so that all races that KCSAN observes are
reported.
* Bug reports that involve an ASSERT access type will be reported as
"KCSAN: assert: race in ..." instead of "data-race"; this will help
more easily distinguish them.
* Update a few comments to just mention 'races' where we do not always
mean pure data races.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-02-06 22:46:24 +07:00
|
|
|
* slow-path, as long as no state changes that cause a race to be
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
* detected and reported have occurred until kcsan_is_enabled() is
|
|
|
|
* checked.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(watchpoint != NULL))
|
2020-01-11 01:48:33 +07:00
|
|
|
kcsan_found_watchpoint(ptr, size, type, watchpoint,
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
encoded_watchpoint);
|
2020-02-05 00:21:10 +07:00
|
|
|
else if (unlikely(should_watch(ptr, size, type)))
|
2020-01-11 01:48:33 +07:00
|
|
|
kcsan_setup_watchpoint(ptr, size, type);
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* === Public interface ===================================================== */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void __init kcsan_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!in_task());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kcsan_debugfs_init();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We are in the init task, and no other tasks should be running;
|
|
|
|
* WRITE_ONCE without memory barrier is sufficient.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-02-08 01:59:10 +07:00
|
|
|
if (kcsan_early_enable)
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(kcsan_enabled, true);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* === Exported interface =================================================== */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void kcsan_disable_current(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
++get_ctx()->disable_count;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_disable_current);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void kcsan_enable_current(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (get_ctx()->disable_count-- == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Warn if kcsan_enable_current() calls are unbalanced with
|
|
|
|
* kcsan_disable_current() calls, which causes disable_count to
|
|
|
|
* become negative and should not happen.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
kcsan_disable_current(); /* restore to 0, KCSAN still enabled */
|
|
|
|
kcsan_disable_current(); /* disable to generate warning */
|
|
|
|
WARN(1, "Unbalanced %s()", __func__);
|
|
|
|
kcsan_enable_current();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_enable_current);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Do *not* check and warn if we are in a flat atomic region: nestable
|
|
|
|
* and flat atomic regions are independent from each other.
|
|
|
|
* See include/linux/kcsan.h: struct kcsan_ctx comments for more
|
|
|
|
* comments.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
++get_ctx()->atomic_nest_count;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void kcsan_nestable_atomic_end(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (get_ctx()->atomic_nest_count-- == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Warn if kcsan_nestable_atomic_end() calls are unbalanced with
|
|
|
|
* kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin() calls, which causes
|
|
|
|
* atomic_nest_count to become negative and should not happen.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin(); /* restore to 0 */
|
|
|
|
kcsan_disable_current(); /* disable to generate warning */
|
|
|
|
WARN(1, "Unbalanced %s()", __func__);
|
|
|
|
kcsan_enable_current();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_nestable_atomic_end);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void kcsan_flat_atomic_begin(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
get_ctx()->in_flat_atomic = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_flat_atomic_begin);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void kcsan_flat_atomic_end(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
get_ctx()->in_flat_atomic = false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_flat_atomic_end);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void kcsan_atomic_next(int n)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
get_ctx()->atomic_next = n;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_atomic_next);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-11 23:04:22 +07:00
|
|
|
void kcsan_set_access_mask(unsigned long mask)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
get_ctx()->access_mask = mask;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcsan_set_access_mask);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-15 01:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
void __kcsan_check_access(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
check_access(ptr, size, type);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kcsan_check_access);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* KCSAN uses the same instrumentation that is emitted by supported compilers
|
|
|
|
* for ThreadSanitizer (TSAN).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* When enabled, the compiler emits instrumentation calls (the functions
|
|
|
|
* prefixed with "__tsan" below) for all loads and stores that it generated;
|
|
|
|
* inline asm is not instrumented.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note that, not all supported compiler versions distinguish aligned/unaligned
|
|
|
|
* accesses, but e.g. recent versions of Clang do. We simply alias the unaligned
|
|
|
|
* version to the generic version, which can handle both.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define DEFINE_TSAN_READ_WRITE(size) \
|
|
|
|
void __tsan_read##size(void *ptr) \
|
|
|
|
{ \
|
|
|
|
check_access(ptr, size, 0); \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_read##size); \
|
|
|
|
void __tsan_unaligned_read##size(void *ptr) \
|
|
|
|
__alias(__tsan_read##size); \
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_unaligned_read##size); \
|
|
|
|
void __tsan_write##size(void *ptr) \
|
|
|
|
{ \
|
|
|
|
check_access(ptr, size, KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE); \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_write##size); \
|
|
|
|
void __tsan_unaligned_write##size(void *ptr) \
|
|
|
|
__alias(__tsan_write##size); \
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_unaligned_write##size)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_TSAN_READ_WRITE(1);
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_TSAN_READ_WRITE(2);
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_TSAN_READ_WRITE(4);
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_TSAN_READ_WRITE(8);
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_TSAN_READ_WRITE(16);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void __tsan_read_range(void *ptr, size_t size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
check_access(ptr, size, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_read_range);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void __tsan_write_range(void *ptr, size_t size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
check_access(ptr, size, KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_write_range);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The below are not required by KCSAN, but can still be emitted by the
|
|
|
|
* compiler.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void __tsan_func_entry(void *call_pc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_func_entry);
|
|
|
|
void __tsan_func_exit(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_func_exit);
|
|
|
|
void __tsan_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_init);
|