linux_dsm_epyc7002/arch/ia64/kernel/crash.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 21:07:57 +07:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* arch/ia64/kernel/crash.c
*
* Architecture specific (ia64) functions for kexec based crash dumps.
*
* Created by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@hp.com>
* Copyright (C) 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
* Copyright (C) 2005 Intel Corp Zou Nan hai <nanhai.zou@intel.com>
*
*/
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/elfcore.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
#include <asm/mca.h>
int kdump_status[NR_CPUS];
static atomic_t kdump_cpu_frozen;
atomic_t kdump_in_progress;
[IA64] kdump: Mask INIT first in panic-kdump path Summary: Asserting INIT might block kdump if the system is already going to start kdump via panic. Description: INIT can interrupt anywhere in panic path, so it can interrupt in middle of kdump kicked by panic. Therefore there is a race if kdump is kicked concurrently, via Panic and via INIT. INIT could fail to invoke kdump if the system is already going to start kdump via panic. It could not restart kdump from INIT handler if some of cpus are already playing dead with INIT masked. It also means that INIT could block kdump's progress if no monarch is entered in the INIT rendezvous. Panic+INIT is a rare, but possible situation since it can be assumed that the kernel or an internal agent decides to panic the unstable system while another external agent decides to send an INIT to the system at same time. How to reproduce: Assert INIT just after panic, before all other cpus have frozen Expected results: continue kdump invoked by panic, or restart kdump from INIT Actual results: might be hang, crashdump not retrieved Proposed Fix: This patch masks INIT first in panic path to take the initiative on kdump, and reuse atomic value kdump_in_progress to make sure there is only one initiator of kdump. All INITs asserted later should be used only for freezing all other cpus. This mask will be removed soon by rfi in relocate_kernel.S, before jump into kdump kernel, after all cpus are frozen and no-op INIT handler is registered. So if INIT was in the interval while it is masked, it will pend on the system and will received just after the rfi, and handled by the no-op handler. If there was a MCA event while psr.mc is 1, in theory the event will pend on the system and will received just after the rfi same as above. MCA handler is unregistered here at the time, so received MCA will not reach to OS_MCA and will result in warmboot by SAL. Note that codes in this masked interval are relatively simpler than that in MCA/INIT handler which also executed with the mask. So it can be said that probability of error in this interval is supposed not so higher than that in MCA/INIT handler. Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Haren Myneni <hbabu@us.ibm.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
2009-08-07 04:51:57 +07:00
static int kdump_freeze_monarch;
static int kdump_on_init = 1;
static int kdump_on_fatal_mca = 1;
extern void ia64_dump_cpu_regs(void *);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct elf_prstatus, elf_prstatus);
void
crash_save_this_cpu(void)
{
void *buf;
unsigned long cfm, sof, sol;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct elf_prstatus *prstatus = &per_cpu(elf_prstatus, cpu);
elf_greg_t *dst = (elf_greg_t *)&(prstatus->pr_reg);
memset(prstatus, 0, sizeof(*prstatus));
prstatus->pr_pid = current->pid;
ia64_dump_cpu_regs(dst);
cfm = dst[43];
sol = (cfm >> 7) & 0x7f;
sof = cfm & 0x7f;
dst[46] = (unsigned long)ia64_rse_skip_regs((unsigned long *)dst[46],
sof - sol);
buf = (u64 *) per_cpu_ptr(crash_notes, cpu);
if (!buf)
return;
buf = append_elf_note(buf, KEXEC_CORE_NOTE_NAME, NT_PRSTATUS, prstatus,
sizeof(*prstatus));
final_note(buf);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
static int
kdump_wait_cpu_freeze(void)
{
int cpu_num = num_online_cpus() - 1;
int timeout = 1000;
while(timeout-- > 0) {
if (atomic_read(&kdump_cpu_frozen) == cpu_num)
return 0;
udelay(1000);
}
return 1;
}
#endif
void
machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *pt)
{
/* This function is only called after the system
* has paniced or is otherwise in a critical state.
* The minimum amount of code to allow a kexec'd kernel
* to run successfully needs to happen here.
*
* In practice this means shooting down the other cpus in
* an SMP system.
*/
kexec_disable_iosapic();
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
[IA64] kdump: Mask INIT first in panic-kdump path Summary: Asserting INIT might block kdump if the system is already going to start kdump via panic. Description: INIT can interrupt anywhere in panic path, so it can interrupt in middle of kdump kicked by panic. Therefore there is a race if kdump is kicked concurrently, via Panic and via INIT. INIT could fail to invoke kdump if the system is already going to start kdump via panic. It could not restart kdump from INIT handler if some of cpus are already playing dead with INIT masked. It also means that INIT could block kdump's progress if no monarch is entered in the INIT rendezvous. Panic+INIT is a rare, but possible situation since it can be assumed that the kernel or an internal agent decides to panic the unstable system while another external agent decides to send an INIT to the system at same time. How to reproduce: Assert INIT just after panic, before all other cpus have frozen Expected results: continue kdump invoked by panic, or restart kdump from INIT Actual results: might be hang, crashdump not retrieved Proposed Fix: This patch masks INIT first in panic path to take the initiative on kdump, and reuse atomic value kdump_in_progress to make sure there is only one initiator of kdump. All INITs asserted later should be used only for freezing all other cpus. This mask will be removed soon by rfi in relocate_kernel.S, before jump into kdump kernel, after all cpus are frozen and no-op INIT handler is registered. So if INIT was in the interval while it is masked, it will pend on the system and will received just after the rfi, and handled by the no-op handler. If there was a MCA event while psr.mc is 1, in theory the event will pend on the system and will received just after the rfi same as above. MCA handler is unregistered here at the time, so received MCA will not reach to OS_MCA and will result in warmboot by SAL. Note that codes in this masked interval are relatively simpler than that in MCA/INIT handler which also executed with the mask. So it can be said that probability of error in this interval is supposed not so higher than that in MCA/INIT handler. Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Haren Myneni <hbabu@us.ibm.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
2009-08-07 04:51:57 +07:00
/*
* If kdump_on_init is set and an INIT is asserted here, kdump will
* be started again via INIT monarch.
*/
local_irq_disable();
ia64_set_psr_mc(); /* mask MCA/INIT */
if (atomic_inc_return(&kdump_in_progress) != 1)
unw_init_running(kdump_cpu_freeze, NULL);
/*
* Now this cpu is ready for kdump.
* Stop all others by IPI or INIT. They could receive INIT from
* outside and might be INIT monarch, but only thing they have to
* do is falling into kdump_cpu_freeze().
*
* If an INIT is asserted here:
* - All receivers might be slaves, since some of cpus could already
* be frozen and INIT might be masked on monarch. In this case,
* all slaves will be frozen soon since kdump_in_progress will let
* them into DIE_INIT_SLAVE_LEAVE.
[IA64] kdump: Mask INIT first in panic-kdump path Summary: Asserting INIT might block kdump if the system is already going to start kdump via panic. Description: INIT can interrupt anywhere in panic path, so it can interrupt in middle of kdump kicked by panic. Therefore there is a race if kdump is kicked concurrently, via Panic and via INIT. INIT could fail to invoke kdump if the system is already going to start kdump via panic. It could not restart kdump from INIT handler if some of cpus are already playing dead with INIT masked. It also means that INIT could block kdump's progress if no monarch is entered in the INIT rendezvous. Panic+INIT is a rare, but possible situation since it can be assumed that the kernel or an internal agent decides to panic the unstable system while another external agent decides to send an INIT to the system at same time. How to reproduce: Assert INIT just after panic, before all other cpus have frozen Expected results: continue kdump invoked by panic, or restart kdump from INIT Actual results: might be hang, crashdump not retrieved Proposed Fix: This patch masks INIT first in panic path to take the initiative on kdump, and reuse atomic value kdump_in_progress to make sure there is only one initiator of kdump. All INITs asserted later should be used only for freezing all other cpus. This mask will be removed soon by rfi in relocate_kernel.S, before jump into kdump kernel, after all cpus are frozen and no-op INIT handler is registered. So if INIT was in the interval while it is masked, it will pend on the system and will received just after the rfi, and handled by the no-op handler. If there was a MCA event while psr.mc is 1, in theory the event will pend on the system and will received just after the rfi same as above. MCA handler is unregistered here at the time, so received MCA will not reach to OS_MCA and will result in warmboot by SAL. Note that codes in this masked interval are relatively simpler than that in MCA/INIT handler which also executed with the mask. So it can be said that probability of error in this interval is supposed not so higher than that in MCA/INIT handler. Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Haren Myneni <hbabu@us.ibm.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
2009-08-07 04:51:57 +07:00
* - One might be a monarch, but INIT rendezvous will fail since
* at least this cpu already have INIT masked so it never join
* to the rendezvous. In this case, all slaves and monarch will
* be frozen soon with no wait since the INIT rendezvous is skipped
* by kdump_in_progress.
[IA64] kdump: Mask INIT first in panic-kdump path Summary: Asserting INIT might block kdump if the system is already going to start kdump via panic. Description: INIT can interrupt anywhere in panic path, so it can interrupt in middle of kdump kicked by panic. Therefore there is a race if kdump is kicked concurrently, via Panic and via INIT. INIT could fail to invoke kdump if the system is already going to start kdump via panic. It could not restart kdump from INIT handler if some of cpus are already playing dead with INIT masked. It also means that INIT could block kdump's progress if no monarch is entered in the INIT rendezvous. Panic+INIT is a rare, but possible situation since it can be assumed that the kernel or an internal agent decides to panic the unstable system while another external agent decides to send an INIT to the system at same time. How to reproduce: Assert INIT just after panic, before all other cpus have frozen Expected results: continue kdump invoked by panic, or restart kdump from INIT Actual results: might be hang, crashdump not retrieved Proposed Fix: This patch masks INIT first in panic path to take the initiative on kdump, and reuse atomic value kdump_in_progress to make sure there is only one initiator of kdump. All INITs asserted later should be used only for freezing all other cpus. This mask will be removed soon by rfi in relocate_kernel.S, before jump into kdump kernel, after all cpus are frozen and no-op INIT handler is registered. So if INIT was in the interval while it is masked, it will pend on the system and will received just after the rfi, and handled by the no-op handler. If there was a MCA event while psr.mc is 1, in theory the event will pend on the system and will received just after the rfi same as above. MCA handler is unregistered here at the time, so received MCA will not reach to OS_MCA and will result in warmboot by SAL. Note that codes in this masked interval are relatively simpler than that in MCA/INIT handler which also executed with the mask. So it can be said that probability of error in this interval is supposed not so higher than that in MCA/INIT handler. Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Haren Myneni <hbabu@us.ibm.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
2009-08-07 04:51:57 +07:00
*/
kdump_smp_send_stop();
/* not all cpu response to IPI, send INIT to freeze them */
if (kdump_wait_cpu_freeze()) {
kdump_smp_send_init();
/* wait again, don't go ahead if possible */
kdump_wait_cpu_freeze();
}
#endif
}
static void
machine_kdump_on_init(void)
{
crash_save_vmcoreinfo();
local_irq_disable();
kexec_disable_iosapic();
machine_kexec(ia64_kimage);
}
void
kdump_cpu_freeze(struct unw_frame_info *info, void *arg)
{
int cpuid;
[IA64] kdump: Mask MCA/INIT on frozen cpus Summary: INIT asserted on kdump kernel invokes INIT handler not only on a cpu that running on the kdump kernel, but also BSP of the panicked kernel, because the (badly) frozen BSP can be thawed by INIT. Description: The kdump_cpu_freeze() is called on cpus except one that initiates panic and/or kdump, to stop/offline the cpu (on ia64, it means we pass control of cpus to SAL, or put them in spinloop). Note that CPU0(BSP) always go to spinloop, so if panic was happened on an AP, there are at least 2cpus (= the AP and BSP) which not back to SAL. On the spinning cpus, interrupts are disabled (rsm psr.i), but INIT is still interruptible because psr.mc for mask them is not set unless kdump_cpu_freeze() is not called from MCA/INIT context. Therefore, assume that a panic was happened on an AP, kdump was invoked, new INIT handlers for kdump kernel was registered and then an INIT is asserted. From the viewpoint of SAL, there are 2 online cpus, so INIT will be delivered to both of them. It likely means that not only the AP (= a cpu executing kdump) enters INIT handler which is newly registered, but also BSP (= another cpu spinning in panicked kernel) enters the same INIT handler. Of course setting of registers in BSP are still old (for panicked kernel), so what happen with running handler with wrong setting will be extremely unexpected. I believe this is not desirable behavior. How to Reproduce: Start kdump on one of APs (e.g. cpu1) # taskset 0x2 echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger Then assert INIT after kdump kernel is booted, after new INIT handler for kdump kernel is registered. Expected results: An INIT handler is invoked only on the AP. Actual results: An INIT handler is invoked on the AP and BSP. Sample of results: I got following console log by asserting INIT after prompt "root:/>". It seems that two monarchs appeared by one INIT, and one panicked at last. And it also seems that the panicked one supposed there were 4 online cpus and no one did rendezvous: : [ 0 %]dropping to initramfs shell exiting this shell will reboot your system root:/> Entered OS INIT handler. PSP=fff301a0 cpu=0 monarch=0 ia64_init_handler: Promoting cpu 0 to monarch. Delaying for 5 seconds... All OS INIT slaves have reached rendezvous Processes interrupted by INIT - 0 (cpu 0 task 0xa000000100af0000) : <<snip>> : Entered OS INIT handler. PSP=fff301a0 cpu=0 monarch=1 Delaying for 5 seconds... mlogbuf_finish: printing switched to urgent mode, MCA/INIT might be dodgy or fail. OS INIT slave did not rendezvous on cpu 1 2 3 INIT swapper 0[0]: bugcheck! 0 [1] : <<snip>> : Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! Proposed fix: To avoid this problem, this patch inserts ia64_set_psr_mc() to mask INIT on cpus going to be frozen. This masking have no effect if the kdump_cpu_freeze() is called from INIT handler when kdump_on_init == 1, because psr.mc is already turned on to 1 before entering OS_INIT. I confirmed that weird log like above are disappeared after applying this patch. Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Haren Myneni <hbabu@us.ibm.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
2009-08-07 04:51:56 +07:00
local_irq_disable();
cpuid = smp_processor_id();
crash_save_this_cpu();
current->thread.ksp = (__u64)info->sw - 16;
[IA64] kdump: Mask MCA/INIT on frozen cpus Summary: INIT asserted on kdump kernel invokes INIT handler not only on a cpu that running on the kdump kernel, but also BSP of the panicked kernel, because the (badly) frozen BSP can be thawed by INIT. Description: The kdump_cpu_freeze() is called on cpus except one that initiates panic and/or kdump, to stop/offline the cpu (on ia64, it means we pass control of cpus to SAL, or put them in spinloop). Note that CPU0(BSP) always go to spinloop, so if panic was happened on an AP, there are at least 2cpus (= the AP and BSP) which not back to SAL. On the spinning cpus, interrupts are disabled (rsm psr.i), but INIT is still interruptible because psr.mc for mask them is not set unless kdump_cpu_freeze() is not called from MCA/INIT context. Therefore, assume that a panic was happened on an AP, kdump was invoked, new INIT handlers for kdump kernel was registered and then an INIT is asserted. From the viewpoint of SAL, there are 2 online cpus, so INIT will be delivered to both of them. It likely means that not only the AP (= a cpu executing kdump) enters INIT handler which is newly registered, but also BSP (= another cpu spinning in panicked kernel) enters the same INIT handler. Of course setting of registers in BSP are still old (for panicked kernel), so what happen with running handler with wrong setting will be extremely unexpected. I believe this is not desirable behavior. How to Reproduce: Start kdump on one of APs (e.g. cpu1) # taskset 0x2 echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger Then assert INIT after kdump kernel is booted, after new INIT handler for kdump kernel is registered. Expected results: An INIT handler is invoked only on the AP. Actual results: An INIT handler is invoked on the AP and BSP. Sample of results: I got following console log by asserting INIT after prompt "root:/>". It seems that two monarchs appeared by one INIT, and one panicked at last. And it also seems that the panicked one supposed there were 4 online cpus and no one did rendezvous: : [ 0 %]dropping to initramfs shell exiting this shell will reboot your system root:/> Entered OS INIT handler. PSP=fff301a0 cpu=0 monarch=0 ia64_init_handler: Promoting cpu 0 to monarch. Delaying for 5 seconds... All OS INIT slaves have reached rendezvous Processes interrupted by INIT - 0 (cpu 0 task 0xa000000100af0000) : <<snip>> : Entered OS INIT handler. PSP=fff301a0 cpu=0 monarch=1 Delaying for 5 seconds... mlogbuf_finish: printing switched to urgent mode, MCA/INIT might be dodgy or fail. OS INIT slave did not rendezvous on cpu 1 2 3 INIT swapper 0[0]: bugcheck! 0 [1] : <<snip>> : Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! Proposed fix: To avoid this problem, this patch inserts ia64_set_psr_mc() to mask INIT on cpus going to be frozen. This masking have no effect if the kdump_cpu_freeze() is called from INIT handler when kdump_on_init == 1, because psr.mc is already turned on to 1 before entering OS_INIT. I confirmed that weird log like above are disappeared after applying this patch. Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Haren Myneni <hbabu@us.ibm.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
2009-08-07 04:51:56 +07:00
ia64_set_psr_mc(); /* mask MCA/INIT and stop reentrance */
atomic_inc(&kdump_cpu_frozen);
kdump_status[cpuid] = 1;
mb();
for (;;)
cpu_relax();
}
static int
kdump_init_notifier(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long val, void *data)
{
struct ia64_mca_notify_die *nd;
struct die_args *args = data;
if (atomic_read(&kdump_in_progress)) {
switch (val) {
case DIE_INIT_MONARCH_LEAVE:
if (!kdump_freeze_monarch)
break;
/* fall through */
case DIE_INIT_SLAVE_LEAVE:
case DIE_INIT_MONARCH_ENTER:
case DIE_MCA_RENDZVOUS_LEAVE:
unw_init_running(kdump_cpu_freeze, NULL);
break;
}
}
if (!kdump_on_init && !kdump_on_fatal_mca)
return NOTIFY_DONE;
if (!ia64_kimage) {
if (val == DIE_INIT_MONARCH_LEAVE)
ia64_mca_printk(KERN_NOTICE
"%s: kdump not configured\n",
__func__);
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
if (val != DIE_INIT_MONARCH_LEAVE &&
val != DIE_INIT_MONARCH_PROCESS &&
val != DIE_MCA_MONARCH_LEAVE)
return NOTIFY_DONE;
nd = (struct ia64_mca_notify_die *)args->err;
switch (val) {
case DIE_INIT_MONARCH_PROCESS:
/* Reason code 1 means machine check rendezvous*/
if (kdump_on_init && (nd->sos->rv_rc != 1)) {
[IA64] kdump: Mask INIT first in panic-kdump path Summary: Asserting INIT might block kdump if the system is already going to start kdump via panic. Description: INIT can interrupt anywhere in panic path, so it can interrupt in middle of kdump kicked by panic. Therefore there is a race if kdump is kicked concurrently, via Panic and via INIT. INIT could fail to invoke kdump if the system is already going to start kdump via panic. It could not restart kdump from INIT handler if some of cpus are already playing dead with INIT masked. It also means that INIT could block kdump's progress if no monarch is entered in the INIT rendezvous. Panic+INIT is a rare, but possible situation since it can be assumed that the kernel or an internal agent decides to panic the unstable system while another external agent decides to send an INIT to the system at same time. How to reproduce: Assert INIT just after panic, before all other cpus have frozen Expected results: continue kdump invoked by panic, or restart kdump from INIT Actual results: might be hang, crashdump not retrieved Proposed Fix: This patch masks INIT first in panic path to take the initiative on kdump, and reuse atomic value kdump_in_progress to make sure there is only one initiator of kdump. All INITs asserted later should be used only for freezing all other cpus. This mask will be removed soon by rfi in relocate_kernel.S, before jump into kdump kernel, after all cpus are frozen and no-op INIT handler is registered. So if INIT was in the interval while it is masked, it will pend on the system and will received just after the rfi, and handled by the no-op handler. If there was a MCA event while psr.mc is 1, in theory the event will pend on the system and will received just after the rfi same as above. MCA handler is unregistered here at the time, so received MCA will not reach to OS_MCA and will result in warmboot by SAL. Note that codes in this masked interval are relatively simpler than that in MCA/INIT handler which also executed with the mask. So it can be said that probability of error in this interval is supposed not so higher than that in MCA/INIT handler. Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Haren Myneni <hbabu@us.ibm.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
2009-08-07 04:51:57 +07:00
if (atomic_inc_return(&kdump_in_progress) != 1)
kdump_freeze_monarch = 1;
}
break;
case DIE_INIT_MONARCH_LEAVE:
/* Reason code 1 means machine check rendezvous*/
if (kdump_on_init && (nd->sos->rv_rc != 1))
machine_kdump_on_init();
break;
case DIE_MCA_MONARCH_LEAVE:
/* *(nd->data) indicate if MCA is recoverable */
if (kdump_on_fatal_mca && !(*(nd->data))) {
if (atomic_inc_return(&kdump_in_progress) == 1)
[IA64] kdump: Mask INIT first in panic-kdump path Summary: Asserting INIT might block kdump if the system is already going to start kdump via panic. Description: INIT can interrupt anywhere in panic path, so it can interrupt in middle of kdump kicked by panic. Therefore there is a race if kdump is kicked concurrently, via Panic and via INIT. INIT could fail to invoke kdump if the system is already going to start kdump via panic. It could not restart kdump from INIT handler if some of cpus are already playing dead with INIT masked. It also means that INIT could block kdump's progress if no monarch is entered in the INIT rendezvous. Panic+INIT is a rare, but possible situation since it can be assumed that the kernel or an internal agent decides to panic the unstable system while another external agent decides to send an INIT to the system at same time. How to reproduce: Assert INIT just after panic, before all other cpus have frozen Expected results: continue kdump invoked by panic, or restart kdump from INIT Actual results: might be hang, crashdump not retrieved Proposed Fix: This patch masks INIT first in panic path to take the initiative on kdump, and reuse atomic value kdump_in_progress to make sure there is only one initiator of kdump. All INITs asserted later should be used only for freezing all other cpus. This mask will be removed soon by rfi in relocate_kernel.S, before jump into kdump kernel, after all cpus are frozen and no-op INIT handler is registered. So if INIT was in the interval while it is masked, it will pend on the system and will received just after the rfi, and handled by the no-op handler. If there was a MCA event while psr.mc is 1, in theory the event will pend on the system and will received just after the rfi same as above. MCA handler is unregistered here at the time, so received MCA will not reach to OS_MCA and will result in warmboot by SAL. Note that codes in this masked interval are relatively simpler than that in MCA/INIT handler which also executed with the mask. So it can be said that probability of error in this interval is supposed not so higher than that in MCA/INIT handler. Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Haren Myneni <hbabu@us.ibm.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
2009-08-07 04:51:57 +07:00
machine_kdump_on_init();
/* We got fatal MCA while kdump!? No way!! */
}
break;
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static struct ctl_table kdump_ctl_table[] = {
{
.procname = "kdump_on_init",
.data = &kdump_on_init,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "kdump_on_fatal_mca",
.data = &kdump_on_fatal_mca,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{ }
};
static struct ctl_table sys_table[] = {
{
.procname = "kernel",
.mode = 0555,
.child = kdump_ctl_table,
},
{ }
};
#endif
static int
machine_crash_setup(void)
{
/* be notified before default_monarch_init_process */
static struct notifier_block kdump_init_notifier_nb = {
.notifier_call = kdump_init_notifier,
.priority = 1,
};
int ret;
if((ret = register_die_notifier(&kdump_init_notifier_nb)) != 0)
return ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
[PATCH] sysctl: remove insert_at_head from register_sysctl The semantic effect of insert_at_head is that it would allow new registered sysctl entries to override existing sysctl entries of the same name. Which is pain for caching and the proc interface never implemented. I have done an audit and discovered that none of the current users of register_sysctl care as (excpet for directories) they do not register duplicate sysctl entries. So this patch simply removes the support for overriding existing entries in the sys_sysctl interface since no one uses it or cares and it makes future enhancments harder. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@steeleye.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com> Cc: David Chinner <dgc@sgi.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14 15:34:09 +07:00
register_sysctl_table(sys_table);
#endif
return 0;
}
__initcall(machine_crash_setup);