linux_dsm_epyc7002/include/asm-i386/elf.h

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#ifndef __ASMi386_ELF_H
#define __ASMi386_ELF_H
/*
* ELF register definitions..
*/
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/user.h>
#include <asm/auxvec.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#define R_386_NONE 0
#define R_386_32 1
#define R_386_PC32 2
#define R_386_GOT32 3
#define R_386_PLT32 4
#define R_386_COPY 5
#define R_386_GLOB_DAT 6
#define R_386_JMP_SLOT 7
#define R_386_RELATIVE 8
#define R_386_GOTOFF 9
#define R_386_GOTPC 10
#define R_386_NUM 11
typedef unsigned long elf_greg_t;
#define ELF_NGREG (sizeof (struct user_regs_struct) / sizeof(elf_greg_t))
typedef elf_greg_t elf_gregset_t[ELF_NGREG];
typedef struct user_i387_struct elf_fpregset_t;
typedef struct user_fxsr_struct elf_fpxregset_t;
/*
* This is used to ensure we don't load something for the wrong architecture.
*/
#define elf_check_arch(x) \
(((x)->e_machine == EM_386) || ((x)->e_machine == EM_486))
/*
* These are used to set parameters in the core dumps.
*/
#define ELF_CLASS ELFCLASS32
#define ELF_DATA ELFDATA2LSB
#define ELF_ARCH EM_386
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/system.h> /* for savesegment */
#include <asm/desc.h>
/* SVR4/i386 ABI (pages 3-31, 3-32) says that when the program starts %edx
contains a pointer to a function which might be registered using `atexit'.
This provides a mean for the dynamic linker to call DT_FINI functions for
shared libraries that have been loaded before the code runs.
A value of 0 tells we have no such handler.
We might as well make sure everything else is cleared too (except for %esp),
just to make things more deterministic.
*/
#define ELF_PLAT_INIT(_r, load_addr) do { \
_r->ebx = 0; _r->ecx = 0; _r->edx = 0; \
_r->esi = 0; _r->edi = 0; _r->ebp = 0; \
_r->eax = 0; \
} while (0)
#define USE_ELF_CORE_DUMP
#define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE 4096
/* This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed. Typical
use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
the loader. We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk. */
#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
/* regs is struct pt_regs, pr_reg is elf_gregset_t (which is
now struct_user_regs, they are different) */
#define ELF_CORE_COPY_REGS(pr_reg, regs) \
pr_reg[0] = regs->ebx; \
pr_reg[1] = regs->ecx; \
pr_reg[2] = regs->edx; \
pr_reg[3] = regs->esi; \
pr_reg[4] = regs->edi; \
pr_reg[5] = regs->ebp; \
pr_reg[6] = regs->eax; \
pr_reg[7] = regs->xds; \
pr_reg[8] = regs->xes; \
pr_reg[9] = regs->xfs; \
savesegment(gs,pr_reg[10]); \
pr_reg[11] = regs->orig_eax; \
pr_reg[12] = regs->eip; \
pr_reg[13] = regs->xcs; \
pr_reg[14] = regs->eflags; \
pr_reg[15] = regs->esp; \
pr_reg[16] = regs->xss;
/* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space,
but it's not easy, and we've already done it here. */
#define ELF_HWCAP (boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[0])
/* This yields a string that ld.so will use to load implementation
specific libraries for optimization. This is more specific in
intent than poking at uname or /proc/cpuinfo.
For the moment, we have only optimizations for the Intel generations,
but that could change... */
#define ELF_PLATFORM (utsname()->machine)
#define SET_PERSONALITY(ex, ibcs2) do { } while (0)
/*
* An executable for which elf_read_implies_exec() returns TRUE will
* have the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag set automatically.
*/
#define elf_read_implies_exec(ex, executable_stack) (executable_stack != EXSTACK_DISABLE_X)
struct task_struct;
extern int dump_task_regs (struct task_struct *, elf_gregset_t *);
extern int dump_task_fpu (struct task_struct *, elf_fpregset_t *);
extern int dump_task_extended_fpu (struct task_struct *, struct user_fxsr_struct *);
#define ELF_CORE_COPY_TASK_REGS(tsk, elf_regs) dump_task_regs(tsk, elf_regs)
#define ELF_CORE_COPY_FPREGS(tsk, elf_fpregs) dump_task_fpu(tsk, elf_fpregs)
#define ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS(tsk, elf_xfpregs) dump_task_extended_fpu(tsk, elf_xfpregs)
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it. Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do single-stepping and other debugging features. It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the VDSO). There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore. There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime /proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned on/off. (This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.) This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell started this patch and i completed it. [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3] [akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 16:53:50 +07:00
#define VDSO_HIGH_BASE (__fix_to_virt(FIX_VDSO))
#define VDSO_BASE ((unsigned long)current->mm->context.vdso)
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO
# define VDSO_COMPAT_BASE VDSO_HIGH_BASE
# define VDSO_PRELINK VDSO_HIGH_BASE
#else
# define VDSO_COMPAT_BASE VDSO_BASE
# define VDSO_PRELINK 0
#endif
#define VDSO_SYM(x) \
(VDSO_COMPAT_BASE + (unsigned long)(x) - VDSO_PRELINK)
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it. Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do single-stepping and other debugging features. It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the VDSO). There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore. There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime /proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned on/off. (This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.) This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell started this patch and i completed it. [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3] [akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 16:53:50 +07:00
#define VDSO_HIGH_EHDR ((const struct elfhdr *) VDSO_HIGH_BASE)
#define VDSO_EHDR ((const struct elfhdr *) VDSO_COMPAT_BASE)
extern void __kernel_vsyscall;
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it. Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do single-stepping and other debugging features. It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the VDSO). There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore. There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime /proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned on/off. (This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.) This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell started this patch and i completed it. [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3] [akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 16:53:50 +07:00
#define VDSO_ENTRY VDSO_SYM(&__kernel_vsyscall)
#ifndef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it. Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do single-stepping and other debugging features. It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the VDSO). There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore. There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime /proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned on/off. (This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.) This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell started this patch and i completed it. [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3] [akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 16:53:50 +07:00
#define ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES
struct linux_binprm;
extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
int executable_stack);
#endif
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it. Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do single-stepping and other debugging features. It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the VDSO). There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore. There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime /proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned on/off. (This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.) This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell started this patch and i completed it. [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3] [akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 16:53:50 +07:00
extern unsigned int vdso_enabled;
#define ARCH_DLINFO \
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it. Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do single-stepping and other debugging features. It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the VDSO). There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore. There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime /proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned on/off. (This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.) This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell started this patch and i completed it. [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3] [akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 16:53:50 +07:00
do if (vdso_enabled) { \
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SYSINFO, VDSO_ENTRY); \
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SYSINFO_EHDR, VDSO_COMPAT_BASE); \
} while (0)
#endif
#endif