License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 21:07:57 +07:00
|
|
|
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* include/linux/random.h
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Include file for the random number generator.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H
|
|
|
|
#define _LINUX_RANDOM_H
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-09 17:19:39 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/list.h>
|
2015-10-08 06:20:38 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/once.h>
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-13 16:46:48 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <uapi/linux/random.h>
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-09 17:19:39 +07:00
|
|
|
struct random_ready_callback {
|
|
|
|
struct list_head list;
|
|
|
|
void (*func)(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
|
|
|
|
struct module *owner;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2012-07-04 22:16:01 +07:00
|
|
|
extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
|
gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin
This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as
possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation
(due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering,
thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).
At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for
how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals.
The need for very-early boot entropy tends to be very architecture or
system design specific, so this plugin is more suited for those sorts
of special cases. The existing kernel RNG already attempts to extract
entropy from reliable runtime variation, but this plugin takes the idea to
a logical extreme by permuting a global variable based on any variation
in code execution (e.g. a different value (and permutation function)
is used to permute the global based on loop count, case statement,
if/then/else branching, etc).
To do this, the plugin starts by inserting a local variable in every
marked function. The plugin then adds logic so that the value of this
variable is modified by randomly chosen operations (add, xor and rol) and
random values (gcc generates separate static values for each location at
compile time and also injects the stack pointer at runtime). The resulting
value depends on the control flow path (e.g., loops and branches taken).
Before the function returns, the plugin mixes this local variable into
the latent_entropy global variable. The value of this global variable
is added to the kernel entropy pool in do_one_initcall() and _do_fork(),
though it does not credit any bytes of entropy to the pool; the contents
of the global are just used to mix the pool.
Additionally, the plugin can pre-initialize arrays with build-time
random contents, so that two different kernel builds running on identical
hardware will not have the same starting values.
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
[kees: expanded commit message and code comments]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2016-06-21 01:41:19 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
|
|
|
|
static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(latent_entropy));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
|
2016-06-21 01:42:34 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
|
|
|
|
extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
|
2017-06-08 06:58:56 +07:00
|
|
|
extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
|
2018-08-01 02:11:00 +07:00
|
|
|
extern bool rng_is_initialized(void);
|
2015-06-09 17:19:39 +07:00
|
|
|
extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
|
|
|
|
extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
|
2018-06-22 06:15:32 +07:00
|
|
|
extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef MODULE
|
2007-02-12 15:55:28 +07:00
|
|
|
extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-22 22:34:08 +07:00
|
|
|
u32 get_random_u32(void);
|
|
|
|
u64 get_random_u64(void);
|
|
|
|
static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return get_random_u32();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
|
|
|
|
return get_random_u64();
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
return get_random_u32();
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function
Patch series "stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary", v2.
Zero out the first byte of the stack canary value on 64 bit systems, in
order to mitigate unterminated C string overflows.
The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the canary,
and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or obtained through
some other means.
Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems, which
will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32 bit systems, so
the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on 64-bit systems.
Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in execshield and Daniel Micay's
linux-hardened tree.
Also see https://github.com/thestinger/linux-hardened/
This patch (of 5):
Introduce get_random_canary(), which provides a random unsigned long
canary value with the first byte zeroed out on 64 bit architectures, in
order to mitigate non-terminated C string overflows.
The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the canary,
and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or obtained through
some other means.
Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems, which
will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32 bit systems, so
the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on 64-bit systems.
Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in the old execshield patches, and
Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-2-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-13 04:36:17 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* On 64-bit architectures, protect against non-terminated C string overflows
|
|
|
|
* by zeroing out the first byte of the canary; this leaves 56 bits of entropy.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
|
|
|
|
# ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
|
|
|
|
# define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffffffff00UL
|
|
|
|
# else /* big endian, 64 bits: */
|
|
|
|
# define CANARY_MASK 0x00ffffffffffffffUL
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
#else /* 32 bits: */
|
|
|
|
# define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffUL
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long val = get_random_long();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return val & CANARY_MASK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-08 07:05:02 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
|
|
|
|
* Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
|
|
|
|
static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
|
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
|
2018-02-05 05:07:46 +07:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2017-06-08 07:05:02 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
|
|
|
|
static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
|
|
|
|
int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(ret)) \
|
|
|
|
return ret; \
|
|
|
|
*out = get_random_ ## var(); \
|
|
|
|
return 0; \
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
|
|
|
|
declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
|
|
|
|
declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
|
|
|
|
declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
|
|
|
|
#undef declare_get_random_var
|
|
|
|
|
random: simplify API for random address requests
To date, all callers of randomize_range() have set the length to 0, and
check for a zero return value. For the current callers, the only way to
get zero returned is if end <= start. Since they are all adding a
constant to the start address, this is unnecessary.
We can remove a bunch of needless checks by simplifying the API to do just
what everyone wants, return an address between [start, start + range).
While we're here, s/get_random_int/get_random_long/. No current call site
is adversely affected by get_random_int(), since all current range
requests are < UINT_MAX. However, we should match caller expectations to
avoid coming up short (ha!) in the future.
All current callers to randomize_range() chose to use the start address if
randomize_range() failed. Therefore, we simplify things by just returning
the start address on error.
randomize_range() will be removed once all callers have been converted
over to randomize_addr().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160803233913.32511-2-jason@lakedaemon.net
Signed-off-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-12 03:53:52 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
|
|
|
u32 prandom_u32(void);
|
random32: improvements to prandom_bytes
This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing
prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t
for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling
the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will
further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when
GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned
int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of
prandom_u32_max() for timer slack.
Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes()
which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as
they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any
control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we
have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care.
Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which
are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is,
drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}:
These tests basically fill a test write-vector through
prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time
and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector
and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification
phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and
prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the
read-vector to check if the data is the same.
Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through
the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device
(simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53
and i.MX6):
# modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \
third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15
# modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0
# modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0
# modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0
We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular
result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's
just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading
from taus88 to taus113.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann <LW@KARO-electronics.de>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-23 22:03:28 +07:00
|
|
|
void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
|
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
|
|
|
void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
|
2013-11-11 18:20:34 +07:00
|
|
|
void prandom_reseed_late(void);
|
2006-10-17 14:09:42 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2013-11-11 18:20:35 +07:00
|
|
|
struct rnd_state {
|
random32: upgrade taus88 generator to taus113 from errata paper
Since we use prandom*() functions quite often in networking code
i.e. in UDP port selection, netfilter code, etc, upgrade the PRNG
from Pierre L'Ecuyer's original paper "Maximally Equidistributed
Combined Tausworthe Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65,
213 (1996), 203--213 to the version published in his errata paper [1].
The Tausworthe generator is a maximally-equidistributed generator,
that is fast and has good statistical properties [1].
The version presented there upgrades the 3 state LFSR to a 4 state
LFSR with increased periodicity from about 2^88 to 2^113. The
algorithm is presented in [1] by the very same author who also
designed the original algorithm in [2].
Also, by increasing the state, we make it a bit harder for attackers
to "guess" the PRNGs internal state. See also discussion in [3].
Now, as we use this sort of weak initialization discussed in [3]
only between core_initcall() until late_initcall() time [*] for
prandom32*() users, namely in prandom_init(), it is less relevant
from late_initcall() onwards as we overwrite seeds through
prandom_reseed() anyways with a seed source of higher entropy, that
is, get_random_bytes(). In other words, a exhaustive keysearch of
96 bit would be needed. Now, with the help of this patch, this
state-search increases further to 128 bit. Initialization needs
to make sure that s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127.
taus88 and taus113 algorithm is also part of GSL. I added a test
case in the next patch to verify internal behaviour of this patch
with GSL and ran tests with the dieharder 3.31.1 RNG test suite:
$ dieharder -g 052 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus88
$ dieharder -g 054 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus113
With this seed configuration, in order to compare both, we get
the following differences:
algorithm taus88 taus113
rands/second [**] 1.61e+08 1.37e+08
sts_serial(4, 1st run) WEAK PASSED
sts_serial(9, 2nd run) WEAK PASSED
rgb_lagged_sum(31) WEAK PASSED
We took out diehard_sums test as according to the authors it is
considered broken and unusable [4]. Despite that and the slight
decrease in performance (which is acceptable), taus113 here passes
all 113 tests (only rgb_minimum_distance_5 in WEAK, the rest PASSED).
In general, taus/taus113 is considered "very good" by the authors
of dieharder [5].
The papers [1][2] states a single warm-up step is sufficient by
running quicktaus once on each state to ensure proper initialization
of ~s_{0}:
Our selection of (s) according to Table 1 of [1] row 1 holds the
condition L - k <= r - s, that is,
(32 32 32 32) - (31 29 28 25) <= (25 27 15 22) - (18 2 7 13)
with r = k - q and q = (6 2 13 3) as also stated by the paper.
So according to [2] we are safe with one round of quicktaus for
initialization. However we decided to include the warm-up phase
of the PRNG as done in GSL in every case as a safety net. We also
use the warm up phase to make the output of the RNG easier to
verify by the GSL output.
In prandom_init(), we also mix random_get_entropy() into it, just
like drivers/char/random.c does it, jiffies ^ random_get_entropy().
random-get_entropy() is get_cycles(). xor is entropy preserving so
it is fine if it is not implemented by some architectures.
Note, this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel, but
rather as a fast PRNG for various randomizations i.e. in the
networking code, or elsewhere for debugging purposes, for example.
[*]: In order to generate some "sort of pseduo-randomness", since
get_random_bytes() is not yet available for us, we use jiffies and
initialize states s1 - s3 with a simple linear congruential generator
(LCG), that is x <- x * 69069; and derive s2, s3, from the 32bit
initialization from s1. So the above quote from [3] accounts only
for the time from core to late initcall, not afterwards.
[**] Single threaded run on MacBook Air w/ Intel Core i5-3317U
[1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps
[2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps
[3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/12103/
[4] http://code.google.com/p/dieharder/source/browse/trunk/libdieharder/diehard_sums.c?spec=svn490&r=490#20
[5] http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php
Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-11 18:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
__u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
|
2013-11-11 18:20:35 +07:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
random32: upgrade taus88 generator to taus113 from errata paper
Since we use prandom*() functions quite often in networking code
i.e. in UDP port selection, netfilter code, etc, upgrade the PRNG
from Pierre L'Ecuyer's original paper "Maximally Equidistributed
Combined Tausworthe Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65,
213 (1996), 203--213 to the version published in his errata paper [1].
The Tausworthe generator is a maximally-equidistributed generator,
that is fast and has good statistical properties [1].
The version presented there upgrades the 3 state LFSR to a 4 state
LFSR with increased periodicity from about 2^88 to 2^113. The
algorithm is presented in [1] by the very same author who also
designed the original algorithm in [2].
Also, by increasing the state, we make it a bit harder for attackers
to "guess" the PRNGs internal state. See also discussion in [3].
Now, as we use this sort of weak initialization discussed in [3]
only between core_initcall() until late_initcall() time [*] for
prandom32*() users, namely in prandom_init(), it is less relevant
from late_initcall() onwards as we overwrite seeds through
prandom_reseed() anyways with a seed source of higher entropy, that
is, get_random_bytes(). In other words, a exhaustive keysearch of
96 bit would be needed. Now, with the help of this patch, this
state-search increases further to 128 bit. Initialization needs
to make sure that s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127.
taus88 and taus113 algorithm is also part of GSL. I added a test
case in the next patch to verify internal behaviour of this patch
with GSL and ran tests with the dieharder 3.31.1 RNG test suite:
$ dieharder -g 052 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus88
$ dieharder -g 054 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus113
With this seed configuration, in order to compare both, we get
the following differences:
algorithm taus88 taus113
rands/second [**] 1.61e+08 1.37e+08
sts_serial(4, 1st run) WEAK PASSED
sts_serial(9, 2nd run) WEAK PASSED
rgb_lagged_sum(31) WEAK PASSED
We took out diehard_sums test as according to the authors it is
considered broken and unusable [4]. Despite that and the slight
decrease in performance (which is acceptable), taus113 here passes
all 113 tests (only rgb_minimum_distance_5 in WEAK, the rest PASSED).
In general, taus/taus113 is considered "very good" by the authors
of dieharder [5].
The papers [1][2] states a single warm-up step is sufficient by
running quicktaus once on each state to ensure proper initialization
of ~s_{0}:
Our selection of (s) according to Table 1 of [1] row 1 holds the
condition L - k <= r - s, that is,
(32 32 32 32) - (31 29 28 25) <= (25 27 15 22) - (18 2 7 13)
with r = k - q and q = (6 2 13 3) as also stated by the paper.
So according to [2] we are safe with one round of quicktaus for
initialization. However we decided to include the warm-up phase
of the PRNG as done in GSL in every case as a safety net. We also
use the warm up phase to make the output of the RNG easier to
verify by the GSL output.
In prandom_init(), we also mix random_get_entropy() into it, just
like drivers/char/random.c does it, jiffies ^ random_get_entropy().
random-get_entropy() is get_cycles(). xor is entropy preserving so
it is fine if it is not implemented by some architectures.
Note, this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel, but
rather as a fast PRNG for various randomizations i.e. in the
networking code, or elsewhere for debugging purposes, for example.
[*]: In order to generate some "sort of pseduo-randomness", since
get_random_bytes() is not yet available for us, we use jiffies and
initialize states s1 - s3 with a simple linear congruential generator
(LCG), that is x <- x * 69069; and derive s2, s3, from the 32bit
initialization from s1. So the above quote from [3] accounts only
for the time from core to late initcall, not afterwards.
[**] Single threaded run on MacBook Air w/ Intel Core i5-3317U
[1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps
[2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps
[3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/12103/
[4] http://code.google.com/p/dieharder/source/browse/trunk/libdieharder/diehard_sums.c?spec=svn490&r=490#20
[5] http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php
Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-11 18:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
|
random32: improvements to prandom_bytes
This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing
prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t
for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling
the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will
further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when
GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned
int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of
prandom_u32_max() for timer slack.
Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes()
which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as
they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any
control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we
have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care.
Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which
are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is,
drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}:
These tests basically fill a test write-vector through
prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time
and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector
and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification
phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and
prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the
read-vector to check if the data is the same.
Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through
the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device
(simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53
and i.MX6):
# modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \
third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15
# modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0
# modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0
# modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0
We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular
result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's
just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading
from taus88 to taus113.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann <LW@KARO-electronics.de>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-23 22:03:28 +07:00
|
|
|
void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t nbytes);
|
2015-10-08 06:20:38 +07:00
|
|
|
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define prandom_init_once(pcpu_state) \
|
|
|
|
DO_ONCE(prandom_seed_full_state, (pcpu_state))
|
2010-05-27 04:44:13 +07:00
|
|
|
|
random32: add prandom_u32_max and convert open coded users
Many functions have open coded a function that returns a random
number in range [0,N-1]. Under the assumption that we have a PRNG
such as taus113 with being well distributed in [0, ~0U] space,
we can implement such a function as uword t = (n*m')>>32, where
m' is a random number obtained from PRNG, n the right open interval
border and t our resulting random number, with n,m',t in u32 universe.
Lets go with Joe and simply call it prandom_u32_max(), although
technically we have an right open interval endpoint, but that we
have documented. Other users can further be migrated to the new
prandom_u32_max() function later on; for now, we need to make sure
to migrate reciprocal_divide() users for the reciprocal_divide()
follow-up fixup since their function signatures are going to change.
Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.
Cc: Jakub Zawadzki <darkjames-ws@darkjames.pl>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-22 08:29:39 +07:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* prandom_u32_max - returns a pseudo-random number in interval [0, ep_ro)
|
|
|
|
* @ep_ro: right open interval endpoint
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns a pseudo-random number that is in interval [0, ep_ro). Note
|
|
|
|
* that the result depends on PRNG being well distributed in [0, ~0U]
|
|
|
|
* u32 space. Here we use maximally equidistributed combined Tausworthe
|
|
|
|
* generator, that is, prandom_u32(). This is useful when requesting a
|
|
|
|
* random index of an array containing ep_ro elements, for example.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns: pseudo-random number in interval [0, ep_ro)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline u32 prandom_u32_max(u32 ep_ro)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (u32)(((u64) prandom_u32() * ep_ro) >> 32);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-27 04:44:13 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Handle minimum values for seeds
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline u32 __seed(u32 x, u32 m)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (x < m) ? x + m : x;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
|
|
|
* prandom_seed_state - set seed for prandom_u32_state().
|
2010-05-27 04:44:13 +07:00
|
|
|
* @state: pointer to state structure to receive the seed.
|
|
|
|
* @seed: arbitrary 64-bit value to use as a seed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
|
|
|
static inline void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed)
|
2010-05-27 04:44:13 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u32 i = (seed >> 32) ^ (seed << 10) ^ seed;
|
|
|
|
|
random32: upgrade taus88 generator to taus113 from errata paper
Since we use prandom*() functions quite often in networking code
i.e. in UDP port selection, netfilter code, etc, upgrade the PRNG
from Pierre L'Ecuyer's original paper "Maximally Equidistributed
Combined Tausworthe Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65,
213 (1996), 203--213 to the version published in his errata paper [1].
The Tausworthe generator is a maximally-equidistributed generator,
that is fast and has good statistical properties [1].
The version presented there upgrades the 3 state LFSR to a 4 state
LFSR with increased periodicity from about 2^88 to 2^113. The
algorithm is presented in [1] by the very same author who also
designed the original algorithm in [2].
Also, by increasing the state, we make it a bit harder for attackers
to "guess" the PRNGs internal state. See also discussion in [3].
Now, as we use this sort of weak initialization discussed in [3]
only between core_initcall() until late_initcall() time [*] for
prandom32*() users, namely in prandom_init(), it is less relevant
from late_initcall() onwards as we overwrite seeds through
prandom_reseed() anyways with a seed source of higher entropy, that
is, get_random_bytes(). In other words, a exhaustive keysearch of
96 bit would be needed. Now, with the help of this patch, this
state-search increases further to 128 bit. Initialization needs
to make sure that s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127.
taus88 and taus113 algorithm is also part of GSL. I added a test
case in the next patch to verify internal behaviour of this patch
with GSL and ran tests with the dieharder 3.31.1 RNG test suite:
$ dieharder -g 052 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus88
$ dieharder -g 054 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus113
With this seed configuration, in order to compare both, we get
the following differences:
algorithm taus88 taus113
rands/second [**] 1.61e+08 1.37e+08
sts_serial(4, 1st run) WEAK PASSED
sts_serial(9, 2nd run) WEAK PASSED
rgb_lagged_sum(31) WEAK PASSED
We took out diehard_sums test as according to the authors it is
considered broken and unusable [4]. Despite that and the slight
decrease in performance (which is acceptable), taus113 here passes
all 113 tests (only rgb_minimum_distance_5 in WEAK, the rest PASSED).
In general, taus/taus113 is considered "very good" by the authors
of dieharder [5].
The papers [1][2] states a single warm-up step is sufficient by
running quicktaus once on each state to ensure proper initialization
of ~s_{0}:
Our selection of (s) according to Table 1 of [1] row 1 holds the
condition L - k <= r - s, that is,
(32 32 32 32) - (31 29 28 25) <= (25 27 15 22) - (18 2 7 13)
with r = k - q and q = (6 2 13 3) as also stated by the paper.
So according to [2] we are safe with one round of quicktaus for
initialization. However we decided to include the warm-up phase
of the PRNG as done in GSL in every case as a safety net. We also
use the warm up phase to make the output of the RNG easier to
verify by the GSL output.
In prandom_init(), we also mix random_get_entropy() into it, just
like drivers/char/random.c does it, jiffies ^ random_get_entropy().
random-get_entropy() is get_cycles(). xor is entropy preserving so
it is fine if it is not implemented by some architectures.
Note, this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel, but
rather as a fast PRNG for various randomizations i.e. in the
networking code, or elsewhere for debugging purposes, for example.
[*]: In order to generate some "sort of pseduo-randomness", since
get_random_bytes() is not yet available for us, we use jiffies and
initialize states s1 - s3 with a simple linear congruential generator
(LCG), that is x <- x * 69069; and derive s2, s3, from the 32bit
initialization from s1. So the above quote from [3] accounts only
for the time from core to late initcall, not afterwards.
[**] Single threaded run on MacBook Air w/ Intel Core i5-3317U
[1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps
[2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps
[3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/12103/
[4] http://code.google.com/p/dieharder/source/browse/trunk/libdieharder/diehard_sums.c?spec=svn490&r=490#20
[5] http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php
Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-11 18:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
state->s1 = __seed(i, 2U);
|
|
|
|
state->s2 = __seed(i, 8U);
|
|
|
|
state->s3 = __seed(i, 16U);
|
|
|
|
state->s4 = __seed(i, 128U);
|
2010-05-27 04:44:13 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-08-01 03:54:50 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
|
|
|
|
# include <asm/archrandom.h>
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2016-06-09 02:38:38 +07:00
|
|
|
static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
|
2011-08-01 03:54:50 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-09 02:38:38 +07:00
|
|
|
static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
|
2011-08-01 03:54:50 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-09 02:38:38 +07:00
|
|
|
static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
|
2014-03-18 06:36:30 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-09 02:38:38 +07:00
|
|
|
static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
|
2014-03-18 06:36:27 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-09 02:38:38 +07:00
|
|
|
static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
|
2014-03-18 06:36:27 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-09 02:38:38 +07:00
|
|
|
static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
|
2014-03-18 06:36:30 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-01 03:54:50 +07:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-22 16:49:50 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */
|
|
|
|
static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32(u32 seed)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return seed * 1664525 + 1013904223;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
#endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
|