linux_dsm_epyc7002/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c

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/*
BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
Copyright (c) 2000-2001, 2010, Code Aurora Forum. All rights reserved.
Written 2000,2001 by Maxim Krasnyansky <maxk@qualcomm.com>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
published by the Free Software Foundation;
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
*/
/* Bluetooth HCI connection handling. */
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
#include "hci_request.h"
#include "smp.h"
#include "a2mp.h"
struct sco_param {
u16 pkt_type;
u16 max_latency;
u8 retrans_effort;
};
static const struct sco_param esco_param_cvsd[] = {
{ EDR_ESCO_MASK & ~ESCO_2EV3, 0x000a, 0x01 }, /* S3 */
{ EDR_ESCO_MASK & ~ESCO_2EV3, 0x0007, 0x01 }, /* S2 */
{ EDR_ESCO_MASK | ESCO_EV3, 0x0007, 0x01 }, /* S1 */
{ EDR_ESCO_MASK | ESCO_HV3, 0xffff, 0x01 }, /* D1 */
{ EDR_ESCO_MASK | ESCO_HV1, 0xffff, 0x01 }, /* D0 */
};
static const struct sco_param sco_param_cvsd[] = {
{ EDR_ESCO_MASK | ESCO_HV3, 0xffff, 0xff }, /* D1 */
{ EDR_ESCO_MASK | ESCO_HV1, 0xffff, 0xff }, /* D0 */
};
static const struct sco_param esco_param_msbc[] = {
{ EDR_ESCO_MASK & ~ESCO_2EV3, 0x000d, 0x02 }, /* T2 */
{ EDR_ESCO_MASK | ESCO_EV3, 0x0008, 0x02 }, /* T1 */
};
/* This function requires the caller holds hdev->lock */
static void hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_conn_params *params;
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct smp_irk *irk;
bdaddr_t *bdaddr;
u8 bdaddr_type;
bdaddr = &conn->dst;
bdaddr_type = conn->dst_type;
/* Check if we need to convert to identity address */
irk = hci_get_irk(hdev, bdaddr, bdaddr_type);
if (irk) {
bdaddr = &irk->bdaddr;
bdaddr_type = irk->addr_type;
}
params = hci_pend_le_action_lookup(&hdev->pend_le_conns, bdaddr,
bdaddr_type);
if (!params || !params->explicit_connect)
return;
/* The connection attempt was doing scan for new RPA, and is
* in scan phase. If params are not associated with any other
* autoconnect action, remove them completely. If they are, just unmark
* them as waiting for connection, by clearing explicit_connect field.
*/
params->explicit_connect = false;
list_del_init(&params->action);
switch (params->auto_connect) {
case HCI_AUTO_CONN_EXPLICIT:
hci_conn_params_del(hdev, bdaddr, bdaddr_type);
/* return instead of break to avoid duplicate scan update */
return;
case HCI_AUTO_CONN_DIRECT:
case HCI_AUTO_CONN_ALWAYS:
list_add(&params->action, &hdev->pend_le_conns);
break;
case HCI_AUTO_CONN_REPORT:
list_add(&params->action, &hdev->pend_le_reports);
break;
default:
break;
}
hci_update_background_scan(hdev);
}
static void hci_conn_cleanup(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_PARAM_REMOVAL_PEND, &conn->flags))
hci_conn_params_del(conn->hdev, &conn->dst, conn->dst_type);
hci_chan_list_flush(conn);
hci_conn_hash_del(hdev, conn);
if (hdev->notify)
hdev->notify(hdev, HCI_NOTIFY_CONN_DEL);
hci_conn_del_sysfs(conn);
debugfs_remove_recursive(conn->debugfs);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
hci_conn_put(conn);
}
Bluetooth: Fix missing hdev locking for LE scan cleanup The hci_conn objects don't have a dedicated lock themselves but rely on the caller to hold the hci_dev lock for most types of access. The hci_conn_timeout() function has so far sent certain HCI commands based on the hci_conn state which has been possible without holding the hci_dev lock. The recent changes to do LE scanning before connect attempts added even more operations to hci_conn and hci_dev from hci_conn_timeout, thereby exposing potential race conditions with the hci_dev and hci_conn states. As an example of such a race, here there's a timeout but an l2cap_sock_connect() call manages to race with the cleanup routine: [Oct21 08:14] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b12c0, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000010] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000013] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000063] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000049] hci_conn_params_del: addr ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 1) [ +0.000002] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] hci_chan_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 chan f4e7ccc0 [ +0.004528] l2cap_sock_create: sock e708fc00 [ +0.000023] l2cap_chan_create: chan ee4b1770 [ +0.000001] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_init: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000029] l2cap_sock_bind: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000010] l2cap_sock_setsockopt: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000037] l2cap_sock_connect: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_connect: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 2) psm 0x00 [ +0.000002] hci_get_route: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f [ +0.000001] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 8 [ +0.000003] hci_conn_hold: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 0 Above the l2cap_chan_connect() shouldn't have been able to reach the hci_conn f53d56e0 anymore but since hci_conn_timeout didn't do proper locking that's not the case. The end result is a reference to hci_conn that's not in the conn_hash list, resulting in list corruption when trying to remove it later: [Oct21 08:15] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b1770, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000001] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000015] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000038] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_hash_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000461] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1782 at lib/list_debug.c:56 __list_del_entry+0x3f/0x71() [ +0.000839] list_del corruption, f53d56e0->prev is LIST_POISON2 (00000200) The necessary fix is unfortunately more complicated than just adding hci_dev_lock/unlock calls to the hci_conn_timeout() call path. Particularly, the hci_conn_del() API, which expects the hci_dev lock to be held, performs a cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hcon->disc_work) which would lead to a deadlock if the hci_conn_timeout() call path tries to acquire the same lock. This patch solves the problem by deferring the cleanup work to a separate work callback. To protect against the hci_dev or hci_conn going away meanwhile temporary references are taken with the help of hci_dev_hold() and hci_conn_get(). Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
2015-10-21 19:21:31 +07:00
static void le_scan_cleanup(struct work_struct *work)
{
Bluetooth: Fix missing hdev locking for LE scan cleanup The hci_conn objects don't have a dedicated lock themselves but rely on the caller to hold the hci_dev lock for most types of access. The hci_conn_timeout() function has so far sent certain HCI commands based on the hci_conn state which has been possible without holding the hci_dev lock. The recent changes to do LE scanning before connect attempts added even more operations to hci_conn and hci_dev from hci_conn_timeout, thereby exposing potential race conditions with the hci_dev and hci_conn states. As an example of such a race, here there's a timeout but an l2cap_sock_connect() call manages to race with the cleanup routine: [Oct21 08:14] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b12c0, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000010] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000013] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000063] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000049] hci_conn_params_del: addr ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 1) [ +0.000002] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] hci_chan_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 chan f4e7ccc0 [ +0.004528] l2cap_sock_create: sock e708fc00 [ +0.000023] l2cap_chan_create: chan ee4b1770 [ +0.000001] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_init: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000029] l2cap_sock_bind: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000010] l2cap_sock_setsockopt: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000037] l2cap_sock_connect: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_connect: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 2) psm 0x00 [ +0.000002] hci_get_route: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f [ +0.000001] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 8 [ +0.000003] hci_conn_hold: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 0 Above the l2cap_chan_connect() shouldn't have been able to reach the hci_conn f53d56e0 anymore but since hci_conn_timeout didn't do proper locking that's not the case. The end result is a reference to hci_conn that's not in the conn_hash list, resulting in list corruption when trying to remove it later: [Oct21 08:15] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b1770, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000001] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000015] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000038] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_hash_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000461] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1782 at lib/list_debug.c:56 __list_del_entry+0x3f/0x71() [ +0.000839] list_del corruption, f53d56e0->prev is LIST_POISON2 (00000200) The necessary fix is unfortunately more complicated than just adding hci_dev_lock/unlock calls to the hci_conn_timeout() call path. Particularly, the hci_conn_del() API, which expects the hci_dev lock to be held, performs a cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hcon->disc_work) which would lead to a deadlock if the hci_conn_timeout() call path tries to acquire the same lock. This patch solves the problem by deferring the cleanup work to a separate work callback. To protect against the hci_dev or hci_conn going away meanwhile temporary references are taken with the help of hci_dev_hold() and hci_conn_get(). Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
2015-10-21 19:21:31 +07:00
struct hci_conn *conn = container_of(work, struct hci_conn,
le_scan_cleanup);
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct hci_conn *c = NULL;
BT_DBG("%s hcon %p", hdev->name, conn);
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
/* Check that the hci_conn is still around */
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &hdev->conn_hash.list, list) {
if (c == conn)
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (c == conn) {
hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup(conn);
hci_conn_cleanup(conn);
}
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
hci_conn_put(conn);
}
Bluetooth: Fix missing hdev locking for LE scan cleanup The hci_conn objects don't have a dedicated lock themselves but rely on the caller to hold the hci_dev lock for most types of access. The hci_conn_timeout() function has so far sent certain HCI commands based on the hci_conn state which has been possible without holding the hci_dev lock. The recent changes to do LE scanning before connect attempts added even more operations to hci_conn and hci_dev from hci_conn_timeout, thereby exposing potential race conditions with the hci_dev and hci_conn states. As an example of such a race, here there's a timeout but an l2cap_sock_connect() call manages to race with the cleanup routine: [Oct21 08:14] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b12c0, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000010] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000013] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000063] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000049] hci_conn_params_del: addr ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 1) [ +0.000002] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] hci_chan_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 chan f4e7ccc0 [ +0.004528] l2cap_sock_create: sock e708fc00 [ +0.000023] l2cap_chan_create: chan ee4b1770 [ +0.000001] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_init: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000029] l2cap_sock_bind: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000010] l2cap_sock_setsockopt: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000037] l2cap_sock_connect: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_connect: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 2) psm 0x00 [ +0.000002] hci_get_route: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f [ +0.000001] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 8 [ +0.000003] hci_conn_hold: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 0 Above the l2cap_chan_connect() shouldn't have been able to reach the hci_conn f53d56e0 anymore but since hci_conn_timeout didn't do proper locking that's not the case. The end result is a reference to hci_conn that's not in the conn_hash list, resulting in list corruption when trying to remove it later: [Oct21 08:15] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b1770, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000001] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000015] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000038] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_hash_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000461] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1782 at lib/list_debug.c:56 __list_del_entry+0x3f/0x71() [ +0.000839] list_del corruption, f53d56e0->prev is LIST_POISON2 (00000200) The necessary fix is unfortunately more complicated than just adding hci_dev_lock/unlock calls to the hci_conn_timeout() call path. Particularly, the hci_conn_del() API, which expects the hci_dev lock to be held, performs a cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hcon->disc_work) which would lead to a deadlock if the hci_conn_timeout() call path tries to acquire the same lock. This patch solves the problem by deferring the cleanup work to a separate work callback. To protect against the hci_dev or hci_conn going away meanwhile temporary references are taken with the help of hci_dev_hold() and hci_conn_get(). Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
2015-10-21 19:21:31 +07:00
static void hci_connect_le_scan_remove(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
BT_DBG("%s hcon %p", conn->hdev->name, conn);
/* We can't call hci_conn_del/hci_conn_cleanup here since that
* could deadlock with another hci_conn_del() call that's holding
* hci_dev_lock and doing cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->disc_work).
* Instead, grab temporary extra references to the hci_dev and
* hci_conn and perform the necessary cleanup in a separate work
* callback.
*/
Bluetooth: Fix missing hdev locking for LE scan cleanup The hci_conn objects don't have a dedicated lock themselves but rely on the caller to hold the hci_dev lock for most types of access. The hci_conn_timeout() function has so far sent certain HCI commands based on the hci_conn state which has been possible without holding the hci_dev lock. The recent changes to do LE scanning before connect attempts added even more operations to hci_conn and hci_dev from hci_conn_timeout, thereby exposing potential race conditions with the hci_dev and hci_conn states. As an example of such a race, here there's a timeout but an l2cap_sock_connect() call manages to race with the cleanup routine: [Oct21 08:14] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b12c0, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000010] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000013] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000063] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000049] hci_conn_params_del: addr ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 1) [ +0.000002] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] hci_chan_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 chan f4e7ccc0 [ +0.004528] l2cap_sock_create: sock e708fc00 [ +0.000023] l2cap_chan_create: chan ee4b1770 [ +0.000001] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_init: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000029] l2cap_sock_bind: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000010] l2cap_sock_setsockopt: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000037] l2cap_sock_connect: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_connect: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 2) psm 0x00 [ +0.000002] hci_get_route: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f [ +0.000001] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 8 [ +0.000003] hci_conn_hold: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 0 Above the l2cap_chan_connect() shouldn't have been able to reach the hci_conn f53d56e0 anymore but since hci_conn_timeout didn't do proper locking that's not the case. The end result is a reference to hci_conn that's not in the conn_hash list, resulting in list corruption when trying to remove it later: [Oct21 08:15] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b1770, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000001] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000015] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000038] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_hash_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000461] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1782 at lib/list_debug.c:56 __list_del_entry+0x3f/0x71() [ +0.000839] list_del corruption, f53d56e0->prev is LIST_POISON2 (00000200) The necessary fix is unfortunately more complicated than just adding hci_dev_lock/unlock calls to the hci_conn_timeout() call path. Particularly, the hci_conn_del() API, which expects the hci_dev lock to be held, performs a cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hcon->disc_work) which would lead to a deadlock if the hci_conn_timeout() call path tries to acquire the same lock. This patch solves the problem by deferring the cleanup work to a separate work callback. To protect against the hci_dev or hci_conn going away meanwhile temporary references are taken with the help of hci_dev_hold() and hci_conn_get(). Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
2015-10-21 19:21:31 +07:00
hci_dev_hold(conn->hdev);
hci_conn_get(conn);
/* Even though we hold a reference to the hdev, many other
* things might get cleaned up meanwhile, including the hdev's
* own workqueue, so we can't use that for scheduling.
*/
Bluetooth: Fix missing hdev locking for LE scan cleanup The hci_conn objects don't have a dedicated lock themselves but rely on the caller to hold the hci_dev lock for most types of access. The hci_conn_timeout() function has so far sent certain HCI commands based on the hci_conn state which has been possible without holding the hci_dev lock. The recent changes to do LE scanning before connect attempts added even more operations to hci_conn and hci_dev from hci_conn_timeout, thereby exposing potential race conditions with the hci_dev and hci_conn states. As an example of such a race, here there's a timeout but an l2cap_sock_connect() call manages to race with the cleanup routine: [Oct21 08:14] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b12c0, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000010] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000013] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000063] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000049] hci_conn_params_del: addr ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 1) [ +0.000002] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] hci_chan_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 chan f4e7ccc0 [ +0.004528] l2cap_sock_create: sock e708fc00 [ +0.000023] l2cap_chan_create: chan ee4b1770 [ +0.000001] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_init: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000029] l2cap_sock_bind: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000010] l2cap_sock_setsockopt: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000037] l2cap_sock_connect: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_connect: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 2) psm 0x00 [ +0.000002] hci_get_route: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f [ +0.000001] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 8 [ +0.000003] hci_conn_hold: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 0 Above the l2cap_chan_connect() shouldn't have been able to reach the hci_conn f53d56e0 anymore but since hci_conn_timeout didn't do proper locking that's not the case. The end result is a reference to hci_conn that's not in the conn_hash list, resulting in list corruption when trying to remove it later: [Oct21 08:15] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b1770, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000001] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000015] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000038] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_hash_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000461] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1782 at lib/list_debug.c:56 __list_del_entry+0x3f/0x71() [ +0.000839] list_del corruption, f53d56e0->prev is LIST_POISON2 (00000200) The necessary fix is unfortunately more complicated than just adding hci_dev_lock/unlock calls to the hci_conn_timeout() call path. Particularly, the hci_conn_del() API, which expects the hci_dev lock to be held, performs a cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hcon->disc_work) which would lead to a deadlock if the hci_conn_timeout() call path tries to acquire the same lock. This patch solves the problem by deferring the cleanup work to a separate work callback. To protect against the hci_dev or hci_conn going away meanwhile temporary references are taken with the help of hci_dev_hold() and hci_conn_get(). Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
2015-10-21 19:21:31 +07:00
schedule_work(&conn->le_scan_cleanup);
}
static void hci_acl_create_connection(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct inquiry_entry *ie;
struct hci_cp_create_conn cp;
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
conn->state = BT_CONNECT;
conn->out = true;
conn->role = HCI_ROLE_MASTER;
conn->attempt++;
conn->link_policy = hdev->link_policy;
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
bacpy(&cp.bdaddr, &conn->dst);
cp.pscan_rep_mode = 0x02;
ie = hci_inquiry_cache_lookup(hdev, &conn->dst);
if (ie) {
if (inquiry_entry_age(ie) <= INQUIRY_ENTRY_AGE_MAX) {
cp.pscan_rep_mode = ie->data.pscan_rep_mode;
cp.pscan_mode = ie->data.pscan_mode;
cp.clock_offset = ie->data.clock_offset |
cpu_to_le16(0x8000);
}
memcpy(conn->dev_class, ie->data.dev_class, 3);
if (ie->data.ssp_mode > 0)
set_bit(HCI_CONN_SSP_ENABLED, &conn->flags);
}
cp.pkt_type = cpu_to_le16(conn->pkt_type);
if (lmp_rswitch_capable(hdev) && !(hdev->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
cp.role_switch = 0x01;
else
cp.role_switch = 0x00;
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_CREATE_CONN, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
int hci_disconnect(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 reason)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
/* When we are master of an established connection and it enters
* the disconnect timeout, then go ahead and try to read the
* current clock offset. Processing of the result is done
* within the event handling and hci_clock_offset_evt function.
*/
if (conn->type == ACL_LINK && conn->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER &&
(conn->state == BT_CONNECTED || conn->state == BT_CONFIG)) {
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct hci_cp_read_clock_offset clkoff_cp;
clkoff_cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_READ_CLOCK_OFFSET, sizeof(clkoff_cp),
&clkoff_cp);
}
return hci_abort_conn(conn, reason);
}
static void hci_add_sco(struct hci_conn *conn, __u16 handle)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct hci_cp_add_sco cp;
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
conn->state = BT_CONNECT;
conn->out = true;
conn->attempt++;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(handle);
cp.pkt_type = cpu_to_le16(conn->pkt_type);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_ADD_SCO, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
bool hci_setup_sync(struct hci_conn *conn, __u16 handle)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct hci_cp_setup_sync_conn cp;
const struct sco_param *param;
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
conn->state = BT_CONNECT;
conn->out = true;
conn->attempt++;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(handle);
cp.tx_bandwidth = cpu_to_le32(0x00001f40);
cp.rx_bandwidth = cpu_to_le32(0x00001f40);
cp.voice_setting = cpu_to_le16(conn->setting);
switch (conn->setting & SCO_AIRMODE_MASK) {
case SCO_AIRMODE_TRANSP:
if (conn->attempt > ARRAY_SIZE(esco_param_msbc))
return false;
param = &esco_param_msbc[conn->attempt - 1];
break;
case SCO_AIRMODE_CVSD:
if (lmp_esco_capable(conn->link)) {
if (conn->attempt > ARRAY_SIZE(esco_param_cvsd))
return false;
param = &esco_param_cvsd[conn->attempt - 1];
} else {
if (conn->attempt > ARRAY_SIZE(sco_param_cvsd))
return false;
param = &sco_param_cvsd[conn->attempt - 1];
}
break;
default:
return false;
}
cp.retrans_effort = param->retrans_effort;
cp.pkt_type = __cpu_to_le16(param->pkt_type);
cp.max_latency = __cpu_to_le16(param->max_latency);
if (hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_SETUP_SYNC_CONN, sizeof(cp), &cp) < 0)
return false;
return true;
}
u8 hci_le_conn_update(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 min, u16 max, u16 latency,
u16 to_multiplier)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct hci_conn_params *params;
struct hci_cp_le_conn_update cp;
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
params = hci_conn_params_lookup(hdev, &conn->dst, conn->dst_type);
if (params) {
params->conn_min_interval = min;
params->conn_max_interval = max;
params->conn_latency = latency;
params->supervision_timeout = to_multiplier;
}
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
cp.conn_interval_min = cpu_to_le16(min);
cp.conn_interval_max = cpu_to_le16(max);
cp.conn_latency = cpu_to_le16(latency);
cp.supervision_timeout = cpu_to_le16(to_multiplier);
cp.min_ce_len = cpu_to_le16(0x0000);
cp.max_ce_len = cpu_to_le16(0x0000);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_CONN_UPDATE, sizeof(cp), &cp);
if (params)
return 0x01;
return 0x00;
}
void hci_le_start_enc(struct hci_conn *conn, __le16 ediv, __le64 rand,
__u8 ltk[16], __u8 key_size)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct hci_cp_le_start_enc cp;
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
cp.rand = rand;
cp.ediv = ediv;
memcpy(cp.ltk, ltk, key_size);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_START_ENC, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
/* Device _must_ be locked */
void hci_sco_setup(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
{
struct hci_conn *sco = conn->link;
if (!sco)
return;
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
if (!status) {
if (lmp_esco_capable(conn->hdev))
hci_setup_sync(sco, conn->handle);
else
hci_add_sco(sco, conn->handle);
} else {
hci_connect_cfm(sco, status);
hci_conn_del(sco);
}
}
static void hci_conn_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct hci_conn *conn = container_of(work, struct hci_conn,
disc_work.work);
Bluetooth: Fix for ACL disconnect when pairing fails When pairing fails hci_conn refcnt drops below zero. This cause that ACL link is not disconnected when disconnect timeout fires. Probably this is because l2cap_conn_del calls l2cap_chan_del for each channel, and inside l2cap_chan_del conn is dropped. After that loop hci_chan_del is called which also drops conn. Anyway, as it is desrcibed in hci_core.h, it is known that refcnt drops below 0 sometimes and it should be fine. If so, let disconnect link when hci_conn_timeout fires and refcnt is 0 or below. This patch does it. This affects PTS test SM_TC_JW_BV_05_C Logs from scenario: [69713.706227] [6515] pair_device: [69713.706230] [6515] hci_conn_add: hci0 dst 00:1b:dc:06:06:22 [69713.706233] [6515] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 8 [69713.706235] [6515] hci_conn_init_sysfs: conn ffff88021f65a000 [69713.706239] [6515] hci_req_add_ev: hci0 opcode 0x200d plen 25 [69713.706242] [6515] hci_prepare_cmd: skb len 28 [69713.706243] [6515] hci_req_run: length 1 [69713.706248] [6515] hci_conn_hold: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 0 [69713.706251] [6515] hci_dev_put: hci0 orig refcnt 9 [69713.706281] [8909] hci_cmd_work: hci0 cmd_cnt 1 cmd queued 1 [69713.706288] [8909] hci_send_frame: hci0 type 1 len 28 [69713.706290] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 28 [69713.706316] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.706382] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.711664] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69713.711668] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 6 [69713.711680] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 Event packet [69713.711683] [8909] hci_cs_le_create_conn: hci0 status 0x00 [69713.711685] [8909] hci_sent_cmd_data: hci0 opcode 0x200d [69713.711688] [8909] hci_req_cmd_complete: opcode 0x200d status 0x00 [69713.711690] [8909] hci_sent_cmd_data: hci0 opcode 0x200d [69713.711695] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.711744] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.818875] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69713.818889] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 21 [69713.818913] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 Event packet [69713.818917] [8909] hci_le_conn_complete_evt: hci0 status 0x00 [69713.818922] [8909] hci_send_to_control: len 19 [69713.818927] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.818938] [8909] hci_conn_add_sysfs: conn ffff88021f65a000 [69713.818975] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 [69713.818981] [6515] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e75a080, sk ffff88010323ac00 ... [69713.819021] [8909] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 10 [69713.819025] [8909] l2cap_connect_cfm: hcon ffff88021f65a000 bdaddr 00:1b:dc:06:06:22 status 0 [69713.819028] [8909] hci_chan_create: hci0 hcon ffff88021f65a000 [69713.819031] [8909] l2cap_conn_add: hcon ffff88021f65a000 conn ffff880221005c00 hchan ffff88020d60b1c0 [69713.819034] [8909] l2cap_conn_ready: conn ffff880221005c00 [69713.819036] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.819037] [8909] smp_conn_security: conn ffff880221005c00 hcon ffff88021f65a000 level 0x02 [69713.819039] [8909] smp_chan_create: [69713.819041] [8909] hci_conn_hold: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 1 [69713.819043] [8909] smp_send_cmd: code 0x01 [69713.819045] [8909] hci_send_acl: hci0 chan ffff88020d60b1c0 flags 0x0000 [69713.819046] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9900, sk ffff88012bf4e800 [69713.819049] [8909] hci_queue_acl: hci0 nonfrag skb ffff88005157c100 len 15 [69713.819055] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9900, sk ffff88012bf4e800 [69713.819057] [8909] l2cap_le_conn_ready: [69713.819064] [8909] l2cap_chan_create: chan ffff88005ede2c00 [69713.819066] [8909] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 1 [69713.819069] [8909] l2cap_sock_init: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.819072] [8909] bt_accept_enqueue: parent ffff880160356000, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.819074] [8909] __l2cap_chan_add: conn ffff880221005c00, psm 0x00, dcid 0x0004 [69713.819076] [8909] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 2 [69713.819078] [8909] hci_conn_hold: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 2 [69713.819080] [8909] smp_conn_security: conn ffff880221005c00 hcon ffff88021f65a000 level 0x01 [69713.819082] [8909] l2cap_sock_ready_cb: sk ffff88005ede5800, parent ffff880160356000 [69713.819086] [8909] le_pairing_complete_cb: status 0 [69713.819091] [8909] hci_tx_work: hci0 acl 10 sco 8 le 0 [69713.819093] [8909] hci_sched_acl: hci0 [69713.819094] [8909] hci_sched_sco: hci0 [69713.819096] [8909] hci_sched_esco: hci0 [69713.819098] [8909] hci_sched_le: hci0 [69713.819099] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.819101] [8909] hci_chan_sent: chan ffff88020d60b1c0 quote 10 [69713.819104] [8909] hci_sched_le: chan ffff88020d60b1c0 skb ffff88005157c100 len 15 priority 7 [69713.819106] [8909] hci_send_frame: hci0 type 2 len 15 [69713.819108] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 15 [69713.819119] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.819121] [8909] hci_prio_recalculate: hci0 [69713.819123] [8909] process_pending_rx: [69713.819226] [6450] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e758780, sk ffff88010323d400 ... [69713.822022] [6450] l2cap_sock_accept: sk ffff880160356000 timeo 0 [69713.822024] [6450] bt_accept_dequeue: parent ffff880160356000 [69713.822026] [6450] bt_accept_unlink: sk ffff88005ede5800 state 1 [69713.822028] [6450] l2cap_sock_accept: new socket ffff88005ede5800 [69713.822368] [6450] l2cap_sock_getname: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.822375] [6450] l2cap_sock_getsockopt: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.822383] [6450] l2cap_sock_getname: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.822414] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 ... [69713.823255] [6450] l2cap_sock_getname: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.823259] [6450] l2cap_sock_getsockopt: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.824322] [6450] l2cap_sock_getname: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.824330] [6450] l2cap_sock_getsockopt: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.825029] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 ... [69713.825187] [6450] l2cap_sock_sendmsg: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.825189] [6450] bt_sock_wait_ready: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.825192] [6450] l2cap_create_basic_pdu: chan ffff88005ede2c00 len 3 [69713.825196] [6450] l2cap_do_send: chan ffff88005ede2c00, skb ffff880160b0b500 len 7 priority 0 [69713.825199] [6450] hci_send_acl: hci0 chan ffff88020d60b1c0 flags 0x0000 [69713.825201] [6450] hci_queue_acl: hci0 nonfrag skb ffff880160b0b500 len 11 [69713.825210] [8909] hci_tx_work: hci0 acl 9 sco 8 le 0 [69713.825213] [8909] hci_sched_acl: hci0 [69713.825214] [8909] hci_sched_sco: hci0 [69713.825216] [8909] hci_sched_esco: hci0 [69713.825217] [8909] hci_sched_le: hci0 [69713.825219] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.825221] [8909] hci_chan_sent: chan ffff88020d60b1c0 quote 9 [69713.825223] [8909] hci_sched_le: chan ffff88020d60b1c0 skb ffff880160b0b500 len 11 priority 0 [69713.825225] [8909] hci_send_frame: hci0 type 2 len 11 [69713.825227] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 11 [69713.825242] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.825253] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.825253] [8909] hci_prio_recalculate: hci0 [69713.825292] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.825768] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 ... [69713.866902] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69713.866921] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 7 [69713.866928] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 Event packet [69713.866931] [8909] hci_num_comp_pkts_evt: hci0 num_hndl 1 [69713.866937] [8909] hci_tx_work: hci0 acl 9 sco 8 le 0 [69713.866939] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.866940] [8909] hci_sched_acl: hci0 ... [69713.866944] [8909] hci_sched_le: hci0 [69713.866953] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.866997] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.867840] [28074] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69713.867844] [28074] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 7 [69713.867850] [28074] hci_rx_work: hci0 Event packet [69713.867853] [28074] hci_num_comp_pkts_evt: hci0 num_hndl 1 [69713.867857] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.867858] [28074] hci_tx_work: hci0 acl 10 sco 8 le 0 [69713.867860] [28074] hci_sched_acl: hci0 [69713.867861] [28074] hci_sched_sco: hci0 [69713.867862] [28074] hci_sched_esco: hci0 [69713.867863] [28074] hci_sched_le: hci0 [69713.867865] [28074] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.867888] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69714.145661] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69714.145666] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 10 [69714.145676] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 ACL data packet [69714.145679] [8909] hci_acldata_packet: hci0 len 6 handle 0x002d flags 0x0002 [69714.145681] [8909] hci_conn_enter_active_mode: hcon ffff88021f65a000 mode 0 [69714.145683] [8909] l2cap_recv_acldata: conn ffff880221005c00 len 6 flags 0x2 [69714.145693] [8909] l2cap_recv_frame: len 2, cid 0x0006 [69714.145696] [8909] hci_send_to_control: len 14 [69714.145710] [8909] smp_chan_destroy: [69714.145713] [8909] pairing_complete: status 3 [69714.145714] [8909] cmd_complete: sock ffff88010323ac00 [69714.145717] [8909] hci_conn_drop: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 3 [69714.145719] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69714.145720] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 [69714.145722] [6515] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e75a080, sk ffff88010323ac00 [69714.145724] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8801db6b4f00, sk ffff880160351c00 ... [69714.145735] [6515] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e75a080, sk ffff88010323ac00 [69714.145737] [8909] hci_conn_drop: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 2 [69714.145739] [8909] l2cap_conn_del: hcon ffff88021f65a000 conn ffff880221005c00, err 13 [69714.145740] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8801db6b5400, sk ffff88021e775000 [69714.145743] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8801db6b5e00, sk ffff880160356000 [69714.145744] [8909] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 3 [69714.145746] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.145748] [8909] l2cap_chan_del: chan ffff88005ede2c00, conn ffff880221005c00, err 13 [69714.145749] [8909] l2cap_chan_put: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 4 [69714.145751] [8909] hci_conn_drop: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 1 [69714.145754] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.145756] [8909] l2cap_chan_put: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 3 [69714.145759] [8909] hci_chan_del: hci0 hcon ffff88021f65a000 chan ffff88020d60b1c0 [69714.145766] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69714.145787] [6515] hci_sock_release: sock ffff88005e75a080 sk ffff88010323ac00 [69714.146002] [6450] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e758780, sk ffff88010323d400 [69714.150795] [6450] l2cap_sock_release: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.150799] [6450] l2cap_sock_shutdown: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.150802] [6450] l2cap_chan_close: chan ffff88005ede2c00 state BT_CLOSED [69714.150805] [6450] l2cap_sock_kill: sk ffff88005ede5800 state BT_CLOSED [69714.150806] [6450] l2cap_chan_put: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 2 [69714.150808] [6450] l2cap_sock_destruct: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.150809] [6450] l2cap_chan_put: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 1 [69714.150811] [6450] l2cap_chan_destroy: chan ffff88005ede2c00 [69714.150970] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 ... [69714.151991] [8909] hci_conn_drop: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 0 [69716.150339] [8909] hci_conn_timeout: hcon ffff88021f65a000 state BT_CONNECTED, refcnt -1 Signed-off-by: Lukasz Rymanowski <lukasz.rymanowski@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2014-06-17 18:04:20 +07:00
int refcnt = atomic_read(&conn->refcnt);
BT_DBG("hcon %p state %s", conn, state_to_string(conn->state));
Bluetooth: Fix for ACL disconnect when pairing fails When pairing fails hci_conn refcnt drops below zero. This cause that ACL link is not disconnected when disconnect timeout fires. Probably this is because l2cap_conn_del calls l2cap_chan_del for each channel, and inside l2cap_chan_del conn is dropped. After that loop hci_chan_del is called which also drops conn. Anyway, as it is desrcibed in hci_core.h, it is known that refcnt drops below 0 sometimes and it should be fine. If so, let disconnect link when hci_conn_timeout fires and refcnt is 0 or below. This patch does it. This affects PTS test SM_TC_JW_BV_05_C Logs from scenario: [69713.706227] [6515] pair_device: [69713.706230] [6515] hci_conn_add: hci0 dst 00:1b:dc:06:06:22 [69713.706233] [6515] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 8 [69713.706235] [6515] hci_conn_init_sysfs: conn ffff88021f65a000 [69713.706239] [6515] hci_req_add_ev: hci0 opcode 0x200d plen 25 [69713.706242] [6515] hci_prepare_cmd: skb len 28 [69713.706243] [6515] hci_req_run: length 1 [69713.706248] [6515] hci_conn_hold: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 0 [69713.706251] [6515] hci_dev_put: hci0 orig refcnt 9 [69713.706281] [8909] hci_cmd_work: hci0 cmd_cnt 1 cmd queued 1 [69713.706288] [8909] hci_send_frame: hci0 type 1 len 28 [69713.706290] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 28 [69713.706316] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.706382] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.711664] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69713.711668] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 6 [69713.711680] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 Event packet [69713.711683] [8909] hci_cs_le_create_conn: hci0 status 0x00 [69713.711685] [8909] hci_sent_cmd_data: hci0 opcode 0x200d [69713.711688] [8909] hci_req_cmd_complete: opcode 0x200d status 0x00 [69713.711690] [8909] hci_sent_cmd_data: hci0 opcode 0x200d [69713.711695] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.711744] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.818875] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69713.818889] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 21 [69713.818913] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 Event packet [69713.818917] [8909] hci_le_conn_complete_evt: hci0 status 0x00 [69713.818922] [8909] hci_send_to_control: len 19 [69713.818927] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.818938] [8909] hci_conn_add_sysfs: conn ffff88021f65a000 [69713.818975] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 [69713.818981] [6515] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e75a080, sk ffff88010323ac00 ... [69713.819021] [8909] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 10 [69713.819025] [8909] l2cap_connect_cfm: hcon ffff88021f65a000 bdaddr 00:1b:dc:06:06:22 status 0 [69713.819028] [8909] hci_chan_create: hci0 hcon ffff88021f65a000 [69713.819031] [8909] l2cap_conn_add: hcon ffff88021f65a000 conn ffff880221005c00 hchan ffff88020d60b1c0 [69713.819034] [8909] l2cap_conn_ready: conn ffff880221005c00 [69713.819036] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.819037] [8909] smp_conn_security: conn ffff880221005c00 hcon ffff88021f65a000 level 0x02 [69713.819039] [8909] smp_chan_create: [69713.819041] [8909] hci_conn_hold: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 1 [69713.819043] [8909] smp_send_cmd: code 0x01 [69713.819045] [8909] hci_send_acl: hci0 chan ffff88020d60b1c0 flags 0x0000 [69713.819046] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9900, sk ffff88012bf4e800 [69713.819049] [8909] hci_queue_acl: hci0 nonfrag skb ffff88005157c100 len 15 [69713.819055] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9900, sk ffff88012bf4e800 [69713.819057] [8909] l2cap_le_conn_ready: [69713.819064] [8909] l2cap_chan_create: chan ffff88005ede2c00 [69713.819066] [8909] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 1 [69713.819069] [8909] l2cap_sock_init: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.819072] [8909] bt_accept_enqueue: parent ffff880160356000, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.819074] [8909] __l2cap_chan_add: conn ffff880221005c00, psm 0x00, dcid 0x0004 [69713.819076] [8909] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 2 [69713.819078] [8909] hci_conn_hold: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 2 [69713.819080] [8909] smp_conn_security: conn ffff880221005c00 hcon ffff88021f65a000 level 0x01 [69713.819082] [8909] l2cap_sock_ready_cb: sk ffff88005ede5800, parent ffff880160356000 [69713.819086] [8909] le_pairing_complete_cb: status 0 [69713.819091] [8909] hci_tx_work: hci0 acl 10 sco 8 le 0 [69713.819093] [8909] hci_sched_acl: hci0 [69713.819094] [8909] hci_sched_sco: hci0 [69713.819096] [8909] hci_sched_esco: hci0 [69713.819098] [8909] hci_sched_le: hci0 [69713.819099] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.819101] [8909] hci_chan_sent: chan ffff88020d60b1c0 quote 10 [69713.819104] [8909] hci_sched_le: chan ffff88020d60b1c0 skb ffff88005157c100 len 15 priority 7 [69713.819106] [8909] hci_send_frame: hci0 type 2 len 15 [69713.819108] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 15 [69713.819119] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.819121] [8909] hci_prio_recalculate: hci0 [69713.819123] [8909] process_pending_rx: [69713.819226] [6450] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e758780, sk ffff88010323d400 ... [69713.822022] [6450] l2cap_sock_accept: sk ffff880160356000 timeo 0 [69713.822024] [6450] bt_accept_dequeue: parent ffff880160356000 [69713.822026] [6450] bt_accept_unlink: sk ffff88005ede5800 state 1 [69713.822028] [6450] l2cap_sock_accept: new socket ffff88005ede5800 [69713.822368] [6450] l2cap_sock_getname: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.822375] [6450] l2cap_sock_getsockopt: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.822383] [6450] l2cap_sock_getname: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.822414] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 ... [69713.823255] [6450] l2cap_sock_getname: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.823259] [6450] l2cap_sock_getsockopt: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.824322] [6450] l2cap_sock_getname: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.824330] [6450] l2cap_sock_getsockopt: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.825029] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 ... [69713.825187] [6450] l2cap_sock_sendmsg: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.825189] [6450] bt_sock_wait_ready: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.825192] [6450] l2cap_create_basic_pdu: chan ffff88005ede2c00 len 3 [69713.825196] [6450] l2cap_do_send: chan ffff88005ede2c00, skb ffff880160b0b500 len 7 priority 0 [69713.825199] [6450] hci_send_acl: hci0 chan ffff88020d60b1c0 flags 0x0000 [69713.825201] [6450] hci_queue_acl: hci0 nonfrag skb ffff880160b0b500 len 11 [69713.825210] [8909] hci_tx_work: hci0 acl 9 sco 8 le 0 [69713.825213] [8909] hci_sched_acl: hci0 [69713.825214] [8909] hci_sched_sco: hci0 [69713.825216] [8909] hci_sched_esco: hci0 [69713.825217] [8909] hci_sched_le: hci0 [69713.825219] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.825221] [8909] hci_chan_sent: chan ffff88020d60b1c0 quote 9 [69713.825223] [8909] hci_sched_le: chan ffff88020d60b1c0 skb ffff880160b0b500 len 11 priority 0 [69713.825225] [8909] hci_send_frame: hci0 type 2 len 11 [69713.825227] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 11 [69713.825242] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.825253] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.825253] [8909] hci_prio_recalculate: hci0 [69713.825292] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.825768] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 ... [69713.866902] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69713.866921] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 7 [69713.866928] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 Event packet [69713.866931] [8909] hci_num_comp_pkts_evt: hci0 num_hndl 1 [69713.866937] [8909] hci_tx_work: hci0 acl 9 sco 8 le 0 [69713.866939] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.866940] [8909] hci_sched_acl: hci0 ... [69713.866944] [8909] hci_sched_le: hci0 [69713.866953] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.866997] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.867840] [28074] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69713.867844] [28074] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 7 [69713.867850] [28074] hci_rx_work: hci0 Event packet [69713.867853] [28074] hci_num_comp_pkts_evt: hci0 num_hndl 1 [69713.867857] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.867858] [28074] hci_tx_work: hci0 acl 10 sco 8 le 0 [69713.867860] [28074] hci_sched_acl: hci0 [69713.867861] [28074] hci_sched_sco: hci0 [69713.867862] [28074] hci_sched_esco: hci0 [69713.867863] [28074] hci_sched_le: hci0 [69713.867865] [28074] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.867888] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69714.145661] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69714.145666] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 10 [69714.145676] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 ACL data packet [69714.145679] [8909] hci_acldata_packet: hci0 len 6 handle 0x002d flags 0x0002 [69714.145681] [8909] hci_conn_enter_active_mode: hcon ffff88021f65a000 mode 0 [69714.145683] [8909] l2cap_recv_acldata: conn ffff880221005c00 len 6 flags 0x2 [69714.145693] [8909] l2cap_recv_frame: len 2, cid 0x0006 [69714.145696] [8909] hci_send_to_control: len 14 [69714.145710] [8909] smp_chan_destroy: [69714.145713] [8909] pairing_complete: status 3 [69714.145714] [8909] cmd_complete: sock ffff88010323ac00 [69714.145717] [8909] hci_conn_drop: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 3 [69714.145719] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69714.145720] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 [69714.145722] [6515] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e75a080, sk ffff88010323ac00 [69714.145724] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8801db6b4f00, sk ffff880160351c00 ... [69714.145735] [6515] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e75a080, sk ffff88010323ac00 [69714.145737] [8909] hci_conn_drop: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 2 [69714.145739] [8909] l2cap_conn_del: hcon ffff88021f65a000 conn ffff880221005c00, err 13 [69714.145740] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8801db6b5400, sk ffff88021e775000 [69714.145743] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8801db6b5e00, sk ffff880160356000 [69714.145744] [8909] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 3 [69714.145746] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.145748] [8909] l2cap_chan_del: chan ffff88005ede2c00, conn ffff880221005c00, err 13 [69714.145749] [8909] l2cap_chan_put: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 4 [69714.145751] [8909] hci_conn_drop: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 1 [69714.145754] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.145756] [8909] l2cap_chan_put: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 3 [69714.145759] [8909] hci_chan_del: hci0 hcon ffff88021f65a000 chan ffff88020d60b1c0 [69714.145766] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69714.145787] [6515] hci_sock_release: sock ffff88005e75a080 sk ffff88010323ac00 [69714.146002] [6450] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e758780, sk ffff88010323d400 [69714.150795] [6450] l2cap_sock_release: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.150799] [6450] l2cap_sock_shutdown: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.150802] [6450] l2cap_chan_close: chan ffff88005ede2c00 state BT_CLOSED [69714.150805] [6450] l2cap_sock_kill: sk ffff88005ede5800 state BT_CLOSED [69714.150806] [6450] l2cap_chan_put: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 2 [69714.150808] [6450] l2cap_sock_destruct: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.150809] [6450] l2cap_chan_put: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 1 [69714.150811] [6450] l2cap_chan_destroy: chan ffff88005ede2c00 [69714.150970] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 ... [69714.151991] [8909] hci_conn_drop: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 0 [69716.150339] [8909] hci_conn_timeout: hcon ffff88021f65a000 state BT_CONNECTED, refcnt -1 Signed-off-by: Lukasz Rymanowski <lukasz.rymanowski@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2014-06-17 18:04:20 +07:00
WARN_ON(refcnt < 0);
/* FIXME: It was observed that in pairing failed scenario, refcnt
* drops below 0. Probably this is because l2cap_conn_del calls
* l2cap_chan_del for each channel, and inside l2cap_chan_del conn is
* dropped. After that loop hci_chan_del is called which also drops
* conn. For now make sure that ACL is alive if refcnt is higher then 0,
* otherwise drop it.
*/
if (refcnt > 0)
return;
/* LE connections in scanning state need special handling */
if (conn->state == BT_CONNECT && conn->type == LE_LINK &&
test_bit(HCI_CONN_SCANNING, &conn->flags)) {
hci_connect_le_scan_remove(conn);
return;
}
hci_abort_conn(conn, hci_proto_disconn_ind(conn));
}
/* Enter sniff mode */
static void hci_conn_idle(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct hci_conn *conn = container_of(work, struct hci_conn,
idle_work.work);
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
BT_DBG("hcon %p mode %d", conn, conn->mode);
if (!lmp_sniff_capable(hdev) || !lmp_sniff_capable(conn))
return;
if (conn->mode != HCI_CM_ACTIVE || !(conn->link_policy & HCI_LP_SNIFF))
return;
if (lmp_sniffsubr_capable(hdev) && lmp_sniffsubr_capable(conn)) {
struct hci_cp_sniff_subrate cp;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
cp.max_latency = cpu_to_le16(0);
cp.min_remote_timeout = cpu_to_le16(0);
cp.min_local_timeout = cpu_to_le16(0);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_SNIFF_SUBRATE, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_MODE_CHANGE_PEND, &conn->flags)) {
struct hci_cp_sniff_mode cp;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
cp.max_interval = cpu_to_le16(hdev->sniff_max_interval);
cp.min_interval = cpu_to_le16(hdev->sniff_min_interval);
cp.attempt = cpu_to_le16(4);
cp.timeout = cpu_to_le16(1);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_SNIFF_MODE, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
}
static void hci_conn_auto_accept(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct hci_conn *conn = container_of(work, struct hci_conn,
auto_accept_work.work);
hci_send_cmd(conn->hdev, HCI_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY, sizeof(conn->dst),
&conn->dst);
}
static void le_conn_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct hci_conn *conn = container_of(work, struct hci_conn,
le_conn_timeout.work);
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
BT_DBG("");
/* We could end up here due to having done directed advertising,
* so clean up the state if necessary. This should however only
* happen with broken hardware or if low duty cycle was used
* (which doesn't have a timeout of its own).
*/
if (conn->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) {
u8 enable = 0x00;
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_SET_ADV_ENABLE, sizeof(enable),
&enable);
hci_le_conn_failed(conn, HCI_ERROR_ADVERTISING_TIMEOUT);
return;
}
hci_abort_conn(conn, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
}
struct hci_conn *hci_conn_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst,
u8 role)
{
struct hci_conn *conn;
BT_DBG("%s dst %pMR", hdev->name, dst);
conn = kzalloc(sizeof(*conn), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!conn)
return NULL;
bacpy(&conn->dst, dst);
bacpy(&conn->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
conn->hdev = hdev;
conn->type = type;
conn->role = role;
conn->mode = HCI_CM_ACTIVE;
conn->state = BT_OPEN;
conn->auth_type = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING;
conn->io_capability = hdev->io_capability;
conn->remote_auth = 0xff;
conn->key_type = 0xff;
conn->rssi = HCI_RSSI_INVALID;
conn->tx_power = HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID;
conn->max_tx_power = HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID;
set_bit(HCI_CONN_POWER_SAVE, &conn->flags);
Bluetooth: Add different pairing timeout for Legacy Pairing The Bluetooth stack uses a reference counting for all established ACL links and if no user (L2CAP connection) is present, the link will be terminated to save power. The problem part is the dedicated pairing when using Legacy Pairing (Bluetooth 2.0 and before). At that point no user is present and pairing attempts will be disconnected within 10 seconds or less. In previous kernel version this was not a problem since the disconnect timeout wasn't triggered on incoming connections for the first time. However this caused issues with broken host stacks that kept the connections around after dedicated pairing. When the support for Simple Pairing got added, the link establishment procedure needed to be changed and now causes issues when using Legacy Pairing When using Simple Pairing it is possible to do a proper reference counting of ACL link users. With Legacy Pairing this is not possible since the specification is unclear in some areas and too many broken Bluetooth devices have already been deployed. So instead of trying to deal with all the broken devices, a special pairing timeout will be introduced that increases the timeout to 60 seconds when pairing is triggered. If a broken devices now puts the stack into an unforeseen state, the worst that happens is the disconnect timeout triggers after 120 seconds instead of 4 seconds. This allows successful pairings with legacy and broken devices now. Based on a report by Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-04-27 01:01:22 +07:00
conn->disc_timeout = HCI_DISCONN_TIMEOUT;
if (conn->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
conn->out = true;
switch (type) {
case ACL_LINK:
conn->pkt_type = hdev->pkt_type & ACL_PTYPE_MASK;
break;
case LE_LINK:
/* conn->src should reflect the local identity address */
hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &conn->src, &conn->src_type);
break;
case SCO_LINK:
if (lmp_esco_capable(hdev))
conn->pkt_type = (hdev->esco_type & SCO_ESCO_MASK) |
(hdev->esco_type & EDR_ESCO_MASK);
else
conn->pkt_type = hdev->pkt_type & SCO_PTYPE_MASK;
break;
case ESCO_LINK:
conn->pkt_type = hdev->esco_type & ~EDR_ESCO_MASK;
break;
}
skb_queue_head_init(&conn->data_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&conn->chan_list);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->disc_work, hci_conn_timeout);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->auto_accept_work, hci_conn_auto_accept);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->idle_work, hci_conn_idle);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->le_conn_timeout, le_conn_timeout);
Bluetooth: Fix missing hdev locking for LE scan cleanup The hci_conn objects don't have a dedicated lock themselves but rely on the caller to hold the hci_dev lock for most types of access. The hci_conn_timeout() function has so far sent certain HCI commands based on the hci_conn state which has been possible without holding the hci_dev lock. The recent changes to do LE scanning before connect attempts added even more operations to hci_conn and hci_dev from hci_conn_timeout, thereby exposing potential race conditions with the hci_dev and hci_conn states. As an example of such a race, here there's a timeout but an l2cap_sock_connect() call manages to race with the cleanup routine: [Oct21 08:14] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b12c0, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000010] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000013] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000063] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000049] hci_conn_params_del: addr ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 1) [ +0.000002] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] hci_chan_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 chan f4e7ccc0 [ +0.004528] l2cap_sock_create: sock e708fc00 [ +0.000023] l2cap_chan_create: chan ee4b1770 [ +0.000001] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_init: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000029] l2cap_sock_bind: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000010] l2cap_sock_setsockopt: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000037] l2cap_sock_connect: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_connect: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 2) psm 0x00 [ +0.000002] hci_get_route: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f [ +0.000001] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 8 [ +0.000003] hci_conn_hold: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 0 Above the l2cap_chan_connect() shouldn't have been able to reach the hci_conn f53d56e0 anymore but since hci_conn_timeout didn't do proper locking that's not the case. The end result is a reference to hci_conn that's not in the conn_hash list, resulting in list corruption when trying to remove it later: [Oct21 08:15] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b1770, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000001] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000015] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000038] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_hash_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000461] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1782 at lib/list_debug.c:56 __list_del_entry+0x3f/0x71() [ +0.000839] list_del corruption, f53d56e0->prev is LIST_POISON2 (00000200) The necessary fix is unfortunately more complicated than just adding hci_dev_lock/unlock calls to the hci_conn_timeout() call path. Particularly, the hci_conn_del() API, which expects the hci_dev lock to be held, performs a cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hcon->disc_work) which would lead to a deadlock if the hci_conn_timeout() call path tries to acquire the same lock. This patch solves the problem by deferring the cleanup work to a separate work callback. To protect against the hci_dev or hci_conn going away meanwhile temporary references are taken with the help of hci_dev_hold() and hci_conn_get(). Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
2015-10-21 19:21:31 +07:00
INIT_WORK(&conn->le_scan_cleanup, le_scan_cleanup);
atomic_set(&conn->refcnt, 0);
hci_dev_hold(hdev);
hci_conn_hash_add(hdev, conn);
if (hdev->notify)
hdev->notify(hdev, HCI_NOTIFY_CONN_ADD);
Bluetooth: Fix issue with sysfs handling for connections Due to a semantic changes in flush_workqueue() the current approach of synchronizing the sysfs handling for connections doesn't work anymore. The whole approach is actually fully broken and based on assumptions that are no longer valid. With the introduction of Simple Pairing support, the creation of low-level ACL links got changed. This change invalidates the reason why in the past two independent work queues have been used for adding/removing sysfs devices. The adding of the actual sysfs device is now postponed until the host controller successfully assigns an unique handle to that link. So the real synchronization happens inside the controller and not the host. The only left-over problem is that some internals of the sysfs device handling are not initialized ahead of time. This leaves potential access to invalid data and can cause various NULL pointer dereferences. To fix this a new function makes sure that all sysfs details are initialized when an connection attempt is made. The actual sysfs device is only registered when the connection has been successfully established. To avoid a race condition with the registration, the check if a device is registered has been moved into the removal work. As an extra protection two flush_work() calls are left in place to make sure a previous add/del work has been completed first. Based on a report by Marc Pignat <marc.pignat@hevs.ch> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Tested-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com> Tested-by: Roger Quadros <ext-roger.quadros@nokia.com> Tested-by: Marc Pignat <marc.pignat@hevs.ch>
2009-05-03 08:24:06 +07:00
hci_conn_init_sysfs(conn);
return conn;
}
int hci_conn_del(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
BT_DBG("%s hcon %p handle %d", hdev->name, conn, conn->handle);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->disc_work);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->auto_accept_work);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->idle_work);
if (conn->type == ACL_LINK) {
struct hci_conn *sco = conn->link;
if (sco)
sco->link = NULL;
/* Unacked frames */
hdev->acl_cnt += conn->sent;
} else if (conn->type == LE_LINK) {
cancel_delayed_work(&conn->le_conn_timeout);
if (hdev->le_pkts)
hdev->le_cnt += conn->sent;
else
hdev->acl_cnt += conn->sent;
} else {
struct hci_conn *acl = conn->link;
if (acl) {
acl->link = NULL;
hci_conn_drop(acl);
}
}
if (conn->amp_mgr)
amp_mgr_put(conn->amp_mgr);
skb_queue_purge(&conn->data_q);
/* Remove the connection from the list and cleanup its remaining
* state. This is a separate function since for some cases like
* BT_CONNECT_SCAN we *only* want the cleanup part without the
* rest of hci_conn_del.
*/
hci_conn_cleanup(conn);
return 0;
}
struct hci_dev *hci_get_route(bdaddr_t *dst, bdaddr_t *src, uint8_t src_type)
{
int use_src = bacmp(src, BDADDR_ANY);
struct hci_dev *hdev = NULL, *d;
BT_DBG("%pMR -> %pMR", src, dst);
read_lock(&hci_dev_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(d, &hci_dev_list, list) {
if (!test_bit(HCI_UP, &d->flags) ||
hci_dev_test_flag(d, HCI_USER_CHANNEL) ||
d->dev_type != HCI_PRIMARY)
continue;
/* Simple routing:
* No source address - find interface with bdaddr != dst
* Source address - find interface with bdaddr == src
*/
if (use_src) {
bdaddr_t id_addr;
u8 id_addr_type;
if (src_type == BDADDR_BREDR) {
if (!lmp_bredr_capable(d))
continue;
bacpy(&id_addr, &d->bdaddr);
id_addr_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
} else {
if (!lmp_le_capable(d))
continue;
hci_copy_identity_address(d, &id_addr,
&id_addr_type);
/* Convert from HCI to three-value type */
if (id_addr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
id_addr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
else
id_addr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
}
if (!bacmp(&id_addr, src) && id_addr_type == src_type) {
hdev = d; break;
}
} else {
if (bacmp(&d->bdaddr, dst)) {
hdev = d; break;
}
}
}
if (hdev)
hdev = hci_dev_hold(hdev);
read_unlock(&hci_dev_list_lock);
return hdev;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_get_route);
/* This function requires the caller holds hdev->lock */
void hci_le_conn_failed(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct hci_conn_params *params;
params = hci_pend_le_action_lookup(&hdev->pend_le_conns, &conn->dst,
conn->dst_type);
if (params && params->conn) {
hci_conn_drop(params->conn);
hci_conn_put(params->conn);
params->conn = NULL;
}
conn->state = BT_CLOSED;
/* If the status indicates successful cancellation of
* the attempt (i.e. Unkown Connection Id) there's no point of
* notifying failure since we'll go back to keep trying to
* connect. The only exception is explicit connect requests
* where a timeout + cancel does indicate an actual failure.
*/
if (status != HCI_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CONN_ID ||
(params && params->explicit_connect))
mgmt_connect_failed(hdev, &conn->dst, conn->type,
conn->dst_type, status);
hci_connect_cfm(conn, status);
hci_conn_del(conn);
Bluetooth: Introduce LE auto connection infrastructure This patch introduces the LE auto connection infrastructure which will be used to implement the LE auto connection options. In summary, the auto connection mechanism works as follows: Once the first pending LE connection is created, the background scanning is started. When the target device is found in range, the kernel autonomously starts the connection attempt. If connection is established successfully, that pending LE connection is deleted and the background is stopped. To achieve that, this patch introduces the hci_update_background_scan() which controls the background scanning state. This function starts or stops the background scanning based on the hdev->pend_le_conns list. If there is no pending LE connection, the background scanning is stopped. Otherwise, we start the background scanning. Then, every time a pending LE connection is added we call hci_update_ background_scan() so the background scanning is started (in case it is not already running). Likewise, every time a pending LE connection is deleted we call hci_update_background_scan() so the background scanning is stopped (in case this was the last pending LE connection) or it is started again (in case we have more pending LE connections). Finally, we also call hci_update_background_scan() in hci_le_conn_failed() so the background scan is restarted in case the connection establishment fails. This way the background scanning keeps running until all pending LE connection are established. At this point, resolvable addresses are not support by this infrastructure. The proper support is added in upcoming patches. Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes <andre.guedes@openbossa.org> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2014-02-27 06:21:47 +07:00
/* Since we may have temporarily stopped the background scanning in
* favor of connection establishment, we should restart it.
*/
hci_update_background_scan(hdev);
/* Re-enable advertising in case this was a failed connection
* attempt as a peripheral.
*/
hci_req_reenable_advertising(hdev);
}
static void create_le_conn_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status, u16 opcode)
{
struct hci_conn *conn;
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
conn = hci_lookup_le_connect(hdev);
if (!status) {
hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup(conn);
goto done;
}
bt_dev_err(hdev, "request failed to create LE connection: "
"status 0x%2.2x", status);
if (!conn)
goto done;
hci_le_conn_failed(conn, status);
done:
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
}
static bool conn_use_rpa(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
return hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY);
}
static void hci_req_add_le_create_conn(struct hci_request *req,
Bluetooth: Fix connection if directed advertising and privacy is used Local random address needs to be updated before creating connection if RPA from LE Direct Advertising Report was resolved in host. Otherwise remote device might ignore connection request due to address mismatch. This was affecting following qualification test cases: GAP/CONN/SCEP/BV-03-C, GAP/CONN/GCEP/BV-05-C, GAP/CONN/DCEP/BV-05-C Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #11350 [hci0] 84680.231216 Address: 56:BC:E8:24:11:68 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11351 [hci0] 84680.246022 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #11352 [hci0] 84680.246417 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11353 [hci0] 84680.248854 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11354 [hci0] 84680.249466 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11355 [hci0] 84680.253222 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #11356 [hci0] 84680.458387 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:D6:76:8C:DF:82 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) RSSI: -74 dBm (0xb6) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11357 [hci0] 84680.458737 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11358 [hci0] 84680.469982 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #11359 [hci0] 84680.470444 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #11360 [hci0] 84680.474971 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) plen 0 #11361 [hci0] 84682.545385 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11362 [hci0] 84682.551014 LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #11363 [hci0] 84682.551074 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Unknown Connection Identifier (0x02) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Public (0x00) Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00) Connection interval: 0.00 msec (0x0000) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 0 msec (0x0000) Master clock accuracy: 0x00 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #210 [hci0] 667.152459 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #211 [hci0] 667.153613 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #212 [hci0] 667.153704 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #213 [hci0] 667.154584 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #214 [hci0] 667.182619 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) RSSI: -70 dBm (0xba) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #215 [hci0] 667.182704 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #216 [hci0] 667.183599 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #217 [hci0] 667.183645 Address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #218 [hci0] 667.184590 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #219 [hci0] 667.184613 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #220 [hci0] 667.186558 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #221 [hci0] 667.485824 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Master clock accuracy: 0x07 @ MGMT Event: Device Connected (0x000b) plen 13 {0x0002} [hci0] 667.485996 LE Address: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Flags: 0x00000000 Data length: 0 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2018-04-03 18:40:06 +07:00
struct hci_conn *conn,
bdaddr_t *direct_rpa)
{
struct hci_cp_le_create_conn cp;
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
u8 own_addr_type;
Bluetooth: Fix connection if directed advertising and privacy is used Local random address needs to be updated before creating connection if RPA from LE Direct Advertising Report was resolved in host. Otherwise remote device might ignore connection request due to address mismatch. This was affecting following qualification test cases: GAP/CONN/SCEP/BV-03-C, GAP/CONN/GCEP/BV-05-C, GAP/CONN/DCEP/BV-05-C Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #11350 [hci0] 84680.231216 Address: 56:BC:E8:24:11:68 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11351 [hci0] 84680.246022 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #11352 [hci0] 84680.246417 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11353 [hci0] 84680.248854 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11354 [hci0] 84680.249466 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11355 [hci0] 84680.253222 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #11356 [hci0] 84680.458387 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:D6:76:8C:DF:82 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) RSSI: -74 dBm (0xb6) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11357 [hci0] 84680.458737 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11358 [hci0] 84680.469982 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #11359 [hci0] 84680.470444 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #11360 [hci0] 84680.474971 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) plen 0 #11361 [hci0] 84682.545385 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11362 [hci0] 84682.551014 LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #11363 [hci0] 84682.551074 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Unknown Connection Identifier (0x02) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Public (0x00) Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00) Connection interval: 0.00 msec (0x0000) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 0 msec (0x0000) Master clock accuracy: 0x00 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #210 [hci0] 667.152459 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #211 [hci0] 667.153613 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #212 [hci0] 667.153704 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #213 [hci0] 667.154584 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #214 [hci0] 667.182619 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) RSSI: -70 dBm (0xba) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #215 [hci0] 667.182704 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #216 [hci0] 667.183599 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #217 [hci0] 667.183645 Address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #218 [hci0] 667.184590 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #219 [hci0] 667.184613 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #220 [hci0] 667.186558 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #221 [hci0] 667.485824 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Master clock accuracy: 0x07 @ MGMT Event: Device Connected (0x000b) plen 13 {0x0002} [hci0] 667.485996 LE Address: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Flags: 0x00000000 Data length: 0 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2018-04-03 18:40:06 +07:00
/* If direct address was provided we use it instead of current
* address.
*/
Bluetooth: Fix connection if directed advertising and privacy is used Local random address needs to be updated before creating connection if RPA from LE Direct Advertising Report was resolved in host. Otherwise remote device might ignore connection request due to address mismatch. This was affecting following qualification test cases: GAP/CONN/SCEP/BV-03-C, GAP/CONN/GCEP/BV-05-C, GAP/CONN/DCEP/BV-05-C Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #11350 [hci0] 84680.231216 Address: 56:BC:E8:24:11:68 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11351 [hci0] 84680.246022 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #11352 [hci0] 84680.246417 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11353 [hci0] 84680.248854 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11354 [hci0] 84680.249466 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11355 [hci0] 84680.253222 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #11356 [hci0] 84680.458387 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:D6:76:8C:DF:82 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) RSSI: -74 dBm (0xb6) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11357 [hci0] 84680.458737 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11358 [hci0] 84680.469982 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #11359 [hci0] 84680.470444 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #11360 [hci0] 84680.474971 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) plen 0 #11361 [hci0] 84682.545385 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11362 [hci0] 84682.551014 LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #11363 [hci0] 84682.551074 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Unknown Connection Identifier (0x02) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Public (0x00) Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00) Connection interval: 0.00 msec (0x0000) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 0 msec (0x0000) Master clock accuracy: 0x00 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #210 [hci0] 667.152459 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #211 [hci0] 667.153613 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #212 [hci0] 667.153704 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #213 [hci0] 667.154584 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #214 [hci0] 667.182619 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) RSSI: -70 dBm (0xba) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #215 [hci0] 667.182704 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #216 [hci0] 667.183599 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #217 [hci0] 667.183645 Address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #218 [hci0] 667.184590 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #219 [hci0] 667.184613 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #220 [hci0] 667.186558 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #221 [hci0] 667.485824 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Master clock accuracy: 0x07 @ MGMT Event: Device Connected (0x000b) plen 13 {0x0002} [hci0] 667.485996 LE Address: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Flags: 0x00000000 Data length: 0 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2018-04-03 18:40:06 +07:00
if (direct_rpa) {
if (bacmp(&req->hdev->random_addr, direct_rpa))
hci_req_add(req, HCI_OP_LE_SET_RANDOM_ADDR, 6,
direct_rpa);
/* direct address is always RPA */
own_addr_type = ADDR_LE_DEV_RANDOM;
} else {
/* Update random address, but set require_privacy to false so
* that we never connect with an non-resolvable address.
*/
if (hci_update_random_address(req, false, conn_use_rpa(conn),
&own_addr_type))
return;
}
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
/* Set window to be the same value as the interval to enable
* continuous scanning.
*/
cp.scan_interval = cpu_to_le16(hdev->le_scan_interval);
cp.scan_window = cp.scan_interval;
bacpy(&cp.peer_addr, &conn->dst);
cp.peer_addr_type = conn->dst_type;
cp.own_address_type = own_addr_type;
cp.conn_interval_min = cpu_to_le16(conn->le_conn_min_interval);
cp.conn_interval_max = cpu_to_le16(conn->le_conn_max_interval);
cp.conn_latency = cpu_to_le16(conn->le_conn_latency);
cp.supervision_timeout = cpu_to_le16(conn->le_supv_timeout);
cp.min_ce_len = cpu_to_le16(0x0000);
cp.max_ce_len = cpu_to_le16(0x0000);
hci_req_add(req, HCI_OP_LE_CREATE_CONN, sizeof(cp), &cp);
conn->state = BT_CONNECT;
clear_bit(HCI_CONN_SCANNING, &conn->flags);
}
static void hci_req_directed_advertising(struct hci_request *req,
struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = req->hdev;
struct hci_cp_le_set_adv_param cp;
u8 own_addr_type;
u8 enable;
/* Clear the HCI_LE_ADV bit temporarily so that the
* hci_update_random_address knows that it's safe to go ahead
* and write a new random address. The flag will be set back on
* as soon as the SET_ADV_ENABLE HCI command completes.
*/
hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ADV);
/* Set require_privacy to false so that the remote device has a
* chance of identifying us.
*/
if (hci_update_random_address(req, false, conn_use_rpa(conn),
&own_addr_type) < 0)
return;
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
cp.type = LE_ADV_DIRECT_IND;
cp.own_address_type = own_addr_type;
cp.direct_addr_type = conn->dst_type;
bacpy(&cp.direct_addr, &conn->dst);
cp.channel_map = hdev->le_adv_channel_map;
hci_req_add(req, HCI_OP_LE_SET_ADV_PARAM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
enable = 0x01;
hci_req_add(req, HCI_OP_LE_SET_ADV_ENABLE, sizeof(enable), &enable);
conn->state = BT_CONNECT;
}
struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst,
u8 dst_type, u8 sec_level, u16 conn_timeout,
Bluetooth: Fix connection if directed advertising and privacy is used Local random address needs to be updated before creating connection if RPA from LE Direct Advertising Report was resolved in host. Otherwise remote device might ignore connection request due to address mismatch. This was affecting following qualification test cases: GAP/CONN/SCEP/BV-03-C, GAP/CONN/GCEP/BV-05-C, GAP/CONN/DCEP/BV-05-C Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #11350 [hci0] 84680.231216 Address: 56:BC:E8:24:11:68 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11351 [hci0] 84680.246022 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #11352 [hci0] 84680.246417 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11353 [hci0] 84680.248854 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11354 [hci0] 84680.249466 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11355 [hci0] 84680.253222 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #11356 [hci0] 84680.458387 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:D6:76:8C:DF:82 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) RSSI: -74 dBm (0xb6) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11357 [hci0] 84680.458737 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11358 [hci0] 84680.469982 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #11359 [hci0] 84680.470444 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #11360 [hci0] 84680.474971 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) plen 0 #11361 [hci0] 84682.545385 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11362 [hci0] 84682.551014 LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #11363 [hci0] 84682.551074 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Unknown Connection Identifier (0x02) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Public (0x00) Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00) Connection interval: 0.00 msec (0x0000) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 0 msec (0x0000) Master clock accuracy: 0x00 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #210 [hci0] 667.152459 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #211 [hci0] 667.153613 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #212 [hci0] 667.153704 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #213 [hci0] 667.154584 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #214 [hci0] 667.182619 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) RSSI: -70 dBm (0xba) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #215 [hci0] 667.182704 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #216 [hci0] 667.183599 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #217 [hci0] 667.183645 Address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #218 [hci0] 667.184590 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #219 [hci0] 667.184613 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #220 [hci0] 667.186558 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #221 [hci0] 667.485824 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Master clock accuracy: 0x07 @ MGMT Event: Device Connected (0x000b) plen 13 {0x0002} [hci0] 667.485996 LE Address: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Flags: 0x00000000 Data length: 0 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2018-04-03 18:40:06 +07:00
u8 role, bdaddr_t *direct_rpa)
{
struct hci_conn_params *params;
struct hci_conn *conn;
struct smp_irk *irk;
struct hci_request req;
int err;
/* Let's make sure that le is enabled.*/
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
if (lmp_le_capable(hdev))
return ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED);
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
/* Since the controller supports only one LE connection attempt at a
* time, we return -EBUSY if there is any connection attempt running.
*/
if (hci_lookup_le_connect(hdev))
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
/* If there's already a connection object but it's not in
* scanning state it means it must already be established, in
* which case we can't do anything else except report a failure
* to connect.
*/
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, dst, dst_type);
if (conn && !test_bit(HCI_CONN_SCANNING, &conn->flags)) {
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
}
/* When given an identity address with existing identity
* resolving key, the connection needs to be established
* to a resolvable random address.
*
* Storing the resolvable random address is required here
* to handle connection failures. The address will later
* be resolved back into the original identity address
* from the connect request.
*/
irk = hci_find_irk_by_addr(hdev, dst, dst_type);
if (irk && bacmp(&irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {
dst = &irk->rpa;
dst_type = ADDR_LE_DEV_RANDOM;
}
if (conn) {
bacpy(&conn->dst, dst);
} else {
conn = hci_conn_add(hdev, LE_LINK, dst, role);
if (!conn)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
hci_conn_hold(conn);
conn->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
}
conn->dst_type = dst_type;
conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
conn->conn_timeout = conn_timeout;
hci_req_init(&req, hdev);
/* Disable advertising if we're active. For master role
* connections most controllers will refuse to connect if
* advertising is enabled, and for slave role connections we
* anyway have to disable it in order to start directed
* advertising.
*/
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ADV)) {
u8 enable = 0x00;
hci_req_add(&req, HCI_OP_LE_SET_ADV_ENABLE, sizeof(enable),
&enable);
}
/* If requested to connect as slave use directed advertising */
if (conn->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) {
/* If we're active scanning most controllers are unable
* to initiate advertising. Simply reject the attempt.
*/
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_SCAN) &&
hdev->le_scan_type == LE_SCAN_ACTIVE) {
hci_req_purge(&req);
hci_conn_del(conn);
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
}
hci_req_directed_advertising(&req, conn);
goto create_conn;
}
params = hci_conn_params_lookup(hdev, &conn->dst, conn->dst_type);
if (params) {
conn->le_conn_min_interval = params->conn_min_interval;
conn->le_conn_max_interval = params->conn_max_interval;
conn->le_conn_latency = params->conn_latency;
conn->le_supv_timeout = params->supervision_timeout;
} else {
conn->le_conn_min_interval = hdev->le_conn_min_interval;
conn->le_conn_max_interval = hdev->le_conn_max_interval;
conn->le_conn_latency = hdev->le_conn_latency;
conn->le_supv_timeout = hdev->le_supv_timeout;
}
/* If controller is scanning, we stop it since some controllers are
* not able to scan and connect at the same time. Also set the
* HCI_LE_SCAN_INTERRUPTED flag so that the command complete
* handler for scan disabling knows to set the correct discovery
* state.
*/
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_SCAN)) {
hci_req_add_le_scan_disable(&req);
hci_dev_set_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_SCAN_INTERRUPTED);
}
Bluetooth: Fix connection if directed advertising and privacy is used Local random address needs to be updated before creating connection if RPA from LE Direct Advertising Report was resolved in host. Otherwise remote device might ignore connection request due to address mismatch. This was affecting following qualification test cases: GAP/CONN/SCEP/BV-03-C, GAP/CONN/GCEP/BV-05-C, GAP/CONN/DCEP/BV-05-C Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #11350 [hci0] 84680.231216 Address: 56:BC:E8:24:11:68 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11351 [hci0] 84680.246022 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #11352 [hci0] 84680.246417 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11353 [hci0] 84680.248854 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11354 [hci0] 84680.249466 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11355 [hci0] 84680.253222 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #11356 [hci0] 84680.458387 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:D6:76:8C:DF:82 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) RSSI: -74 dBm (0xb6) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11357 [hci0] 84680.458737 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11358 [hci0] 84680.469982 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #11359 [hci0] 84680.470444 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #11360 [hci0] 84680.474971 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) plen 0 #11361 [hci0] 84682.545385 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11362 [hci0] 84682.551014 LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #11363 [hci0] 84682.551074 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Unknown Connection Identifier (0x02) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Public (0x00) Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00) Connection interval: 0.00 msec (0x0000) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 0 msec (0x0000) Master clock accuracy: 0x00 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #210 [hci0] 667.152459 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #211 [hci0] 667.153613 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #212 [hci0] 667.153704 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #213 [hci0] 667.154584 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #214 [hci0] 667.182619 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) RSSI: -70 dBm (0xba) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #215 [hci0] 667.182704 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #216 [hci0] 667.183599 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #217 [hci0] 667.183645 Address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #218 [hci0] 667.184590 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #219 [hci0] 667.184613 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #220 [hci0] 667.186558 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #221 [hci0] 667.485824 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Master clock accuracy: 0x07 @ MGMT Event: Device Connected (0x000b) plen 13 {0x0002} [hci0] 667.485996 LE Address: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Flags: 0x00000000 Data length: 0 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2018-04-03 18:40:06 +07:00
hci_req_add_le_create_conn(&req, conn, direct_rpa);
create_conn:
err = hci_req_run(&req, create_le_conn_complete);
if (err) {
hci_conn_del(conn);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
return conn;
}
static bool is_connected(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *addr, u8 type)
{
struct hci_conn *conn;
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, addr, type);
if (!conn)
return false;
if (conn->state != BT_CONNECTED)
return false;
return true;
}
/* This function requires the caller holds hdev->lock */
static int hci_explicit_conn_params_set(struct hci_dev *hdev,
bdaddr_t *addr, u8 addr_type)
{
struct hci_conn_params *params;
if (is_connected(hdev, addr, addr_type))
return -EISCONN;
params = hci_conn_params_lookup(hdev, addr, addr_type);
if (!params) {
params = hci_conn_params_add(hdev, addr, addr_type);
if (!params)
return -ENOMEM;
/* If we created new params, mark them to be deleted in
* hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup. It's different case than
* existing disabled params, those will stay after cleanup.
*/
params->auto_connect = HCI_AUTO_CONN_EXPLICIT;
}
/* We're trying to connect, so make sure params are at pend_le_conns */
if (params->auto_connect == HCI_AUTO_CONN_DISABLED ||
params->auto_connect == HCI_AUTO_CONN_REPORT ||
params->auto_connect == HCI_AUTO_CONN_EXPLICIT) {
list_del_init(&params->action);
list_add(&params->action, &hdev->pend_le_conns);
}
params->explicit_connect = true;
BT_DBG("addr %pMR (type %u) auto_connect %u", addr, addr_type,
params->auto_connect);
return 0;
}
/* This function requires the caller holds hdev->lock */
struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le_scan(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst,
u8 dst_type, u8 sec_level,
u16 conn_timeout)
{
struct hci_conn *conn;
/* Let's make sure that le is enabled.*/
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
if (lmp_le_capable(hdev))
return ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED);
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
/* Some devices send ATT messages as soon as the physical link is
* established. To be able to handle these ATT messages, the user-
* space first establishes the connection and then starts the pairing
* process.
*
* So if a hci_conn object already exists for the following connection
* attempt, we simply update pending_sec_level and auth_type fields
* and return the object found.
*/
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, dst, dst_type);
if (conn) {
if (conn->pending_sec_level < sec_level)
conn->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
goto done;
}
BT_DBG("requesting refresh of dst_addr");
conn = hci_conn_add(hdev, LE_LINK, dst, HCI_ROLE_MASTER);
if (!conn)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (hci_explicit_conn_params_set(hdev, dst, dst_type) < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
conn->state = BT_CONNECT;
set_bit(HCI_CONN_SCANNING, &conn->flags);
conn->dst_type = dst_type;
conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
conn->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
conn->conn_timeout = conn_timeout;
hci_update_background_scan(hdev);
done:
hci_conn_hold(conn);
return conn;
}
struct hci_conn *hci_connect_acl(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst,
u8 sec_level, u8 auth_type)
{
struct hci_conn *acl;
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BREDR_ENABLED)) {
if (lmp_bredr_capable(hdev))
return ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED);
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
acl = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, ACL_LINK, dst);
if (!acl) {
acl = hci_conn_add(hdev, ACL_LINK, dst, HCI_ROLE_MASTER);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
hci_conn_hold(acl);
[Bluetooth] Enforce correct authentication requirements With the introduction of Security Mode 4 and Simple Pairing from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification it became mandatory that the initiator requires authentication and encryption before any L2CAP channel can be established. The only exception here is PSM 1 for the service discovery protocol (SDP). It is meant to be used without any encryption since it contains only public information. This is how Bluetooth 2.0 and before handle connections on PSM 1. For Bluetooth 2.1 devices the pairing procedure differentiates between no bonding, general bonding and dedicated bonding. The L2CAP layer wrongly uses always general bonding when creating new connections, but it should not do this for SDP connections. In this case the authentication requirement should be no bonding and the just-works model should be used, but in case of non-SDP connection it is required to use general bonding. If the new connection requires man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection, it also first wrongly creates an unauthenticated link key and then later on requests an upgrade to an authenticated link key to provide full MITM protection. With Simple Pairing the link key generation is an expensive operation (compared to Bluetooth 2.0 and before) and doing this twice during a connection setup causes a noticeable delay when establishing a new connection. This should be avoided to not regress from the expected Bluetooth 2.0 connection times. The authentication requirements are known up-front and so enforce them. To fulfill these requirements the hci_connect() function has been extended with an authentication requirement parameter that will be stored inside the connection information and can be retrieved by userspace at any time. This allows the correct IO capabilities exchange and results in the expected behavior. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2008-09-09 12:19:20 +07:00
if (acl->state == BT_OPEN || acl->state == BT_CLOSED) {
acl->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
acl->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
[Bluetooth] Enforce correct authentication requirements With the introduction of Security Mode 4 and Simple Pairing from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification it became mandatory that the initiator requires authentication and encryption before any L2CAP channel can be established. The only exception here is PSM 1 for the service discovery protocol (SDP). It is meant to be used without any encryption since it contains only public information. This is how Bluetooth 2.0 and before handle connections on PSM 1. For Bluetooth 2.1 devices the pairing procedure differentiates between no bonding, general bonding and dedicated bonding. The L2CAP layer wrongly uses always general bonding when creating new connections, but it should not do this for SDP connections. In this case the authentication requirement should be no bonding and the just-works model should be used, but in case of non-SDP connection it is required to use general bonding. If the new connection requires man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection, it also first wrongly creates an unauthenticated link key and then later on requests an upgrade to an authenticated link key to provide full MITM protection. With Simple Pairing the link key generation is an expensive operation (compared to Bluetooth 2.0 and before) and doing this twice during a connection setup causes a noticeable delay when establishing a new connection. This should be avoided to not regress from the expected Bluetooth 2.0 connection times. The authentication requirements are known up-front and so enforce them. To fulfill these requirements the hci_connect() function has been extended with an authentication requirement parameter that will be stored inside the connection information and can be retrieved by userspace at any time. This allows the correct IO capabilities exchange and results in the expected behavior. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2008-09-09 12:19:20 +07:00
acl->auth_type = auth_type;
hci_acl_create_connection(acl);
[Bluetooth] Enforce correct authentication requirements With the introduction of Security Mode 4 and Simple Pairing from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification it became mandatory that the initiator requires authentication and encryption before any L2CAP channel can be established. The only exception here is PSM 1 for the service discovery protocol (SDP). It is meant to be used without any encryption since it contains only public information. This is how Bluetooth 2.0 and before handle connections on PSM 1. For Bluetooth 2.1 devices the pairing procedure differentiates between no bonding, general bonding and dedicated bonding. The L2CAP layer wrongly uses always general bonding when creating new connections, but it should not do this for SDP connections. In this case the authentication requirement should be no bonding and the just-works model should be used, but in case of non-SDP connection it is required to use general bonding. If the new connection requires man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection, it also first wrongly creates an unauthenticated link key and then later on requests an upgrade to an authenticated link key to provide full MITM protection. With Simple Pairing the link key generation is an expensive operation (compared to Bluetooth 2.0 and before) and doing this twice during a connection setup causes a noticeable delay when establishing a new connection. This should be avoided to not regress from the expected Bluetooth 2.0 connection times. The authentication requirements are known up-front and so enforce them. To fulfill these requirements the hci_connect() function has been extended with an authentication requirement parameter that will be stored inside the connection information and can be retrieved by userspace at any time. This allows the correct IO capabilities exchange and results in the expected behavior. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2008-09-09 12:19:20 +07:00
}
return acl;
}
struct hci_conn *hci_connect_sco(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst,
__u16 setting)
{
struct hci_conn *acl;
struct hci_conn *sco;
acl = hci_connect_acl(hdev, dst, BT_SECURITY_LOW, HCI_AT_NO_BONDING);
if (IS_ERR(acl))
return acl;
sco = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, type, dst);
if (!sco) {
sco = hci_conn_add(hdev, type, dst, HCI_ROLE_MASTER);
if (!sco) {
hci_conn_drop(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
}
acl->link = sco;
sco->link = acl;
hci_conn_hold(sco);
sco->setting = setting;
if (acl->state == BT_CONNECTED &&
(sco->state == BT_OPEN || sco->state == BT_CLOSED)) {
set_bit(HCI_CONN_POWER_SAVE, &acl->flags);
hci_conn_enter_active_mode(acl, BT_POWER_FORCE_ACTIVE_ON);
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_MODE_CHANGE_PEND, &acl->flags)) {
/* defer SCO setup until mode change completed */
set_bit(HCI_CONN_SCO_SETUP_PEND, &acl->flags);
return sco;
}
hci_sco_setup(acl, 0x00);
}
return sco;
}
/* Check link security requirement */
int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
/* In Secure Connections Only mode, it is required that Secure
* Connections is used and the link is encrypted with AES-CCM
* using a P-256 authenticated combination key.
*/
if (hci_dev_test_flag(conn->hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
if (!hci_conn_sc_enabled(conn) ||
!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags) ||
conn->key_type != HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256)
return 0;
}
if (hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn) &&
!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/* Authenticate remote device */
static int hci_conn_auth(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
if (conn->pending_sec_level > sec_level)
sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
if (sec_level > conn->sec_level)
conn->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
else if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH, &conn->flags))
return 1;
/* Make sure we preserve an existing MITM requirement*/
auth_type |= (conn->auth_type & 0x01);
conn->auth_type = auth_type;
if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND, &conn->flags)) {
struct hci_cp_auth_requested cp;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
hci_send_cmd(conn->hdev, HCI_OP_AUTH_REQUESTED,
sizeof(cp), &cp);
/* If we're already encrypted set the REAUTH_PEND flag,
* otherwise set the ENCRYPT_PEND.
*/
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
set_bit(HCI_CONN_REAUTH_PEND, &conn->flags);
else
set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);
}
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 03:58:04 +07:00
return 0;
}
/* Encrypt the the link */
static void hci_conn_encrypt(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags)) {
struct hci_cp_set_conn_encrypt cp;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
cp.encrypt = 0x01;
hci_send_cmd(conn->hdev, HCI_OP_SET_CONN_ENCRYPT, sizeof(cp),
&cp);
}
}
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 03:58:04 +07:00
/* Enable security */
int hci_conn_security(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type,
bool initiator)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
if (conn->type == LE_LINK)
return smp_conn_security(conn, sec_level);
/* For sdp we don't need the link key. */
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 03:58:04 +07:00
if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
return 1;
/* For non 2.1 devices and low security level we don't need the link
key. */
if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW && !hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn))
return 1;
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 03:58:04 +07:00
/* For other security levels we need the link key. */
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH, &conn->flags))
goto auth;
/* An authenticated FIPS approved combination key has sufficient
* security for security level 4. */
if (conn->key_type == HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256 &&
sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
goto encrypt;
/* An authenticated combination key has sufficient security for
security level 3. */
if ((conn->key_type == HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P192 ||
conn->key_type == HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256) &&
sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
goto encrypt;
/* An unauthenticated combination key has sufficient security for
security level 1 and 2. */
if ((conn->key_type == HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P192 ||
conn->key_type == HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256) &&
(sec_level == BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM || sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW))
goto encrypt;
/* A combination key has always sufficient security for the security
levels 1 or 2. High security level requires the combination key
is generated using maximum PIN code length (16).
For pre 2.1 units. */
if (conn->key_type == HCI_LK_COMBINATION &&
(sec_level == BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM || sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW ||
conn->pin_length == 16))
goto encrypt;
auth:
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags))
return 0;
if (initiator)
set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_INITIATOR, &conn->flags);
if (!hci_conn_auth(conn, sec_level, auth_type))
return 0;
encrypt:
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
return 1;
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 03:58:04 +07:00
hci_conn_encrypt(conn);
return 0;
}
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 03:58:04 +07:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_conn_security);
/* Check secure link requirement */
int hci_conn_check_secure(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
/* Accept if non-secure or higher security level is required */
if (sec_level != BT_SECURITY_HIGH && sec_level != BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
return 1;
/* Accept if secure or higher security level is already present */
if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH ||
conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
return 1;
/* Reject not secure link */
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_conn_check_secure);
/* Switch role */
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 03:58:04 +07:00
int hci_conn_switch_role(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 role)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
if (role == conn->role)
return 1;
if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_RSWITCH_PEND, &conn->flags)) {
struct hci_cp_switch_role cp;
bacpy(&cp.bdaddr, &conn->dst);
cp.role = role;
hci_send_cmd(conn->hdev, HCI_OP_SWITCH_ROLE, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 03:58:04 +07:00
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_conn_switch_role);
/* Enter active mode */
void hci_conn_enter_active_mode(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 force_active)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
BT_DBG("hcon %p mode %d", conn, conn->mode);
if (conn->mode != HCI_CM_SNIFF)
goto timer;
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_POWER_SAVE, &conn->flags) && !force_active)
goto timer;
if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_MODE_CHANGE_PEND, &conn->flags)) {
struct hci_cp_exit_sniff_mode cp;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_EXIT_SNIFF_MODE, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
timer:
if (hdev->idle_timeout > 0)
queue_delayed_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->idle_work,
msecs_to_jiffies(hdev->idle_timeout));
}
/* Drop all connection on the device */
void hci_conn_hash_flush(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
Bluetooth: Use list _safe deleting from conn_hash_list Use list_for_each_entry_safe which is safe version against removal of list entry. Otherwise we remove hci_conn element and reference next element which result in accessing LIST_POISON. [ 95.571834] Bluetooth: unknown link type 127 [ 95.578349] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 20002000 [ 95.580236] IP: [<20002000>] 0x20001fff [ 95.580763] *pde = 00000000 [ 95.581196] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP ... [ 95.582298] Pid: 3355, comm: hciconfig Tainted: G O 3.2.0-VirttualBox [ 95.582298] EIP: 0060:[<20002000>] EFLAGS: 00210206 CPU: 0 [ 95.582298] EIP is at 0x20002000 ... [ 95.582298] Call Trace: [ 95.582298] [<f8231ab6>] ? hci_conn_hash_flush+0x76/0xf0 [bluetooth] [ 95.582298] [<f822bcb1>] hci_dev_do_close+0xc1/0x2e0 [bluetooth] [ 95.582298] [<f822d679>] ? hci_dev_get+0x69/0xb0 [bluetooth] [ 95.582298] [<f822e1da>] hci_dev_close+0x2a/0x50 [bluetooth] [ 95.582298] [<f824102f>] hci_sock_ioctl+0x1af/0x3f0 [bluetooth] [ 95.582298] [<c11153ea>] ? handle_pte_fault+0x8a/0x8f0 [ 95.582298] [<c146becf>] sock_ioctl+0x5f/0x260 [ 95.582298] [<c146be70>] ? sock_fasync+0x90/0x90 [ 95.582298] [<c1152b33>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x83/0x5b0 [ 95.582298] [<c1563f87>] ? do_page_fault+0x297/0x500 [ 95.582298] [<c1563cf0>] ? spurious_fault+0xd0/0xd0 [ 95.582298] [<c107165b>] ? up_read+0x1b/0x30 [ 95.582298] [<c1563f87>] ? do_page_fault+0x297/0x500 [ 95.582298] [<c100aa9f>] ? init_fpu+0xef/0x160 [ 95.582298] [<c15617c0>] ? do_debug+0x180/0x180 [ 95.582298] [<c100a958>] ? fpu_finit+0x28/0x80 [ 95.582298] [<c11530e7>] sys_ioctl+0x87/0x90 [ 95.582298] [<c156795f>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x38 ... Signed-off-by: Andrei Emeltchenko <andrei.emeltchenko@intel.com> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2012-02-02 15:32:17 +07:00
struct hci_conn *c, *n;
BT_DBG("hdev %s", hdev->name);
Bluetooth: Use list _safe deleting from conn_hash_list Use list_for_each_entry_safe which is safe version against removal of list entry. Otherwise we remove hci_conn element and reference next element which result in accessing LIST_POISON. [ 95.571834] Bluetooth: unknown link type 127 [ 95.578349] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 20002000 [ 95.580236] IP: [<20002000>] 0x20001fff [ 95.580763] *pde = 00000000 [ 95.581196] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP ... [ 95.582298] Pid: 3355, comm: hciconfig Tainted: G O 3.2.0-VirttualBox [ 95.582298] EIP: 0060:[<20002000>] EFLAGS: 00210206 CPU: 0 [ 95.582298] EIP is at 0x20002000 ... [ 95.582298] Call Trace: [ 95.582298] [<f8231ab6>] ? hci_conn_hash_flush+0x76/0xf0 [bluetooth] [ 95.582298] [<f822bcb1>] hci_dev_do_close+0xc1/0x2e0 [bluetooth] [ 95.582298] [<f822d679>] ? hci_dev_get+0x69/0xb0 [bluetooth] [ 95.582298] [<f822e1da>] hci_dev_close+0x2a/0x50 [bluetooth] [ 95.582298] [<f824102f>] hci_sock_ioctl+0x1af/0x3f0 [bluetooth] [ 95.582298] [<c11153ea>] ? handle_pte_fault+0x8a/0x8f0 [ 95.582298] [<c146becf>] sock_ioctl+0x5f/0x260 [ 95.582298] [<c146be70>] ? sock_fasync+0x90/0x90 [ 95.582298] [<c1152b33>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x83/0x5b0 [ 95.582298] [<c1563f87>] ? do_page_fault+0x297/0x500 [ 95.582298] [<c1563cf0>] ? spurious_fault+0xd0/0xd0 [ 95.582298] [<c107165b>] ? up_read+0x1b/0x30 [ 95.582298] [<c1563f87>] ? do_page_fault+0x297/0x500 [ 95.582298] [<c100aa9f>] ? init_fpu+0xef/0x160 [ 95.582298] [<c15617c0>] ? do_debug+0x180/0x180 [ 95.582298] [<c100a958>] ? fpu_finit+0x28/0x80 [ 95.582298] [<c11530e7>] sys_ioctl+0x87/0x90 [ 95.582298] [<c156795f>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x38 ... Signed-off-by: Andrei Emeltchenko <andrei.emeltchenko@intel.com> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2012-02-02 15:32:17 +07:00
list_for_each_entry_safe(c, n, &h->list, list) {
c->state = BT_CLOSED;
hci_disconn_cfm(c, HCI_ERROR_LOCAL_HOST_TERM);
hci_conn_del(c);
}
}
/* Check pending connect attempts */
void hci_conn_check_pending(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct hci_conn *conn;
BT_DBG("hdev %s", hdev->name);
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_state(hdev, ACL_LINK, BT_CONNECT2);
if (conn)
hci_acl_create_connection(conn);
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
}
static u32 get_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
u32 link_mode = 0;
if (conn->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
link_mode |= HCI_LM_MASTER;
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
link_mode |= HCI_LM_ENCRYPT;
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH, &conn->flags))
link_mode |= HCI_LM_AUTH;
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_SECURE, &conn->flags))
link_mode |= HCI_LM_SECURE;
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_FIPS, &conn->flags))
link_mode |= HCI_LM_FIPS;
return link_mode;
}
int hci_get_conn_list(void __user *arg)
{
struct hci_conn *c;
struct hci_conn_list_req req, *cl;
struct hci_conn_info *ci;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
int n = 0, size, err;
if (copy_from_user(&req, arg, sizeof(req)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!req.conn_num || req.conn_num > (PAGE_SIZE * 2) / sizeof(*ci))
return -EINVAL;
size = sizeof(req) + req.conn_num * sizeof(*ci);
cl = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cl)
return -ENOMEM;
hdev = hci_dev_get(req.dev_id);
if (!hdev) {
kfree(cl);
return -ENODEV;
}
ci = cl->conn_info;
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
list_for_each_entry(c, &hdev->conn_hash.list, list) {
bacpy(&(ci + n)->bdaddr, &c->dst);
(ci + n)->handle = c->handle;
(ci + n)->type = c->type;
(ci + n)->out = c->out;
(ci + n)->state = c->state;
(ci + n)->link_mode = get_link_mode(c);
if (++n >= req.conn_num)
break;
}
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
cl->dev_id = hdev->id;
cl->conn_num = n;
size = sizeof(req) + n * sizeof(*ci);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
err = copy_to_user(arg, cl, size);
kfree(cl);
return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
int hci_get_conn_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg)
{
struct hci_conn_info_req req;
struct hci_conn_info ci;
struct hci_conn *conn;
char __user *ptr = arg + sizeof(req);
if (copy_from_user(&req, arg, sizeof(req)))
return -EFAULT;
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, req.type, &req.bdaddr);
if (conn) {
bacpy(&ci.bdaddr, &conn->dst);
ci.handle = conn->handle;
ci.type = conn->type;
ci.out = conn->out;
ci.state = conn->state;
ci.link_mode = get_link_mode(conn);
}
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
if (!conn)
return -ENOENT;
return copy_to_user(ptr, &ci, sizeof(ci)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
int hci_get_auth_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg)
{
struct hci_auth_info_req req;
struct hci_conn *conn;
if (copy_from_user(&req, arg, sizeof(req)))
return -EFAULT;
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, ACL_LINK, &req.bdaddr);
if (conn)
req.type = conn->auth_type;
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
if (!conn)
return -ENOENT;
return copy_to_user(arg, &req, sizeof(req)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
struct hci_chan *hci_chan_create(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct hci_chan *chan;
BT_DBG("%s hcon %p", hdev->name, conn);
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_DROP, &conn->flags)) {
BT_DBG("Refusing to create new hci_chan");
return NULL;
}
chan = kzalloc(sizeof(*chan), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!chan)
return NULL;
chan->conn = hci_conn_get(conn);
skb_queue_head_init(&chan->data_q);
chan->state = BT_CONNECTED;
list_add_rcu(&chan->list, &conn->chan_list);
return chan;
}
void hci_chan_del(struct hci_chan *chan)
{
struct hci_conn *conn = chan->conn;
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
BT_DBG("%s hcon %p chan %p", hdev->name, conn, chan);
list_del_rcu(&chan->list);
synchronize_rcu();
/* Prevent new hci_chan's to be created for this hci_conn */
set_bit(HCI_CONN_DROP, &conn->flags);
hci_conn_put(conn);
skb_queue_purge(&chan->data_q);
kfree(chan);
}
void hci_chan_list_flush(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_chan *chan, *n;
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
list_for_each_entry_safe(chan, n, &conn->chan_list, list)
hci_chan_del(chan);
}
static struct hci_chan *__hci_chan_lookup_handle(struct hci_conn *hcon,
__u16 handle)
{
struct hci_chan *hchan;
list_for_each_entry(hchan, &hcon->chan_list, list) {
if (hchan->handle == handle)
return hchan;
}
return NULL;
}
struct hci_chan *hci_chan_lookup_handle(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 handle)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
struct hci_conn *hcon;
struct hci_chan *hchan = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(hcon, &h->list, list) {
hchan = __hci_chan_lookup_handle(hcon, handle);
if (hchan)
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return hchan;
}