linux_dsm_epyc7002/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c

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/*
* Kexec bzImage loader
*
* Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
* Authors:
* Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
*
* This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
* Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec-bzImage64: " fmt
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
kexec: verify the signature of signed PE bzImage This is the final piece of the puzzle of verifying kernel image signature during kexec_file_load() syscall. This patch calls into PE file routines to verify signature of bzImage. If signature are valid, kexec_file_load() succeeds otherwise it fails. Two new config options have been introduced. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. I tested these patches with both "pesign" and "sbsign" signed bzImages. I used signing_key.priv key and signing_key.x509 cert for signing as generated during kernel build process (if module signing is enabled). Used following method to sign bzImage. pesign ====== - Convert DER format cert to PEM format cert openssl x509 -in signing_key.x509 -inform DER -out signing_key.x509.PEM -outform PEM - Generate a .p12 file from existing cert and private key file openssl pkcs12 -export -out kernel-key.p12 -inkey signing_key.priv -in signing_key.x509.PEM - Import .p12 file into pesign db pk12util -i /tmp/kernel-key.p12 -d /etc/pki/pesign - Sign bzImage pesign -i /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ -o /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.pesign -c "Glacier signing key - Magrathea" -s sbsign ====== sbsign --key signing_key.priv --cert signing_key.x509.PEM --output /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.sbsign /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ Patch details: Well all the hard work is done in previous patches. Now bzImage loader has just call into that code and verify whether bzImage signature are valid or not. Also create two config options. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 04:26:13 +07:00
#include <linux/verify_pefile.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/crash.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/kexec-bzimage64.h>
#define MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN 30 /* elfcorehdr=0x<64bit-value> */
/*
* Defines lowest physical address for various segments. Not sure where
* exactly these limits came from. Current bzimage64 loader in kexec-tools
* uses these so I am retaining it. It can be changed over time as we gain
* more insight.
*/
#define MIN_PURGATORY_ADDR 0x3000
#define MIN_BOOTPARAM_ADDR 0x3000
#define MIN_KERNEL_LOAD_ADDR 0x100000
#define MIN_INITRD_LOAD_ADDR 0x1000000
/*
* This is a place holder for all boot loader specific data structure which
* gets allocated in one call but gets freed much later during cleanup
* time. Right now there is only one field but it can grow as need be.
*/
struct bzimage64_data {
/*
* Temporary buffer to hold bootparams buffer. This should be
* freed once the bootparam segment has been loaded.
*/
void *bootparams_buf;
};
static int setup_initrd(struct boot_params *params,
unsigned long initrd_load_addr, unsigned long initrd_len)
{
params->hdr.ramdisk_image = initrd_load_addr & 0xffffffffUL;
params->hdr.ramdisk_size = initrd_len & 0xffffffffUL;
params->ext_ramdisk_image = initrd_load_addr >> 32;
params->ext_ramdisk_size = initrd_len >> 32;
return 0;
}
static int setup_cmdline(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params,
unsigned long bootparams_load_addr,
unsigned long cmdline_offset, char *cmdline,
unsigned long cmdline_len)
{
char *cmdline_ptr = ((char *)params) + cmdline_offset;
unsigned long cmdline_ptr_phys, len = 0;
uint32_t cmdline_low_32, cmdline_ext_32;
if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
len = sprintf(cmdline_ptr,
"elfcorehdr=0x%lx ", image->arch.elf_load_addr);
}
memcpy(cmdline_ptr + len, cmdline, cmdline_len);
cmdline_len += len;
cmdline_ptr[cmdline_len - 1] = '\0';
pr_debug("Final command line is: %s\n", cmdline_ptr);
cmdline_ptr_phys = bootparams_load_addr + cmdline_offset;
cmdline_low_32 = cmdline_ptr_phys & 0xffffffffUL;
cmdline_ext_32 = cmdline_ptr_phys >> 32;
params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr = cmdline_low_32;
if (cmdline_ext_32)
params->ext_cmd_line_ptr = cmdline_ext_32;
return 0;
}
static int setup_e820_entries(struct boot_params *params)
{
unsigned int nr_e820_entries;
nr_e820_entries = e820_saved.nr_map;
/* TODO: Pass entries more than E820MAX in bootparams setup data */
if (nr_e820_entries > E820MAX)
nr_e820_entries = E820MAX;
params->e820_entries = nr_e820_entries;
memcpy(&params->e820_map, &e820_saved.map,
nr_e820_entries * sizeof(struct e820entry));
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
static int setup_efi_info_memmap(struct boot_params *params,
unsigned long params_load_addr,
unsigned int efi_map_offset,
unsigned int efi_map_sz)
{
void *efi_map = (void *)params + efi_map_offset;
unsigned long efi_map_phys_addr = params_load_addr + efi_map_offset;
struct efi_info *ei = &params->efi_info;
if (!efi_map_sz)
return 0;
efi_runtime_map_copy(efi_map, efi_map_sz);
ei->efi_memmap = efi_map_phys_addr & 0xffffffff;
ei->efi_memmap_hi = efi_map_phys_addr >> 32;
ei->efi_memmap_size = efi_map_sz;
return 0;
}
static int
prepare_add_efi_setup_data(struct boot_params *params,
unsigned long params_load_addr,
unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset)
{
unsigned long setup_data_phys;
struct setup_data *sd = (void *)params + efi_setup_data_offset;
struct efi_setup_data *esd = (void *)sd + sizeof(struct setup_data);
esd->fw_vendor = efi.fw_vendor;
esd->runtime = efi.runtime;
esd->tables = efi.config_table;
esd->smbios = efi.smbios;
sd->type = SETUP_EFI;
sd->len = sizeof(struct efi_setup_data);
/* Add setup data */
setup_data_phys = params_load_addr + efi_setup_data_offset;
sd->next = params->hdr.setup_data;
params->hdr.setup_data = setup_data_phys;
return 0;
}
static int
setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
unsigned int efi_map_offset, unsigned int efi_map_sz,
unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset)
{
struct efi_info *current_ei = &boot_params.efi_info;
struct efi_info *ei = &params->efi_info;
if (!current_ei->efi_memmap_size)
return 0;
/*
* If 1:1 mapping is not enabled, second kernel can not setup EFI
* and use EFI run time services. User space will have to pass
* acpi_rsdp=<addr> on kernel command line to make second kernel boot
* without efi.
*/
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
ei->efi_memdesc_version = current_ei->efi_memdesc_version;
ei->efi_memdesc_size = efi_get_runtime_map_desc_size();
setup_efi_info_memmap(params, params_load_addr, efi_map_offset,
efi_map_sz);
prepare_add_efi_setup_data(params, params_load_addr,
efi_setup_data_offset);
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_EFI */
static int
setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params,
unsigned long params_load_addr,
unsigned int efi_map_offset, unsigned int efi_map_sz,
unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset)
{
unsigned int nr_e820_entries;
unsigned long long mem_k, start, end;
int i, ret = 0;
/* Get subarch from existing bootparams */
params->hdr.hardware_subarch = boot_params.hdr.hardware_subarch;
/* Copying screen_info will do? */
memcpy(&params->screen_info, &boot_params.screen_info,
sizeof(struct screen_info));
/* Fill in memsize later */
params->screen_info.ext_mem_k = 0;
params->alt_mem_k = 0;
/* Default APM info */
memset(&params->apm_bios_info, 0, sizeof(params->apm_bios_info));
/* Default drive info */
memset(&params->hd0_info, 0, sizeof(params->hd0_info));
memset(&params->hd1_info, 0, sizeof(params->hd1_info));
if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
ret = crash_setup_memmap_entries(image, params);
if (ret)
return ret;
} else
setup_e820_entries(params);
nr_e820_entries = params->e820_entries;
for (i = 0; i < nr_e820_entries; i++) {
if (params->e820_map[i].type != E820_RAM)
continue;
start = params->e820_map[i].addr;
end = params->e820_map[i].addr + params->e820_map[i].size - 1;
if ((start <= 0x100000) && end > 0x100000) {
mem_k = (end >> 10) - (0x100000 >> 10);
params->screen_info.ext_mem_k = mem_k;
params->alt_mem_k = mem_k;
if (mem_k > 0xfc00)
params->screen_info.ext_mem_k = 0xfc00; /* 64M*/
if (mem_k > 0xffffffff)
params->alt_mem_k = 0xffffffff;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/* Setup EFI state */
setup_efi_state(params, params_load_addr, efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz,
efi_setup_data_offset);
#endif
/* Setup EDD info */
memcpy(params->eddbuf, boot_params.eddbuf,
EDDMAXNR * sizeof(struct edd_info));
params->eddbuf_entries = boot_params.eddbuf_entries;
memcpy(params->edd_mbr_sig_buffer, boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buffer,
EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX * sizeof(unsigned int));
return ret;
}
static int bzImage64_probe(const char *buf, unsigned long len)
{
int ret = -ENOEXEC;
struct setup_header *header;
/* kernel should be at least two sectors long */
if (len < 2 * 512) {
pr_err("File is too short to be a bzImage\n");
return ret;
}
header = (struct setup_header *)(buf + offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr));
if (memcmp((char *)&header->header, "HdrS", 4) != 0) {
pr_err("Not a bzImage\n");
return ret;
}
if (header->boot_flag != 0xAA55) {
pr_err("No x86 boot sector present\n");
return ret;
}
if (header->version < 0x020C) {
pr_err("Must be at least protocol version 2.12\n");
return ret;
}
if (!(header->loadflags & LOADED_HIGH)) {
pr_err("zImage not a bzImage\n");
return ret;
}
if (!(header->xloadflags & XLF_KERNEL_64)) {
pr_err("Not a bzImage64. XLF_KERNEL_64 is not set.\n");
return ret;
}
if (!(header->xloadflags & XLF_CAN_BE_LOADED_ABOVE_4G)) {
pr_err("XLF_CAN_BE_LOADED_ABOVE_4G is not set.\n");
return ret;
}
/*
* Can't handle 32bit EFI as it does not allow loading kernel
* above 4G. This should be handled by 32bit bzImage loader
*/
if (efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES) && !efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT)) {
pr_debug("EFI is 32 bit. Can't load kernel above 4G.\n");
return ret;
}
/* I've got a bzImage */
pr_debug("It's a relocatable bzImage64\n");
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
unsigned long initrd_len, char *cmdline,
unsigned long cmdline_len)
{
struct setup_header *header;
int setup_sects, kern16_size, ret = 0;
unsigned long setup_header_size, params_cmdline_sz, params_misc_sz;
struct boot_params *params;
unsigned long bootparam_load_addr, kernel_load_addr, initrd_load_addr;
unsigned long purgatory_load_addr;
unsigned long kernel_bufsz, kernel_memsz, kernel_align;
char *kernel_buf;
struct bzimage64_data *ldata;
struct kexec_entry64_regs regs64;
void *stack;
unsigned int setup_hdr_offset = offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr);
unsigned int efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz, efi_setup_data_offset;
header = (struct setup_header *)(kernel + setup_hdr_offset);
setup_sects = header->setup_sects;
if (setup_sects == 0)
setup_sects = 4;
kern16_size = (setup_sects + 1) * 512;
if (kernel_len < kern16_size) {
pr_err("bzImage truncated\n");
return ERR_PTR(-ENOEXEC);
}
if (cmdline_len > header->cmdline_size) {
pr_err("Kernel command line too long\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
/*
* In case of crash dump, we will append elfcorehdr=<addr> to
* command line. Make sure it does not overflow
*/
if (cmdline_len + MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN > header->cmdline_size) {
pr_debug("Appending elfcorehdr=<addr> to command line exceeds maximum allowed length\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
/* Allocate and load backup region */
if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
ret = crash_load_segments(image);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
/*
* Load purgatory. For 64bit entry point, purgatory code can be
* anywhere.
*/
ret = kexec_load_purgatory(image, MIN_PURGATORY_ADDR, ULONG_MAX, 1,
&purgatory_load_addr);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Loading purgatory failed\n");
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
pr_debug("Loaded purgatory at 0x%lx\n", purgatory_load_addr);
/*
* Load Bootparams and cmdline and space for efi stuff.
*
* Allocate memory together for multiple data structures so
* that they all can go in single area/segment and we don't
* have to create separate segment for each. Keeps things
* little bit simple
*/
efi_map_sz = efi_get_runtime_map_size();
efi_map_sz = ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16);
params_cmdline_sz = sizeof(struct boot_params) + cmdline_len +
MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN;
params_cmdline_sz = ALIGN(params_cmdline_sz, 16);
params_misc_sz = params_cmdline_sz + efi_map_sz +
sizeof(struct setup_data) +
sizeof(struct efi_setup_data);
params = kzalloc(params_misc_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!params)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
efi_map_offset = params_cmdline_sz;
efi_setup_data_offset = efi_map_offset + efi_map_sz;
/* Copy setup header onto bootparams. Documentation/x86/boot.txt */
setup_header_size = 0x0202 + kernel[0x0201] - setup_hdr_offset;
/* Is there a limit on setup header size? */
memcpy(&params->hdr, (kernel + setup_hdr_offset), setup_header_size);
ret = kexec_add_buffer(image, (char *)params, params_misc_sz,
params_misc_sz, 16, MIN_BOOTPARAM_ADDR,
ULONG_MAX, 1, &bootparam_load_addr);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
pr_debug("Loaded boot_param, command line and misc at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
bootparam_load_addr, params_misc_sz, params_misc_sz);
/* Load kernel */
kernel_buf = kernel + kern16_size;
kernel_bufsz = kernel_len - kern16_size;
kernel_memsz = PAGE_ALIGN(header->init_size);
kernel_align = header->kernel_alignment;
ret = kexec_add_buffer(image, kernel_buf,
kernel_bufsz, kernel_memsz, kernel_align,
MIN_KERNEL_LOAD_ADDR, ULONG_MAX, 1,
&kernel_load_addr);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
pr_debug("Loaded 64bit kernel at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
kernel_load_addr, kernel_memsz, kernel_memsz);
/* Load initrd high */
if (initrd) {
ret = kexec_add_buffer(image, initrd, initrd_len, initrd_len,
PAGE_SIZE, MIN_INITRD_LOAD_ADDR,
ULONG_MAX, 1, &initrd_load_addr);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
pr_debug("Loaded initrd at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
initrd_load_addr, initrd_len, initrd_len);
setup_initrd(params, initrd_load_addr, initrd_len);
}
setup_cmdline(image, params, bootparam_load_addr,
sizeof(struct boot_params), cmdline, cmdline_len);
/* bootloader info. Do we need a separate ID for kexec kernel loader? */
params->hdr.type_of_loader = 0x0D << 4;
params->hdr.loadflags = 0;
/* Setup purgatory regs for entry */
ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "entry64_regs", &regs64,
sizeof(regs64), 1);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
regs64.rbx = 0; /* Bootstrap Processor */
regs64.rsi = bootparam_load_addr;
regs64.rip = kernel_load_addr + 0x200;
stack = kexec_purgatory_get_symbol_addr(image, "stack_end");
if (IS_ERR(stack)) {
pr_err("Could not find address of symbol stack_end\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_params;
}
regs64.rsp = (unsigned long)stack;
ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "entry64_regs", &regs64,
sizeof(regs64), 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
ret = setup_boot_parameters(image, params, bootparam_load_addr,
efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz,
efi_setup_data_offset);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
/* Allocate loader specific data */
ldata = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bzimage64_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ldata) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_params;
}
/*
* Store pointer to params so that it could be freed after loading
* params segment has been loaded and contents have been copied
* somewhere else.
*/
ldata->bootparams_buf = params;
return ldata;
out_free_params:
kfree(params);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
/* This cleanup function is called after various segments have been loaded */
static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)
{
struct bzimage64_data *ldata = loader_data;
if (!ldata)
return 0;
kfree(ldata->bootparams_buf);
ldata->bootparams_buf = NULL;
return 0;
}
kexec: verify the signature of signed PE bzImage This is the final piece of the puzzle of verifying kernel image signature during kexec_file_load() syscall. This patch calls into PE file routines to verify signature of bzImage. If signature are valid, kexec_file_load() succeeds otherwise it fails. Two new config options have been introduced. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. I tested these patches with both "pesign" and "sbsign" signed bzImages. I used signing_key.priv key and signing_key.x509 cert for signing as generated during kernel build process (if module signing is enabled). Used following method to sign bzImage. pesign ====== - Convert DER format cert to PEM format cert openssl x509 -in signing_key.x509 -inform DER -out signing_key.x509.PEM -outform PEM - Generate a .p12 file from existing cert and private key file openssl pkcs12 -export -out kernel-key.p12 -inkey signing_key.priv -in signing_key.x509.PEM - Import .p12 file into pesign db pk12util -i /tmp/kernel-key.p12 -d /etc/pki/pesign - Sign bzImage pesign -i /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ -o /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.pesign -c "Glacier signing key - Magrathea" -s sbsign ====== sbsign --key signing_key.priv --cert signing_key.x509.PEM --output /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.sbsign /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ Patch details: Well all the hard work is done in previous patches. Now bzImage loader has just call into that code and verify whether bzImage signature are valid or not. Also create two config options. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 04:26:13 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
kexec: verify the signature of signed PE bzImage This is the final piece of the puzzle of verifying kernel image signature during kexec_file_load() syscall. This patch calls into PE file routines to verify signature of bzImage. If signature are valid, kexec_file_load() succeeds otherwise it fails. Two new config options have been introduced. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. I tested these patches with both "pesign" and "sbsign" signed bzImages. I used signing_key.priv key and signing_key.x509 cert for signing as generated during kernel build process (if module signing is enabled). Used following method to sign bzImage. pesign ====== - Convert DER format cert to PEM format cert openssl x509 -in signing_key.x509 -inform DER -out signing_key.x509.PEM -outform PEM - Generate a .p12 file from existing cert and private key file openssl pkcs12 -export -out kernel-key.p12 -inkey signing_key.priv -in signing_key.x509.PEM - Import .p12 file into pesign db pk12util -i /tmp/kernel-key.p12 -d /etc/pki/pesign - Sign bzImage pesign -i /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ -o /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.pesign -c "Glacier signing key - Magrathea" -s sbsign ====== sbsign --key signing_key.priv --cert signing_key.x509.PEM --output /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.sbsign /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ Patch details: Well all the hard work is done in previous patches. Now bzImage loader has just call into that code and verify whether bzImage signature are valid or not. Also create two config options. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 04:26:13 +07:00
{
bool trusted;
int ret;
ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then contributes to the signature. Further, we already require the master message content type to be pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1]. We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them entirely as appropriate. To this end: (1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one that does not. (2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them. Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are rejected: (a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the content type in the SignedData object. (b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data. (c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within the validity window of the matching X.509 cert. (d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents. (e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents. (f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents. The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present. The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP). The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or if it contains more than one element in its set of values. (3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers: (*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal content. (*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't remove these). (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE These are invalid in this context but are included for later use when limiting the use of X.509 certs. (4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between the above options for testing purposes. For example: echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7 will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE). Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
2015-08-05 21:22:27 +07:00
system_trusted_keyring,
VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
&trusted);
kexec: verify the signature of signed PE bzImage This is the final piece of the puzzle of verifying kernel image signature during kexec_file_load() syscall. This patch calls into PE file routines to verify signature of bzImage. If signature are valid, kexec_file_load() succeeds otherwise it fails. Two new config options have been introduced. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. I tested these patches with both "pesign" and "sbsign" signed bzImages. I used signing_key.priv key and signing_key.x509 cert for signing as generated during kernel build process (if module signing is enabled). Used following method to sign bzImage. pesign ====== - Convert DER format cert to PEM format cert openssl x509 -in signing_key.x509 -inform DER -out signing_key.x509.PEM -outform PEM - Generate a .p12 file from existing cert and private key file openssl pkcs12 -export -out kernel-key.p12 -inkey signing_key.priv -in signing_key.x509.PEM - Import .p12 file into pesign db pk12util -i /tmp/kernel-key.p12 -d /etc/pki/pesign - Sign bzImage pesign -i /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ -o /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.pesign -c "Glacier signing key - Magrathea" -s sbsign ====== sbsign --key signing_key.priv --cert signing_key.x509.PEM --output /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.sbsign /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ Patch details: Well all the hard work is done in previous patches. Now bzImage loader has just call into that code and verify whether bzImage signature are valid or not. Also create two config options. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 04:26:13 +07:00
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!trusted)
return -EKEYREJECTED;
return 0;
}
#endif
struct kexec_file_ops kexec_bzImage64_ops = {
.probe = bzImage64_probe,
.load = bzImage64_load,
.cleanup = bzImage64_cleanup,
kexec: verify the signature of signed PE bzImage This is the final piece of the puzzle of verifying kernel image signature during kexec_file_load() syscall. This patch calls into PE file routines to verify signature of bzImage. If signature are valid, kexec_file_load() succeeds otherwise it fails. Two new config options have been introduced. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. I tested these patches with both "pesign" and "sbsign" signed bzImages. I used signing_key.priv key and signing_key.x509 cert for signing as generated during kernel build process (if module signing is enabled). Used following method to sign bzImage. pesign ====== - Convert DER format cert to PEM format cert openssl x509 -in signing_key.x509 -inform DER -out signing_key.x509.PEM -outform PEM - Generate a .p12 file from existing cert and private key file openssl pkcs12 -export -out kernel-key.p12 -inkey signing_key.priv -in signing_key.x509.PEM - Import .p12 file into pesign db pk12util -i /tmp/kernel-key.p12 -d /etc/pki/pesign - Sign bzImage pesign -i /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ -o /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.pesign -c "Glacier signing key - Magrathea" -s sbsign ====== sbsign --key signing_key.priv --cert signing_key.x509.PEM --output /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.sbsign /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ Patch details: Well all the hard work is done in previous patches. Now bzImage loader has just call into that code and verify whether bzImage signature are valid or not. Also create two config options. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 04:26:13 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
.verify_sig = bzImage64_verify_sig,
#endif
};