linux_dsm_epyc7002/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig

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# IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture
#
config IMA
bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
select SECURITYFS
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_MD5
select CRYPTO_SHA1
select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML
select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES
help
The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
values of executables and other sensitive system files,
as they are read or executed. If an attacker manages
to change the contents of an important system file
being measured, we can tell.
If your system has a TPM chip, then IMA also maintains
an aggregate integrity value over this list inside the
TPM hardware, so that the TPM can prove to a third party
whether or not critical system files have been modified.
Read <http://www.usenix.org/events/sec04/tech/sailer.html>
to learn more about IMA.
If unsure, say N.
config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
int
depends on IMA
range 8 14
default 10
help
IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX determines the TPM PCR register index
that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the
measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10.
config IMA_LSM_RULES
bool
depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)
default y
help
Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
ima: integrity appraisal extension IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute 'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides authenticity. This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by EVM, if enabled and configured. Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'. Changelov v4: - changed iint cache flags to hex values Changelog v3: - change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail Changelog v2: - fix audit msg 'res' value - removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values Changelog v1: - removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin) - setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin) - evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr (INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the 'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS). - replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin) - re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin) - include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA - merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin) - removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin) - use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured (moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c) - make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file Changelog: - add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin) - fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin) - cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin) - changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those measured/appraised. - don't try to appraise new/empty files - expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig - IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled - add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub - unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status, not before. (Found by Joe Perches) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 22:15:05 +07:00
choice
prompt "Default template"
default IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
depends on IMA
help
Select the default IMA measurement template.
The original 'ima' measurement list template contains a
hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname,
limited to 255 characters. The 'ima-ng' measurement list
template permits both larger hash digests and longer
pathnames.
config IMA_TEMPLATE
bool "ima"
config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
bool "ima-ng (default)"
config IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
bool "ima-sig"
endchoice
config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
string
depends on IMA
default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE
default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
default "ima-sig" if IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
choice
prompt "Default integrity hash algorithm"
default IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
depends on IMA
help
Select the default hash algorithm used for the measurement
list, integrity appraisal and audit log. The compiled default
hash algorithm can be overwritten using the kernel command
line 'ima_hash=' option.
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
bool "SHA1 (default)"
depends on CRYPTO_SHA1
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
bool "SHA256"
depends on CRYPTO_SHA256 && !IMA_TEMPLATE
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
bool "SHA512"
depends on CRYPTO_SHA512 && !IMA_TEMPLATE
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
bool "WP512"
depends on CRYPTO_WP512 && !IMA_TEMPLATE
endchoice
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH
string
depends on IMA
default "sha1" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
default "sha256" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
default "sha512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
default "wp512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
ima: integrity appraisal extension IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute 'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides authenticity. This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by EVM, if enabled and configured. Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'. Changelov v4: - changed iint cache flags to hex values Changelog v3: - change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail Changelog v2: - fix audit msg 'res' value - removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values Changelog v1: - removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin) - setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin) - evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr (INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the 'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS). - replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin) - re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin) - include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA - merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin) - removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin) - use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured (moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c) - make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file Changelog: - add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin) - fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin) - cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin) - changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those measured/appraised. - don't try to appraise new/empty files - expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig - IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled - add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub - unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status, not before. (Found by Joe Perches) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 22:15:05 +07:00
config IMA_APPRAISE
bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
depends on IMA
default n
help
This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal.
It requires the system to be labeled with a security extended
attribute containing the file hash measurement. To protect
the security extended attributes from offline attack, enable
and configure EVM.
For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
<http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
If unsure, say N.
config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed"
depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
default y
help
This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
config IMA_LOAD_X509
bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
default n
help
File signature verification is based on the public keys
loaded on the .ima trusted keyring. These public keys are
X509 certificates signed by a trusted key on the
.system keyring. This option enables X509 certificate
loading from the kernel onto the '.ima' trusted keyring.
config IMA_X509_PATH
string "IMA X509 certificate path"
depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
default "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
help
This option defines IMA X509 certificate path.
config IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
bool "Require signed user-space initialization"
depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
default n
help
This option requires user-space init to be signed.