linux_dsm_epyc7002/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 21:07:57 +07:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _ASM_X86_IO_H
#define _ASM_X86_IO_H
/*
* This file contains the definitions for the x86 IO instructions
* inb/inw/inl/outb/outw/outl and the "string versions" of the same
* (insb/insw/insl/outsb/outsw/outsl). You can also use "pausing"
* versions of the single-IO instructions (inb_p/inw_p/..).
*
* This file is not meant to be obfuscating: it's just complicated
* to (a) handle it all in a way that makes gcc able to optimize it
* as well as possible and (b) trying to avoid writing the same thing
* over and over again with slight variations and possibly making a
* mistake somewhere.
*/
/*
* Thanks to James van Artsdalen for a better timing-fix than
* the two short jumps: using outb's to a nonexistent port seems
* to guarantee better timings even on fast machines.
*
* On the other hand, I'd like to be sure of a non-existent port:
* I feel a bit unsafe about using 0x80 (should be safe, though)
*
* Linus
*/
/*
* Bit simplified and optimized by Jan Hubicka
* Support of BIGMEM added by Gerhard Wichert, Siemens AG, July 1999.
*
* isa_memset_io, isa_memcpy_fromio, isa_memcpy_toio added,
* isa_read[wl] and isa_write[wl] fixed
* - Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@conectiva.com.br>
*/
#define ARCH_HAS_IOREMAP_WC
#define ARCH_HAS_IOREMAP_WT
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
x86/mm: Decouple <linux/vmalloc.h> from <asm/io.h> Nothing in <asm/io.h> uses anything from <linux/vmalloc.h>, so remove it from there and fix up the resulting build problems triggered on x86 {64|32}-bit {def|allmod|allno}configs. The breakages were triggering in places where x86 builds relied on vmalloc() facilities but did not include <linux/vmalloc.h> explicitly and relied on the implicit inclusion via <asm/io.h>. Also add: - <linux/init.h> to <linux/io.h> - <asm/pgtable_types> to <asm/io.h> ... which were two other implicit header file dependencies. Suggested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> [ Tidied up the changelog. ] Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <JBottomley@odin.com> Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Suma Ramars <sramars@cisco.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-06-02 16:01:38 +07:00
#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
#define build_mmio_read(name, size, type, reg, barrier) \
static inline type name(const volatile void __iomem *addr) \
{ type ret; asm volatile("mov" size " %1,%0":reg (ret) \
:"m" (*(volatile type __force *)addr) barrier); return ret; }
#define build_mmio_write(name, size, type, reg, barrier) \
static inline void name(type val, volatile void __iomem *addr) \
{ asm volatile("mov" size " %0,%1": :reg (val), \
"m" (*(volatile type __force *)addr) barrier); }
build_mmio_read(readb, "b", unsigned char, "=q", :"memory")
build_mmio_read(readw, "w", unsigned short, "=r", :"memory")
build_mmio_read(readl, "l", unsigned int, "=r", :"memory")
build_mmio_read(__readb, "b", unsigned char, "=q", )
build_mmio_read(__readw, "w", unsigned short, "=r", )
build_mmio_read(__readl, "l", unsigned int, "=r", )
build_mmio_write(writeb, "b", unsigned char, "q", :"memory")
build_mmio_write(writew, "w", unsigned short, "r", :"memory")
build_mmio_write(writel, "l", unsigned int, "r", :"memory")
build_mmio_write(__writeb, "b", unsigned char, "q", )
build_mmio_write(__writew, "w", unsigned short, "r", )
build_mmio_write(__writel, "l", unsigned int, "r", )
#define readb readb
#define readw readw
#define readl readl
#define readb_relaxed(a) __readb(a)
#define readw_relaxed(a) __readw(a)
#define readl_relaxed(a) __readl(a)
#define __raw_readb __readb
#define __raw_readw __readw
#define __raw_readl __readl
#define writeb writeb
#define writew writew
#define writel writel
#define writeb_relaxed(v, a) __writeb(v, a)
#define writew_relaxed(v, a) __writew(v, a)
#define writel_relaxed(v, a) __writel(v, a)
#define __raw_writeb __writeb
#define __raw_writew __writew
#define __raw_writel __writel
#define mmiowb() barrier()
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
build_mmio_read(readq, "q", unsigned long, "=r", :"memory")
build_mmio_read(__readq, "q", unsigned long, "=r", )
build_mmio_write(writeq, "q", unsigned long, "r", :"memory")
build_mmio_write(__writeq, "q", unsigned long, "r", )
#define readq_relaxed(a) __readq(a)
#define writeq_relaxed(v, a) __writeq(v, a)
#define __raw_readq __readq
#define __raw_writeq __writeq
/* Let people know that we have them */
#define readq readq
#define writeq writeq
x86: remove 32-bit versions of readq()/writeq() The presense of a writeq() implementation on 32-bit x86 that splits the 64-bit write into two 32-bit writes turns out to break the mpt2sas driver (and in general is risky for drivers as was discussed in <http://lkml.kernel.org/r/adaab6c1h7c.fsf@cisco.com>). To fix this, revert 2c5643b1c5c7 ("x86: provide readq()/writeq() on 32-bit too") and follow-on cleanups. This unfortunately leads to pushing non-atomic definitions of readq() and write() to various x86-only drivers that in the meantime started using the definitions in the x86 version of <asm/io.h>. However as discussed exhaustively, this is actually the right thing to do, because the right way to split a 64-bit transaction is hardware dependent and therefore belongs in the hardware driver (eg mpt2sas needs a spinlock to make sure no other accesses occur in between the two halves of the access). Build tested on 32- and 64-bit x86 allmodconfig. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/x86-32-writeq-is-broken@mdm.bga.com Acked-by: Hitoshi Mitake <h.mitake@gmail.com> Cc: Kashyap Desai <Kashyap.Desai@lsi.com> Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org> Cc: Ravi Anand <ravi.anand@qlogic.com> Cc: Vikas Chaudhary <vikas.chaudhary@qlogic.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Uhlenkott <juhlenko@akamai.com> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@parallels.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-05-25 07:13:09 +07:00
#endif
x86/mm: Limit mmap() of /dev/mem to valid physical addresses One thing /dev/mem access APIs should verify is that there's no way that excessively large pfn's can leak into the high bits of the page table entry. In particular, if people can use "very large physical page addresses" through /dev/mem to set the bits past bit 58 - SOFTW4 and permission key bits and NX bit, that could *really* confuse the kernel. We had an earlier attempt: ce56a86e2ade ("x86/mm: Limit mmap() of /dev/mem to valid physical addresses") ... which turned out to be too restrictive (breaking mem=... bootups for example) and had to be reverted in: 90edaac62729 ("Revert "x86/mm: Limit mmap() of /dev/mem to valid physical addresses"") This v2 attempt modifies the original patch and makes sure that mmap(/dev/mem) limits the pfns so that it at least fits in the actual pteval_t architecturally: - Make sure mmap_mem() actually validates that the offset fits in phys_addr_t ( This may be indirectly true due to some other check, but it's not entirely obvious. ) - Change valid_mmap_phys_addr_range() to just use phys_addr_valid() on the top byte ( Top byte is sufficient, because mmap_mem() has already checked that it cannot wrap. ) - Add a few comments about what the valid_phys_addr_range() vs. valid_mmap_phys_addr_range() difference is. Signed-off-by: Craig Bergstrom <craigb@google.com> [ Fixed the checks and added comments. ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [ Collected the discussion and patches into a commit. ] Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Cc: Sean Young <sean@mess.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFyEcOMb657vWSmrM13OxmHxC-XxeBmNis=DwVvpJUOogQ@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-16 05:29:51 +07:00
#define ARCH_HAS_VALID_PHYS_ADDR_RANGE
extern int valid_phys_addr_range(phys_addr_t addr, size_t size);
extern int valid_mmap_phys_addr_range(unsigned long pfn, size_t size);
/**
* virt_to_phys - map virtual addresses to physical
* @address: address to remap
*
* The returned physical address is the physical (CPU) mapping for
* the memory address given. It is only valid to use this function on
* addresses directly mapped or allocated via kmalloc.
*
* This function does not give bus mappings for DMA transfers. In
* almost all conceivable cases a device driver should not be using
* this function
*/
static inline phys_addr_t virt_to_phys(volatile void *address)
{
return __pa(address);
}
#define virt_to_phys virt_to_phys
/**
* phys_to_virt - map physical address to virtual
* @address: address to remap
*
* The returned virtual address is a current CPU mapping for
* the memory address given. It is only valid to use this function on
* addresses that have a kernel mapping
*
* This function does not handle bus mappings for DMA transfers. In
* almost all conceivable cases a device driver should not be using
* this function
*/
static inline void *phys_to_virt(phys_addr_t address)
{
return __va(address);
}
#define phys_to_virt phys_to_virt
/*
* Change "struct page" to physical address.
*/
#define page_to_phys(page) ((dma_addr_t)page_to_pfn(page) << PAGE_SHIFT)
/*
* ISA I/O bus memory addresses are 1:1 with the physical address.
* However, we truncate the address to unsigned int to avoid undesirable
* promitions in legacy drivers.
*/
static inline unsigned int isa_virt_to_bus(volatile void *address)
{
return (unsigned int)virt_to_phys(address);
}
#define isa_page_to_bus(page) ((unsigned int)page_to_phys(page))
#define isa_bus_to_virt phys_to_virt
/*
* However PCI ones are not necessarily 1:1 and therefore these interfaces
* are forbidden in portable PCI drivers.
*
* Allow them on x86 for legacy drivers, though.
*/
#define virt_to_bus virt_to_phys
#define bus_to_virt phys_to_virt
/*
* The default ioremap() behavior is non-cached; if you need something
* else, you probably want one of the following.
*/
extern void __iomem *ioremap_nocache(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size);
#define ioremap_nocache ioremap_nocache
extern void __iomem *ioremap_uc(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size);
#define ioremap_uc ioremap_uc
extern void __iomem *ioremap_cache(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size);
#define ioremap_cache ioremap_cache
extern void __iomem *ioremap_prot(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size, unsigned long prot_val);
#define ioremap_prot ioremap_prot
/**
* ioremap - map bus memory into CPU space
* @offset: bus address of the memory
* @size: size of the resource to map
*
* ioremap performs a platform specific sequence of operations to
* make bus memory CPU accessible via the readb/readw/readl/writeb/
* writew/writel functions and the other mmio helpers. The returned
* address is not guaranteed to be usable directly as a virtual
* address.
*
* If the area you are trying to map is a PCI BAR you should have a
* look at pci_iomap().
*/
static inline void __iomem *ioremap(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size)
{
return ioremap_nocache(offset, size);
}
#define ioremap ioremap
extern void iounmap(volatile void __iomem *addr);
#define iounmap iounmap
extern void set_iounmap_nonlazy(void);
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#include <asm-generic/iomap.h>
/*
* ISA space is 'always mapped' on a typical x86 system, no need to
* explicitly ioremap() it. The fact that the ISA IO space is mapped
* to PAGE_OFFSET is pure coincidence - it does not mean ISA values
* are physical addresses. The following constant pointer can be
* used as the IO-area pointer (it can be iounmapped as well, so the
* analogy with PCI is quite large):
*/
#define __ISA_IO_base ((char __iomem *)(PAGE_OFFSET))
/*
* Cache management
*
* This needed for two cases
* 1. Out of order aware processors
* 2. Accidentally out of order processors (PPro errata #51)
*/
static inline void flush_write_buffers(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE)
asm volatile("lock; addl $0,0(%%esp)": : :"memory");
#endif
}
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
extern void native_io_delay(void);
extern int io_delay_type;
extern void io_delay_init(void);
#if defined(CONFIG_PARAVIRT)
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#else
static inline void slow_down_io(void)
{
native_io_delay();
#ifdef REALLY_SLOW_IO
native_io_delay();
native_io_delay();
native_io_delay();
#endif
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
extern struct static_key_false sev_enable_key;
static inline bool sev_key_active(void)
{
return static_branch_unlikely(&sev_enable_key);
}
#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
static inline bool sev_key_active(void) { return false; }
#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
#define BUILDIO(bwl, bw, type) \
static inline void out##bwl(unsigned type value, int port) \
{ \
asm volatile("out" #bwl " %" #bw "0, %w1" \
: : "a"(value), "Nd"(port)); \
} \
\
static inline unsigned type in##bwl(int port) \
{ \
unsigned type value; \
asm volatile("in" #bwl " %w1, %" #bw "0" \
: "=a"(value) : "Nd"(port)); \
return value; \
} \
\
static inline void out##bwl##_p(unsigned type value, int port) \
{ \
out##bwl(value, port); \
slow_down_io(); \
} \
\
static inline unsigned type in##bwl##_p(int port) \
{ \
unsigned type value = in##bwl(port); \
slow_down_io(); \
return value; \
} \
\
static inline void outs##bwl(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count) \
{ \
if (sev_key_active()) { \
unsigned type *value = (unsigned type *)addr; \
while (count) { \
out##bwl(*value, port); \
value++; \
count--; \
} \
} else { \
asm volatile("rep; outs" #bwl \
: "+S"(addr), "+c"(count) \
: "d"(port) : "memory"); \
} \
} \
\
static inline void ins##bwl(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count) \
{ \
if (sev_key_active()) { \
unsigned type *value = (unsigned type *)addr; \
while (count) { \
*value = in##bwl(port); \
value++; \
count--; \
} \
} else { \
asm volatile("rep; ins" #bwl \
: "+D"(addr), "+c"(count) \
: "d"(port) : "memory"); \
} \
}
BUILDIO(b, b, char)
BUILDIO(w, w, short)
BUILDIO(l, , int)
#define inb inb
#define inw inw
#define inl inl
#define inb_p inb_p
#define inw_p inw_p
#define inl_p inl_p
#define insb insb
#define insw insw
#define insl insl
#define outb outb
#define outw outw
#define outl outl
#define outb_p outb_p
#define outw_p outw_p
#define outl_p outl_p
#define outsb outsb
#define outsw outsw
#define outsl outsl
extern void *xlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys);
extern void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr);
#define xlate_dev_mem_ptr xlate_dev_mem_ptr
#define unxlate_dev_mem_ptr unxlate_dev_mem_ptr
extern int ioremap_change_attr(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size,
enum page_cache_mode pcm);
extern void __iomem *ioremap_wc(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size);
#define ioremap_wc ioremap_wc
extern void __iomem *ioremap_wt(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size);
#define ioremap_wt ioremap_wt
extern bool is_early_ioremap_ptep(pte_t *ptep);
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
#include <xen/xen.h>
struct bio_vec;
extern bool xen_biovec_phys_mergeable(const struct bio_vec *vec1,
const struct bio_vec *vec2);
#define BIOVEC_PHYS_MERGEABLE(vec1, vec2) \
(__BIOVEC_PHYS_MERGEABLE(vec1, vec2) && \
(!xen_domain() || xen_biovec_phys_mergeable(vec1, vec2)))
#endif /* CONFIG_XEN */
#define IO_SPACE_LIMIT 0xffff
#include <asm-generic/io.h>
#undef PCI_IOBASE
#ifdef CONFIG_MTRR
x86/mm/mtrr: Avoid #ifdeffery with phys_wc_to_mtrr_index() There is only one user but since we're going to bury MTRR next out of access to drivers, expose this last piece of API to drivers in a general fashion only needing io.h for access to helpers. Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Abhilash Kesavan <a.kesavan@samsung.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Antonino Daplas <adaplas@gmail.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jean-Christophe Plagniol-Villard <plagnioj@jcrosoft.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Suresh Siddha <sbsiddha@gmail.com> Cc: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <syrjala@sci.fi> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1429722736-4473-1-git-send-email-mcgrof@do-not-panic.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1432628901-18044-11-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-26 15:28:13 +07:00
extern int __must_check arch_phys_wc_index(int handle);
#define arch_phys_wc_index arch_phys_wc_index
extern int __must_check arch_phys_wc_add(unsigned long base,
unsigned long size);
extern void arch_phys_wc_del(int handle);
#define arch_phys_wc_add arch_phys_wc_add
#endif
x86/io: add interface to reserve io memtype for a resource range. (v1.1) A recent change to the mm code in: 87744ab3832b mm: fix cache mode tracking in vm_insert_mixed() started enforcing checking the memory type against the registered list for amixed pfn insertion mappings. It happens that the drm drivers for a number of gpus relied on this being broken. Currently the driver only inserted VRAM mappings into the tracking table when they came from the kernel, and userspace mappings never landed in the table. This led to a regression where all the mapping end up as UC instead of WC now. I've considered a number of solutions but since this needs to be fixed in fixes and not next, and some of the solutions were going to introduce overhead that hadn't been there before I didn't consider them viable at this stage. These mainly concerned hooking into the TTM io reserve APIs, but these API have a bunch of fast paths I didn't want to unwind to add this to. The solution I've decided on is to add a new API like the arch_phys_wc APIs (these would have worked but wc_del didn't take a range), and use them from the drivers to add a WC compatible mapping to the table for all VRAM on those GPUs. This means we can then create userspace mapping that won't get degraded to UC. v1.1: use CONFIG_X86_PAT + add some comments in io.h Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: mcgrof@suse.com Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
2016-10-24 12:27:59 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAT
extern int arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc(resource_size_t start, resource_size_t size);
extern void arch_io_free_memtype_wc(resource_size_t start, resource_size_t size);
#define arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc
#endif
x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Boot data (such as EFI related data) is not encrypted when the system is booted because UEFI/BIOS does not run with SME active. In order to access this data properly it needs to be mapped decrypted. Update early_memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to modify the pagetable protection attributes before they are applied to the new mapping. This is used to remove the encryption mask for boot related data. Update memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to determine if RAM remapping is allowed. RAM remapping will cause an encrypted mapping to be generated. By preventing RAM remapping, ioremap_cache() will be used instead, which will provide a decrypted mapping of the boot related data. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/81fb6b4117a5df6b9f2eda342f81bbef4b23d2e5.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 04:10:16 +07:00
extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset,
unsigned long size,
unsigned long flags);
#define arch_memremap_can_ram_remap arch_memremap_can_ram_remap
x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem When accessing memory using /dev/mem (or /dev/kmem) use the proper encryption attributes when mapping the memory. To insure the proper attributes are applied when reading or writing /dev/mem, update the xlate_dev_mem_ptr() function to use memremap() which will essentially perform the same steps of applying __va for RAM or using ioremap() if not RAM. To insure the proper attributes are applied when mmapping /dev/mem, update the phys_mem_access_prot() to call phys_mem_access_encrypted(), a new function which will check if the memory should be mapped encrypted or not. If it is not to be mapped encrypted then the VMA protection value is updated to remove the encryption bit. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c917f403ab9f61cbfd455ad6425ed8429a5e7b54.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 04:10:30 +07:00
extern bool phys_mem_access_encrypted(unsigned long phys_addr,
unsigned long size);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_IO_H */