2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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#ifndef __SHMEM_FS_H
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#define __SHMEM_FS_H
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shm: add sealing API
If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
- one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
- one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
- one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries
If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
for policy enforcement. However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
often not possible without local copies. Look at the following two
use-cases:
1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
local copy.
While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
to denial of service attacks.
This patch introduces the concept of SEALING. If you seal a file, a
specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever. Unlike locks,
seals can only be set, never removed. Hence, once you verified a specific
set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can perform the blocked
operations on this file, anymore.
An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
- SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
- GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
- WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
write().
- SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
don't want.
The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
without any trust-relationship:
1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).
The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
sealing.
F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
on the file. You cannot remove seals again.
The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 04:25:27 +07:00
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#include <linux/file.h>
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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#include <linux/swap.h>
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#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
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2011-06-28 06:18:04 +07:00
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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2010-08-10 07:19:05 +07:00
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#include <linux/percpu_counter.h>
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2012-08-24 03:53:28 +07:00
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#include <linux/xattr.h>
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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/* inode in-kernel data */
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struct shmem_inode_info {
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spinlock_t lock;
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shm: add sealing API
If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
- one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
- one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
- one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries
If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
for policy enforcement. However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
often not possible without local copies. Look at the following two
use-cases:
1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
local copy.
While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
to denial of service attacks.
This patch introduces the concept of SEALING. If you seal a file, a
specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever. Unlike locks,
seals can only be set, never removed. Hence, once you verified a specific
set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can perform the blocked
operations on this file, anymore.
An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
- SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
- GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
- WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
write().
- SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
don't want.
The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
without any trust-relationship:
1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).
The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
sealing.
F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
on the file. You cannot remove seals again.
The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 04:25:27 +07:00
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unsigned int seals; /* shmem seals */
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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unsigned long flags;
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unsigned long alloced; /* data pages alloced to file */
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2016-01-23 06:08:52 +07:00
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unsigned long swapped; /* subtotal assigned to swap */
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2016-07-27 05:26:38 +07:00
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struct list_head shrinklist; /* shrinkable hpage inodes */
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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struct list_head swaplist; /* chain of maybes on swap */
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2016-07-27 05:26:38 +07:00
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struct shared_policy policy; /* NUMA memory alloc policy */
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2012-08-24 03:53:28 +07:00
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struct simple_xattrs xattrs; /* list of xattrs */
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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struct inode vfs_inode;
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};
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struct shmem_sb_info {
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unsigned long max_blocks; /* How many blocks are allowed */
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2010-08-10 07:19:05 +07:00
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struct percpu_counter used_blocks; /* How many are allocated */
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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unsigned long max_inodes; /* How many inodes are allowed */
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unsigned long free_inodes; /* How many are left for allocation */
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2008-02-08 19:21:48 +07:00
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spinlock_t stat_lock; /* Serialize shmem_sb_info changes */
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shmem: prepare huge= mount option and sysfs knob
This patch adds new mount option "huge=". It can have following values:
- "always":
Attempt to allocate huge pages every time we need a new page;
- "never":
Do not allocate huge pages;
- "within_size":
Only allocate huge page if it will be fully within i_size.
Also respect fadvise()/madvise() hints;
- "advise:
Only allocate huge pages if requested with fadvise()/madvise();
Default is "never" for now.
"mount -o remount,huge= /mountpoint" works fine after mount: remounting
huge=never will not attempt to break up huge pages at all, just stop
more from being allocated.
No new config option: put this under CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE, which
is the appropriate option to protect those who don't want the new bloat,
and with which we shall share some pmd code.
Prohibit the option when !CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE, just as mpol is
invalid without CONFIG_NUMA (was hidden in mpol_parse_str(): make it
explicit).
Allow enabling THP only if the machine has_transparent_hugepage().
But what about Shmem with no user-visible mount? SysV SHM, memfds,
shared anonymous mmaps (of /dev/zero or MAP_ANONYMOUS), GPU drivers' DRM
objects, Ashmem. Though unlikely to suit all usages, provide sysfs knob
/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/shmem_enabled to experiment with
huge on those.
And allow shmem_enabled two further values:
- "deny":
For use in emergencies, to force the huge option off from
all mounts;
- "force":
Force the huge option on for all - very useful for testing;
Based on patch by Hugh Dickins.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-28-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-07-27 05:26:13 +07:00
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umode_t mode; /* Mount mode for root directory */
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unsigned char huge; /* Whether to try for hugepages */
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2012-02-08 07:46:12 +07:00
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kuid_t uid; /* Mount uid for root directory */
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kgid_t gid; /* Mount gid for root directory */
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mempolicy: use struct mempolicy pointer in shmem_sb_info
This patch replaces the mempolicy mode, mode_flags, and nodemask in the
shmem_sb_info struct with a struct mempolicy pointer, initialized to NULL.
This removes dependency on the details of mempolicy from shmem.c and hugetlbfs
inode.c and simplifies the interfaces.
mpol_parse_str() in mempolicy.c is changed to return, via a pointer to a
pointer arg, a struct mempolicy pointer on success. For MPOL_DEFAULT, the
returned pointer is NULL. Further, mpol_parse_str() now takes a 'no_context'
argument that causes the input nodemask to be stored in the w.user_nodemask of
the created mempolicy for use when the mempolicy is installed in a tmpfs inode
shared policy tree. At that time, any cpuset contextualization is applied to
the original input nodemask. This preserves the previous behavior where the
input nodemask was stored in the superblock. We can think of the returned
mempolicy as "context free".
Because mpol_parse_str() is now calling mpol_new(), we can remove from
mpol_to_str() the semantic checks that mpol_new() already performs.
Add 'no_context' parameter to mpol_to_str() to specify that it should format
the nodemask in w.user_nodemask for 'bind' and 'interleave' policies.
Change mpol_shared_policy_init() to take a pointer to a "context free" struct
mempolicy and to create a new, "contextualized" mempolicy using the mode,
mode_flags and user_nodemask from the input mempolicy.
Note: we know that the mempolicy passed to mpol_to_str() or
mpol_shared_policy_init() from a tmpfs superblock is "context free". This
is currently the only instance thereof. However, if we found more uses for
this concept, and introduced any ambiguity as to whether a mempolicy was
context free or not, we could add another internal mode flag to identify
context free mempolicies. Then, we could remove the 'no_context' argument
from mpol_to_str().
Added shmem_get_sbmpol() to return a reference counted superblock mempolicy,
if one exists, to pass to mpol_shared_policy_init(). We must add the
reference under the sb stat_lock to prevent races with replacement of the mpol
by remount. This reference is removed in mpol_shared_policy_init().
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: another build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: yet another build fix]
Signed-off-by: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 16:13:26 +07:00
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struct mempolicy *mpol; /* default memory policy for mappings */
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2016-07-27 05:26:38 +07:00
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spinlock_t shrinklist_lock; /* Protects shrinklist */
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struct list_head shrinklist; /* List of shinkable inodes */
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unsigned long shrinklist_len; /* Length of shrinklist */
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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};
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static inline struct shmem_inode_info *SHMEM_I(struct inode *inode)
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{
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return container_of(inode, struct shmem_inode_info, vfs_inode);
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}
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2011-06-28 06:18:02 +07:00
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/*
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* Functions in mm/shmem.c called directly from elsewhere:
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*/
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2011-08-04 06:21:21 +07:00
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extern int shmem_init(void);
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Driver Core: devtmpfs - kernel-maintained tmpfs-based /dev
Devtmpfs lets the kernel create a tmpfs instance called devtmpfs
very early at kernel initialization, before any driver-core device
is registered. Every device with a major/minor will provide a
device node in devtmpfs.
Devtmpfs can be changed and altered by userspace at any time,
and in any way needed - just like today's udev-mounted tmpfs.
Unmodified udev versions will run just fine on top of it, and will
recognize an already existing kernel-created device node and use it.
The default node permissions are root:root 0600. Proper permissions
and user/group ownership, meaningful symlinks, all other policy still
needs to be applied by userspace.
If a node is created by devtmps, devtmpfs will remove the device node
when the device goes away. If the device node was created by
userspace, or the devtmpfs created node was replaced by userspace, it
will no longer be removed by devtmpfs.
If it is requested to auto-mount it, it makes init=/bin/sh work
without any further userspace support. /dev will be fully populated
and dynamic, and always reflect the current device state of the kernel.
With the commonly used dynamic device numbers, it solves the problem
where static devices nodes may point to the wrong devices.
It is intended to make the initial bootup logic simpler and more robust,
by de-coupling the creation of the inital environment, to reliably run
userspace processes, from a complex userspace bootstrap logic to provide
a working /dev.
Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Tested-By: Harald Hoyer <harald@redhat.com>
Tested-By: Scott James Remnant <scott@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-04-30 20:23:42 +07:00
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extern int shmem_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent);
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2011-06-28 06:18:02 +07:00
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extern struct file *shmem_file_setup(const char *name,
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loff_t size, unsigned long flags);
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2013-12-02 18:24:19 +07:00
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extern struct file *shmem_kernel_file_setup(const char *name, loff_t size,
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unsigned long flags);
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2011-06-28 06:18:02 +07:00
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extern int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_struct *);
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2016-07-27 05:26:15 +07:00
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extern unsigned long shmem_get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long addr,
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unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags);
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2011-06-28 06:18:02 +07:00
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extern int shmem_lock(struct file *file, int lock, struct user_struct *user);
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2017-02-25 05:59:36 +07:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_SHMEM
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2014-04-04 04:47:46 +07:00
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extern bool shmem_mapping(struct address_space *mapping);
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2017-02-25 05:59:36 +07:00
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#else
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static inline bool shmem_mapping(struct address_space *mapping)
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{
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return false;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_SHMEM */
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SHM_UNLOCK: fix Unevictable pages stranded after swap
Commit cc39c6a9bbde ("mm: account skipped entries to avoid looping in
find_get_pages") correctly fixed an infinite loop; but left a problem
that find_get_pages() on shmem would return 0 (appearing to callers to
mean end of tree) when it meets a run of nr_pages swap entries.
The only uses of find_get_pages() on shmem are via pagevec_lookup(),
called from invalidate_mapping_pages(), and from shmctl SHM_UNLOCK's
scan_mapping_unevictable_pages(). The first is already commented, and
not worth worrying about; but the second can leave pages on the
Unevictable list after an unusual sequence of swapping and locking.
Fix that by using shmem_find_get_pages_and_swap() (then ignoring the
swap) instead of pagevec_lookup().
But I don't want to contaminate vmscan.c with shmem internals, nor
shmem.c with LRU locking. So move scan_mapping_unevictable_pages() into
shmem.c, renaming it shmem_unlock_mapping(); and rename
check_move_unevictable_page() to check_move_unevictable_pages(), looping
down an array of pages, oftentimes under the same lock.
Leave out the "rotate unevictable list" block: that's a leftover from
when this was used for /proc/sys/vm/scan_unevictable_pages, whose flawed
handling involved looking at pages at tail of LRU.
Was there significance to the sequence first ClearPageUnevictable, then
test page_evictable, then SetPageUnevictable here? I think not, we're
under LRU lock, and have no barriers between those.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shaohua.li@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [back to 3.1 but will need respins]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-21 05:34:21 +07:00
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extern void shmem_unlock_mapping(struct address_space *mapping);
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2011-06-28 06:18:04 +07:00
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extern struct page *shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp(struct address_space *mapping,
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pgoff_t index, gfp_t gfp_mask);
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tmpfs: take control of its truncate_range
2.6.35's new truncate convention gave tmpfs the opportunity to control
its file truncation, no longer enforced from outside by vmtruncate().
We shall want to build upon that, to handle pagecache and swap together.
Slightly redefine the ->truncate_range interface: let it now be called
between the unmap_mapping_range()s, with the filesystem responsible for
doing the truncate_inode_pages_range() from it - just as the filesystem
is nowadays responsible for doing that from its ->setattr.
Let's rename shmem_notify_change() to shmem_setattr(). Instead of
calling the generic truncate_setsize(), bring that code in so we can
call shmem_truncate_range() - which will later be updated to perform its
own variant of truncate_inode_pages_range().
Remove the punch_hole unmap_mapping_range() from shmem_truncate_range():
now that the COW's unmap_mapping_range() comes after ->truncate_range,
there is no need to call it a third time.
Export shmem_truncate_range() and add it to the list in shmem_fs.h, so
that i915_gem_object_truncate() can call it explicitly in future; get
this patch in first, then update drm/i915 once this is available (until
then, i915 will just be doing the truncate_inode_pages() twice).
Though introduced five years ago, no other filesystem is implementing
->truncate_range, and its only other user is madvise(,,MADV_REMOVE): we
expect to convert it to fallocate(,FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE,,) shortly,
whereupon ->truncate_range can be removed from inode_operations -
shmem_truncate_range() will help i915 across that transition too.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-06-28 06:18:03 +07:00
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extern void shmem_truncate_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t start, loff_t end);
|
2011-06-28 06:18:02 +07:00
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extern int shmem_unuse(swp_entry_t entry, struct page *page);
|
Driver Core: devtmpfs - kernel-maintained tmpfs-based /dev
Devtmpfs lets the kernel create a tmpfs instance called devtmpfs
very early at kernel initialization, before any driver-core device
is registered. Every device with a major/minor will provide a
device node in devtmpfs.
Devtmpfs can be changed and altered by userspace at any time,
and in any way needed - just like today's udev-mounted tmpfs.
Unmodified udev versions will run just fine on top of it, and will
recognize an already existing kernel-created device node and use it.
The default node permissions are root:root 0600. Proper permissions
and user/group ownership, meaningful symlinks, all other policy still
needs to be applied by userspace.
If a node is created by devtmps, devtmpfs will remove the device node
when the device goes away. If the device node was created by
userspace, or the devtmpfs created node was replaced by userspace, it
will no longer be removed by devtmpfs.
If it is requested to auto-mount it, it makes init=/bin/sh work
without any further userspace support. /dev will be fully populated
and dynamic, and always reflect the current device state of the kernel.
With the commonly used dynamic device numbers, it solves the problem
where static devices nodes may point to the wrong devices.
It is intended to make the initial bootup logic simpler and more robust,
by de-coupling the creation of the inital environment, to reliably run
userspace processes, from a complex userspace bootstrap logic to provide
a working /dev.
Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Tested-By: Harald Hoyer <harald@redhat.com>
Tested-By: Scott James Remnant <scott@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-04-30 20:23:42 +07:00
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mm, proc: reduce cost of /proc/pid/smaps for shmem mappings
The previous patch has improved swap accounting for shmem mapping, which
however made /proc/pid/smaps more expensive for shmem mappings, as we
consult the radix tree for each pte_none entry, so the overal complexity
is O(n*log(n)).
We can reduce this significantly for mappings that cannot contain COWed
pages, because then we can either use the statistics tha shmem object
itself tracks (if the mapping contains the whole object, or the swap
usage of the whole object is zero), or use the radix tree iterator,
which is much more effective than repeated find_get_entry() calls.
This patch therefore introduces a function shmem_swap_usage(vma) and
makes /proc/pid/smaps use it when possible. Only for writable private
mappings of shmem objects (i.e. tmpfs files) with the shmem object
itself (partially) swapped outwe have to resort to the find_get_entry()
approach.
Hopefully such mappings are relatively uncommon.
To demonstrate the diference, I have measured this on a process that
creates a 2GB mapping and dirties single pages with a stride of 2MB, and
time how long does it take to cat /proc/pid/smaps of this process 100
times.
Private writable mapping of a /dev/shm/file (the most complex case):
real 0m3.831s
user 0m0.180s
sys 0m3.212s
Shared mapping of an almost full mapping of a partially swapped /dev/shm/file
(which needs to employ the radix tree iterator).
real 0m1.351s
user 0m0.096s
sys 0m0.768s
Same, but with /dev/shm/file not swapped (so no radix tree walk needed)
real 0m0.935s
user 0m0.128s
sys 0m0.344s
Private anonymous mapping:
real 0m0.949s
user 0m0.116s
sys 0m0.348s
The cost is now much closer to the private anonymous mapping case, unless
the shmem mapping is private and writable.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-15 06:19:20 +07:00
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|
|
extern unsigned long shmem_swap_usage(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
|
2016-01-15 06:19:23 +07:00
|
|
|
extern unsigned long shmem_partial_swap_usage(struct address_space *mapping,
|
|
|
|
|
pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end);
|
mm, proc: reduce cost of /proc/pid/smaps for shmem mappings
The previous patch has improved swap accounting for shmem mapping, which
however made /proc/pid/smaps more expensive for shmem mappings, as we
consult the radix tree for each pte_none entry, so the overal complexity
is O(n*log(n)).
We can reduce this significantly for mappings that cannot contain COWed
pages, because then we can either use the statistics tha shmem object
itself tracks (if the mapping contains the whole object, or the swap
usage of the whole object is zero), or use the radix tree iterator,
which is much more effective than repeated find_get_entry() calls.
This patch therefore introduces a function shmem_swap_usage(vma) and
makes /proc/pid/smaps use it when possible. Only for writable private
mappings of shmem objects (i.e. tmpfs files) with the shmem object
itself (partially) swapped outwe have to resort to the find_get_entry()
approach.
Hopefully such mappings are relatively uncommon.
To demonstrate the diference, I have measured this on a process that
creates a 2GB mapping and dirties single pages with a stride of 2MB, and
time how long does it take to cat /proc/pid/smaps of this process 100
times.
Private writable mapping of a /dev/shm/file (the most complex case):
real 0m3.831s
user 0m0.180s
sys 0m3.212s
Shared mapping of an almost full mapping of a partially swapped /dev/shm/file
(which needs to employ the radix tree iterator).
real 0m1.351s
user 0m0.096s
sys 0m0.768s
Same, but with /dev/shm/file not swapped (so no radix tree walk needed)
real 0m0.935s
user 0m0.128s
sys 0m0.344s
Private anonymous mapping:
real 0m0.949s
user 0m0.116s
sys 0m0.348s
The cost is now much closer to the private anonymous mapping case, unless
the shmem mapping is private and writable.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-15 06:19:20 +07:00
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|
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|
2016-07-27 05:26:32 +07:00
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|
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/* Flag allocation requirements to shmem_getpage */
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|
|
|
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enum sgp_type {
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SGP_READ, /* don't exceed i_size, don't allocate page */
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SGP_CACHE, /* don't exceed i_size, may allocate page */
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SGP_NOHUGE, /* like SGP_CACHE, but no huge pages */
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SGP_HUGE, /* like SGP_CACHE, huge pages preferred */
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SGP_WRITE, /* may exceed i_size, may allocate !Uptodate page */
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SGP_FALLOC, /* like SGP_WRITE, but make existing page Uptodate */
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};
|
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|
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extern int shmem_getpage(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index,
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struct page **pagep, enum sgp_type sgp);
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|
2011-06-28 06:18:04 +07:00
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static inline struct page *shmem_read_mapping_page(
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struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t index)
|
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|
|
|
{
|
|
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|
|
return shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp(mapping, index,
|
|
|
|
|
mapping_gfp_mask(mapping));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
2016-07-27 05:26:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static inline bool shmem_file(struct file *file)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHMEM))
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|
|
return false;
|
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|
|
if (!file || !file->f_mapping)
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|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
return shmem_mapping(file->f_mapping);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
2016-07-27 05:26:18 +07:00
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|
|
extern bool shmem_charge(struct inode *inode, long pages);
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|
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|
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extern void shmem_uncharge(struct inode *inode, long pages);
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|
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|
|
shm: add sealing API
If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
- one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
- one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
- one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries
If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
for policy enforcement. However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
often not possible without local copies. Look at the following two
use-cases:
1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
local copy.
While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
to denial of service attacks.
This patch introduces the concept of SEALING. If you seal a file, a
specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever. Unlike locks,
seals can only be set, never removed. Hence, once you verified a specific
set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can perform the blocked
operations on this file, anymore.
An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
- SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
- GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
- WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
write().
- SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
don't want.
The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
without any trust-relationship:
1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).
The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
sealing.
F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
on the file. You cannot remove seals again.
The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 04:25:27 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
extern int shmem_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals);
|
|
|
|
|
extern int shmem_get_seals(struct file *file);
|
|
|
|
|
extern long shmem_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline long shmem_fcntl(struct file *f, unsigned int c, unsigned long a)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-27 05:26:35 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGE_PAGECACHE
|
|
|
|
|
extern bool shmem_huge_enabled(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool shmem_huge_enabled(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-23 06:43:25 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SHMEM
|
|
|
|
|
extern int shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, pmd_t *dst_pmd,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long dst_addr,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long src_addr,
|
|
|
|
|
struct page **pagep);
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
#define shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte(dst_mm, dst_pte, dst_vma, dst_addr, \
|
|
|
|
|
src_addr, pagep) ({ BUG(); 0; })
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
#endif
|