linux_dsm_epyc7002/include/linux/capability.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 21:07:57 +07:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* This is <linux/capability.h>
*
Implement file posix capabilities Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 13:31:36 +07:00
* Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
* Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
* with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
*
* See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
*
* ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
Implement file posix capabilities Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 13:31:36 +07:00
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
capabilities: remain source compatible with 32-bit raw legacy capability support. Source code out there hard-codes a notion of what the _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION #define means in terms of the semantics of the raw capability system calls capget() and capset(). Its unfortunate, but true. Since the confusing header file has been in a released kernel, there is software that is erroneously using 64-bit capabilities with the semantics of 32-bit compatibilities. These recently compiled programs may suffer corruption of their memory when sys_getcap() overwrites more memory than they are coded to expect, and the raising of added capabilities when using sys_capset(). As such, this patch does a number of things to clean up the situation for all. It 1. forces the _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION define to always retain its legacy value. 2. adopts a new #define strategy for the kernel's internal implementation of the preferred magic. 3. deprecates v2 capability magic in favor of a new (v3) magic number. The functionality of v3 is entirely equivalent to v2, the only difference being that the v2 magic causes the kernel to log a "deprecated" warning so the admin can find applications that may be using v2 inappropriately. [User space code continues to be encouraged to use the libcap API which protects the application from details like this. libcap-2.10 is the first to support v3 capabilities.] Fixes issue reported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=447518. Thanks to Bojan Smojver for the report. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depreciate/deprecate/g] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: be robust about put_user size] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Bojan Smojver <bojan@rexursive.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
2008-05-28 12:05:17 +07:00
#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
extern int file_caps_enabled;
typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
capabilities: remain source compatible with 32-bit raw legacy capability support. Source code out there hard-codes a notion of what the _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION #define means in terms of the semantics of the raw capability system calls capget() and capset(). Its unfortunate, but true. Since the confusing header file has been in a released kernel, there is software that is erroneously using 64-bit capabilities with the semantics of 32-bit compatibilities. These recently compiled programs may suffer corruption of their memory when sys_getcap() overwrites more memory than they are coded to expect, and the raising of added capabilities when using sys_capset(). As such, this patch does a number of things to clean up the situation for all. It 1. forces the _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION define to always retain its legacy value. 2. adopts a new #define strategy for the kernel's internal implementation of the preferred magic. 3. deprecates v2 capability magic in favor of a new (v3) magic number. The functionality of v3 is entirely equivalent to v2, the only difference being that the v2 magic causes the kernel to log a "deprecated" warning so the admin can find applications that may be using v2 inappropriately. [User space code continues to be encouraged to use the libcap API which protects the application from details like this. libcap-2.10 is the first to support v3 capabilities.] Fixes issue reported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=447518. Thanks to Bojan Smojver for the report. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depreciate/deprecate/g] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: be robust about put_user size] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Bojan Smojver <bojan@rexursive.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
2008-05-28 12:05:17 +07:00
__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
} kernel_cap_t;
/* same as vfs_ns_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
__u32 magic_etc;
kernel_cap_t permitted;
kernel_cap_t inheritable;
kuid_t rootid;
};
#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
struct file;
struct inode;
userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespace - Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-24 06:43:17 +07:00
struct dentry;
struct task_struct;
userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespace - Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-24 06:43:17 +07:00
struct user_namespace;
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
/*
* Internal kernel functions only
*/
Implement file posix capabilities Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 13:31:36 +07:00
#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
capabilities: remain source compatible with 32-bit raw legacy capability support. Source code out there hard-codes a notion of what the _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION #define means in terms of the semantics of the raw capability system calls capget() and capset(). Its unfortunate, but true. Since the confusing header file has been in a released kernel, there is software that is erroneously using 64-bit capabilities with the semantics of 32-bit compatibilities. These recently compiled programs may suffer corruption of their memory when sys_getcap() overwrites more memory than they are coded to expect, and the raising of added capabilities when using sys_capset(). As such, this patch does a number of things to clean up the situation for all. It 1. forces the _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION define to always retain its legacy value. 2. adopts a new #define strategy for the kernel's internal implementation of the preferred magic. 3. deprecates v2 capability magic in favor of a new (v3) magic number. The functionality of v3 is entirely equivalent to v2, the only difference being that the v2 magic causes the kernel to log a "deprecated" warning so the admin can find applications that may be using v2 inappropriately. [User space code continues to be encouraged to use the libcap API which protects the application from details like this. libcap-2.10 is the first to support v3 capabilities.] Fixes issue reported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=447518. Thanks to Bojan Smojver for the report. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depreciate/deprecate/g] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: be robust about put_user size] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Bojan Smojver <bojan@rexursive.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
2008-05-28 12:05:17 +07:00
for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
/*
* CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
*
* The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
* At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
*
* It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
*
* We could also define fsmask as follows:
* 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
* 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
*/
# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC, and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires an absolute minimum of application support and a very small amount of configuration data. Smack uses extended attributes and provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of system Smack attributes. The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script, and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on http://www.schaufler-ca.com Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine environment and on an old Sony laptop. Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not include "/". A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it. Smack defines and uses these labels: "*" - pronounced "star" "_" - pronounced "floor" "^" - pronounced "hat" "?" - pronounced "huh" The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order: 1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied. 2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^" is permitted. 3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_" is permitted. 4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted. 5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same label is permitted. 6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded rule set is permitted. 7. Any other access is denied. Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access triples to /smack/load. Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time of day. Some practical use cases: Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack to support this, these rules could be defined: C Unclass rx S C rx S Unclass rx TS S rx TS C rx TS Unclass rx A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it. An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it has to be explicitly stated. Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a subject cannot access an object with a different label no access rules are required to implement compartmentalization. A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated with this Smack access rule: A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does: ESPN ABC r ABC ESPN r On my portable video device I have two applications, one that shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which is just as well all things considered. Another case that I especially like: SatData Guard w Guard Publish w A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label. The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label. This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish file system object because file system semanitic require read as well as write. The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least for a while. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 13:29:50 +07:00
# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
capabilities: remain source compatible with 32-bit raw legacy capability support. Source code out there hard-codes a notion of what the _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION #define means in terms of the semantics of the raw capability system calls capget() and capset(). Its unfortunate, but true. Since the confusing header file has been in a released kernel, there is software that is erroneously using 64-bit capabilities with the semantics of 32-bit compatibilities. These recently compiled programs may suffer corruption of their memory when sys_getcap() overwrites more memory than they are coded to expect, and the raising of added capabilities when using sys_capset(). As such, this patch does a number of things to clean up the situation for all. It 1. forces the _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION define to always retain its legacy value. 2. adopts a new #define strategy for the kernel's internal implementation of the preferred magic. 3. deprecates v2 capability magic in favor of a new (v3) magic number. The functionality of v3 is entirely equivalent to v2, the only difference being that the v2 magic causes the kernel to log a "deprecated" warning so the admin can find applications that may be using v2 inappropriately. [User space code continues to be encouraged to use the libcap API which protects the application from details like this. libcap-2.10 is the first to support v3 capabilities.] Fixes issue reported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=447518. Thanks to Bojan Smojver for the report. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depreciate/deprecate/g] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: be robust about put_user size] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Bojan Smojver <bojan@rexursive.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
2008-05-28 12:05:17 +07:00
#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744 plus fixing it a different way... We found, when trying to run an application from an application which had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status. Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4 capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are undefined future capabilities. The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl() we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So the 'parent' will look something like: CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapBnd: ffffffc000000000 All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do... So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does. They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls execve() the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't have. The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity. The solution here: 1) stop hiding capability bits in status This makes debugging easier! 2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init and you won't get them in any other task either. This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other things) 3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use ~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility. This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run. 4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward compatibility. This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2014-07-24 02:36:26 +07:00
#define CAP_LAST_U32 ((_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) - 1)
#define CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1)
# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744 plus fixing it a different way... We found, when trying to run an application from an application which had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status. Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4 capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are undefined future capabilities. The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl() we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So the 'parent' will look something like: CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapBnd: ffffffc000000000 All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do... So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does. They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls execve() the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't have. The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity. The solution here: 1) stop hiding capability bits in status This makes debugging easier! 2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init and you won't get them in any other task either. This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other things) 3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use ~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility. This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run. 4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward compatibility. This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2014-07-24 02:36:26 +07:00
# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK }})
# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
capabilities: remain source compatible with 32-bit raw legacy capability support. Source code out there hard-codes a notion of what the _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION #define means in terms of the semantics of the raw capability system calls capget() and capset(). Its unfortunate, but true. Since the confusing header file has been in a released kernel, there is software that is erroneously using 64-bit capabilities with the semantics of 32-bit compatibilities. These recently compiled programs may suffer corruption of their memory when sys_getcap() overwrites more memory than they are coded to expect, and the raising of added capabilities when using sys_capset(). As such, this patch does a number of things to clean up the situation for all. It 1. forces the _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION define to always retain its legacy value. 2. adopts a new #define strategy for the kernel's internal implementation of the preferred magic. 3. deprecates v2 capability magic in favor of a new (v3) magic number. The functionality of v3 is entirely equivalent to v2, the only difference being that the v2 magic causes the kernel to log a "deprecated" warning so the admin can find applications that may be using v2 inappropriately. [User space code continues to be encouraged to use the libcap API which protects the application from details like this. libcap-2.10 is the first to support v3 capabilities.] Fixes issue reported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=447518. Thanks to Bojan Smojver for the report. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depreciate/deprecate/g] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: be robust about put_user size] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Bojan Smojver <bojan@rexursive.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
2008-05-28 12:05:17 +07:00
#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
do { \
unsigned __capi; \
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
} \
} while (0)
#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
do { \
unsigned __capi; \
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
} \
} while (0)
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
const kernel_cap_t b)
{
kernel_cap_t dest;
CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
return dest;
}
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
const kernel_cap_t b)
{
kernel_cap_t dest;
CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
return dest;
}
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
const kernel_cap_t drop)
{
kernel_cap_t dest;
CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
return dest;
}
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
{
kernel_cap_t dest;
CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
return dest;
}
static inline bool cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
unsigned __capi;
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
return false;
}
return true;
}
/*
* Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
* return true if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
* cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return true
* return false if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
* cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return false
*/
static inline bool cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
{
kernel_cap_t dest;
dest = cap_drop(a, set);
return cap_isclear(dest);
}
/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
}
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
const kernel_cap_t permitted)
{
const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
return cap_combine(a,
cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
}
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
}
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
const kernel_cap_t permitted)
{
const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
return cap_combine(a,
cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
}
kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems, supporting multiple users is not necessary. This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled under CONFIG_EXPERT menu. When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case and processes always have all capabilities. The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid, setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups, getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset. Also, groups.c is compiled out completely. In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid adding two ifdef blocks. This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much. The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work. Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS. Bloat-o-meter output: add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-16 06:16:41 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER
extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespace - Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-24 06:43:17 +07:00
extern bool capable(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems, supporting multiple users is not necessary. This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled under CONFIG_EXPERT menu. When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case and processes always have all capabilities. The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid, setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups, getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset. Also, groups.c is compiled out completely. In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid adding two ifdef blocks. This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much. The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work. Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS. Bloat-o-meter output: add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-16 06:16:41 +07:00
#else
static inline bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
{
return true;
}
static inline bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
return true;
}
static inline bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
{
return true;
}
static inline bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
return true;
}
static inline bool capable(int cap)
{
return true;
}
static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
return true;
}
static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
return true;
}
static inline bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
return true;
}
kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems, supporting multiple users is not necessary. This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled under CONFIG_EXPERT menu. When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case and processes always have all capabilities. The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid, setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups, getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset. Also, groups.c is compiled out completely. In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid adding two ifdef blocks. This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much. The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work. Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS. Bloat-o-meter output: add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-16 06:16:41 +07:00
#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode);
extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
capabilities: Introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Introduce the CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON can assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems. CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure. Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted, multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to mass users of a system, and securely unblocks applicability and scalability of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases. CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability. Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring and observability operations. [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html [3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5590d543-82c6-490a-6544-08e6a5517db0@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2020-04-02 15:45:31 +07:00
static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
{
return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
}
bpf, capability: Introduce CAP_BPF Split BPF operations that are allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN into combination of CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN. For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well. The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF: - to load tracing program types BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc} use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON - to load networking program types BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, SK_SKB, etc} use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN There are few exceptions from this rule: - bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using tracing mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_PERFMON if networking program is using this helper. - BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only to discourage production use. - BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN. - bpf_probe_write_user() is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only. CAPs are not checked at attach/detach time with two exceptions: - loading BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB is allowed for unprivileged users, hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at attach time. - flow_dissector detach doesn't check prog FD at detach, hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at detach time. CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to iterate BPF objects (progs, maps, links) via get_next_id command and convert them to file descriptor via GET_FD_BY_ID command. This restriction guarantees that mutliple tasks with CAP_BPF are not able to affect each other. That leads to clean isolation of tasks. For example: task A with CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN loads and attaches a firewall via bpf_link. task B with the same capabilities cannot detach that firewall unless task A explicitly passed link FD to task B via scm_rights or bpffs. CAP_SYS_ADMIN can still detach/unload everything. Two networking user apps with CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_NET_ADMIN can accidentely mess with each other programs and maps. Two networking user apps with CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_BPF cannot affect each other. CAP_NET_ADMIN + CAP_BPF allows networking programs access only packet data. Such networking progs cannot access arbitrary kernel memory or leak pointers. bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should NOT be installed with CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets. But users with these two permissions will be able to use these tracing tools. CAP_PERFMON is least secure, since it allows kprobes and kernel memory access. CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic via iproute2. CAP_BPF is the safest from security point of view and harmless on its own. Having CAP_BPF and/or CAP_NET_ADMIN is not enough to write into arbitrary map and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog. CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system. Existing unprivileged BPF operations are not affected. In particular unprivileged users are allowed to load socket_filter and cg_skb program types and to create array, hash, prog_array, map-in-map map types. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
2020-05-14 06:03:53 +07:00
static inline bool bpf_capable(void)
{
return capable(CAP_BPF) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
}
capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE This patch introduces CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, a new capability facilitating checkpoint/restore for non-root users. Over the last years, The CRIU (Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace) team has been asked numerous times if it is possible to checkpoint/restore a process as non-root. The answer usually was: 'almost'. The main blocker to restore a process as non-root was to control the PID of the restored process. This feature available via the clone3 system call, or via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid is unfortunately guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. In the past two years, requests for non-root checkpoint/restore have increased due to the following use cases: * Checkpoint/Restore in an HPC environment in combination with a resource manager distributing jobs where users are always running as non-root. There is a desire to provide a way to checkpoint and restore long running jobs. * Container migration as non-root * We have been in contact with JVM developers who are integrating CRIU into a Java VM to decrease the startup time. These checkpoint/restore applications are not meant to be running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. We have seen the following workarounds: * Use a setuid wrapper around CRIU: See https://github.com/FredHutch/slurm-examples/blob/master/checkpointer/lib/checkpointer/checkpointer-suid.c * Use a setuid helper that writes to ns_last_pid. Unfortunately, this helper delegation technique is impossible to use with clone3, and is thus prone to races. See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid * Cycle through PIDs with fork() until the desired PID is reached: This has been demonstrated to work with cycling rates of 100,000 PIDs/s See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid * Patch out the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check from the kernel * Run the desired application in a new user and PID namespace to provide a local CAP_SYS_ADMIN for controlling PIDs. This technique has limited use in typical container environments (e.g., Kubernetes) as /proc is typically protected with read-only layers (e.g., /proc/sys) for hardening purposes. Read-only layers prevent additional /proc mounts (due to proc's SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE property), making the use of new PID namespaces limited as certain applications need access to /proc matching their PID namespace. The introduced capability allows to: * Control PIDs when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable for the corresponding PID namespace via ns_last_pid/clone3. * Open files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace, useful for recovering files that are unreachable via the file system such as deleted files, or memfd files. See corresponding selftest for an example with clone3(). Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-2-areber@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2020-07-19 17:04:11 +07:00
static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
return ns_capable(ns, CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
}
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the host. However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root. This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect. When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. This is done during the execution of setxattr() to catch user-space-initiated capability writes. Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns, will run the file with capabilities. Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace. If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the given uid is root will. Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful. This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent namespace. Example using tar: $ cp /bin/sleep sleepx $ mkdir b1 b2 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b1 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b2 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -cf b1/sleepx.tar sleepx $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -C b2 -xf b1/sleepx.tar $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- getcap b2/sleepx b2/sleepx = cap_sys_admin+ep # /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/getv3xattr b2/sleepx v3 xattr, rootid is 100001 A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltp Changelog: Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite() Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns (From ebiederm: mar 28 2017) commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3 get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr() Apr 09 2017: don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root. return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns Apr 18 2017: . Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing. . Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous xattr doesn't matter. Apr 24 2017: . incorporate Eric's incremental diff . move cap_convert_nscap to setxattr and simplify its usage May 8, 2017: . fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-05-09 01:11:56 +07:00
extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size);
#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */