linux_dsm_epyc7002/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c

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/*
* Implementation of the policy database.
*
* Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
*/
/*
* Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
*
* Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
*
* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
*
* Added conditional policy language extensions
*
* Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
*
* Added support for the policy capability bitmap
*
* Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
* Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/flex_array.h>
#include "security.h"
#include "policydb.h"
#include "conditional.h"
#include "mls.h"
#include "services.h"
#define _DEBUG_HASHES
#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
static const char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
"common prefixes",
"classes",
"roles",
"types",
"users",
"bools",
"levels",
"categories",
};
#endif
static unsigned int symtab_sizes[SYM_NUM] = {
2,
32,
16,
512,
128,
16,
16,
16,
};
struct policydb_compat_info {
int version;
int sym_num;
int ocon_num;
};
/* These need to be updated if SYM_NUM or OCON_NUM changes */
static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 3,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 1,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 1,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/range When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role, and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file) examples always are done with directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 [no rule] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none [default user source] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source [default user target] system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target [default role source] unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source [default role target] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target [default range source low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low [default range source high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high [default range source low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high [default range target low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low [default range target high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high [default range target low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-03-21 01:35:12 +07:00
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 04:19:56 +07:00
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
};
static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
{
int i;
struct policydb_compat_info *info = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policydb_compat); i++) {
if (policydb_compat[i].version == version) {
info = &policydb_compat[i];
break;
}
}
return info;
}
/*
* Initialize the role table.
*/
static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
{
char *key = NULL;
int rc;
struct role_datum *role;
rc = -ENOMEM;
role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!role)
goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
role->value = ++p->p_roles.nprim;
if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL)
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
key = kstrdup(OBJECT_R, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
goto out;
rc = hashtab_insert(p->p_roles.table, key, role);
if (rc)
goto out;
return 0;
out:
kfree(key);
kfree(role);
return rc;
}
static u32 filenametr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
{
const struct filename_trans *ft = k;
unsigned long hash;
unsigned int byte_num;
unsigned char focus;
hash = ft->stype ^ ft->ttype ^ ft->tclass;
byte_num = 0;
while ((focus = ft->name[byte_num++]))
hash = partial_name_hash(focus, hash);
return hash & (h->size - 1);
}
static int filenametr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
{
const struct filename_trans *ft1 = k1;
const struct filename_trans *ft2 = k2;
int v;
v = ft1->stype - ft2->stype;
if (v)
return v;
v = ft1->ttype - ft2->ttype;
if (v)
return v;
v = ft1->tclass - ft2->tclass;
if (v)
return v;
return strcmp(ft1->name, ft2->name);
}
static u32 rangetr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
{
const struct range_trans *key = k;
return (key->source_type + (key->target_type << 3) +
(key->target_class << 5)) & (h->size - 1);
}
static int rangetr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
{
const struct range_trans *key1 = k1, *key2 = k2;
int v;
v = key1->source_type - key2->source_type;
if (v)
return v;
v = key1->target_type - key2->target_type;
if (v)
return v;
v = key1->target_class - key2->target_class;
return v;
}
/*
* Initialize a policy database structure.
*/
static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
{
int i, rc;
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
rc = symtab_init(&p->symtab[i], symtab_sizes[i]);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
rc = avtab_init(&p->te_avtab);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = roles_init(p);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = cond_policydb_init(p);
if (rc)
goto out;
p->filename_trans = hashtab_create(filenametr_hash, filenametr_cmp, (1 << 10));
if (!p->filename_trans) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, 256);
if (!p->range_tr) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
return 0;
out:
hashtab_destroy(p->filename_trans);
hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
return rc;
}
/*
* The following *_index functions are used to
* define the val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
* in a policy database structure. The val_to_name
* arrays are used when converting security context
* structures into string representations. The
* val_to_struct arrays are used when the attributes
* of a class, role, or user are needed.
*/
static int common_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
{
struct policydb *p;
struct common_datum *comdatum;
struct flex_array *fa;
comdatum = datum;
p = datap;
if (!comdatum->value || comdatum->value > p->p_commons.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_COMMONS];
if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, comdatum->value - 1, key,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
BUG();
return 0;
}
static int class_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
{
struct policydb *p;
struct class_datum *cladatum;
struct flex_array *fa;
cladatum = datum;
p = datap;
if (!cladatum->value || cladatum->value > p->p_classes.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES];
if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, cladatum->value - 1, key,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
BUG();
p->class_val_to_struct[cladatum->value - 1] = cladatum;
return 0;
}
static int role_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
{
struct policydb *p;
struct role_datum *role;
struct flex_array *fa;
role = datum;
p = datap;
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
if (!role->value
|| role->value > p->p_roles.nprim
|| role->bounds > p->p_roles.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES];
if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, role->value - 1, key,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
BUG();
p->role_val_to_struct[role->value - 1] = role;
return 0;
}
static int type_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
{
struct policydb *p;
struct type_datum *typdatum;
struct flex_array *fa;
typdatum = datum;
p = datap;
if (typdatum->primary) {
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
if (!typdatum->value
|| typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim
|| typdatum->bounds > p->p_types.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES];
if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, typdatum->value - 1, key,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
BUG();
fa = p->type_val_to_struct_array;
if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, typdatum->value - 1, typdatum,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
BUG();
}
return 0;
}
static int user_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
{
struct policydb *p;
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
struct flex_array *fa;
usrdatum = datum;
p = datap;
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
if (!usrdatum->value
|| usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim
|| usrdatum->bounds > p->p_users.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS];
if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, usrdatum->value - 1, key,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
BUG();
p->user_val_to_struct[usrdatum->value - 1] = usrdatum;
return 0;
}
static int sens_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
{
struct policydb *p;
struct level_datum *levdatum;
struct flex_array *fa;
levdatum = datum;
p = datap;
if (!levdatum->isalias) {
if (!levdatum->level->sens ||
levdatum->level->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS];
if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, levdatum->level->sens - 1, key,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
BUG();
}
return 0;
}
static int cat_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
{
struct policydb *p;
struct cat_datum *catdatum;
struct flex_array *fa;
catdatum = datum;
p = datap;
if (!catdatum->isalias) {
if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS];
if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, catdatum->value - 1, key,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
BUG();
}
return 0;
}
static int (*index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
{
common_index,
class_index,
role_index,
type_index,
user_index,
cond_index_bool,
sens_index,
cat_index,
};
#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
{
struct hashtab_info info;
hashtab_stat(h, &info);
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
"longest chain length %d\n", hash_name, h->nel,
info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
}
static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
hash_eval(s[i].table, symtab_name[i]);
}
#else
static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, char *hash_name)
{
}
#endif
/*
* Define the other val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
* in a policy database structure.
*
* Caller must clean up on failure.
*/
static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
{
int i, rc;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools",
p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim, p->p_bools.nprim);
if (p->mls_enabled)
printk: reinstate KERN_CONT for printing continuation lines Long long ago the kernel log buffer was a buffered stream of bytes, very much like stdio in user space. It supported log levels by scanning the stream and noticing the log level markers at the beginning of each line, but if you wanted to print a partial line in multiple chunks, you just did multiple printk() calls, and it just automatically worked. Except when it didn't, and you had very confusing output when different lines got all mixed up with each other. Then you got fragment lines mixing with each other, or with non-fragment lines, because it was traditionally impossible to tell whether a printk() call was a continuation or not. To at least help clarify the issue of continuation lines, we added a KERN_CONT marker back in 2007 to mark continuation lines: 474925277671 ("printk: add KERN_CONT annotation"). That continuation marker was initially an empty string, and didn't actuall make any semantic difference. But it at least made it possible to annotate the source code, and have check-patch notice that a printk() didn't need or want a log level marker, because it was a continuation of a previous line. To avoid the ambiguity between a continuation line that had that KERN_CONT marker, and a printk with no level information at all, we then in 2009 made KERN_CONT be a real log level marker which meant that we could now reliably tell the difference between the two cases. 5fd29d6ccbc9 ("printk: clean up handling of log-levels and newlines") and we could take advantage of that to make sure we didn't mix up continuation lines with lines that just didn't have any loglevel at all. Then, in 2012, the kernel log buffer was changed to be a "record" based log, where each line was a record that has a loglevel and a timestamp. You can see the beginning of that conversion in commits e11fea92e13f ("kmsg: export printk records to the /dev/kmsg interface") 7ff9554bb578 ("printk: convert byte-buffer to variable-length record buffer") with a number of follow-up commits to fix some painful fallout from that conversion. Over all, it took a couple of months to sort out most of it. But the upside was that you could have concurrent readers (and writers) of the kernel log and not have lines with mixed output in them. And one particular pain-point for the record-based kernel logging was exactly the fragmentary lines that are generated in smaller chunks. In order to still log them as one recrod, the continuation lines need to be attached to the previous record properly. However the explicit continuation record marker that is actually useful for this exact case was actually removed in aroundm the same time by commit 61e99ab8e35a ("printk: remove the now unnecessary "C" annotation for KERN_CONT") due to the incorrect belief that KERN_CONT wasn't meaningful. The ambiguity between "is this a continuation line" or "is this a plain printk with no log level information" was reintroduced, and in fact became an even bigger pain point because there was now the whole record-level merging of kernel messages going on. This patch reinstates the KERN_CONT as a real non-empty string marker, so that the ambiguity is fixed once again. But it's not a plain revert of that original removal: in the four years since we made KERN_CONT an empty string again, not only has the format of the log level markers changed, we've also had some usage changes in this area. For example, some ACPI code seems to use KERN_CONT _together_ with a log level, and now uses both the KERN_CONT marker and (for example) a KERN_INFO marker to show that it's an informational continuation of a line. Which is actually not a bad idea - if the continuation line cannot be attached to its predecessor, without the log level information we don't know what log level to assign to it (and we traditionally just assigned it the default loglevel). So having both a log level and the KERN_CONT marker is not necessarily a bad idea, but it does mean that we need to actually iterate over potentially multiple markers, rather than just a single one. Also, since KERN_CONT was still conceptually needed, and encouraged, but didn't actually _do_ anything, we've also had the reverse problem: rather than having too many annotations it has too few, and there is bit rot with code that no longer marks the continuation lines with the KERN_CONT marker. So this patch not only re-instates the non-empty KERN_CONT marker, it also fixes up the cases of bit-rot I noticed in my own logs. There are probably other cases where KERN_CONT will be needed to be added, either because it is new code that never dealt with the need for KERN_CONT, or old code that has bitrotted without anybody noticing. That said, we should strive to avoid the need for KERN_CONT. It does result in real problems for logging, and should generally not be seen as a good feature. If we some day can get rid of the feature entirely, because nobody does any fragmented printk calls, that would be lovely. But until that point, let's at mark the code that relies on the hacky multi-fragment kernel printk's. Not only does it avoid the ambiguity, it also annotates code as "maybe this would be good to fix some day". (That said, particularly during single-threaded bootup, the downsides of KERN_CONT are very limited. Things get much hairier when you have multiple threads going on and user level reading and writing logs too). Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-09 10:32:40 +07:00
printk(KERN_CONT ", %d sens, %d cats", p->p_levels.nprim,
p->p_cats.nprim);
printk: reinstate KERN_CONT for printing continuation lines Long long ago the kernel log buffer was a buffered stream of bytes, very much like stdio in user space. It supported log levels by scanning the stream and noticing the log level markers at the beginning of each line, but if you wanted to print a partial line in multiple chunks, you just did multiple printk() calls, and it just automatically worked. Except when it didn't, and you had very confusing output when different lines got all mixed up with each other. Then you got fragment lines mixing with each other, or with non-fragment lines, because it was traditionally impossible to tell whether a printk() call was a continuation or not. To at least help clarify the issue of continuation lines, we added a KERN_CONT marker back in 2007 to mark continuation lines: 474925277671 ("printk: add KERN_CONT annotation"). That continuation marker was initially an empty string, and didn't actuall make any semantic difference. But it at least made it possible to annotate the source code, and have check-patch notice that a printk() didn't need or want a log level marker, because it was a continuation of a previous line. To avoid the ambiguity between a continuation line that had that KERN_CONT marker, and a printk with no level information at all, we then in 2009 made KERN_CONT be a real log level marker which meant that we could now reliably tell the difference between the two cases. 5fd29d6ccbc9 ("printk: clean up handling of log-levels and newlines") and we could take advantage of that to make sure we didn't mix up continuation lines with lines that just didn't have any loglevel at all. Then, in 2012, the kernel log buffer was changed to be a "record" based log, where each line was a record that has a loglevel and a timestamp. You can see the beginning of that conversion in commits e11fea92e13f ("kmsg: export printk records to the /dev/kmsg interface") 7ff9554bb578 ("printk: convert byte-buffer to variable-length record buffer") with a number of follow-up commits to fix some painful fallout from that conversion. Over all, it took a couple of months to sort out most of it. But the upside was that you could have concurrent readers (and writers) of the kernel log and not have lines with mixed output in them. And one particular pain-point for the record-based kernel logging was exactly the fragmentary lines that are generated in smaller chunks. In order to still log them as one recrod, the continuation lines need to be attached to the previous record properly. However the explicit continuation record marker that is actually useful for this exact case was actually removed in aroundm the same time by commit 61e99ab8e35a ("printk: remove the now unnecessary "C" annotation for KERN_CONT") due to the incorrect belief that KERN_CONT wasn't meaningful. The ambiguity between "is this a continuation line" or "is this a plain printk with no log level information" was reintroduced, and in fact became an even bigger pain point because there was now the whole record-level merging of kernel messages going on. This patch reinstates the KERN_CONT as a real non-empty string marker, so that the ambiguity is fixed once again. But it's not a plain revert of that original removal: in the four years since we made KERN_CONT an empty string again, not only has the format of the log level markers changed, we've also had some usage changes in this area. For example, some ACPI code seems to use KERN_CONT _together_ with a log level, and now uses both the KERN_CONT marker and (for example) a KERN_INFO marker to show that it's an informational continuation of a line. Which is actually not a bad idea - if the continuation line cannot be attached to its predecessor, without the log level information we don't know what log level to assign to it (and we traditionally just assigned it the default loglevel). So having both a log level and the KERN_CONT marker is not necessarily a bad idea, but it does mean that we need to actually iterate over potentially multiple markers, rather than just a single one. Also, since KERN_CONT was still conceptually needed, and encouraged, but didn't actually _do_ anything, we've also had the reverse problem: rather than having too many annotations it has too few, and there is bit rot with code that no longer marks the continuation lines with the KERN_CONT marker. So this patch not only re-instates the non-empty KERN_CONT marker, it also fixes up the cases of bit-rot I noticed in my own logs. There are probably other cases where KERN_CONT will be needed to be added, either because it is new code that never dealt with the need for KERN_CONT, or old code that has bitrotted without anybody noticing. That said, we should strive to avoid the need for KERN_CONT. It does result in real problems for logging, and should generally not be seen as a good feature. If we some day can get rid of the feature entirely, because nobody does any fragmented printk calls, that would be lovely. But until that point, let's at mark the code that relies on the hacky multi-fragment kernel printk's. Not only does it avoid the ambiguity, it also annotates code as "maybe this would be good to fix some day". (That said, particularly during single-threaded bootup, the downsides of KERN_CONT are very limited. Things get much hairier when you have multiple threads going on and user level reading and writing logs too). Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-09 10:32:40 +07:00
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %d classes, %d rules\n",
p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules");
symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab);
#endif
rc = -ENOMEM;
p->class_val_to_struct =
kzalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(*(p->class_val_to_struct)),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->class_val_to_struct)
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
p->role_val_to_struct =
kzalloc(p->p_roles.nprim * sizeof(*(p->role_val_to_struct)),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->role_val_to_struct)
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
p->user_val_to_struct =
kzalloc(p->p_users.nprim * sizeof(*(p->user_val_to_struct)),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->user_val_to_struct)
goto out;
/* Yes, I want the sizeof the pointer, not the structure */
rc = -ENOMEM;
p->type_val_to_struct_array = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct type_datum *),
p->p_types.nprim,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!p->type_val_to_struct_array)
goto out;
rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_val_to_struct_array, 0,
p->p_types.nprim, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (rc)
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
goto out;
rc = cond_init_bool_indexes(p);
if (rc)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
p->sym_val_to_name[i] = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(char *),
p->symtab[i].nprim,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!p->sym_val_to_name[i])
goto out;
rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->sym_val_to_name[i],
0, p->symtab[i].nprim,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, index_f[i], p);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
/*
* The following *_destroy functions are used to
* free any memory allocated for each kind of
* symbol data in the policy database.
*/
static int perm_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
kfree(key);
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
struct common_datum *comdatum;
kfree(key);
if (datum) {
comdatum = datum;
hashtab_map(comdatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
hashtab_destroy(comdatum->permissions.table);
}
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
static void constraint_expr_destroy(struct constraint_expr *expr)
{
if (expr) {
ebitmap_destroy(&expr->names);
if (expr->type_names) {
ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->types);
ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->negset);
kfree(expr->type_names);
}
kfree(expr);
}
}
static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
struct class_datum *cladatum;
struct constraint_node *constraint, *ctemp;
struct constraint_expr *e, *etmp;
kfree(key);
if (datum) {
cladatum = datum;
hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
hashtab_destroy(cladatum->permissions.table);
constraint = cladatum->constraints;
while (constraint) {
e = constraint->expr;
while (e) {
etmp = e;
e = e->next;
constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
}
ctemp = constraint;
constraint = constraint->next;
kfree(ctemp);
}
constraint = cladatum->validatetrans;
while (constraint) {
e = constraint->expr;
while (e) {
etmp = e;
e = e->next;
constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
}
ctemp = constraint;
constraint = constraint->next;
kfree(ctemp);
}
kfree(cladatum->comkey);
}
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
static int role_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
struct role_datum *role;
kfree(key);
if (datum) {
role = datum;
ebitmap_destroy(&role->dominates);
ebitmap_destroy(&role->types);
}
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
static int type_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
kfree(key);
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
static int user_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
kfree(key);
if (datum) {
usrdatum = datum;
ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->roles);
ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[0].cat);
ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[1].cat);
ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->dfltlevel.cat);
}
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
static int sens_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
struct level_datum *levdatum;
kfree(key);
if (datum) {
levdatum = datum;
ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
kfree(levdatum->level);
}
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
static int cat_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
kfree(key);
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
{
common_destroy,
cls_destroy,
role_destroy,
type_destroy,
user_destroy,
cond_destroy_bool,
sens_destroy,
cat_destroy,
};
static int filenametr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
struct filename_trans *ft = key;
kfree(ft->name);
kfree(key);
kfree(datum);
cond_resched();
return 0;
}
static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
struct mls_range *rt = datum;
kfree(key);
ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[0].cat);
ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[1].cat);
kfree(datum);
cond_resched();
return 0;
}
static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i)
{
if (!c)
return;
context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
context_destroy(&c->context[1]);
if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS ||
i == OCON_NETIF || i == OCON_FSUSE)
kfree(c->u.name);
kfree(c);
}
/*
* Free any memory allocated by a policy database structure.
*/
void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
{
struct ocontext *c, *ctmp;
struct genfs *g, *gtmp;
int i;
struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL;
struct role_trans *tr, *ltr = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
cond_resched();
hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, destroy_f[i], NULL);
hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
}
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
if (p->sym_val_to_name[i])
flex_array_free(p->sym_val_to_name[i]);
}
kfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
kfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
kfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
if (p->type_val_to_struct_array)
flex_array_free(p->type_val_to_struct_array);
avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
for (i = 0; i < OCON_NUM; i++) {
cond_resched();
c = p->ocontexts[i];
while (c) {
ctmp = c;
c = c->next;
ocontext_destroy(ctmp, i);
}
p->ocontexts[i] = NULL;
}
g = p->genfs;
while (g) {
cond_resched();
kfree(g->fstype);
c = g->head;
while (c) {
ctmp = c;
c = c->next;
ocontext_destroy(ctmp, OCON_FSUSE);
}
gtmp = g;
g = g->next;
kfree(gtmp);
}
p->genfs = NULL;
cond_policydb_destroy(p);
for (tr = p->role_tr; tr; tr = tr->next) {
cond_resched();
kfree(ltr);
ltr = tr;
}
kfree(ltr);
for (ra = p->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
cond_resched();
kfree(lra);
lra = ra;
}
kfree(lra);
hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, filenametr_destroy, NULL);
hashtab_destroy(p->filename_trans);
hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_tr_destroy, NULL);
hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
if (p->type_attr_map_array) {
for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
struct ebitmap *e;
e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i);
if (!e)
continue;
ebitmap_destroy(e);
}
flex_array_free(p->type_attr_map_array);
}
ebitmap_destroy(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
return;
}
/*
* Load the initial SIDs specified in a policy database
* structure into a SID table.
*/
int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
{
struct ocontext *head, *c;
int rc;
rc = sidtab_init(s);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: out of memory on SID table init\n");
goto out;
}
head = p->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
for (c = head; c; c = c->next) {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!c->context[0].user) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: SID %s was never defined.\n",
c->u.name);
goto out;
}
rc = sidtab_insert(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0]);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
c->u.name);
goto out;
}
}
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class)
{
if (!class || class > p->p_classes.nprim)
return 0;
return 1;
}
int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role)
{
if (!role || role > p->p_roles.nprim)
return 0;
return 1;
}
int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type)
{
if (!type || type > p->p_types.nprim)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Return 1 if the fields in the security context
* structure `c' are valid. Return 0 otherwise.
*/
int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
{
struct role_datum *role;
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
if (!c->role || c->role > p->p_roles.nprim)
return 0;
if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
return 0;
if (!c->type || c->type > p->p_types.nprim)
return 0;
if (c->role != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
/*
* Role must be authorized for the type.
*/
role = p->role_val_to_struct[c->role - 1];
if (!role || !ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, c->type - 1))
/* role may not be associated with type */
return 0;
/*
* User must be authorized for the role.
*/
usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
if (!usrdatum)
return 0;
if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&usrdatum->roles, c->role - 1))
/* user may not be associated with role */
return 0;
}
if (!mls_context_isvalid(p, c))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Read a MLS range structure from a policydb binary
* representation file.
*/
static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
{
__le32 buf[2];
u32 items;
int rc;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
items = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: range overflow\n");
goto out;
}
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * items);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: truncated range\n");
goto out;
}
r->level[0].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (items > 1)
r->level[1].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
else
r->level[1].sens = r->level[0].sens;
rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading low categories\n");
goto out;
}
if (items > 1) {
rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading high categories\n");
goto bad_high;
}
} else {
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&r->level[1].cat, &r->level[0].cat);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: out of memory\n");
goto bad_high;
}
}
return 0;
bad_high:
ebitmap_destroy(&r->level[0].cat);
out:
return rc;
}
/*
* Read and validate a security context structure
* from a policydb binary representation file.
*/
static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c,
struct policydb *p,
void *fp)
{
__le32 buf[3];
int rc;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: context truncated\n");
goto out;
}
c->user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
c->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
c->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
rc = mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: error reading MLS range of context\n");
goto out;
}
}
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(p, c)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: invalid security context\n");
context_destroy(c);
goto out;
}
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
/*
* The following *_read functions are used to
* read the symbol data from a policy database
* binary representation file.
*/
static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
{
int rc;
char *str;
if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
return -EINVAL;
str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
/* it's expected the caller should free the str */
*strp = str;
rc = next_entry(str, fp, len);
if (rc)
return rc;
str[len] = '\0';
return 0;
}
static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct perm_datum *perdatum;
int rc;
__le32 buf[2];
u32 len;
rc = -ENOMEM;
perdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*perdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!perdatum)
goto bad;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, perdatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
return 0;
bad:
perm_destroy(key, perdatum, NULL);
return rc;
}
static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct common_datum *comdatum;
__le32 buf[4];
u32 len, nel;
int i, rc;
rc = -ENOMEM;
comdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!comdatum)
goto bad;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE);
if (rc)
goto bad;
comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
rc = perm_read(p, comdatum->permissions.table, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, comdatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
return 0;
bad:
common_destroy(key, comdatum, NULL);
return rc;
}
static void type_set_init(struct type_set *t)
{
ebitmap_init(&t->types);
ebitmap_init(&t->negset);
}
static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
{
__le32 buf[1];
int rc;
if (ebitmap_read(&t->types, fp))
return -EINVAL;
if (ebitmap_read(&t->negset, fp))
return -EINVAL;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc < 0)
return -EINVAL;
t->flags = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
return 0;
}
static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p,
struct constraint_node **nodep,
int ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp)
{
struct constraint_node *c, *lc;
struct constraint_expr *e, *le;
__le32 buf[3];
u32 nexpr;
int rc, i, j, depth;
lc = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < ncons; i++) {
c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!c)
return -ENOMEM;
if (lc)
lc->next = c;
else
*nodep = c;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
if (rc)
return rc;
c->permissions = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
nexpr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
le = NULL;
depth = -1;
for (j = 0; j < nexpr; j++) {
e = kzalloc(sizeof(*e), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!e)
return -ENOMEM;
if (le)
le->next = e;
else
c->expr = e;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 3));
if (rc)
return rc;
e->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
e->attr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
e->op = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
switch (e->expr_type) {
case CEXPR_NOT:
if (depth < 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case CEXPR_AND:
case CEXPR_OR:
if (depth < 1)
return -EINVAL;
depth--;
break;
case CEXPR_ATTR:
if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
return -EINVAL;
depth++;
break;
case CEXPR_NAMES:
if (!allowxtarget && (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET))
return -EINVAL;
if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
return -EINVAL;
depth++;
rc = ebitmap_read(&e->names, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (p->policyvers >=
POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
e->type_names = kzalloc(sizeof
(*e->type_names),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!e->type_names)
return -ENOMEM;
type_set_init(e->type_names);
rc = type_set_read(e->type_names, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
le = e;
}
if (depth != 0)
return -EINVAL;
lc = c;
}
return 0;
}
static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct class_datum *cladatum;
__le32 buf[6];
u32 len, len2, ncons, nel;
int i, rc;
rc = -ENOMEM;
cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cladatum)
goto bad;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*6);
if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
cladatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE);
if (rc)
goto bad;
cladatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
if (len2) {
rc = str_read(&cladatum->comkey, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len2);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = -EINVAL;
cladatum->comdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_commons.table, cladatum->comkey);
if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unknown common %s\n", cladatum->comkey);
goto bad;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
rc = perm_read(p, cladatum->permissions.table, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS) {
/* grab the validatetrans rules */
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto bad;
ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->validatetrans,
ncons, 1, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/range When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role, and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file) examples always are done with directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 [no rule] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none [default user source] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source [default user target] system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target [default role source] unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source [default role target] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target [default range source low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low [default range source high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high [default range source low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high [default range target low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low [default range target high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high [default range target low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-03-21 01:35:12 +07:00
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
if (rc)
goto bad;
cladatum->default_user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
cladatum->default_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
cladatum->default_range = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
}
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1);
if (rc)
goto bad;
cladatum->default_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
}
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, cladatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
return 0;
bad:
cls_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
return rc;
}
static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct role_datum *role;
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
int rc, to_read = 2;
__le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
rc = -ENOMEM;
role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!role)
goto bad;
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
to_read = 3;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
role->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
role->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = ebitmap_read(&role->dominates, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = ebitmap_read(&role->types, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
if (strcmp(key, OBJECT_R) == 0) {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Role %s has wrong value %d\n",
OBJECT_R, role->value);
goto bad;
}
rc = 0;
goto bad;
}
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, role);
if (rc)
goto bad;
return 0;
bad:
role_destroy(key, role, NULL);
return rc;
}
static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct type_datum *typdatum;
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
int rc, to_read = 3;
__le32 buf[4];
u32 len;
rc = -ENOMEM;
typdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*typdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!typdatum)
goto bad;
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
to_read = 4;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
typdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
u32 prop = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
if (prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY)
typdatum->primary = 1;
if (prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE)
typdatum->attribute = 1;
typdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
} else {
typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
}
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, typdatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
return 0;
bad:
type_destroy(key, typdatum, NULL);
return rc;
}
/*
* Read a MLS level structure from a policydb binary
* representation file.
*/
static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, void *fp)
{
__le32 buf[1];
int rc;
memset(lp, 0, sizeof(*lp));
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: truncated level\n");
return rc;
}
lp->sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
rc = ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading level categories\n");
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
int rc, to_read = 2;
__le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
rc = -ENOMEM;
usrdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*usrdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!usrdatum)
goto bad;
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
to_read = 3;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
usrdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
usrdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = ebitmap_read(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
rc = mls_read_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = mls_read_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, usrdatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
return 0;
bad:
user_destroy(key, usrdatum, NULL);
return rc;
}
static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct level_datum *levdatum;
int rc;
__le32 buf[2];
u32 len;
rc = -ENOMEM;
levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!levdatum)
goto bad;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_ATOMIC, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = -ENOMEM;
levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mls_level), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!levdatum->level)
goto bad;
rc = mls_read_level(levdatum->level, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, levdatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
return 0;
bad:
sens_destroy(key, levdatum, NULL);
return rc;
}
static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct cat_datum *catdatum;
int rc;
__le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
rc = -ENOMEM;
catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!catdatum)
goto bad;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_ATOMIC, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, catdatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
return 0;
bad:
cat_destroy(key, catdatum, NULL);
return rc;
}
static int (*read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) =
{
common_read,
class_read,
role_read,
type_read,
user_read,
cond_read_bool,
sens_read,
cat_read,
};
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
{
struct user_datum *upper, *user;
struct policydb *p = datap;
int depth = 0;
upper = user = datum;
while (upper->bounds) {
struct ebitmap_node *node;
unsigned long bit;
if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: user %s: "
"too deep or looped boundary",
(char *) key);
return -EINVAL;
}
upper = p->user_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, node, bit) {
if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->roles, bit))
continue;
printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
"user=%s role=%s bounds=%s\n",
sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, user->value - 1),
sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, bit),
sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, upper->value - 1));
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
{
struct role_datum *upper, *role;
struct policydb *p = datap;
int depth = 0;
upper = role = datum;
while (upper->bounds) {
struct ebitmap_node *node;
unsigned long bit;
if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: role %s: "
"too deep or looped bounds\n",
(char *) key);
return -EINVAL;
}
upper = p->role_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, node, bit) {
if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->types, bit))
continue;
printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
"role=%s type=%s bounds=%s\n",
sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, role->value - 1),
sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, bit),
sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, upper->value - 1));
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
{
struct type_datum *upper;
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
struct policydb *p = datap;
int depth = 0;
upper = datum;
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
while (upper->bounds) {
if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type %s: "
"too deep or looped boundary\n",
(char *) key);
return -EINVAL;
}
upper = flex_array_get_ptr(p->type_val_to_struct_array,
upper->bounds - 1);
BUG_ON(!upper);
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
if (upper->attribute) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type %s: "
"bounded by attribute %s",
(char *) key,
sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, upper->value - 1));
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int policydb_bounds_sanity_check(struct policydb *p)
{
int rc;
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
return 0;
rc = hashtab_map(p->p_users.table,
user_bounds_sanity_check, p);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = hashtab_map(p->p_roles.table,
role_bounds_sanity_check, p);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = hashtab_map(p->p_types.table,
type_bounds_sanity_check, p);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-01 00:37:50 +07:00
u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name)
{
struct class_datum *cladatum;
cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, name);
if (!cladatum)
return 0;
return cladatum->value;
}
u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name)
{
struct class_datum *cladatum;
struct perm_datum *perdatum = NULL;
struct common_datum *comdatum;
if (!tclass || tclass > p->p_classes.nprim)
return 0;
cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass-1];
comdatum = cladatum->comdatum;
if (comdatum)
perdatum = hashtab_search(comdatum->permissions.table,
name);
if (!perdatum)
perdatum = hashtab_search(cladatum->permissions.table,
name);
if (!perdatum)
return 0;
return 1U << (perdatum->value-1);
}
static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
struct range_trans *rt = NULL;
struct mls_range *r = NULL;
int i, rc;
__le32 buf[2];
u32 nel;
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS)
return 0;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
rt = kzalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rt)
goto out;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
if (rc)
goto out;
rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
} else
rt->target_class = p->process_class;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) ||
!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) ||
!policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class))
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!r)
goto out;
rc = mls_read_range_helper(r, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: rangetrans: invalid range\n");
goto out;
}
rc = hashtab_insert(p->range_tr, rt, r);
if (rc)
goto out;
rt = NULL;
r = NULL;
}
hash_eval(p->range_tr, "rangetr");
rc = 0;
out:
kfree(rt);
kfree(r);
return rc;
}
static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
struct filename_trans *ft;
struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
char *name;
u32 nel, len;
__le32 buf[4];
int rc, i;
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
return 0;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
return rc;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
ft = NULL;
otype = NULL;
name = NULL;
rc = -ENOMEM;
ft = kzalloc(sizeof(*ft), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ft)
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
otype = kmalloc(sizeof(*otype), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!otype)
goto out;
/* length of the path component string */
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
/* path component string */
rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
ft->name = name;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
if (rc)
goto out;
ft->stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
ft->ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
ft->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
otype->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ft->ttype, 1);
if (rc)
goto out;
SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy Hello. I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 . [ 681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak) Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing ebitmap_set_bit() call. ---------- >>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks memory if hashtab_insert() returns error. unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8): comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5 W...kkk. backtrace: [<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360 [<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70 [<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500 [<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750 [<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0 [<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will show below message and the boot sequence freezes. systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-01-06 19:28:15 +07:00
rc = hashtab_insert(p->filename_trans, ft, otype);
if (rc) {
/*
* Do not return -EEXIST to the caller, or the system
* will not boot.
*/
if (rc != -EEXIST)
goto out;
/* But free memory to avoid memory leak. */
kfree(ft);
kfree(name);
kfree(otype);
}
}
hash_eval(p->filename_trans, "filenametr");
return 0;
out:
kfree(ft);
kfree(name);
kfree(otype);
return rc;
}
static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
int i, j, rc;
u32 nel, nel2, len, len2;
__le32 buf[1];
struct ocontext *l, *c;
struct ocontext *newc = NULL;
struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs;
struct genfs *newgenfs = NULL;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
rc = -ENOMEM;
newgenfs = kzalloc(sizeof(*newgenfs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!newgenfs)
goto out;
rc = str_read(&newgenfs->fstype, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs fstype %s\n",
newgenfs->fstype);
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0)
break;
}
newgenfs->next = genfs;
if (genfs_p)
genfs_p->next = newgenfs;
else
p->genfs = newgenfs;
genfs = newgenfs;
newgenfs = NULL;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
rc = -ENOMEM;
newc = kzalloc(sizeof(*newc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!newc)
goto out;
rc = str_read(&newc->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
for (l = NULL, c = genfs->head; c;
l = c, c = c->next) {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
(!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs entry (%s,%s)\n",
genfs->fstype, c->u.name);
goto out;
}
len = strlen(newc->u.name);
len2 = strlen(c->u.name);
if (len > len2)
break;
}
newc->next = c;
if (l)
l->next = newc;
else
genfs->head = newc;
newc = NULL;
}
}
rc = 0;
out:
if (newgenfs)
kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
kfree(newgenfs);
ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
return rc;
}
static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
void *fp)
{
int i, j, rc;
u32 nel, len;
__le32 buf[3];
struct ocontext *l, *c;
u32 nodebuf[8];
for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
l = NULL;
for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!c)
goto out;
if (l)
l->next = c;
else
p->ocontexts[i] = c;
l = c;
switch (i) {
case OCON_ISID:
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
break;
case OCON_FS:
case OCON_NETIF:
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
break;
case OCON_PORT:
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
if (rc)
goto out;
c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
break;
case OCON_NODE:
rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
if (rc)
goto out;
c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */
c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */
rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
break;
case OCON_FSUSE:
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
/* Determined at runtime, not in policy DB. */
if (c->v.behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
goto out;
if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX)
goto out;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
break;
case OCON_NODE6: {
int k;
rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
if (rc)
goto out;
for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k];
for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4];
rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
break;
}
}
}
}
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
/*
* Read the configuration data from a policy database binary
* representation file into a policy database structure.
*/
int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
struct role_allow *ra, *lra;
struct role_trans *tr, *ltr;
int i, j, rc;
__le32 buf[4];
u32 len, nprim, nel;
char *policydb_str;
struct policydb_compat_info *info;
rc = policydb_init(p);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* Read the magic number and string length. */
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (le32_to_cpu(buf[0]) != POLICYDB_MAGIC) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb magic number 0x%x does "
"not match expected magic number 0x%x\n",
le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_MAGIC);
goto bad;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
if (len != strlen(POLICYDB_STRING)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb string length %d does not "
"match expected length %zu\n",
len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
goto bad;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!policydb_str) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to allocate memory for policydb "
"string of length %d\n", len);
goto bad;
}
rc = next_entry(policydb_str, fp, len);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: truncated policydb string identifier\n");
kfree(policydb_str);
goto bad;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
policydb_str[len] = '\0';
if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb string %s does not match "
"my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
kfree(policydb_str);
goto bad;
}
/* Done with policydb_str. */
kfree(policydb_str);
policydb_str = NULL;
/* Read the version and table sizes. */
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*4);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = -EINVAL;
p->policyvers = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN ||
p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb version %d does not match "
"my version range %d-%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN, POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
goto bad;
}
if ((le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS)) {
p->mls_enabled = 1;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: security policydb version %d "
"(MLS) not backwards compatible\n",
p->policyvers);
goto bad;
}
}
p->reject_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & REJECT_UNKNOWN);
p->allow_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & ALLOW_UNKNOWN);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
rc = ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
rc = ebitmap_read(&p->permissive_map, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
if (!info) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to find policy compat info "
"for version %d\n", p->policyvers);
goto bad;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
if (le32_to_cpu(buf[2]) != info->sym_num ||
le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
"not match mine (%d,%d)\n", le32_to_cpu(buf[2]),
le32_to_cpu(buf[3]),
info->sym_num, info->ocon_num);
goto bad;
}
for (i = 0; i < info->sym_num; i++) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
if (rc)
goto bad;
nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
rc = read_f[i](p, p->symtab[i].table, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
p->symtab[i].nprim = nprim;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
p->process_class = string_to_security_class(p, "process");
if (!p->process_class)
goto bad;
rc = avtab_read(&p->te_avtab, fp, p);
if (rc)
goto bad;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL) {
rc = cond_read_list(p, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto bad;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
ltr = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
tr = kzalloc(sizeof(*tr), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tr)
goto bad;
if (ltr)
ltr->next = tr;
else
p->role_tr = tr;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = -EINVAL;
tr->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
tr->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
tr->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto bad;
tr->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
} else
tr->tclass = p->process_class;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->role) ||
!policydb_type_isvalid(p, tr->type) ||
!policydb_class_isvalid(p, tr->tclass) ||
!policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->new_role))
goto bad;
ltr = tr;
}
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto bad;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
lra = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
ra = kzalloc(sizeof(*ra), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ra)
goto bad;
if (lra)
lra->next = ra;
else
p->role_allow = ra;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = -EINVAL;
ra->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
ra->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->role) ||
!policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->new_role))
goto bad;
lra = ra;
}
rc = filename_trans_read(p, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = policydb_index(p);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = -EINVAL;
p->process_trans_perms = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "transition");
p->process_trans_perms |= string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "dyntransition");
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-01 00:37:50 +07:00
if (!p->process_trans_perms)
goto bad;
rc = ocontext_read(p, info, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = genfs_read(p, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = range_read(p, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = -ENOMEM;
p->type_attr_map_array = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct ebitmap),
p->p_types.nprim,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!p->type_attr_map_array)
goto bad;
/* preallocate so we don't have to worry about the put ever failing */
rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_attr_map_array, 0, p->p_types.nprim,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (rc)
goto bad;
for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
struct ebitmap *e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i);
BUG_ON(!e);
ebitmap_init(e);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
rc = ebitmap_read(e, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
/* add the type itself as the degenerate case */
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(e, i, 1);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 14:35:57 +07:00
rc = policydb_bounds_sanity_check(p);
if (rc)
goto bad;
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
bad:
policydb_destroy(p);
goto out;
}
/*
* Write a MLS level structure to a policydb binary
* representation file.
*/
static int mls_write_level(struct mls_level *l, void *fp)
{
__le32 buf[1];
int rc;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(l->sens);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = ebitmap_write(&l->cat, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
/*
* Write a MLS range structure to a policydb binary
* representation file.
*/
static int mls_write_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
{
__le32 buf[3];
size_t items;
int rc, eq;
eq = mls_level_eq(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]);
if (eq)
items = 2;
else
items = 3;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(items-1);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[0].sens);
if (!eq)
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[1].sens);
BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (!eq) {
rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
static int sens_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
{
char *key = vkey;
struct level_datum *levdatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
void *fp = pd->fp;
__le32 buf[2];
size_t len;
int rc;
len = strlen(key);
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(levdatum->isalias);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = mls_write_level(levdatum->level, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
static int cat_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
{
char *key = vkey;
struct cat_datum *catdatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
void *fp = pd->fp;
__le32 buf[3];
size_t len;
int rc;
len = strlen(key);
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->value);
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->isalias);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
static int role_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
struct role_trans *r = p->role_tr;
struct role_trans *tr;
u32 buf[3];
size_t nel;
int rc;
nel = 0;
for (tr = r; tr; tr = tr->next)
nel++;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
for (tr = r; tr; tr = tr->next) {
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(tr->role);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(tr->type);
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(tr->new_role);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(tr->tclass);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int role_allow_write(struct role_allow *r, void *fp)
{
struct role_allow *ra;
u32 buf[2];
size_t nel;
int rc;
nel = 0;
for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next)
nel++;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next) {
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ra->role);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ra->new_role);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Write a security context structure
* to a policydb binary representation file.
*/
static int context_write(struct policydb *p, struct context *c,
void *fp)
{
int rc;
__le32 buf[3];
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->user);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->role);
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->type);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = mls_write_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
/*
* The following *_write functions are used to
* write the symbol data to a policy database
* binary representation file.
*/
static int perm_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *fp)
{
char *key = vkey;
struct perm_datum *perdatum = datum;
__le32 buf[2];
size_t len;
int rc;
len = strlen(key);
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(perdatum->value);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
static int common_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
{
char *key = vkey;
struct common_datum *comdatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
void *fp = pd->fp;
__le32 buf[4];
size_t len;
int rc;
len = strlen(key);
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->value);
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.nprim);
buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.table->nel);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = hashtab_map(comdatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
static int type_set_write(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
{
int rc;
__le32 buf[1];
if (ebitmap_write(&t->types, fp))
return -EINVAL;
if (ebitmap_write(&t->negset, fp))
return -EINVAL;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(t->flags);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node,
void *fp)
{
struct constraint_node *c;
struct constraint_expr *e;
__le32 buf[3];
u32 nel;
int rc;
for (c = node; c; c = c->next) {
nel = 0;
for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next)
nel++;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->permissions);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next) {
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(e->expr_type);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(e->attr);
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(e->op);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
switch (e->expr_type) {
case CEXPR_NAMES:
rc = ebitmap_write(&e->names, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (p->policyvers >=
POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
rc = type_set_write(e->type_names, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
static int class_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
{
char *key = vkey;
struct class_datum *cladatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
void *fp = pd->fp;
struct policydb *p = pd->p;
struct constraint_node *c;
__le32 buf[6];
u32 ncons;
size_t len, len2;
int rc;
len = strlen(key);
if (cladatum->comkey)
len2 = strlen(cladatum->comkey);
else
len2 = 0;
ncons = 0;
for (c = cladatum->constraints; c; c = c->next)
ncons++;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len2);
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->value);
buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.nprim);
if (cladatum->permissions.table)
buf[4] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.table->nel);
else
buf[4] = 0;
buf[5] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 6, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (cladatum->comkey) {
rc = put_entry(cladatum->comkey, 1, len2, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->constraints, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* write out the validatetrans rule */
ncons = 0;
for (c = cladatum->validatetrans; c; c = c->next)
ncons++;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->validatetrans, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/range When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role, and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file) examples always are done with directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 [no rule] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none [default user source] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source [default user target] system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target [default role source] unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source [default role target] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target [default range source low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low [default range source high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high [default range source low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high [default range target low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low [default range target high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high [default range target low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-03-21 01:35:12 +07:00
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_user);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_role);
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_range);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 3, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_type);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
static int role_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
{
char *key = vkey;
struct role_datum *role = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
void *fp = pd->fp;
struct policydb *p = pd->p;
__le32 buf[3];
size_t items, len;
int rc;
len = strlen(key);
items = 0;
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->value);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->bounds);
BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = ebitmap_write(&role->dominates, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = ebitmap_write(&role->types, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
static int type_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
{
char *key = vkey;
struct type_datum *typdatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
struct policydb *p = pd->p;
void *fp = pd->fp;
__le32 buf[4];
int rc;
size_t items, len;
len = strlen(key);
items = 0;
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->value);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
u32 properties = 0;
if (typdatum->primary)
properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY;
if (typdatum->attribute)
properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE;
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(properties);
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->bounds);
} else {
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->primary);
}
BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
static int user_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
{
char *key = vkey;
struct user_datum *usrdatum = datum;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
struct policydb *p = pd->p;
void *fp = pd->fp;
__le32 buf[3];
size_t items, len;
int rc;
len = strlen(key);
items = 0;
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->value);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->bounds);
BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = ebitmap_write(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = mls_write_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = mls_write_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
static int (*write_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum,
void *datap) =
{
common_write,
class_write,
role_write,
type_write,
user_write,
cond_write_bool,
sens_write,
cat_write,
};
static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
void *fp)
{
unsigned int i, j, rc;
size_t nel, len;
__le32 buf[3];
u32 nodebuf[8];
struct ocontext *c;
for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
nel = 0;
for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next)
nel++;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next) {
switch (i) {
case OCON_ISID:
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->sid[0]);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
break;
case OCON_FS:
case OCON_NETIF:
len = strlen(c->u.name);
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = context_write(p, &c->context[1], fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
break;
case OCON_PORT:
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.protocol);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.low_port);
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.high_port);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
break;
case OCON_NODE:
nodebuf[0] = c->u.node.addr; /* network order */
nodebuf[1] = c->u.node.mask; /* network order */
rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
break;
case OCON_FSUSE:
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.behavior);
len = strlen(c->u.name);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
break;
case OCON_NODE6:
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
nodebuf[j] = c->u.node6.addr[j]; /* network order */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
nodebuf[j + 4] = c->u.node6.mask[j]; /* network order */
rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 8, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
break;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
static int genfs_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
struct genfs *genfs;
struct ocontext *c;
size_t len;
__le32 buf[1];
int rc;
len = 0;
for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next)
len++;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
len = strlen(genfs->fstype);
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(genfs->fstype, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
len = 0;
for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next)
len++;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
len = strlen(c->u.name);
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.sclass);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int hashtab_cnt(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
{
int *cnt = ptr;
*cnt = *cnt + 1;
return 0;
}
static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
{
__le32 buf[2];
struct range_trans *rt = key;
struct mls_range *r = data;
struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
void *fp = pd->fp;
struct policydb *p = pd->p;
int rc;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->source_type);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_type);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_class);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
rc = mls_write_range_helper(r, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
__le32 buf[1];
int rc, nel;
struct policy_data pd;
pd.p = p;
pd.fp = fp;
/* count the number of entries in the hashtab */
nel = 0;
rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, hashtab_cnt, &nel);
if (rc)
return rc;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* actually write all of the entries */
rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_write_helper, &pd);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
{
__le32 buf[4];
struct filename_trans *ft = key;
struct filename_trans_datum *otype = data;
void *fp = ptr;
int rc;
u32 len;
len = strlen(ft->name);
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ft->stype);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(otype->otype);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
u32 nel;
__le32 buf[1];
int rc;
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
return 0;
nel = 0;
rc = hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, hashtab_cnt, &nel);
if (rc)
return rc;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, filename_write_helper, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
/*
* Write the configuration data in a policy database
* structure to a policy database binary representation
* file.
*/
int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
unsigned int i, num_syms;
int rc;
__le32 buf[4];
u32 config;
size_t len;
struct policydb_compat_info *info;
/*
* refuse to write policy older than compressed avtab
* to simplify the writer. There are other tests dropped
* since we assume this throughout the writer code. Be
* careful if you ever try to remove this restriction
*/
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d."
" Because it is less than version %d\n", p->policyvers,
POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB);
return -EINVAL;
}
config = 0;
if (p->mls_enabled)
config |= POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS;
if (p->reject_unknown)
config |= REJECT_UNKNOWN;
if (p->allow_unknown)
config |= ALLOW_UNKNOWN;
/* Write the magic number and string identifiers. */
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(POLICYDB_MAGIC);
len = strlen(POLICYDB_STRING);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(POLICYDB_STRING, 1, len, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* Write the version, config, and table sizes. */
info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
if (!info) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
"version %d", p->policyvers);
return -EINVAL;
}
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->policyvers);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(config);
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(info->sym_num);
buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(info->ocon_num);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
rc = ebitmap_write(&p->policycaps, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
rc = ebitmap_write(&p->permissive_map, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
num_syms = info->sym_num;
for (i = 0; i < num_syms; i++) {
struct policy_data pd;
pd.fp = fp;
pd.p = p;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].nprim);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].table->nel);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, write_f[i], &pd);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
rc = avtab_write(p, &p->te_avtab, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = cond_write_list(p, p->cond_list, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = role_trans_write(p, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = role_allow_write(p->role_allow, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = filename_trans_write(p, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = ocontext_write(p, info, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = genfs_write(p, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = range_write(p, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
struct ebitmap *e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i);
BUG_ON(!e);
rc = ebitmap_write(e, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
return 0;
}