[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 12:00:56 +07:00
|
|
|
/* request_key_auth.c: request key authorisation controlling key def
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
|
|
|
|
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
|
|
|
|
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
|
|
|
|
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
|
|
|
|
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/module.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/err.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
|
|
|
|
#include "internal.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, const void *, size_t);
|
|
|
|
static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
|
|
|
|
static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* the request-key authorisation key type definition
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
|
|
|
|
.name = ".request_key_auth",
|
|
|
|
.def_datalen = sizeof(struct request_key_auth),
|
|
|
|
.instantiate = request_key_auth_instantiate,
|
|
|
|
.describe = request_key_auth_describe,
|
|
|
|
.destroy = request_key_auth_destroy,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* instantiate a request-key authorisation record
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,
|
|
|
|
const void *data,
|
|
|
|
size_t datalen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;
|
|
|
|
struct key *instkey;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
rka = kmalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (rka) {
|
|
|
|
/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key
|
|
|
|
* request of another process */
|
|
|
|
instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(0);
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
|
|
|
|
/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */
|
|
|
|
irka = instkey->payload.data;
|
|
|
|
rka->context = irka->context;
|
|
|
|
rka->pid = irka->pid;
|
|
|
|
key_put(instkey);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
/* it isn't - use this process as the context */
|
|
|
|
rka->context = current;
|
|
|
|
rka->pid = current->pid;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rka->target_key = key_get((struct key *) data);
|
|
|
|
key->payload.data = rka;
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end request_key_auth_instantiate() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
|
|
|
|
struct seq_file *m)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
seq_puts(m, "key:");
|
|
|
|
seq_puts(m, key->description);
|
|
|
|
seq_printf(m, " pid:%d", rka->pid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end request_key_auth_describe() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* destroy an instantiation authorisation token key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_put(rka->target_key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end request_key_auth_destroy() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* create a session keyring to be for the invokation of /sbin/request-key and
|
|
|
|
* stick an authorisation token in it
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, struct key **_rkakey)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct key *keyring, *rkakey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char desc[20];
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kenter("%d,", target->serial);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* allocate a new session keyring */
|
|
|
|
sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", target->serial);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, current->fsuid, current->fsgid, 1, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
|
|
|
|
kleave("= %ld", PTR_ERR(keyring));
|
|
|
|
return keyring;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* allocate the auth key */
|
|
|
|
sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rkakey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,
|
|
|
|
current->fsuid, current->fsgid,
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_USR_VIEW, 1);
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 12:00:56 +07:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(rkakey)) {
|
|
|
|
key_put(keyring);
|
|
|
|
kleave("= %ld", PTR_ERR(rkakey));
|
|
|
|
return rkakey;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* construct and attach to the keyring */
|
|
|
|
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(rkakey, target, 0, keyring, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
|
|
key_revoke(rkakey);
|
|
|
|
key_put(rkakey);
|
|
|
|
key_put(keyring);
|
|
|
|
kleave("= %d", ret);
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*_rkakey = rkakey;
|
|
|
|
kleave(" = {%d} ({%d})", keyring->serial, rkakey->serial);
|
|
|
|
return keyring;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end request_key_auth_new() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* get the authorisation key for instantiation of a specific key if attached to
|
|
|
|
* the current process's keyrings
|
|
|
|
* - this key is inserted into a keyring and that is set as /sbin/request-key's
|
|
|
|
* session keyring
|
|
|
|
* - a target_id of zero specifies any valid token
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
|
|
|
|
struct key *instkey;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we must have our own personal session keyring */
|
|
|
|
if (!tsk->signal->session_keyring)
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* and it must contain a suitable request authorisation key
|
|
|
|
* - lock RCU against session keyring changing
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
instkey = keyring_search_instkey(
|
|
|
|
rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring), target_id);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
return instkey;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_get_instantiation_authkey() */
|