2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
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*
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* Authors:
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* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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* Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
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*
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* File: ima_crypto.c
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* Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
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*/
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 15:04:11 +07:00
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
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#include <crypto/hash.h>
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2013-04-25 14:43:56 +07:00
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#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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#include "ima.h"
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
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static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
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int ima_init_crypto(void)
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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{
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
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long rc;
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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2013-04-25 14:43:56 +07:00
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ima_shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], 0, 0);
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
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if (IS_ERR(ima_shash_tfm)) {
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rc = PTR_ERR(ima_shash_tfm);
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2013-04-25 14:43:56 +07:00
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pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n",
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hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], rc);
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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return rc;
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}
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
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return 0;
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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}
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2013-07-04 21:40:01 +07:00
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static struct crypto_shash *ima_alloc_tfm(enum hash_algo algo)
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{
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struct crypto_shash *tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
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int rc;
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if (algo != ima_hash_algo && algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
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tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
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rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
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pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %d)\n",
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hash_algo_name[algo], rc);
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}
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}
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return tfm;
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}
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static void ima_free_tfm(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
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{
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if (tfm != ima_shash_tfm)
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crypto_free_shash(tfm);
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}
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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/*
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* Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest
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*/
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2013-04-25 14:43:56 +07:00
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static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
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struct ima_digest_data *hash,
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struct crypto_shash *tfm)
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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{
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2009-08-22 01:32:49 +07:00
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loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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char *rbuf;
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ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 22:15:05 +07:00
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int rc, read = 0;
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
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struct {
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struct shash_desc shash;
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2013-04-25 14:43:56 +07:00
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char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)];
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
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} desc;
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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2013-04-25 14:43:56 +07:00
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desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
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desc.shash.flags = 0;
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2013-07-04 21:40:01 +07:00
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hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
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rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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if (rc != 0)
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return rc;
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rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!rbuf) {
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rc = -ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 22:15:05 +07:00
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if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
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file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
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read = 1;
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}
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2013-01-24 05:07:38 +07:00
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i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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while (offset < i_size) {
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int rbuf_len;
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rbuf_len = kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
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if (rbuf_len < 0) {
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rc = rbuf_len;
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break;
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}
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2009-08-22 01:32:49 +07:00
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if (rbuf_len == 0)
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break;
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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offset += rbuf_len;
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
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rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, rbuf, rbuf_len);
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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if (rc)
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break;
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}
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kfree(rbuf);
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if (!rc)
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2013-04-25 14:43:56 +07:00
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rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
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ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 22:15:05 +07:00
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if (read)
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file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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out:
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return rc;
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}
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|
2013-04-25 14:43:56 +07:00
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int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
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{
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2013-07-04 21:40:01 +07:00
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struct crypto_shash *tfm;
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2013-04-25 14:43:56 +07:00
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int rc;
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2013-07-04 21:40:01 +07:00
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tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm))
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return PTR_ERR(tfm);
|
2013-04-25 14:43:56 +07:00
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rc = ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(file, hash, tfm);
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2013-07-04 21:40:01 +07:00
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ima_free_tfm(tfm);
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2013-04-25 14:43:56 +07:00
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return rc;
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}
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|
2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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/*
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2013-06-07 17:16:33 +07:00
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* Calculate the hash of template data
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
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*/
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2013-06-07 17:16:33 +07:00
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static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
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2013-11-09 01:21:39 +07:00
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struct ima_template_desc *td,
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2013-06-07 17:16:33 +07:00
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int num_fields,
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struct ima_digest_data *hash,
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struct crypto_shash *tfm)
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
|
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{
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
|
|
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struct {
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struct shash_desc shash;
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2013-06-07 17:16:24 +07:00
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char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)];
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
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} desc;
|
2013-06-07 17:16:33 +07:00
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int rc, i;
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2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
|
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2013-06-07 17:16:24 +07:00
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desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
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2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
|
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desc.shash.flags = 0;
|
2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
|
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2013-06-07 17:16:24 +07:00
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hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
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2013-04-25 14:43:56 +07:00
|
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|
2013-06-07 17:16:33 +07:00
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|
|
rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
|
|
|
|
if (rc != 0)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) {
|
2013-11-09 01:21:39 +07:00
|
|
|
if (strcmp(td->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash,
|
|
|
|
(const u8 *) &field_data[i].len,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(field_data[i].len));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-06-07 17:16:33 +07:00
|
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data,
|
|
|
|
field_data[i].len);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!rc)
|
|
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-11-09 01:21:39 +07:00
|
|
|
int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
|
|
|
|
struct ima_template_desc *desc, int num_fields,
|
2013-06-07 17:16:33 +07:00
|
|
|
struct ima_digest_data *hash)
|
2013-06-07 17:16:24 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
2013-11-09 01:21:39 +07:00
|
|
|
rc = ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(field_data, desc, num_fields,
|
|
|
|
hash, tfm);
|
2013-06-07 17:16:24 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ima_free_tfm(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-05-22 02:43:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
|
2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!ima_used_chip)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
|
2010-04-22 21:49:36 +07:00
|
|
|
pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
|
2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Calculate the boot aggregate hash
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-06-07 17:16:25 +07:00
|
|
|
static int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(char *digest,
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_shash *tfm)
|
2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-03-12 07:29:47 +07:00
|
|
|
u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
|
2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
|
|
|
int rc, i;
|
2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
struct shash_desc shash;
|
2013-06-07 17:16:25 +07:00
|
|
|
char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)];
|
2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
|
|
|
} desc;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-07 17:16:25 +07:00
|
|
|
desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
|
2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
|
|
|
desc.shash.flags = 0;
|
2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
|
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
|
2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
|
|
|
if (rc != 0)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* cumulative sha1 over tpm registers 0-7 */
|
|
|
|
for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) {
|
|
|
|
ima_pcrread(i, pcr_i);
|
|
|
|
/* now accumulate with current aggregate */
|
2013-03-12 07:29:47 +07:00
|
|
|
rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, pcr_i, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
|
2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!rc)
|
2012-06-08 14:42:30 +07:00
|
|
|
crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest);
|
2009-02-04 21:06:58 +07:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-06-07 17:16:25 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
|
|
|
|
rc = ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(hash->digest, tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ima_free_tfm(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|