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linux_dsm_epyc7002/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c

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arm64: detect silicon revisions and set cap bits accordingly After each CPU has been started, we iterate through a list of CPU features or bugs to detect CPUs which need (or could benefit from) kernel code patches. For each feature/bug there is a function which checks if that particular CPU is affected. We will later provide some more generic functions for common things like testing for certain MIDR ranges. We do this for every CPU to cover big.LITTLE systems properly as well. If a certain feature/bug has been detected, the capability bit will be set, so that later the call to apply_alternatives() will trigger the actual code patching. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:09 +07:00
/*
* Contains CPU specific errata definitions
*
* Copyright (C) 2014 ARM Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/cputype.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
arm64: add Cortex-A53 cache errata workaround The ARM errata 819472, 826319, 827319 and 824069 define the same workaround for these hardware issues in certain Cortex-A53 parts. Use the new alternatives framework and the CPU MIDR detection to patch "cache clean" into "cache clean and invalidate" instructions if an affected CPU is detected at runtime. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: add __maybe_unused to squash gcc warning] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:10 +07:00
static bool __maybe_unused
arm64: cpufeature: Add scope for capability check Add scope parameter to the arm64_cpu_capabilities::matches(), so that this can be reused for checking the capability on a given CPU vs the system wide. The system uses the default scope associated with the capability for initialising the CPU_HWCAPs and ELF_HWCAPs. Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
arm64: add Cortex-A53 cache errata workaround The ARM errata 819472, 826319, 827319 and 824069 define the same workaround for these hardware issues in certain Cortex-A53 parts. Use the new alternatives framework and the CPU MIDR detection to patch "cache clean" into "cache clean and invalidate" instructions if an affected CPU is detected at runtime. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: add __maybe_unused to squash gcc warning] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:10 +07:00
{
arm64: cpufeature: Add scope for capability check Add scope parameter to the arm64_cpu_capabilities::matches(), so that this can be reused for checking the capability on a given CPU vs the system wide. The system uses the default scope associated with the capability for initialising the CPU_HWCAPs and ELF_HWCAPs. Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
arm64: prefetch: add alternative pattern for CPUs without a prefetcher Most CPUs have a hardware prefetcher which generally performs better without explicit prefetch instructions issued by software, however some CPUs (e.g. Cavium ThunderX) rely solely on explicit prefetch instructions. This patch adds an alternative pattern (ARM64_HAS_NO_HW_PREFETCH) to allow our library code to make use of explicit prefetch instructions during things like copy routines only when the CPU does not have the capability to perform the prefetching itself. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Tested-by: Andrew Pinski <apinski@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-02-02 19:46:24 +07:00
return MIDR_IS_CPU_MODEL_RANGE(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_model,
entry->midr_range_min,
entry->midr_range_max);
arm64: add Cortex-A53 cache errata workaround The ARM errata 819472, 826319, 827319 and 824069 define the same workaround for these hardware issues in certain Cortex-A53 parts. Use the new alternatives framework and the CPU MIDR detection to patch "cache clean" into "cache clean and invalidate" instructions if an affected CPU is detected at runtime. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: add __maybe_unused to squash gcc warning] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:10 +07:00
}
arm64: cpu_errata: Add Kryo to Falkor 1003 errata The Kryo CPUs are also affected by the Falkor 1003 errata, so we need to do the same workaround on Kryo CPUs. The MIDR is slightly more complicated here, where the PART number is not always the same when looking at all the bits from 15 to 4. Drop the lower 8 bits and just look at the top 4 to see if it's '2' and then consider those as Kryo CPUs. This covers all the combinations without having to list them all out. Fixes: 38fd94b0275c ("arm64: Work around Falkor erratum 1003") Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2017-12-14 05:19:37 +07:00
static bool __maybe_unused
is_kryo_midr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
{
u32 model;
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
model = read_cpuid_id();
model &= MIDR_IMPLEMENTOR_MASK | (0xf00 << MIDR_PARTNUM_SHIFT) |
MIDR_ARCHITECTURE_MASK;
return model == entry->midr_model;
}
arm64: Work around systems with mismatched cache line sizes Systems with differing CPU i-cache/d-cache line sizes can cause problems with the cache management by software when the execution is migrated from one to another. Usually, the application reads the cache size on a CPU and then uses that length to perform cache operations. However, if it gets migrated to another CPU with a smaller cache line size, things could go completely wrong. To prevent such cases, always use the smallest cache line size among the CPUs. The kernel CPU feature infrastructure already keeps track of the safe value for all CPUID registers including CTR. This patch works around the problem by : For kernel, dynamically patch the kernel to read the cache size from the system wide copy of CTR_EL0. For applications, trap read accesses to CTR_EL0 (by clearing the SCTLR.UCT) and emulate the mrs instruction to return the system wide safe value of CTR_EL0. For faster access (i.e, avoiding to lookup the system wide value of CTR_EL0 via read_system_reg), we keep track of the pointer to table entry for CTR_EL0 in the CPU feature infrastructure. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-09-09 20:07:16 +07:00
static bool
has_mismatched_cache_line_size(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
int scope)
{
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
return (read_cpuid_cachetype() & arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0.strict_mask) !=
(arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0.sys_val & arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0.strict_mask);
}
arm64: cpufeature: Schedule enable() calls instead of calling them via IPI The enable() call for a cpufeature/errata is called using on_each_cpu(). This issues a cross-call IPI to get the work done. Implicitly, this stashes the running PSTATE in SPSR when the CPU receives the IPI, and restores it when we return. This means an enable() call can never modify PSTATE. To allow PAN to do this, change the on_each_cpu() call to use stop_machine(). This schedules the work on each CPU which allows us to modify PSTATE. This involves changing the protype of all the enable() functions. enable_cpu_capabilities() is called during boot and enables the feature on all online CPUs. This path now uses stop_machine(). CPU features for hotplug'd CPUs are enabled by verify_local_cpu_features() which only acts on the local CPU, and can already modify the running PSTATE as it is called from secondary_start_kernel(). Reported-by: Tony Thompson <anthony.thompson@arm.com> Reported-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-10-18 17:27:46 +07:00
static int cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(void *__unused)
arm64: Work around systems with mismatched cache line sizes Systems with differing CPU i-cache/d-cache line sizes can cause problems with the cache management by software when the execution is migrated from one to another. Usually, the application reads the cache size on a CPU and then uses that length to perform cache operations. However, if it gets migrated to another CPU with a smaller cache line size, things could go completely wrong. To prevent such cases, always use the smallest cache line size among the CPUs. The kernel CPU feature infrastructure already keeps track of the safe value for all CPUID registers including CTR. This patch works around the problem by : For kernel, dynamically patch the kernel to read the cache size from the system wide copy of CTR_EL0. For applications, trap read accesses to CTR_EL0 (by clearing the SCTLR.UCT) and emulate the mrs instruction to return the system wide safe value of CTR_EL0. For faster access (i.e, avoiding to lookup the system wide value of CTR_EL0 via read_system_reg), we keep track of the pointer to table entry for CTR_EL0 in the CPU feature infrastructure. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-09-09 20:07:16 +07:00
{
/* Clear SCTLR_EL1.UCT */
config_sctlr_el1(SCTLR_EL1_UCT, 0);
arm64: cpufeature: Schedule enable() calls instead of calling them via IPI The enable() call for a cpufeature/errata is called using on_each_cpu(). This issues a cross-call IPI to get the work done. Implicitly, this stashes the running PSTATE in SPSR when the CPU receives the IPI, and restores it when we return. This means an enable() call can never modify PSTATE. To allow PAN to do this, change the on_each_cpu() call to use stop_machine(). This schedules the work on each CPU which allows us to modify PSTATE. This involves changing the protype of all the enable() functions. enable_cpu_capabilities() is called during boot and enables the feature on all online CPUs. This path now uses stop_machine(). CPU features for hotplug'd CPUs are enabled by verify_local_cpu_features() which only acts on the local CPU, and can already modify the running PSTATE as it is called from secondary_start_kernel(). Reported-by: Tony Thompson <anthony.thompson@arm.com> Reported-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-10-18 17:27:46 +07:00
return 0;
arm64: Work around systems with mismatched cache line sizes Systems with differing CPU i-cache/d-cache line sizes can cause problems with the cache management by software when the execution is migrated from one to another. Usually, the application reads the cache size on a CPU and then uses that length to perform cache operations. However, if it gets migrated to another CPU with a smaller cache line size, things could go completely wrong. To prevent such cases, always use the smallest cache line size among the CPUs. The kernel CPU feature infrastructure already keeps track of the safe value for all CPUID registers including CTR. This patch works around the problem by : For kernel, dynamically patch the kernel to read the cache size from the system wide copy of CTR_EL0. For applications, trap read accesses to CTR_EL0 (by clearing the SCTLR.UCT) and emulate the mrs instruction to return the system wide safe value of CTR_EL0. For faster access (i.e, avoiding to lookup the system wide value of CTR_EL0 via read_system_reg), we keep track of the pointer to table entry for CTR_EL0 in the CPU feature infrastructure. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-09-09 20:07:16 +07:00
}
arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Aliasing attacks against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge information from one context to another. This patch adds initial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for CPUs that are affected. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-03 18:17:58 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM
arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available. The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-03 19:46:21 +07:00
extern char __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start[], __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end[];
arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for Falkor Falkor is susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a mitigation for these attacks, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> [will: fix label name when !CONFIG_KVM and remove references to MIDR_FALKOR] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-06 03:28:59 +07:00
extern char __qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_start[];
extern char __qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_end[];
arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available. The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-03 19:46:21 +07:00
arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Aliasing attacks against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge information from one context to another. This patch adds initial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for CPUs that are affected. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-03 18:17:58 +07:00
static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start,
const char *hyp_vecs_end)
{
void *dst = lm_alias(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start + slot * SZ_2K);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < SZ_2K; i += 0x80)
memcpy(dst + i, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end - hyp_vecs_start);
flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K);
}
static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
const char *hyp_vecs_start,
const char *hyp_vecs_end)
{
static int last_slot = -1;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bp_lock);
int cpu, slot = -1;
spin_lock(&bp_lock);
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
if (per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.fn, cpu) == fn) {
slot = per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, cpu);
break;
}
}
if (slot == -1) {
last_slot++;
BUG_ON(((__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end - __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start)
/ SZ_2K) <= last_slot);
slot = last_slot;
__copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
}
__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
}
#else
arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for Falkor Falkor is susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a mitigation for these attacks, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> [will: fix label name when !CONFIG_KVM and remove references to MIDR_FALKOR] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-06 03:28:59 +07:00
#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start NULL
#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end NULL
#define __qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_start NULL
#define __qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_end NULL
arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available. The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-03 19:46:21 +07:00
arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Aliasing attacks against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge information from one context to another. This patch adds initial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for CPUs that are affected. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-03 18:17:58 +07:00
static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
const char *hyp_vecs_start,
const char *hyp_vecs_end)
{
__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KVM */
static void install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
const char *hyp_vecs_start,
const char *hyp_vecs_end)
{
u64 pfr0;
if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
return;
pfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT))
return;
__install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
}
arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available. The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-03 19:46:21 +07:00
#include <linux/psci.h>
static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data)
{
const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data;
if (psci_ops.get_version)
install_bp_hardening_cb(entry,
(bp_hardening_cb_t)psci_ops.get_version,
__psci_hyp_bp_inval_start,
__psci_hyp_bp_inval_end);
return 0;
}
arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for Falkor Falkor is susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a mitigation for these attacks, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> [will: fix label name when !CONFIG_KVM and remove references to MIDR_FALKOR] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-06 03:28:59 +07:00
static void qcom_link_stack_sanitization(void)
{
u64 tmp;
asm volatile("mov %0, x30 \n"
".rept 16 \n"
"bl . + 4 \n"
".endr \n"
"mov x30, %0 \n"
: "=&r" (tmp));
}
static int qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization(void *data)
{
const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data;
install_bp_hardening_cb(entry, qcom_link_stack_sanitization,
__qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_start,
__qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_end);
return 0;
}
arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Aliasing attacks against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge information from one context to another. This patch adds initial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for CPUs that are affected. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-03 18:17:58 +07:00
#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
arm64: add Cortex-A53 cache errata workaround The ARM errata 819472, 826319, 827319 and 824069 define the same workaround for these hardware issues in certain Cortex-A53 parts. Use the new alternatives framework and the CPU MIDR detection to patch "cache clean" into "cache clean and invalidate" instructions if an affected CPU is detected at runtime. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: add __maybe_unused to squash gcc warning] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:10 +07:00
#define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \
arm64: cpufeature: Add scope for capability check Add scope parameter to the arm64_cpu_capabilities::matches(), so that this can be reused for checking the capability on a given CPU vs the system wide. The system uses the default scope associated with the capability for initialising the CPU_HWCAPs and ELF_HWCAPs. Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \
arm64: Extract feature parsing code from cpu_errata.c As we detect more architectural features at runtime, it makes sense to reuse the existing framework whilst avoiding to call a feature an erratum... This patch extract the core capability parsing, moves it into a new file (cpufeature.c), and let the CPU errata detection code use it. Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
.matches = is_affected_midr_range, \
arm64: add Cortex-A53 cache errata workaround The ARM errata 819472, 826319, 827319 and 824069 define the same workaround for these hardware issues in certain Cortex-A53 parts. Use the new alternatives framework and the CPU MIDR detection to patch "cache clean" into "cache clean and invalidate" instructions if an affected CPU is detected at runtime. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: add __maybe_unused to squash gcc warning] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:10 +07:00
.midr_model = model, \
.midr_range_min = min, \
.midr_range_max = max
arm64: cpu_errata: Allow an erratum to be match for all revisions of a core Some minor erratum may not be fixed in further revisions of a core, leading to a situation where the workaround needs to be updated each time an updated core is released. Introduce a MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS match helper that will work for all versions of that MIDR, once and for all. Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2017-02-01 21:38:46 +07:00
#define MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model) \
.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \
.matches = is_affected_midr_range, \
.midr_model = model, \
.midr_range_min = 0, \
.midr_range_max = (MIDR_VARIANT_MASK | MIDR_REVISION_MASK)
arm64: Extract feature parsing code from cpu_errata.c As we detect more architectural features at runtime, it makes sense to reuse the existing framework whilst avoiding to call a feature an erratum... This patch extract the core capability parsing, moves it into a new file (cpufeature.c), and let the CPU errata detection code use it. Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
arm64: protect alternatives workarounds with Kconfig options Not all of the errata we have workarounds for apply necessarily to all SoCs, so people compiling a kernel for one very specific SoC may not need to patch the kernel. Introduce a new submenu in the "Platform selection" menu to allow people to turn off certain bugs if they are not affected. By default all of them are enabled. Normal users or distribution kernels shouldn't bother to deselect any bugs here, since the alternatives framework will take care of patching them in only if needed. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: moved kconfig menu under `Kernel Features'] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:12 +07:00
#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_826319) || \
defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_827319) || \
defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_824069)
arm64: add Cortex-A53 cache errata workaround The ARM errata 819472, 826319, 827319 and 824069 define the same workaround for these hardware issues in certain Cortex-A53 parts. Use the new alternatives framework and the CPU MIDR detection to patch "cache clean" into "cache clean and invalidate" instructions if an affected CPU is detected at runtime. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: add __maybe_unused to squash gcc warning] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:10 +07:00
{
/* Cortex-A53 r0p[012] */
.desc = "ARM errata 826319, 827319, 824069",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE,
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0x00, 0x02),
arm64: trap userspace "dc cvau" cache operation on errata-affected core The ARM errata 819472, 826319, 827319 and 824069 for affected Cortex-A53 cores demand to promote "dc cvau" instructions to "dc civac". Since we allow userspace to also emit those instructions, we should make sure that "dc cvau" gets promoted there too. So lets grasp the nettle here and actually trap every userland cache maintenance instruction once we detect at least one affected core in the system. We then emulate the instruction by executing it on behalf of userland, promoting "dc cvau" to "dc civac" on the way and injecting access fault back into userspace. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: s/set_segfault/arm64_notify_segfault/] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-06-29 00:07:32 +07:00
.enable = cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap,
arm64: add Cortex-A53 cache errata workaround The ARM errata 819472, 826319, 827319 and 824069 define the same workaround for these hardware issues in certain Cortex-A53 parts. Use the new alternatives framework and the CPU MIDR detection to patch "cache clean" into "cache clean and invalidate" instructions if an affected CPU is detected at runtime. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: add __maybe_unused to squash gcc warning] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:10 +07:00
},
arm64: protect alternatives workarounds with Kconfig options Not all of the errata we have workarounds for apply necessarily to all SoCs, so people compiling a kernel for one very specific SoC may not need to patch the kernel. Introduce a new submenu in the "Platform selection" menu to allow people to turn off certain bugs if they are not affected. By default all of them are enabled. Normal users or distribution kernels shouldn't bother to deselect any bugs here, since the alternatives framework will take care of patching them in only if needed. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: moved kconfig menu under `Kernel Features'] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:12 +07:00
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_819472
{
/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01] */
.desc = "ARM errata 819472",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE,
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0x00, 0x01),
arm64: trap userspace "dc cvau" cache operation on errata-affected core The ARM errata 819472, 826319, 827319 and 824069 for affected Cortex-A53 cores demand to promote "dc cvau" instructions to "dc civac". Since we allow userspace to also emit those instructions, we should make sure that "dc cvau" gets promoted there too. So lets grasp the nettle here and actually trap every userland cache maintenance instruction once we detect at least one affected core in the system. We then emulate the instruction by executing it on behalf of userland, promoting "dc cvau" to "dc civac" on the way and injecting access fault back into userspace. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: s/set_segfault/arm64_notify_segfault/] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-06-29 00:07:32 +07:00
.enable = cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap,
arm64: protect alternatives workarounds with Kconfig options Not all of the errata we have workarounds for apply necessarily to all SoCs, so people compiling a kernel for one very specific SoC may not need to patch the kernel. Introduce a new submenu in the "Platform selection" menu to allow people to turn off certain bugs if they are not affected. By default all of them are enabled. Normal users or distribution kernels shouldn't bother to deselect any bugs here, since the alternatives framework will take care of patching them in only if needed. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: moved kconfig menu under `Kernel Features'] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:12 +07:00
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_832075
arm64: add Cortex-A53 cache errata workaround The ARM errata 819472, 826319, 827319 and 824069 define the same workaround for these hardware issues in certain Cortex-A53 parts. Use the new alternatives framework and the CPU MIDR detection to patch "cache clean" into "cache clean and invalidate" instructions if an affected CPU is detected at runtime. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: add __maybe_unused to squash gcc warning] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:10 +07:00
{
arm64: add Cortex-A57 erratum 832075 workaround The ARM erratum 832075 applies to certain revisions of Cortex-A57, one of the workarounds is to change device loads into using load-aquire semantics. This is achieved using the alternatives framework. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:11 +07:00
/* Cortex-A57 r0p0 - r1p2 */
.desc = "ARM erratum 832075",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_DEVICE_LOAD_ACQUIRE,
arm64: errata: Provide macro for major and minor cpu revisions Definition of cpu ranges are hard to read if the cpu variant is not zero. Provide MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV() macro to describe the full hardware revision of a cpu including variant and (minor) revision. Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2017-01-13 20:12:09 +07:00
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A57,
MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),
MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(1, 2)),
arm64: add Cortex-A57 erratum 832075 workaround The ARM erratum 832075 applies to certain revisions of Cortex-A57, one of the workarounds is to change device loads into using load-aquire semantics. This is achieved using the alternatives framework. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:11 +07:00
},
arm64: errata: add workaround for cortex-a53 erratum #845719 When running a compat (AArch32) userspace on Cortex-A53, a load at EL0 from a virtual address that matches the bottom 32 bits of the virtual address used by a recent load at (AArch64) EL1 might return incorrect data. This patch works around the issue by writing to the contextidr_el1 register on the exception return path when returning to a 32-bit task. This workaround is patched in at runtime based on the MIDR value of the processor. Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2015-03-24 02:07:02 +07:00
#endif
arm64: KVM: Add workaround for Cortex-A57 erratum 834220 Cortex-A57 parts up to r1p2 can misreport Stage 2 translation faults when a Stage 1 permission fault or device alignment fault should have been reported. This patch implements the workaround (which is to validate that the Stage-1 translation actually succeeds) by using code patching. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-11-16 17:28:18 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_834220
{
/* Cortex-A57 r0p0 - r1p2 */
.desc = "ARM erratum 834220",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_834220,
arm64: errata: Provide macro for major and minor cpu revisions Definition of cpu ranges are hard to read if the cpu variant is not zero. Provide MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV() macro to describe the full hardware revision of a cpu including variant and (minor) revision. Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2017-01-13 20:12:09 +07:00
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A57,
MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),
MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(1, 2)),
arm64: KVM: Add workaround for Cortex-A57 erratum 834220 Cortex-A57 parts up to r1p2 can misreport Stage 2 translation faults when a Stage 1 permission fault or device alignment fault should have been reported. This patch implements the workaround (which is to validate that the Stage-1 translation actually succeeds) by using code patching. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-11-16 17:28:18 +07:00
},
#endif
arm64: errata: add workaround for cortex-a53 erratum #845719 When running a compat (AArch32) userspace on Cortex-A53, a load at EL0 from a virtual address that matches the bottom 32 bits of the virtual address used by a recent load at (AArch64) EL1 might return incorrect data. This patch works around the issue by writing to the contextidr_el1 register on the exception return path when returning to a 32-bit task. This workaround is patched in at runtime based on the MIDR value of the processor. Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2015-03-24 02:07:02 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_845719
{
/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01234] */
.desc = "ARM erratum 845719",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_845719,
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0x00, 0x04),
},
irqchip/gicv3: Workaround for Cavium ThunderX erratum 23154 This patch implements Cavium ThunderX erratum 23154. The gicv3 of ThunderX requires a modified version for reading the IAR status to ensure data synchronization. Since this is in the fast-path and called with each interrupt, runtime patching is used using jump label patching for smallest overhead (no-op). This is the same technique as used for tracepoints. Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zygnier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tirumalesh Chalamarla <tchalamarla@cavium.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1442869119-1814-3-git-send-email-rric@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-09-22 03:58:35 +07:00
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23154
{
/* Cavium ThunderX, pass 1.x */
.desc = "Cavium erratum 23154",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_23154,
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX, 0x00, 0x01),
},
arm64: Add workaround for Cavium erratum 27456 On ThunderX T88 pass 1.x through 2.1 parts, broadcast TLBI instructions may cause the icache to become corrupted if it contains data for a non-current ASID. This patch implements the workaround (which invalidates the local icache when switching the mm) by using code patching. Signed-off-by: Andrew Pinski <apinski@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-02-25 08:44:57 +07:00
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456
{
/* Cavium ThunderX, T88 pass 1.x - 2.1 */
.desc = "Cavium erratum 27456",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456,
arm64: errata: Provide macro for major and minor cpu revisions Definition of cpu ranges are hard to read if the cpu variant is not zero. Provide MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV() macro to describe the full hardware revision of a cpu including variant and (minor) revision. Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2017-01-13 20:12:09 +07:00
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX,
MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),
MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(1, 1)),
arm64: Add workaround for Cavium erratum 27456 On ThunderX T88 pass 1.x through 2.1 parts, broadcast TLBI instructions may cause the icache to become corrupted if it contains data for a non-current ASID. This patch implements the workaround (which invalidates the local icache when switching the mm) by using code patching. Signed-off-by: Andrew Pinski <apinski@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-02-25 08:44:57 +07:00
},
arm64: Enable workaround for Cavium erratum 27456 on thunderx-81xx Cavium erratum 27456 commit 104a0c02e8b1 ("arm64: Add workaround for Cavium erratum 27456") is applicable for thunderx-81xx pass1.0 SoC as well. Adding code to enable to 81xx. Signed-off-by: Ganapatrao Kulkarni <gkulkarni@cavium.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Pinski <apinski@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-07-07 11:48:17 +07:00
{
/* Cavium ThunderX, T81 pass 1.0 */
.desc = "Cavium erratum 27456",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456,
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX, 0x00, 0x00),
},
arm64: Add workaround for Cavium Thunder erratum 30115 Some Cavium Thunder CPUs suffer a problem where a KVM guest may inadvertently cause the host kernel to quit receiving interrupts. Use the Group-0/1 trapping in order to deal with it. [maz]: Adapted patch to the Group-0/1 trapping, reworked commit log Tested-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
2017-06-09 18:49:48 +07:00
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_30115
{
/* Cavium ThunderX, T88 pass 1.x - 2.2 */
.desc = "Cavium erratum 30115",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_30115,
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX, 0x00,
(1 << MIDR_VARIANT_SHIFT) | 2),
},
{
/* Cavium ThunderX, T81 pass 1.0 - 1.2 */
.desc = "Cavium erratum 30115",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_30115,
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX, 0x00, 0x02),
},
{
/* Cavium ThunderX, T83 pass 1.0 */
.desc = "Cavium erratum 30115",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_30115,
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX, 0x00, 0x00),
},
arm64: protect alternatives workarounds with Kconfig options Not all of the errata we have workarounds for apply necessarily to all SoCs, so people compiling a kernel for one very specific SoC may not need to patch the kernel. Introduce a new submenu in the "Platform selection" menu to allow people to turn off certain bugs if they are not affected. By default all of them are enabled. Normal users or distribution kernels shouldn't bother to deselect any bugs here, since the alternatives framework will take care of patching them in only if needed. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: moved kconfig menu under `Kernel Features'] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:12 +07:00
#endif
arm64: Work around systems with mismatched cache line sizes Systems with differing CPU i-cache/d-cache line sizes can cause problems with the cache management by software when the execution is migrated from one to another. Usually, the application reads the cache size on a CPU and then uses that length to perform cache operations. However, if it gets migrated to another CPU with a smaller cache line size, things could go completely wrong. To prevent such cases, always use the smallest cache line size among the CPUs. The kernel CPU feature infrastructure already keeps track of the safe value for all CPUID registers including CTR. This patch works around the problem by : For kernel, dynamically patch the kernel to read the cache size from the system wide copy of CTR_EL0. For applications, trap read accesses to CTR_EL0 (by clearing the SCTLR.UCT) and emulate the mrs instruction to return the system wide safe value of CTR_EL0. For faster access (i.e, avoiding to lookup the system wide value of CTR_EL0 via read_system_reg), we keep track of the pointer to table entry for CTR_EL0 in the CPU feature infrastructure. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-09-09 20:07:16 +07:00
{
.desc = "Mismatched cache line size",
.capability = ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_LINE_SIZE,
.matches = has_mismatched_cache_line_size,
.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
.enable = cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access,
},
arm64: Work around Falkor erratum 1003 The Qualcomm Datacenter Technologies Falkor v1 CPU may allocate TLB entries using an incorrect ASID when TTBRx_EL1 is being updated. When the erratum is triggered, page table entries using the new translation table base address (BADDR) will be allocated into the TLB using the old ASID. All circumstances leading to the incorrect ASID being cached in the TLB arise when software writes TTBRx_EL1[ASID] and TTBRx_EL1[BADDR], a memory operation is in the process of performing a translation using the specific TTBRx_EL1 being written, and the memory operation uses a translation table descriptor designated as non-global. EL2 and EL3 code changing the EL1&0 ASID is not subject to this erratum because hardware is prohibited from performing translations from an out-of-context translation regime. Consider the following pseudo code. write new BADDR and ASID values to TTBRx_EL1 Replacing the above sequence with the one below will ensure that no TLB entries with an incorrect ASID are used by software. write reserved value to TTBRx_EL1[ASID] ISB write new value to TTBRx_EL1[BADDR] ISB write new value to TTBRx_EL1[ASID] ISB When the above sequence is used, page table entries using the new BADDR value may still be incorrectly allocated into the TLB using the reserved ASID. Yet this will not reduce functionality, since TLB entries incorrectly tagged with the reserved ASID will never be hit by a later instruction. Based on work by Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Christopher Covington <cov@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2017-02-09 03:08:37 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1003
{
.desc = "Qualcomm Technologies Falkor erratum 1003",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003,
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1,
MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),
MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0)),
},
arm64: cpu_errata: Add Kryo to Falkor 1003 errata The Kryo CPUs are also affected by the Falkor 1003 errata, so we need to do the same workaround on Kryo CPUs. The MIDR is slightly more complicated here, where the PART number is not always the same when looking at all the bits from 15 to 4. Drop the lower 8 bits and just look at the top 4 to see if it's '2' and then consider those as Kryo CPUs. This covers all the combinations without having to list them all out. Fixes: 38fd94b0275c ("arm64: Work around Falkor erratum 1003") Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2017-12-14 05:19:37 +07:00
{
.desc = "Qualcomm Technologies Kryo erratum 1003",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003,
.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
.midr_model = MIDR_QCOM_KRYO,
.matches = is_kryo_midr,
},
arm64: Work around Falkor erratum 1003 The Qualcomm Datacenter Technologies Falkor v1 CPU may allocate TLB entries using an incorrect ASID when TTBRx_EL1 is being updated. When the erratum is triggered, page table entries using the new translation table base address (BADDR) will be allocated into the TLB using the old ASID. All circumstances leading to the incorrect ASID being cached in the TLB arise when software writes TTBRx_EL1[ASID] and TTBRx_EL1[BADDR], a memory operation is in the process of performing a translation using the specific TTBRx_EL1 being written, and the memory operation uses a translation table descriptor designated as non-global. EL2 and EL3 code changing the EL1&0 ASID is not subject to this erratum because hardware is prohibited from performing translations from an out-of-context translation regime. Consider the following pseudo code. write new BADDR and ASID values to TTBRx_EL1 Replacing the above sequence with the one below will ensure that no TLB entries with an incorrect ASID are used by software. write reserved value to TTBRx_EL1[ASID] ISB write new value to TTBRx_EL1[BADDR] ISB write new value to TTBRx_EL1[ASID] ISB When the above sequence is used, page table entries using the new BADDR value may still be incorrectly allocated into the TLB using the reserved ASID. Yet this will not reduce functionality, since TLB entries incorrectly tagged with the reserved ASID will never be hit by a later instruction. Based on work by Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Christopher Covington <cov@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2017-02-09 03:08:37 +07:00
#endif
arm64: Work around Falkor erratum 1009 During a TLB invalidate sequence targeting the inner shareable domain, Falkor may prematurely complete the DSB before all loads and stores using the old translation are observed. Instruction fetches are not subject to the conditions of this erratum. If the original code sequence includes multiple TLB invalidate instructions followed by a single DSB, onle one of the TLB instructions needs to be repeated to work around this erratum. While the erratum only applies to cases in which the TLBI specifies the inner-shareable domain (*IS form of TLBI) and the DSB is ISH form or stronger (OSH, SYS), this changes applies the workaround overabundantly-- to local TLBI, DSB NSH sequences as well--for simplicity. Based on work by Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Christopher Covington <cov@codeaurora.org> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2017-02-01 00:50:19 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1009
{
.desc = "Qualcomm Technologies Falkor erratum 1009",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1,
MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),
MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0)),
},
arm64: cpu_errata: Add capability to advertise Cortex-A73 erratum 858921 In order to work around Cortex-A73 erratum 858921 in a subsequent patch, add the required capability that advertise the erratum. As the configuration option it depends on is not present yet, this has no immediate effect. Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2017-03-21 00:18:06 +07:00
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_858921
{
/* Cortex-A73 all versions */
.desc = "ARM erratum 858921",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_858921,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
},
arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available. The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-03 19:46:21 +07:00
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
{
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
},
{
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
},
{
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
},
{
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
},
arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for Falkor Falkor is susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a mitigation for these attacks, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> [will: fix label name when !CONFIG_KVM and remove references to MIDR_FALKOR] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-01-06 03:28:59 +07:00
{
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1),
.enable = qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization,
},
{
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1),
},
arm64: Work around Falkor erratum 1009 During a TLB invalidate sequence targeting the inner shareable domain, Falkor may prematurely complete the DSB before all loads and stores using the old translation are observed. Instruction fetches are not subject to the conditions of this erratum. If the original code sequence includes multiple TLB invalidate instructions followed by a single DSB, onle one of the TLB instructions needs to be repeated to work around this erratum. While the erratum only applies to cases in which the TLBI specifies the inner-shareable domain (*IS form of TLBI) and the DSB is ISH form or stronger (OSH, SYS), this changes applies the workaround overabundantly-- to local TLBI, DSB NSH sequences as well--for simplicity. Based on work by Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Christopher Covington <cov@codeaurora.org> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2017-02-01 00:50:19 +07:00
#endif
arm64: add Cortex-A57 erratum 832075 workaround The ARM erratum 832075 applies to certain revisions of Cortex-A57, one of the workarounds is to change device loads into using load-aquire semantics. This is achieved using the alternatives framework. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:11 +07:00
{
arm64: add Cortex-A53 cache errata workaround The ARM errata 819472, 826319, 827319 and 824069 define the same workaround for these hardware issues in certain Cortex-A53 parts. Use the new alternatives framework and the CPU MIDR detection to patch "cache clean" into "cache clean and invalidate" instructions if an affected CPU is detected at runtime. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> [will: add __maybe_unused to squash gcc warning] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:10 +07:00
}
arm64: detect silicon revisions and set cap bits accordingly After each CPU has been started, we iterate through a list of CPU features or bugs to detect CPUs which need (or could benefit from) kernel code patches. For each feature/bug there is a function which checks if that particular CPU is affected. We will later provide some more generic functions for common things like testing for certain MIDR ranges. We do this for every CPU to cover big.LITTLE systems properly as well. If a certain feature/bug has been detected, the capability bit will be set, so that later the call to apply_alternatives() will trigger the actual code patching. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:09 +07:00
};
arm64: Verify CPU errata work arounds on hotplugged CPU CPU Errata work arounds are detected and applied to the kernel code at boot time and the data is then freed up. If a new hotplugged CPU requires a work around which was not applied at boot time, there is nothing we can do but simply fail the booting. Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-22 18:25:34 +07:00
/*
* The CPU Errata work arounds are detected and applied at boot time
* and the related information is freed soon after. If the new CPU requires
* an errata not detected at boot, fail this CPU.
*/
arm64: Use consistent naming for errata handling This is a cosmetic change to rename the functions dealing with the errata work arounds to be more consistent with their naming. 1) check_local_cpu_errata() => update_cpu_errata_workarounds() check_local_cpu_errata() actually updates the system's errata work arounds. So rename it to reflect the same. 2) verify_local_cpu_errata() => verify_local_cpu_errata_workarounds() Use errata_workarounds instead of _errata. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-09-09 20:07:09 +07:00
void verify_local_cpu_errata_workarounds(void)
arm64: Verify CPU errata work arounds on hotplugged CPU CPU Errata work arounds are detected and applied to the kernel code at boot time and the data is then freed up. If a new hotplugged CPU requires a work around which was not applied at boot time, there is nothing we can do but simply fail the booting. Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-04-22 18:25:34 +07:00
{
const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps = arm64_errata;
for (; caps->matches; caps++)
if (!cpus_have_cap(caps->capability) &&
caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
pr_crit("CPU%d: Requires work around for %s, not detected"
" at boot time\n",
smp_processor_id(),
caps->desc ? : "an erratum");
cpu_die_early();
}
}
arm64: Use consistent naming for errata handling This is a cosmetic change to rename the functions dealing with the errata work arounds to be more consistent with their naming. 1) check_local_cpu_errata() => update_cpu_errata_workarounds() check_local_cpu_errata() actually updates the system's errata work arounds. So rename it to reflect the same. 2) verify_local_cpu_errata() => verify_local_cpu_errata_workarounds() Use errata_workarounds instead of _errata. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2016-09-09 20:07:09 +07:00
void update_cpu_errata_workarounds(void)
arm64: detect silicon revisions and set cap bits accordingly After each CPU has been started, we iterate through a list of CPU features or bugs to detect CPUs which need (or could benefit from) kernel code patches. For each feature/bug there is a function which checks if that particular CPU is affected. We will later provide some more generic functions for common things like testing for certain MIDR ranges. We do this for every CPU to cover big.LITTLE systems properly as well. If a certain feature/bug has been detected, the capability bit will be set, so that later the call to apply_alternatives() will trigger the actual code patching. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:09 +07:00
{
arm64: Refactor check_cpu_capabilities check_cpu_capabilities runs through a given list of caps and checks if the system has the cap, updates the system capability bitmap and also runs any enable() methods associated with them. All of this is not quite obvious from the name 'check'. This patch splits the check_cpu_capabilities into two parts : 1) update_cpu_capabilities => Runs through the given list and updates the system wide capability map. 2) enable_cpu_capabilities => Runs through the given list and invokes enable() (if any) for the caps enabled on the system. Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinsa@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:49 +07:00
update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, "enabling workaround for");
arm64: detect silicon revisions and set cap bits accordingly After each CPU has been started, we iterate through a list of CPU features or bugs to detect CPUs which need (or could benefit from) kernel code patches. For each feature/bug there is a function which checks if that particular CPU is affected. We will later provide some more generic functions for common things like testing for certain MIDR ranges. We do this for every CPU to cover big.LITTLE systems properly as well. If a certain feature/bug has been detected, the capability bit will be set, so that later the call to apply_alternatives() will trigger the actual code patching. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2014-11-14 22:54:09 +07:00
}
arm64: errata: Calling enable functions for CPU errata too Currently we call the (optional) enable function for CPU _features_ only. As CPU _errata_ descriptions share the same data structure and having an enable function is useful for errata as well (for instance to set bits in SCTLR), lets call it when enumerating erratas too. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-06-29 00:07:30 +07:00
void __init enable_errata_workarounds(void)
{
enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata);
}
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