linux_dsm_epyc7002/security/selinux/netlabel.c

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treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 13 Based on 2 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along with this program if not see http www gnu org licenses this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details [based] [from] [clk] [highbank] [c] you should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along with this program if not see http www gnu org licenses extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 355 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Jilayne Lovejoy <opensource@jilayne.com> Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190519154041.837383322@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-19 20:51:43 +07:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* SELinux NetLabel Support
*
* This file provides the necessary glue to tie NetLabel into the SELinux
* subsystem.
*
* Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
*/
/*
* (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007, 2008
*/
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 15:04:11 +07:00
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include "objsec.h"
#include "security.h"
#include "netlabel.h"
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached - Cache a SID lookup
* @skb: the packet
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
* @sid: the SID
*
* Description:
* Query the SELinux security server to lookup the correct SID for the given
* security attributes. If the query is successful, cache the result to speed
* up future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
u32 *sid)
{
int rc;
rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&selinux_state, secattr, sid);
if (rc == 0 &&
(secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) &&
(secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE))
netlbl_cache_add(skb, family, secattr);
return rc;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr - Generate the NetLabel socket secattr
* @sk: the socket
*
* Description:
* Generate the NetLabel security attributes for a socket, making full use of
* the socket's attribute cache. Returns a pointer to the security attributes
* on success, NULL on failure.
*
*/
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
return sksec->nlbl_secattr;
secattr = netlbl_secattr_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (secattr == NULL)
return NULL;
rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, sksec->sid,
secattr);
if (rc != 0) {
netlbl_secattr_free(secattr);
return NULL;
}
sksec->nlbl_secattr = secattr;
return secattr;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr - Get the cached NetLabel secattr
* @sk: the socket
* @sid: the SID
*
* Query the socket's cached secattr and if the SID matches the cached value
* return the cache, otherwise return NULL.
*
*/
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
const struct sock *sk,
u32 sid)
{
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
if (secattr == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
(secattr->attr.secid == sid))
return secattr;
return NULL;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate - Invalidate the NetLabel cache
*
* Description:
* Invalidate the NetLabel security attribute mapping cache.
*
*/
void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
{
netlbl_cache_invalidate();
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_err - Handle a NetLabel packet error
* @skb: the packet
* @error: the error code
* @gateway: true if host is acting as a gateway, false otherwise
*
* Description:
* When a packet is dropped due to a call to avc_has_perm() pass the error
* code to the NetLabel subsystem so any protocol specific processing can be
* done. This is safe to call even if you are unsure if NetLabel labeling is
* present on the packet, NetLabel is smart enough to only act when it should.
*
*/
void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, int error, int gateway)
{
netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, error, gateway);
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free - Free the NetLabel fields
* @sksec: the sk_security_struct
*
* Description:
* Free all of the memory in the NetLabel fields of a sk_security_struct.
*
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
{
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
netlbl_secattr_free(sksec->nlbl_secattr);
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
* @sksec: the sk_security_struct
* @family: the socket family
*
* Description:
* Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset.
* The caller is responsible for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
*
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
{
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid - Get the sid of a packet using NetLabel
* @skb: the packet
* @family: protocol family
* @type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
* @sid: the SID
*
* Description:
* Call the NetLabel mechanism to get the security attributes of the given
* packet and use those attributes to determine the correct context/SID to
* assign to the packet. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
u32 *type,
u32 *sid)
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (!netlbl_enabled()) {
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
return 0;
}
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, family,
&secattr, sid);
else
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
*type = secattr.type;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
return rc;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid - Set the NetLabel on a packet given a sid
* @skb: the packet
* @family: protocol family
* @sid: the SID
*
* Description
* Call the NetLabel mechanism to set the label of a packet using @sid.
* Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
u32 sid)
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr_storage;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = NULL;
struct sock *sk;
/* if this is a locally generated packet check to see if it is already
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid);
}
if (secattr == NULL) {
secattr = &secattr_storage;
netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, sid,
secattr);
if (rc != 0)
goto skbuff_setsid_return;
}
rc = netlbl_skbuff_setattr(skb, family, secattr);
skbuff_setsid_return:
if (secattr == &secattr_storage)
netlbl_secattr_destroy(secattr);
return rc;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request - Label an incoming sctp association.
* @ep: incoming association endpoint.
* @skb: the packet.
*
* Description:
* A new incoming connection is represented by @ep, ......
* Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
if (ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
return 0;
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state,
ep->secid, &secattr);
if (rc != 0)
goto assoc_request_return;
/* Move skb hdr address info to a struct sockaddr and then call
* netlbl_conn_setattr().
*/
if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, (void *)&addr4, &secattr);
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && ip_hdr(skb)->version == 6) {
addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, (void *)&addr6, &secattr);
} else {
rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
if (rc == 0)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
assoc_request_return:
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
return rc;
}
/**
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
* selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
* @req: incoming connection request socket
*
* Description:
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
* A new incoming connection request is represented by @req, we need to label
* the new request_sock here and the stack will ensure the on-the-wire label
* will get preserved when a full sock is created once the connection handshake
* is complete. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
{
int rc;
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
return 0;
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, req->secid,
&secattr);
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
if (rc != 0)
goto inet_conn_request_return;
rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
inet_conn_request_return:
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
return rc;
}
/**
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
* selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone - Initialize the newly created sock
* @sk: the new sock
*
* Description:
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
* A new connection has been established using @sk, we've already labeled the
* socket via the request_sock struct in selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request() but
* we need to set the NetLabel state here since we now have a sock structure.
*
*/
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
else
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone - Copy state to the newly created sock
* @sk: current sock
* @newsk: the new sock
*
* Description:
* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3).
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
}
/**
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
* selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
* @sock: the socket to label
* @family: protocol family
*
* Description:
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
* Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
* SID. Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
return 0;
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
if (secattr == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, family, secattr);
switch (rc) {
case 0:
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
break;
case -EDESTADDRREQ:
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
rc = 0;
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 04:10:34 +07:00
break;
}
return rc;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb - Do an inbound access check using NetLabel
* @sksec: the sock's sk_security_struct
* @skb: the packet
* @family: protocol family
* @ad: the audit data
*
* Description:
* Fetch the NetLabel security attributes from @skb and perform an access check
* against the receiving socket. Returns zero on success, negative values on
* error.
*
*/
int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
int rc;
u32 nlbl_sid;
u32 perm;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (!netlbl_enabled())
return 0;
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, family,
&secattr, &nlbl_sid);
else
nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
switch (sksec->sclass) {
case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
break;
case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
break;
default:
perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
}
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
if (rc == 0)
return 0;
if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
return rc;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_option - Is this a NetLabel option
* @level: the socket level or protocol
* @optname: the socket option name
*
* Description:
* Returns true if @level and @optname refer to a NetLabel option.
* Helper for selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt().
*/
static inline int selinux_netlbl_option(int level, int optname)
{
return (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS) ||
(level == IPPROTO_IPV6 && optname == IPV6_HOPOPTS);
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt - Do not allow users to remove a NetLabel
* @sock: the socket
* @level: the socket level or protocol
* @optname: the socket option name
*
* Description:
* Check the setsockopt() call and if the user is trying to replace the IP
* options on a socket and a NetLabel is in place for the socket deny the
* access; otherwise allow the access. Returns zero when the access is
* allowed, -EACCES when denied, and other negative values on error.
*
*/
int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
int level,
int optname)
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
(sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED ||
sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_CONNLABELED)) {
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
lock_sock(sk);
/* call the netlabel function directly as we want to see the
* on-the-wire label that is assigned via the socket's options
* and not the cached netlabel/lsm attributes */
rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr);
release_sock(sk);
if (rc == 0)
rc = -EACCES;
else if (rc == -ENOMSG)
rc = 0;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
}
return rc;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper - Help label a client-side socket on
* connect
* @sk: the socket to label
* @addr: the destination address
*
* Description:
* Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
* Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
* is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
* the socket */
if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
rc = 0;
return rc;
}
secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
if (secattr == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
return rc;
}
rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr);
if (rc == 0)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
return rc;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked - Label a client-side socket on
* connect
* @sk: the socket to label
* @addr: the destination address
*
* Description:
* Attempt to label a connected socket that already has the socket locked
* with NetLabel using the given address.
* Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
return 0;
return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr);
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
* @sk: the socket to label
* @addr: the destination address
*
* Description:
* Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
* Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
lock_sock(sk);
rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
selinux: correct locking in selinux_netlbl_socket_connect) The SELinux/NetLabel glue code has a locking bug that affects systems with NetLabel enabled, see the kernel error message below. This patch corrects this problem by converting the bottom half socket lock to a more conventional, and correct for this call-path, lock_sock() call. =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Not tainted ------------------------------- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1928 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by ping/731: #0: (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-...}, at: [...] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<...>] netlbl_conn_setattr stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 731 Comm: ping Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000001 ffff88006f659d28 ffffffff81726b6a ffff88003732c500 ffff88006f659d58 ffffffff810e4457 ffff88006b845a00 0000000000000000 000000000000000c ffff880075aa2f50 ffff88006f659d90 ffffffff8169bec7 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81726b6a>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74 [<ffffffff810e4457>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe7/0x120 [<ffffffff8169bec7>] cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x187/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8170f317>] netlbl_conn_setattr+0x187/0x190 [<ffffffff8170f195>] ? netlbl_conn_setattr+0x5/0x190 [<ffffffff8131ac9e>] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xae/0xc0 [<ffffffff81303025>] selinux_socket_connect+0x135/0x170 [<ffffffff8119d127>] ? might_fault+0x57/0xb0 [<ffffffff812fb146>] security_socket_connect+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff815d3ad3>] SYSC_connect+0x73/0x130 [<ffffffff81739a85>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d [<ffffffff810e5e2d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0 [<ffffffff81373d4e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff815d52be>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81739a59>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-09-27 04:00:46 +07:00
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
}