linux_dsm_epyc7002/kernel/kcov.c

931 lines
25 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 21:07:57 +07:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kcov: " fmt
#define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
#include <linux/atomic.h>
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
#include <linux/hashtable.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/preempt.h>
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/kcov.h>
kcov: convert kcov.refcount to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable kcov.refcount is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. **Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the kcov.refcount it might make a difference in following places: - kcov_put(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547634429-772-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-08 07:30:00 +07:00
#include <linux/refcount.h>
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
#include <linux/log2.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
#define kcov_debug(fmt, ...) pr_debug("%s: " fmt, __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
/* Number of 64-bit words written per one comparison: */
#define KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP 4
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
/*
* kcov descriptor (one per opened debugfs file).
* State transitions of the descriptor:
* - initial state after open()
* - then there must be a single ioctl(KCOV_INIT_TRACE) call
* - then, mmap() call (several calls are allowed but not useful)
* - then, ioctl(KCOV_ENABLE, arg), where arg is
* KCOV_TRACE_PC - to trace only the PCs
* or
* KCOV_TRACE_CMP - to trace only the comparison operands
* - then, ioctl(KCOV_DISABLE) to disable the task.
* Enabling/disabling ioctls can be repeated (only one task a time allowed).
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
*/
struct kcov {
/*
* Reference counter. We keep one for:
* - opened file descriptor
* - task with enabled coverage (we can't unwire it from another task)
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
* - each code section for remote coverage collection
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
*/
kcov: convert kcov.refcount to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable kcov.refcount is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. **Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the kcov.refcount it might make a difference in following places: - kcov_put(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547634429-772-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-08 07:30:00 +07:00
refcount_t refcount;
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
/* The lock protects mode, size, area and t. */
spinlock_t lock;
enum kcov_mode mode;
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
/* Size of arena (in long's). */
unsigned int size;
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
/* Coverage buffer shared with user space. */
void *area;
/* Task for which we collect coverage, or NULL. */
struct task_struct *t;
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
/* Collecting coverage from remote (background) threads. */
bool remote;
/* Size of remote area (in long's). */
unsigned int remote_size;
/*
* Sequence is incremented each time kcov is reenabled, used by
* kcov_remote_stop(), see the comment there.
*/
int sequence;
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
};
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
struct kcov_remote_area {
struct list_head list;
unsigned int size;
};
struct kcov_remote {
u64 handle;
struct kcov *kcov;
struct hlist_node hnode;
};
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kcov_remote_lock);
static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(kcov_remote_map, 4);
static struct list_head kcov_remote_areas = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kcov_remote_areas);
/* Must be called with kcov_remote_lock locked. */
static struct kcov_remote *kcov_remote_find(u64 handle)
{
struct kcov_remote *remote;
hash_for_each_possible(kcov_remote_map, remote, hnode, handle) {
if (remote->handle == handle)
return remote;
}
return NULL;
}
static struct kcov_remote *kcov_remote_add(struct kcov *kcov, u64 handle)
{
struct kcov_remote *remote;
if (kcov_remote_find(handle))
return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
remote = kmalloc(sizeof(*remote), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!remote)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
remote->handle = handle;
remote->kcov = kcov;
hash_add(kcov_remote_map, &remote->hnode, handle);
return remote;
}
/* Must be called with kcov_remote_lock locked. */
static struct kcov_remote_area *kcov_remote_area_get(unsigned int size)
{
struct kcov_remote_area *area;
struct list_head *pos;
kcov_debug("size = %u\n", size);
list_for_each(pos, &kcov_remote_areas) {
area = list_entry(pos, struct kcov_remote_area, list);
if (area->size == size) {
list_del(&area->list);
kcov_debug("rv = %px\n", area);
return area;
}
}
kcov_debug("rv = NULL\n");
return NULL;
}
/* Must be called with kcov_remote_lock locked. */
static void kcov_remote_area_put(struct kcov_remote_area *area,
unsigned int size)
{
kcov_debug("area = %px, size = %u\n", area, size);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&area->list);
area->size = size;
list_add(&area->list, &kcov_remote_areas);
}
static notrace bool check_kcov_mode(enum kcov_mode needed_mode, struct task_struct *t)
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
{
2018-06-15 05:27:41 +07:00
unsigned int mode;
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
/*
* We are interested in code coverage as a function of a syscall inputs,
* so we ignore code executed in interrupts.
*/
if (!in_task())
return false;
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
mode = READ_ONCE(t->kcov_mode);
/*
* There is some code that runs in interrupts but for which
* in_interrupt() returns false (e.g. preempt_schedule_irq()).
* READ_ONCE()/barrier() effectively provides load-acquire wrt
* interrupts, there are paired barrier()/WRITE_ONCE() in
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
* kcov_start().
*/
barrier();
return mode == needed_mode;
}
static notrace unsigned long canonicalize_ip(unsigned long ip)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
ip -= kaslr_offset();
#endif
return ip;
}
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
/*
* Entry point from instrumented code.
* This is called once per basic-block/edge.
*/
void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
{
struct task_struct *t;
unsigned long *area;
unsigned long ip = canonicalize_ip(_RET_IP_);
unsigned long pos;
t = current;
if (!check_kcov_mode(KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC, t))
return;
area = t->kcov_area;
/* The first 64-bit word is the number of subsequent PCs. */
pos = READ_ONCE(area[0]) + 1;
if (likely(pos < t->kcov_size)) {
area[pos] = ip;
WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc);
#ifdef CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS
kernel/kcov.c: mark write_comp_data() as notrace Since __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 is marked as notrace, the function called from __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 shouldn't be traceable either. ftrace_graph_caller() gets called every time func write_comp_data() gets called if it isn't marked 'notrace'. This is the backtrace from gdb: #0 ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179 #1 0xffffff8010201920 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:151 #2 0xffffff8010439714 in write_comp_data (type=5, arg1=0, arg2=0, ip=18446743524224276596) at ../kernel/kcov.c:116 #3 0xffffff8010439894 in __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 (arg1=<optimized out>, arg2=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/kcov.c:188 #4 0xffffff8010201874 in prepare_ftrace_return (self_addr=18446743524226602768, parent=0xffffff801014b918, frame_pointer=18446743524223531344) at ./include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:27 #5 0xffffff801020194c in ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:182 Rework so that write_comp_data() that are called from __sanitizer_cov_trace_*_cmp*() are marked as 'notrace'. Commit 903e8ff86753 ("kernel/kcov.c: mark funcs in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() as notrace") missed to mark write_comp_data() as 'notrace'. When that patch was created gcc-7 was used. In lib/Kconfig.debug config KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage=trace-cmp) That code path isn't hit with gcc-7. However, it were that with gcc-8. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181206143011.23719-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 06:28:24 +07:00
static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
{
struct task_struct *t;
u64 *area;
u64 count, start_index, end_pos, max_pos;
t = current;
if (!check_kcov_mode(KCOV_MODE_TRACE_CMP, t))
return;
ip = canonicalize_ip(ip);
/*
* We write all comparison arguments and types as u64.
* The buffer was allocated for t->kcov_size unsigned longs.
*/
area = (u64 *)t->kcov_area;
max_pos = t->kcov_size * sizeof(unsigned long);
count = READ_ONCE(area[0]);
/* Every record is KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP 64-bit words. */
start_index = 1 + count * KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP;
end_pos = (start_index + KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP) * sizeof(u64);
if (likely(end_pos <= max_pos)) {
area[start_index] = type;
area[start_index + 1] = arg1;
area[start_index + 2] = arg2;
area[start_index + 3] = ip;
WRITE_ONCE(area[0], count + 1);
}
}
void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1(u8 arg1, u8 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(0), arg1, arg2, _RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1);
void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp2(u16 arg1, u16 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(1), arg1, arg2, _RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp2);
void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4(u32 arg1, u32 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(2), arg1, arg2, _RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4);
void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8(u64 arg1, u64 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(3), arg1, arg2, _RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8);
void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp1(u8 arg1, u8 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(0) | KCOV_CMP_CONST, arg1, arg2,
_RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp1);
void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2(u16 arg1, u16 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(1) | KCOV_CMP_CONST, arg1, arg2,
_RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2);
void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4(u32 arg1, u32 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(2) | KCOV_CMP_CONST, arg1, arg2,
_RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4);
void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8(u64 arg1, u64 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(3) | KCOV_CMP_CONST, arg1, arg2,
_RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8);
void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch(u64 val, u64 *cases)
{
u64 i;
u64 count = cases[0];
u64 size = cases[1];
u64 type = KCOV_CMP_CONST;
switch (size) {
case 8:
type |= KCOV_CMP_SIZE(0);
break;
case 16:
type |= KCOV_CMP_SIZE(1);
break;
case 32:
type |= KCOV_CMP_SIZE(2);
break;
case 64:
type |= KCOV_CMP_SIZE(3);
break;
default:
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
write_comp_data(type, cases[i + 2], val, _RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_switch);
#endif /* ifdef CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS */
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
static void kcov_start(struct task_struct *t, unsigned int size,
void *area, enum kcov_mode mode, int sequence)
{
kcov_debug("t = %px, size = %u, area = %px\n", t, size, area);
/* Cache in task struct for performance. */
t->kcov_size = size;
t->kcov_area = area;
/* See comment in check_kcov_mode(). */
barrier();
WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_mode, mode);
t->kcov_sequence = sequence;
}
static void kcov_stop(struct task_struct *t)
{
WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_mode, KCOV_MODE_DISABLED);
barrier();
t->kcov_size = 0;
t->kcov_area = NULL;
}
static void kcov_task_reset(struct task_struct *t)
{
kcov_stop(t);
t->kcov = NULL;
t->kcov_sequence = 0;
t->kcov_handle = 0;
}
void kcov_task_init(struct task_struct *t)
{
kcov_task_reset(t);
t->kcov_handle = current->kcov_handle;
}
static void kcov_reset(struct kcov *kcov)
{
kcov->t = NULL;
kcov->mode = KCOV_MODE_INIT;
kcov->remote = false;
kcov->remote_size = 0;
kcov->sequence++;
}
static void kcov_remote_reset(struct kcov *kcov)
{
int bkt;
struct kcov_remote *remote;
struct hlist_node *tmp;
spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock);
hash_for_each_safe(kcov_remote_map, bkt, tmp, remote, hnode) {
if (remote->kcov != kcov)
continue;
kcov_debug("removing handle %llx\n", remote->handle);
hash_del(&remote->hnode);
kfree(remote);
}
/* Do reset before unlock to prevent races with kcov_remote_start(). */
kcov_reset(kcov);
spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
}
static void kcov_disable(struct task_struct *t, struct kcov *kcov)
{
kcov_task_reset(t);
if (kcov->remote)
kcov_remote_reset(kcov);
else
kcov_reset(kcov);
}
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
static void kcov_get(struct kcov *kcov)
{
kcov: convert kcov.refcount to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable kcov.refcount is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. **Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the kcov.refcount it might make a difference in following places: - kcov_put(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547634429-772-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-08 07:30:00 +07:00
refcount_inc(&kcov->refcount);
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
}
static void kcov_put(struct kcov *kcov)
{
kcov: convert kcov.refcount to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable kcov.refcount is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. **Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the kcov.refcount it might make a difference in following places: - kcov_put(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547634429-772-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-08 07:30:00 +07:00
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&kcov->refcount)) {
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
kcov_remote_reset(kcov);
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
vfree(kcov->area);
kfree(kcov);
}
}
void kcov_task_exit(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct kcov *kcov;
kcov = t->kcov;
if (kcov == NULL)
return;
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
spin_lock(&kcov->lock);
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
kcov_debug("t = %px, kcov->t = %px\n", t, kcov->t);
/*
* For KCOV_ENABLE devices we want to make sure that t->kcov->t == t,
* which comes down to:
* WARN_ON(!kcov->remote && kcov->t != t);
*
* For KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE devices, the exiting task is either:
* 2. A remote task between kcov_remote_start() and kcov_remote_stop().
* In this case we should print a warning right away, since a task
* shouldn't be exiting when it's in a kcov coverage collection
* section. Here t points to the task that is collecting remote
* coverage, and t->kcov->t points to the thread that created the
* kcov device. Which means that to detect this case we need to
* check that t != t->kcov->t, and this gives us the following:
* WARN_ON(kcov->remote && kcov->t != t);
*
* 2. The task that created kcov exiting without calling KCOV_DISABLE,
* and then again we can make sure that t->kcov->t == t:
* WARN_ON(kcov->remote && kcov->t != t);
*
* By combining all three checks into one we get:
*/
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
if (WARN_ON(kcov->t != t)) {
spin_unlock(&kcov->lock);
return;
}
/* Just to not leave dangling references behind. */
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
kcov_disable(t, kcov);
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
spin_unlock(&kcov->lock);
kcov_put(kcov);
}
static int kcov_mmap(struct file *filep, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
int res = 0;
void *area;
struct kcov *kcov = vma->vm_file->private_data;
unsigned long size, off;
struct page *page;
area = vmalloc_user(vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start);
if (!area)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock(&kcov->lock);
size = kcov->size * sizeof(unsigned long);
if (kcov->mode != KCOV_MODE_INIT || vma->vm_pgoff != 0 ||
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != size) {
res = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
if (!kcov->area) {
kcov->area = area;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND;
spin_unlock(&kcov->lock);
for (off = 0; off < size; off += PAGE_SIZE) {
page = vmalloc_to_page(kcov->area + off);
if (vm_insert_page(vma, vma->vm_start + off, page))
WARN_ONCE(1, "vm_insert_page() failed");
}
return 0;
}
exit:
spin_unlock(&kcov->lock);
vfree(area);
return res;
}
static int kcov_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filep)
{
struct kcov *kcov;
kcov = kzalloc(sizeof(*kcov), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kcov)
return -ENOMEM;
kcov->mode = KCOV_MODE_DISABLED;
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
kcov->sequence = 1;
kcov: convert kcov.refcount to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable kcov.refcount is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. **Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the kcov.refcount it might make a difference in following places: - kcov_put(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547634429-772-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-08 07:30:00 +07:00
refcount_set(&kcov->refcount, 1);
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
spin_lock_init(&kcov->lock);
filep->private_data = kcov;
return nonseekable_open(inode, filep);
}
static int kcov_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filep)
{
kcov_put(filep->private_data);
return 0;
}
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
static int kcov_get_mode(unsigned long arg)
{
if (arg == KCOV_TRACE_PC)
return KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC;
else if (arg == KCOV_TRACE_CMP)
#ifdef CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS
return KCOV_MODE_TRACE_CMP;
#else
return -ENOTSUPP;
#endif
else
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* Fault in a lazily-faulted vmalloc area before it can be used by
* __santizer_cov_trace_pc(), to avoid recursion issues if any code on the
* vmalloc fault handling path is instrumented.
*/
static void kcov_fault_in_area(struct kcov *kcov)
{
unsigned long stride = PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long);
unsigned long *area = kcov->area;
unsigned long offset;
for (offset = 0; offset < kcov->size; offset += stride)
READ_ONCE(area[offset]);
}
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
static inline bool kcov_check_handle(u64 handle, bool common_valid,
bool uncommon_valid, bool zero_valid)
{
if (handle & ~(KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_MASK | KCOV_INSTANCE_MASK))
return false;
switch (handle & KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_MASK) {
case KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_COMMON:
return (handle & KCOV_INSTANCE_MASK) ?
common_valid : zero_valid;
case KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_USB:
return uncommon_valid;
default:
return false;
}
return false;
}
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
static int kcov_ioctl_locked(struct kcov *kcov, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct task_struct *t;
unsigned long size, unused;
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
int mode, i;
struct kcov_remote_arg *remote_arg;
struct kcov_remote *remote;
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
switch (cmd) {
case KCOV_INIT_TRACE:
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
kcov_debug("KCOV_INIT_TRACE\n");
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
/*
* Enable kcov in trace mode and setup buffer size.
* Must happen before anything else.
*/
if (kcov->mode != KCOV_MODE_DISABLED)
return -EBUSY;
/*
* Size must be at least 2 to hold current position and one PC.
* Later we allocate size * sizeof(unsigned long) memory,
* that must not overflow.
*/
size = arg;
if (size < 2 || size > INT_MAX / sizeof(unsigned long))
return -EINVAL;
kcov->size = size;
kcov->mode = KCOV_MODE_INIT;
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
return 0;
case KCOV_ENABLE:
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
kcov_debug("KCOV_ENABLE\n");
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
/*
* Enable coverage for the current task.
* At this point user must have been enabled trace mode,
* and mmapped the file. Coverage collection is disabled only
* at task exit or voluntary by KCOV_DISABLE. After that it can
* be enabled for another task.
*/
if (kcov->mode != KCOV_MODE_INIT || !kcov->area)
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
return -EINVAL;
t = current;
if (kcov->t != NULL || t->kcov != NULL)
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
return -EBUSY;
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
mode = kcov_get_mode(arg);
if (mode < 0)
return mode;
kcov_fault_in_area(kcov);
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
kcov->mode = mode;
kcov_start(t, kcov->size, kcov->area, kcov->mode,
kcov->sequence);
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
t->kcov = kcov;
kcov->t = t;
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
/* Put either in kcov_task_exit() or in KCOV_DISABLE. */
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
kcov_get(kcov);
return 0;
case KCOV_DISABLE:
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
kcov_debug("KCOV_DISABLE\n");
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
/* Disable coverage for the current task. */
unused = arg;
if (unused != 0 || current->kcov != kcov)
return -EINVAL;
t = current;
if (WARN_ON(kcov->t != t))
return -EINVAL;
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
kcov_disable(t, kcov);
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
kcov_put(kcov);
return 0;
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
case KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE:
kcov_debug("KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE\n");
if (kcov->mode != KCOV_MODE_INIT || !kcov->area)
return -EINVAL;
t = current;
if (kcov->t != NULL || t->kcov != NULL)
return -EBUSY;
remote_arg = (struct kcov_remote_arg *)arg;
mode = kcov_get_mode(remote_arg->trace_mode);
if (mode < 0)
return mode;
if (remote_arg->area_size > LONG_MAX / sizeof(unsigned long))
return -EINVAL;
kcov->mode = mode;
t->kcov = kcov;
kcov->t = t;
kcov->remote = true;
kcov->remote_size = remote_arg->area_size;
spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock);
for (i = 0; i < remote_arg->num_handles; i++) {
kcov_debug("handle %llx\n", remote_arg->handles[i]);
if (!kcov_check_handle(remote_arg->handles[i],
false, true, false)) {
spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
kcov_disable(t, kcov);
return -EINVAL;
}
remote = kcov_remote_add(kcov, remote_arg->handles[i]);
if (IS_ERR(remote)) {
spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
kcov_disable(t, kcov);
return PTR_ERR(remote);
}
}
if (remote_arg->common_handle) {
kcov_debug("common handle %llx\n",
remote_arg->common_handle);
if (!kcov_check_handle(remote_arg->common_handle,
true, false, false)) {
spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
kcov_disable(t, kcov);
return -EINVAL;
}
remote = kcov_remote_add(kcov,
remote_arg->common_handle);
if (IS_ERR(remote)) {
spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
kcov_disable(t, kcov);
return PTR_ERR(remote);
}
t->kcov_handle = remote_arg->common_handle;
}
spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
/* Put either in kcov_task_exit() or in KCOV_DISABLE. */
kcov_get(kcov);
return 0;
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
default:
return -ENOTTY;
}
}
static long kcov_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kcov *kcov;
int res;
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
struct kcov_remote_arg *remote_arg = NULL;
unsigned int remote_num_handles;
unsigned long remote_arg_size;
if (cmd == KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE) {
if (get_user(remote_num_handles, (unsigned __user *)(arg +
offsetof(struct kcov_remote_arg, num_handles))))
return -EFAULT;
if (remote_num_handles > KCOV_REMOTE_MAX_HANDLES)
return -EINVAL;
remote_arg_size = struct_size(remote_arg, handles,
remote_num_handles);
remote_arg = memdup_user((void __user *)arg, remote_arg_size);
if (IS_ERR(remote_arg))
return PTR_ERR(remote_arg);
if (remote_arg->num_handles != remote_num_handles) {
kfree(remote_arg);
return -EINVAL;
}
arg = (unsigned long)remote_arg;
}
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
kcov = filep->private_data;
spin_lock(&kcov->lock);
res = kcov_ioctl_locked(kcov, cmd, arg);
spin_unlock(&kcov->lock);
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
kfree(remote_arg);
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
return res;
}
static const struct file_operations kcov_fops = {
.open = kcov_open,
.unlocked_ioctl = kcov_ioctl,
.compat_ioctl = kcov_ioctl,
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
.mmap = kcov_mmap,
.release = kcov_close,
};
kcov: remote coverage support Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3. This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and vhost. Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this when custom annotations are added (the list is based on process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot): 1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker, 2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers, 3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker, 4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers, 5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker. These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit instance: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524 This patch (of 3): Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov. With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers). To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code sections, that are referenced by those handles. Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(). Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased. When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage selectively from different subsystems. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 07:52:43 +07:00
/*
* kcov_remote_start() and kcov_remote_stop() can be used to annotate a section
* of code in a kernel background thread to allow kcov to be used to collect
* coverage from that part of code.
*
* The handle argument of kcov_remote_start() identifies a code section that is
* used for coverage collection. A userspace process passes this handle to
* KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl to make the used kcov device start collecting
* coverage for the code section identified by this handle.
*
* The usage of these annotations in the kernel code is different depending on
* the type of the kernel thread whose code is being annotated.
*
* For global kernel threads that are spawned in a limited number of instances
* (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per USB HCD), each
* instance must be assigned a unique 4-byte instance id. The instance id is
* then combined with a 1-byte subsystem id to get a handle via
* kcov_remote_handle(subsystem_id, instance_id).
*
* For local kernel threads that are spawned from system calls handler when a
* user interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers), a handle is
* passed from a userspace process as the common_handle field of the
* kcov_remote_arg struct (note, that the user must generate a handle by using
* kcov_remote_handle() with KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_COMMON as the subsystem id and an
* arbitrary 4-byte non-zero number as the instance id). This common handle
* then gets saved into the task_struct of the process that issued the
* KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl. When this proccess issues system calls that spawn
* kernel threads, the common handle must be retrived via kcov_common_handle()
* and passed to the spawned threads via custom annotations. Those kernel
* threads must in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start(common_handle) and
* kcov_remote_stop(). All of the threads that are spawned by the same process
* obtain the same handle, hence the name "common".
*
* See Documentation/dev-tools/kcov.rst for more details.
*
* Internally, this function looks up the kcov device associated with the
* provided handle, allocates an area for coverage collection, and saves the
* pointers to kcov and area into the current task_struct to allow coverage to
* be collected via __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc()
* In turns kcov_remote_stop() clears those pointers from task_struct to stop
* collecting coverage and copies all collected coverage into the kcov area.
*/
void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle)
{
struct kcov_remote *remote;
void *area;
struct task_struct *t;
unsigned int size;
enum kcov_mode mode;
int sequence;
if (WARN_ON(!kcov_check_handle(handle, true, true, true)))
return;
if (WARN_ON(!in_task()))
return;
t = current;
/*
* Check that kcov_remote_start is not called twice
* nor called by user tasks (with enabled kcov).
*/
if (WARN_ON(t->kcov))
return;
kcov_debug("handle = %llx\n", handle);
spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock);
remote = kcov_remote_find(handle);
if (!remote) {
kcov_debug("no remote found");
spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
return;
}
/* Put in kcov_remote_stop(). */
kcov_get(remote->kcov);
t->kcov = remote->kcov;
/*
* Read kcov fields before unlock to prevent races with
* KCOV_DISABLE / kcov_remote_reset().
*/
size = remote->kcov->remote_size;
mode = remote->kcov->mode;
sequence = remote->kcov->sequence;
area = kcov_remote_area_get(size);
spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
if (!area) {
area = vmalloc(size * sizeof(unsigned long));
if (!area) {
t->kcov = NULL;
kcov_put(remote->kcov);
return;
}
}
/* Reset coverage size. */
*(u64 *)area = 0;
kcov_debug("area = %px, size = %u", area, size);
kcov_start(t, size, area, mode, sequence);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcov_remote_start);
static void kcov_move_area(enum kcov_mode mode, void *dst_area,
unsigned int dst_area_size, void *src_area)
{
u64 word_size = sizeof(unsigned long);
u64 count_size, entry_size_log;
u64 dst_len, src_len;
void *dst_entries, *src_entries;
u64 dst_occupied, dst_free, bytes_to_move, entries_moved;
kcov_debug("%px %u <= %px %lu\n",
dst_area, dst_area_size, src_area, *(unsigned long *)src_area);
switch (mode) {
case KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC:
dst_len = READ_ONCE(*(unsigned long *)dst_area);
src_len = *(unsigned long *)src_area;
count_size = sizeof(unsigned long);
entry_size_log = __ilog2_u64(sizeof(unsigned long));
break;
case KCOV_MODE_TRACE_CMP:
dst_len = READ_ONCE(*(u64 *)dst_area);
src_len = *(u64 *)src_area;
count_size = sizeof(u64);
BUILD_BUG_ON(!is_power_of_2(KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP));
entry_size_log = __ilog2_u64(sizeof(u64) * KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP);
break;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
return;
}
/* As arm can't divide u64 integers use log of entry size. */
if (dst_len > ((dst_area_size * word_size - count_size) >>
entry_size_log))
return;
dst_occupied = count_size + (dst_len << entry_size_log);
dst_free = dst_area_size * word_size - dst_occupied;
bytes_to_move = min(dst_free, src_len << entry_size_log);
dst_entries = dst_area + dst_occupied;
src_entries = src_area + count_size;
memcpy(dst_entries, src_entries, bytes_to_move);
entries_moved = bytes_to_move >> entry_size_log;
switch (mode) {
case KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC:
WRITE_ONCE(*(unsigned long *)dst_area, dst_len + entries_moved);
break;
case KCOV_MODE_TRACE_CMP:
WRITE_ONCE(*(u64 *)dst_area, dst_len + entries_moved);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* See the comment before kcov_remote_start() for usage details. */
void kcov_remote_stop(void)
{
struct task_struct *t = current;
struct kcov *kcov = t->kcov;
void *area = t->kcov_area;
unsigned int size = t->kcov_size;
int sequence = t->kcov_sequence;
if (!kcov) {
kcov_debug("no kcov found\n");
return;
}
kcov_stop(t);
t->kcov = NULL;
spin_lock(&kcov->lock);
/*
* KCOV_DISABLE could have been called between kcov_remote_start()
* and kcov_remote_stop(), hence the check.
*/
kcov_debug("move if: %d == %d && %d\n",
sequence, kcov->sequence, (int)kcov->remote);
if (sequence == kcov->sequence && kcov->remote)
kcov_move_area(kcov->mode, kcov->area, kcov->size, area);
spin_unlock(&kcov->lock);
spin_lock(&kcov_remote_lock);
kcov_remote_area_put(area, size);
spin_unlock(&kcov_remote_lock);
kcov_put(kcov);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcov_remote_stop);
/* See the comment before kcov_remote_start() for usage details. */
u64 kcov_common_handle(void)
{
return current->kcov_handle;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kcov_common_handle);
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
static int __init kcov_init(void)
{
/*
* The kcov debugfs file won't ever get removed and thus,
* there is no need to protect it against removal races. The
* use of debugfs_create_file_unsafe() is actually safe here.
*/
debugfs_create_file_unsafe("kcov", 0600, NULL, NULL, &kcov_fops);
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
return 0;
}
device_initcall(kcov_init);