2007-10-17 13:29:46 +07:00
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/* Basic authentication token and access key management
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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*
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2007-10-17 13:29:46 +07:00
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* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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2006-06-27 16:53:54 +07:00
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#include <linux/poison.h>
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
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#include <linux/security.h>
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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#include <linux/workqueue.h>
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2006-06-26 14:24:54 +07:00
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#include <linux/random.h>
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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2006-12-07 11:33:20 +07:00
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static struct kmem_cache *key_jar;
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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struct rb_root key_serial_tree; /* tree of keys indexed by serial */
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DEFINE_SPINLOCK(key_serial_lock);
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struct rb_root key_user_tree; /* tree of quota records indexed by UID */
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DEFINE_SPINLOCK(key_user_lock);
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static LIST_HEAD(key_types_list);
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static DECLARE_RWSEM(key_types_sem);
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2006-11-22 21:55:48 +07:00
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static void key_cleanup(struct work_struct *work);
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static DECLARE_WORK(key_cleanup_task, key_cleanup);
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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/* we serialise key instantiation and link */
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2007-10-17 13:29:46 +07:00
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DEFINE_MUTEX(key_construction_mutex);
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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/* any key who's type gets unegistered will be re-typed to this */
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2006-01-06 15:11:25 +07:00
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static struct key_type key_type_dead = {
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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.name = "dead",
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};
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#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
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void __key_check(const struct key *key)
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{
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printk("__key_check: key %p {%08x} should be {%08x}\n",
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key, key->magic, KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC);
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BUG();
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}
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#endif
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* get the key quota record for a user, allocating a new record if one doesn't
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* already exist
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*/
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struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid)
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{
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struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user;
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struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
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struct rb_node **p;
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try_again:
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p = &key_user_tree.rb_node;
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spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
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/* search the tree for a user record with a matching UID */
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while (*p) {
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parent = *p;
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user = rb_entry(parent, struct key_user, node);
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if (uid < user->uid)
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p = &(*p)->rb_left;
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else if (uid > user->uid)
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p = &(*p)->rb_right;
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else
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goto found;
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}
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/* if we get here, we failed to find a match in the tree */
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if (!candidate) {
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/* allocate a candidate user record if we don't already have
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* one */
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spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
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user = NULL;
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candidate = kmalloc(sizeof(struct key_user), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (unlikely(!candidate))
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goto out;
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/* the allocation may have scheduled, so we need to repeat the
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* search lest someone else added the record whilst we were
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* asleep */
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goto try_again;
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}
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/* if we get here, then the user record still hadn't appeared on the
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* second pass - so we use the candidate record */
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atomic_set(&candidate->usage, 1);
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atomic_set(&candidate->nkeys, 0);
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atomic_set(&candidate->nikeys, 0);
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candidate->uid = uid;
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candidate->qnkeys = 0;
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candidate->qnbytes = 0;
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spin_lock_init(&candidate->lock);
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2007-10-17 13:29:46 +07:00
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mutex_init(&candidate->cons_lock);
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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rb_link_node(&candidate->node, parent, p);
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rb_insert_color(&candidate->node, &key_user_tree);
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spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
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user = candidate;
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goto out;
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/* okay - we found a user record for this UID */
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found:
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atomic_inc(&user->usage);
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spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
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2005-11-07 16:01:35 +07:00
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kfree(candidate);
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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out:
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return user;
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} /* end key_user_lookup() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* dispose of a user structure
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*/
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void key_user_put(struct key_user *user)
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{
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if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&user->usage, &key_user_lock)) {
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rb_erase(&user->node, &key_user_tree);
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spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
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kfree(user);
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}
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} /* end key_user_put() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* insert a key with a fixed serial number
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*/
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static void __init __key_insert_serial(struct key *key)
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{
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struct rb_node *parent, **p;
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struct key *xkey;
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parent = NULL;
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p = &key_serial_tree.rb_node;
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while (*p) {
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parent = *p;
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xkey = rb_entry(parent, struct key, serial_node);
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if (key->serial < xkey->serial)
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p = &(*p)->rb_left;
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else if (key->serial > xkey->serial)
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p = &(*p)->rb_right;
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else
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BUG();
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}
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/* we've found a suitable hole - arrange for this key to occupy it */
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rb_link_node(&key->serial_node, parent, p);
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rb_insert_color(&key->serial_node, &key_serial_tree);
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} /* end __key_insert_serial() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* assign a key the next unique serial number
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2006-06-26 14:24:54 +07:00
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* - these are assigned randomly to avoid security issues through covert
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* channel problems
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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*/
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static inline void key_alloc_serial(struct key *key)
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{
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struct rb_node *parent, **p;
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struct key *xkey;
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2006-06-26 14:24:54 +07:00
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/* propose a random serial number and look for a hole for it in the
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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* serial number tree */
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2006-06-26 14:24:54 +07:00
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do {
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get_random_bytes(&key->serial, sizeof(key->serial));
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key->serial >>= 1; /* negative numbers are not permitted */
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} while (key->serial < 3);
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spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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2007-02-06 20:45:51 +07:00
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attempt_insertion:
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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parent = NULL;
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p = &key_serial_tree.rb_node;
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while (*p) {
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parent = *p;
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xkey = rb_entry(parent, struct key, serial_node);
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if (key->serial < xkey->serial)
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p = &(*p)->rb_left;
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else if (key->serial > xkey->serial)
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p = &(*p)->rb_right;
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else
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goto serial_exists;
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}
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2007-02-06 20:45:51 +07:00
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/* we've found a suitable hole - arrange for this key to occupy it */
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rb_link_node(&key->serial_node, parent, p);
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rb_insert_color(&key->serial_node, &key_serial_tree);
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spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
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return;
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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/* we found a key with the proposed serial number - walk the tree from
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* that point looking for the next unused serial number */
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2006-06-26 14:24:54 +07:00
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serial_exists:
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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for (;;) {
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2006-06-26 14:24:54 +07:00
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key->serial++;
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2007-02-06 20:45:51 +07:00
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if (key->serial < 3) {
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key->serial = 3;
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goto attempt_insertion;
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}
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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parent = rb_next(parent);
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if (!parent)
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2007-02-06 20:45:51 +07:00
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goto attempt_insertion;
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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xkey = rb_entry(parent, struct key, serial_node);
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if (key->serial < xkey->serial)
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2007-02-06 20:45:51 +07:00
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goto attempt_insertion;
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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}
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} /* end key_alloc_serial() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* allocate a key of the specified type
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* - update the user's quota to reflect the existence of the key
|
2006-01-06 15:11:24 +07:00
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* - called from a key-type operation with key_types_sem read-locked by
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* key_create_or_update()
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* - this prevents unregistration of the key type
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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* - upon return the key is as yet uninstantiated; the caller needs to either
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* instantiate the key or discard it before returning
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*/
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struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
|
2006-06-23 04:47:17 +07:00
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uid_t uid, gid_t gid, struct task_struct *ctx,
|
2006-06-26 14:24:50 +07:00
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key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags)
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
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{
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struct key_user *user = NULL;
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struct key *key;
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size_t desclen, quotalen;
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
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int ret;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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if (!desc || !*desc)
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goto error;
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desclen = strlen(desc) + 1;
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quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen;
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/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
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user = key_user_lookup(uid);
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if (!user)
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goto no_memory_1;
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/* check that the user's quota permits allocation of another key and
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* its description */
|
2006-06-26 14:24:50 +07:00
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if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
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spin_lock(&user->lock);
|
2006-06-26 14:24:50 +07:00
|
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|
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN)) {
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|
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if (user->qnkeys + 1 >= KEYQUOTA_MAX_KEYS ||
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user->qnbytes + quotalen >= KEYQUOTA_MAX_BYTES
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)
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goto no_quota;
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}
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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user->qnkeys++;
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user->qnbytes += quotalen;
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spin_unlock(&user->lock);
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|
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}
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|
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|
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/* allocate and initialise the key and its description */
|
2006-12-07 11:33:17 +07:00
|
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key = kmem_cache_alloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!key)
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goto no_memory_2;
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|
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|
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if (desc) {
|
2006-12-07 11:33:47 +07:00
|
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|
key->description = kmemdup(desc, desclen, GFP_KERNEL);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!key->description)
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|
goto no_memory_3;
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|
|
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}
|
|
|
|
|
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atomic_set(&key->usage, 1);
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|
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init_rwsem(&key->sem);
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|
|
key->type = type;
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|
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key->user = user;
|
|
|
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key->quotalen = quotalen;
|
|
|
|
key->datalen = type->def_datalen;
|
|
|
|
key->uid = uid;
|
|
|
|
key->gid = gid;
|
|
|
|
key->perm = perm;
|
|
|
|
key->flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
key->expiry = 0;
|
|
|
|
key->payload.data = NULL;
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
key->security = NULL;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-26 14:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
|
|
|
|
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
/* let the security module know about the key */
|
2006-06-26 14:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = security_key_alloc(key, ctx, flags);
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
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|
|
goto security_error;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
/* publish the key by giving it a serial number */
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&user->nkeys);
|
|
|
|
key_alloc_serial(key);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
error:
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
return key;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
security_error:
|
|
|
|
kfree(key->description);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
|
2006-06-26 14:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&user->lock);
|
|
|
|
user->qnkeys--;
|
|
|
|
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_user_put(user);
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
no_memory_3:
|
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
|
|
|
|
no_memory_2:
|
2006-06-26 14:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&user->lock);
|
|
|
|
user->qnkeys--;
|
|
|
|
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_user_put(user);
|
|
|
|
no_memory_1:
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
no_quota:
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
|
|
|
|
key_user_put(user);
|
|
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(-EDQUOT);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_alloc() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_alloc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* reserve an amount of quota for the key's payload
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int delta = (int) datalen - key->datalen;
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* contemplate the quota adjustment */
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
if (delta != 0 && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (delta > 0 &&
|
|
|
|
key->user->qnbytes + delta > KEYQUOTA_MAX_BYTES
|
|
|
|
) {
|
|
|
|
ret = -EDQUOT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
key->user->qnbytes += delta;
|
|
|
|
key->quotalen += delta;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* change the recorded data length if that didn't generate an error */
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
|
|
key->datalen = datalen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_payload_reserve() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically
|
|
|
|
* - called with the target keyring's semaphore writelocked
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
|
|
|
|
const void *data,
|
|
|
|
size_t datalen,
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 12:00:56 +07:00
|
|
|
struct key *keyring,
|
|
|
|
struct key *instkey)
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret, awaken;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
key_check(keyring);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
awaken = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = -EBUSY;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-17 13:29:46 +07:00
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* can't instantiate twice */
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
/* instantiate the key */
|
|
|
|
ret = key->type->instantiate(key, data, datalen);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* mark the key as being instantiated */
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
awaken = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* and link it into the destination keyring */
|
|
|
|
if (keyring)
|
|
|
|
ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 12:00:56 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* disable the authorisation key */
|
|
|
|
if (instkey)
|
|
|
|
key_revoke(instkey);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-17 13:29:46 +07:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
|
|
|
|
if (awaken)
|
2007-10-17 13:29:46 +07:00
|
|
|
wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end __key_instantiate_and_link() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
|
|
|
|
const void *data,
|
|
|
|
size_t datalen,
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 12:00:56 +07:00
|
|
|
struct key *keyring,
|
|
|
|
struct key *instkey)
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keyring)
|
|
|
|
down_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 12:00:56 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, instkey);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keyring)
|
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 12:00:56 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
} /* end key_instantiate_and_link() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_instantiate_and_link);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* negatively instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
|
|
|
|
unsigned timeout,
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 12:00:56 +07:00
|
|
|
struct key *keyring,
|
|
|
|
struct key *instkey)
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct timespec now;
|
|
|
|
int ret, awaken;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
key_check(keyring);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
awaken = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = -EBUSY;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keyring)
|
|
|
|
down_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-17 13:29:46 +07:00
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* can't instantiate twice */
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
|
|
|
|
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
now = current_kernel_time();
|
|
|
|
key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
awaken = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* and link it into the destination keyring */
|
|
|
|
if (keyring)
|
|
|
|
ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 12:00:56 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* disable the authorisation key */
|
|
|
|
if (instkey)
|
|
|
|
key_revoke(instkey);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-17 13:29:46 +07:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keyring)
|
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
|
|
|
|
if (awaken)
|
2007-10-17 13:29:46 +07:00
|
|
|
wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_negate_and_link() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_negate_and_link);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* do cleaning up in process context so that we don't have to disable
|
|
|
|
* interrupts all over the place
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-11-22 21:55:48 +07:00
|
|
|
static void key_cleanup(struct work_struct *work)
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node *_n;
|
|
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
go_again:
|
|
|
|
/* look for a dead key in the tree */
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (_n = rb_first(&key_serial_tree); _n; _n = rb_next(_n)) {
|
|
|
|
key = rb_entry(_n, struct key, serial_node);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0)
|
|
|
|
goto found_dead_key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
found_dead_key:
|
|
|
|
/* we found a dead key - once we've removed it from the tree, we can
|
|
|
|
* drop the lock */
|
|
|
|
rb_erase(&key->serial_node, &key_serial_tree);
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
security_key_free(key);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
/* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
|
|
|
|
key->user->qnkeys--;
|
|
|
|
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_user_put(key->user);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* now throw away the key memory */
|
|
|
|
if (key->type->destroy)
|
|
|
|
key->type->destroy(key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(key->description);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
|
|
|
|
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* there may, of course, be more than one key to destroy */
|
|
|
|
goto go_again;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_cleanup() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* dispose of a reference to a key
|
|
|
|
* - when all the references are gone, we schedule the cleanup task to come and
|
|
|
|
* pull it out of the tree in definite process context
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void key_put(struct key *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (key) {
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&key->usage))
|
|
|
|
schedule_work(&key_cleanup_task);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_put() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_put);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* find a key by its serial number
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node *n;
|
|
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* search the tree for the specified key */
|
|
|
|
n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
|
|
|
|
while (n) {
|
|
|
|
key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (id < key->serial)
|
|
|
|
n = n->rb_left;
|
|
|
|
else if (id > key->serial)
|
|
|
|
n = n->rb_right;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
not_found:
|
|
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
found:
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
/* pretend it doesn't exist if it's dead */
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0 ||
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
key->type == &key_type_dead)
|
|
|
|
goto not_found;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
|
|
|
|
* doesn't actually change the key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
return key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_lookup() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* find and lock the specified key type against removal
|
|
|
|
* - we return with the sem readlocked
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct key_type *key_type_lookup(const char *type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct key_type *ktype;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_read(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
|
|
|
|
* types */
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(ktype, &key_types_list, link) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(ktype->name, type) == 0)
|
|
|
|
goto found_kernel_type;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
up_read(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
ktype = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
found_kernel_type:
|
|
|
|
return ktype;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_type_lookup() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* unlock a key type
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
up_read(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_type_put() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* attempt to update an existing key
|
|
|
|
* - the key has an incremented refcount
|
|
|
|
* - we need to put the key if we get an error
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
|
|
|
|
const void *payload, size_t plen)
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* need write permission on the key to update it */
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -EEXIST;
|
|
|
|
if (!key->type->update)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen);
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
/* updating a negative key instantiates it */
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
up_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return key_ref;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
error:
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
key_put(key);
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end __key_update() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* search the specified keyring for a key of the same description; if one is
|
|
|
|
* found, update it, otherwise add a new one
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
|
|
|
|
const char *type,
|
|
|
|
const char *description,
|
|
|
|
const void *payload,
|
|
|
|
size_t plen,
|
2006-06-26 14:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long flags)
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct key_type *ktype;
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
key_perm_t perm;
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
|
|
|
|
* types */
|
|
|
|
ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate)
|
|
|
|
goto error_2;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_check(keyring);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-04-10 21:15:21 +07:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
|
|
|
|
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
|
|
|
|
goto error_2;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
down_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
|
|
|
|
* to modify the keyring */
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
goto error_3;
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2006-03-25 18:06:52 +07:00
|
|
|
/* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing
|
|
|
|
* key of the same type and description in the destination keyring and
|
|
|
|
* update that instead if possible
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-03-25 18:06:52 +07:00
|
|
|
if (ktype->update) {
|
|
|
|
key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, ktype, description,
|
|
|
|
0);
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
|
|
|
|
goto found_matching_key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* decide on the permissions we want */
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
|
|
|
|
perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_LINK | KEY_USR_SETATTR;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ktype->read)
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
perm |= KEY_POS_READ | KEY_USR_READ;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ktype == &key_type_keyring || ktype->update)
|
|
|
|
perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* allocate a new key */
|
|
|
|
key = key_alloc(ktype, description, current->fsuid, current->fsgid,
|
2006-06-26 14:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
current, perm, flags);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(key));
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
goto error_3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 12:00:56 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, plen, keyring, NULL);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
|
|
key_put(key);
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
|
|
goto error_3;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
error_3:
|
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
error_2:
|
|
|
|
key_type_put(ktype);
|
|
|
|
error:
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
return key_ref;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
found_matching_key:
|
|
|
|
/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it
|
|
|
|
* - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
key_type_put(ktype);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, payload, plen);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_create_or_update() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* update a key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-09-28 23:03:15 +07:00
|
|
|
struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* the key must be writable */
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* attempt to update it if supported */
|
|
|
|
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
if (key->type->update) {
|
|
|
|
down_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-31 06:02:44 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen);
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
/* updating a negative key instantiates it */
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
up_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_update() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* revoke a key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void key_revoke(struct key *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-17 13:29:46 +07:00
|
|
|
/* make sure no one's trying to change or use the key when we mark it
|
|
|
|
* - we tell lockdep that we might nest because we might be revoking an
|
|
|
|
* authorisation key whilst holding the sem on a key we've just
|
|
|
|
* instantiated
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (!test_and_set_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags) &&
|
|
|
|
key->type->revoke)
|
2006-06-23 04:47:18 +07:00
|
|
|
key->type->revoke(key);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
up_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_revoke() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_revoke);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* register a type of key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int register_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct key_type *p;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -EEXIST;
|
|
|
|
down_write(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* disallow key types with the same name */
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(p, &key_types_list, link) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(p->name, ktype->name) == 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* store the type */
|
|
|
|
list_add(&ktype->link, &key_types_list);
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
up_write(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end register_key_type() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_key_type);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* unregister a type of key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node *_n;
|
|
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_write(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* withdraw the key type */
|
|
|
|
list_del_init(&ktype->link);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
/* mark all the keys of this type dead */
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (_n = rb_first(&key_serial_tree); _n; _n = rb_next(_n)) {
|
|
|
|
key = rb_entry(_n, struct key, serial_node);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
if (key->type == ktype)
|
|
|
|
key->type = &key_type_dead;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* make sure everyone revalidates their keys */
|
2005-06-26 04:55:38 +07:00
|
|
|
synchronize_rcu();
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we should now be able to destroy the payloads of all the keys of
|
|
|
|
* this type with impunity */
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
for (_n = rb_first(&key_serial_tree); _n; _n = rb_next(_n)) {
|
|
|
|
key = rb_entry(_n, struct key, serial_node);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
if (key->type == ktype) {
|
|
|
|
if (ktype->destroy)
|
|
|
|
ktype->destroy(key);
|
2006-06-27 16:53:54 +07:00
|
|
|
memset(&key->payload, KEY_DESTROY, sizeof(key->payload));
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
up_write(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end unregister_key_type() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_key_type);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* initialise the key management stuff
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void __init key_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* allocate a slab in which we can store keys */
|
|
|
|
key_jar = kmem_cache_create("key_jar", sizeof(struct key),
|
2007-07-20 08:11:58 +07:00
|
|
|
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add the special key types */
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list);
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&key_type_dead.link, &key_types_list);
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&key_type_user.link, &key_types_list);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* record the root user tracking */
|
|
|
|
rb_link_node(&root_key_user.node,
|
|
|
|
NULL,
|
|
|
|
&key_user_tree.rb_node);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rb_insert_color(&root_key_user.node,
|
|
|
|
&key_user_tree);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* record root's user standard keyrings */
|
|
|
|
key_check(&root_user_keyring);
|
|
|
|
key_check(&root_session_keyring);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__key_insert_serial(&root_user_keyring);
|
|
|
|
__key_insert_serial(&root_session_keyring);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
keyring_publish_name(&root_user_keyring);
|
|
|
|
keyring_publish_name(&root_session_keyring);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* link the two root keyrings together */
|
|
|
|
key_link(&root_session_keyring, &root_user_keyring);
|
2005-06-24 12:00:49 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
} /* end key_init() */
|