linux_dsm_epyc7002/fs/f2fs/verity.c

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f2fs: add fs-verity support Add fs-verity support to f2fs. fs-verity is a filesystem feature that enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of read-only files. It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/. See Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full documentation. The f2fs support for fs-verity consists of: - Adding a filesystem feature flag and an inode flag for fs-verity. - Implementing the fsverity_operations to support enabling verity on an inode and reading/writing the verity metadata. - Updating ->readpages() to verify data as it's read from verity files and to support reading verity metadata pages. - Updating ->write_begin(), ->write_end(), and ->writepages() to support writing verity metadata pages. - Calling the fs-verity hooks for ->open(), ->setattr(), and ->ioctl(). Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can be read/written internally by f2fs with only some relatively small changes to f2fs. Extended attributes cannot be used because (a) f2fs limits the total size of an inode's xattr entries to 4096 bytes, which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block, and (b) f2fs encryption doesn't encrypt xattrs, yet the verity metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is because it contains hashes of the plaintext data. Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-07-22 23:26:24 +07:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* fs/f2fs/verity.c: fs-verity support for f2fs
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
/*
* Implementation of fsverity_operations for f2fs.
*
* Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and
* fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K
* boundary beyond i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are
* readonly, and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but
* can be read/written internally by f2fs with only some relatively small
* changes to f2fs. Extended attributes cannot be used because (a) f2fs limits
* the total size of an inode's xattr entries to 4096 bytes, which wouldn't be
* enough for even a single Merkle tree block, and (b) f2fs encryption doesn't
* encrypt xattrs, yet the verity metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is
* because it contains hashes of the plaintext data.
*
* Using a 64K boundary rather than a 4K one keeps things ready for
* architectures with 64K pages, and it doesn't necessarily waste space on-disk
* since there can be a hole between i_size and the start of the Merkle tree.
*/
#include <linux/f2fs_fs.h>
#include "f2fs.h"
#include "xattr.h"
static inline loff_t f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(const struct inode *inode)
{
return round_up(inode->i_size, 65536);
}
/*
* Read some verity metadata from the inode. __vfs_read() can't be used because
* we need to read beyond i_size.
*/
static int pagecache_read(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t count,
loff_t pos)
{
while (count) {
size_t n = min_t(size_t, count,
PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(pos));
struct page *page;
void *addr;
page = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, pos >> PAGE_SHIFT,
NULL);
if (IS_ERR(page))
return PTR_ERR(page);
addr = kmap_atomic(page);
memcpy(buf, addr + offset_in_page(pos), n);
kunmap_atomic(addr);
put_page(page);
buf += n;
pos += n;
count -= n;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Write some verity metadata to the inode for FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
* kernel_write() can't be used because the file descriptor is readonly.
*/
static int pagecache_write(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, size_t count,
loff_t pos)
{
if (pos + count > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
return -EFBIG;
while (count) {
size_t n = min_t(size_t, count,
PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(pos));
struct page *page;
void *fsdata;
void *addr;
int res;
res = pagecache_write_begin(NULL, inode->i_mapping, pos, n, 0,
&page, &fsdata);
if (res)
return res;
addr = kmap_atomic(page);
memcpy(addr + offset_in_page(pos), buf, n);
kunmap_atomic(addr);
res = pagecache_write_end(NULL, inode->i_mapping, pos, n, n,
page, fsdata);
if (res < 0)
return res;
if (res != n)
return -EIO;
buf += n;
pos += n;
count -= n;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Format of f2fs verity xattr. This points to the location of the verity
* descriptor within the file data rather than containing it directly because
* the verity descriptor *must* be encrypted when f2fs encryption is used. But,
* f2fs encryption does not encrypt xattrs.
*/
struct fsverity_descriptor_location {
__le32 version;
__le32 size;
__le64 pos;
};
static int f2fs_begin_enable_verity(struct file *filp)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
int err;
if (f2fs_verity_in_progress(inode))
return -EBUSY;
if (f2fs_is_atomic_file(inode) || f2fs_is_volatile_file(inode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/*
* Since the file was opened readonly, we have to initialize the quotas
* here and not rely on ->open() doing it. This must be done before
* evicting the inline data.
*/
err = dquot_initialize(inode);
if (err)
return err;
err = f2fs_convert_inline_inode(inode);
if (err)
return err;
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS);
return 0;
}
static int f2fs_end_enable_verity(struct file *filp, const void *desc,
size_t desc_size, u64 merkle_tree_size)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
u64 desc_pos = f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode) + merkle_tree_size;
struct fsverity_descriptor_location dloc = {
.version = cpu_to_le32(1),
.size = cpu_to_le32(desc_size),
.pos = cpu_to_le64(desc_pos),
};
int err = 0;
if (desc != NULL) {
/* Succeeded; write the verity descriptor. */
err = pagecache_write(inode, desc, desc_size, desc_pos);
/* Write all pages before clearing FI_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS. */
if (!err)
err = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
}
/* If we failed, truncate anything we wrote past i_size. */
if (desc == NULL || err)
f2fs_truncate(inode);
clear_inode_flag(inode, FI_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS);
if (desc != NULL && !err) {
err = f2fs_setxattr(inode, F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_VERITY,
F2FS_XATTR_NAME_VERITY, &dloc, sizeof(dloc),
NULL, XATTR_CREATE);
if (!err) {
file_set_verity(inode);
f2fs_set_inode_flags(inode);
f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode, true);
}
}
return err;
}
static int f2fs_get_verity_descriptor(struct inode *inode, void *buf,
size_t buf_size)
{
struct fsverity_descriptor_location dloc;
int res;
u32 size;
u64 pos;
/* Get the descriptor location */
res = f2fs_getxattr(inode, F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_VERITY,
F2FS_XATTR_NAME_VERITY, &dloc, sizeof(dloc), NULL);
if (res < 0 && res != -ERANGE)
return res;
if (res != sizeof(dloc) || dloc.version != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
f2fs_warn(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "unknown verity xattr format");
return -EINVAL;
}
size = le32_to_cpu(dloc.size);
pos = le64_to_cpu(dloc.pos);
/* Get the descriptor */
if (pos + size < pos || pos + size > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes ||
pos < f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode) || size > INT_MAX) {
f2fs_warn(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "invalid verity xattr");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (buf_size) {
if (size > buf_size)
return -ERANGE;
res = pagecache_read(inode, buf, size, pos);
if (res)
return res;
}
return size;
}
fs-verity: implement readahead of Merkle tree pages When fs-verity verifies data pages, currently it reads each Merkle tree page synchronously using read_mapping_page(). Therefore, when the Merkle tree pages aren't already cached, fs-verity causes an extra 4 KiB I/O request for every 512 KiB of data (assuming that the Merkle tree uses SHA-256 and 4 KiB blocks). This results in more I/O requests and performance loss than is strictly necessary. Therefore, implement readahead of the Merkle tree pages. For simplicity, we take advantage of the fact that the kernel already does readahead of the file's *data*, just like it does for any other file. Due to this, we don't really need a separate readahead state (struct file_ra_state) just for the Merkle tree, but rather we just need to piggy-back on the existing data readahead requests. We also only really need to bother with the first level of the Merkle tree, since the usual fan-out factor is 128, so normally over 99% of Merkle tree I/O requests are for the first level. Therefore, make fsverity_verify_bio() enable readahead of the first Merkle tree level, for up to 1/4 the number of pages in the bio, when it sees that the REQ_RAHEAD flag is set on the bio. The readahead size is then passed down to ->read_merkle_tree_page() for the filesystem to (optionally) implement if it sees that the requested page is uncached. While we're at it, also make build_merkle_tree_level() set the Merkle tree readahead size, since it's easy to do there. However, for now don't set the readahead size in fsverity_verify_page(), since currently it's only used to verify holes on ext4 and f2fs, and it would need parameters added to know how much to read ahead. This patch significantly improves fs-verity sequential read performance. Some quick benchmarks with 'cat'-ing a 250MB file after dropping caches: On an ARM64 phone (using sha256-ce): Before: 217 MB/s After: 263 MB/s (compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 357 MB/s) In an x86_64 VM (using sha256-avx2): Before: 173 MB/s After: 215 MB/s (compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 223 MB/s) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200106205533.137005-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-01-07 03:55:33 +07:00
/*
* Prefetch some pages from the file's Merkle tree.
*
* This is basically a stripped-down version of __do_page_cache_readahead()
* which works on pages past i_size.
*/
static void f2fs_merkle_tree_readahead(struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t start_index, unsigned long count)
{
LIST_HEAD(pages);
unsigned int nr_pages = 0;
struct page *page;
pgoff_t index;
struct blk_plug plug;
for (index = start_index; index < start_index + count; index++) {
page = xa_load(&mapping->i_pages, index);
if (!page || xa_is_value(page)) {
page = __page_cache_alloc(readahead_gfp_mask(mapping));
if (!page)
break;
page->index = index;
list_add(&page->lru, &pages);
nr_pages++;
}
}
blk_start_plug(&plug);
f2fs_mpage_readpages(mapping, &pages, NULL, nr_pages, true);
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
}
f2fs: add fs-verity support Add fs-verity support to f2fs. fs-verity is a filesystem feature that enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of read-only files. It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/. See Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full documentation. The f2fs support for fs-verity consists of: - Adding a filesystem feature flag and an inode flag for fs-verity. - Implementing the fsverity_operations to support enabling verity on an inode and reading/writing the verity metadata. - Updating ->readpages() to verify data as it's read from verity files and to support reading verity metadata pages. - Updating ->write_begin(), ->write_end(), and ->writepages() to support writing verity metadata pages. - Calling the fs-verity hooks for ->open(), ->setattr(), and ->ioctl(). Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can be read/written internally by f2fs with only some relatively small changes to f2fs. Extended attributes cannot be used because (a) f2fs limits the total size of an inode's xattr entries to 4096 bytes, which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block, and (b) f2fs encryption doesn't encrypt xattrs, yet the verity metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is because it contains hashes of the plaintext data. Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-07-22 23:26:24 +07:00
static struct page *f2fs_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode,
fs-verity: implement readahead of Merkle tree pages When fs-verity verifies data pages, currently it reads each Merkle tree page synchronously using read_mapping_page(). Therefore, when the Merkle tree pages aren't already cached, fs-verity causes an extra 4 KiB I/O request for every 512 KiB of data (assuming that the Merkle tree uses SHA-256 and 4 KiB blocks). This results in more I/O requests and performance loss than is strictly necessary. Therefore, implement readahead of the Merkle tree pages. For simplicity, we take advantage of the fact that the kernel already does readahead of the file's *data*, just like it does for any other file. Due to this, we don't really need a separate readahead state (struct file_ra_state) just for the Merkle tree, but rather we just need to piggy-back on the existing data readahead requests. We also only really need to bother with the first level of the Merkle tree, since the usual fan-out factor is 128, so normally over 99% of Merkle tree I/O requests are for the first level. Therefore, make fsverity_verify_bio() enable readahead of the first Merkle tree level, for up to 1/4 the number of pages in the bio, when it sees that the REQ_RAHEAD flag is set on the bio. The readahead size is then passed down to ->read_merkle_tree_page() for the filesystem to (optionally) implement if it sees that the requested page is uncached. While we're at it, also make build_merkle_tree_level() set the Merkle tree readahead size, since it's easy to do there. However, for now don't set the readahead size in fsverity_verify_page(), since currently it's only used to verify holes on ext4 and f2fs, and it would need parameters added to know how much to read ahead. This patch significantly improves fs-verity sequential read performance. Some quick benchmarks with 'cat'-ing a 250MB file after dropping caches: On an ARM64 phone (using sha256-ce): Before: 217 MB/s After: 263 MB/s (compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 357 MB/s) In an x86_64 VM (using sha256-avx2): Before: 173 MB/s After: 215 MB/s (compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 223 MB/s) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200106205533.137005-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-01-07 03:55:33 +07:00
pgoff_t index,
unsigned long num_ra_pages)
f2fs: add fs-verity support Add fs-verity support to f2fs. fs-verity is a filesystem feature that enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of read-only files. It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/. See Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full documentation. The f2fs support for fs-verity consists of: - Adding a filesystem feature flag and an inode flag for fs-verity. - Implementing the fsverity_operations to support enabling verity on an inode and reading/writing the verity metadata. - Updating ->readpages() to verify data as it's read from verity files and to support reading verity metadata pages. - Updating ->write_begin(), ->write_end(), and ->writepages() to support writing verity metadata pages. - Calling the fs-verity hooks for ->open(), ->setattr(), and ->ioctl(). Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can be read/written internally by f2fs with only some relatively small changes to f2fs. Extended attributes cannot be used because (a) f2fs limits the total size of an inode's xattr entries to 4096 bytes, which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block, and (b) f2fs encryption doesn't encrypt xattrs, yet the verity metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is because it contains hashes of the plaintext data. Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-07-22 23:26:24 +07:00
{
fs-verity: implement readahead of Merkle tree pages When fs-verity verifies data pages, currently it reads each Merkle tree page synchronously using read_mapping_page(). Therefore, when the Merkle tree pages aren't already cached, fs-verity causes an extra 4 KiB I/O request for every 512 KiB of data (assuming that the Merkle tree uses SHA-256 and 4 KiB blocks). This results in more I/O requests and performance loss than is strictly necessary. Therefore, implement readahead of the Merkle tree pages. For simplicity, we take advantage of the fact that the kernel already does readahead of the file's *data*, just like it does for any other file. Due to this, we don't really need a separate readahead state (struct file_ra_state) just for the Merkle tree, but rather we just need to piggy-back on the existing data readahead requests. We also only really need to bother with the first level of the Merkle tree, since the usual fan-out factor is 128, so normally over 99% of Merkle tree I/O requests are for the first level. Therefore, make fsverity_verify_bio() enable readahead of the first Merkle tree level, for up to 1/4 the number of pages in the bio, when it sees that the REQ_RAHEAD flag is set on the bio. The readahead size is then passed down to ->read_merkle_tree_page() for the filesystem to (optionally) implement if it sees that the requested page is uncached. While we're at it, also make build_merkle_tree_level() set the Merkle tree readahead size, since it's easy to do there. However, for now don't set the readahead size in fsverity_verify_page(), since currently it's only used to verify holes on ext4 and f2fs, and it would need parameters added to know how much to read ahead. This patch significantly improves fs-verity sequential read performance. Some quick benchmarks with 'cat'-ing a 250MB file after dropping caches: On an ARM64 phone (using sha256-ce): Before: 217 MB/s After: 263 MB/s (compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 357 MB/s) In an x86_64 VM (using sha256-avx2): Before: 173 MB/s After: 215 MB/s (compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 223 MB/s) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200106205533.137005-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-01-07 03:55:33 +07:00
struct page *page;
f2fs: add fs-verity support Add fs-verity support to f2fs. fs-verity is a filesystem feature that enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of read-only files. It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/. See Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full documentation. The f2fs support for fs-verity consists of: - Adding a filesystem feature flag and an inode flag for fs-verity. - Implementing the fsverity_operations to support enabling verity on an inode and reading/writing the verity metadata. - Updating ->readpages() to verify data as it's read from verity files and to support reading verity metadata pages. - Updating ->write_begin(), ->write_end(), and ->writepages() to support writing verity metadata pages. - Calling the fs-verity hooks for ->open(), ->setattr(), and ->ioctl(). Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can be read/written internally by f2fs with only some relatively small changes to f2fs. Extended attributes cannot be used because (a) f2fs limits the total size of an inode's xattr entries to 4096 bytes, which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block, and (b) f2fs encryption doesn't encrypt xattrs, yet the verity metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is because it contains hashes of the plaintext data. Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-07-22 23:26:24 +07:00
index += f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
fs-verity: implement readahead of Merkle tree pages When fs-verity verifies data pages, currently it reads each Merkle tree page synchronously using read_mapping_page(). Therefore, when the Merkle tree pages aren't already cached, fs-verity causes an extra 4 KiB I/O request for every 512 KiB of data (assuming that the Merkle tree uses SHA-256 and 4 KiB blocks). This results in more I/O requests and performance loss than is strictly necessary. Therefore, implement readahead of the Merkle tree pages. For simplicity, we take advantage of the fact that the kernel already does readahead of the file's *data*, just like it does for any other file. Due to this, we don't really need a separate readahead state (struct file_ra_state) just for the Merkle tree, but rather we just need to piggy-back on the existing data readahead requests. We also only really need to bother with the first level of the Merkle tree, since the usual fan-out factor is 128, so normally over 99% of Merkle tree I/O requests are for the first level. Therefore, make fsverity_verify_bio() enable readahead of the first Merkle tree level, for up to 1/4 the number of pages in the bio, when it sees that the REQ_RAHEAD flag is set on the bio. The readahead size is then passed down to ->read_merkle_tree_page() for the filesystem to (optionally) implement if it sees that the requested page is uncached. While we're at it, also make build_merkle_tree_level() set the Merkle tree readahead size, since it's easy to do there. However, for now don't set the readahead size in fsverity_verify_page(), since currently it's only used to verify holes on ext4 and f2fs, and it would need parameters added to know how much to read ahead. This patch significantly improves fs-verity sequential read performance. Some quick benchmarks with 'cat'-ing a 250MB file after dropping caches: On an ARM64 phone (using sha256-ce): Before: 217 MB/s After: 263 MB/s (compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 357 MB/s) In an x86_64 VM (using sha256-avx2): Before: 173 MB/s After: 215 MB/s (compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 223 MB/s) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200106205533.137005-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-01-07 03:55:33 +07:00
page = find_get_page_flags(inode->i_mapping, index, FGP_ACCESSED);
if (!page || !PageUptodate(page)) {
if (page)
put_page(page);
else if (num_ra_pages > 1)
f2fs_merkle_tree_readahead(inode->i_mapping, index,
num_ra_pages);
page = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, index, NULL);
}
return page;
f2fs: add fs-verity support Add fs-verity support to f2fs. fs-verity is a filesystem feature that enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of read-only files. It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/. See Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full documentation. The f2fs support for fs-verity consists of: - Adding a filesystem feature flag and an inode flag for fs-verity. - Implementing the fsverity_operations to support enabling verity on an inode and reading/writing the verity metadata. - Updating ->readpages() to verify data as it's read from verity files and to support reading verity metadata pages. - Updating ->write_begin(), ->write_end(), and ->writepages() to support writing verity metadata pages. - Calling the fs-verity hooks for ->open(), ->setattr(), and ->ioctl(). Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can be read/written internally by f2fs with only some relatively small changes to f2fs. Extended attributes cannot be used because (a) f2fs limits the total size of an inode's xattr entries to 4096 bytes, which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block, and (b) f2fs encryption doesn't encrypt xattrs, yet the verity metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is because it contains hashes of the plaintext data. Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-07-22 23:26:24 +07:00
}
static int f2fs_write_merkle_tree_block(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
u64 index, int log_blocksize)
{
loff_t pos = f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode) + (index << log_blocksize);
return pagecache_write(inode, buf, 1 << log_blocksize, pos);
}
const struct fsverity_operations f2fs_verityops = {
.begin_enable_verity = f2fs_begin_enable_verity,
.end_enable_verity = f2fs_end_enable_verity,
.get_verity_descriptor = f2fs_get_verity_descriptor,
.read_merkle_tree_page = f2fs_read_merkle_tree_page,
.write_merkle_tree_block = f2fs_write_merkle_tree_block,
};