linux_dsm_epyc7002/fs/fcntl.c

646 lines
14 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* linux/fs/fcntl.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
*/
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/dnotify.h>
#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <asm/poll.h>
#include <asm/siginfo.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
void fastcall set_close_on_exec(unsigned int fd, int flag)
{
struct files_struct *files = current->files;
struct fdtable *fdt;
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
if (flag)
FD_SET(fd, fdt->close_on_exec);
else
FD_CLR(fd, fdt->close_on_exec);
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
}
static int get_close_on_exec(unsigned int fd)
{
struct files_struct *files = current->files;
struct fdtable *fdt;
int res;
rcu_read_lock();
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
res = FD_ISSET(fd, fdt->close_on_exec);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
/*
* locate_fd finds a free file descriptor in the open_fds fdset,
* expanding the fd arrays if necessary. Must be called with the
* file_lock held for write.
*/
static int locate_fd(struct files_struct *files,
struct file *file, unsigned int orig_start)
{
unsigned int newfd;
unsigned int start;
int error;
struct fdtable *fdt;
error = -EINVAL;
if (orig_start >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
goto out;
repeat:
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
/*
* Someone might have closed fd's in the range
* orig_start..fdt->next_fd
*/
start = orig_start;
if (start < files->next_fd)
start = files->next_fd;
newfd = start;
if (start < fdt->max_fds)
newfd = find_next_zero_bit(fdt->open_fds->fds_bits,
fdt->max_fds, start);
error = -EMFILE;
if (newfd >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
goto out;
error = expand_files(files, newfd);
if (error < 0)
goto out;
/*
* If we needed to expand the fs array we
* might have blocked - try again.
*/
if (error)
goto repeat;
/*
* We reacquired files_lock, so we are safe as long as
* we reacquire the fdtable pointer and use it while holding
* the lock, no one can free it during that time.
*/
if (start <= files->next_fd)
files->next_fd = newfd + 1;
error = newfd;
out:
return error;
}
static int dupfd(struct file *file, unsigned int start)
{
struct files_struct * files = current->files;
struct fdtable *fdt;
int fd;
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
fd = locate_fd(files, file, start);
if (fd >= 0) {
/* locate_fd() may have expanded fdtable, load the ptr */
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
FD_SET(fd, fdt->open_fds);
FD_CLR(fd, fdt->close_on_exec);
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
fd_install(fd, file);
} else {
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
fput(file);
}
return fd;
}
asmlinkage long sys_dup2(unsigned int oldfd, unsigned int newfd)
{
int err = -EBADF;
struct file * file, *tofree;
struct files_struct * files = current->files;
struct fdtable *fdt;
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
if (!(file = fcheck(oldfd)))
goto out_unlock;
err = newfd;
if (newfd == oldfd)
goto out_unlock;
err = -EBADF;
if (newfd >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
goto out_unlock;
get_file(file); /* We are now finished with oldfd */
err = expand_files(files, newfd);
if (err < 0)
goto out_fput;
/* To avoid races with open() and dup(), we will mark the fd as
* in-use in the open-file bitmap throughout the entire dup2()
* process. This is quite safe: do_close() uses the fd array
* entry, not the bitmap, to decide what work needs to be
* done. --sct */
/* Doesn't work. open() might be there first. --AV */
/* Yes. It's a race. In user space. Nothing sane to do */
err = -EBUSY;
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
tofree = fdt->fd[newfd];
if (!tofree && FD_ISSET(newfd, fdt->open_fds))
goto out_fput;
rcu_assign_pointer(fdt->fd[newfd], file);
FD_SET(newfd, fdt->open_fds);
FD_CLR(newfd, fdt->close_on_exec);
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
if (tofree)
filp_close(tofree, files);
err = newfd;
out:
return err;
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
goto out;
out_fput:
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
fput(file);
goto out;
}
asmlinkage long sys_dup(unsigned int fildes)
{
int ret = -EBADF;
struct file * file = fget(fildes);
if (file)
ret = dupfd(file, 0);
return ret;
}
#define SETFL_MASK (O_APPEND | O_NONBLOCK | O_NDELAY | FASYNC | O_DIRECT | O_NOATIME)
static int setfl(int fd, struct file * filp, unsigned long arg)
{
struct inode * inode = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
int error = 0;
/*
* O_APPEND cannot be cleared if the file is marked as append-only
* and the file is open for write.
*/
if (((arg ^ filp->f_flags) & O_APPEND) && IS_APPEND(inode))
return -EPERM;
/* O_NOATIME can only be set by the owner or superuser */
if ((arg & O_NOATIME) && !(filp->f_flags & O_NOATIME))
if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
return -EPERM;
/* required for strict SunOS emulation */
if (O_NONBLOCK != O_NDELAY)
if (arg & O_NDELAY)
arg |= O_NONBLOCK;
if (arg & O_DIRECT) {
if (!filp->f_mapping || !filp->f_mapping->a_ops ||
!filp->f_mapping->a_ops->direct_IO)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (filp->f_op && filp->f_op->check_flags)
error = filp->f_op->check_flags(arg);
if (error)
return error;
lock_kernel();
if ((arg ^ filp->f_flags) & FASYNC) {
if (filp->f_op && filp->f_op->fasync) {
error = filp->f_op->fasync(fd, filp, (arg & FASYNC) != 0);
if (error < 0)
goto out;
}
}
filp->f_flags = (arg & SETFL_MASK) | (filp->f_flags & ~SETFL_MASK);
out:
unlock_kernel();
return error;
}
static void f_modown(struct file *filp, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type,
uid_t uid, uid_t euid, int force)
{
write_lock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock);
if (force || !filp->f_owner.pid) {
put_pid(filp->f_owner.pid);
filp->f_owner.pid = get_pid(pid);
filp->f_owner.pid_type = type;
filp->f_owner.uid = uid;
filp->f_owner.euid = euid;
}
write_unlock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock);
}
int __f_setown(struct file *filp, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type,
int force)
{
int err;
err = security_file_set_fowner(filp);
if (err)
return err;
f_modown(filp, pid, type, current->uid, current->euid, force);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__f_setown);
int f_setown(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg, int force)
{
enum pid_type type;
struct pid *pid;
int who = arg;
int result;
type = PIDTYPE_PID;
if (who < 0) {
type = PIDTYPE_PGID;
who = -who;
}
rcu_read_lock();
pid = find_pid(who);
result = __f_setown(filp, pid, type, force);
rcu_read_unlock();
return result;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(f_setown);
void f_delown(struct file *filp)
{
f_modown(filp, NULL, PIDTYPE_PID, 0, 0, 1);
}
pid_t f_getown(struct file *filp)
{
pid_t pid;
read_lock(&filp->f_owner.lock);
pid = pid_nr(filp->f_owner.pid);
if (filp->f_owner.pid_type == PIDTYPE_PGID)
pid = -pid;
read_unlock(&filp->f_owner.lock);
return pid;
}
static long do_fcntl(int fd, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
struct file *filp)
{
long err = -EINVAL;
switch (cmd) {
case F_DUPFD:
get_file(filp);
err = dupfd(filp, arg);
break;
case F_GETFD:
err = get_close_on_exec(fd) ? FD_CLOEXEC : 0;
break;
case F_SETFD:
err = 0;
set_close_on_exec(fd, arg & FD_CLOEXEC);
break;
case F_GETFL:
err = filp->f_flags;
break;
case F_SETFL:
err = setfl(fd, filp, arg);
break;
case F_GETLK:
err = fcntl_getlk(filp, (struct flock __user *) arg);
break;
case F_SETLK:
case F_SETLKW:
[PATCH] stale POSIX lock handling I believe that there is a problem with the handling of POSIX locks, which the attached patch should address. The problem appears to be a race between fcntl(2) and close(2). A multithreaded application could close a file descriptor at the same time as it is trying to acquire a lock using the same file descriptor. I would suggest that that multithreaded application is not providing the proper synchronization for itself, but the OS should still behave correctly. SUS3 (Single UNIX Specification Version 3, read: POSIX) indicates that when a file descriptor is closed, that all POSIX locks on the file, owned by the process which closed the file descriptor, should be released. The trick here is when those locks are released. The current code releases all locks which exist when close is processing, but any locks in progress are handled when the last reference to the open file is released. There are three cases to consider. One is the simple case, a multithreaded (mt) process has a file open and races to close it and acquire a lock on it. In this case, the close will release one reference to the open file and when the fcntl is done, it will release the other reference. For this situation, no locks should exist on the file when both the close and fcntl operations are done. The current system will handle this case because the last reference to the open file is being released. The second case is when the mt process has dup(2)'d the file descriptor. The close will release one reference to the file and the fcntl, when done, will release another, but there will still be at least one more reference to the open file. One could argue that the existence of a lock on the file after the close has completed is okay, because it was acquired after the close operation and there is still a way for the application to release the lock on the file, using an existing file descriptor. The third case is when the mt process has forked, after opening the file and either before or after becoming an mt process. In this case, each process would hold a reference to the open file. For each process, this degenerates to first case above. However, the lock continues to exist until both processes have released their references to the open file. This lock could block other lock requests. The changes to release the lock when the last reference to the open file aren't quite right because they would allow the lock to exist as long as there was a reference to the open file. This is too long. The new proposed solution is to add support in the fcntl code path to detect a race with close and then to release the lock which was just acquired when such as race is detected. This causes locks to be released in a timely fashion and for the system to conform to the POSIX semantic specification. This was tested by instrumenting a kernel to detect the handling locks and then running a program which generates case #3 above. A dangling lock could be reliably generated. When the changes to detect the close/fcntl race were added, a dangling lock could no longer be generated. Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@debian.org> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-07-28 01:45:09 +07:00
err = fcntl_setlk(fd, filp, cmd, (struct flock __user *) arg);
break;
case F_GETOWN:
/*
* XXX If f_owner is a process group, the
* negative return value will get converted
* into an error. Oops. If we keep the
* current syscall conventions, the only way
* to fix this will be in libc.
*/
err = f_getown(filp);
force_successful_syscall_return();
break;
case F_SETOWN:
err = f_setown(filp, arg, 1);
break;
case F_GETSIG:
err = filp->f_owner.signum;
break;
case F_SETSIG:
/* arg == 0 restores default behaviour. */
if (!valid_signal(arg)) {
break;
}
err = 0;
filp->f_owner.signum = arg;
break;
case F_GETLEASE:
err = fcntl_getlease(filp);
break;
case F_SETLEASE:
err = fcntl_setlease(fd, filp, arg);
break;
case F_NOTIFY:
err = fcntl_dirnotify(fd, filp, arg);
break;
default:
break;
}
return err;
}
asmlinkage long sys_fcntl(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct file *filp;
long err = -EBADF;
filp = fget(fd);
if (!filp)
goto out;
err = security_file_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg);
if (err) {
fput(filp);
return err;
}
err = do_fcntl(fd, cmd, arg, filp);
fput(filp);
out:
return err;
}
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
asmlinkage long sys_fcntl64(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct file * filp;
long err;
err = -EBADF;
filp = fget(fd);
if (!filp)
goto out;
err = security_file_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg);
if (err) {
fput(filp);
return err;
}
err = -EBADF;
switch (cmd) {
case F_GETLK64:
err = fcntl_getlk64(filp, (struct flock64 __user *) arg);
break;
case F_SETLK64:
case F_SETLKW64:
[PATCH] stale POSIX lock handling I believe that there is a problem with the handling of POSIX locks, which the attached patch should address. The problem appears to be a race between fcntl(2) and close(2). A multithreaded application could close a file descriptor at the same time as it is trying to acquire a lock using the same file descriptor. I would suggest that that multithreaded application is not providing the proper synchronization for itself, but the OS should still behave correctly. SUS3 (Single UNIX Specification Version 3, read: POSIX) indicates that when a file descriptor is closed, that all POSIX locks on the file, owned by the process which closed the file descriptor, should be released. The trick here is when those locks are released. The current code releases all locks which exist when close is processing, but any locks in progress are handled when the last reference to the open file is released. There are three cases to consider. One is the simple case, a multithreaded (mt) process has a file open and races to close it and acquire a lock on it. In this case, the close will release one reference to the open file and when the fcntl is done, it will release the other reference. For this situation, no locks should exist on the file when both the close and fcntl operations are done. The current system will handle this case because the last reference to the open file is being released. The second case is when the mt process has dup(2)'d the file descriptor. The close will release one reference to the file and the fcntl, when done, will release another, but there will still be at least one more reference to the open file. One could argue that the existence of a lock on the file after the close has completed is okay, because it was acquired after the close operation and there is still a way for the application to release the lock on the file, using an existing file descriptor. The third case is when the mt process has forked, after opening the file and either before or after becoming an mt process. In this case, each process would hold a reference to the open file. For each process, this degenerates to first case above. However, the lock continues to exist until both processes have released their references to the open file. This lock could block other lock requests. The changes to release the lock when the last reference to the open file aren't quite right because they would allow the lock to exist as long as there was a reference to the open file. This is too long. The new proposed solution is to add support in the fcntl code path to detect a race with close and then to release the lock which was just acquired when such as race is detected. This causes locks to be released in a timely fashion and for the system to conform to the POSIX semantic specification. This was tested by instrumenting a kernel to detect the handling locks and then running a program which generates case #3 above. A dangling lock could be reliably generated. When the changes to detect the close/fcntl race were added, a dangling lock could no longer be generated. Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@debian.org> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-07-28 01:45:09 +07:00
err = fcntl_setlk64(fd, filp, cmd,
(struct flock64 __user *) arg);
break;
default:
err = do_fcntl(fd, cmd, arg, filp);
break;
}
fput(filp);
out:
return err;
}
#endif
/* Table to convert sigio signal codes into poll band bitmaps */
static const long band_table[NSIGPOLL] = {
POLLIN | POLLRDNORM, /* POLL_IN */
POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND, /* POLL_OUT */
POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLMSG, /* POLL_MSG */
POLLERR, /* POLL_ERR */
POLLPRI | POLLRDBAND, /* POLL_PRI */
POLLHUP | POLLERR /* POLL_HUP */
};
static inline int sigio_perm(struct task_struct *p,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
{
return (((fown->euid == 0) ||
(fown->euid == p->suid) || (fown->euid == p->uid) ||
(fown->uid == p->suid) || (fown->uid == p->uid)) &&
!security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig));
}
static void send_sigio_to_task(struct task_struct *p,
struct fown_struct *fown,
int fd,
int reason)
{
if (!sigio_perm(p, fown, fown->signum))
return;
switch (fown->signum) {
siginfo_t si;
default:
/* Queue a rt signal with the appropriate fd as its
value. We use SI_SIGIO as the source, not
SI_KERNEL, since kernel signals always get
delivered even if we can't queue. Failure to
queue in this case _should_ be reported; we fall
back to SIGIO in that case. --sct */
si.si_signo = fown->signum;
si.si_errno = 0;
si.si_code = reason;
/* Make sure we are called with one of the POLL_*
reasons, otherwise we could leak kernel stack into
userspace. */
BUG_ON((reason & __SI_MASK) != __SI_POLL);
if (reason - POLL_IN >= NSIGPOLL)
si.si_band = ~0L;
else
si.si_band = band_table[reason - POLL_IN];
si.si_fd = fd;
if (!group_send_sig_info(fown->signum, &si, p))
break;
/* fall-through: fall back on the old plain SIGIO signal */
case 0:
group_send_sig_info(SIGIO, SEND_SIG_PRIV, p);
}
}
void send_sigio(struct fown_struct *fown, int fd, int band)
{
struct task_struct *p;
enum pid_type type;
struct pid *pid;
read_lock(&fown->lock);
type = fown->pid_type;
pid = fown->pid;
if (!pid)
goto out_unlock_fown;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
do_each_pid_task(pid, type, p) {
send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band);
} while_each_pid_task(pid, type, p);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
out_unlock_fown:
read_unlock(&fown->lock);
}
static void send_sigurg_to_task(struct task_struct *p,
struct fown_struct *fown)
{
if (sigio_perm(p, fown, SIGURG))
group_send_sig_info(SIGURG, SEND_SIG_PRIV, p);
}
int send_sigurg(struct fown_struct *fown)
{
struct task_struct *p;
enum pid_type type;
struct pid *pid;
int ret = 0;
read_lock(&fown->lock);
type = fown->pid_type;
pid = fown->pid;
if (!pid)
goto out_unlock_fown;
ret = 1;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
do_each_pid_task(pid, type, p) {
send_sigurg_to_task(p, fown);
} while_each_pid_task(pid, type, p);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
out_unlock_fown:
read_unlock(&fown->lock);
return ret;
}
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(fasync_lock);
static struct kmem_cache *fasync_cache __read_mostly;
/*
* fasync_helper() is used by some character device drivers (mainly mice)
* to set up the fasync queue. It returns negative on error, 0 if it did
* no changes and positive if it added/deleted the entry.
*/
int fasync_helper(int fd, struct file * filp, int on, struct fasync_struct **fapp)
{
struct fasync_struct *fa, **fp;
struct fasync_struct *new = NULL;
int result = 0;
if (on) {
new = kmem_cache_alloc(fasync_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
}
write_lock_irq(&fasync_lock);
for (fp = fapp; (fa = *fp) != NULL; fp = &fa->fa_next) {
if (fa->fa_file == filp) {
if(on) {
fa->fa_fd = fd;
kmem_cache_free(fasync_cache, new);
} else {
*fp = fa->fa_next;
kmem_cache_free(fasync_cache, fa);
result = 1;
}
goto out;
}
}
if (on) {
new->magic = FASYNC_MAGIC;
new->fa_file = filp;
new->fa_fd = fd;
new->fa_next = *fapp;
*fapp = new;
result = 1;
}
out:
write_unlock_irq(&fasync_lock);
return result;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fasync_helper);
void __kill_fasync(struct fasync_struct *fa, int sig, int band)
{
while (fa) {
struct fown_struct * fown;
if (fa->magic != FASYNC_MAGIC) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kill_fasync: bad magic number in "
"fasync_struct!\n");
return;
}
fown = &fa->fa_file->f_owner;
/* Don't send SIGURG to processes which have not set a
queued signum: SIGURG has its own default signalling
mechanism. */
if (!(sig == SIGURG && fown->signum == 0))
send_sigio(fown, fa->fa_fd, band);
fa = fa->fa_next;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kill_fasync);
void kill_fasync(struct fasync_struct **fp, int sig, int band)
{
/* First a quick test without locking: usually
* the list is empty.
*/
if (*fp) {
read_lock(&fasync_lock);
/* reread *fp after obtaining the lock */
__kill_fasync(*fp, sig, band);
read_unlock(&fasync_lock);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kill_fasync);
static int __init fasync_init(void)
{
fasync_cache = kmem_cache_create("fasync_cache",
sizeof(struct fasync_struct), 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
return 0;
}
module_init(fasync_init)