linux_dsm_epyc7002/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* SR-IPv6 implementation
*
* Author:
* David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be>
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/ip_tunnels.h>
#include <net/lwtunnel.h>
#include <net/netevent.h>
#include <net/netns/generic.h>
#include <net/ip6_fib.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/seg6.h>
#include <linux/seg6.h>
#include <linux/seg6_iptunnel.h>
#include <net/addrconf.h>
#include <net/ip6_route.h>
#include <net/dst_cache.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
#include <net/seg6_hmac.h>
#endif
struct seg6_lwt {
struct dst_cache cache;
struct seg6_iptunnel_encap tuninfo[0];
};
static inline struct seg6_lwt *seg6_lwt_lwtunnel(struct lwtunnel_state *lwt)
{
return (struct seg6_lwt *)lwt->data;
}
static inline struct seg6_iptunnel_encap *
seg6_encap_lwtunnel(struct lwtunnel_state *lwt)
{
return seg6_lwt_lwtunnel(lwt)->tuninfo;
}
static const struct nla_policy seg6_iptunnel_policy[SEG6_IPTUNNEL_MAX + 1] = {
[SEG6_IPTUNNEL_SRH] = { .type = NLA_BINARY },
};
static int nla_put_srh(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype,
struct seg6_iptunnel_encap *tuninfo)
{
struct seg6_iptunnel_encap *data;
struct nlattr *nla;
int len;
len = SEG6_IPTUN_ENCAP_SIZE(tuninfo);
nla = nla_reserve(skb, attrtype, len);
if (!nla)
return -EMSGSIZE;
data = nla_data(nla);
memcpy(data, tuninfo, len);
return 0;
}
static void set_tun_src(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev,
struct in6_addr *daddr, struct in6_addr *saddr)
{
struct seg6_pernet_data *sdata = seg6_pernet(net);
struct in6_addr *tun_src;
rcu_read_lock();
tun_src = rcu_dereference(sdata->tun_src);
if (!ipv6_addr_any(tun_src)) {
memcpy(saddr, tun_src, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
} else {
ipv6_dev_get_saddr(net, dev, daddr, IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC,
saddr);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
ipv6: sr: Compute flowlabel for outer IPv6 header of seg6 encap mode ECMP (equal-cost multipath) hashes are typically computed on the packets' 5-tuple(src IP, dst IP, src port, dst port, L4 proto). For encapsulated packets, the L4 data is not readily available and ECMP hashing will often revert to (src IP, dst IP). This will lead to traffic polarization on a single ECMP path, causing congestion and waste of network capacity. In IPv6, the 20-bit flow label field is also used as part of the ECMP hash. In the lack of L4 data, the hashing will be on (src IP, dst IP, flow label). Having a non-zero flow label is thus important for proper traffic load balancing when L4 data is unavailable (i.e., when packets are encapsulated). Currently, the seg6_do_srh_encap() function extracts the original packet's flow label and set it as the outer IPv6 flow label. There are two issues with this behaviour: a) There is no guarantee that the inner flow label is set by the source. b) If the original packet is not IPv6, the flow label will be set to zero (e.g., IPv4 or L2 encap). This patch adds a function, named seg6_make_flowlabel(), that computes a flow label from a given skb. It supports IPv6, IPv4 and L2 payloads, and leverages the per namespace 'seg6_flowlabel" sysctl value. The currently support behaviours are as follows: -1 set flowlabel to zero. 0 copy flowlabel from Inner paceket in case of Inner IPv6 (Set flowlabel to 0 in case IPv4/L2) 1 Compute the flowlabel using seg6_make_flowlabel() This patch has been tested for IPv6, IPv4, and L2 traffic. Signed-off-by: Ahmed Abdelsalam <amsalam20@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-25 01:23:16 +07:00
/* Compute flowlabel for outer IPv6 header */
static __be32 seg6_make_flowlabel(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ipv6hdr *inner_hdr)
{
int do_flowlabel = net->ipv6.sysctl.seg6_flowlabel;
__be32 flowlabel = 0;
u32 hash;
if (do_flowlabel > 0) {
hash = skb_get_hash(skb);
hash = rol32(hash, 16);
ipv6: sr: Compute flowlabel for outer IPv6 header of seg6 encap mode ECMP (equal-cost multipath) hashes are typically computed on the packets' 5-tuple(src IP, dst IP, src port, dst port, L4 proto). For encapsulated packets, the L4 data is not readily available and ECMP hashing will often revert to (src IP, dst IP). This will lead to traffic polarization on a single ECMP path, causing congestion and waste of network capacity. In IPv6, the 20-bit flow label field is also used as part of the ECMP hash. In the lack of L4 data, the hashing will be on (src IP, dst IP, flow label). Having a non-zero flow label is thus important for proper traffic load balancing when L4 data is unavailable (i.e., when packets are encapsulated). Currently, the seg6_do_srh_encap() function extracts the original packet's flow label and set it as the outer IPv6 flow label. There are two issues with this behaviour: a) There is no guarantee that the inner flow label is set by the source. b) If the original packet is not IPv6, the flow label will be set to zero (e.g., IPv4 or L2 encap). This patch adds a function, named seg6_make_flowlabel(), that computes a flow label from a given skb. It supports IPv6, IPv4 and L2 payloads, and leverages the per namespace 'seg6_flowlabel" sysctl value. The currently support behaviours are as follows: -1 set flowlabel to zero. 0 copy flowlabel from Inner paceket in case of Inner IPv6 (Set flowlabel to 0 in case IPv4/L2) 1 Compute the flowlabel using seg6_make_flowlabel() This patch has been tested for IPv6, IPv4, and L2 traffic. Signed-off-by: Ahmed Abdelsalam <amsalam20@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-25 01:23:16 +07:00
flowlabel = (__force __be32)hash & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
} else if (!do_flowlabel && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
flowlabel = ip6_flowlabel(inner_hdr);
}
return flowlabel;
}
/* encapsulate an IPv6 packet within an outer IPv6 header with a given SRH */
int seg6_do_srh_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh, int proto)
{
ipv6: sr: fix NULL pointer dereference when setting encap source address When using seg6 in encap mode, we call ipv6_dev_get_saddr() to set the source address of the outer IPv6 header, in case none was specified. Using skb->dev can lead to BUG() when it is in an inconsistent state. This patch uses the net_device attached to the skb's dst instead. [940807.667429] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000047c [940807.762427] IP: ipv6_dev_get_saddr+0x8b/0x1d0 [940807.815725] PGD 0 P4D 0 [940807.847173] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [940807.890073] Modules linked in: [940807.927765] CPU: 6 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/6 Tainted: G W 4.16.0-rc1-seg6bpf+ #2 [940808.028988] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL120 G6/ProLiant DL120 G6, BIOS O26 09/06/2010 [940808.128128] RIP: 0010:ipv6_dev_get_saddr+0x8b/0x1d0 [940808.187667] RSP: 0018:ffff88043fd836b0 EFLAGS: 00010206 [940808.251366] RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: ffff88042cb1c860 RCX: 00000000000000fe [940808.338025] RDX: 00000000000002c0 RSI: ffff88042cb1c860 RDI: 0000000000004500 [940808.424683] RBP: ffff88043fd83740 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffffffffff [940808.511342] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88042cb1c850 [940808.598012] R13: ffffffff8208e380 R14: ffff88042ac8da00 R15: 0000000000000002 [940808.684675] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88043fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [940808.783036] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [940808.852975] CR2: 000000000000047c CR3: 00000004255fe000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [940808.939634] Call Trace: [940808.970041] <IRQ> [940808.995250] ? ip6t_do_table+0x265/0x640 [940809.043341] seg6_do_srh_encap+0x28f/0x300 [940809.093516] ? seg6_do_srh+0x1a0/0x210 [940809.139528] seg6_do_srh+0x1a0/0x210 [940809.183462] seg6_output+0x28/0x1e0 [940809.226358] lwtunnel_output+0x3f/0x70 [940809.272370] ip6_xmit+0x2b8/0x530 [940809.313185] ? ac6_proc_exit+0x20/0x20 [940809.359197] inet6_csk_xmit+0x7d/0xc0 [940809.404173] tcp_transmit_skb+0x548/0x9a0 [940809.453304] __tcp_retransmit_skb+0x1a8/0x7a0 [940809.506603] ? ip6_default_advmss+0x40/0x40 [940809.557824] ? tcp_current_mss+0x24/0x90 [940809.605925] tcp_retransmit_skb+0xd/0x80 [940809.654016] tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue.part.17+0xf9/0x210 [940809.719797] tcp_ack+0xa47/0x1110 [940809.760612] tcp_rcv_established+0x13c/0x570 [940809.812865] tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x151/0x3d0 [940809.858879] tcp_v6_rcv+0xa5c/0xb10 [940809.901770] ? seg6_output+0xdd/0x1e0 [940809.946745] ip6_input_finish+0xbb/0x460 [940809.994837] ip6_input+0x74/0x80 [940810.034612] ? ip6_rcv_finish+0xb0/0xb0 [940810.081663] ipv6_rcv+0x31c/0x4c0 ... Fixes: 6c8702c60b886 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels") Reported-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-20 21:44:56 +07:00
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
struct net *net = dev_net(dst->dev);
struct ipv6hdr *hdr, *inner_hdr;
struct ipv6_sr_hdr *isrh;
int hdrlen, tot_len, err;
ipv6: sr: Compute flowlabel for outer IPv6 header of seg6 encap mode ECMP (equal-cost multipath) hashes are typically computed on the packets' 5-tuple(src IP, dst IP, src port, dst port, L4 proto). For encapsulated packets, the L4 data is not readily available and ECMP hashing will often revert to (src IP, dst IP). This will lead to traffic polarization on a single ECMP path, causing congestion and waste of network capacity. In IPv6, the 20-bit flow label field is also used as part of the ECMP hash. In the lack of L4 data, the hashing will be on (src IP, dst IP, flow label). Having a non-zero flow label is thus important for proper traffic load balancing when L4 data is unavailable (i.e., when packets are encapsulated). Currently, the seg6_do_srh_encap() function extracts the original packet's flow label and set it as the outer IPv6 flow label. There are two issues with this behaviour: a) There is no guarantee that the inner flow label is set by the source. b) If the original packet is not IPv6, the flow label will be set to zero (e.g., IPv4 or L2 encap). This patch adds a function, named seg6_make_flowlabel(), that computes a flow label from a given skb. It supports IPv6, IPv4 and L2 payloads, and leverages the per namespace 'seg6_flowlabel" sysctl value. The currently support behaviours are as follows: -1 set flowlabel to zero. 0 copy flowlabel from Inner paceket in case of Inner IPv6 (Set flowlabel to 0 in case IPv4/L2) 1 Compute the flowlabel using seg6_make_flowlabel() This patch has been tested for IPv6, IPv4, and L2 traffic. Signed-off-by: Ahmed Abdelsalam <amsalam20@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-25 01:23:16 +07:00
__be32 flowlabel;
hdrlen = (osrh->hdrlen + 1) << 3;
tot_len = hdrlen + sizeof(*hdr);
ipv6: sr: fix memory OOB access in seg6_do_srh_encap/inline seg6_do_srh_encap and seg6_do_srh_inline can possibly do an out-of-bounds access when adding the SRH to the packet. This no longer happen when expanding the skb not only by the size of the SRH (+ outer IPv6 header), but also by skb->mac_len. [ 53.793056] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in seg6_do_srh_encap+0x284/0x620 [ 53.794564] Write of size 14 at addr ffff88011975ecfa by task ping/674 [ 53.796665] CPU: 0 PID: 674 Comm: ping Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3-ARCH+ #90 [ 53.796670] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 [ 53.796673] Call Trace: [ 53.796679] <IRQ> [ 53.796689] dump_stack+0x71/0xab [ 53.796700] print_address_description+0x6a/0x270 [ 53.796707] kasan_report+0x258/0x380 [ 53.796715] ? seg6_do_srh_encap+0x284/0x620 [ 53.796722] memmove+0x34/0x50 [ 53.796730] seg6_do_srh_encap+0x284/0x620 [ 53.796741] ? seg6_do_srh+0x29b/0x360 [ 53.796747] seg6_do_srh+0x29b/0x360 [ 53.796756] seg6_input+0x2e/0x2e0 [ 53.796765] lwtunnel_input+0x93/0xd0 [ 53.796774] ipv6_rcv+0x690/0x920 [ 53.796783] ? ip6_input+0x170/0x170 [ 53.796791] ? eth_gro_receive+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 53.796800] ? ip6_input+0x170/0x170 [ 53.796809] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xcc0/0x13f0 [ 53.796820] ? netdev_info+0x110/0x110 [ 53.796827] ? napi_complete_done+0xb6/0x170 [ 53.796834] ? e1000_clean+0x6da/0xf70 [ 53.796845] ? process_backlog+0x129/0x2a0 [ 53.796853] process_backlog+0x129/0x2a0 [ 53.796862] net_rx_action+0x211/0x5c0 [ 53.796870] ? napi_complete_done+0x170/0x170 [ 53.796887] ? run_rebalance_domains+0x11f/0x150 [ 53.796891] __do_softirq+0x10e/0x39e [ 53.796894] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 [ 53.796895] </IRQ> [ 53.796898] do_softirq.part.16+0x54/0x60 [ 53.796900] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x5b/0x60 [ 53.796903] ip6_finish_output2+0x416/0x9f0 [ 53.796906] ? ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x110/0x110 [ 53.796909] ? ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow+0x390/0x390 [ 53.796911] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x66/0x80 [ 53.796913] ? ip6_mtu+0x44/0xf0 [ 53.796916] ? ip6_output+0xfc/0x220 [ 53.796918] ip6_output+0xfc/0x220 [ 53.796921] ? ip6_finish_output+0x2b0/0x2b0 [ 53.796923] ? memcpy+0x34/0x50 [ 53.796926] ip6_send_skb+0x43/0xc0 [ 53.796929] rawv6_sendmsg+0x1216/0x1530 [ 53.796932] ? __orc_find+0x6b/0xc0 [ 53.796934] ? rawv6_rcv_skb+0x160/0x160 [ 53.796937] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x66/0x80 [ 53.796939] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x66/0x80 [ 53.796942] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x1e/0x30 [ 53.796944] ? kernel_text_address+0xec/0x100 [ 53.796946] ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30 [ 53.796948] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50 [ 53.796950] ? __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100 [ 53.796954] ? save_stack+0x89/0xb0 [ 53.796956] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 [ 53.796958] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xd2/0x1f0 [ 53.796961] ? prepare_creds+0x23/0x160 [ 53.796963] ? __x64_sys_capset+0x252/0x3e0 [ 53.796966] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x160 [ 53.796968] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 53.796971] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x170/0x380 [ 53.796973] ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x12c0/0x12c0 [ 53.796977] ? tty_vhangup+0x20/0x20 [ 53.796979] ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90 [ 53.796982] ? __mod_node_page_state+0x8d/0xa0 [ 53.796986] ? __check_object_size+0xe7/0x240 [ 53.796989] ? __sys_sendto+0x229/0x290 [ 53.796991] ? rawv6_rcv_skb+0x160/0x160 [ 53.796993] __sys_sendto+0x229/0x290 [ 53.796996] ? __ia32_sys_getpeername+0x50/0x50 [ 53.796999] ? commit_creds+0x2de/0x520 [ 53.797002] ? security_capset+0x57/0x70 [ 53.797004] ? __x64_sys_capset+0x29f/0x3e0 [ 53.797007] ? __x64_sys_rt_sigsuspend+0xe0/0xe0 [ 53.797011] ? __do_page_fault+0x664/0x770 [ 53.797014] __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 [ 53.797017] do_syscall_64+0x69/0x160 [ 53.797019] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 53.797022] RIP: 0033:0x7f43b7a6714a [ 53.797023] RSP: 002b:00007ffd891bd368 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 53.797026] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006129c0 RCX: 00007f43b7a6714a [ 53.797028] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00000000006129c0 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 53.797029] RBP: 00007ffd891be640 R08: 0000000000610940 R09: 000000000000001c [ 53.797030] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 53.797032] R13: 000000000060e6a0 R14: 0000000000008004 R15: 000000000040b661 [ 53.797171] Allocated by task 642: [ 53.797460] kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 [ 53.797463] kmem_cache_alloc+0xd2/0x1f0 [ 53.797465] getname_flags+0x40/0x210 [ 53.797467] user_path_at_empty+0x1d/0x40 [ 53.797469] do_faccessat+0x12a/0x320 [ 53.797471] do_syscall_64+0x69/0x160 [ 53.797473] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 53.797607] Freed by task 642: [ 53.797869] __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 [ 53.797871] kmem_cache_free+0xa8/0x230 [ 53.797872] filename_lookup+0x15b/0x230 [ 53.797874] do_faccessat+0x12a/0x320 [ 53.797876] do_syscall_64+0x69/0x160 [ 53.797878] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 53.798014] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88011975e600 which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096 [ 53.799043] The buggy address is located 1786 bytes inside of 4096-byte region [ffff88011975e600, ffff88011975f600) [ 53.800013] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 53.800414] page:ffffea000465d600 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 53.801259] flags: 0x17fff0000008100(slab|head) [ 53.801640] raw: 017fff0000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000100070007 [ 53.803147] raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88011b185a40 0000000000000000 [ 53.803787] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 53.804384] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 53.804788] ffff88011975eb80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 53.805384] ffff88011975ec00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 53.805979] >ffff88011975ec80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 53.806577] ^ [ 53.807165] ffff88011975ed00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 53.807762] ffff88011975ed80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 53.808356] ================================================================== [ 53.808949] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fixes: 6c8702c60b88 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mathieu Xhonneux <m.xhonneux@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-25 19:29:41 +07:00
err = skb_cow_head(skb, tot_len + skb->mac_len);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
inner_hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
ipv6: sr: extract the right key values for "seg6_make_flowlabel" The seg6_make_flowlabel() is used by seg6_do_srh_encap() to compute the flowlabel from a given skb. It relies on skb_get_hash() which eventually calls __skb_flow_dissect() to extract the flow_keys struct values from the skb. In case of IPv4 traffic, calling seg6_make_flowlabel() after skb_push(), skb_reset_network_header(), and skb_mac_header_rebuild() will results in flow_keys struct of all key values set to zero. This patch calls seg6_make_flowlabel() before resetting the headers of skb to get the right key values. Extracted Key values are based on the type inner packet as follows: 1) IPv6 traffic: src_IP, dst_IP, L4 proto, and flowlabel of inner packet. 2) IPv4 traffic: src_IP, dst_IP, L4 proto, src_port, and dst_port 3) L2 traffic: depends on what kind of traffic carried into the L2 frame. IPv6 and IPv4 traffic works as discussed 1) and 2) Here a hex_dump of struct flow_keys for IPv4 and IPv6 traffic 10.100.1.100: 47302 > 30.0.0.2: 5001 00000000: 14 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 11 00 00 00 00 00 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 13 89 b8 c6 1e 00 00 02 00000020: 0a 64 01 64 fc00:a1:a > b2::2 00000000: 28 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 86 dd 11 00 99 f9 02 00 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b2 00 00 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 fc 00 00 a1 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0a Signed-off-by: Ahmed Abdelsalam <amsalam20@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-28 17:18:35 +07:00
flowlabel = seg6_make_flowlabel(net, skb, inner_hdr);
skb_push(skb, tot_len);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb_mac_header_rebuild(skb);
hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
/* inherit tc, flowlabel and hlim
* hlim will be decremented in ip6_forward() afterwards and
* decapsulation will overwrite inner hlim with outer hlim
*/
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
ip6_flow_hdr(hdr, ip6_tclass(ip6_flowinfo(inner_hdr)),
ipv6: sr: Compute flowlabel for outer IPv6 header of seg6 encap mode ECMP (equal-cost multipath) hashes are typically computed on the packets' 5-tuple(src IP, dst IP, src port, dst port, L4 proto). For encapsulated packets, the L4 data is not readily available and ECMP hashing will often revert to (src IP, dst IP). This will lead to traffic polarization on a single ECMP path, causing congestion and waste of network capacity. In IPv6, the 20-bit flow label field is also used as part of the ECMP hash. In the lack of L4 data, the hashing will be on (src IP, dst IP, flow label). Having a non-zero flow label is thus important for proper traffic load balancing when L4 data is unavailable (i.e., when packets are encapsulated). Currently, the seg6_do_srh_encap() function extracts the original packet's flow label and set it as the outer IPv6 flow label. There are two issues with this behaviour: a) There is no guarantee that the inner flow label is set by the source. b) If the original packet is not IPv6, the flow label will be set to zero (e.g., IPv4 or L2 encap). This patch adds a function, named seg6_make_flowlabel(), that computes a flow label from a given skb. It supports IPv6, IPv4 and L2 payloads, and leverages the per namespace 'seg6_flowlabel" sysctl value. The currently support behaviours are as follows: -1 set flowlabel to zero. 0 copy flowlabel from Inner paceket in case of Inner IPv6 (Set flowlabel to 0 in case IPv4/L2) 1 Compute the flowlabel using seg6_make_flowlabel() This patch has been tested for IPv6, IPv4, and L2 traffic. Signed-off-by: Ahmed Abdelsalam <amsalam20@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-25 01:23:16 +07:00
flowlabel);
hdr->hop_limit = inner_hdr->hop_limit;
} else {
ipv6: sr: Compute flowlabel for outer IPv6 header of seg6 encap mode ECMP (equal-cost multipath) hashes are typically computed on the packets' 5-tuple(src IP, dst IP, src port, dst port, L4 proto). For encapsulated packets, the L4 data is not readily available and ECMP hashing will often revert to (src IP, dst IP). This will lead to traffic polarization on a single ECMP path, causing congestion and waste of network capacity. In IPv6, the 20-bit flow label field is also used as part of the ECMP hash. In the lack of L4 data, the hashing will be on (src IP, dst IP, flow label). Having a non-zero flow label is thus important for proper traffic load balancing when L4 data is unavailable (i.e., when packets are encapsulated). Currently, the seg6_do_srh_encap() function extracts the original packet's flow label and set it as the outer IPv6 flow label. There are two issues with this behaviour: a) There is no guarantee that the inner flow label is set by the source. b) If the original packet is not IPv6, the flow label will be set to zero (e.g., IPv4 or L2 encap). This patch adds a function, named seg6_make_flowlabel(), that computes a flow label from a given skb. It supports IPv6, IPv4 and L2 payloads, and leverages the per namespace 'seg6_flowlabel" sysctl value. The currently support behaviours are as follows: -1 set flowlabel to zero. 0 copy flowlabel from Inner paceket in case of Inner IPv6 (Set flowlabel to 0 in case IPv4/L2) 1 Compute the flowlabel using seg6_make_flowlabel() This patch has been tested for IPv6, IPv4, and L2 traffic. Signed-off-by: Ahmed Abdelsalam <amsalam20@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-25 01:23:16 +07:00
ip6_flow_hdr(hdr, 0, flowlabel);
hdr->hop_limit = ip6_dst_hoplimit(skb_dst(skb));
memset(IP6CB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IP6CB(skb)));
}
hdr->nexthdr = NEXTHDR_ROUTING;
isrh = (void *)hdr + sizeof(*hdr);
memcpy(isrh, osrh, hdrlen);
isrh->nexthdr = proto;
hdr->daddr = isrh->segments[isrh->first_segment];
ipv6: sr: fix NULL pointer dereference in seg6_do_srh_encap()- v4 pkts In case of seg6 in encap mode, seg6_do_srh_encap() calls set_tun_src() in order to set the src addr of outer IPv6 header. The net_device is required for set_tun_src(). However calling ip6_dst_idev() on dst_entry in case of IPv4 traffic results on the following bug. Using just dst->dev should fix this BUG. [ 196.242461] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 [ 196.242975] PGD 800000010f076067 P4D 800000010f076067 PUD 10f060067 PMD 0 [ 196.243329] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 196.243468] Modules linked in: nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd input_leds glue_helper led_class pcspkr serio_raw mac_hid video autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid e1000 i2c_piix4 ahci pata_acpi libahci [ 196.244362] CPU: 2 PID: 1089 Comm: ping Not tainted 4.16.0+ #1 [ 196.244606] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 196.244968] RIP: 0010:seg6_do_srh_encap+0x1ac/0x300 [ 196.245236] RSP: 0018:ffffb2ce00b23a60 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 196.245464] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8c7f53eea300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 196.245742] RDX: 0000f10000000000 RSI: ffff8c7f52085a6c RDI: ffff8c7f41166850 [ 196.246018] RBP: ffffb2ce00b23aa8 R08: 00000000000261e0 R09: ffff8c7f41166800 [ 196.246294] R10: ffffdce5040ac780 R11: ffff8c7f41166828 R12: ffff8c7f41166808 [ 196.246570] R13: ffff8c7f52085a44 R14: ffffffffb73211c0 R15: ffff8c7e69e44200 [ 196.246846] FS: 00007fc448789700(0000) GS:ffff8c7f59d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 196.247286] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 196.247526] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010f05a000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 196.247804] Call Trace: [ 196.247972] seg6_do_srh+0x15b/0x1c0 [ 196.248156] seg6_output+0x3c/0x220 [ 196.248341] ? prandom_u32+0x14/0x20 [ 196.248526] ? ip_idents_reserve+0x6c/0x80 [ 196.248723] ? __ip_select_ident+0x90/0x100 [ 196.248923] ? ip_append_data.part.50+0x6c/0xd0 [ 196.249133] lwtunnel_output+0x44/0x70 [ 196.249328] ip_send_skb+0x15/0x40 [ 196.249515] raw_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xac0 [ 196.249701] ? _copy_from_user+0x2e/0x60 [ 196.249897] ? rw_copy_check_uvector+0x53/0x110 [ 196.250106] ? _copy_from_user+0x2e/0x60 [ 196.250299] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0xce/0x140 [ 196.250508] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 [ 196.250690] ___sys_sendmsg+0x292/0x2a0 [ 196.250881] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [ 196.251074] ? copy_termios+0x1e/0x70 [ 196.251261] ? _copy_to_user+0x22/0x30 [ 196.251575] ? tty_mode_ioctl+0x1c3/0x4e0 [ 196.251782] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [ 196.251972] ? mutex_lock+0xe/0x30 [ 196.252152] ? vvar_fault+0xd2/0x110 [ 196.252337] ? __do_fault+0x1f/0xc0 [ 196.252521] ? __handle_mm_fault+0xc1f/0x12d0 [ 196.252727] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x63/0xa0 [ 196.252919] __sys_sendmsg+0x63/0xa0 [ 196.253107] do_syscall_64+0x72/0x200 [ 196.253305] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 [ 196.253530] RIP: 0033:0x7fc4480b0690 [ 196.253715] RSP: 002b:00007ffde9f252f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 196.254053] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 00007fc4480b0690 [ 196.254331] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000060a360 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 196.254608] RBP: 00007ffde9f253f0 R08: 00000000002d1e81 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 196.254884] R10: 00007ffde9f250c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000b22070 [ 196.255205] R13: 20c49ba5e353f7cf R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007ffde9f278fe [ 196.255484] Code: a5 0f b6 45 c0 41 88 41 28 41 0f b6 41 2c 48 c1 e0 04 49 8b 54 01 38 49 8b 44 01 30 49 89 51 20 49 89 41 18 48 8b 83 b0 00 00 00 <48> 8b 30 49 8b 86 08 0b 00 00 48 8b 40 20 48 8b 50 08 48 0b 10 [ 196.256190] RIP: seg6_do_srh_encap+0x1ac/0x300 RSP: ffffb2ce00b23a60 [ 196.256445] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 196.256676] ---[ end trace 71af7d093603885c ]--- Fixes: 8936ef7604c11 ("ipv6: sr: fix NULL pointer dereference when setting encap source address") Signed-off-by: Ahmed Abdelsalam <amsalam20@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-20 20:58:05 +07:00
set_tun_src(net, dst->dev, &hdr->daddr, &hdr->saddr);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
if (sr_has_hmac(isrh)) {
err = seg6_push_hmac(net, &hdr->saddr, isrh);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
}
#endif
skb_postpush_rcsum(skb, hdr, tot_len);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(seg6_do_srh_encap);
/* insert an SRH within an IPv6 packet, just after the IPv6 header */
int seg6_do_srh_inline(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh)
{
struct ipv6hdr *hdr, *oldhdr;
struct ipv6_sr_hdr *isrh;
int hdrlen, err;
hdrlen = (osrh->hdrlen + 1) << 3;
ipv6: sr: fix memory OOB access in seg6_do_srh_encap/inline seg6_do_srh_encap and seg6_do_srh_inline can possibly do an out-of-bounds access when adding the SRH to the packet. This no longer happen when expanding the skb not only by the size of the SRH (+ outer IPv6 header), but also by skb->mac_len. [ 53.793056] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in seg6_do_srh_encap+0x284/0x620 [ 53.794564] Write of size 14 at addr ffff88011975ecfa by task ping/674 [ 53.796665] CPU: 0 PID: 674 Comm: ping Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3-ARCH+ #90 [ 53.796670] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 [ 53.796673] Call Trace: [ 53.796679] <IRQ> [ 53.796689] dump_stack+0x71/0xab [ 53.796700] print_address_description+0x6a/0x270 [ 53.796707] kasan_report+0x258/0x380 [ 53.796715] ? seg6_do_srh_encap+0x284/0x620 [ 53.796722] memmove+0x34/0x50 [ 53.796730] seg6_do_srh_encap+0x284/0x620 [ 53.796741] ? seg6_do_srh+0x29b/0x360 [ 53.796747] seg6_do_srh+0x29b/0x360 [ 53.796756] seg6_input+0x2e/0x2e0 [ 53.796765] lwtunnel_input+0x93/0xd0 [ 53.796774] ipv6_rcv+0x690/0x920 [ 53.796783] ? ip6_input+0x170/0x170 [ 53.796791] ? eth_gro_receive+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 53.796800] ? ip6_input+0x170/0x170 [ 53.796809] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xcc0/0x13f0 [ 53.796820] ? netdev_info+0x110/0x110 [ 53.796827] ? napi_complete_done+0xb6/0x170 [ 53.796834] ? e1000_clean+0x6da/0xf70 [ 53.796845] ? process_backlog+0x129/0x2a0 [ 53.796853] process_backlog+0x129/0x2a0 [ 53.796862] net_rx_action+0x211/0x5c0 [ 53.796870] ? napi_complete_done+0x170/0x170 [ 53.796887] ? run_rebalance_domains+0x11f/0x150 [ 53.796891] __do_softirq+0x10e/0x39e [ 53.796894] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 [ 53.796895] </IRQ> [ 53.796898] do_softirq.part.16+0x54/0x60 [ 53.796900] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x5b/0x60 [ 53.796903] ip6_finish_output2+0x416/0x9f0 [ 53.796906] ? ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x110/0x110 [ 53.796909] ? ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow+0x390/0x390 [ 53.796911] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x66/0x80 [ 53.796913] ? ip6_mtu+0x44/0xf0 [ 53.796916] ? ip6_output+0xfc/0x220 [ 53.796918] ip6_output+0xfc/0x220 [ 53.796921] ? ip6_finish_output+0x2b0/0x2b0 [ 53.796923] ? memcpy+0x34/0x50 [ 53.796926] ip6_send_skb+0x43/0xc0 [ 53.796929] rawv6_sendmsg+0x1216/0x1530 [ 53.796932] ? __orc_find+0x6b/0xc0 [ 53.796934] ? rawv6_rcv_skb+0x160/0x160 [ 53.796937] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x66/0x80 [ 53.796939] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x66/0x80 [ 53.796942] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x1e/0x30 [ 53.796944] ? kernel_text_address+0xec/0x100 [ 53.796946] ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30 [ 53.796948] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50 [ 53.796950] ? __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100 [ 53.796954] ? save_stack+0x89/0xb0 [ 53.796956] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 [ 53.796958] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xd2/0x1f0 [ 53.796961] ? prepare_creds+0x23/0x160 [ 53.796963] ? __x64_sys_capset+0x252/0x3e0 [ 53.796966] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x160 [ 53.796968] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 53.796971] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x170/0x380 [ 53.796973] ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x12c0/0x12c0 [ 53.796977] ? tty_vhangup+0x20/0x20 [ 53.796979] ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90 [ 53.796982] ? __mod_node_page_state+0x8d/0xa0 [ 53.796986] ? __check_object_size+0xe7/0x240 [ 53.796989] ? __sys_sendto+0x229/0x290 [ 53.796991] ? rawv6_rcv_skb+0x160/0x160 [ 53.796993] __sys_sendto+0x229/0x290 [ 53.796996] ? __ia32_sys_getpeername+0x50/0x50 [ 53.796999] ? commit_creds+0x2de/0x520 [ 53.797002] ? security_capset+0x57/0x70 [ 53.797004] ? __x64_sys_capset+0x29f/0x3e0 [ 53.797007] ? __x64_sys_rt_sigsuspend+0xe0/0xe0 [ 53.797011] ? __do_page_fault+0x664/0x770 [ 53.797014] __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 [ 53.797017] do_syscall_64+0x69/0x160 [ 53.797019] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 53.797022] RIP: 0033:0x7f43b7a6714a [ 53.797023] RSP: 002b:00007ffd891bd368 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 53.797026] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006129c0 RCX: 00007f43b7a6714a [ 53.797028] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00000000006129c0 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 53.797029] RBP: 00007ffd891be640 R08: 0000000000610940 R09: 000000000000001c [ 53.797030] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 53.797032] R13: 000000000060e6a0 R14: 0000000000008004 R15: 000000000040b661 [ 53.797171] Allocated by task 642: [ 53.797460] kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 [ 53.797463] kmem_cache_alloc+0xd2/0x1f0 [ 53.797465] getname_flags+0x40/0x210 [ 53.797467] user_path_at_empty+0x1d/0x40 [ 53.797469] do_faccessat+0x12a/0x320 [ 53.797471] do_syscall_64+0x69/0x160 [ 53.797473] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 53.797607] Freed by task 642: [ 53.797869] __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 [ 53.797871] kmem_cache_free+0xa8/0x230 [ 53.797872] filename_lookup+0x15b/0x230 [ 53.797874] do_faccessat+0x12a/0x320 [ 53.797876] do_syscall_64+0x69/0x160 [ 53.797878] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 53.798014] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88011975e600 which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096 [ 53.799043] The buggy address is located 1786 bytes inside of 4096-byte region [ffff88011975e600, ffff88011975f600) [ 53.800013] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 53.800414] page:ffffea000465d600 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 53.801259] flags: 0x17fff0000008100(slab|head) [ 53.801640] raw: 017fff0000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000100070007 [ 53.803147] raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88011b185a40 0000000000000000 [ 53.803787] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 53.804384] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 53.804788] ffff88011975eb80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 53.805384] ffff88011975ec00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 53.805979] >ffff88011975ec80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 53.806577] ^ [ 53.807165] ffff88011975ed00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 53.807762] ffff88011975ed80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 53.808356] ================================================================== [ 53.808949] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fixes: 6c8702c60b88 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mathieu Xhonneux <m.xhonneux@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-25 19:29:41 +07:00
err = skb_cow_head(skb, hdrlen + skb->mac_len);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
oldhdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
skb_postpull_rcsum(skb, skb_network_header(skb),
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + hdrlen);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb_mac_header_rebuild(skb);
hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
memmove(hdr, oldhdr, sizeof(*hdr));
isrh = (void *)hdr + sizeof(*hdr);
memcpy(isrh, osrh, hdrlen);
isrh->nexthdr = hdr->nexthdr;
hdr->nexthdr = NEXTHDR_ROUTING;
isrh->segments[0] = hdr->daddr;
hdr->daddr = isrh->segments[isrh->first_segment];
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
if (sr_has_hmac(isrh)) {
struct net *net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
err = seg6_push_hmac(net, &hdr->saddr, isrh);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
}
#endif
skb_postpush_rcsum(skb, hdr, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + hdrlen);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(seg6_do_srh_inline);
static int seg6_do_srh(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
struct seg6_iptunnel_encap *tinfo;
int proto, err = 0;
tinfo = seg6_encap_lwtunnel(dst->lwtstate);
switch (tinfo->mode) {
case SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_INLINE:
if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
return -EINVAL;
err = seg6_do_srh_inline(skb, tinfo->srh);
if (err)
return err;
break;
case SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_ENCAP:
err = iptunnel_handle_offloads(skb, SKB_GSO_IPXIP6);
if (err)
return err;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
proto = IPPROTO_IPV6;
else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
proto = IPPROTO_IPIP;
else
return -EINVAL;
err = seg6_do_srh_encap(skb, tinfo->srh, proto);
if (err)
return err;
skb_set_inner_transport_header(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb));
skb_set_inner_protocol(skb, skb->protocol);
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
break;
case SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP:
if (!skb_mac_header_was_set(skb))
return -EINVAL;
if (pskb_expand_head(skb, skb->mac_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
skb_mac_header_rebuild(skb);
skb_push(skb, skb->mac_len);
err = seg6_do_srh_encap(skb, tinfo->srh, NEXTHDR_NONE);
if (err)
return err;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
break;
}
ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
skb_set_transport_header(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
return 0;
}
static int seg6_input(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dst_entry *orig_dst = skb_dst(skb);
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct seg6_lwt *slwt;
int err;
err = seg6_do_srh(skb);
if (unlikely(err)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
slwt = seg6_lwt_lwtunnel(orig_dst->lwtstate);
preempt_disable();
dst = dst_cache_get(&slwt->cache);
preempt_enable();
skb_dst_drop(skb);
if (!dst) {
ip6_route_input(skb);
dst = skb_dst(skb);
if (!dst->error) {
preempt_disable();
dst_cache_set_ip6(&slwt->cache, dst,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr);
preempt_enable();
}
} else {
skb_dst_set(skb, dst);
}
ipv6: sr: fix BUG due to headroom too small after SRH push When a locally generated packet receives an SRH with two or more segments, the remaining headroom is too small to push an ethernet header. This patch ensures that the headroom is large enough after SRH push. The BUG generated the following trace. [ 192.950285] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff81809675 len:198 put:14 head:ffff88006f306400 data:ffff88006f3063fa tail:0xc0 end:0x2c0 dev:A-1 [ 192.952456] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 192.953218] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:105! [ 192.953411] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 192.953411] Modules linked in: [ 192.953411] CPU: 5 PID: 3433 Comm: ping6 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc3+ #237 [ 192.953411] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.1-0-g8891697-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 192.953411] task: ffff88007c2d42c0 task.stack: ffffc90000ef4000 [ 192.953411] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x61/0x70 [ 192.953411] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ef7900 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 192.953411] RAX: 0000000000000085 RBX: 00000000000086dd RCX: 0000000000000201 [ 192.953411] RDX: 0000000080000201 RSI: ffffffff81d104c5 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 192.953411] RBP: ffffc90000ef7920 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 192.953411] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 192.953411] R13: ffff88007c5a4000 R14: ffff88007b363d80 R15: 00000000000000b8 [ 192.953411] FS: 00007f94b558b700(0000) GS:ffff88007fd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 192.953411] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 192.953411] CR2: 00007fff5ecd5080 CR3: 0000000074141000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [ 192.953411] Call Trace: [ 192.953411] skb_push+0x3b/0x40 [ 192.953411] eth_header+0x25/0xc0 [ 192.953411] neigh_resolve_output+0x168/0x230 [ 192.953411] ? ip6_finish_output2+0x242/0x8f0 [ 192.953411] ip6_finish_output2+0x242/0x8f0 [ 192.953411] ? ip6_finish_output2+0x76/0x8f0 [ 192.953411] ip6_finish_output+0xa8/0x1d0 [ 192.953411] ip6_output+0x64/0x2d0 [ 192.953411] ? ip6_output+0x73/0x2d0 [ 192.953411] ? ip6_dst_check+0xb5/0xc0 [ 192.953411] ? dst_cache_per_cpu_get.isra.2+0x40/0x80 [ 192.953411] seg6_output+0xb0/0x220 [ 192.953411] lwtunnel_output+0xcf/0x210 [ 192.953411] ? lwtunnel_output+0x59/0x210 [ 192.953411] ip6_local_out+0x38/0x70 [ 192.953411] ip6_send_skb+0x2a/0xb0 [ 192.953411] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x48/0x50 [ 192.953411] rawv6_sendmsg+0xa39/0xf10 [ 192.953411] ? __lock_acquire+0x489/0x890 [ 192.953411] ? __mutex_lock+0x1fc/0x970 [ 192.953411] ? __lock_acquire+0x489/0x890 [ 192.953411] ? __mutex_lock+0x1fc/0x970 [ 192.953411] ? tty_ioctl+0x283/0xec0 [ 192.953411] inet_sendmsg+0x45/0x1d0 [ 192.953411] ? _copy_from_user+0x54/0x80 [ 192.953411] sock_sendmsg+0x33/0x40 [ 192.953411] SYSC_sendto+0xef/0x170 [ 192.953411] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xc2 [ 192.953411] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x12b/0x1b0 [ 192.953411] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 192.953411] SyS_sendto+0x9/0x10 [ 192.953411] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 [ 192.953411] RIP: 0033:0x7f94b453db33 [ 192.953411] RSP: 002b:00007fff5ecd0578 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 192.953411] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff5ecd16e0 RCX: 00007f94b453db33 [ 192.953411] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055a78352e9c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 192.953411] RBP: 00007fff5ecd1690 R08: 000055a78352c940 R09: 000000000000001c [ 192.953411] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055a783321e10 [ 192.953411] R13: 000055a7839890c0 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 192.953411] Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 c4 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 90 58 d2 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 4f 70 9a ff <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 97 d8 00 00 [ 192.953411] RIP: skb_panic+0x61/0x70 RSP: ffffc90000ef7900 [ 193.000186] ---[ end trace bd0b89fabdf2f92c ]--- [ 193.000951] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 193.001137] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 193.001169] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Fixes: 19d5a26f5ef8de5dcb78799feaf404d717b1aac3 ("ipv6: sr: expand skb head only if necessary") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-16 17:27:14 +07:00
err = skb_cow_head(skb, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dst->dev));
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
return dst_input(skb);
}
static int seg6_output(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dst_entry *orig_dst = skb_dst(skb);
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct seg6_lwt *slwt;
int err = -EINVAL;
err = seg6_do_srh(skb);
if (unlikely(err))
goto drop;
slwt = seg6_lwt_lwtunnel(orig_dst->lwtstate);
ipv6: sr: fix several BUGs when preemption is enabled When CONFIG_PREEMPT=y, CONFIG_IPV6=m and CONFIG_SEG6_HMAC=y, seg6_hmac_init() is called during the initialization of the ipv6 module. This causes a subsequent call to smp_processor_id() with preemption enabled, resulting in the following trace. [ 20.451460] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: systemd/1 [ 20.452556] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x19 [ 20.453304] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5-00973-g46738b1 #1 [ 20.454406] ffffc9000062fc18 ffffffff813607b2 0000000000000000 ffffffff81a7f782 [ 20.455528] ffffc9000062fc48 ffffffff813778dc 0000000000000000 00000000001dcf98 [ 20.456539] ffffffffa003bd08 ffffffff81af93e0 ffffc9000062fc58 ffffffff81377905 [ 20.456539] Call Trace: [ 20.456539] [<ffffffff813607b2>] dump_stack+0x63/0x7f [ 20.456539] [<ffffffff813778dc>] check_preemption_disabled+0xd1/0xe3 [ 20.456539] [<ffffffff81377905>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x19 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa0061f3b>] seg6_hmac_init+0xfa/0x192 [ipv6] [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa0061ccc>] seg6_init+0x39/0x6f [ipv6] [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa006121a>] inet6_init+0x21a/0x321 [ipv6] [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa0061000>] ? 0xffffffffa0061000 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81000457>] do_one_initcall+0x8b/0x115 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff811328a3>] do_init_module+0x53/0x1c4 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff8110650a>] load_module+0x1153/0x14ec [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81106a7b>] SYSC_finit_module+0x8c/0xb9 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81106a7b>] ? SYSC_finit_module+0x8c/0xb9 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81106abc>] SyS_finit_module+0x9/0xb [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff810014d1>] do_syscall_64+0x62/0x75 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff816834f0>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Moreover, dst_cache_* functions also call smp_processor_id(), generating a similar trace. This patch uses raw_cpu_ptr() in seg6_hmac_init() rather than this_cpu_ptr() and disable preemption when using dst_cache_* functions. Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-13 03:30:01 +07:00
preempt_disable();
dst = dst_cache_get(&slwt->cache);
ipv6: sr: fix several BUGs when preemption is enabled When CONFIG_PREEMPT=y, CONFIG_IPV6=m and CONFIG_SEG6_HMAC=y, seg6_hmac_init() is called during the initialization of the ipv6 module. This causes a subsequent call to smp_processor_id() with preemption enabled, resulting in the following trace. [ 20.451460] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: systemd/1 [ 20.452556] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x19 [ 20.453304] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5-00973-g46738b1 #1 [ 20.454406] ffffc9000062fc18 ffffffff813607b2 0000000000000000 ffffffff81a7f782 [ 20.455528] ffffc9000062fc48 ffffffff813778dc 0000000000000000 00000000001dcf98 [ 20.456539] ffffffffa003bd08 ffffffff81af93e0 ffffc9000062fc58 ffffffff81377905 [ 20.456539] Call Trace: [ 20.456539] [<ffffffff813607b2>] dump_stack+0x63/0x7f [ 20.456539] [<ffffffff813778dc>] check_preemption_disabled+0xd1/0xe3 [ 20.456539] [<ffffffff81377905>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x19 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa0061f3b>] seg6_hmac_init+0xfa/0x192 [ipv6] [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa0061ccc>] seg6_init+0x39/0x6f [ipv6] [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa006121a>] inet6_init+0x21a/0x321 [ipv6] [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa0061000>] ? 0xffffffffa0061000 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81000457>] do_one_initcall+0x8b/0x115 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff811328a3>] do_init_module+0x53/0x1c4 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff8110650a>] load_module+0x1153/0x14ec [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81106a7b>] SYSC_finit_module+0x8c/0xb9 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81106a7b>] ? SYSC_finit_module+0x8c/0xb9 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81106abc>] SyS_finit_module+0x9/0xb [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff810014d1>] do_syscall_64+0x62/0x75 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff816834f0>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Moreover, dst_cache_* functions also call smp_processor_id(), generating a similar trace. This patch uses raw_cpu_ptr() in seg6_hmac_init() rather than this_cpu_ptr() and disable preemption when using dst_cache_* functions. Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-13 03:30:01 +07:00
preempt_enable();
if (unlikely(!dst)) {
struct ipv6hdr *hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct flowi6 fl6;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.daddr = hdr->daddr;
fl6.saddr = hdr->saddr;
fl6.flowlabel = ip6_flowinfo(hdr);
fl6.flowi6_mark = skb->mark;
fl6.flowi6_proto = hdr->nexthdr;
dst = ip6_route_output(net, NULL, &fl6);
if (dst->error) {
err = dst->error;
dst_release(dst);
goto drop;
}
ipv6: sr: fix several BUGs when preemption is enabled When CONFIG_PREEMPT=y, CONFIG_IPV6=m and CONFIG_SEG6_HMAC=y, seg6_hmac_init() is called during the initialization of the ipv6 module. This causes a subsequent call to smp_processor_id() with preemption enabled, resulting in the following trace. [ 20.451460] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: systemd/1 [ 20.452556] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x19 [ 20.453304] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5-00973-g46738b1 #1 [ 20.454406] ffffc9000062fc18 ffffffff813607b2 0000000000000000 ffffffff81a7f782 [ 20.455528] ffffc9000062fc48 ffffffff813778dc 0000000000000000 00000000001dcf98 [ 20.456539] ffffffffa003bd08 ffffffff81af93e0 ffffc9000062fc58 ffffffff81377905 [ 20.456539] Call Trace: [ 20.456539] [<ffffffff813607b2>] dump_stack+0x63/0x7f [ 20.456539] [<ffffffff813778dc>] check_preemption_disabled+0xd1/0xe3 [ 20.456539] [<ffffffff81377905>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x19 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa0061f3b>] seg6_hmac_init+0xfa/0x192 [ipv6] [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa0061ccc>] seg6_init+0x39/0x6f [ipv6] [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa006121a>] inet6_init+0x21a/0x321 [ipv6] [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa0061000>] ? 0xffffffffa0061000 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81000457>] do_one_initcall+0x8b/0x115 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff811328a3>] do_init_module+0x53/0x1c4 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff8110650a>] load_module+0x1153/0x14ec [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81106a7b>] SYSC_finit_module+0x8c/0xb9 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81106a7b>] ? SYSC_finit_module+0x8c/0xb9 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81106abc>] SyS_finit_module+0x9/0xb [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff810014d1>] do_syscall_64+0x62/0x75 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff816834f0>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Moreover, dst_cache_* functions also call smp_processor_id(), generating a similar trace. This patch uses raw_cpu_ptr() in seg6_hmac_init() rather than this_cpu_ptr() and disable preemption when using dst_cache_* functions. Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-13 03:30:01 +07:00
preempt_disable();
dst_cache_set_ip6(&slwt->cache, dst, &fl6.saddr);
ipv6: sr: fix several BUGs when preemption is enabled When CONFIG_PREEMPT=y, CONFIG_IPV6=m and CONFIG_SEG6_HMAC=y, seg6_hmac_init() is called during the initialization of the ipv6 module. This causes a subsequent call to smp_processor_id() with preemption enabled, resulting in the following trace. [ 20.451460] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: systemd/1 [ 20.452556] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x19 [ 20.453304] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5-00973-g46738b1 #1 [ 20.454406] ffffc9000062fc18 ffffffff813607b2 0000000000000000 ffffffff81a7f782 [ 20.455528] ffffc9000062fc48 ffffffff813778dc 0000000000000000 00000000001dcf98 [ 20.456539] ffffffffa003bd08 ffffffff81af93e0 ffffc9000062fc58 ffffffff81377905 [ 20.456539] Call Trace: [ 20.456539] [<ffffffff813607b2>] dump_stack+0x63/0x7f [ 20.456539] [<ffffffff813778dc>] check_preemption_disabled+0xd1/0xe3 [ 20.456539] [<ffffffff81377905>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x19 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa0061f3b>] seg6_hmac_init+0xfa/0x192 [ipv6] [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa0061ccc>] seg6_init+0x39/0x6f [ipv6] [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa006121a>] inet6_init+0x21a/0x321 [ipv6] [ 20.460260] [<ffffffffa0061000>] ? 0xffffffffa0061000 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81000457>] do_one_initcall+0x8b/0x115 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff811328a3>] do_init_module+0x53/0x1c4 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff8110650a>] load_module+0x1153/0x14ec [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81106a7b>] SYSC_finit_module+0x8c/0xb9 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81106a7b>] ? SYSC_finit_module+0x8c/0xb9 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff81106abc>] SyS_finit_module+0x9/0xb [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff810014d1>] do_syscall_64+0x62/0x75 [ 20.460260] [<ffffffff816834f0>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Moreover, dst_cache_* functions also call smp_processor_id(), generating a similar trace. This patch uses raw_cpu_ptr() in seg6_hmac_init() rather than this_cpu_ptr() and disable preemption when using dst_cache_* functions. Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-13 03:30:01 +07:00
preempt_enable();
}
skb_dst_drop(skb);
skb_dst_set(skb, dst);
ipv6: sr: fix BUG due to headroom too small after SRH push When a locally generated packet receives an SRH with two or more segments, the remaining headroom is too small to push an ethernet header. This patch ensures that the headroom is large enough after SRH push. The BUG generated the following trace. [ 192.950285] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff81809675 len:198 put:14 head:ffff88006f306400 data:ffff88006f3063fa tail:0xc0 end:0x2c0 dev:A-1 [ 192.952456] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 192.953218] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:105! [ 192.953411] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 192.953411] Modules linked in: [ 192.953411] CPU: 5 PID: 3433 Comm: ping6 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc3+ #237 [ 192.953411] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.1-0-g8891697-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 192.953411] task: ffff88007c2d42c0 task.stack: ffffc90000ef4000 [ 192.953411] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x61/0x70 [ 192.953411] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ef7900 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 192.953411] RAX: 0000000000000085 RBX: 00000000000086dd RCX: 0000000000000201 [ 192.953411] RDX: 0000000080000201 RSI: ffffffff81d104c5 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 192.953411] RBP: ffffc90000ef7920 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 192.953411] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 192.953411] R13: ffff88007c5a4000 R14: ffff88007b363d80 R15: 00000000000000b8 [ 192.953411] FS: 00007f94b558b700(0000) GS:ffff88007fd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 192.953411] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 192.953411] CR2: 00007fff5ecd5080 CR3: 0000000074141000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [ 192.953411] Call Trace: [ 192.953411] skb_push+0x3b/0x40 [ 192.953411] eth_header+0x25/0xc0 [ 192.953411] neigh_resolve_output+0x168/0x230 [ 192.953411] ? ip6_finish_output2+0x242/0x8f0 [ 192.953411] ip6_finish_output2+0x242/0x8f0 [ 192.953411] ? ip6_finish_output2+0x76/0x8f0 [ 192.953411] ip6_finish_output+0xa8/0x1d0 [ 192.953411] ip6_output+0x64/0x2d0 [ 192.953411] ? ip6_output+0x73/0x2d0 [ 192.953411] ? ip6_dst_check+0xb5/0xc0 [ 192.953411] ? dst_cache_per_cpu_get.isra.2+0x40/0x80 [ 192.953411] seg6_output+0xb0/0x220 [ 192.953411] lwtunnel_output+0xcf/0x210 [ 192.953411] ? lwtunnel_output+0x59/0x210 [ 192.953411] ip6_local_out+0x38/0x70 [ 192.953411] ip6_send_skb+0x2a/0xb0 [ 192.953411] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x48/0x50 [ 192.953411] rawv6_sendmsg+0xa39/0xf10 [ 192.953411] ? __lock_acquire+0x489/0x890 [ 192.953411] ? __mutex_lock+0x1fc/0x970 [ 192.953411] ? __lock_acquire+0x489/0x890 [ 192.953411] ? __mutex_lock+0x1fc/0x970 [ 192.953411] ? tty_ioctl+0x283/0xec0 [ 192.953411] inet_sendmsg+0x45/0x1d0 [ 192.953411] ? _copy_from_user+0x54/0x80 [ 192.953411] sock_sendmsg+0x33/0x40 [ 192.953411] SYSC_sendto+0xef/0x170 [ 192.953411] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xc2 [ 192.953411] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x12b/0x1b0 [ 192.953411] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 192.953411] SyS_sendto+0x9/0x10 [ 192.953411] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 [ 192.953411] RIP: 0033:0x7f94b453db33 [ 192.953411] RSP: 002b:00007fff5ecd0578 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 192.953411] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff5ecd16e0 RCX: 00007f94b453db33 [ 192.953411] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055a78352e9c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 192.953411] RBP: 00007fff5ecd1690 R08: 000055a78352c940 R09: 000000000000001c [ 192.953411] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055a783321e10 [ 192.953411] R13: 000055a7839890c0 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 192.953411] Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 c4 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 90 58 d2 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 4f 70 9a ff <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 97 d8 00 00 [ 192.953411] RIP: skb_panic+0x61/0x70 RSP: ffffc90000ef7900 [ 193.000186] ---[ end trace bd0b89fabdf2f92c ]--- [ 193.000951] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 193.001137] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 193.001169] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Fixes: 19d5a26f5ef8de5dcb78799feaf404d717b1aac3 ("ipv6: sr: expand skb head only if necessary") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-16 17:27:14 +07:00
err = skb_cow_head(skb, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dst->dev));
if (unlikely(err))
goto drop;
return dst_output(net, sk, skb);
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
static int seg6_build_state(struct nlattr *nla,
unsigned int family, const void *cfg,
struct lwtunnel_state **ts,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
struct nlattr *tb[SEG6_IPTUNNEL_MAX + 1];
struct seg6_iptunnel_encap *tuninfo;
struct lwtunnel_state *newts;
int tuninfo_len, min_size;
struct seg6_lwt *slwt;
int err;
if (family != AF_INET && family != AF_INET6)
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 19:07:28 +07:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, SEG6_IPTUNNEL_MAX, nla,
seg6_iptunnel_policy, extack);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (!tb[SEG6_IPTUNNEL_SRH])
return -EINVAL;
tuninfo = nla_data(tb[SEG6_IPTUNNEL_SRH]);
tuninfo_len = nla_len(tb[SEG6_IPTUNNEL_SRH]);
/* tuninfo must contain at least the iptunnel encap structure,
* the SRH and one segment
*/
min_size = sizeof(*tuninfo) + sizeof(struct ipv6_sr_hdr) +
sizeof(struct in6_addr);
if (tuninfo_len < min_size)
return -EINVAL;
switch (tuninfo->mode) {
case SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_INLINE:
if (family != AF_INET6)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_ENCAP:
break;
case SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
/* verify that SRH is consistent */
if (!seg6_validate_srh(tuninfo->srh, tuninfo_len - sizeof(*tuninfo)))
return -EINVAL;
newts = lwtunnel_state_alloc(tuninfo_len + sizeof(*slwt));
if (!newts)
return -ENOMEM;
slwt = seg6_lwt_lwtunnel(newts);
ipv6: sr: fix scheduling in RCU when creating seg6 lwtunnel state The seg6_build_state() function is called with RCU read lock held, so we cannot use GFP_KERNEL. This patch uses GFP_ATOMIC instead. [ 92.770271] ============================= [ 92.770628] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 92.770921] 4.16.0-rc4+ #12 Not tainted [ 92.771277] ----------------------------- [ 92.771585] ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:302 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! [ 92.772279] [ 92.772279] other info that might help us debug this: [ 92.772279] [ 92.773067] [ 92.773067] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 92.773514] 2 locks held by ip/2413: [ 92.773765] #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000e5461720>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x441/0x4d0 [ 92.774377] #1: (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [<00000000df4f161e>] lwtunnel_build_state+0x59/0x210 [ 92.775065] [ 92.775065] stack backtrace: [ 92.775371] CPU: 0 PID: 2413 Comm: ip Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4+ #12 [ 92.775791] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1.fc27 04/01/2014 [ 92.776608] Call Trace: [ 92.776852] dump_stack+0x7d/0xbc [ 92.777130] __schedule+0x133/0xf00 [ 92.777393] ? unwind_get_return_address_ptr+0x50/0x50 [ 92.777783] ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8 [ 92.778073] ? rcu_is_watching+0x19/0x30 [ 92.778383] ? kernel_text_address+0x49/0x60 [ 92.778800] ? __kernel_text_address+0x9/0x30 [ 92.779241] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x29/0x40 [ 92.779727] ? pcpu_alloc+0x102/0x8f0 [ 92.780101] _cond_resched+0x23/0x50 [ 92.780459] __mutex_lock+0xbd/0xad0 [ 92.780818] ? pcpu_alloc+0x102/0x8f0 [ 92.781194] ? seg6_build_state+0x11d/0x240 [ 92.781611] ? save_stack+0x9b/0xb0 [ 92.781965] ? __ww_mutex_wakeup_for_backoff+0xf0/0xf0 [ 92.782480] ? seg6_build_state+0x11d/0x240 [ 92.782925] ? lwtunnel_build_state+0x1bd/0x210 [ 92.783393] ? ip6_route_info_create+0x687/0x1640 [ 92.783846] ? ip6_route_add+0x74/0x110 [ 92.784236] ? inet6_rtm_newroute+0x8a/0xd0 Fixes: 6c8702c60b886 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-20 21:44:55 +07:00
err = dst_cache_init(&slwt->cache, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (err) {
kfree(newts);
return err;
}
memcpy(&slwt->tuninfo, tuninfo, tuninfo_len);
newts->type = LWTUNNEL_ENCAP_SEG6;
newts->flags |= LWTUNNEL_STATE_INPUT_REDIRECT;
if (tuninfo->mode != SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP)
newts->flags |= LWTUNNEL_STATE_OUTPUT_REDIRECT;
newts->headroom = seg6_lwt_headroom(tuninfo);
*ts = newts;
return 0;
}
static void seg6_destroy_state(struct lwtunnel_state *lwt)
{
dst_cache_destroy(&seg6_lwt_lwtunnel(lwt)->cache);
}
static int seg6_fill_encap_info(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct lwtunnel_state *lwtstate)
{
struct seg6_iptunnel_encap *tuninfo = seg6_encap_lwtunnel(lwtstate);
if (nla_put_srh(skb, SEG6_IPTUNNEL_SRH, tuninfo))
return -EMSGSIZE;
return 0;
}
static int seg6_encap_nlsize(struct lwtunnel_state *lwtstate)
{
struct seg6_iptunnel_encap *tuninfo = seg6_encap_lwtunnel(lwtstate);
return nla_total_size(SEG6_IPTUN_ENCAP_SIZE(tuninfo));
}
static int seg6_encap_cmp(struct lwtunnel_state *a, struct lwtunnel_state *b)
{
struct seg6_iptunnel_encap *a_hdr = seg6_encap_lwtunnel(a);
struct seg6_iptunnel_encap *b_hdr = seg6_encap_lwtunnel(b);
int len = SEG6_IPTUN_ENCAP_SIZE(a_hdr);
if (len != SEG6_IPTUN_ENCAP_SIZE(b_hdr))
return 1;
return memcmp(a_hdr, b_hdr, len);
}
static const struct lwtunnel_encap_ops seg6_iptun_ops = {
.build_state = seg6_build_state,
.destroy_state = seg6_destroy_state,
.output = seg6_output,
.input = seg6_input,
.fill_encap = seg6_fill_encap_info,
.get_encap_size = seg6_encap_nlsize,
.cmp_encap = seg6_encap_cmp,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
};
int __init seg6_iptunnel_init(void)
{
return lwtunnel_encap_add_ops(&seg6_iptun_ops, LWTUNNEL_ENCAP_SEG6);
}
void seg6_iptunnel_exit(void)
{
lwtunnel_encap_del_ops(&seg6_iptun_ops, LWTUNNEL_ENCAP_SEG6);
}