linux_dsm_epyc7002/lib/random32.c

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/*
* This is a maximally equidistributed combined Tausworthe generator
* based on code from GNU Scientific Library 1.5 (30 Jun 2004)
*
* lfsr113 version:
*
* x_n = (s1_n ^ s2_n ^ s3_n ^ s4_n)
*
* s1_{n+1} = (((s1_n & 4294967294) << 18) ^ (((s1_n << 6) ^ s1_n) >> 13))
* s2_{n+1} = (((s2_n & 4294967288) << 2) ^ (((s2_n << 2) ^ s2_n) >> 27))
* s3_{n+1} = (((s3_n & 4294967280) << 7) ^ (((s3_n << 13) ^ s3_n) >> 21))
* s4_{n+1} = (((s4_n & 4294967168) << 13) ^ (((s4_n << 3) ^ s4_n) >> 12))
*
* The period of this generator is about 2^113 (see erratum paper).
*
* From: P. L'Ecuyer, "Maximally Equidistributed Combined Tausworthe
* Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65, 213 (1996), 203--213:
* http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps
* ftp://ftp.iro.umontreal.ca/pub/simulation/lecuyer/papers/tausme.ps
*
* There is an erratum in the paper "Tables of Maximally Equidistributed
* Combined LFSR Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 68, 225 (1999),
* 261--269: http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps
*
* ... the k_j most significant bits of z_j must be non-zero,
* for each j. (Note: this restriction also applies to the
* computer code given in [4], but was mistakenly not mentioned
* in that paper.)
*
* This affects the seeding procedure by imposing the requirement
* s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127.
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
random32: improvements to prandom_bytes This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of prandom_u32_max() for timer slack. Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes() which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care. Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is, drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}: These tests basically fill a test write-vector through prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the read-vector to check if the data is the same. Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device (simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53 and i.MX6): # modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \ third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15 # modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0 We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading from taus88 to taus113. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann <LW@KARO-electronics.de> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-23 22:03:28 +07:00
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void);
random32: mix in entropy from core to late initcall Currently, we have a 3-stage seeding process in prandom(): Phase 1 is from the early actual initialization of prandom() subsystem which happens during core_initcall() and remains most likely until the beginning of late_initcall() phase. Here, the system might not have enough entropy available for seeding with strong randomness from the random driver. That means, we currently have a 32bit weak LCG() seeding the PRNG status register 1 and mixing that successively into the other 3 registers just to get it up and running. Phase 2 starts with late_initcall() phase resp. when the random driver has initialized its non-blocking pool with enough entropy. At that time, we throw away *all* inner state from its 4 registers and do a full reseed with strong randomness. Phase 3 starts right after that and does a periodic reseed with random slack of status register 1 by a strong random source again. A problem in phase 1 is that during bootup data structures can be initialized, e.g. on module load time, and thus access a weakly seeded prandom and are never changed for the rest of their live-time, thus carrying along the results from a week seed. Lets make sure that current but also future users access a possibly better early seeded prandom. This patch therefore improves phase 1 by trying to make it more 'unpredictable' through mixing in seed from a possible hardware source. Now, the mix-in xors inner state with the outcome of either of the two functions arch_get_random_{,seed}_int(), preferably arch_get_random_seed_int() as it likely represents a non-deterministic random bit generator in hw rather than a cryptographically secure PRNG in hw. However, not all might have the first one, so we use the PRNG as a fallback if available. As we xor the seed into the current state, the worst case would be that a hardware source could be unverifiable compromised or backdoored. In that case nevertheless it would be as good as our original early seeding function prandom_seed_very_weak() since we mix through xor which is entropy preserving. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-28 19:01:38 +07:00
#else
static inline void prandom_state_selftest(void)
{
}
#endif
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
/**
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
* prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator.
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
*
* This is used for pseudo-randomness with no outside seeding.
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
* For more random results, use prandom_u32().
*/
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state)
{
random32: mix in entropy from core to late initcall Currently, we have a 3-stage seeding process in prandom(): Phase 1 is from the early actual initialization of prandom() subsystem which happens during core_initcall() and remains most likely until the beginning of late_initcall() phase. Here, the system might not have enough entropy available for seeding with strong randomness from the random driver. That means, we currently have a 32bit weak LCG() seeding the PRNG status register 1 and mixing that successively into the other 3 registers just to get it up and running. Phase 2 starts with late_initcall() phase resp. when the random driver has initialized its non-blocking pool with enough entropy. At that time, we throw away *all* inner state from its 4 registers and do a full reseed with strong randomness. Phase 3 starts right after that and does a periodic reseed with random slack of status register 1 by a strong random source again. A problem in phase 1 is that during bootup data structures can be initialized, e.g. on module load time, and thus access a weakly seeded prandom and are never changed for the rest of their live-time, thus carrying along the results from a week seed. Lets make sure that current but also future users access a possibly better early seeded prandom. This patch therefore improves phase 1 by trying to make it more 'unpredictable' through mixing in seed from a possible hardware source. Now, the mix-in xors inner state with the outcome of either of the two functions arch_get_random_{,seed}_int(), preferably arch_get_random_seed_int() as it likely represents a non-deterministic random bit generator in hw rather than a cryptographically secure PRNG in hw. However, not all might have the first one, so we use the PRNG as a fallback if available. As we xor the seed into the current state, the worst case would be that a hardware source could be unverifiable compromised or backdoored. In that case nevertheless it would be as good as our original early seeding function prandom_seed_very_weak() since we mix through xor which is entropy preserving. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-28 19:01:38 +07:00
#define TAUSWORTHE(s, a, b, c, d) ((s & c) << d) ^ (((s << a) ^ s) >> b)
random32: upgrade taus88 generator to taus113 from errata paper Since we use prandom*() functions quite often in networking code i.e. in UDP port selection, netfilter code, etc, upgrade the PRNG from Pierre L'Ecuyer's original paper "Maximally Equidistributed Combined Tausworthe Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65, 213 (1996), 203--213 to the version published in his errata paper [1]. The Tausworthe generator is a maximally-equidistributed generator, that is fast and has good statistical properties [1]. The version presented there upgrades the 3 state LFSR to a 4 state LFSR with increased periodicity from about 2^88 to 2^113. The algorithm is presented in [1] by the very same author who also designed the original algorithm in [2]. Also, by increasing the state, we make it a bit harder for attackers to "guess" the PRNGs internal state. See also discussion in [3]. Now, as we use this sort of weak initialization discussed in [3] only between core_initcall() until late_initcall() time [*] for prandom32*() users, namely in prandom_init(), it is less relevant from late_initcall() onwards as we overwrite seeds through prandom_reseed() anyways with a seed source of higher entropy, that is, get_random_bytes(). In other words, a exhaustive keysearch of 96 bit would be needed. Now, with the help of this patch, this state-search increases further to 128 bit. Initialization needs to make sure that s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127. taus88 and taus113 algorithm is also part of GSL. I added a test case in the next patch to verify internal behaviour of this patch with GSL and ran tests with the dieharder 3.31.1 RNG test suite: $ dieharder -g 052 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus88 $ dieharder -g 054 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus113 With this seed configuration, in order to compare both, we get the following differences: algorithm taus88 taus113 rands/second [**] 1.61e+08 1.37e+08 sts_serial(4, 1st run) WEAK PASSED sts_serial(9, 2nd run) WEAK PASSED rgb_lagged_sum(31) WEAK PASSED We took out diehard_sums test as according to the authors it is considered broken and unusable [4]. Despite that and the slight decrease in performance (which is acceptable), taus113 here passes all 113 tests (only rgb_minimum_distance_5 in WEAK, the rest PASSED). In general, taus/taus113 is considered "very good" by the authors of dieharder [5]. The papers [1][2] states a single warm-up step is sufficient by running quicktaus once on each state to ensure proper initialization of ~s_{0}: Our selection of (s) according to Table 1 of [1] row 1 holds the condition L - k <= r - s, that is, (32 32 32 32) - (31 29 28 25) <= (25 27 15 22) - (18 2 7 13) with r = k - q and q = (6 2 13 3) as also stated by the paper. So according to [2] we are safe with one round of quicktaus for initialization. However we decided to include the warm-up phase of the PRNG as done in GSL in every case as a safety net. We also use the warm up phase to make the output of the RNG easier to verify by the GSL output. In prandom_init(), we also mix random_get_entropy() into it, just like drivers/char/random.c does it, jiffies ^ random_get_entropy(). random-get_entropy() is get_cycles(). xor is entropy preserving so it is fine if it is not implemented by some architectures. Note, this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel, but rather as a fast PRNG for various randomizations i.e. in the networking code, or elsewhere for debugging purposes, for example. [*]: In order to generate some "sort of pseduo-randomness", since get_random_bytes() is not yet available for us, we use jiffies and initialize states s1 - s3 with a simple linear congruential generator (LCG), that is x <- x * 69069; and derive s2, s3, from the 32bit initialization from s1. So the above quote from [3] accounts only for the time from core to late initcall, not afterwards. [**] Single threaded run on MacBook Air w/ Intel Core i5-3317U [1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps [2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps [3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/12103/ [4] http://code.google.com/p/dieharder/source/browse/trunk/libdieharder/diehard_sums.c?spec=svn490&r=490#20 [5] http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-11 18:20:36 +07:00
state->s1 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s1, 6U, 13U, 4294967294U, 18U);
state->s2 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s2, 2U, 27U, 4294967288U, 2U);
state->s3 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s3, 13U, 21U, 4294967280U, 7U);
state->s4 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s4, 3U, 12U, 4294967168U, 13U);
random32: upgrade taus88 generator to taus113 from errata paper Since we use prandom*() functions quite often in networking code i.e. in UDP port selection, netfilter code, etc, upgrade the PRNG from Pierre L'Ecuyer's original paper "Maximally Equidistributed Combined Tausworthe Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65, 213 (1996), 203--213 to the version published in his errata paper [1]. The Tausworthe generator is a maximally-equidistributed generator, that is fast and has good statistical properties [1]. The version presented there upgrades the 3 state LFSR to a 4 state LFSR with increased periodicity from about 2^88 to 2^113. The algorithm is presented in [1] by the very same author who also designed the original algorithm in [2]. Also, by increasing the state, we make it a bit harder for attackers to "guess" the PRNGs internal state. See also discussion in [3]. Now, as we use this sort of weak initialization discussed in [3] only between core_initcall() until late_initcall() time [*] for prandom32*() users, namely in prandom_init(), it is less relevant from late_initcall() onwards as we overwrite seeds through prandom_reseed() anyways with a seed source of higher entropy, that is, get_random_bytes(). In other words, a exhaustive keysearch of 96 bit would be needed. Now, with the help of this patch, this state-search increases further to 128 bit. Initialization needs to make sure that s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127. taus88 and taus113 algorithm is also part of GSL. I added a test case in the next patch to verify internal behaviour of this patch with GSL and ran tests with the dieharder 3.31.1 RNG test suite: $ dieharder -g 052 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus88 $ dieharder -g 054 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus113 With this seed configuration, in order to compare both, we get the following differences: algorithm taus88 taus113 rands/second [**] 1.61e+08 1.37e+08 sts_serial(4, 1st run) WEAK PASSED sts_serial(9, 2nd run) WEAK PASSED rgb_lagged_sum(31) WEAK PASSED We took out diehard_sums test as according to the authors it is considered broken and unusable [4]. Despite that and the slight decrease in performance (which is acceptable), taus113 here passes all 113 tests (only rgb_minimum_distance_5 in WEAK, the rest PASSED). In general, taus/taus113 is considered "very good" by the authors of dieharder [5]. The papers [1][2] states a single warm-up step is sufficient by running quicktaus once on each state to ensure proper initialization of ~s_{0}: Our selection of (s) according to Table 1 of [1] row 1 holds the condition L - k <= r - s, that is, (32 32 32 32) - (31 29 28 25) <= (25 27 15 22) - (18 2 7 13) with r = k - q and q = (6 2 13 3) as also stated by the paper. So according to [2] we are safe with one round of quicktaus for initialization. However we decided to include the warm-up phase of the PRNG as done in GSL in every case as a safety net. We also use the warm up phase to make the output of the RNG easier to verify by the GSL output. In prandom_init(), we also mix random_get_entropy() into it, just like drivers/char/random.c does it, jiffies ^ random_get_entropy(). random-get_entropy() is get_cycles(). xor is entropy preserving so it is fine if it is not implemented by some architectures. Note, this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel, but rather as a fast PRNG for various randomizations i.e. in the networking code, or elsewhere for debugging purposes, for example. [*]: In order to generate some "sort of pseduo-randomness", since get_random_bytes() is not yet available for us, we use jiffies and initialize states s1 - s3 with a simple linear congruential generator (LCG), that is x <- x * 69069; and derive s2, s3, from the 32bit initialization from s1. So the above quote from [3] accounts only for the time from core to late initcall, not afterwards. [**] Single threaded run on MacBook Air w/ Intel Core i5-3317U [1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps [2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps [3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/12103/ [4] http://code.google.com/p/dieharder/source/browse/trunk/libdieharder/diehard_sums.c?spec=svn490&r=490#20 [5] http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-11 18:20:36 +07:00
return (state->s1 ^ state->s2 ^ state->s3 ^ state->s4);
}
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32_state);
/**
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
* prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
*
* A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
* algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
* considered safe for cryptographic use.
*/
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
u32 prandom_u32(void)
{
struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
u32 res;
res = prandom_u32_state(state);
put_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
return res;
}
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
/**
* prandom_bytes_state - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
*
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
* @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
* @bytes: the requested number of bytes
*
* This is used for pseudo-randomness with no outside seeding.
* For more random results, use prandom_bytes().
*/
random32: improvements to prandom_bytes This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of prandom_u32_max() for timer slack. Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes() which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care. Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is, drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}: These tests basically fill a test write-vector through prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the read-vector to check if the data is the same. Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device (simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53 and i.MX6): # modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \ third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15 # modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0 We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading from taus88 to taus113. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann <LW@KARO-electronics.de> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-23 22:03:28 +07:00
void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t bytes)
{
random32: improvements to prandom_bytes This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of prandom_u32_max() for timer slack. Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes() which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care. Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is, drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}: These tests basically fill a test write-vector through prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the read-vector to check if the data is the same. Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device (simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53 and i.MX6): # modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \ third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15 # modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0 We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading from taus88 to taus113. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann <LW@KARO-electronics.de> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-23 22:03:28 +07:00
u8 *ptr = buf;
random32: improvements to prandom_bytes This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of prandom_u32_max() for timer slack. Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes() which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care. Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is, drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}: These tests basically fill a test write-vector through prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the read-vector to check if the data is the same. Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device (simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53 and i.MX6): # modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \ third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15 # modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0 We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading from taus88 to taus113. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann <LW@KARO-electronics.de> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-23 22:03:28 +07:00
while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) {
put_unaligned(prandom_u32_state(state), (u32 *) ptr);
ptr += sizeof(u32);
bytes -= sizeof(u32);
}
random32: improvements to prandom_bytes This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of prandom_u32_max() for timer slack. Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes() which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care. Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is, drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}: These tests basically fill a test write-vector through prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the read-vector to check if the data is the same. Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device (simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53 and i.MX6): # modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \ third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15 # modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0 We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading from taus88 to taus113. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann <LW@KARO-electronics.de> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-23 22:03:28 +07:00
if (bytes > 0) {
u32 rem = prandom_u32_state(state);
do {
*ptr++ = (u8) rem;
bytes--;
rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
} while (bytes > 0);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes_state);
/**
* prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
* @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
* @bytes: the requested number of bytes
*/
random32: improvements to prandom_bytes This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of prandom_u32_max() for timer slack. Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes() which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care. Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is, drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}: These tests basically fill a test write-vector through prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the read-vector to check if the data is the same. Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device (simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53 and i.MX6): # modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \ third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15 # modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0 We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading from taus88 to taus113. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann <LW@KARO-electronics.de> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-23 22:03:28 +07:00
void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
{
struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
prandom_bytes_state(state, buf, bytes);
put_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
random32: upgrade taus88 generator to taus113 from errata paper Since we use prandom*() functions quite often in networking code i.e. in UDP port selection, netfilter code, etc, upgrade the PRNG from Pierre L'Ecuyer's original paper "Maximally Equidistributed Combined Tausworthe Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65, 213 (1996), 203--213 to the version published in his errata paper [1]. The Tausworthe generator is a maximally-equidistributed generator, that is fast and has good statistical properties [1]. The version presented there upgrades the 3 state LFSR to a 4 state LFSR with increased periodicity from about 2^88 to 2^113. The algorithm is presented in [1] by the very same author who also designed the original algorithm in [2]. Also, by increasing the state, we make it a bit harder for attackers to "guess" the PRNGs internal state. See also discussion in [3]. Now, as we use this sort of weak initialization discussed in [3] only between core_initcall() until late_initcall() time [*] for prandom32*() users, namely in prandom_init(), it is less relevant from late_initcall() onwards as we overwrite seeds through prandom_reseed() anyways with a seed source of higher entropy, that is, get_random_bytes(). In other words, a exhaustive keysearch of 96 bit would be needed. Now, with the help of this patch, this state-search increases further to 128 bit. Initialization needs to make sure that s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127. taus88 and taus113 algorithm is also part of GSL. I added a test case in the next patch to verify internal behaviour of this patch with GSL and ran tests with the dieharder 3.31.1 RNG test suite: $ dieharder -g 052 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus88 $ dieharder -g 054 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus113 With this seed configuration, in order to compare both, we get the following differences: algorithm taus88 taus113 rands/second [**] 1.61e+08 1.37e+08 sts_serial(4, 1st run) WEAK PASSED sts_serial(9, 2nd run) WEAK PASSED rgb_lagged_sum(31) WEAK PASSED We took out diehard_sums test as according to the authors it is considered broken and unusable [4]. Despite that and the slight decrease in performance (which is acceptable), taus113 here passes all 113 tests (only rgb_minimum_distance_5 in WEAK, the rest PASSED). In general, taus/taus113 is considered "very good" by the authors of dieharder [5]. The papers [1][2] states a single warm-up step is sufficient by running quicktaus once on each state to ensure proper initialization of ~s_{0}: Our selection of (s) according to Table 1 of [1] row 1 holds the condition L - k <= r - s, that is, (32 32 32 32) - (31 29 28 25) <= (25 27 15 22) - (18 2 7 13) with r = k - q and q = (6 2 13 3) as also stated by the paper. So according to [2] we are safe with one round of quicktaus for initialization. However we decided to include the warm-up phase of the PRNG as done in GSL in every case as a safety net. We also use the warm up phase to make the output of the RNG easier to verify by the GSL output. In prandom_init(), we also mix random_get_entropy() into it, just like drivers/char/random.c does it, jiffies ^ random_get_entropy(). random-get_entropy() is get_cycles(). xor is entropy preserving so it is fine if it is not implemented by some architectures. Note, this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel, but rather as a fast PRNG for various randomizations i.e. in the networking code, or elsewhere for debugging purposes, for example. [*]: In order to generate some "sort of pseduo-randomness", since get_random_bytes() is not yet available for us, we use jiffies and initialize states s1 - s3 with a simple linear congruential generator (LCG), that is x <- x * 69069; and derive s2, s3, from the 32bit initialization from s1. So the above quote from [3] accounts only for the time from core to late initcall, not afterwards. [**] Single threaded run on MacBook Air w/ Intel Core i5-3317U [1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps [2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps [3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/12103/ [4] http://code.google.com/p/dieharder/source/browse/trunk/libdieharder/diehard_sums.c?spec=svn490&r=490#20 [5] http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-11 18:20:36 +07:00
static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
{
random32: improvements to prandom_bytes This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of prandom_u32_max() for timer slack. Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes() which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care. Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is, drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}: These tests basically fill a test write-vector through prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the read-vector to check if the data is the same. Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device (simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53 and i.MX6): # modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \ third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15 # modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0 We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading from taus88 to taus113. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann <LW@KARO-electronics.de> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-23 22:03:28 +07:00
/* Calling RNG ten times to satisfy recurrence condition */
random32: upgrade taus88 generator to taus113 from errata paper Since we use prandom*() functions quite often in networking code i.e. in UDP port selection, netfilter code, etc, upgrade the PRNG from Pierre L'Ecuyer's original paper "Maximally Equidistributed Combined Tausworthe Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65, 213 (1996), 203--213 to the version published in his errata paper [1]. The Tausworthe generator is a maximally-equidistributed generator, that is fast and has good statistical properties [1]. The version presented there upgrades the 3 state LFSR to a 4 state LFSR with increased periodicity from about 2^88 to 2^113. The algorithm is presented in [1] by the very same author who also designed the original algorithm in [2]. Also, by increasing the state, we make it a bit harder for attackers to "guess" the PRNGs internal state. See also discussion in [3]. Now, as we use this sort of weak initialization discussed in [3] only between core_initcall() until late_initcall() time [*] for prandom32*() users, namely in prandom_init(), it is less relevant from late_initcall() onwards as we overwrite seeds through prandom_reseed() anyways with a seed source of higher entropy, that is, get_random_bytes(). In other words, a exhaustive keysearch of 96 bit would be needed. Now, with the help of this patch, this state-search increases further to 128 bit. Initialization needs to make sure that s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127. taus88 and taus113 algorithm is also part of GSL. I added a test case in the next patch to verify internal behaviour of this patch with GSL and ran tests with the dieharder 3.31.1 RNG test suite: $ dieharder -g 052 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus88 $ dieharder -g 054 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus113 With this seed configuration, in order to compare both, we get the following differences: algorithm taus88 taus113 rands/second [**] 1.61e+08 1.37e+08 sts_serial(4, 1st run) WEAK PASSED sts_serial(9, 2nd run) WEAK PASSED rgb_lagged_sum(31) WEAK PASSED We took out diehard_sums test as according to the authors it is considered broken and unusable [4]. Despite that and the slight decrease in performance (which is acceptable), taus113 here passes all 113 tests (only rgb_minimum_distance_5 in WEAK, the rest PASSED). In general, taus/taus113 is considered "very good" by the authors of dieharder [5]. The papers [1][2] states a single warm-up step is sufficient by running quicktaus once on each state to ensure proper initialization of ~s_{0}: Our selection of (s) according to Table 1 of [1] row 1 holds the condition L - k <= r - s, that is, (32 32 32 32) - (31 29 28 25) <= (25 27 15 22) - (18 2 7 13) with r = k - q and q = (6 2 13 3) as also stated by the paper. So according to [2] we are safe with one round of quicktaus for initialization. However we decided to include the warm-up phase of the PRNG as done in GSL in every case as a safety net. We also use the warm up phase to make the output of the RNG easier to verify by the GSL output. In prandom_init(), we also mix random_get_entropy() into it, just like drivers/char/random.c does it, jiffies ^ random_get_entropy(). random-get_entropy() is get_cycles(). xor is entropy preserving so it is fine if it is not implemented by some architectures. Note, this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel, but rather as a fast PRNG for various randomizations i.e. in the networking code, or elsewhere for debugging purposes, for example. [*]: In order to generate some "sort of pseduo-randomness", since get_random_bytes() is not yet available for us, we use jiffies and initialize states s1 - s3 with a simple linear congruential generator (LCG), that is x <- x * 69069; and derive s2, s3, from the 32bit initialization from s1. So the above quote from [3] accounts only for the time from core to late initcall, not afterwards. [**] Single threaded run on MacBook Air w/ Intel Core i5-3317U [1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps [2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps [3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/12103/ [4] http://code.google.com/p/dieharder/source/browse/trunk/libdieharder/diehard_sums.c?spec=svn490&r=490#20 [5] http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-11 18:20:36 +07:00
prandom_u32_state(state);
prandom_u32_state(state);
prandom_u32_state(state);
prandom_u32_state(state);
prandom_u32_state(state);
prandom_u32_state(state);
prandom_u32_state(state);
prandom_u32_state(state);
prandom_u32_state(state);
prandom_u32_state(state);
}
random32: mix in entropy from core to late initcall Currently, we have a 3-stage seeding process in prandom(): Phase 1 is from the early actual initialization of prandom() subsystem which happens during core_initcall() and remains most likely until the beginning of late_initcall() phase. Here, the system might not have enough entropy available for seeding with strong randomness from the random driver. That means, we currently have a 32bit weak LCG() seeding the PRNG status register 1 and mixing that successively into the other 3 registers just to get it up and running. Phase 2 starts with late_initcall() phase resp. when the random driver has initialized its non-blocking pool with enough entropy. At that time, we throw away *all* inner state from its 4 registers and do a full reseed with strong randomness. Phase 3 starts right after that and does a periodic reseed with random slack of status register 1 by a strong random source again. A problem in phase 1 is that during bootup data structures can be initialized, e.g. on module load time, and thus access a weakly seeded prandom and are never changed for the rest of their live-time, thus carrying along the results from a week seed. Lets make sure that current but also future users access a possibly better early seeded prandom. This patch therefore improves phase 1 by trying to make it more 'unpredictable' through mixing in seed from a possible hardware source. Now, the mix-in xors inner state with the outcome of either of the two functions arch_get_random_{,seed}_int(), preferably arch_get_random_seed_int() as it likely represents a non-deterministic random bit generator in hw rather than a cryptographically secure PRNG in hw. However, not all might have the first one, so we use the PRNG as a fallback if available. As we xor the seed into the current state, the worst case would be that a hardware source could be unverifiable compromised or backdoored. In that case nevertheless it would be as good as our original early seeding function prandom_seed_very_weak() since we mix through xor which is entropy preserving. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-28 19:01:38 +07:00
static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
{
random32: improvements to prandom_bytes This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of prandom_u32_max() for timer slack. Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes() which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care. Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is, drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}: These tests basically fill a test write-vector through prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the read-vector to check if the data is the same. Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device (simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53 and i.MX6): # modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \ third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15 # modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0 We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading from taus88 to taus113. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann <LW@KARO-electronics.de> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-23 22:03:28 +07:00
unsigned int val = 0;
random32: mix in entropy from core to late initcall Currently, we have a 3-stage seeding process in prandom(): Phase 1 is from the early actual initialization of prandom() subsystem which happens during core_initcall() and remains most likely until the beginning of late_initcall() phase. Here, the system might not have enough entropy available for seeding with strong randomness from the random driver. That means, we currently have a 32bit weak LCG() seeding the PRNG status register 1 and mixing that successively into the other 3 registers just to get it up and running. Phase 2 starts with late_initcall() phase resp. when the random driver has initialized its non-blocking pool with enough entropy. At that time, we throw away *all* inner state from its 4 registers and do a full reseed with strong randomness. Phase 3 starts right after that and does a periodic reseed with random slack of status register 1 by a strong random source again. A problem in phase 1 is that during bootup data structures can be initialized, e.g. on module load time, and thus access a weakly seeded prandom and are never changed for the rest of their live-time, thus carrying along the results from a week seed. Lets make sure that current but also future users access a possibly better early seeded prandom. This patch therefore improves phase 1 by trying to make it more 'unpredictable' through mixing in seed from a possible hardware source. Now, the mix-in xors inner state with the outcome of either of the two functions arch_get_random_{,seed}_int(), preferably arch_get_random_seed_int() as it likely represents a non-deterministic random bit generator in hw rather than a cryptographically secure PRNG in hw. However, not all might have the first one, so we use the PRNG as a fallback if available. As we xor the seed into the current state, the worst case would be that a hardware source could be unverifiable compromised or backdoored. In that case nevertheless it would be as good as our original early seeding function prandom_seed_very_weak() since we mix through xor which is entropy preserving. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-28 19:01:38 +07:00
(void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
arch_get_random_int(&val));
return val;
}
static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
bool mix_with_hwseed)
{
#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
}
/**
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
* prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
* @seed: seed value
*
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
* Add some additional seeding to the prandom pool.
*/
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
{
int i;
/*
* No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are, well,
* expected.
*/
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
random32: upgrade taus88 generator to taus113 from errata paper Since we use prandom*() functions quite often in networking code i.e. in UDP port selection, netfilter code, etc, upgrade the PRNG from Pierre L'Ecuyer's original paper "Maximally Equidistributed Combined Tausworthe Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65, 213 (1996), 203--213 to the version published in his errata paper [1]. The Tausworthe generator is a maximally-equidistributed generator, that is fast and has good statistical properties [1]. The version presented there upgrades the 3 state LFSR to a 4 state LFSR with increased periodicity from about 2^88 to 2^113. The algorithm is presented in [1] by the very same author who also designed the original algorithm in [2]. Also, by increasing the state, we make it a bit harder for attackers to "guess" the PRNGs internal state. See also discussion in [3]. Now, as we use this sort of weak initialization discussed in [3] only between core_initcall() until late_initcall() time [*] for prandom32*() users, namely in prandom_init(), it is less relevant from late_initcall() onwards as we overwrite seeds through prandom_reseed() anyways with a seed source of higher entropy, that is, get_random_bytes(). In other words, a exhaustive keysearch of 96 bit would be needed. Now, with the help of this patch, this state-search increases further to 128 bit. Initialization needs to make sure that s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127. taus88 and taus113 algorithm is also part of GSL. I added a test case in the next patch to verify internal behaviour of this patch with GSL and ran tests with the dieharder 3.31.1 RNG test suite: $ dieharder -g 052 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus88 $ dieharder -g 054 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus113 With this seed configuration, in order to compare both, we get the following differences: algorithm taus88 taus113 rands/second [**] 1.61e+08 1.37e+08 sts_serial(4, 1st run) WEAK PASSED sts_serial(9, 2nd run) WEAK PASSED rgb_lagged_sum(31) WEAK PASSED We took out diehard_sums test as according to the authors it is considered broken and unusable [4]. Despite that and the slight decrease in performance (which is acceptable), taus113 here passes all 113 tests (only rgb_minimum_distance_5 in WEAK, the rest PASSED). In general, taus/taus113 is considered "very good" by the authors of dieharder [5]. The papers [1][2] states a single warm-up step is sufficient by running quicktaus once on each state to ensure proper initialization of ~s_{0}: Our selection of (s) according to Table 1 of [1] row 1 holds the condition L - k <= r - s, that is, (32 32 32 32) - (31 29 28 25) <= (25 27 15 22) - (18 2 7 13) with r = k - q and q = (6 2 13 3) as also stated by the paper. So according to [2] we are safe with one round of quicktaus for initialization. However we decided to include the warm-up phase of the PRNG as done in GSL in every case as a safety net. We also use the warm up phase to make the output of the RNG easier to verify by the GSL output. In prandom_init(), we also mix random_get_entropy() into it, just like drivers/char/random.c does it, jiffies ^ random_get_entropy(). random-get_entropy() is get_cycles(). xor is entropy preserving so it is fine if it is not implemented by some architectures. Note, this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel, but rather as a fast PRNG for various randomizations i.e. in the networking code, or elsewhere for debugging purposes, for example. [*]: In order to generate some "sort of pseduo-randomness", since get_random_bytes() is not yet available for us, we use jiffies and initialize states s1 - s3 with a simple linear congruential generator (LCG), that is x <- x * 69069; and derive s2, s3, from the 32bit initialization from s1. So the above quote from [3] accounts only for the time from core to late initcall, not afterwards. [**] Single threaded run on MacBook Air w/ Intel Core i5-3317U [1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps [2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps [3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/12103/ [4] http://code.google.com/p/dieharder/source/browse/trunk/libdieharder/diehard_sums.c?spec=svn490&r=490#20 [5] http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-11 18:20:36 +07:00
state->s1 = __seed(state->s1 ^ entropy, 2U);
prandom_warmup(state);
}
}
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
/*
* Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
* to start the prandom_u32() engine.
*/
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
static int __init prandom_init(void)
{
int i;
prandom_state_selftest();
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
random32: mix in entropy from core to late initcall Currently, we have a 3-stage seeding process in prandom(): Phase 1 is from the early actual initialization of prandom() subsystem which happens during core_initcall() and remains most likely until the beginning of late_initcall() phase. Here, the system might not have enough entropy available for seeding with strong randomness from the random driver. That means, we currently have a 32bit weak LCG() seeding the PRNG status register 1 and mixing that successively into the other 3 registers just to get it up and running. Phase 2 starts with late_initcall() phase resp. when the random driver has initialized its non-blocking pool with enough entropy. At that time, we throw away *all* inner state from its 4 registers and do a full reseed with strong randomness. Phase 3 starts right after that and does a periodic reseed with random slack of status register 1 by a strong random source again. A problem in phase 1 is that during bootup data structures can be initialized, e.g. on module load time, and thus access a weakly seeded prandom and are never changed for the rest of their live-time, thus carrying along the results from a week seed. Lets make sure that current but also future users access a possibly better early seeded prandom. This patch therefore improves phase 1 by trying to make it more 'unpredictable' through mixing in seed from a possible hardware source. Now, the mix-in xors inner state with the outcome of either of the two functions arch_get_random_{,seed}_int(), preferably arch_get_random_seed_int() as it likely represents a non-deterministic random bit generator in hw rather than a cryptographically secure PRNG in hw. However, not all might have the first one, so we use the PRNG as a fallback if available. As we xor the seed into the current state, the worst case would be that a hardware source could be unverifiable compromised or backdoored. In that case nevertheless it would be as good as our original early seeding function prandom_seed_very_weak() since we mix through xor which is entropy preserving. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-28 19:01:38 +07:00
u32 weak_seed = (i + jiffies) ^ random_get_entropy();
random32: mix in entropy from core to late initcall Currently, we have a 3-stage seeding process in prandom(): Phase 1 is from the early actual initialization of prandom() subsystem which happens during core_initcall() and remains most likely until the beginning of late_initcall() phase. Here, the system might not have enough entropy available for seeding with strong randomness from the random driver. That means, we currently have a 32bit weak LCG() seeding the PRNG status register 1 and mixing that successively into the other 3 registers just to get it up and running. Phase 2 starts with late_initcall() phase resp. when the random driver has initialized its non-blocking pool with enough entropy. At that time, we throw away *all* inner state from its 4 registers and do a full reseed with strong randomness. Phase 3 starts right after that and does a periodic reseed with random slack of status register 1 by a strong random source again. A problem in phase 1 is that during bootup data structures can be initialized, e.g. on module load time, and thus access a weakly seeded prandom and are never changed for the rest of their live-time, thus carrying along the results from a week seed. Lets make sure that current but also future users access a possibly better early seeded prandom. This patch therefore improves phase 1 by trying to make it more 'unpredictable' through mixing in seed from a possible hardware source. Now, the mix-in xors inner state with the outcome of either of the two functions arch_get_random_{,seed}_int(), preferably arch_get_random_seed_int() as it likely represents a non-deterministic random bit generator in hw rather than a cryptographically secure PRNG in hw. However, not all might have the first one, so we use the PRNG as a fallback if available. As we xor the seed into the current state, the worst case would be that a hardware source could be unverifiable compromised or backdoored. In that case nevertheless it would be as good as our original early seeding function prandom_seed_very_weak() since we mix through xor which is entropy preserving. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-28 19:01:38 +07:00
prandom_seed_early(state, weak_seed, true);
random32: upgrade taus88 generator to taus113 from errata paper Since we use prandom*() functions quite often in networking code i.e. in UDP port selection, netfilter code, etc, upgrade the PRNG from Pierre L'Ecuyer's original paper "Maximally Equidistributed Combined Tausworthe Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65, 213 (1996), 203--213 to the version published in his errata paper [1]. The Tausworthe generator is a maximally-equidistributed generator, that is fast and has good statistical properties [1]. The version presented there upgrades the 3 state LFSR to a 4 state LFSR with increased periodicity from about 2^88 to 2^113. The algorithm is presented in [1] by the very same author who also designed the original algorithm in [2]. Also, by increasing the state, we make it a bit harder for attackers to "guess" the PRNGs internal state. See also discussion in [3]. Now, as we use this sort of weak initialization discussed in [3] only between core_initcall() until late_initcall() time [*] for prandom32*() users, namely in prandom_init(), it is less relevant from late_initcall() onwards as we overwrite seeds through prandom_reseed() anyways with a seed source of higher entropy, that is, get_random_bytes(). In other words, a exhaustive keysearch of 96 bit would be needed. Now, with the help of this patch, this state-search increases further to 128 bit. Initialization needs to make sure that s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127. taus88 and taus113 algorithm is also part of GSL. I added a test case in the next patch to verify internal behaviour of this patch with GSL and ran tests with the dieharder 3.31.1 RNG test suite: $ dieharder -g 052 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus88 $ dieharder -g 054 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus113 With this seed configuration, in order to compare both, we get the following differences: algorithm taus88 taus113 rands/second [**] 1.61e+08 1.37e+08 sts_serial(4, 1st run) WEAK PASSED sts_serial(9, 2nd run) WEAK PASSED rgb_lagged_sum(31) WEAK PASSED We took out diehard_sums test as according to the authors it is considered broken and unusable [4]. Despite that and the slight decrease in performance (which is acceptable), taus113 here passes all 113 tests (only rgb_minimum_distance_5 in WEAK, the rest PASSED). In general, taus/taus113 is considered "very good" by the authors of dieharder [5]. The papers [1][2] states a single warm-up step is sufficient by running quicktaus once on each state to ensure proper initialization of ~s_{0}: Our selection of (s) according to Table 1 of [1] row 1 holds the condition L - k <= r - s, that is, (32 32 32 32) - (31 29 28 25) <= (25 27 15 22) - (18 2 7 13) with r = k - q and q = (6 2 13 3) as also stated by the paper. So according to [2] we are safe with one round of quicktaus for initialization. However we decided to include the warm-up phase of the PRNG as done in GSL in every case as a safety net. We also use the warm up phase to make the output of the RNG easier to verify by the GSL output. In prandom_init(), we also mix random_get_entropy() into it, just like drivers/char/random.c does it, jiffies ^ random_get_entropy(). random-get_entropy() is get_cycles(). xor is entropy preserving so it is fine if it is not implemented by some architectures. Note, this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel, but rather as a fast PRNG for various randomizations i.e. in the networking code, or elsewhere for debugging purposes, for example. [*]: In order to generate some "sort of pseduo-randomness", since get_random_bytes() is not yet available for us, we use jiffies and initialize states s1 - s3 with a simple linear congruential generator (LCG), that is x <- x * 69069; and derive s2, s3, from the 32bit initialization from s1. So the above quote from [3] accounts only for the time from core to late initcall, not afterwards. [**] Single threaded run on MacBook Air w/ Intel Core i5-3317U [1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps [2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps [3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/12103/ [4] http://code.google.com/p/dieharder/source/browse/trunk/libdieharder/diehard_sums.c?spec=svn490&r=490#20 [5] http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-11 18:20:36 +07:00
prandom_warmup(state);
}
return 0;
}
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
core_initcall(prandom_init);
static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare);
random32: mix in entropy from core to late initcall Currently, we have a 3-stage seeding process in prandom(): Phase 1 is from the early actual initialization of prandom() subsystem which happens during core_initcall() and remains most likely until the beginning of late_initcall() phase. Here, the system might not have enough entropy available for seeding with strong randomness from the random driver. That means, we currently have a 32bit weak LCG() seeding the PRNG status register 1 and mixing that successively into the other 3 registers just to get it up and running. Phase 2 starts with late_initcall() phase resp. when the random driver has initialized its non-blocking pool with enough entropy. At that time, we throw away *all* inner state from its 4 registers and do a full reseed with strong randomness. Phase 3 starts right after that and does a periodic reseed with random slack of status register 1 by a strong random source again. A problem in phase 1 is that during bootup data structures can be initialized, e.g. on module load time, and thus access a weakly seeded prandom and are never changed for the rest of their live-time, thus carrying along the results from a week seed. Lets make sure that current but also future users access a possibly better early seeded prandom. This patch therefore improves phase 1 by trying to make it more 'unpredictable' through mixing in seed from a possible hardware source. Now, the mix-in xors inner state with the outcome of either of the two functions arch_get_random_{,seed}_int(), preferably arch_get_random_seed_int() as it likely represents a non-deterministic random bit generator in hw rather than a cryptographically secure PRNG in hw. However, not all might have the first one, so we use the PRNG as a fallback if available. As we xor the seed into the current state, the worst case would be that a hardware source could be unverifiable compromised or backdoored. In that case nevertheless it would be as good as our original early seeding function prandom_seed_very_weak() since we mix through xor which is entropy preserving. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-28 19:01:38 +07:00
static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, __prandom_timer, 0, 0);
static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare)
{
u32 entropy;
unsigned long expires;
get_random_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
prandom_seed(entropy);
/* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
random32: improvements to prandom_bytes This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of prandom_u32_max() for timer slack. Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes() which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care. Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is, drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}: These tests basically fill a test write-vector through prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the read-vector to check if the data is the same. Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device (simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53 and i.MX6): # modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \ third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15 # modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0 # modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0 We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading from taus88 to taus113. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann <LW@KARO-electronics.de> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-23 22:03:28 +07:00
expires = 40 + prandom_u32_max(40);
seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(expires * MSEC_PER_SEC);
add_timer(&seed_timer);
}
static void __init __prandom_start_seed_timer(void)
{
seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(40 * MSEC_PER_SEC);
add_timer(&seed_timer);
}
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
{
int i;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct rnd_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(pcpu_state, i);
u32 seeds[4];
get_random_bytes(&seeds, sizeof(seeds));
state->s1 = __seed(seeds[0], 2U);
state->s2 = __seed(seeds[1], 8U);
state->s3 = __seed(seeds[2], 16U);
state->s4 = __seed(seeds[3], 128U);
prandom_warmup(state);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed_full_state);
/*
* Generate better values after random number generator
* is fully initialized.
*/
static void __prandom_reseed(bool late)
{
unsigned long flags;
static bool latch = false;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
/* Asking for random bytes might result in bytes getting
* moved into the nonblocking pool and thus marking it
* as initialized. In this case we would double back into
* this function and attempt to do a late reseed.
* Ignore the pointless attempt to reseed again if we're
* already waiting for bytes when the nonblocking pool
* got initialized.
*/
/* only allow initial seeding (late == false) once */
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&lock, flags))
return;
if (latch && !late)
goto out;
latch = true;
prandom_seed_full_state(&net_rand_state);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock, flags);
}
void prandom_reseed_late(void)
{
__prandom_reseed(true);
}
static int __init prandom_reseed(void)
{
__prandom_reseed(false);
__prandom_start_seed_timer();
return 0;
}
random32: rename random32 to prandom This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18 07:04:23 +07:00
late_initcall(prandom_reseed);
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
static struct prandom_test1 {
u32 seed;
u32 result;
} test1[] = {
{ 1U, 3484351685U },
{ 2U, 2623130059U },
{ 3U, 3125133893U },
{ 4U, 984847254U },
};
static struct prandom_test2 {
u32 seed;
u32 iteration;
u32 result;
} test2[] = {
/* Test cases against taus113 from GSL library. */
{ 931557656U, 959U, 2975593782U },
{ 1339693295U, 876U, 3887776532U },
{ 1545556285U, 961U, 1615538833U },
{ 601730776U, 723U, 1776162651U },
{ 1027516047U, 687U, 511983079U },
{ 416526298U, 700U, 916156552U },
{ 1395522032U, 652U, 2222063676U },
{ 366221443U, 617U, 2992857763U },
{ 1539836965U, 714U, 3783265725U },
{ 556206671U, 994U, 799626459U },
{ 684907218U, 799U, 367789491U },
{ 2121230701U, 931U, 2115467001U },
{ 1668516451U, 644U, 3620590685U },
{ 768046066U, 883U, 2034077390U },
{ 1989159136U, 833U, 1195767305U },
{ 536585145U, 996U, 3577259204U },
{ 1008129373U, 642U, 1478080776U },
{ 1740775604U, 939U, 1264980372U },
{ 1967883163U, 508U, 10734624U },
{ 1923019697U, 730U, 3821419629U },
{ 442079932U, 560U, 3440032343U },
{ 1961302714U, 845U, 841962572U },
{ 2030205964U, 962U, 1325144227U },
{ 1160407529U, 507U, 240940858U },
{ 635482502U, 779U, 4200489746U },
{ 1252788931U, 699U, 867195434U },
{ 1961817131U, 719U, 668237657U },
{ 1071468216U, 983U, 917876630U },
{ 1281848367U, 932U, 1003100039U },
{ 582537119U, 780U, 1127273778U },
{ 1973672777U, 853U, 1071368872U },
{ 1896756996U, 762U, 1127851055U },
{ 847917054U, 500U, 1717499075U },
{ 1240520510U, 951U, 2849576657U },
{ 1685071682U, 567U, 1961810396U },
{ 1516232129U, 557U, 3173877U },
{ 1208118903U, 612U, 1613145022U },
{ 1817269927U, 693U, 4279122573U },
{ 1510091701U, 717U, 638191229U },
{ 365916850U, 807U, 600424314U },
{ 399324359U, 702U, 1803598116U },
{ 1318480274U, 779U, 2074237022U },
{ 697758115U, 840U, 1483639402U },
{ 1696507773U, 840U, 577415447U },
{ 2081979121U, 981U, 3041486449U },
{ 955646687U, 742U, 3846494357U },
{ 1250683506U, 749U, 836419859U },
{ 595003102U, 534U, 366794109U },
{ 47485338U, 558U, 3521120834U },
{ 619433479U, 610U, 3991783875U },
{ 704096520U, 518U, 4139493852U },
{ 1712224984U, 606U, 2393312003U },
{ 1318233152U, 922U, 3880361134U },
{ 855572992U, 761U, 1472974787U },
{ 64721421U, 703U, 683860550U },
{ 678931758U, 840U, 380616043U },
{ 692711973U, 778U, 1382361947U },
{ 677703619U, 530U, 2826914161U },
{ 92393223U, 586U, 1522128471U },
{ 1222592920U, 743U, 3466726667U },
{ 358288986U, 695U, 1091956998U },
{ 1935056945U, 958U, 514864477U },
{ 735675993U, 990U, 1294239989U },
{ 1560089402U, 897U, 2238551287U },
{ 70616361U, 829U, 22483098U },
{ 368234700U, 731U, 2913875084U },
{ 20221190U, 879U, 1564152970U },
{ 539444654U, 682U, 1835141259U },
{ 1314987297U, 840U, 1801114136U },
{ 2019295544U, 645U, 3286438930U },
{ 469023838U, 716U, 1637918202U },
{ 1843754496U, 653U, 2562092152U },
{ 400672036U, 809U, 4264212785U },
{ 404722249U, 965U, 2704116999U },
{ 600702209U, 758U, 584979986U },
{ 519953954U, 667U, 2574436237U },
{ 1658071126U, 694U, 2214569490U },
{ 420480037U, 749U, 3430010866U },
{ 690103647U, 969U, 3700758083U },
{ 1029424799U, 937U, 3787746841U },
{ 2012608669U, 506U, 3362628973U },
{ 1535432887U, 998U, 42610943U },
{ 1330635533U, 857U, 3040806504U },
{ 1223800550U, 539U, 3954229517U },
{ 1322411537U, 680U, 3223250324U },
{ 1877847898U, 945U, 2915147143U },
{ 1646356099U, 874U, 965988280U },
{ 805687536U, 744U, 4032277920U },
{ 1948093210U, 633U, 1346597684U },
{ 392609744U, 783U, 1636083295U },
{ 690241304U, 770U, 1201031298U },
{ 1360302965U, 696U, 1665394461U },
{ 1220090946U, 780U, 1316922812U },
{ 447092251U, 500U, 3438743375U },
{ 1613868791U, 592U, 828546883U },
{ 523430951U, 548U, 2552392304U },
{ 726692899U, 810U, 1656872867U },
{ 1364340021U, 836U, 3710513486U },
{ 1986257729U, 931U, 935013962U },
{ 407983964U, 921U, 728767059U },
};
static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
{
int i, j, errors = 0, runs = 0;
bool error = false;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test1); i++) {
struct rnd_state state;
random32: mix in entropy from core to late initcall Currently, we have a 3-stage seeding process in prandom(): Phase 1 is from the early actual initialization of prandom() subsystem which happens during core_initcall() and remains most likely until the beginning of late_initcall() phase. Here, the system might not have enough entropy available for seeding with strong randomness from the random driver. That means, we currently have a 32bit weak LCG() seeding the PRNG status register 1 and mixing that successively into the other 3 registers just to get it up and running. Phase 2 starts with late_initcall() phase resp. when the random driver has initialized its non-blocking pool with enough entropy. At that time, we throw away *all* inner state from its 4 registers and do a full reseed with strong randomness. Phase 3 starts right after that and does a periodic reseed with random slack of status register 1 by a strong random source again. A problem in phase 1 is that during bootup data structures can be initialized, e.g. on module load time, and thus access a weakly seeded prandom and are never changed for the rest of their live-time, thus carrying along the results from a week seed. Lets make sure that current but also future users access a possibly better early seeded prandom. This patch therefore improves phase 1 by trying to make it more 'unpredictable' through mixing in seed from a possible hardware source. Now, the mix-in xors inner state with the outcome of either of the two functions arch_get_random_{,seed}_int(), preferably arch_get_random_seed_int() as it likely represents a non-deterministic random bit generator in hw rather than a cryptographically secure PRNG in hw. However, not all might have the first one, so we use the PRNG as a fallback if available. As we xor the seed into the current state, the worst case would be that a hardware source could be unverifiable compromised or backdoored. In that case nevertheless it would be as good as our original early seeding function prandom_seed_very_weak() since we mix through xor which is entropy preserving. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-28 19:01:38 +07:00
prandom_seed_early(&state, test1[i].seed, false);
prandom_warmup(&state);
if (test1[i].result != prandom_u32_state(&state))
error = true;
}
if (error)
pr_warn("prandom: seed boundary self test failed\n");
else
pr_info("prandom: seed boundary self test passed\n");
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test2); i++) {
struct rnd_state state;
random32: mix in entropy from core to late initcall Currently, we have a 3-stage seeding process in prandom(): Phase 1 is from the early actual initialization of prandom() subsystem which happens during core_initcall() and remains most likely until the beginning of late_initcall() phase. Here, the system might not have enough entropy available for seeding with strong randomness from the random driver. That means, we currently have a 32bit weak LCG() seeding the PRNG status register 1 and mixing that successively into the other 3 registers just to get it up and running. Phase 2 starts with late_initcall() phase resp. when the random driver has initialized its non-blocking pool with enough entropy. At that time, we throw away *all* inner state from its 4 registers and do a full reseed with strong randomness. Phase 3 starts right after that and does a periodic reseed with random slack of status register 1 by a strong random source again. A problem in phase 1 is that during bootup data structures can be initialized, e.g. on module load time, and thus access a weakly seeded prandom and are never changed for the rest of their live-time, thus carrying along the results from a week seed. Lets make sure that current but also future users access a possibly better early seeded prandom. This patch therefore improves phase 1 by trying to make it more 'unpredictable' through mixing in seed from a possible hardware source. Now, the mix-in xors inner state with the outcome of either of the two functions arch_get_random_{,seed}_int(), preferably arch_get_random_seed_int() as it likely represents a non-deterministic random bit generator in hw rather than a cryptographically secure PRNG in hw. However, not all might have the first one, so we use the PRNG as a fallback if available. As we xor the seed into the current state, the worst case would be that a hardware source could be unverifiable compromised or backdoored. In that case nevertheless it would be as good as our original early seeding function prandom_seed_very_weak() since we mix through xor which is entropy preserving. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-28 19:01:38 +07:00
prandom_seed_early(&state, test2[i].seed, false);
prandom_warmup(&state);
for (j = 0; j < test2[i].iteration - 1; j++)
prandom_u32_state(&state);
if (test2[i].result != prandom_u32_state(&state))
errors++;
runs++;
cond_resched();
}
if (errors)
pr_warn("prandom: %d/%d self tests failed\n", errors, runs);
else
pr_info("prandom: %d self tests passed\n", runs);
}
#endif