2018-01-10 00:57:36 +07:00
|
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Cryptographic API.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Support for Samsung S5PV210 and Exynos HW acceleration.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Copyright (C) 2011 NetUP Inc. All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
// Copyright (c) 2017 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Hash part based on omap-sham.c driver.
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 08:58:25 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/clk.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/crypto.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/err.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/errno.h>
|
2016-03-22 08:58:25 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/init.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/io.h>
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/kernel.h>
|
2016-03-22 08:58:25 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/module.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/of.h>
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/platform_device.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <crypto/ctr.h>
|
2016-03-22 08:58:25 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <crypto/aes.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <crypto/hash.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <crypto/md5.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <crypto/sha.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#define _SBF(s, v) ((v) << (s))
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Feed control registers */
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCINTSTAT 0x0000
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTSTAT_HPARTINT BIT(7)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTSTAT_HDONEINT BIT(5)
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTSTAT_BRDMAINT BIT(3)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTSTAT_BTDMAINT BIT(2)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTSTAT_HRDMAINT BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTSTAT_PKDMAINT BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCINTENSET 0x0004
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTENSET_HPARTINTENSET BIT(7)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTENSET_HDONEINTENSET BIT(5)
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTENSET_BRDMAINTENSET BIT(3)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTENSET_BTDMAINTENSET BIT(2)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTENSET_HRDMAINTENSET BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTENSET_PKDMAINTENSET BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCINTENCLR 0x0008
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTENCLR_HPARTINTENCLR BIT(7)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTENCLR_HDONEINTENCLR BIT(5)
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTENCLR_BRDMAINTENCLR BIT(3)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTENCLR_BTDMAINTENCLR BIT(2)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTENCLR_HRDMAINTENCLR BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTENCLR_PKDMAINTENCLR BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCINTPEND 0x000C
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTPEND_HPARTINTP BIT(7)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTPEND_HDONEINTP BIT(5)
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTPEND_BRDMAINTP BIT(3)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTPEND_BTDMAINTP BIT(2)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTPEND_HRDMAINTP BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCINTPEND_PKDMAINTP BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCFIFOSTAT 0x0010
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCFIFOSTAT_BRFIFOFUL BIT(7)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCFIFOSTAT_BRFIFOEMP BIT(6)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCFIFOSTAT_BTFIFOFUL BIT(5)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCFIFOSTAT_BTFIFOEMP BIT(4)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCFIFOSTAT_HRFIFOFUL BIT(3)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCFIFOSTAT_HRFIFOEMP BIT(2)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCFIFOSTAT_PKFIFOFUL BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCFIFOSTAT_PKFIFOEMP BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCFIFOCTRL 0x0014
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCFIFOCTRL_DESSEL BIT(2)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASHIN_INDEPENDENT _SBF(0, 0x00)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASHIN_CIPHER_INPUT _SBF(0, 0x01)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASHIN_CIPHER_OUTPUT _SBF(0, 0x02)
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASHIN_MASK _SBF(0, 0x03)
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCBRDMAS 0x0020
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCBRDMAL 0x0024
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCBRDMAC 0x0028
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCBRDMAC_BYTESWAP BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCBRDMAC_FLUSH BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCBTDMAS 0x0030
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCBTDMAL 0x0034
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCBTDMAC 0x0038
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCBTDMAC_BYTESWAP BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCBTDMAC_FLUSH BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCHRDMAS 0x0040
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCHRDMAL 0x0044
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCHRDMAC 0x0048
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCHRDMAC_BYTESWAP BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCHRDMAC_FLUSH BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCPKDMAS 0x0050
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCPKDMAL 0x0054
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCPKDMAC 0x0058
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCPKDMAC_BYTESWAP BIT(3)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCPKDMAC_DESCEND BIT(2)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCPKDMAC_TRANSMIT BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_FCPKDMAC_FLUSH BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_FCPKDMAO 0x005C
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* AES registers */
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_AES_CONTROL 0x00
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_BYTESWAP_DI BIT(11)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_BYTESWAP_DO BIT(10)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_BYTESWAP_IV BIT(9)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_BYTESWAP_CNT BIT(8)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_BYTESWAP_KEY BIT(7)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_KEY_CHANGE_MODE BIT(6)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_KEY_SIZE_128 _SBF(4, 0x00)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_KEY_SIZE_192 _SBF(4, 0x01)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_KEY_SIZE_256 _SBF(4, 0x02)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_FIFO_MODE BIT(3)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_CHAIN_MODE_ECB _SBF(1, 0x00)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_CHAIN_MODE_CBC _SBF(1, 0x01)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_CHAIN_MODE_CTR _SBF(1, 0x02)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_MODE_DECRYPT BIT(0)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_AES_STATUS 0x04
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_BUSY BIT(2)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_INPUT_READY BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_OUTPUT_READY BIT(0)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_AES_IN_DATA(s) (0x10 + (s << 2))
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_AES_OUT_DATA(s) (0x20 + (s << 2))
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_AES_IV_DATA(s) (0x30 + (s << 2))
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_AES_CNT_DATA(s) (0x40 + (s << 2))
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_AES_KEY_DATA(s) (0x80 + (s << 2))
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG(dev, reg) ((dev)->ioaddr + (SSS_REG_##reg))
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_READ(dev, reg) __raw_readl(SSS_REG(dev, reg))
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_WRITE(dev, reg, val) __raw_writel((val), SSS_REG(dev, reg))
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_REG(dev, reg) ((dev)->aes_ioaddr + SSS_REG_##reg)
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
#define SSS_AES_WRITE(dev, reg, val) __raw_writel((val), \
|
|
|
|
SSS_AES_REG(dev, reg))
|
|
|
|
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
/* HW engine modes */
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#define FLAGS_AES_DECRYPT BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
#define FLAGS_AES_MODE_MASK _SBF(1, 0x03)
|
|
|
|
#define FLAGS_AES_CBC _SBF(1, 0x01)
|
|
|
|
#define FLAGS_AES_CTR _SBF(1, 0x02)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#define AES_KEY_LEN 16
|
|
|
|
#define CRYPTO_QUEUE_LEN 1
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
/* HASH registers */
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_HASH_CTRL 0x00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_USER_IV_EN BIT(5)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_INIT_BIT BIT(4)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_ENGINE_SHA1 _SBF(1, 0x00)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_ENGINE_MD5 _SBF(1, 0x01)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_ENGINE_SHA256 _SBF(1, 0x02)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_ENGINE_MASK _SBF(1, 0x03)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_HASH_CTRL_PAUSE 0x04
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_PAUSE BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_HASH_CTRL_FIFO 0x08
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_FIFO_MODE_DMA BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_FIFO_MODE_CPU 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_HASH_CTRL_SWAP 0x0C
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_BYTESWAP_DI BIT(3)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_BYTESWAP_DO BIT(2)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_BYTESWAP_IV BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_BYTESWAP_KEY BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_HASH_STATUS 0x10
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_STATUS_MSG_DONE BIT(6)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_STATUS_PARTIAL_DONE BIT(4)
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_STATUS_BUFFER_READY BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_HASH_MSG_SIZE_LOW 0x20
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_HASH_MSG_SIZE_HIGH 0x24
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_HASH_PRE_MSG_SIZE_LOW 0x28
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_HASH_PRE_MSG_SIZE_HIGH 0x2C
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_HASH_IV(s) (0xB0 + ((s) << 2))
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_REG_HASH_OUT(s) (0x100 + ((s) << 2))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_REG_SIZEOF 4
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_MD5_MAX_REG (MD5_DIGEST_SIZE / HASH_REG_SIZEOF)
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_SHA1_MAX_REG (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE / HASH_REG_SIZEOF)
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_SHA256_MAX_REG (SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / HASH_REG_SIZEOF)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* HASH bit numbers, used by device, setting in dev->hash_flags with
|
|
|
|
* functions set_bit(), clear_bit() or tested with test_bit() or BIT(),
|
|
|
|
* to keep HASH state BUSY or FREE, or to signal state from irq_handler
|
|
|
|
* to hash_tasklet. SGS keep track of allocated memory for scatterlist
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_FLAGS_BUSY 0
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_FLAGS_FINAL 1
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_FLAGS_DMA_ACTIVE 2
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_FLAGS_OUTPUT_READY 3
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_FLAGS_DMA_READY 4
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_FLAGS_SGS_COPIED 5
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_FLAGS_SGS_ALLOCED 6
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* HASH HW constants */
|
|
|
|
#define BUFLEN HASH_BLOCK_SIZE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_DMA_LEN_ALIGN 8
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_DMA_ALIGN_MASK (SSS_HASH_DMA_LEN_ALIGN - 1)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSS_HASH_QUEUE_LENGTH 10
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* struct samsung_aes_variant - platform specific SSS driver data
|
|
|
|
* @aes_offset: AES register offset from SSS module's base.
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
* @hash_offset: HASH register offset from SSS module's base.
|
2019-02-22 19:21:44 +07:00
|
|
|
* @clk_names: names of clocks needed to run SSS IP
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Specifies platform specific configuration of SSS module.
|
|
|
|
* Note: A structure for driver specific platform data is used for future
|
|
|
|
* expansion of its usage.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct samsung_aes_variant {
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int aes_offset;
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int hash_offset;
|
2019-03-01 21:02:54 +07:00
|
|
|
const char *clk_names[2];
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_reqctx {
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long mode;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_ctx {
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev *dev;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-17 22:09:29 +07:00
|
|
|
u8 aes_key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
u8 nonce[CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE];
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
int keylen;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-17 21:49:21 +07:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* struct s5p_aes_dev - Crypto device state container
|
|
|
|
* @dev: Associated device
|
|
|
|
* @clk: Clock for accessing hardware
|
|
|
|
* @ioaddr: Mapped IO memory region
|
|
|
|
* @aes_ioaddr: Per-varian offset for AES block IO memory
|
|
|
|
* @irq_fc: Feed control interrupt line
|
|
|
|
* @req: Crypto request currently handled by the device
|
|
|
|
* @ctx: Configuration for currently handled crypto request
|
|
|
|
* @sg_src: Scatter list with source data for currently handled block
|
|
|
|
* in device. This is DMA-mapped into device.
|
|
|
|
* @sg_dst: Scatter list with destination data for currently handled block
|
|
|
|
* in device. This is DMA-mapped into device.
|
|
|
|
* @sg_src_cpy: In case of unaligned access, copied scatter list
|
|
|
|
* with source data.
|
|
|
|
* @sg_dst_cpy: In case of unaligned access, copied scatter list
|
|
|
|
* with destination data.
|
|
|
|
* @tasklet: New request scheduling jib
|
|
|
|
* @queue: Crypto queue
|
|
|
|
* @busy: Indicates whether the device is currently handling some request
|
|
|
|
* thus it uses some of the fields from this state, like:
|
|
|
|
* req, ctx, sg_src/dst (and copies). This essentially
|
|
|
|
* protects against concurrent access to these fields.
|
|
|
|
* @lock: Lock for protecting both access to device hardware registers
|
|
|
|
* and fields related to current request (including the busy field).
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
* @res: Resources for hash.
|
|
|
|
* @io_hash_base: Per-variant offset for HASH block IO memory.
|
|
|
|
* @hash_lock: Lock for protecting hash_req, hash_queue and hash_flags
|
|
|
|
* variable.
|
|
|
|
* @hash_flags: Flags for current HASH op.
|
|
|
|
* @hash_queue: Async hash queue.
|
|
|
|
* @hash_tasklet: New HASH request scheduling job.
|
|
|
|
* @xmit_buf: Buffer for current HASH request transfer into SSS block.
|
|
|
|
* @hash_req: Current request sending to SSS HASH block.
|
|
|
|
* @hash_sg_iter: Scatterlist transferred through DMA into SSS HASH block.
|
|
|
|
* @hash_sg_cnt: Counter for hash_sg_iter.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @use_hash: true if HASH algs enabled
|
2017-03-17 21:49:21 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev {
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
struct device *dev;
|
|
|
|
struct clk *clk;
|
2019-02-22 19:21:44 +07:00
|
|
|
struct clk *pclk;
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
void __iomem *ioaddr;
|
|
|
|
void __iomem *aes_ioaddr;
|
|
|
|
int irq_fc;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req;
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_ctx *ctx;
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg_src;
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg_dst;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg_src_cpy;
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg_dst_cpy;
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
struct tasklet_struct tasklet;
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_queue queue;
|
|
|
|
bool busy;
|
|
|
|
spinlock_t lock;
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct resource *res;
|
|
|
|
void __iomem *io_hash_base;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spinlock_t hash_lock; /* protect hash_ vars */
|
|
|
|
unsigned long hash_flags;
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_queue hash_queue;
|
|
|
|
struct tasklet_struct hash_tasklet;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
u8 xmit_buf[BUFLEN];
|
|
|
|
struct ahash_request *hash_req;
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *hash_sg_iter;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hash_sg_cnt;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool use_hash;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* struct s5p_hash_reqctx - HASH request context
|
|
|
|
* @dd: Associated device
|
|
|
|
* @op_update: Current request operation (OP_UPDATE or OP_FINAL)
|
|
|
|
* @digcnt: Number of bytes processed by HW (without buffer[] ones)
|
|
|
|
* @digest: Digest message or IV for partial result
|
|
|
|
* @nregs: Number of HW registers for digest or IV read/write
|
|
|
|
* @engine: Bits for selecting type of HASH in SSS block
|
|
|
|
* @sg: sg for DMA transfer
|
|
|
|
* @sg_len: Length of sg for DMA transfer
|
|
|
|
* @sgl[]: sg for joining buffer and req->src scatterlist
|
|
|
|
* @skip: Skip offset in req->src for current op
|
|
|
|
* @total: Total number of bytes for current request
|
|
|
|
* @finup: Keep state for finup or final.
|
|
|
|
* @error: Keep track of error.
|
|
|
|
* @bufcnt: Number of bytes holded in buffer[]
|
|
|
|
* @buffer[]: For byte(s) from end of req->src in UPDATE op
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx {
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev *dd;
|
|
|
|
bool op_update;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
u64 digcnt;
|
|
|
|
u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int nregs; /* digest_size / sizeof(reg) */
|
|
|
|
u32 engine;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int sg_len;
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist sgl[2];
|
|
|
|
unsigned int skip;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int total;
|
|
|
|
bool finup;
|
|
|
|
bool error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
u32 bufcnt;
|
|
|
|
u8 buffer[0];
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* struct s5p_hash_ctx - HASH transformation context
|
|
|
|
* @dd: Associated device
|
|
|
|
* @flags: Bits for algorithm HASH.
|
|
|
|
* @fallback: Software transformation for zero message or size < BUFLEN.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_ctx {
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev *dd;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_shash *fallback;
|
|
|
|
};
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct samsung_aes_variant s5p_aes_data = {
|
|
|
|
.aes_offset = 0x4000,
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.hash_offset = 0x6000,
|
2019-02-22 19:21:44 +07:00
|
|
|
.clk_names = { "secss", },
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct samsung_aes_variant exynos_aes_data = {
|
|
|
|
.aes_offset = 0x200,
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.hash_offset = 0x400,
|
2019-02-22 19:21:44 +07:00
|
|
|
.clk_names = { "secss", },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct samsung_aes_variant exynos5433_slim_aes_data = {
|
|
|
|
.aes_offset = 0x400,
|
|
|
|
.hash_offset = 0x800,
|
|
|
|
.clk_names = { "pclk", "aclk", },
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:13 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct of_device_id s5p_sss_dt_match[] = {
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.compatible = "samsung,s5pv210-secss",
|
|
|
|
.data = &s5p_aes_data,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.compatible = "samsung,exynos4210-secss",
|
|
|
|
.data = &exynos_aes_data,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2019-02-22 19:21:44 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.compatible = "samsung,exynos5433-slim-sss",
|
|
|
|
.data = &exynos5433_slim_aes_data,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2014-05-08 20:58:13 +07:00
|
|
|
{ },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, s5p_sss_dt_match);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
static inline const struct samsung_aes_variant *find_s5p_sss_version
|
|
|
|
(const struct platform_device *pdev)
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_OF) && (pdev->dev.of_node)) {
|
|
|
|
const struct of_device_id *match;
|
2016-01-11 18:45:50 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
match = of_match_node(s5p_sss_dt_match,
|
|
|
|
pdev->dev.of_node);
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
return (const struct samsung_aes_variant *)match->data;
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
return (const struct samsung_aes_variant *)
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
platform_get_device_id(pdev)->driver_data;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
static struct s5p_aes_dev *s5p_dev;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
static void s5p_set_dma_indata(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev,
|
|
|
|
const struct scatterlist *sg)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCBRDMAS, sg_dma_address(sg));
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCBRDMAL, sg_dma_len(sg));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
static void s5p_set_dma_outdata(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev,
|
|
|
|
const struct scatterlist *sg)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCBTDMAS, sg_dma_address(sg));
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCBTDMAL, sg_dma_len(sg));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
static void s5p_free_sg_cpy(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev, struct scatterlist **sg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!*sg)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
len = ALIGN(dev->req->cryptlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
free_pages((unsigned long)sg_virt(*sg), get_order(len));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(*sg);
|
|
|
|
*sg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_sg_copy_buf(void *buf, struct scatterlist *sg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int nbytes, int out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct scatter_walk walk;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!nbytes)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
scatterwalk_start(&walk, sg);
|
|
|
|
scatterwalk_copychunks(buf, &walk, nbytes, out);
|
|
|
|
scatterwalk_done(&walk, out, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
static void s5p_sg_done(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req = dev->req;
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_reqctx *reqctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
|
2019-02-19 23:02:32 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
if (dev->sg_dst_cpy) {
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev->dev,
|
|
|
|
"Copying %d bytes of output data back to original place\n",
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
dev->req->cryptlen);
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
s5p_sg_copy_buf(sg_virt(dev->sg_dst_cpy), dev->req->dst,
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
dev->req->cryptlen, 1);
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s5p_free_sg_cpy(dev, &dev->sg_src_cpy);
|
|
|
|
s5p_free_sg_cpy(dev, &dev->sg_dst_cpy);
|
2019-02-19 23:02:32 +07:00
|
|
|
if (reqctx->mode & FLAGS_AES_CBC)
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
memcpy_fromio(req->iv, dev->aes_ioaddr + SSS_REG_AES_IV_DATA(0), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
2019-02-19 23:02:32 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
else if (reqctx->mode & FLAGS_AES_CTR)
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
memcpy_fromio(req->iv, dev->aes_ioaddr + SSS_REG_AES_CNT_DATA(0), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Calls the completion. Cannot be called with dev->lock hold. */
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static void s5p_aes_complete(struct skcipher_request *req, int err)
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-09-17 22:09:27 +07:00
|
|
|
req->base.complete(&req->base, err);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_unset_outdata(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dma_unmap_sg(dev->dev, dev->sg_dst, 1, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_unset_indata(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dma_unmap_sg(dev->dev, dev->sg_src, 1, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
static int s5p_make_sg_cpy(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev, struct scatterlist *src,
|
2018-09-17 22:09:28 +07:00
|
|
|
struct scatterlist **dst)
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
void *pages;
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*dst = kmalloc(sizeof(**dst), GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
|
|
if (!*dst)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
len = ALIGN(dev->req->cryptlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
pages = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC, get_order(len));
|
|
|
|
if (!pages) {
|
|
|
|
kfree(*dst);
|
|
|
|
*dst = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
s5p_sg_copy_buf(pages, src, dev->req->cryptlen, 0);
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sg_init_table(*dst, 1);
|
|
|
|
sg_set_buf(*dst, pages, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
static int s5p_set_outdata(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev, struct scatterlist *sg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-09-17 22:09:29 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!sg->length)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-17 22:09:29 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!dma_map_sg(dev->dev, sg, 1, DMA_FROM_DEVICE))
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev->sg_dst = sg;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-17 22:09:29 +07:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_set_indata(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev, struct scatterlist *sg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-09-17 22:09:29 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!sg->length)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-17 22:09:29 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!dma_map_sg(dev->dev, sg, 1, DMA_TO_DEVICE))
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev->sg_src = sg;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-17 22:09:29 +07:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-22 19:15:23 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
* Returns -ERRNO on error (mapping of new data failed).
|
|
|
|
* On success returns:
|
|
|
|
* - 0 if there is no more data,
|
|
|
|
* - 1 if new transmitting (output) data is ready and its address+length
|
|
|
|
* have to be written to device (by calling s5p_set_dma_outdata()).
|
2016-04-22 19:15:23 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_tx(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s5p_unset_outdata(dev);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!sg_is_last(dev->sg_dst)) {
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = s5p_set_outdata(dev, sg_next(dev->sg_dst));
|
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
2014-05-08 20:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-22 19:15:23 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-22 19:15:23 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
* Returns -ERRNO on error (mapping of new data failed).
|
|
|
|
* On success returns:
|
|
|
|
* - 0 if there is no more data,
|
|
|
|
* - 1 if new receiving (input) data is ready and its address+length
|
|
|
|
* have to be written to device (by calling s5p_set_dma_indata()).
|
2016-04-22 19:15:23 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_rx(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev/*, bool *set_dma*/)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s5p_unset_indata(dev);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!sg_is_last(dev->sg_src)) {
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = s5p_set_indata(dev, sg_next(dev->sg_src));
|
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-22 19:15:23 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
static inline u32 s5p_hash_read(struct s5p_aes_dev *dd, u32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return __raw_readl(dd->io_hash_base + offset);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void s5p_hash_write(struct s5p_aes_dev *dd,
|
|
|
|
u32 offset, u32 value)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
__raw_writel(value, dd->io_hash_base + offset);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_set_dma_hashdata() - start DMA with sg
|
|
|
|
* @dev: device
|
|
|
|
* @sg: scatterlist ready to DMA transmit
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_set_dma_hashdata(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev,
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
const struct scatterlist *sg)
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dev->hash_sg_cnt--;
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCHRDMAS, sg_dma_address(sg));
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCHRDMAL, sg_dma_len(sg)); /* DMA starts */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_rx() - get next hash_sg_iter
|
|
|
|
* @dev: device
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return:
|
|
|
|
* 2 if there is no more data and it is UPDATE op
|
|
|
|
* 1 if new receiving (input) data is ready and can be written to device
|
|
|
|
* 0 if there is no more data and it is FINAL op
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_rx(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (dev->hash_sg_cnt > 0) {
|
|
|
|
dev->hash_sg_iter = sg_next(dev->hash_sg_iter);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_bit(HASH_FLAGS_DMA_READY, &dev->hash_flags);
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(HASH_FLAGS_FINAL, &dev->hash_flags))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
static irqreturn_t s5p_aes_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct platform_device *pdev = dev_id;
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev *dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req;
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
int err_dma_tx = 0;
|
|
|
|
int err_dma_rx = 0;
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
int err_dma_hx = 0;
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
bool tx_end = false;
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
bool hx_end = false;
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
2018-09-17 22:09:29 +07:00
|
|
|
u32 status, st_bits;
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Handle rx or tx interrupt. If there is still data (scatterlist did not
|
|
|
|
* reach end), then map next scatterlist entry.
|
|
|
|
* In case of such mapping error, s5p_aes_complete() should be called.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If there is no more data in tx scatter list, call s5p_aes_complete()
|
|
|
|
* and schedule new tasklet.
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Handle hx interrupt. If there is still data map next entry.
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-04-19 20:44:12 +07:00
|
|
|
status = SSS_READ(dev, FCINTSTAT);
|
|
|
|
if (status & SSS_FCINTSTAT_BRDMAINT)
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
err_dma_rx = s5p_aes_rx(dev);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (status & SSS_FCINTSTAT_BTDMAINT) {
|
|
|
|
if (sg_is_last(dev->sg_dst))
|
|
|
|
tx_end = true;
|
|
|
|
err_dma_tx = s5p_aes_tx(dev);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
if (status & SSS_FCINTSTAT_HRDMAINT)
|
|
|
|
err_dma_hx = s5p_hash_rx(dev);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
st_bits = status & (SSS_FCINTSTAT_BRDMAINT | SSS_FCINTSTAT_BTDMAINT |
|
|
|
|
SSS_FCINTSTAT_HRDMAINT);
|
|
|
|
/* clear DMA bits */
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCINTPEND, st_bits);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* clear HASH irq bits */
|
|
|
|
if (status & (SSS_FCINTSTAT_HDONEINT | SSS_FCINTSTAT_HPARTINT)) {
|
|
|
|
/* cannot have both HPART and HDONE */
|
|
|
|
if (status & SSS_FCINTSTAT_HPARTINT)
|
|
|
|
st_bits = SSS_HASH_STATUS_PARTIAL_DONE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (status & SSS_FCINTSTAT_HDONEINT)
|
|
|
|
st_bits = SSS_HASH_STATUS_MSG_DONE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_bit(HASH_FLAGS_OUTPUT_READY, &dev->hash_flags);
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write(dev, SSS_REG_HASH_STATUS, st_bits);
|
|
|
|
hx_end = true;
|
|
|
|
/* when DONE or PART, do not handle HASH DMA */
|
|
|
|
err_dma_hx = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
if (err_dma_rx < 0) {
|
|
|
|
err = err_dma_rx;
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (err_dma_tx < 0) {
|
|
|
|
err = err_dma_tx;
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tx_end) {
|
|
|
|
s5p_sg_done(dev);
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
if (err_dma_hx == 1)
|
|
|
|
s5p_set_dma_hashdata(dev, dev->hash_sg_iter);
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-17 22:09:27 +07:00
|
|
|
s5p_aes_complete(dev->req, 0);
|
2017-03-17 21:49:19 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Device is still busy */
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
tasklet_schedule(&dev->tasklet);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Writing length of DMA block (either receiving or
|
|
|
|
* transmitting) will start the operation immediately, so this
|
|
|
|
* should be done at the end (even after clearing pending
|
|
|
|
* interrupts to not miss the interrupt).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (err_dma_tx == 1)
|
|
|
|
s5p_set_dma_outdata(dev, dev->sg_dst);
|
|
|
|
if (err_dma_rx == 1)
|
|
|
|
s5p_set_dma_indata(dev, dev->sg_src);
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
if (err_dma_hx == 1)
|
|
|
|
s5p_set_dma_hashdata(dev, dev->hash_sg_iter);
|
2016-04-22 19:15:23 +07:00
|
|
|
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
goto hash_irq_end;
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
s5p_sg_done(dev);
|
2017-03-17 21:49:19 +07:00
|
|
|
dev->busy = false;
|
2018-09-17 22:09:27 +07:00
|
|
|
req = dev->req;
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
if (err_dma_hx == 1)
|
|
|
|
s5p_set_dma_hashdata(dev, dev->hash_sg_iter);
|
|
|
|
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
|
2018-09-17 22:09:27 +07:00
|
|
|
s5p_aes_complete(req, err);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
hash_irq_end:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Note about else if:
|
|
|
|
* when hash_sg_iter reaches end and its UPDATE op,
|
|
|
|
* issue SSS_HASH_PAUSE and wait for HPART irq
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (hx_end)
|
|
|
|
tasklet_schedule(&dev->hash_tasklet);
|
|
|
|
else if (err_dma_hx == 2)
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write(dev, SSS_REG_HASH_CTRL_PAUSE,
|
|
|
|
SSS_HASH_PAUSE);
|
|
|
|
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
return IRQ_HANDLED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_read_msg() - read message or IV from HW
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_read_msg(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev *dd = ctx->dd;
|
|
|
|
u32 *hash = (u32 *)ctx->digest;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nregs; i++)
|
|
|
|
hash[i] = s5p_hash_read(dd, SSS_REG_HASH_OUT(i));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_write_ctx_iv() - write IV for next partial/finup op.
|
|
|
|
* @dd: device
|
|
|
|
* @ctx: request context
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_write_ctx_iv(struct s5p_aes_dev *dd,
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
const struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx)
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
const u32 *hash = (const u32 *)ctx->digest;
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nregs; i++)
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write(dd, SSS_REG_HASH_IV(i), hash[i]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_write_iv() - write IV for next partial/finup op.
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_write_iv(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write_ctx_iv(ctx->dd, ctx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_copy_result() - copy digest into req->result
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_copy_result(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
const struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!req->result)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(req->result, ctx->digest, ctx->nregs * HASH_REG_SIZEOF);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_dma_flush() - flush HASH DMA
|
|
|
|
* @dev: secss device
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_dma_flush(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCHRDMAC, SSS_FCHRDMAC_FLUSH);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_dma_enable() - enable DMA mode for HASH
|
|
|
|
* @dev: secss device
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* enable DMA mode for HASH
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_dma_enable(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write(dev, SSS_REG_HASH_CTRL_FIFO, SSS_HASH_FIFO_MODE_DMA);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_irq_disable() - disable irq HASH signals
|
|
|
|
* @dev: secss device
|
|
|
|
* @flags: bitfield with irq's to be disabled
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_irq_disable(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev, u32 flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCINTENCLR, flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_irq_enable() - enable irq signals
|
|
|
|
* @dev: secss device
|
|
|
|
* @flags: bitfield with irq's to be enabled
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_irq_enable(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev, int flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCINTENSET, flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_set_flow() - set flow inside SecSS AES/DES with/without HASH
|
|
|
|
* @dev: secss device
|
|
|
|
* @hashflow: HASH stream flow with/without crypto AES/DES
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_set_flow(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev, u32 hashflow)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
|
|
|
u32 flow;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
flow = SSS_READ(dev, FCFIFOCTRL);
|
|
|
|
flow &= ~SSS_HASHIN_MASK;
|
|
|
|
flow |= hashflow;
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCFIFOCTRL, flow);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_ahash_dma_init() - enable DMA and set HASH flow inside SecSS
|
|
|
|
* @dev: secss device
|
|
|
|
* @hashflow: HASH stream flow with/without AES/DES
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* flush HASH DMA and enable DMA, set HASH stream flow inside SecSS HW,
|
|
|
|
* enable HASH irq's HRDMA, HDONE, HPART
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_ahash_dma_init(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev, u32 hashflow)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_irq_disable(dev, SSS_FCINTENCLR_HRDMAINTENCLR |
|
|
|
|
SSS_FCINTENCLR_HDONEINTENCLR |
|
|
|
|
SSS_FCINTENCLR_HPARTINTENCLR);
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_dma_flush(dev);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_dma_enable(dev);
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_set_flow(dev, hashflow & SSS_HASHIN_MASK);
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_irq_enable(dev, SSS_FCINTENSET_HRDMAINTENSET |
|
|
|
|
SSS_FCINTENSET_HDONEINTENSET |
|
|
|
|
SSS_FCINTENSET_HPARTINTENSET);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_write_ctrl() - prepare HASH block in SecSS for processing
|
|
|
|
* @dd: secss device
|
|
|
|
* @length: length for request
|
|
|
|
* @final: true if final op
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Prepare SSS HASH block for processing bytes in DMA mode. If it is called
|
|
|
|
* after previous updates, fill up IV words. For final, calculate and set
|
|
|
|
* lengths for HASH so SecSS can finalize hash. For partial, set SSS HASH
|
|
|
|
* length as 2^63 so it will be never reached and set to zero prelow and
|
|
|
|
* prehigh.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This function does not start DMA transfer.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_write_ctrl(struct s5p_aes_dev *dd, size_t length,
|
|
|
|
bool final)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(dd->hash_req);
|
|
|
|
u32 prelow, prehigh, low, high;
|
|
|
|
u32 configflags, swapflags;
|
|
|
|
u64 tmplen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
configflags = ctx->engine | SSS_HASH_INIT_BIT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (likely(ctx->digcnt)) {
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write_ctx_iv(dd, ctx);
|
|
|
|
configflags |= SSS_HASH_USER_IV_EN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (final) {
|
|
|
|
/* number of bytes for last part */
|
|
|
|
low = length;
|
|
|
|
high = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* total number of bits prev hashed */
|
|
|
|
tmplen = ctx->digcnt * 8;
|
|
|
|
prelow = (u32)tmplen;
|
|
|
|
prehigh = (u32)(tmplen >> 32);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
prelow = 0;
|
|
|
|
prehigh = 0;
|
|
|
|
low = 0;
|
|
|
|
high = BIT(31);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
swapflags = SSS_HASH_BYTESWAP_DI | SSS_HASH_BYTESWAP_DO |
|
|
|
|
SSS_HASH_BYTESWAP_IV | SSS_HASH_BYTESWAP_KEY;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write(dd, SSS_REG_HASH_MSG_SIZE_LOW, low);
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write(dd, SSS_REG_HASH_MSG_SIZE_HIGH, high);
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write(dd, SSS_REG_HASH_PRE_MSG_SIZE_LOW, prelow);
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write(dd, SSS_REG_HASH_PRE_MSG_SIZE_HIGH, prehigh);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write(dd, SSS_REG_HASH_CTRL_SWAP, swapflags);
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write(dd, SSS_REG_HASH_CTRL, configflags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_xmit_dma() - start DMA hash processing
|
|
|
|
* @dd: secss device
|
|
|
|
* @length: length for request
|
|
|
|
* @final: true if final op
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Update digcnt here, as it is needed for finup/final op.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_xmit_dma(struct s5p_aes_dev *dd, size_t length,
|
|
|
|
bool final)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(dd->hash_req);
|
|
|
|
unsigned int cnt;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cnt = dma_map_sg(dd->dev, ctx->sg, ctx->sg_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
|
|
|
|
if (!cnt) {
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dd->dev, "dma_map_sg error\n");
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = true;
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_bit(HASH_FLAGS_DMA_ACTIVE, &dd->hash_flags);
|
|
|
|
dd->hash_sg_iter = ctx->sg;
|
|
|
|
dd->hash_sg_cnt = cnt;
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write_ctrl(dd, length, final);
|
|
|
|
ctx->digcnt += length;
|
|
|
|
ctx->total -= length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* catch last interrupt */
|
|
|
|
if (final)
|
|
|
|
set_bit(HASH_FLAGS_FINAL, &dd->hash_flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s5p_set_dma_hashdata(dd, dd->hash_sg_iter); /* DMA starts */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINPROGRESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_copy_sgs() - copy request's bytes into new buffer
|
|
|
|
* @ctx: request context
|
|
|
|
* @sg: source scatterlist request
|
|
|
|
* @new_len: number of bytes to process from sg
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Allocate new buffer, copy data for HASH into it. If there was xmit_buf
|
|
|
|
* filled, copy it first, then copy data from sg into it. Prepare one sgl[0]
|
|
|
|
* with allocated buffer.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Set bit in dd->hash_flag so we can free it after irq ends processing.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_copy_sgs(struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx,
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg, unsigned int new_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pages, len;
|
|
|
|
void *buf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
len = new_len + ctx->bufcnt;
|
|
|
|
pages = get_order(len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC, pages);
|
|
|
|
if (!buf) {
|
|
|
|
dev_err(ctx->dd->dev, "alloc pages for unaligned case.\n");
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = true;
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->bufcnt)
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, ctx->dd->xmit_buf, ctx->bufcnt);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(buf + ctx->bufcnt, sg, ctx->skip,
|
|
|
|
new_len, 0);
|
|
|
|
sg_init_table(ctx->sgl, 1);
|
|
|
|
sg_set_buf(ctx->sgl, buf, len);
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg = ctx->sgl;
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg_len = 1;
|
|
|
|
ctx->bufcnt = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->skip = 0;
|
|
|
|
set_bit(HASH_FLAGS_SGS_COPIED, &ctx->dd->hash_flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_copy_sg_lists() - copy sg list and make fixes in copy
|
|
|
|
* @ctx: request context
|
|
|
|
* @sg: source scatterlist request
|
|
|
|
* @new_len: number of bytes to process from sg
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Allocate new scatterlist table, copy data for HASH into it. If there was
|
|
|
|
* xmit_buf filled, prepare it first, then copy page, length and offset from
|
|
|
|
* source sg into it, adjusting begin and/or end for skip offset and
|
|
|
|
* hash_later value.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Resulting sg table will be assigned to ctx->sg. Set flag so we can free
|
|
|
|
* it after irq ends processing.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_copy_sg_lists(struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx,
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg, unsigned int new_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int skip = ctx->skip, n = sg_nents(sg);
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *tmp;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->bufcnt)
|
|
|
|
n++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg = kmalloc_array(n, sizeof(*sg), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->sg) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = true;
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sg_init_table(ctx->sg, n);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp = ctx->sg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->bufcnt) {
|
|
|
|
sg_set_buf(tmp, ctx->dd->xmit_buf, ctx->bufcnt);
|
|
|
|
tmp = sg_next(tmp);
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg_len++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (sg && skip >= sg->length) {
|
|
|
|
skip -= sg->length;
|
|
|
|
sg = sg_next(sg);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (sg && new_len) {
|
|
|
|
len = sg->length - skip;
|
|
|
|
if (new_len < len)
|
|
|
|
len = new_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
new_len -= len;
|
|
|
|
sg_set_page(tmp, sg_page(sg), len, sg->offset + skip);
|
|
|
|
skip = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (new_len <= 0)
|
|
|
|
sg_mark_end(tmp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp = sg_next(tmp);
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg_len++;
|
|
|
|
sg = sg_next(sg);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_bit(HASH_FLAGS_SGS_ALLOCED, &ctx->dd->hash_flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_prepare_sgs() - prepare sg for processing
|
|
|
|
* @ctx: request context
|
|
|
|
* @sg: source scatterlist request
|
|
|
|
* @nbytes: number of bytes to process from sg
|
|
|
|
* @final: final flag
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Check two conditions: (1) if buffers in sg have len aligned data, and (2)
|
|
|
|
* sg table have good aligned elements (list_ok). If one of this checks fails,
|
|
|
|
* then either (1) allocates new buffer for data with s5p_hash_copy_sgs, copy
|
|
|
|
* data into this buffer and prepare request in sgl, or (2) allocates new sg
|
|
|
|
* table and prepare sg elements.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For digest or finup all conditions can be good, and we may not need any
|
|
|
|
* fixes.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_prepare_sgs(struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx,
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int new_len, bool final)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int skip = ctx->skip, nbytes = new_len, n = 0;
|
|
|
|
bool aligned = true, list_ok = true;
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg_tmp = sg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!sg || !sg->length || !new_len)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (skip || !final)
|
|
|
|
list_ok = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (nbytes > 0 && sg_tmp) {
|
|
|
|
n++;
|
|
|
|
if (skip >= sg_tmp->length) {
|
|
|
|
skip -= sg_tmp->length;
|
|
|
|
if (!sg_tmp->length) {
|
|
|
|
aligned = false;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED(sg_tmp->length - skip, BUFLEN)) {
|
|
|
|
aligned = false;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (nbytes < sg_tmp->length - skip) {
|
|
|
|
list_ok = false;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
nbytes -= sg_tmp->length - skip;
|
|
|
|
skip = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sg_tmp = sg_next(sg_tmp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!aligned)
|
|
|
|
return s5p_hash_copy_sgs(ctx, sg, new_len);
|
|
|
|
else if (!list_ok)
|
|
|
|
return s5p_hash_copy_sg_lists(ctx, sg, new_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Have aligned data from previous operation and/or current
|
|
|
|
* Note: will enter here only if (digest or finup) and aligned
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->bufcnt) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg_len = n;
|
|
|
|
sg_init_table(ctx->sgl, 2);
|
|
|
|
sg_set_buf(ctx->sgl, ctx->dd->xmit_buf, ctx->bufcnt);
|
|
|
|
sg_chain(ctx->sgl, 2, sg);
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg = ctx->sgl;
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg_len++;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg = sg;
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg_len = n;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_prepare_request() - prepare request for processing
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
* @update: true if UPDATE op
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note 1: we can have update flag _and_ final flag at the same time.
|
|
|
|
* Note 2: we enter here when digcnt > BUFLEN (=HASH_BLOCK_SIZE) or
|
|
|
|
* either req->nbytes or ctx->bufcnt + req->nbytes is > BUFLEN or
|
|
|
|
* we have final op
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_prepare_request(struct ahash_request *req, bool update)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
bool final = ctx->finup;
|
|
|
|
int xmit_len, hash_later, nbytes;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (update)
|
|
|
|
nbytes = req->nbytes;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
nbytes = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->total = nbytes + ctx->bufcnt;
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->total)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (nbytes && (!IS_ALIGNED(ctx->bufcnt, BUFLEN))) {
|
|
|
|
/* bytes left from previous request, so fill up to BUFLEN */
|
|
|
|
int len = BUFLEN - ctx->bufcnt % BUFLEN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len > nbytes)
|
|
|
|
len = nbytes;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ctx->buffer + ctx->bufcnt, req->src,
|
|
|
|
0, len, 0);
|
|
|
|
ctx->bufcnt += len;
|
|
|
|
nbytes -= len;
|
|
|
|
ctx->skip = len;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ctx->skip = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->bufcnt)
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ctx->dd->xmit_buf, ctx->buffer, ctx->bufcnt);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xmit_len = ctx->total;
|
|
|
|
if (final) {
|
|
|
|
hash_later = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ALIGNED(xmit_len, BUFLEN))
|
|
|
|
xmit_len -= BUFLEN;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
xmit_len -= xmit_len & (BUFLEN - 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hash_later = ctx->total - xmit_len;
|
|
|
|
/* copy hash_later bytes from end of req->src */
|
|
|
|
/* previous bytes are in xmit_buf, so no overwrite */
|
|
|
|
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ctx->buffer, req->src,
|
|
|
|
req->nbytes - hash_later,
|
|
|
|
hash_later, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (xmit_len > BUFLEN) {
|
|
|
|
ret = s5p_hash_prepare_sgs(ctx, req->src, nbytes - hash_later,
|
|
|
|
final);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* have buffered data only */
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!ctx->bufcnt)) {
|
|
|
|
/* first update didn't fill up buffer */
|
|
|
|
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ctx->dd->xmit_buf, req->src,
|
|
|
|
0, xmit_len, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sg_init_table(ctx->sgl, 1);
|
|
|
|
sg_set_buf(ctx->sgl, ctx->dd->xmit_buf, xmit_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg = ctx->sgl;
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg_len = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->bufcnt = hash_later;
|
|
|
|
if (!final)
|
|
|
|
ctx->total = xmit_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_update_dma_stop() - unmap DMA
|
|
|
|
* @dd: secss device
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Unmap scatterlist ctx->sg.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_update_dma_stop(struct s5p_aes_dev *dd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
const struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(dd->hash_req);
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dma_unmap_sg(dd->dev, ctx->sg, ctx->sg_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
|
|
|
|
clear_bit(HASH_FLAGS_DMA_ACTIVE, &dd->hash_flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_finish() - copy calculated digest to crypto layer
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_finish(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev *dd = ctx->dd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->digcnt)
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_copy_result(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dd->dev, "hash_finish digcnt: %lld\n", ctx->digcnt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_finish_req() - finish request
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
* @err: error
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_finish_req(struct ahash_request *req, int err)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev *dd = ctx->dd;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(HASH_FLAGS_SGS_COPIED, &dd->hash_flags))
|
|
|
|
free_pages((unsigned long)sg_virt(ctx->sg),
|
|
|
|
get_order(ctx->sg->length));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(HASH_FLAGS_SGS_ALLOCED, &dd->hash_flags))
|
|
|
|
kfree(ctx->sg);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->sg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
dd->hash_flags &= ~(BIT(HASH_FLAGS_SGS_ALLOCED) |
|
|
|
|
BIT(HASH_FLAGS_SGS_COPIED));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!err && !ctx->error) {
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_read_msg(req);
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(HASH_FLAGS_FINAL, &dd->hash_flags))
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_finish(req);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_irqsave(&dd->hash_lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
dd->hash_flags &= ~(BIT(HASH_FLAGS_BUSY) | BIT(HASH_FLAGS_FINAL) |
|
|
|
|
BIT(HASH_FLAGS_DMA_READY) |
|
|
|
|
BIT(HASH_FLAGS_OUTPUT_READY));
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dd->hash_lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (req->base.complete)
|
|
|
|
req->base.complete(&req->base, err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_handle_queue() - handle hash queue
|
|
|
|
* @dd: device s5p_aes_dev
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If req!=NULL enqueue it on dd->queue, if FLAGS_BUSY is not set on the
|
|
|
|
* device then processes the first request from the dd->queue
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns: see s5p_hash_final below.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_handle_queue(struct s5p_aes_dev *dd,
|
|
|
|
struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_async_request *async_req, *backlog;
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
|
|
|
int err = 0, ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retry:
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_irqsave(&dd->hash_lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
if (req)
|
|
|
|
ret = ahash_enqueue_request(&dd->hash_queue, req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(HASH_FLAGS_BUSY, &dd->hash_flags)) {
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dd->hash_lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
backlog = crypto_get_backlog(&dd->hash_queue);
|
|
|
|
async_req = crypto_dequeue_request(&dd->hash_queue);
|
|
|
|
if (async_req)
|
|
|
|
set_bit(HASH_FLAGS_BUSY, &dd->hash_flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dd->hash_lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!async_req)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (backlog)
|
|
|
|
backlog->complete(backlog, -EINPROGRESS);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req = ahash_request_cast(async_req);
|
|
|
|
dd->hash_req = req;
|
|
|
|
ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = s5p_hash_prepare_request(req, ctx->op_update);
|
|
|
|
if (err || !ctx->total)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dd->dev, "handling new req, op_update: %u, nbytes: %d\n",
|
|
|
|
ctx->op_update, req->nbytes);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s5p_ahash_dma_init(dd, SSS_HASHIN_INDEPENDENT);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->digcnt)
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_write_iv(req); /* restore hash IV */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->op_update) { /* HASH_OP_UPDATE */
|
|
|
|
err = s5p_hash_xmit_dma(dd, ctx->total, ctx->finup);
|
|
|
|
if (err != -EINPROGRESS && ctx->finup && !ctx->error)
|
|
|
|
/* no final() after finup() */
|
|
|
|
err = s5p_hash_xmit_dma(dd, ctx->total, true);
|
|
|
|
} else { /* HASH_OP_FINAL */
|
|
|
|
err = s5p_hash_xmit_dma(dd, ctx->total, true);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
if (err != -EINPROGRESS) {
|
|
|
|
/* hash_tasklet_cb will not finish it, so do it here */
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_finish_req(req, err);
|
|
|
|
req = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Execute next request immediately if there is anything
|
|
|
|
* in queue.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_tasklet_cb() - hash tasklet
|
|
|
|
* @data: ptr to s5p_aes_dev
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_tasklet_cb(unsigned long data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev *dd = (struct s5p_aes_dev *)data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(HASH_FLAGS_BUSY, &dd->hash_flags)) {
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_handle_queue(dd, NULL);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(HASH_FLAGS_DMA_READY, &dd->hash_flags)) {
|
|
|
|
if (test_and_clear_bit(HASH_FLAGS_DMA_ACTIVE,
|
|
|
|
&dd->hash_flags)) {
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_update_dma_stop(dd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_and_clear_bit(HASH_FLAGS_OUTPUT_READY,
|
|
|
|
&dd->hash_flags)) {
|
|
|
|
/* hash or semi-hash ready */
|
|
|
|
clear_bit(HASH_FLAGS_DMA_READY, &dd->hash_flags);
|
2017-11-10 04:26:04 +07:00
|
|
|
goto finish;
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
finish:
|
|
|
|
/* finish curent request */
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_finish_req(dd->hash_req, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we are not busy, process next req */
|
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(HASH_FLAGS_BUSY, &dd->hash_flags))
|
|
|
|
s5p_hash_handle_queue(dd, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_enqueue() - enqueue request
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
* @op: operation UPDATE (true) or FINAL (false)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns: see s5p_hash_final below.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_enqueue(struct ahash_request *req, bool op)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req->base.tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->op_update = op;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return s5p_hash_handle_queue(tctx->dd, req);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_update() - process the hash input data
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If request will fit in buffer, copy it and return immediately
|
|
|
|
* else enqueue it with OP_UPDATE.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns: see s5p_hash_final below.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_update(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!req->nbytes)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->bufcnt + req->nbytes <= BUFLEN) {
|
|
|
|
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ctx->buffer + ctx->bufcnt, req->src,
|
|
|
|
0, req->nbytes, 0);
|
|
|
|
ctx->bufcnt += req->nbytes;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return s5p_hash_enqueue(req, true); /* HASH_OP_UPDATE */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_shash_digest() - calculate shash digest
|
|
|
|
* @tfm: crypto transformation
|
|
|
|
* @flags: tfm flags
|
|
|
|
* @data: input data
|
|
|
|
* @len: length of data
|
|
|
|
* @out: output buffer
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_shash_digest(struct crypto_shash *tfm, u32 flags,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *data, unsigned int len, u8 *out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
shash->tfm = tfm;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return crypto_shash_digest(shash, data, len, out);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_final_shash() - calculate shash digest
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_final_shash(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req->base.tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return s5p_hash_shash_digest(tctx->fallback, req->base.flags,
|
|
|
|
ctx->buffer, ctx->bufcnt, req->result);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_final() - close up hash and calculate digest
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: in final req->src do not have any data, and req->nbytes can be
|
|
|
|
* non-zero.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If there were no input data processed yet and the buffered hash data is
|
|
|
|
* less than BUFLEN (64) then calculate the final hash immediately by using
|
|
|
|
* SW algorithm fallback.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Otherwise enqueues the current AHASH request with OP_FINAL operation op
|
|
|
|
* and finalize hash message in HW. Note that if digcnt!=0 then there were
|
|
|
|
* previous update op, so there are always some buffered bytes in ctx->buffer,
|
|
|
|
* which means that ctx->bufcnt!=0
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns:
|
|
|
|
* 0 if the request has been processed immediately,
|
|
|
|
* -EINPROGRESS if the operation has been queued for later execution or is set
|
|
|
|
* to processing by HW,
|
|
|
|
* -EBUSY if queue is full and request should be resubmitted later,
|
|
|
|
* other negative values denotes an error.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_final(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->finup = true;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->error)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL; /* uncompleted hash is not needed */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->digcnt && ctx->bufcnt < BUFLEN)
|
|
|
|
return s5p_hash_final_shash(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return s5p_hash_enqueue(req, false); /* HASH_OP_FINAL */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_finup() - process last req->src and calculate digest
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request containing the last update data
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return values: see s5p_hash_final above.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_finup(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
int err1, err2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->finup = true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err1 = s5p_hash_update(req);
|
|
|
|
if (err1 == -EINPROGRESS || err1 == -EBUSY)
|
|
|
|
return err1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* final() has to be always called to cleanup resources even if
|
|
|
|
* update() failed, except EINPROGRESS or calculate digest for small
|
|
|
|
* size
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
err2 = s5p_hash_final(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err1 ?: err2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_init() - initialize AHASH request contex
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Init async hash request context.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_init(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->dd = tctx->dd;
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = false;
|
|
|
|
ctx->finup = false;
|
|
|
|
ctx->bufcnt = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->digcnt = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->total = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->skip = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(tctx->dd->dev, "init: digest size: %d\n",
|
|
|
|
crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm)) {
|
|
|
|
case MD5_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
|
|
ctx->engine = SSS_HASH_ENGINE_MD5;
|
|
|
|
ctx->nregs = HASH_MD5_MAX_REG;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
|
|
ctx->engine = SSS_HASH_ENGINE_SHA1;
|
|
|
|
ctx->nregs = HASH_SHA1_MAX_REG;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
|
|
ctx->engine = SSS_HASH_ENGINE_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
ctx->nregs = HASH_SHA256_MAX_REG;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = true;
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_digest - calculate digest from req->src
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return values: see s5p_hash_final above.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return s5p_hash_init(req) ?: s5p_hash_finup(req);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_cra_init_alg - init crypto alg transformation
|
|
|
|
* @tfm: crypto transformation
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_cra_init_alg(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
const char *alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tctx->dd = s5p_dev;
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate a fallback and abort if it failed. */
|
|
|
|
tctx->fallback = crypto_alloc_shash(alg_name, 0,
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tctx->fallback)) {
|
|
|
|
pr_err("fallback alloc fails for '%s'\n", alg_name);
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(tctx->fallback);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_ahash_set_reqsize(__crypto_ahash_cast(tfm),
|
|
|
|
sizeof(struct s5p_hash_reqctx) + BUFLEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_cra_init - init crypto tfm
|
|
|
|
* @tfm: crypto transformation
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return s5p_hash_cra_init_alg(tfm);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_cra_exit - exit crypto tfm
|
|
|
|
* @tfm: crypto transformation
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* free allocated fallback
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_hash_cra_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_shash(tctx->fallback);
|
|
|
|
tctx->fallback = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_export - export hash state
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
* @out: buffer for exported state
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_export(struct ahash_request *req, void *out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
const struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(out, ctx, sizeof(*ctx) + ctx->bufcnt);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* s5p_hash_import - import hash state
|
|
|
|
* @req: AHASH request
|
|
|
|
* @in: buffer with state to be imported from
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_hash_import(struct ahash_request *req, const void *in)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_hash_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
const struct s5p_hash_reqctx *ctx_in = in;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ctx, in, sizeof(*ctx) + BUFLEN);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx_in->bufcnt > BUFLEN) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = true;
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->dd = tctx->dd;
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct ahash_alg algs_sha1_md5_sha256[] = {
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.init = s5p_hash_init,
|
|
|
|
.update = s5p_hash_update,
|
|
|
|
.final = s5p_hash_final,
|
|
|
|
.finup = s5p_hash_finup,
|
|
|
|
.digest = s5p_hash_digest,
|
|
|
|
.export = s5p_hash_export,
|
|
|
|
.import = s5p_hash_import,
|
|
|
|
.halg.statesize = sizeof(struct s5p_hash_reqctx) + BUFLEN,
|
|
|
|
.halg.digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.halg.base = {
|
|
|
|
.cra_name = "sha1",
|
|
|
|
.cra_driver_name = "exynos-sha1",
|
|
|
|
.cra_priority = 100,
|
2018-07-01 05:16:12 +07:00
|
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
|
|
.cra_blocksize = HASH_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s5p_hash_ctx),
|
|
|
|
.cra_alignmask = SSS_HASH_DMA_ALIGN_MASK,
|
|
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
.cra_init = s5p_hash_cra_init,
|
|
|
|
.cra_exit = s5p_hash_cra_exit,
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.init = s5p_hash_init,
|
|
|
|
.update = s5p_hash_update,
|
|
|
|
.final = s5p_hash_final,
|
|
|
|
.finup = s5p_hash_finup,
|
|
|
|
.digest = s5p_hash_digest,
|
|
|
|
.export = s5p_hash_export,
|
|
|
|
.import = s5p_hash_import,
|
|
|
|
.halg.statesize = sizeof(struct s5p_hash_reqctx) + BUFLEN,
|
|
|
|
.halg.digestsize = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.halg.base = {
|
|
|
|
.cra_name = "md5",
|
|
|
|
.cra_driver_name = "exynos-md5",
|
|
|
|
.cra_priority = 100,
|
2018-07-01 05:16:12 +07:00
|
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
|
|
.cra_blocksize = HASH_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s5p_hash_ctx),
|
|
|
|
.cra_alignmask = SSS_HASH_DMA_ALIGN_MASK,
|
|
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
.cra_init = s5p_hash_cra_init,
|
|
|
|
.cra_exit = s5p_hash_cra_exit,
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.init = s5p_hash_init,
|
|
|
|
.update = s5p_hash_update,
|
|
|
|
.final = s5p_hash_final,
|
|
|
|
.finup = s5p_hash_finup,
|
|
|
|
.digest = s5p_hash_digest,
|
|
|
|
.export = s5p_hash_export,
|
|
|
|
.import = s5p_hash_import,
|
|
|
|
.halg.statesize = sizeof(struct s5p_hash_reqctx) + BUFLEN,
|
|
|
|
.halg.digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.halg.base = {
|
|
|
|
.cra_name = "sha256",
|
|
|
|
.cra_driver_name = "exynos-sha256",
|
|
|
|
.cra_priority = 100,
|
2018-07-01 05:16:12 +07:00
|
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
|
|
.cra_blocksize = HASH_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s5p_hash_ctx),
|
|
|
|
.cra_alignmask = SSS_HASH_DMA_ALIGN_MASK,
|
|
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
.cra_init = s5p_hash_cra_init,
|
|
|
|
.cra_exit = s5p_hash_cra_exit,
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
static void s5p_set_aes(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev,
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
const u8 *key, const u8 *iv, const u8 *ctr,
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
void __iomem *keystart;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
if (iv)
|
2019-02-19 19:01:03 +07:00
|
|
|
memcpy_toio(dev->aes_ioaddr + SSS_REG_AES_IV_DATA(0), iv,
|
|
|
|
AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
if (ctr)
|
2019-02-19 19:01:03 +07:00
|
|
|
memcpy_toio(dev->aes_ioaddr + SSS_REG_AES_CNT_DATA(0), ctr,
|
|
|
|
AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
if (keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_256)
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
keystart = dev->aes_ioaddr + SSS_REG_AES_KEY_DATA(0);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
else if (keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_192)
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
keystart = dev->aes_ioaddr + SSS_REG_AES_KEY_DATA(2);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
else
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
keystart = dev->aes_ioaddr + SSS_REG_AES_KEY_DATA(4);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-01-11 18:45:51 +07:00
|
|
|
memcpy_toio(keystart, key, keylen);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
static bool s5p_is_sg_aligned(struct scatterlist *sg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
while (sg) {
|
2016-04-26 14:29:26 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED(sg->length, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
sg = sg_next(sg);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_set_indata_start(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev,
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req)
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev->sg_src_cpy = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sg = req->src;
|
|
|
|
if (!s5p_is_sg_aligned(sg)) {
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev->dev,
|
|
|
|
"At least one unaligned source scatter list, making a copy\n");
|
|
|
|
err = s5p_make_sg_cpy(dev, sg, &dev->sg_src_cpy);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sg = dev->sg_src_cpy;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = s5p_set_indata(dev, sg);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
s5p_free_sg_cpy(dev, &dev->sg_src_cpy);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_set_outdata_start(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev,
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req)
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev->sg_dst_cpy = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sg = req->dst;
|
|
|
|
if (!s5p_is_sg_aligned(sg)) {
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev->dev,
|
|
|
|
"At least one unaligned dest scatter list, making a copy\n");
|
|
|
|
err = s5p_make_sg_cpy(dev, sg, &dev->sg_dst_cpy);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sg = dev->sg_dst_cpy;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = s5p_set_outdata(dev, sg);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
s5p_free_sg_cpy(dev, &dev->sg_dst_cpy);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
static void s5p_aes_crypt_start(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev, unsigned long mode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req = dev->req;
|
2018-09-17 22:09:29 +07:00
|
|
|
u32 aes_control;
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
u8 *iv, *ctr;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
/* This sets bit [13:12] to 00, which selects 128-bit counter */
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
aes_control = SSS_AES_KEY_CHANGE_MODE;
|
|
|
|
if (mode & FLAGS_AES_DECRYPT)
|
|
|
|
aes_control |= SSS_AES_MODE_DECRYPT;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-07 22:52:09 +07:00
|
|
|
if ((mode & FLAGS_AES_MODE_MASK) == FLAGS_AES_CBC) {
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
aes_control |= SSS_AES_CHAIN_MODE_CBC;
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
iv = req->iv;
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
ctr = NULL;
|
2018-02-07 22:52:09 +07:00
|
|
|
} else if ((mode & FLAGS_AES_MODE_MASK) == FLAGS_AES_CTR) {
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
aes_control |= SSS_AES_CHAIN_MODE_CTR;
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
iv = NULL;
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
ctr = req->iv;
|
2018-02-07 22:52:09 +07:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
iv = NULL; /* AES_ECB */
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
ctr = NULL;
|
2018-02-07 22:52:09 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dev->ctx->keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_192)
|
|
|
|
aes_control |= SSS_AES_KEY_SIZE_192;
|
|
|
|
else if (dev->ctx->keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_256)
|
|
|
|
aes_control |= SSS_AES_KEY_SIZE_256;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
aes_control |= SSS_AES_FIFO_MODE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* as a variant it is possible to use byte swapping on DMA side */
|
|
|
|
aes_control |= SSS_AES_BYTESWAP_DI
|
|
|
|
| SSS_AES_BYTESWAP_DO
|
|
|
|
| SSS_AES_BYTESWAP_IV
|
|
|
|
| SSS_AES_BYTESWAP_KEY
|
|
|
|
| SSS_AES_BYTESWAP_CNT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCINTENCLR,
|
|
|
|
SSS_FCINTENCLR_BTDMAINTENCLR | SSS_FCINTENCLR_BRDMAINTENCLR);
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCFIFOCTRL, 0x00);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
err = s5p_set_indata_start(dev, req);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto indata_error;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
err = s5p_set_outdata_start(dev, req);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto outdata_error;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
SSS_AES_WRITE(dev, AES_CONTROL, aes_control);
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
s5p_set_aes(dev, dev->ctx->aes_key, iv, ctr, dev->ctx->keylen);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 08:58:24 +07:00
|
|
|
s5p_set_dma_indata(dev, dev->sg_src);
|
|
|
|
s5p_set_dma_outdata(dev, dev->sg_dst);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSS_WRITE(dev, FCINTENSET,
|
|
|
|
SSS_FCINTENSET_BTDMAINTENSET | SSS_FCINTENSET_BRDMAINTENSET);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 08:58:23 +07:00
|
|
|
outdata_error:
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
s5p_unset_indata(dev);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 08:58:23 +07:00
|
|
|
indata_error:
|
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix spinlock recursion on LRW(AES)
Running TCRYPT with LRW compiled causes spinlock recursion:
testing speed of async lrw(aes) (lrw(ecb-aes-s5p)) encryption
tcrypt: test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 19007 operations in 1 seconds (304112 bytes)
tcrypt: test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 15753 operations in 1 seconds (1008192 bytes)
tcrypt: test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 14293 operations in 1 seconds (3659008 bytes)
tcrypt: test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 11906 operations in 1 seconds (12191744 bytes)
tcrypt: test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks):
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#1, irq/84-10830000/89
lock: 0xeea99a68, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: irq/84-10830000/89, .owner_cpu: 1
CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: irq/84-10830000 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00001-g897ca6d0800d #559
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c010e1ec>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010ae1c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010ae1c>] (show_stack) from [<c03449c0>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03449c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120)
[<c015de68>] (do_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x28)
[<c0720110>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt+0x2c/0xb4)
[<c0572ca0>] (s5p_aes_crypt) from [<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt+0x78/0xb0 [lrw])
[<bf1d8aa4>] (do_encrypt [lrw]) from [<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done+0x24/0x54 [lrw])
[<bf1d8b00>] (encrypt_done [lrw]) from [<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete+0x60/0xcc)
[<c05732a0>] (s5p_aes_complete) from [<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt+0x134/0x1a0)
[<c0573440>] (s5p_aes_interrupt) from [<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x54)
[<c01667c4>] (irq_thread_fn) from [<c0166a98>] (irq_thread+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c0166a98>] (irq_thread) from [<c0136a28>] (kthread+0x108/0x138)
[<c0136a28>] (kthread) from [<c0107778>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Interrupt handling routine was calling req->base.complete() under
spinlock. In most cases this wasn't fatal but when combined with some
of the cipher modes (like LRW) this caused recursion - starting the new
encryption (s5p_aes_crypt()) while still holding the spinlock from
previous round (s5p_aes_complete()).
Beside that, the s5p_aes_interrupt() error handling path could execute
two completions in case of error for RX and TX blocks.
Rewrite the interrupt handling routine and the completion by:
1. Splitting the operations on scatterlist copies from
s5p_aes_complete() into separate s5p_sg_done(). This still should be
done under lock.
The s5p_aes_complete() now only calls req->base.complete() and it has
to be called outside of lock.
2. Moving the s5p_aes_complete() out of spinlock critical sections.
In interrupt service routine s5p_aes_interrupts(), it appeared in few
places, including error paths inside other functions called from ISR.
This code was not so obvious to read so simplify it by putting the
s5p_aes_complete() only within ISR level.
Reported-by: Nathan Royce <nroycea+kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x: 07de4bc88c crypto: s5p-sss - Fix completing
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-03-09 04:14:20 +07:00
|
|
|
s5p_sg_done(dev);
|
2017-03-17 21:49:19 +07:00
|
|
|
dev->busy = false;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
|
2018-09-17 22:09:27 +07:00
|
|
|
s5p_aes_complete(req, err);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void s5p_tasklet_cb(unsigned long data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev *dev = (struct s5p_aes_dev *)data;
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_async_request *async_req, *backlog;
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_reqctx *reqctx;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
backlog = crypto_get_backlog(&dev->queue);
|
|
|
|
async_req = crypto_dequeue_request(&dev->queue);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!async_req) {
|
|
|
|
dev->busy = false;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2014-05-08 20:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (backlog)
|
|
|
|
backlog->complete(backlog, -EINPROGRESS);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
dev->req = skcipher_request_cast(async_req);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
dev->ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(dev->req->base.tfm);
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
reqctx = skcipher_request_ctx(dev->req);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s5p_aes_crypt_start(dev, reqctx->mode);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_handle_req(struct s5p_aes_dev *dev,
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
err = crypto_enqueue_request(&dev->queue, &req->base);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
if (dev->busy) {
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
|
2018-09-17 22:09:29 +07:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dev->busy = true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tasklet_schedule(&dev->tasklet);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long mode)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_reqctx *reqctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev *dev = ctx->dev;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!req->cryptlen)
|
2019-08-19 21:22:25 +07:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED(req->cryptlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) &&
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
((mode & FLAGS_AES_MODE_MASK) != FLAGS_AES_CTR)) {
|
2019-08-19 21:22:25 +07:00
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev->dev, "request size is not exact amount of AES blocks\n");
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reqctx->mode = mode;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return s5p_aes_handle_req(dev, req);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *cipher,
|
2018-09-17 22:09:29 +07:00
|
|
|
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_skcipher_tfm(cipher);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
|
|
|
|
keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
|
|
|
|
keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ctx->aes_key, key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
ctx->keylen = keylen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_ecb_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return s5p_aes_crypt(req, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return s5p_aes_crypt(req, FLAGS_AES_DECRYPT);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return s5p_aes_crypt(req, FLAGS_AES_CBC);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return s5p_aes_crypt(req, FLAGS_AES_DECRYPT | FLAGS_AES_CBC);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_ctr_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return s5p_aes_crypt(req, FLAGS_AES_CTR);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->dev = s5p_dev;
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct s5p_aes_reqctx));
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.base.cra_name = "ecb(aes)",
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-aes-s5p",
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_priority = 100,
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
2011-11-01 19:39:56 +07:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s5p_aes_ctx),
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_alignmask = 0x0f,
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.setkey = s5p_aes_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = s5p_aes_ecb_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = s5p_aes_ecb_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = s5p_aes_init_tfm,
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.base.cra_name = "cbc(aes)",
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-aes-s5p",
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_priority = 100,
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
2011-11-01 19:39:56 +07:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s5p_aes_ctx),
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_alignmask = 0x0f,
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.setkey = s5p_aes_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = s5p_aes_cbc_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = s5p_aes_cbc_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = s5p_aes_init_tfm,
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.base.cra_name = "ctr(aes)",
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_driver_name = "ctr-aes-s5p",
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_priority = 100,
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.base.cra_blocksize = 1,
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s5p_aes_ctx),
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_alignmask = 0x0f,
|
|
|
|
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.setkey = s5p_aes_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = s5p_aes_ctr_crypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = s5p_aes_ctr_crypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = s5p_aes_init_tfm,
|
2018-09-17 22:09:30 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
|
|
|
|
int i, j, err = -ENODEV;
|
2018-03-02 03:50:13 +07:00
|
|
|
const struct samsung_aes_variant *variant;
|
2016-05-27 18:49:40 +07:00
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev *pdata;
|
|
|
|
struct resource *res;
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int hash_i;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s5p_dev)
|
|
|
|
return -EEXIST;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pdata = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*pdata), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!pdata)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
variant = find_s5p_sss_version(pdev);
|
2014-02-12 11:24:57 +07:00
|
|
|
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Note: HASH and PRNG uses the same registers in secss, avoid
|
|
|
|
* overwrite each other. This will drop HASH when CONFIG_EXYNOS_RNG
|
|
|
|
* is enabled in config. We need larger size for HASH registers in
|
|
|
|
* secss, current describe only AES/DES
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_EXYNOS_HASH)) {
|
|
|
|
if (variant == &exynos_aes_data) {
|
|
|
|
res->end += 0x300;
|
|
|
|
pdata->use_hash = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pdata->res = res;
|
|
|
|
pdata->ioaddr = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, res);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(pdata->ioaddr)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!pdata->use_hash)
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(pdata->ioaddr);
|
|
|
|
/* try AES without HASH */
|
|
|
|
res->end -= 0x300;
|
|
|
|
pdata->use_hash = false;
|
|
|
|
pdata->ioaddr = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, res);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(pdata->ioaddr))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(pdata->ioaddr);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-22 19:21:44 +07:00
|
|
|
pdata->clk = devm_clk_get(dev, variant->clk_names[0]);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(pdata->clk)) {
|
2019-02-22 19:21:44 +07:00
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "failed to find secss clock %s\n",
|
|
|
|
variant->clk_names[0]);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
return -ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
err = clk_prepare_enable(pdata->clk);
|
|
|
|
if (err < 0) {
|
2019-02-22 19:21:44 +07:00
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "Enabling clock %s failed, err %d\n",
|
|
|
|
variant->clk_names[0], err);
|
2014-05-08 20:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-22 19:21:44 +07:00
|
|
|
if (variant->clk_names[1]) {
|
|
|
|
pdata->pclk = devm_clk_get(dev, variant->clk_names[1]);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(pdata->pclk)) {
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "failed to find clock %s\n",
|
|
|
|
variant->clk_names[1]);
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
goto err_clk;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = clk_prepare_enable(pdata->pclk);
|
|
|
|
if (err < 0) {
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "Enabling clock %s failed, err %d\n",
|
|
|
|
variant->clk_names[0], err);
|
|
|
|
goto err_clk;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
pdata->pclk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
spin_lock_init(&pdata->lock);
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
spin_lock_init(&pdata->hash_lock);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
pdata->aes_ioaddr = pdata->ioaddr + variant->aes_offset;
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
pdata->io_hash_base = pdata->ioaddr + variant->hash_offset;
|
2014-05-08 20:58:14 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:12 +07:00
|
|
|
pdata->irq_fc = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (pdata->irq_fc < 0) {
|
|
|
|
err = pdata->irq_fc;
|
|
|
|
dev_warn(dev, "feed control interrupt is not available.\n");
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
goto err_irq;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-03-06 00:14:07 +07:00
|
|
|
err = devm_request_threaded_irq(dev, pdata->irq_fc, NULL,
|
|
|
|
s5p_aes_interrupt, IRQF_ONESHOT,
|
|
|
|
pdev->name, pdev);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
if (err < 0) {
|
2014-05-08 20:58:12 +07:00
|
|
|
dev_warn(dev, "feed control interrupt is not available.\n");
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
goto err_irq;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-08 20:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
pdata->busy = false;
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
pdata->dev = dev;
|
|
|
|
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, pdata);
|
|
|
|
s5p_dev = pdata;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tasklet_init(&pdata->tasklet, s5p_tasklet_cb, (unsigned long)pdata);
|
|
|
|
crypto_init_queue(&pdata->queue, CRYPTO_QUEUE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(algs); i++) {
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
err = crypto_register_skcipher(&algs[i]);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto err_algs;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
if (pdata->use_hash) {
|
|
|
|
tasklet_init(&pdata->hash_tasklet, s5p_hash_tasklet_cb,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long)pdata);
|
|
|
|
crypto_init_queue(&pdata->hash_queue, SSS_HASH_QUEUE_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (hash_i = 0; hash_i < ARRAY_SIZE(algs_sha1_md5_sha256);
|
|
|
|
hash_i++) {
|
|
|
|
struct ahash_alg *alg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
alg = &algs_sha1_md5_sha256[hash_i];
|
|
|
|
err = crypto_register_ahash(alg);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "can't register '%s': %d\n",
|
|
|
|
alg->halg.base.cra_driver_name, err);
|
|
|
|
goto err_hash;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-11 18:45:50 +07:00
|
|
|
dev_info(dev, "s5p-sss driver registered\n");
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
err_hash:
|
|
|
|
for (j = hash_i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
|
|
|
|
crypto_unregister_ahash(&algs_sha1_md5_sha256[j]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tasklet_kill(&pdata->hash_tasklet);
|
|
|
|
res->end -= 0x300;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 08:58:23 +07:00
|
|
|
err_algs:
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
if (i < ARRAY_SIZE(algs))
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "can't register '%s': %d\n", algs[i].base.cra_name,
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
err);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
crypto_unregister_skcipher(&algs[j]);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tasklet_kill(&pdata->tasklet);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 08:58:23 +07:00
|
|
|
err_irq:
|
2019-02-22 19:21:44 +07:00
|
|
|
if (pdata->pclk)
|
|
|
|
clk_disable_unprepare(pdata->pclk);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-22 19:21:44 +07:00
|
|
|
err_clk:
|
|
|
|
clk_disable_unprepare(pdata->clk);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
s5p_dev = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int s5p_aes_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct s5p_aes_dev *pdata = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!pdata)
|
|
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(algs); i++)
|
2019-11-10 00:09:32 +07:00
|
|
|
crypto_unregister_skcipher(&algs[i]);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tasklet_kill(&pdata->tasklet);
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
if (pdata->use_hash) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = ARRAY_SIZE(algs_sha1_md5_sha256) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
|
|
|
|
crypto_unregister_ahash(&algs_sha1_md5_sha256[i]);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
pdata->res->end -= 0x300;
|
|
|
|
tasklet_kill(&pdata->hash_tasklet);
|
|
|
|
pdata->use_hash = false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-22 19:21:44 +07:00
|
|
|
if (pdata->pclk)
|
|
|
|
clk_disable_unprepare(pdata->pclk);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
clk_disable_unprepare(pdata->clk);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
s5p_dev = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct platform_driver s5p_aes_crypto = {
|
|
|
|
.probe = s5p_aes_probe,
|
|
|
|
.remove = s5p_aes_remove,
|
|
|
|
.driver = {
|
|
|
|
.name = "s5p-secss",
|
2014-05-08 20:58:13 +07:00
|
|
|
.of_match_table = s5p_sss_dt_match,
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2011-11-26 20:26:19 +07:00
|
|
|
module_platform_driver(s5p_aes_crypto);
|
2011-04-08 19:40:51 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("S5PV210 AES hw acceleration support.");
|
|
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
|
|
|
|
MODULE_AUTHOR("Vladimir Zapolskiy <vzapolskiy@gmail.com>");
|
2017-10-25 22:27:35 +07:00
|
|
|
MODULE_AUTHOR("Kamil Konieczny <k.konieczny@partner.samsung.com>");
|