linux_dsm_epyc7002/include/asm-generic/futex.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 21:07:57 +07:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _ASM_GENERIC_FUTEX_H
#define _ASM_GENERIC_FUTEX_H
#include <linux/futex.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/errno.h>
#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* The following implementation only for uniprocessor machines.
* It relies on preempt_disable() ensuring mutual exclusion.
*
*/
/**
futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour There is code duplicated over all architecture's headers for futex_atomic_op_inuser. Namely op decoding, access_ok check for uaddr, and comparison of the result. Remove this duplication and leave up to the arches only the needed assembly which is now in arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser. This effectively distributes the Will Deacon's arm64 fix for undefined behaviour reported by UBSAN to all architectures. The fix was done in commit 5f16a046f8e1 (arm64: futex: Fix undefined behaviour with FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT usage). Look there for an example dump. And as suggested by Thomas, check for negative oparg too, because it was also reported to cause undefined behaviour report. Note that s390 removed access_ok check in d12a29703 ("s390/uaccess: remove pointless access_ok() checks") as access_ok there returns true. We introduce it back to the helper for the sake of simplicity (it gets optimized away anyway). Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> [s390] Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> [for tile] Reviewed-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> [core/arm64] Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170824073105.3901-1-jslaby@suse.cz
2017-08-24 14:31:05 +07:00
* arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() - Atomic arithmetic operation with constant
* argument and comparison of the previous
* futex value with another constant.
*
* @encoded_op: encoded operation to execute
* @uaddr: pointer to user space address
*
* Return:
* 0 - On success
* -EFAULT - User access resulted in a page fault
* -EAGAIN - Atomic operation was unable to complete due to contention
* -ENOSYS - Operation not supported
*/
static inline int
futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour There is code duplicated over all architecture's headers for futex_atomic_op_inuser. Namely op decoding, access_ok check for uaddr, and comparison of the result. Remove this duplication and leave up to the arches only the needed assembly which is now in arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser. This effectively distributes the Will Deacon's arm64 fix for undefined behaviour reported by UBSAN to all architectures. The fix was done in commit 5f16a046f8e1 (arm64: futex: Fix undefined behaviour with FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT usage). Look there for an example dump. And as suggested by Thomas, check for negative oparg too, because it was also reported to cause undefined behaviour report. Note that s390 removed access_ok check in d12a29703 ("s390/uaccess: remove pointless access_ok() checks") as access_ok there returns true. We introduce it back to the helper for the sake of simplicity (it gets optimized away anyway). Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> [s390] Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> [for tile] Reviewed-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> [core/arm64] Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170824073105.3901-1-jslaby@suse.cz
2017-08-24 14:31:05 +07:00
arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser(int op, u32 oparg, int *oval, u32 __user *uaddr)
{
int oldval, ret;
u32 tmp;
preempt_disable();
pagefault_disable();
ret = -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(get_user(oldval, uaddr) != 0))
goto out_pagefault_enable;
ret = 0;
tmp = oldval;
switch (op) {
case FUTEX_OP_SET:
tmp = oparg;
break;
case FUTEX_OP_ADD:
tmp += oparg;
break;
case FUTEX_OP_OR:
tmp |= oparg;
break;
case FUTEX_OP_ANDN:
tmp &= ~oparg;
break;
case FUTEX_OP_XOR:
tmp ^= oparg;
break;
default:
ret = -ENOSYS;
}
if (ret == 0 && unlikely(put_user(tmp, uaddr) != 0))
ret = -EFAULT;
out_pagefault_enable:
pagefault_enable();
preempt_enable();
futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour There is code duplicated over all architecture's headers for futex_atomic_op_inuser. Namely op decoding, access_ok check for uaddr, and comparison of the result. Remove this duplication and leave up to the arches only the needed assembly which is now in arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser. This effectively distributes the Will Deacon's arm64 fix for undefined behaviour reported by UBSAN to all architectures. The fix was done in commit 5f16a046f8e1 (arm64: futex: Fix undefined behaviour with FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT usage). Look there for an example dump. And as suggested by Thomas, check for negative oparg too, because it was also reported to cause undefined behaviour report. Note that s390 removed access_ok check in d12a29703 ("s390/uaccess: remove pointless access_ok() checks") as access_ok there returns true. We introduce it back to the helper for the sake of simplicity (it gets optimized away anyway). Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> [s390] Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> [for tile] Reviewed-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> [core/arm64] Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170824073105.3901-1-jslaby@suse.cz
2017-08-24 14:31:05 +07:00
if (ret == 0)
*oval = oldval;
return ret;
}
/**
* futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() - Compare and exchange the content of the
* uaddr with newval if the current value is
* oldval.
* @uval: pointer to store content of @uaddr
* @uaddr: pointer to user space address
* @oldval: old value
* @newval: new value to store to @uaddr
*
* Return:
* 0 - On success
* -EFAULT - User access resulted in a page fault
* -EAGAIN - Atomic operation was unable to complete due to contention
* -ENOSYS - Function not implemented (only if !HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG)
*/
static inline int
futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval, u32 __user *uaddr,
u32 oldval, u32 newval)
{
u32 val;
preempt_disable();
if (unlikely(get_user(val, uaddr) != 0)) {
preempt_enable();
return -EFAULT;
}
if (val == oldval && unlikely(put_user(newval, uaddr) != 0)) {
preempt_enable();
return -EFAULT;
}
*uval = val;
preempt_enable();
return 0;
}
#else
static inline int
futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour There is code duplicated over all architecture's headers for futex_atomic_op_inuser. Namely op decoding, access_ok check for uaddr, and comparison of the result. Remove this duplication and leave up to the arches only the needed assembly which is now in arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser. This effectively distributes the Will Deacon's arm64 fix for undefined behaviour reported by UBSAN to all architectures. The fix was done in commit 5f16a046f8e1 (arm64: futex: Fix undefined behaviour with FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT usage). Look there for an example dump. And as suggested by Thomas, check for negative oparg too, because it was also reported to cause undefined behaviour report. Note that s390 removed access_ok check in d12a29703 ("s390/uaccess: remove pointless access_ok() checks") as access_ok there returns true. We introduce it back to the helper for the sake of simplicity (it gets optimized away anyway). Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> [s390] Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> [for tile] Reviewed-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> [core/arm64] Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170824073105.3901-1-jslaby@suse.cz
2017-08-24 14:31:05 +07:00
arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser(int op, u32 oparg, int *oval, u32 __user *uaddr)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
[PATCH] lightweight robust futexes: arch defaults This patchset provides a new (written from scratch) implementation of robust futexes, called "lightweight robust futexes". We believe this new implementation is faster and simpler than the vma-based robust futex solutions presented before, and we'd like this patchset to be adopted in the upstream kernel. This is version 1 of the patchset. Background ---------- What are robust futexes? To answer that, we first need to understand what futexes are: normal futexes are special types of locks that in the noncontended case can be acquired/released from userspace without having to enter the kernel. A futex is in essence a user-space address, e.g. a 32-bit lock variable field. If userspace notices contention (the lock is already owned and someone else wants to grab it too) then the lock is marked with a value that says "there's a waiter pending", and the sys_futex(FUTEX_WAIT) syscall is used to wait for the other guy to release it. The kernel creates a 'futex queue' internally, so that it can later on match up the waiter with the waker - without them having to know about each other. When the owner thread releases the futex, it notices (via the variable value) that there were waiter(s) pending, and does the sys_futex(FUTEX_WAKE) syscall to wake them up. Once all waiters have taken and released the lock, the futex is again back to 'uncontended' state, and there's no in-kernel state associated with it. The kernel completely forgets that there ever was a futex at that address. This method makes futexes very lightweight and scalable. "Robustness" is about dealing with crashes while holding a lock: if a process exits prematurely while holding a pthread_mutex_t lock that is also shared with some other process (e.g. yum segfaults while holding a pthread_mutex_t, or yum is kill -9-ed), then waiters for that lock need to be notified that the last owner of the lock exited in some irregular way. To solve such types of problems, "robust mutex" userspace APIs were created: pthread_mutex_lock() returns an error value if the owner exits prematurely - and the new owner can decide whether the data protected by the lock can be recovered safely. There is a big conceptual problem with futex based mutexes though: it is the kernel that destroys the owner task (e.g. due to a SEGFAULT), but the kernel cannot help with the cleanup: if there is no 'futex queue' (and in most cases there is none, futexes being fast lightweight locks) then the kernel has no information to clean up after the held lock! Userspace has no chance to clean up after the lock either - userspace is the one that crashes, so it has no opportunity to clean up. Catch-22. In practice, when e.g. yum is kill -9-ed (or segfaults), a system reboot is needed to release that futex based lock. This is one of the leading bugreports against yum. To solve this problem, 'Robust Futex' patches were created and presented on lkml: the one written by Todd Kneisel and David Singleton is the most advanced at the moment. These patches all tried to extend the futex abstraction by registering futex-based locks in the kernel - and thus give the kernel a chance to clean up. E.g. in David Singleton's robust-futex-6.patch, there are 3 new syscall variants to sys_futex(): FUTEX_REGISTER, FUTEX_DEREGISTER and FUTEX_RECOVER. The kernel attaches such robust futexes to vmas (via vma->vm_file->f_mapping->robust_head), and at do_exit() time, all vmas are searched to see whether they have a robust_head set. Lots of work went into the vma-based robust-futex patch, and recently it has improved significantly, but unfortunately it still has two fundamental problems left: - they have quite complex locking and race scenarios. The vma-based patches had been pending for years, but they are still not completely reliable. - they have to scan _every_ vma at sys_exit() time, per thread! The second disadvantage is a real killer: pthread_exit() takes around 1 microsecond on Linux, but with thousands (or tens of thousands) of vmas every pthread_exit() takes a millisecond or more, also totally destroying the CPU's L1 and L2 caches! This is very much noticeable even for normal process sys_exit_group() calls: the kernel has to do the vma scanning unconditionally! (this is because the kernel has no knowledge about how many robust futexes there are to be cleaned up, because a robust futex might have been registered in another task, and the futex variable might have been simply mmap()-ed into this process's address space). This huge overhead forced the creation of CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST, but worse than that: the overhead makes robust futexes impractical for any type of generic Linux distribution. So it became clear to us, something had to be done. Last week, when Thomas Gleixner tried to fix up the vma-based robust futex patch in the -rt tree, he found a handful of new races and we were talking about it and were analyzing the situation. At that point a fundamentally different solution occured to me. This patchset (written in the past couple of days) implements that new solution. Be warned though - the patchset does things we normally dont do in Linux, so some might find the approach disturbing. Parental advice recommended ;-) New approach to robust futexes ------------------------------ At the heart of this new approach there is a per-thread private list of robust locks that userspace is holding (maintained by glibc) - which userspace list is registered with the kernel via a new syscall [this registration happens at most once per thread lifetime]. At do_exit() time, the kernel checks this user-space list: are there any robust futex locks to be cleaned up? In the common case, at do_exit() time, there is no list registered, so the cost of robust futexes is just a simple current->robust_list != NULL comparison. If the thread has registered a list, then normally the list is empty. If the thread/process crashed or terminated in some incorrect way then the list might be non-empty: in this case the kernel carefully walks the list [not trusting it], and marks all locks that are owned by this thread with the FUTEX_OWNER_DEAD bit, and wakes up one waiter (if any). The list is guaranteed to be private and per-thread, so it's lockless. There is one race possible though: since adding to and removing from the list is done after the futex is acquired by glibc, there is a few instructions window for the thread (or process) to die there, leaving the futex hung. To protect against this possibility, userspace (glibc) also maintains a simple per-thread 'list_op_pending' field, to allow the kernel to clean up if the thread dies after acquiring the lock, but just before it could have added itself to the list. Glibc sets this list_op_pending field before it tries to acquire the futex, and clears it after the list-add (or list-remove) has finished. That's all that is needed - all the rest of robust-futex cleanup is done in userspace [just like with the previous patches]. Ulrich Drepper has implemented the necessary glibc support for this new mechanism, which fully enables robust mutexes. (Ulrich plans to commit these changes to glibc-HEAD later today.) Key differences of this userspace-list based approach, compared to the vma based method: - it's much, much faster: at thread exit time, there's no need to loop over every vma (!), which the VM-based method has to do. Only a very simple 'is the list empty' op is done. - no VM changes are needed - 'struct address_space' is left alone. - no registration of individual locks is needed: robust mutexes dont need any extra per-lock syscalls. Robust mutexes thus become a very lightweight primitive - so they dont force the application designer to do a hard choice between performance and robustness - robust mutexes are just as fast. - no per-lock kernel allocation happens. - no resource limits are needed. - no kernel-space recovery call (FUTEX_RECOVER) is needed. - the implementation and the locking is "obvious", and there are no interactions with the VM. Performance ----------- I have benchmarked the time needed for the kernel to process a list of 1 million (!) held locks, using the new method [on a 2GHz CPU]: - with FUTEX_WAIT set [contended mutex]: 130 msecs - without FUTEX_WAIT set [uncontended mutex]: 30 msecs I have also measured an approach where glibc does the lock notification [which it currently does for !pshared robust mutexes], and that took 256 msecs - clearly slower, due to the 1 million FUTEX_WAKE syscalls userspace had to do. (1 million held locks are unheard of - we expect at most a handful of locks to be held at a time. Nevertheless it's nice to know that this approach scales nicely.) Implementation details ---------------------- The patch adds two new syscalls: one to register the userspace list, and one to query the registered list pointer: asmlinkage long sys_set_robust_list(struct robust_list_head __user *head, size_t len); asmlinkage long sys_get_robust_list(int pid, struct robust_list_head __user **head_ptr, size_t __user *len_ptr); List registration is very fast: the pointer is simply stored in current->robust_list. [Note that in the future, if robust futexes become widespread, we could extend sys_clone() to register a robust-list head for new threads, without the need of another syscall.] So there is virtually zero overhead for tasks not using robust futexes, and even for robust futex users, there is only one extra syscall per thread lifetime, and the cleanup operation, if it happens, is fast and straightforward. The kernel doesnt have any internal distinction between robust and normal futexes. If a futex is found to be held at exit time, the kernel sets the highest bit of the futex word: #define FUTEX_OWNER_DIED 0x40000000 and wakes up the next futex waiter (if any). User-space does the rest of the cleanup. Otherwise, robust futexes are acquired by glibc by putting the TID into the futex field atomically. Waiters set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit: #define FUTEX_WAITERS 0x80000000 and the remaining bits are for the TID. Testing, architecture support ----------------------------- I've tested the new syscalls on x86 and x86_64, and have made sure the parsing of the userspace list is robust [ ;-) ] even if the list is deliberately corrupted. i386 and x86_64 syscalls are wired up at the moment, and Ulrich has tested the new glibc code (on x86_64 and i386), and it works for his robust-mutex testcases. All other architectures should build just fine too - but they wont have the new syscalls yet. Architectures need to implement the new futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inuser() inline function before writing up the syscalls (that function returns -ENOSYS right now). This patch: Add placeholder futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inuser() implementations to every architecture that supports futexes. It returns -ENOSYS. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Acked-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-27 16:16:21 +07:00
static inline int
futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval, u32 __user *uaddr,
u32 oldval, u32 newval)
[PATCH] lightweight robust futexes: arch defaults This patchset provides a new (written from scratch) implementation of robust futexes, called "lightweight robust futexes". We believe this new implementation is faster and simpler than the vma-based robust futex solutions presented before, and we'd like this patchset to be adopted in the upstream kernel. This is version 1 of the patchset. Background ---------- What are robust futexes? To answer that, we first need to understand what futexes are: normal futexes are special types of locks that in the noncontended case can be acquired/released from userspace without having to enter the kernel. A futex is in essence a user-space address, e.g. a 32-bit lock variable field. If userspace notices contention (the lock is already owned and someone else wants to grab it too) then the lock is marked with a value that says "there's a waiter pending", and the sys_futex(FUTEX_WAIT) syscall is used to wait for the other guy to release it. The kernel creates a 'futex queue' internally, so that it can later on match up the waiter with the waker - without them having to know about each other. When the owner thread releases the futex, it notices (via the variable value) that there were waiter(s) pending, and does the sys_futex(FUTEX_WAKE) syscall to wake them up. Once all waiters have taken and released the lock, the futex is again back to 'uncontended' state, and there's no in-kernel state associated with it. The kernel completely forgets that there ever was a futex at that address. This method makes futexes very lightweight and scalable. "Robustness" is about dealing with crashes while holding a lock: if a process exits prematurely while holding a pthread_mutex_t lock that is also shared with some other process (e.g. yum segfaults while holding a pthread_mutex_t, or yum is kill -9-ed), then waiters for that lock need to be notified that the last owner of the lock exited in some irregular way. To solve such types of problems, "robust mutex" userspace APIs were created: pthread_mutex_lock() returns an error value if the owner exits prematurely - and the new owner can decide whether the data protected by the lock can be recovered safely. There is a big conceptual problem with futex based mutexes though: it is the kernel that destroys the owner task (e.g. due to a SEGFAULT), but the kernel cannot help with the cleanup: if there is no 'futex queue' (and in most cases there is none, futexes being fast lightweight locks) then the kernel has no information to clean up after the held lock! Userspace has no chance to clean up after the lock either - userspace is the one that crashes, so it has no opportunity to clean up. Catch-22. In practice, when e.g. yum is kill -9-ed (or segfaults), a system reboot is needed to release that futex based lock. This is one of the leading bugreports against yum. To solve this problem, 'Robust Futex' patches were created and presented on lkml: the one written by Todd Kneisel and David Singleton is the most advanced at the moment. These patches all tried to extend the futex abstraction by registering futex-based locks in the kernel - and thus give the kernel a chance to clean up. E.g. in David Singleton's robust-futex-6.patch, there are 3 new syscall variants to sys_futex(): FUTEX_REGISTER, FUTEX_DEREGISTER and FUTEX_RECOVER. The kernel attaches such robust futexes to vmas (via vma->vm_file->f_mapping->robust_head), and at do_exit() time, all vmas are searched to see whether they have a robust_head set. Lots of work went into the vma-based robust-futex patch, and recently it has improved significantly, but unfortunately it still has two fundamental problems left: - they have quite complex locking and race scenarios. The vma-based patches had been pending for years, but they are still not completely reliable. - they have to scan _every_ vma at sys_exit() time, per thread! The second disadvantage is a real killer: pthread_exit() takes around 1 microsecond on Linux, but with thousands (or tens of thousands) of vmas every pthread_exit() takes a millisecond or more, also totally destroying the CPU's L1 and L2 caches! This is very much noticeable even for normal process sys_exit_group() calls: the kernel has to do the vma scanning unconditionally! (this is because the kernel has no knowledge about how many robust futexes there are to be cleaned up, because a robust futex might have been registered in another task, and the futex variable might have been simply mmap()-ed into this process's address space). This huge overhead forced the creation of CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST, but worse than that: the overhead makes robust futexes impractical for any type of generic Linux distribution. So it became clear to us, something had to be done. Last week, when Thomas Gleixner tried to fix up the vma-based robust futex patch in the -rt tree, he found a handful of new races and we were talking about it and were analyzing the situation. At that point a fundamentally different solution occured to me. This patchset (written in the past couple of days) implements that new solution. Be warned though - the patchset does things we normally dont do in Linux, so some might find the approach disturbing. Parental advice recommended ;-) New approach to robust futexes ------------------------------ At the heart of this new approach there is a per-thread private list of robust locks that userspace is holding (maintained by glibc) - which userspace list is registered with the kernel via a new syscall [this registration happens at most once per thread lifetime]. At do_exit() time, the kernel checks this user-space list: are there any robust futex locks to be cleaned up? In the common case, at do_exit() time, there is no list registered, so the cost of robust futexes is just a simple current->robust_list != NULL comparison. If the thread has registered a list, then normally the list is empty. If the thread/process crashed or terminated in some incorrect way then the list might be non-empty: in this case the kernel carefully walks the list [not trusting it], and marks all locks that are owned by this thread with the FUTEX_OWNER_DEAD bit, and wakes up one waiter (if any). The list is guaranteed to be private and per-thread, so it's lockless. There is one race possible though: since adding to and removing from the list is done after the futex is acquired by glibc, there is a few instructions window for the thread (or process) to die there, leaving the futex hung. To protect against this possibility, userspace (glibc) also maintains a simple per-thread 'list_op_pending' field, to allow the kernel to clean up if the thread dies after acquiring the lock, but just before it could have added itself to the list. Glibc sets this list_op_pending field before it tries to acquire the futex, and clears it after the list-add (or list-remove) has finished. That's all that is needed - all the rest of robust-futex cleanup is done in userspace [just like with the previous patches]. Ulrich Drepper has implemented the necessary glibc support for this new mechanism, which fully enables robust mutexes. (Ulrich plans to commit these changes to glibc-HEAD later today.) Key differences of this userspace-list based approach, compared to the vma based method: - it's much, much faster: at thread exit time, there's no need to loop over every vma (!), which the VM-based method has to do. Only a very simple 'is the list empty' op is done. - no VM changes are needed - 'struct address_space' is left alone. - no registration of individual locks is needed: robust mutexes dont need any extra per-lock syscalls. Robust mutexes thus become a very lightweight primitive - so they dont force the application designer to do a hard choice between performance and robustness - robust mutexes are just as fast. - no per-lock kernel allocation happens. - no resource limits are needed. - no kernel-space recovery call (FUTEX_RECOVER) is needed. - the implementation and the locking is "obvious", and there are no interactions with the VM. Performance ----------- I have benchmarked the time needed for the kernel to process a list of 1 million (!) held locks, using the new method [on a 2GHz CPU]: - with FUTEX_WAIT set [contended mutex]: 130 msecs - without FUTEX_WAIT set [uncontended mutex]: 30 msecs I have also measured an approach where glibc does the lock notification [which it currently does for !pshared robust mutexes], and that took 256 msecs - clearly slower, due to the 1 million FUTEX_WAKE syscalls userspace had to do. (1 million held locks are unheard of - we expect at most a handful of locks to be held at a time. Nevertheless it's nice to know that this approach scales nicely.) Implementation details ---------------------- The patch adds two new syscalls: one to register the userspace list, and one to query the registered list pointer: asmlinkage long sys_set_robust_list(struct robust_list_head __user *head, size_t len); asmlinkage long sys_get_robust_list(int pid, struct robust_list_head __user **head_ptr, size_t __user *len_ptr); List registration is very fast: the pointer is simply stored in current->robust_list. [Note that in the future, if robust futexes become widespread, we could extend sys_clone() to register a robust-list head for new threads, without the need of another syscall.] So there is virtually zero overhead for tasks not using robust futexes, and even for robust futex users, there is only one extra syscall per thread lifetime, and the cleanup operation, if it happens, is fast and straightforward. The kernel doesnt have any internal distinction between robust and normal futexes. If a futex is found to be held at exit time, the kernel sets the highest bit of the futex word: #define FUTEX_OWNER_DIED 0x40000000 and wakes up the next futex waiter (if any). User-space does the rest of the cleanup. Otherwise, robust futexes are acquired by glibc by putting the TID into the futex field atomically. Waiters set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit: #define FUTEX_WAITERS 0x80000000 and the remaining bits are for the TID. Testing, architecture support ----------------------------- I've tested the new syscalls on x86 and x86_64, and have made sure the parsing of the userspace list is robust [ ;-) ] even if the list is deliberately corrupted. i386 and x86_64 syscalls are wired up at the moment, and Ulrich has tested the new glibc code (on x86_64 and i386), and it works for his robust-mutex testcases. All other architectures should build just fine too - but they wont have the new syscalls yet. Architectures need to implement the new futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inuser() inline function before writing up the syscalls (that function returns -ENOSYS right now). This patch: Add placeholder futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inuser() implementations to every architecture that supports futexes. It returns -ENOSYS. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Acked-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-27 16:16:21 +07:00
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
#endif