License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 21:07:57 +07:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2016-04-18 23:42:14 +07:00
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/*
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* kaslr.c
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*
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* This contains the routines needed to generate a reasonable level of
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* entropy to choose a randomized kernel base address offset in support
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* of Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR). Additionally
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* handles walking the physical memory maps (and tracking memory regions
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* to avoid) in order to select a physical memory location that can
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* contain the entire properly aligned running kernel image.
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*
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*/
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2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
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/*
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* isspace() in linux/ctype.h is expected by next_args() to filter
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* out "space/lf/tab". While boot/ctype.h conflicts with linux/ctype.h,
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* since isdigit() is implemented in both of them. Hence disable it
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* here.
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*/
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#define BOOT_CTYPE_H
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/*
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* _ctype[] in lib/ctype.c is needed by isspace() of linux/ctype.h.
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* While both lib/ctype.c and lib/cmdline.c will bring EXPORT_SYMBOL
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* which is meaningless and will cause compiling error in some cases.
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*/
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2018-08-22 11:56:04 +07:00
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#define __DISABLE_EXPORTS
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2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
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2013-10-11 07:18:14 +07:00
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#include "misc.h"
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2016-05-03 05:51:00 +07:00
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#include "error.h"
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2017-05-30 16:14:17 +07:00
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#include "../string.h"
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2013-10-11 07:18:14 +07:00
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2013-11-12 05:28:39 +07:00
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#include <generated/compile.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/uts.h>
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#include <linux/utsname.h>
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2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
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#include <linux/ctype.h>
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2017-08-14 21:54:24 +07:00
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#include <linux/efi.h>
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2013-11-12 05:28:39 +07:00
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#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
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2017-08-14 21:54:24 +07:00
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#include <asm/efi.h>
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2013-11-12 05:28:39 +07:00
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2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
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/* Macros used by the included decompressor code below. */
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#define STATIC
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#include <linux/decompress/mm.h>
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2018-02-14 18:16:51 +07:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
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2018-05-18 17:35:23 +07:00
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unsigned int __pgtable_l5_enabled;
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2018-02-15 01:25:35 +07:00
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unsigned int pgdir_shift __ro_after_init = 39;
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unsigned int ptrs_per_p4d __ro_after_init = 1;
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2018-02-14 18:16:51 +07:00
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#endif
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2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
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extern unsigned long get_cmd_line_ptr(void);
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2018-04-07 03:55:09 +07:00
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/* Used by PAGE_KERN* macros: */
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pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0;
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2013-11-12 05:28:39 +07:00
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/* Simplified build-specific string for starting entropy. */
|
2013-11-12 23:56:07 +07:00
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static const char build_str[] = UTS_RELEASE " (" LINUX_COMPILE_BY "@"
|
2013-11-12 05:28:39 +07:00
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LINUX_COMPILE_HOST ") (" LINUX_COMPILER ") " UTS_VERSION;
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static unsigned long rotate_xor(unsigned long hash, const void *area,
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size_t size)
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|
{
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size_t i;
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unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)area;
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for (i = 0; i < size / sizeof(hash); i++) {
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|
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/* Rotate by odd number of bits and XOR. */
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hash = (hash << ((sizeof(hash) * 8) - 7)) | (hash >> 7);
|
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hash ^= ptr[i];
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}
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return hash;
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}
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/* Attempt to create a simple but unpredictable starting entropy. */
|
2016-06-22 07:46:58 +07:00
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static unsigned long get_boot_seed(void)
|
2013-11-12 05:28:39 +07:00
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|
{
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unsigned long hash = 0;
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hash = rotate_xor(hash, build_str, sizeof(build_str));
|
2016-04-18 23:42:12 +07:00
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hash = rotate_xor(hash, boot_params, sizeof(*boot_params));
|
2013-11-12 05:28:39 +07:00
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return hash;
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}
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2016-06-22 07:46:58 +07:00
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#define KASLR_COMPRESSED_BOOT
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#include "../../lib/kaslr.c"
|
2013-10-11 07:18:14 +07:00
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2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
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2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
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/* Only supporting at most 4 unusable memmap regions with kaslr */
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#define MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS 4
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static bool memmap_too_large;
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|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
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|
2020-07-28 06:07:57 +07:00
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/*
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* Store memory limit: MAXMEM on 64-bit and KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE on 32-bit.
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* It may be reduced by "mem=nn[KMG]" or "memmap=nn[KMG]" command line options.
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*/
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static unsigned long long mem_limit;
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2017-05-13 12:46:29 +07:00
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2019-01-23 18:08:50 +07:00
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/* Number of immovable memory regions */
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static int num_immovable_mem;
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2017-05-13 12:46:29 +07:00
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2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
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enum mem_avoid_index {
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MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE = 0,
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MEM_AVOID_INITRD,
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MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE,
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MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS,
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
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MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_BEGIN,
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MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_END = MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_BEGIN + MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS - 1,
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
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MEM_AVOID_MAX,
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};
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|
2014-02-10 04:56:44 +07:00
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static struct mem_vector mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MAX];
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
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static bool mem_overlaps(struct mem_vector *one, struct mem_vector *two)
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{
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|
/* Item one is entirely before item two. */
|
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|
if (one->start + one->size <= two->start)
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|
return false;
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|
/* Item one is entirely after item two. */
|
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|
|
if (one->start >= two->start + two->size)
|
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|
return false;
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|
return true;
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|
}
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|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
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char *skip_spaces(const char *str)
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
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{
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
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while (isspace(*str))
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++str;
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return (char *)str;
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
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}
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
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#include "../../../../lib/ctype.c"
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#include "../../../../lib/cmdline.c"
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
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|
2019-11-07 08:43:26 +07:00
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enum parse_mode {
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PARSE_MEMMAP,
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PARSE_EFI,
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};
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|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
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static int
|
2019-11-07 08:43:26 +07:00
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parse_memmap(char *p, unsigned long long *start, unsigned long long *size,
|
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enum parse_mode mode)
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
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{
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char *oldp;
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if (!p)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* We don't care about this option here */
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if (!strncmp(p, "exactmap", 8))
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return -EINVAL;
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oldp = p;
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
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|
*size = memparse(p, &p);
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
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if (p == oldp)
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return -EINVAL;
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switch (*p) {
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case '#':
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case '$':
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case '!':
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
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*start = memparse(p + 1, &p);
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
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return 0;
|
2017-05-13 12:46:29 +07:00
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|
case '@':
|
2019-11-07 08:43:26 +07:00
|
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|
if (mode == PARSE_MEMMAP) {
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/*
|
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* memmap=nn@ss specifies usable region, should
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* be skipped
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*/
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*size = 0;
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} else {
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unsigned long long flags;
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/*
|
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* efi_fake_mem=nn@ss:attr the attr specifies
|
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* flags that might imply a soft-reservation.
|
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*/
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*start = memparse(p + 1, &p);
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if (p && *p == ':') {
|
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p++;
|
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|
if (kstrtoull(p, 0, &flags) < 0)
|
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|
*size = 0;
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|
else if (flags & EFI_MEMORY_SP)
|
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|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*size = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-05-13 12:46:29 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If w/o offset, only size specified, memmap=nn[KMG] has the
|
|
|
|
* same behaviour as mem=nn[KMG]. It limits the max address
|
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|
|
* system can use. Region above the limit should be avoided.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
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|
*start = 0;
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-07 08:43:26 +07:00
|
|
|
static void mem_avoid_memmap(enum parse_mode mode, char *str)
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
|
|
static int i;
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
|
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if (i >= MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS)
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
|
|
return;
|
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|
|
|
|
|
while (str && (i < MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS)) {
|
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|
int rc;
|
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|
unsigned long long start, size;
|
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|
char *k = strchr(str, ',');
|
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if (k)
|
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|
*k++ = 0;
|
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|
2019-11-07 08:43:26 +07:00
|
|
|
rc = parse_memmap(str, &start, &size, mode);
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
|
|
if (rc < 0)
|
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|
|
break;
|
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|
str = k;
|
2017-05-13 12:46:29 +07:00
|
|
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|
|
|
|
if (start == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Store the specified memory limit if size > 0 */
|
2020-07-28 06:07:57 +07:00
|
|
|
if (size > 0 && size < mem_limit)
|
2017-05-13 12:46:29 +07:00
|
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|
mem_limit = size;
|
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|
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2017-05-13 12:46:29 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_BEGIN + i].start = start;
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_BEGIN + i].size = size;
|
|
|
|
i++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* More than 4 memmaps, fail kaslr */
|
|
|
|
if ((i >= MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS) && str)
|
|
|
|
memmap_too_large = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-06-25 10:16:55 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Store the number of 1GB huge pages which users specified: */
|
|
|
|
static unsigned long max_gb_huge_pages;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void parse_gb_huge_pages(char *param, char *val)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static bool gbpage_sz;
|
|
|
|
char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(param, "hugepagesz")) {
|
|
|
|
p = val;
|
|
|
|
if (memparse(p, &p) != PUD_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
gbpage_sz = false;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (gbpage_sz)
|
|
|
|
warn("Repeatedly set hugeTLB page size of 1G!\n");
|
|
|
|
gbpage_sz = true;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(param, "hugepages") && gbpage_sz) {
|
|
|
|
p = val;
|
|
|
|
max_gb_huge_pages = simple_strtoull(p, &p, 0);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-07 08:57:05 +07:00
|
|
|
static void handle_mem_options(void)
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *args = (char *)get_cmd_line_ptr();
|
2020-07-28 06:07:54 +07:00
|
|
|
size_t len;
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
|
|
char *tmp_cmdline;
|
|
|
|
char *param, *val;
|
2017-05-13 12:46:29 +07:00
|
|
|
u64 mem_size;
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-07-28 06:07:54 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!args)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(args);
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
|
|
tmp_cmdline = malloc(len + 1);
|
2017-11-23 16:08:47 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!tmp_cmdline)
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
|
|
error("Failed to allocate space for tmp_cmdline");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(tmp_cmdline, args, len);
|
|
|
|
tmp_cmdline[len] = 0;
|
|
|
|
args = tmp_cmdline;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Chew leading spaces */
|
|
|
|
args = skip_spaces(args);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (*args) {
|
|
|
|
args = next_arg(args, ¶m, &val);
|
|
|
|
/* Stop at -- */
|
2020-07-28 06:07:55 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!val && strcmp(param, "--") == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-13 12:46:29 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(param, "memmap")) {
|
2019-11-07 08:43:26 +07:00
|
|
|
mem_avoid_memmap(PARSE_MEMMAP, val);
|
2020-07-29 05:57:12 +07:00
|
|
|
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && strstr(param, "hugepages")) {
|
x86/boot/KASLR: Skip specified number of 1GB huge pages when doing physical randomization (KASLR)
When KASLR is enabled then 1GB huge pages allocations might regress
sporadically.
To reproduce on a KVM guest with 4GB RAM:
- add the following options to the kernel command-line:
'default_hugepagesz=1G hugepagesz=1G hugepages=1'
- boot the guest and check number of 1GB pages reserved:
# grep HugePages_Total /proc/meminfo
- sporadically, every couple of bootups the output of this
command shows that when booting with "nokaslr" HugePages_Total is always 1,
while booting without "nokaslr" sometimes HugePages_Total is set as 0
(that is, reserving the 1GB page failed).
Note that you may need to boot a few times to trigger the issue,
because it's somewhat non-deterministic.
The root cause is that kernel may be put into the only good 1GB huge page
in the [0x40000000, 0x7fffffff] physical range randomly.
Below is the dmesg output snippet from the KVM guest. We can see that only
[0x40000000, 0x7fffffff] region is good 1GB huge page,
[0x100000000, 0x13fffffff] will be touched by the memblock top-down allocation:
[...] e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009fbff] usable
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009fc00-0x000000000009ffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000f0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffdffff] usable
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000bffe0000-0x00000000bfffffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000feffc000-0x00000000feffffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fffc0000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000013fffffff] usable
Besides, on bare-metal machines with larger memory, one less 1GB huge page
might be available with KASLR enabled. That too is because the kernel
image might be randomized into those "good" 1GB huge pages.
To fix this, firstly parse the kernel command-line to get how many 1GB huge
pages are specified. Then try to skip the specified number of 1GB huge
pages when decide which memory region kernel can be randomized into.
Also change the name of handle_mem_memmap() as handle_mem_options()
since it handles not only 'mem=' and 'memmap=', but also 'hugepagesxxx' now.
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: indou.takao@jp.fujitsu.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org
Cc: lcapitulino@redhat.com
Cc: yasu.isimatu@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180625031656.12443-3-bhe@redhat.com
[ Rewrote the changelog, fixed style problems in the code. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-06-25 10:16:56 +07:00
|
|
|
parse_gb_huge_pages(param, val);
|
2017-05-13 12:46:29 +07:00
|
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(param, "mem")) {
|
|
|
|
char *p = val;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(p, "nopentium"))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
mem_size = memparse(p, &p);
|
2018-08-07 08:57:05 +07:00
|
|
|
if (mem_size == 0)
|
2020-07-28 06:07:55 +07:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2018-08-07 08:57:05 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-07-28 06:07:57 +07:00
|
|
|
if (mem_size < mem_limit)
|
|
|
|
mem_limit = mem_size;
|
2019-11-07 08:43:26 +07:00
|
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(param, "efi_fake_mem")) {
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid_memmap(PARSE_EFI, val);
|
2017-05-13 12:46:29 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free(tmp_cmdline);
|
2018-08-07 08:57:05 +07:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2017-05-13 12:46:28 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2020-07-28 06:07:57 +07:00
|
|
|
* In theory, KASLR can put the kernel anywhere in the range of [16M, MAXMEM)
|
|
|
|
* on 64-bit, and [16M, KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE) on 32-bit.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* The mem_avoid array is used to store the ranges that need to be avoided
|
|
|
|
* when KASLR searches for an appropriate random address. We must avoid any
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
* regions that are unsafe to overlap with during decompression, and other
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* things like the initrd, cmdline and boot_params. This comment seeks to
|
|
|
|
* explain mem_avoid as clearly as possible since incorrect mem_avoid
|
|
|
|
* memory ranges lead to really hard to debug boot failures.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The initrd, cmdline, and boot_params are trivial to identify for
|
2016-05-10 03:22:05 +07:00
|
|
|
* avoiding. They are MEM_AVOID_INITRD, MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE, and
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS respectively below.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* What is not obvious how to avoid is the range of memory that is used
|
|
|
|
* during decompression (MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE below). This range must cover
|
|
|
|
* the compressed kernel (ZO) and its run space, which is used to extract
|
|
|
|
* the uncompressed kernel (VO) and relocs.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* ZO's full run size sits against the end of the decompression buffer, so
|
|
|
|
* we can calculate where text, data, bss, etc of ZO are positioned more
|
|
|
|
* easily.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For additional background, the decompression calculations can be found
|
|
|
|
* in header.S, and the memory diagram is based on the one found in misc.c.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The following conditions are already enforced by the image layouts and
|
|
|
|
* associated code:
|
|
|
|
* - input + input_size >= output + output_size
|
|
|
|
* - kernel_total_size <= init_size
|
|
|
|
* - kernel_total_size <= output_size (see Note below)
|
|
|
|
* - output + init_size >= output + output_size
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* (Note that kernel_total_size and output_size have no fundamental
|
|
|
|
* relationship, but output_size is passed to choose_random_location
|
|
|
|
* as a maximum of the two. The diagram is showing a case where
|
|
|
|
* kernel_total_size is larger than output_size, but this case is
|
|
|
|
* handled by bumping output_size.)
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* The above conditions can be illustrated by a diagram:
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* 0 output input input+input_size output+init_size
|
|
|
|
* | | | | |
|
|
|
|
* | | | | |
|
|
|
|
* |-----|--------|--------|--------------|-----------|--|-------------|
|
|
|
|
* | | |
|
|
|
|
* | | |
|
|
|
|
* output+init_size-ZO_INIT_SIZE output+output_size output+kernel_total_size
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* [output, output+init_size) is the entire memory range used for
|
|
|
|
* extracting the compressed image.
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* [output, output+kernel_total_size) is the range needed for the
|
|
|
|
* uncompressed kernel (VO) and its run size (bss, brk, etc).
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* [output, output+output_size) is VO plus relocs (i.e. the entire
|
|
|
|
* uncompressed payload contained by ZO). This is the area of the buffer
|
|
|
|
* written to during decompression.
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* [output+init_size-ZO_INIT_SIZE, output+init_size) is the worst-case
|
|
|
|
* range of the copied ZO and decompression code. (i.e. the range
|
|
|
|
* covered backwards of size ZO_INIT_SIZE, starting from output+init_size.)
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* [input, input+input_size) is the original copied compressed image (ZO)
|
|
|
|
* (i.e. it does not include its run size). This range must be avoided
|
|
|
|
* because it contains the data used for decompression.
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* [input+input_size, output+init_size) is [_text, _end) for ZO. This
|
|
|
|
* range includes ZO's heap and stack, and must be avoided since it
|
|
|
|
* performs the decompression.
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
* Since the above two ranges need to be avoided and they are adjacent,
|
|
|
|
* they can be merged, resulting in: [input, output+init_size) which
|
|
|
|
* becomes the MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE below.
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
static void mem_avoid_init(unsigned long input, unsigned long input_size,
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long output)
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long init_size = boot_params->hdr.init_size;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
u64 initrd_start, initrd_size;
|
2020-07-28 06:07:54 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long cmd_line, cmd_line_size;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Avoid the region that is unsafe to overlap during
|
2016-05-06 05:13:47 +07:00
|
|
|
* decompression.
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].start = input;
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].size = (output + init_size) - input;
|
x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand
Currently KASLR only supports relocation in a small physical range (from
16M to 1G), due to using the initial kernel page table identity mapping.
To support ranges above this, we need to have an identity mapping for the
desired memory range before we can decompress (and later run) the kernel.
32-bit kernels already have the needed identity mapping. This patch adds
identity mappings for the needed memory ranges on 64-bit kernels. This
happens in two possible boot paths:
If loaded via startup_32(), we need to set up the needed identity map.
If loaded from a 64-bit bootloader, the bootloader will have already
set up an identity mapping, and we'll start via the compressed kernel's
startup_64(). In this case, the bootloader's page tables need to be
avoided while selecting the new uncompressed kernel location. If not,
the decompressor could overwrite them during decompression.
To accomplish this, we could walk the pagetable and find every page
that is used, and add them to mem_avoid, but this needs extra code and
will require increasing the size of the mem_avoid array.
Instead, we can create a new set of page tables for our own identity
mapping instead. The pages for the new page table will come from the
_pagetable section of the compressed kernel, which means they are
already contained by in mem_avoid array. To do this, we reuse the code
from the uncompressed kernel's identity mapping routines.
The _pgtable will be shared by both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths to reduce
init_size, as now the compressed kernel's _rodata to _end will contribute
to init_size.
To handle the possible mappings, we need to increase the existing page
table buffer size:
When booting via startup_64(), we need to cover the old VO, params,
cmdline and uncompressed kernel. In an extreme case we could have them
all beyond the 512G boundary, which needs (2+2)*4 pages with 2M mappings.
And we'll need 2 for first 2M for VGA RAM. One more is needed for level4.
This gets us to 19 pages total.
When booting via startup_32(), KASLR could move the uncompressed kernel
above 4G, so we need to create extra identity mappings, which should only
need (2+2) pages at most when it is beyond the 512G boundary. So 19
pages is sufficient for this case as well.
The resulting BOOT_*PGT_SIZE defines use the "_SIZE" suffix on their
names to maintain logical consistency with the existing BOOT_HEAP_SIZE
and BOOT_STACK_SIZE defines.
This patch is based on earlier patches from Yinghai Lu and Baoquan He.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462572095-11754-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-07 05:01:35 +07:00
|
|
|
add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].start,
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].size);
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Avoid initrd. */
|
2016-04-18 23:42:12 +07:00
|
|
|
initrd_start = (u64)boot_params->ext_ramdisk_image << 32;
|
|
|
|
initrd_start |= boot_params->hdr.ramdisk_image;
|
|
|
|
initrd_size = (u64)boot_params->ext_ramdisk_size << 32;
|
|
|
|
initrd_size |= boot_params->hdr.ramdisk_size;
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_INITRD].start = initrd_start;
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_INITRD].size = initrd_size;
|
x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand
Currently KASLR only supports relocation in a small physical range (from
16M to 1G), due to using the initial kernel page table identity mapping.
To support ranges above this, we need to have an identity mapping for the
desired memory range before we can decompress (and later run) the kernel.
32-bit kernels already have the needed identity mapping. This patch adds
identity mappings for the needed memory ranges on 64-bit kernels. This
happens in two possible boot paths:
If loaded via startup_32(), we need to set up the needed identity map.
If loaded from a 64-bit bootloader, the bootloader will have already
set up an identity mapping, and we'll start via the compressed kernel's
startup_64(). In this case, the bootloader's page tables need to be
avoided while selecting the new uncompressed kernel location. If not,
the decompressor could overwrite them during decompression.
To accomplish this, we could walk the pagetable and find every page
that is used, and add them to mem_avoid, but this needs extra code and
will require increasing the size of the mem_avoid array.
Instead, we can create a new set of page tables for our own identity
mapping instead. The pages for the new page table will come from the
_pagetable section of the compressed kernel, which means they are
already contained by in mem_avoid array. To do this, we reuse the code
from the uncompressed kernel's identity mapping routines.
The _pgtable will be shared by both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths to reduce
init_size, as now the compressed kernel's _rodata to _end will contribute
to init_size.
To handle the possible mappings, we need to increase the existing page
table buffer size:
When booting via startup_64(), we need to cover the old VO, params,
cmdline and uncompressed kernel. In an extreme case we could have them
all beyond the 512G boundary, which needs (2+2)*4 pages with 2M mappings.
And we'll need 2 for first 2M for VGA RAM. One more is needed for level4.
This gets us to 19 pages total.
When booting via startup_32(), KASLR could move the uncompressed kernel
above 4G, so we need to create extra identity mappings, which should only
need (2+2) pages at most when it is beyond the 512G boundary. So 19
pages is sufficient for this case as well.
The resulting BOOT_*PGT_SIZE defines use the "_SIZE" suffix on their
names to maintain logical consistency with the existing BOOT_HEAP_SIZE
and BOOT_STACK_SIZE defines.
This patch is based on earlier patches from Yinghai Lu and Baoquan He.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462572095-11754-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-07 05:01:35 +07:00
|
|
|
/* No need to set mapping for initrd, it will be handled in VO. */
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Avoid kernel command line. */
|
2020-07-28 06:07:54 +07:00
|
|
|
cmd_line = get_cmd_line_ptr();
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Calculate size of cmd_line. */
|
2020-07-28 06:07:54 +07:00
|
|
|
if (cmd_line) {
|
|
|
|
cmd_line_size = strlen((char *)cmd_line) + 1;
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].start = cmd_line;
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].size = cmd_line_size;
|
|
|
|
add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].start,
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-07 02:44:59 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Avoid boot parameters. */
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].start = (unsigned long)boot_params;
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].size = sizeof(*boot_params);
|
x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand
Currently KASLR only supports relocation in a small physical range (from
16M to 1G), due to using the initial kernel page table identity mapping.
To support ranges above this, we need to have an identity mapping for the
desired memory range before we can decompress (and later run) the kernel.
32-bit kernels already have the needed identity mapping. This patch adds
identity mappings for the needed memory ranges on 64-bit kernels. This
happens in two possible boot paths:
If loaded via startup_32(), we need to set up the needed identity map.
If loaded from a 64-bit bootloader, the bootloader will have already
set up an identity mapping, and we'll start via the compressed kernel's
startup_64(). In this case, the bootloader's page tables need to be
avoided while selecting the new uncompressed kernel location. If not,
the decompressor could overwrite them during decompression.
To accomplish this, we could walk the pagetable and find every page
that is used, and add them to mem_avoid, but this needs extra code and
will require increasing the size of the mem_avoid array.
Instead, we can create a new set of page tables for our own identity
mapping instead. The pages for the new page table will come from the
_pagetable section of the compressed kernel, which means they are
already contained by in mem_avoid array. To do this, we reuse the code
from the uncompressed kernel's identity mapping routines.
The _pgtable will be shared by both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths to reduce
init_size, as now the compressed kernel's _rodata to _end will contribute
to init_size.
To handle the possible mappings, we need to increase the existing page
table buffer size:
When booting via startup_64(), we need to cover the old VO, params,
cmdline and uncompressed kernel. In an extreme case we could have them
all beyond the 512G boundary, which needs (2+2)*4 pages with 2M mappings.
And we'll need 2 for first 2M for VGA RAM. One more is needed for level4.
This gets us to 19 pages total.
When booting via startup_32(), KASLR could move the uncompressed kernel
above 4G, so we need to create extra identity mappings, which should only
need (2+2) pages at most when it is beyond the 512G boundary. So 19
pages is sufficient for this case as well.
The resulting BOOT_*PGT_SIZE defines use the "_SIZE" suffix on their
names to maintain logical consistency with the existing BOOT_HEAP_SIZE
and BOOT_STACK_SIZE defines.
This patch is based on earlier patches from Yinghai Lu and Baoquan He.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462572095-11754-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-07 05:01:35 +07:00
|
|
|
add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].start,
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We don't need to set a mapping for setup_data. */
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Mark the memmap regions we need to avoid */
|
x86/boot/KASLR: Skip specified number of 1GB huge pages when doing physical randomization (KASLR)
When KASLR is enabled then 1GB huge pages allocations might regress
sporadically.
To reproduce on a KVM guest with 4GB RAM:
- add the following options to the kernel command-line:
'default_hugepagesz=1G hugepagesz=1G hugepages=1'
- boot the guest and check number of 1GB pages reserved:
# grep HugePages_Total /proc/meminfo
- sporadically, every couple of bootups the output of this
command shows that when booting with "nokaslr" HugePages_Total is always 1,
while booting without "nokaslr" sometimes HugePages_Total is set as 0
(that is, reserving the 1GB page failed).
Note that you may need to boot a few times to trigger the issue,
because it's somewhat non-deterministic.
The root cause is that kernel may be put into the only good 1GB huge page
in the [0x40000000, 0x7fffffff] physical range randomly.
Below is the dmesg output snippet from the KVM guest. We can see that only
[0x40000000, 0x7fffffff] region is good 1GB huge page,
[0x100000000, 0x13fffffff] will be touched by the memblock top-down allocation:
[...] e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009fbff] usable
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009fc00-0x000000000009ffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000f0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffdffff] usable
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000bffe0000-0x00000000bfffffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000feffc000-0x00000000feffffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fffc0000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000013fffffff] usable
Besides, on bare-metal machines with larger memory, one less 1GB huge page
might be available with KASLR enabled. That too is because the kernel
image might be randomized into those "good" 1GB huge pages.
To fix this, firstly parse the kernel command-line to get how many 1GB huge
pages are specified. Then try to skip the specified number of 1GB huge
pages when decide which memory region kernel can be randomized into.
Also change the name of handle_mem_memmap() as handle_mem_options()
since it handles not only 'mem=' and 'memmap=', but also 'hugepagesxxx' now.
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: indou.takao@jp.fujitsu.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org
Cc: lcapitulino@redhat.com
Cc: yasu.isimatu@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180625031656.12443-3-bhe@redhat.com
[ Rewrote the changelog, fixed style problems in the code. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-06-25 10:16:56 +07:00
|
|
|
handle_mem_options();
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-01-23 18:08:50 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Enumerate the immovable memory regions */
|
|
|
|
num_immovable_mem = count_immovable_mem_regions();
|
|
|
|
|
x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand
Currently KASLR only supports relocation in a small physical range (from
16M to 1G), due to using the initial kernel page table identity mapping.
To support ranges above this, we need to have an identity mapping for the
desired memory range before we can decompress (and later run) the kernel.
32-bit kernels already have the needed identity mapping. This patch adds
identity mappings for the needed memory ranges on 64-bit kernels. This
happens in two possible boot paths:
If loaded via startup_32(), we need to set up the needed identity map.
If loaded from a 64-bit bootloader, the bootloader will have already
set up an identity mapping, and we'll start via the compressed kernel's
startup_64(). In this case, the bootloader's page tables need to be
avoided while selecting the new uncompressed kernel location. If not,
the decompressor could overwrite them during decompression.
To accomplish this, we could walk the pagetable and find every page
that is used, and add them to mem_avoid, but this needs extra code and
will require increasing the size of the mem_avoid array.
Instead, we can create a new set of page tables for our own identity
mapping instead. The pages for the new page table will come from the
_pagetable section of the compressed kernel, which means they are
already contained by in mem_avoid array. To do this, we reuse the code
from the uncompressed kernel's identity mapping routines.
The _pgtable will be shared by both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths to reduce
init_size, as now the compressed kernel's _rodata to _end will contribute
to init_size.
To handle the possible mappings, we need to increase the existing page
table buffer size:
When booting via startup_64(), we need to cover the old VO, params,
cmdline and uncompressed kernel. In an extreme case we could have them
all beyond the 512G boundary, which needs (2+2)*4 pages with 2M mappings.
And we'll need 2 for first 2M for VGA RAM. One more is needed for level4.
This gets us to 19 pages total.
When booting via startup_32(), KASLR could move the uncompressed kernel
above 4G, so we need to create extra identity mappings, which should only
need (2+2) pages at most when it is beyond the 512G boundary. So 19
pages is sufficient for this case as well.
The resulting BOOT_*PGT_SIZE defines use the "_SIZE" suffix on their
names to maintain logical consistency with the existing BOOT_HEAP_SIZE
and BOOT_STACK_SIZE defines.
This patch is based on earlier patches from Yinghai Lu and Baoquan He.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462572095-11754-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-07 05:01:35 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VERBOSE_BOOTUP
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure video RAM can be used. */
|
|
|
|
add_identity_map(0, PMD_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-10 03:22:07 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Does this memory vector overlap a known avoided area? If so, record the
|
|
|
|
* overlap region with the lowest address.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool mem_avoid_overlap(struct mem_vector *img,
|
|
|
|
struct mem_vector *overlap)
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
2014-09-11 23:19:31 +07:00
|
|
|
struct setup_data *ptr;
|
2016-05-10 03:22:07 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long earliest = img->start + img->size;
|
|
|
|
bool is_overlapping = false;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < MEM_AVOID_MAX; i++) {
|
2016-05-10 03:22:07 +07:00
|
|
|
if (mem_overlaps(img, &mem_avoid[i]) &&
|
|
|
|
mem_avoid[i].start < earliest) {
|
|
|
|
*overlap = mem_avoid[i];
|
2016-07-01 14:34:40 +07:00
|
|
|
earliest = overlap->start;
|
2016-05-10 03:22:07 +07:00
|
|
|
is_overlapping = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-11 23:19:31 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Avoid all entries in the setup_data linked list. */
|
2016-04-18 23:42:12 +07:00
|
|
|
ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)boot_params->hdr.setup_data;
|
2014-09-11 23:19:31 +07:00
|
|
|
while (ptr) {
|
|
|
|
struct mem_vector avoid;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-02 01:36:32 +07:00
|
|
|
avoid.start = (unsigned long)ptr;
|
2014-09-11 23:19:31 +07:00
|
|
|
avoid.size = sizeof(*ptr) + ptr->len;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-10 03:22:07 +07:00
|
|
|
if (mem_overlaps(img, &avoid) && (avoid.start < earliest)) {
|
|
|
|
*overlap = avoid;
|
2016-07-01 14:34:40 +07:00
|
|
|
earliest = overlap->start;
|
2016-05-10 03:22:07 +07:00
|
|
|
is_overlapping = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-09-11 23:19:31 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-11-12 20:46:40 +07:00
|
|
|
if (ptr->type == SETUP_INDIRECT &&
|
|
|
|
((struct setup_indirect *)ptr->data)->type != SETUP_INDIRECT) {
|
|
|
|
avoid.start = ((struct setup_indirect *)ptr->data)->addr;
|
|
|
|
avoid.size = ((struct setup_indirect *)ptr->data)->len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mem_overlaps(img, &avoid) && (avoid.start < earliest)) {
|
|
|
|
*overlap = avoid;
|
|
|
|
earliest = overlap->start;
|
|
|
|
is_overlapping = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-11 23:19:31 +07:00
|
|
|
ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)ptr->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-10 03:22:07 +07:00
|
|
|
return is_overlapping;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-10 03:22:06 +07:00
|
|
|
struct slot_area {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long addr;
|
2020-07-29 05:57:15 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long num;
|
2016-05-10 03:22:06 +07:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_SLOT_AREA 100
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct slot_area slot_areas[MAX_SLOT_AREA];
|
2020-07-29 05:57:15 +07:00
|
|
|
static unsigned int slot_area_index;
|
2014-02-10 04:56:44 +07:00
|
|
|
static unsigned long slot_max;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-10 03:22:06 +07:00
|
|
|
static void store_slot_info(struct mem_vector *region, unsigned long image_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct slot_area slot_area;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
slot_area.addr = region->start;
|
2020-07-29 05:57:16 +07:00
|
|
|
slot_area.num = 1 + (region->size - image_size) / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN;
|
2016-05-10 03:22:06 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-07-29 05:57:16 +07:00
|
|
|
slot_areas[slot_area_index++] = slot_area;
|
|
|
|
slot_max += slot_area.num;
|
2016-05-10 03:22:06 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-06-25 10:16:55 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Skip as many 1GB huge pages as possible in the passed region
|
|
|
|
* according to the number which users specified:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
process_gb_huge_pages(struct mem_vector *region, unsigned long image_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-07-29 05:57:13 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long pud_start, pud_end, gb_huge_pages;
|
2018-06-25 10:16:55 +07:00
|
|
|
struct mem_vector tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-07-29 05:57:12 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) || !max_gb_huge_pages) {
|
2018-06-25 10:16:55 +07:00
|
|
|
store_slot_info(region, image_size);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-07-29 05:57:13 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Are there any 1GB pages in the region? */
|
|
|
|
pud_start = ALIGN(region->start, PUD_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
pud_end = ALIGN_DOWN(region->start + region->size, PUD_SIZE);
|
2018-06-25 10:16:55 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* No good 1GB huge pages found: */
|
2020-07-29 05:57:13 +07:00
|
|
|
if (pud_start >= pud_end) {
|
2018-06-25 10:16:55 +07:00
|
|
|
store_slot_info(region, image_size);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-07-29 05:57:13 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Check if the head part of the region is usable. */
|
|
|
|
if (pud_start >= region->start + image_size) {
|
2018-06-25 10:16:55 +07:00
|
|
|
tmp.start = region->start;
|
2020-07-29 05:57:13 +07:00
|
|
|
tmp.size = pud_start - region->start;
|
2018-06-25 10:16:55 +07:00
|
|
|
store_slot_info(&tmp, image_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-07-29 05:57:13 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Skip the good 1GB pages. */
|
|
|
|
gb_huge_pages = (pud_end - pud_start) >> PUD_SHIFT;
|
|
|
|
if (gb_huge_pages > max_gb_huge_pages) {
|
|
|
|
pud_end = pud_start + (max_gb_huge_pages << PUD_SHIFT);
|
|
|
|
max_gb_huge_pages = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
max_gb_huge_pages -= gb_huge_pages;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check if the tail part of the region is usable. */
|
|
|
|
if (region->start + region->size >= pud_end + image_size) {
|
|
|
|
tmp.start = pud_end;
|
|
|
|
tmp.size = region->start + region->size - pud_end;
|
2018-06-25 10:16:55 +07:00
|
|
|
store_slot_info(&tmp, image_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
static unsigned long slots_fetch_random(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-05-26 05:45:33 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long slot;
|
2020-07-29 05:57:15 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
2016-05-26 05:45:33 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Handle case of no slots stored. */
|
|
|
|
if (slot_max == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-22 07:46:58 +07:00
|
|
|
slot = kaslr_get_random_long("Physical") % slot_max;
|
2016-05-26 05:45:33 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < slot_area_index; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (slot >= slot_areas[i].num) {
|
|
|
|
slot -= slot_areas[i].num;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return slot_areas[i].addr + slot * CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (i == slot_area_index)
|
|
|
|
debug_putstr("slots_fetch_random() failed!?\n");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-23 18:08:50 +07:00
|
|
|
static void __process_mem_region(struct mem_vector *entry,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long minimum,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long image_size)
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-05-26 05:45:33 +07:00
|
|
|
struct mem_vector region, overlap;
|
2020-07-29 05:57:10 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long region_end;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-07-29 05:57:10 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Enforce minimum and memory limit. */
|
|
|
|
region.start = max_t(unsigned long long, entry->start, minimum);
|
|
|
|
region_end = min(entry->start + entry->size, mem_limit);
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 05:45:33 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Give up if slot area array is full. */
|
|
|
|
while (slot_area_index < MAX_SLOT_AREA) {
|
|
|
|
/* Potentially raise address to meet alignment needs. */
|
|
|
|
region.start = ALIGN(region.start, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-07-09 19:37:41 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Did we raise the address above the passed in memory entry? */
|
2020-07-29 05:57:10 +07:00
|
|
|
if (region.start > region_end)
|
2016-05-26 05:45:33 +07:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 05:45:33 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Reduce size by any delta from the original address. */
|
2020-07-29 05:57:10 +07:00
|
|
|
region.size = region_end - region.start;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 05:45:33 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Return if region can't contain decompressed kernel */
|
|
|
|
if (region.size < image_size)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If nothing overlaps, store the region and return. */
|
|
|
|
if (!mem_avoid_overlap(®ion, &overlap)) {
|
x86/boot/KASLR: Skip specified number of 1GB huge pages when doing physical randomization (KASLR)
When KASLR is enabled then 1GB huge pages allocations might regress
sporadically.
To reproduce on a KVM guest with 4GB RAM:
- add the following options to the kernel command-line:
'default_hugepagesz=1G hugepagesz=1G hugepages=1'
- boot the guest and check number of 1GB pages reserved:
# grep HugePages_Total /proc/meminfo
- sporadically, every couple of bootups the output of this
command shows that when booting with "nokaslr" HugePages_Total is always 1,
while booting without "nokaslr" sometimes HugePages_Total is set as 0
(that is, reserving the 1GB page failed).
Note that you may need to boot a few times to trigger the issue,
because it's somewhat non-deterministic.
The root cause is that kernel may be put into the only good 1GB huge page
in the [0x40000000, 0x7fffffff] physical range randomly.
Below is the dmesg output snippet from the KVM guest. We can see that only
[0x40000000, 0x7fffffff] region is good 1GB huge page,
[0x100000000, 0x13fffffff] will be touched by the memblock top-down allocation:
[...] e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009fbff] usable
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009fc00-0x000000000009ffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000f0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffdffff] usable
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000bffe0000-0x00000000bfffffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000feffc000-0x00000000feffffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fffc0000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved
[...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000013fffffff] usable
Besides, on bare-metal machines with larger memory, one less 1GB huge page
might be available with KASLR enabled. That too is because the kernel
image might be randomized into those "good" 1GB huge pages.
To fix this, firstly parse the kernel command-line to get how many 1GB huge
pages are specified. Then try to skip the specified number of 1GB huge
pages when decide which memory region kernel can be randomized into.
Also change the name of handle_mem_memmap() as handle_mem_options()
since it handles not only 'mem=' and 'memmap=', but also 'hugepagesxxx' now.
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: indou.takao@jp.fujitsu.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org
Cc: lcapitulino@redhat.com
Cc: yasu.isimatu@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180625031656.12443-3-bhe@redhat.com
[ Rewrote the changelog, fixed style problems in the code. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-06-25 10:16:56 +07:00
|
|
|
process_gb_huge_pages(®ion, image_size);
|
2016-05-26 05:45:33 +07:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Store beginning of region if holds at least image_size. */
|
2020-07-29 05:57:06 +07:00
|
|
|
if (overlap.start >= region.start + image_size) {
|
2020-07-29 05:57:09 +07:00
|
|
|
region.size = overlap.start - region.start;
|
|
|
|
process_gb_huge_pages(®ion, image_size);
|
2016-05-26 05:45:33 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Clip off the overlapping region and start over. */
|
|
|
|
region.start = overlap.start + overlap.size;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-23 18:08:50 +07:00
|
|
|
static bool process_mem_region(struct mem_vector *region,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long long minimum,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long long image_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If no immovable memory found, or MEMORY_HOTREMOVE disabled,
|
|
|
|
* use @region directly.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!num_immovable_mem) {
|
|
|
|
__process_mem_region(region, minimum, image_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA) {
|
|
|
|
debug_putstr("Aborted e820/efi memmap scan (slot_areas full)!\n");
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-02-05 20:04:01 +07:00
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE) && defined(CONFIG_ACPI)
|
2019-01-23 18:08:50 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If immovable memory found, filter the intersection between
|
|
|
|
* immovable memory and @region.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_immovable_mem; i++) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long long start, end, entry_end, region_end;
|
|
|
|
struct mem_vector entry;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mem_overlaps(region, &immovable_mem[i]))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
start = immovable_mem[i].start;
|
|
|
|
end = start + immovable_mem[i].size;
|
|
|
|
region_end = region->start + region->size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
entry.start = clamp(region->start, start, end);
|
|
|
|
entry_end = clamp(region_end, start, end);
|
|
|
|
entry.size = entry_end - entry.start;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__process_mem_region(&entry, minimum, image_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA) {
|
|
|
|
debug_putstr("Aborted e820/efi memmap scan when walking immovable regions(slot_areas full)!\n");
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2019-03-03 01:49:29 +07:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2019-01-23 18:08:50 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-14 21:54:24 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2020-07-28 06:07:56 +07:00
|
|
|
* Returns true if we processed the EFI memmap, which we prefer over the E820
|
|
|
|
* table if it is available.
|
2017-08-14 21:54:24 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
|
|
process_efi_entries(unsigned long minimum, unsigned long image_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct efi_info *e = &boot_params->efi_info;
|
|
|
|
bool efi_mirror_found = false;
|
|
|
|
struct mem_vector region;
|
|
|
|
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long pmap;
|
|
|
|
char *signature;
|
|
|
|
u32 nr_desc;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
signature = (char *)&e->efi_loader_signature;
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(signature, EFI32_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4) &&
|
|
|
|
strncmp(signature, EFI64_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
|
|
|
|
/* Can't handle data above 4GB at this time */
|
|
|
|
if (e->efi_memmap_hi) {
|
|
|
|
warn("EFI memmap is above 4GB, can't be handled now on x86_32. EFI should be disabled.\n");
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pmap = e->efi_memmap;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
pmap = (e->efi_memmap | ((__u64)e->efi_memmap_hi << 32));
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
nr_desc = e->efi_memmap_size / e->efi_memdesc_size;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nr_desc; i++) {
|
|
|
|
md = efi_early_memdesc_ptr(pmap, e->efi_memdesc_size, i);
|
|
|
|
if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE) {
|
|
|
|
efi_mirror_found = true;
|
2017-08-28 14:30:59 +07:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2017-08-14 21:54:24 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-28 14:30:59 +07:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nr_desc; i++) {
|
|
|
|
md = efi_early_memdesc_ptr(pmap, e->efi_memdesc_size, i);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Here we are more conservative in picking free memory than
|
|
|
|
* the EFI spec allows:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* According to the spec, EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_{CODE|DATA} are also
|
|
|
|
* free memory and thus available to place the kernel image into,
|
|
|
|
* but in practice there's firmware where using that memory leads
|
|
|
|
* to crashes.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Only EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY is guaranteed to be free.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (md->type != EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-07 08:43:16 +07:00
|
|
|
if (efi_soft_reserve_enabled() &&
|
|
|
|
(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_SP))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-28 14:30:59 +07:00
|
|
|
if (efi_mirror_found &&
|
|
|
|
!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
region.start = md->phys_addr;
|
|
|
|
region.size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT;
|
2019-01-23 18:08:50 +07:00
|
|
|
if (process_mem_region(®ion, minimum, image_size))
|
2017-08-28 14:30:59 +07:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
2017-08-14 21:54:24 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static inline bool
|
|
|
|
process_efi_entries(unsigned long minimum, unsigned long image_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-09 19:37:39 +07:00
|
|
|
static void process_e820_entries(unsigned long minimum,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long image_size)
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
2017-07-09 19:37:40 +07:00
|
|
|
struct mem_vector region;
|
2017-07-09 19:37:39 +07:00
|
|
|
struct boot_e820_entry *entry;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Verify potential e820 positions, appending to slots list. */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < boot_params->e820_entries; i++) {
|
|
|
|
entry = &boot_params->e820_table[i];
|
|
|
|
/* Skip non-RAM entries. */
|
|
|
|
if (entry->type != E820_TYPE_RAM)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2017-07-09 19:37:40 +07:00
|
|
|
region.start = entry->addr;
|
|
|
|
region.size = entry->size;
|
2019-01-23 18:08:50 +07:00
|
|
|
if (process_mem_region(®ion, minimum, image_size))
|
2017-07-09 19:37:39 +07:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-07-09 19:37:39 +07:00
|
|
|
static unsigned long find_random_phys_addr(unsigned long minimum,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long image_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-07-28 06:07:57 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Bail out early if it's impossible to succeed. */
|
|
|
|
if (minimum + image_size > mem_limit)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Check if we had too many memmaps. */
|
|
|
|
if (memmap_too_large) {
|
2017-08-14 21:54:24 +07:00
|
|
|
debug_putstr("Aborted memory entries scan (more than 4 memmap= args)!\n");
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-07-29 05:57:18 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!process_efi_entries(minimum, image_size))
|
|
|
|
process_e820_entries(minimum, image_size);
|
2017-08-14 21:54:24 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
return slots_fetch_random();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-10 03:22:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static unsigned long find_random_virt_addr(unsigned long minimum,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long image_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long slots, random_addr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* There are how many CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN-sized slots
|
|
|
|
* that can hold image_size within the range of minimum to
|
|
|
|
* KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-07-29 05:57:17 +07:00
|
|
|
slots = 1 + (KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - minimum - image_size) / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN;
|
2016-05-10 03:22:08 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-06-22 07:46:58 +07:00
|
|
|
random_addr = kaslr_get_random_long("Virtual") % slots;
|
2016-05-10 03:22:08 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return random_addr * CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN + minimum;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-06 18:50:15 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Since this function examines addresses much more numerically,
|
|
|
|
* it takes the input and output pointers as 'unsigned long'.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-05-26 05:45:32 +07:00
|
|
|
void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long input_size,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long *output,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long output_size,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long *virt_addr)
|
2013-10-11 07:18:14 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-05-26 05:45:34 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long random_addr, min_addr;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:14 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cmdline_find_option_bool("nokaslr")) {
|
2016-04-21 03:55:46 +07:00
|
|
|
warn("KASLR disabled: 'nokaslr' on cmdline.");
|
2016-05-26 05:45:32 +07:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:14 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-15 01:25:34 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
|
|
|
|
if (__read_cr4() & X86_CR4_LA57) {
|
2018-05-18 17:35:23 +07:00
|
|
|
__pgtable_l5_enabled = 1;
|
2018-02-15 01:25:35 +07:00
|
|
|
pgdir_shift = 48;
|
|
|
|
ptrs_per_p4d = 512;
|
2018-02-15 01:25:34 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 23:42:12 +07:00
|
|
|
boot_params->hdr.loadflags |= KASLR_FLAG;
|
2015-04-01 17:49:52 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 05:45:31 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Prepare to add new identity pagetables on demand. */
|
|
|
|
initialize_identity_maps();
|
|
|
|
|
2020-07-28 06:07:57 +07:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
|
|
|
|
mem_limit = KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
mem_limit = MAXMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Record the various known unsafe memory ranges. */
|
2016-05-26 05:45:32 +07:00
|
|
|
mem_avoid_init(input, input_size, *output);
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 05:45:34 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Low end of the randomization range should be the
|
|
|
|
* smaller of 512M or the initial kernel image
|
|
|
|
* location:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
min_addr = min(*output, 512UL << 20);
|
2020-07-28 06:07:57 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Make sure minimum is aligned. */
|
|
|
|
min_addr = ALIGN(min_addr, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
|
2016-05-26 05:45:34 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-14 21:54:24 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Walk available memory entries to find a random address. */
|
2016-05-26 05:45:34 +07:00
|
|
|
random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(min_addr, output_size);
|
2016-04-18 23:42:15 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!random_addr) {
|
2017-01-12 06:20:01 +07:00
|
|
|
warn("Physical KASLR disabled: no suitable memory region!");
|
2016-05-26 05:45:32 +07:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Update the new physical address location. */
|
|
|
|
if (*output != random_addr) {
|
|
|
|
add_identity_map(random_addr, output_size);
|
|
|
|
*output = random_addr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-04-27 14:42:20 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This loads the identity mapping page table.
|
|
|
|
* This should only be done if a new physical address
|
|
|
|
* is found for the kernel, otherwise we should keep
|
|
|
|
* the old page table to make it be like the "nokaslr"
|
|
|
|
* case.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
finalize_identity_maps();
|
2013-10-11 07:18:16 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 05:45:32 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Pick random virtual address starting from LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. */
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
|
|
|
|
random_addr = find_random_virt_addr(LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, output_size);
|
|
|
|
*virt_addr = random_addr;
|
2013-10-11 07:18:14 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|