2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2019-04-18 20:38:53 +07:00
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/* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 ARM Limited (or its affiliates). */
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2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <crypto/algapi.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
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#include <crypto/authenc.h>
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2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
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#include <crypto/gcm.h>
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#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
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2019-08-15 16:00:52 +07:00
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#include <crypto/internal/des.h>
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2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
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#include "cc_driver.h"
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#include "cc_buffer_mgr.h"
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#include "cc_aead.h"
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#include "cc_request_mgr.h"
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#include "cc_hash.h"
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#include "cc_sram_mgr.h"
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#define template_aead template_u.aead
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#define MAX_AEAD_SETKEY_SEQ 12
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#define MAX_AEAD_PROCESS_SEQ 23
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#define MAX_HMAC_DIGEST_SIZE (SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
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#define MAX_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE (SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE)
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#define MAX_NONCE_SIZE CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE
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struct cc_aead_handle {
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2020-02-12 01:19:07 +07:00
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u32 sram_workspace_addr;
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2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
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struct list_head aead_list;
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};
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struct cc_hmac_s {
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u8 *padded_authkey;
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u8 *ipad_opad; /* IPAD, OPAD*/
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dma_addr_t padded_authkey_dma_addr;
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dma_addr_t ipad_opad_dma_addr;
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};
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struct cc_xcbc_s {
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u8 *xcbc_keys; /* K1,K2,K3 */
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dma_addr_t xcbc_keys_dma_addr;
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};
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struct cc_aead_ctx {
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struct cc_drvdata *drvdata;
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u8 ctr_nonce[MAX_NONCE_SIZE]; /* used for ctr3686 iv and aes ccm */
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u8 *enckey;
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dma_addr_t enckey_dma_addr;
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union {
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struct cc_hmac_s hmac;
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struct cc_xcbc_s xcbc;
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} auth_state;
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unsigned int enc_keylen;
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unsigned int auth_keylen;
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unsigned int authsize; /* Actual (reduced?) size of the MAC/ICv */
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2018-10-18 19:59:57 +07:00
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unsigned int hash_len;
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2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
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enum drv_cipher_mode cipher_mode;
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enum cc_flow_mode flow_mode;
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enum drv_hash_mode auth_mode;
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};
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static void cc_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
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{
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struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
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struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
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dev_dbg(dev, "Clearing context @%p for %s\n", crypto_aead_ctx(tfm),
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crypto_tfm_alg_name(&tfm->base));
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/* Unmap enckey buffer */
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if (ctx->enckey) {
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dma_free_coherent(dev, AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, ctx->enckey,
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ctx->enckey_dma_addr);
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dev_dbg(dev, "Freed enckey DMA buffer enckey_dma_addr=%pad\n",
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&ctx->enckey_dma_addr);
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ctx->enckey_dma_addr = 0;
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ctx->enckey = NULL;
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}
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if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) { /* XCBC authetication */
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struct cc_xcbc_s *xcbc = &ctx->auth_state.xcbc;
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if (xcbc->xcbc_keys) {
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dma_free_coherent(dev, CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE * 3,
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xcbc->xcbc_keys,
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xcbc->xcbc_keys_dma_addr);
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}
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dev_dbg(dev, "Freed xcbc_keys DMA buffer xcbc_keys_dma_addr=%pad\n",
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&xcbc->xcbc_keys_dma_addr);
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xcbc->xcbc_keys_dma_addr = 0;
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xcbc->xcbc_keys = NULL;
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} else if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* HMAC auth. */
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struct cc_hmac_s *hmac = &ctx->auth_state.hmac;
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if (hmac->ipad_opad) {
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dma_free_coherent(dev, 2 * MAX_HMAC_DIGEST_SIZE,
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hmac->ipad_opad,
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hmac->ipad_opad_dma_addr);
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dev_dbg(dev, "Freed ipad_opad DMA buffer ipad_opad_dma_addr=%pad\n",
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&hmac->ipad_opad_dma_addr);
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hmac->ipad_opad_dma_addr = 0;
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hmac->ipad_opad = NULL;
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}
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if (hmac->padded_authkey) {
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dma_free_coherent(dev, MAX_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE,
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hmac->padded_authkey,
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hmac->padded_authkey_dma_addr);
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dev_dbg(dev, "Freed padded_authkey DMA buffer padded_authkey_dma_addr=%pad\n",
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&hmac->padded_authkey_dma_addr);
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hmac->padded_authkey_dma_addr = 0;
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hmac->padded_authkey = NULL;
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}
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}
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}
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2018-10-18 19:59:57 +07:00
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static unsigned int cc_get_aead_hash_len(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
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{
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struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
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return cc_get_default_hash_len(ctx->drvdata);
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}
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2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
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static int cc_aead_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
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{
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struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(tfm);
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struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
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struct cc_crypto_alg *cc_alg =
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container_of(alg, struct cc_crypto_alg, aead_alg);
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struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(cc_alg->drvdata);
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dev_dbg(dev, "Initializing context @%p for %s\n", ctx,
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crypto_tfm_alg_name(&tfm->base));
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/* Initialize modes in instance */
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ctx->cipher_mode = cc_alg->cipher_mode;
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ctx->flow_mode = cc_alg->flow_mode;
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ctx->auth_mode = cc_alg->auth_mode;
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ctx->drvdata = cc_alg->drvdata;
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crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct aead_req_ctx));
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/* Allocate key buffer, cache line aligned */
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ctx->enckey = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
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&ctx->enckey_dma_addr, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!ctx->enckey) {
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dev_err(dev, "Failed allocating key buffer\n");
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goto init_failed;
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}
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dev_dbg(dev, "Allocated enckey buffer in context ctx->enckey=@%p\n",
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ctx->enckey);
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/* Set default authlen value */
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if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) { /* XCBC authetication */
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struct cc_xcbc_s *xcbc = &ctx->auth_state.xcbc;
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const unsigned int key_size = CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE * 3;
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/* Allocate dma-coherent buffer for XCBC's K1+K2+K3 */
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/* (and temporary for user key - up to 256b) */
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xcbc->xcbc_keys = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, key_size,
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&xcbc->xcbc_keys_dma_addr,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!xcbc->xcbc_keys) {
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dev_err(dev, "Failed allocating buffer for XCBC keys\n");
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goto init_failed;
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}
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} else if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* HMAC authentication */
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struct cc_hmac_s *hmac = &ctx->auth_state.hmac;
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const unsigned int digest_size = 2 * MAX_HMAC_DIGEST_SIZE;
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dma_addr_t *pkey_dma = &hmac->padded_authkey_dma_addr;
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/* Allocate dma-coherent buffer for IPAD + OPAD */
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hmac->ipad_opad = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, digest_size,
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&hmac->ipad_opad_dma_addr,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!hmac->ipad_opad) {
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dev_err(dev, "Failed allocating IPAD/OPAD buffer\n");
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goto init_failed;
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}
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dev_dbg(dev, "Allocated authkey buffer in context ctx->authkey=@%p\n",
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hmac->ipad_opad);
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hmac->padded_authkey = dma_alloc_coherent(dev,
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MAX_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE,
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pkey_dma,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!hmac->padded_authkey) {
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dev_err(dev, "failed to allocate padded_authkey\n");
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goto init_failed;
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}
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} else {
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ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad = NULL;
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ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey = NULL;
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}
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2018-10-18 19:59:57 +07:00
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ctx->hash_len = cc_get_aead_hash_len(tfm);
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2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
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return 0;
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init_failed:
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cc_aead_exit(tfm);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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static void cc_aead_complete(struct device *dev, void *cc_req, int err)
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{
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struct aead_request *areq = (struct aead_request *)cc_req;
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struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(areq);
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struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(cc_req);
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struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
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2019-04-18 20:38:46 +07:00
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/* BACKLOG notification */
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if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
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goto done;
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2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
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cc_unmap_aead_request(dev, areq);
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/* Restore ordinary iv pointer */
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areq->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
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if (err)
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goto done;
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if (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
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if (memcmp(areq_ctx->mac_buf, areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr,
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ctx->authsize) != 0) {
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dev_dbg(dev, "Payload authentication failure, (auth-size=%d, cipher=%d)\n",
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ctx->authsize, ctx->cipher_mode);
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/* In case of payload authentication failure, MUST NOT
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* revealed the decrypted message --> zero its memory.
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*/
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2019-07-29 17:40:19 +07:00
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sg_zero_buffer(areq->dst, sg_nents(areq->dst),
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2020-01-16 17:14:38 +07:00
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areq->cryptlen, areq->assoclen);
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2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
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err = -EBADMSG;
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}
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2019-07-02 18:39:18 +07:00
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/*ENCRYPT*/
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} else if (areq_ctx->is_icv_fragmented) {
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u32 skip = areq->cryptlen + areq_ctx->dst_offset;
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2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
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2019-07-02 18:39:18 +07:00
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cc_copy_sg_portion(dev, areq_ctx->mac_buf, areq_ctx->dst_sgl,
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skip, (skip + ctx->authsize),
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CC_SG_FROM_BUF);
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2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
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}
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done:
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aead_request_complete(areq, err);
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}
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static unsigned int xcbc_setkey(struct cc_hw_desc *desc,
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struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx)
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{
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/* Load the AES key */
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hw_desc_init(&desc[0]);
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/* We are using for the source/user key the same buffer
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* as for the output keys, * because after this key loading it
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* is not needed anymore
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*/
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set_din_type(&desc[0], DMA_DLLI,
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ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr, ctx->auth_keylen,
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NS_BIT);
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set_cipher_mode(&desc[0], DRV_CIPHER_ECB);
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set_cipher_config0(&desc[0], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
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set_key_size_aes(&desc[0], ctx->auth_keylen);
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set_flow_mode(&desc[0], S_DIN_to_AES);
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set_setup_mode(&desc[0], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
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hw_desc_init(&desc[1]);
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set_din_const(&desc[1], 0x01010101, CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
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set_flow_mode(&desc[1], DIN_AES_DOUT);
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set_dout_dlli(&desc[1], ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr,
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AES_KEYSIZE_128, NS_BIT, 0);
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hw_desc_init(&desc[2]);
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set_din_const(&desc[2], 0x02020202, CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
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set_flow_mode(&desc[2], DIN_AES_DOUT);
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set_dout_dlli(&desc[2], (ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr
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+ AES_KEYSIZE_128),
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AES_KEYSIZE_128, NS_BIT, 0);
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hw_desc_init(&desc[3]);
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set_din_const(&desc[3], 0x03030303, CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
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set_flow_mode(&desc[3], DIN_AES_DOUT);
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set_dout_dlli(&desc[3], (ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr
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+ 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128),
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AES_KEYSIZE_128, NS_BIT, 0);
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return 4;
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}
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2019-10-19 07:41:37 +07:00
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static unsigned int hmac_setkey(struct cc_hw_desc *desc,
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struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx)
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
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{
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unsigned int hmac_pad_const[2] = { HMAC_IPAD_CONST, HMAC_OPAD_CONST };
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unsigned int digest_ofs = 0;
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unsigned int hash_mode = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
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DRV_HASH_HW_SHA1 : DRV_HASH_HW_SHA256;
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unsigned int digest_size = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
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CC_SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE : CC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
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struct cc_hmac_s *hmac = &ctx->auth_state.hmac;
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unsigned int idx = 0;
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int i;
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/* calc derived HMAC key */
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for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
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/* Load hash initial state */
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hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
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set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
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set_din_sram(&desc[idx],
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cc_larval_digest_addr(ctx->drvdata,
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ctx->auth_mode),
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digest_size);
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set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
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|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Load the hash current length*/
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
|
2018-10-18 19:59:57 +07:00
|
|
|
set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0, ctx->hash_len);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare ipad key */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_xor_val(&desc[idx], hmac_pad_const[i]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Perform HASH update */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
hmac->padded_authkey_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
|
|
|
|
set_xor_active(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_HASH);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get the digset */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx],
|
|
|
|
(hmac->ipad_opad_dma_addr + digest_ofs),
|
|
|
|
digest_size, NS_BIT, 0);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_DISABLED);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
digest_ofs += digest_size;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return idx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int validate_keys_sizes(struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "enc_keylen=%u authkeylen=%u\n",
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen, ctx->auth_keylen);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ctx->auth_mode) {
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_SHA1:
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_SHA256:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC:
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->auth_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
|
|
|
|
ctx->auth_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
|
|
|
|
ctx->auth_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_NULL: /* Not authenc (e.g., CCM) - no auth_key) */
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->auth_keylen > 0)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2020-01-16 17:14:39 +07:00
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "Invalid auth_mode=%d\n", ctx->auth_mode);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check cipher key size */
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->flow_mode == S_DIN_to_DES) {
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->enc_keylen != DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE) {
|
2020-01-16 17:14:39 +07:00
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "Invalid cipher(3DES) key size: %u\n",
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else { /* Default assumed to be AES ciphers */
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->enc_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256) {
|
2020-01-16 17:14:39 +07:00
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "Invalid cipher(AES) key size: %u\n",
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* All tests of keys sizes passed */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This function prepers the user key so it can pass to the hmac processing
|
|
|
|
* (copy to intenral buffer or hash in case of key longer than block
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-04-18 20:39:05 +07:00
|
|
|
static int cc_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *authkey,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dma_addr_t key_dma_addr = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
2020-02-12 01:19:05 +07:00
|
|
|
u32 larval_addr;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
struct cc_crypto_req cc_req = {};
|
|
|
|
unsigned int blocksize;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int digestsize;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hashmode;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = 0;
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
2019-04-18 20:39:05 +07:00
|
|
|
u8 *key = NULL;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[MAX_AEAD_SETKEY_SEQ];
|
|
|
|
dma_addr_t padded_authkey_dma_addr =
|
|
|
|
ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ctx->auth_mode) { /* auth_key required and >0 */
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_SHA1:
|
|
|
|
blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
hashmode = DRV_HASH_HW_SHA1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_SHA256:
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
hashmode = DRV_HASH_HW_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keylen != 0) {
|
2019-04-18 20:39:05 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key = kmemdup(authkey, keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!key)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-12 01:18:58 +07:00
|
|
|
key_dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, key, keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, key_dma_addr)) {
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
|
|
|
|
key, keylen);
|
2019-04-18 20:39:05 +07:00
|
|
|
kzfree(key);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (keylen > blocksize) {
|
|
|
|
/* Load hash initial state */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hashmode);
|
2020-02-12 01:19:05 +07:00
|
|
|
larval_addr = cc_larval_digest_addr(ctx->drvdata,
|
|
|
|
ctx->auth_mode);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
set_din_sram(&desc[idx], larval_addr, digestsize);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Load the hash current length*/
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hashmode);
|
2018-10-18 19:59:57 +07:00
|
|
|
set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0, ctx->hash_len);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_ENABLED);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
key_dma_addr, keylen, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_HASH);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get hashed key */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hashmode);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], padded_authkey_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
digestsize, NS_BIT, 0);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_DISABLED);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx],
|
|
|
|
HASH_DIGEST_RESULT_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0, (blocksize - digestsize));
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], BYPASS);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], (padded_authkey_dma_addr +
|
|
|
|
digestsize), (blocksize - digestsize),
|
|
|
|
NS_BIT, 0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, key_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
keylen, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], BYPASS);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], padded_authkey_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
keylen, NS_BIT, 0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((blocksize - keylen) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0,
|
|
|
|
(blocksize - keylen));
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], BYPASS);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx],
|
|
|
|
(padded_authkey_dma_addr +
|
|
|
|
keylen),
|
|
|
|
(blocksize - keylen), NS_BIT, 0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0, (blocksize - keylen));
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], BYPASS);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], padded_authkey_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
blocksize, NS_BIT, 0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = cc_send_sync_request(ctx->drvdata, &cc_req, desc, idx);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "send_request() failed (rc=%d)\n", rc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (key_dma_addr)
|
|
|
|
dma_unmap_single(dev, key_dma_addr, keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-18 20:39:05 +07:00
|
|
|
kzfree(key);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_crypto_req cc_req = {};
|
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[MAX_AEAD_SETKEY_SEQ];
|
|
|
|
unsigned int seq_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
2018-12-17 14:23:24 +07:00
|
|
|
const u8 *enckey, *authkey;
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "Setting key in context @%p for %s. key=%p keylen=%u\n",
|
|
|
|
ctx, crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)), key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* STAT_PHASE_0: Init and sanity checks */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* authenc() alg. */
|
2018-12-17 14:23:24 +07:00
|
|
|
struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-12-31 10:19:36 +07:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2018-12-17 14:23:24 +07:00
|
|
|
enckey = keys.enckey;
|
|
|
|
authkey = keys.authkey;
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen = keys.enckeylen;
|
|
|
|
ctx->auth_keylen = keys.authkeylen;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR) {
|
|
|
|
/* the nonce is stored in bytes at end of key */
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->enc_keylen <
|
|
|
|
(AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE))
|
crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-12-31 10:19:36 +07:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Copy nonce from last 4 bytes in CTR key to
|
|
|
|
* first 4 bytes in CTR IV
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-12-17 14:23:24 +07:00
|
|
|
memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, enckey + ctx->enc_keylen -
|
|
|
|
CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE, CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Set CTR key size */
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen -= CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else { /* non-authenc - has just one key */
|
2018-12-17 14:23:24 +07:00
|
|
|
enckey = key;
|
|
|
|
authkey = NULL;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen = keylen;
|
|
|
|
ctx->auth_keylen = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = validate_keys_sizes(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-12-31 10:19:36 +07:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* STAT_PHASE_1: Copy key to ctx */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get key material */
|
2018-12-17 14:23:24 +07:00
|
|
|
memcpy(ctx->enckey, enckey, ctx->enc_keylen);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->enc_keylen == 24)
|
|
|
|
memset(ctx->enckey + 24, 0, CC_AES_KEY_SIZE_MAX - 24);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) {
|
2018-12-17 14:23:24 +07:00
|
|
|
memcpy(ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys, authkey,
|
|
|
|
ctx->auth_keylen);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
} else if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* HMAC */
|
2018-12-17 14:23:24 +07:00
|
|
|
rc = cc_get_plain_hmac_key(tfm, authkey, ctx->auth_keylen);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-12-31 10:19:36 +07:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* STAT_PHASE_2: Create sequence */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ctx->auth_mode) {
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_SHA1:
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_SHA256:
|
|
|
|
seq_len = hmac_setkey(desc, ctx);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC:
|
|
|
|
seq_len = xcbc_setkey(desc, ctx);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_NULL: /* non-authenc modes, e.g., CCM */
|
|
|
|
break; /* No auth. key setup */
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "Unsupported authenc (%d)\n", ctx->auth_mode);
|
crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-12-31 10:19:36 +07:00
|
|
|
return -ENOTSUPP;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* STAT_PHASE_3: Submit sequence to HW */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (seq_len > 0) { /* For CCM there is no sequence to setup the key */
|
|
|
|
rc = cc_send_sync_request(ctx->drvdata, &cc_req, desc, seq_len);
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "send_request() failed (rc=%d)\n", rc);
|
crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-12-31 10:19:36 +07:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Update STAT_PHASE_3 */
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-11 15:51:06 +07:00
|
|
|
static int cc_des3_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(err))
|
2019-08-15 16:00:52 +07:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2019-04-11 15:51:06 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-08-15 16:00:52 +07:00
|
|
|
err = verify_aead_des3_key(aead, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen) ?:
|
|
|
|
cc_aead_setkey(aead, key, keylen);
|
2019-04-11 15:51:06 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(&keys, sizeof(keys));
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
static int cc_rfc4309_ccm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keylen < 3)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
keylen -= 3;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key + keylen, 3);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return cc_aead_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int authsize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Unsupported auth. sizes */
|
|
|
|
if (authsize == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
authsize > crypto_aead_maxauthsize(authenc)) {
|
|
|
|
return -ENOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->authsize = authsize;
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "authlen=%d\n", ctx->authsize);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_rfc4309_ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int authsize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (authsize) {
|
|
|
|
case 8:
|
|
|
|
case 12:
|
|
|
|
case 16:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return cc_aead_setauthsize(authenc, authsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int authsize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (authsize) {
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
|
|
|
case 6:
|
|
|
|
case 8:
|
|
|
|
case 10:
|
|
|
|
case 12:
|
|
|
|
case 14:
|
|
|
|
case 16:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return cc_aead_setauthsize(authenc, authsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_set_assoc_desc(struct aead_request *areq, unsigned int flow_mode,
|
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[], unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(areq);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(areq);
|
|
|
|
enum cc_req_dma_buf_type assoc_dma_type = areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (assoc_dma_type) {
|
|
|
|
case CC_DMA_BUF_DLLI:
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "ASSOC buffer type DLLI\n");
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, sg_dma_address(areq->src),
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
areq_ctx->assoclen, NS_BIT);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC &&
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->cryptlen > 0)
|
|
|
|
set_din_not_last_indication(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI:
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "ASSOC buffer type MLLI\n");
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_MLLI, areq_ctx->assoc.sram_addr,
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC &&
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->cryptlen > 0)
|
|
|
|
set_din_not_last_indication(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CC_DMA_BUF_NULL:
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "Invalid ASSOC buffer type\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = (++idx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_proc_authen_desc(struct aead_request *areq,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int flow_mode,
|
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size, int direct)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(areq);
|
|
|
|
enum cc_req_dma_buf_type data_dma_type = areq_ctx->data_buff_type;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(areq);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (data_dma_type) {
|
|
|
|
case CC_DMA_BUF_DLLI:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist *cipher =
|
|
|
|
(direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ?
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->dst_sgl : areq_ctx->src_sgl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int offset =
|
|
|
|
(direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ?
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->dst_offset : areq_ctx->src_offset;
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "AUTHENC: SRC/DST buffer type DLLI\n");
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
(sg_dma_address(cipher) + offset),
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->cryptlen, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* DOUBLE-PASS flow (as default)
|
|
|
|
* assoc. + iv + data -compact in one table
|
|
|
|
* if assoclen is ZERO only IV perform
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-02-12 01:19:07 +07:00
|
|
|
u32 mlli_addr = areq_ctx->assoc.sram_addr;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
u32 mlli_nents = areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (areq_ctx->is_single_pass) {
|
|
|
|
if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
|
|
|
|
mlli_addr = areq_ctx->dst.sram_addr;
|
|
|
|
mlli_nents = areq_ctx->dst.mlli_nents;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
mlli_addr = areq_ctx->src.sram_addr;
|
|
|
|
mlli_nents = areq_ctx->src.mlli_nents;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "AUTHENC: SRC/DST buffer type MLLI\n");
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_MLLI, mlli_addr, mlli_nents,
|
|
|
|
NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case CC_DMA_BUF_NULL:
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "AUTHENC: Invalid SRC/DST buffer type\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = (++idx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_proc_cipher_desc(struct aead_request *areq,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int flow_mode,
|
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(areq);
|
|
|
|
enum cc_req_dma_buf_type data_dma_type = areq_ctx->data_buff_type;
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(areq);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (areq_ctx->cryptlen == 0)
|
|
|
|
return; /*null processing*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (data_dma_type) {
|
|
|
|
case CC_DMA_BUF_DLLI:
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "CIPHER: SRC/DST buffer type DLLI\n");
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
(sg_dma_address(areq_ctx->src_sgl) +
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->src_offset), areq_ctx->cryptlen,
|
|
|
|
NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx],
|
|
|
|
(sg_dma_address(areq_ctx->dst_sgl) +
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->dst_offset),
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->cryptlen, NS_BIT, 0);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI:
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "CIPHER: SRC/DST buffer type MLLI\n");
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_MLLI, areq_ctx->src.sram_addr,
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->src.mlli_nents, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_mlli(&desc[idx], areq_ctx->dst.sram_addr,
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->dst.mlli_nents, NS_BIT, 0);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CC_DMA_BUF_NULL:
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "CIPHER: Invalid SRC/DST buffer type\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = (++idx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_proc_digest_desc(struct aead_request *req,
|
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hash_mode = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
|
|
|
|
DRV_HASH_HW_SHA1 : DRV_HASH_HW_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
int direct = req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get final ICV result */
|
|
|
|
if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], req_ctx->icv_dma_addr, ctx->authsize,
|
|
|
|
NS_BIT, 1);
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
set_queue_last_ind(ctx->drvdata, &desc[idx]);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) {
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_XCBC_MAC);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx],
|
|
|
|
HASH_DIGEST_RESULT_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else { /*Decrypt*/
|
|
|
|
/* Get ICV out from hardware */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
ctx->authsize, NS_BIT, 1);
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
set_queue_last_ind(ctx->drvdata, &desc[idx]);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx],
|
|
|
|
HASH_DIGEST_RESULT_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_DISABLED);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) {
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_XCBC_MAC);
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = (++idx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_set_cipher_desc(struct aead_request *req,
|
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hw_iv_size = req_ctx->hw_iv_size;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
int direct = req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup cipher state */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], direct);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], ctx->flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
hw_iv_size, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR)
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], ctx->cipher_mode);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup enc. key */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], direct);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], ctx->flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->flow_mode == S_DIN_to_AES) {
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, ctx->enckey_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
((ctx->enc_keylen == 24) ? CC_AES_KEY_SIZE_MAX :
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen), NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, ctx->enckey_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_des(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], ctx->cipher_mode);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = idx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_proc_cipher(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size, unsigned int data_flow_mode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
int direct = req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->cryptlen == 0)
|
|
|
|
return; /*null processing*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cc_set_cipher_desc(req, desc, &idx);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_cipher_desc(req, data_flow_mode, desc, &idx);
|
|
|
|
if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
|
|
|
|
/* We must wait for DMA to write all cipher */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = idx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_set_hmac_desc(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hash_mode = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
|
|
|
|
DRV_HASH_HW_SHA1 : DRV_HASH_HW_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int digest_size = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
|
|
|
|
CC_SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE : CC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Loading hash ipad xor key state */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr, digest_size,
|
|
|
|
NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Load init. digest len (64 bytes) */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
|
|
|
|
set_din_sram(&desc[idx], cc_digest_len_addr(ctx->drvdata, hash_mode),
|
2018-10-18 19:59:57 +07:00
|
|
|
ctx->hash_len);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = idx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_set_xcbc_desc(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Loading MAC state */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0, CC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_XCBC_MAC);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup XCBC MAC K1 */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
AES_KEYSIZE_128, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_XCBC_MAC);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup XCBC MAC K2 */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
(ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr +
|
|
|
|
AES_KEYSIZE_128), AES_KEYSIZE_128, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_XCBC_MAC);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup XCBC MAC K3 */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
(ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr +
|
|
|
|
2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128), AES_KEYSIZE_128, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE2);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_XCBC_MAC);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = idx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_proc_header_desc(struct aead_request *req,
|
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Hash associated data */
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
if (areq_ctx->assoclen > 0)
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
cc_set_assoc_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, &idx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Hash IV */
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = idx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_proc_scheme_desc(struct aead_request *req,
|
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_handle *aead_handle = ctx->drvdata->aead_handle;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hash_mode = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
|
|
|
|
DRV_HASH_HW_SHA1 : DRV_HASH_HW_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int digest_size = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
|
|
|
|
CC_SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE : CC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_sram(&desc[idx], aead_handle->sram_workspace_addr,
|
2018-10-18 19:59:57 +07:00
|
|
|
ctx->hash_len);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE1);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_do(&desc[idx], DO_PAD);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get final ICV result */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_sram(&desc[idx], aead_handle->sram_workspace_addr,
|
|
|
|
digest_size);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], HASH_DIGEST_RESULT_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Loading hash opad xor key state */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
(ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr + digest_size),
|
|
|
|
digest_size, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Load init. digest len (64 bytes) */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
|
|
|
|
set_din_sram(&desc[idx], cc_digest_len_addr(ctx->drvdata, hash_mode),
|
2018-10-18 19:59:57 +07:00
|
|
|
ctx->hash_len);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_ENABLED);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Perform HASH update */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_sram(&desc[idx], aead_handle->sram_workspace_addr,
|
|
|
|
digest_size);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_HASH);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = idx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_mlli_to_sram(struct aead_request *req,
|
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[], unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-18 20:38:55 +07:00
|
|
|
if ((req_ctx->assoc_buff_type == CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI ||
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
req_ctx->data_buff_type == CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI ||
|
2019-04-18 20:38:55 +07:00
|
|
|
!req_ctx->is_single_pass) && req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_len) {
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "Copy-to-sram: mlli_dma=%08x, mlli_size=%u\n",
|
2020-02-12 01:19:07 +07:00
|
|
|
ctx->drvdata->mlli_sram_addr,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_len);
|
|
|
|
/* Copy MLLI table host-to-sram */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[*seq_size]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[*seq_size], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_len, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_sram(&desc[*seq_size],
|
|
|
|
ctx->drvdata->mlli_sram_addr,
|
|
|
|
req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_len);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[*seq_size], BYPASS);
|
|
|
|
(*seq_size)++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static enum cc_flow_mode cc_get_data_flow(enum drv_crypto_direction direct,
|
|
|
|
enum cc_flow_mode setup_flow_mode,
|
|
|
|
bool is_single_pass)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
enum cc_flow_mode data_flow_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
|
|
|
|
if (setup_flow_mode == S_DIN_to_AES)
|
|
|
|
data_flow_mode = is_single_pass ?
|
|
|
|
AES_to_HASH_and_DOUT : DIN_AES_DOUT;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
data_flow_mode = is_single_pass ?
|
|
|
|
DES_to_HASH_and_DOUT : DIN_DES_DOUT;
|
|
|
|
} else { /* Decrypt */
|
|
|
|
if (setup_flow_mode == S_DIN_to_AES)
|
|
|
|
data_flow_mode = is_single_pass ?
|
|
|
|
AES_and_HASH : DIN_AES_DOUT;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
data_flow_mode = is_single_pass ?
|
|
|
|
DES_and_HASH : DIN_DES_DOUT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return data_flow_mode;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_hmac_authenc(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
int direct = req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int data_flow_mode =
|
|
|
|
cc_get_data_flow(direct, ctx->flow_mode,
|
|
|
|
req_ctx->is_single_pass);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->is_single_pass) {
|
2020-02-12 01:19:17 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
* Single-pass flow
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
cc_set_hmac_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_set_cipher_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_header_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_cipher_desc(req, data_flow_mode, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_scheme_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-12 01:19:17 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
* Double-pass flow
|
|
|
|
* Fallback for unsupported single-pass modes,
|
|
|
|
* i.e. using assoc. data of non-word-multiple
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
|
|
|
|
/* encrypt first.. */
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
/* authenc after..*/
|
|
|
|
cc_set_hmac_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_authen_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size, direct);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_scheme_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else { /*DECRYPT*/
|
|
|
|
/* authenc first..*/
|
|
|
|
cc_set_hmac_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_authen_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size, direct);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_scheme_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
/* decrypt after.. */
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
/* read the digest result with setting the completion bit
|
|
|
|
* must be after the cipher operation
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
cc_xcbc_authenc(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
int direct = req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int data_flow_mode =
|
|
|
|
cc_get_data_flow(direct, ctx->flow_mode,
|
|
|
|
req_ctx->is_single_pass);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->is_single_pass) {
|
2020-02-12 01:19:17 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
* Single-pass flow
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
cc_set_xcbc_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_set_cipher_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_header_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_cipher_desc(req, data_flow_mode, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-12 01:19:17 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
* Double-pass flow
|
|
|
|
* Fallback for unsupported single-pass modes,
|
|
|
|
* i.e. using assoc. data of non-word-multiple
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
|
|
|
|
/* encrypt first.. */
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
/* authenc after.. */
|
|
|
|
cc_set_xcbc_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_authen_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size, direct);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
} else { /*DECRYPT*/
|
|
|
|
/* authenc first.. */
|
|
|
|
cc_set_xcbc_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_authen_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size, direct);
|
|
|
|
/* decrypt after..*/
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
/* read the digest result with setting the completion bit
|
|
|
|
* must be after the cipher operation
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int validate_data_size(struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx,
|
|
|
|
enum drv_crypto_direction direct,
|
|
|
|
struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int assoclen = areq_ctx->assoclen;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int cipherlen = (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) ?
|
|
|
|
(req->cryptlen - ctx->authsize) : req->cryptlen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT &&
|
|
|
|
req->cryptlen < ctx->authsize)
|
|
|
|
goto data_size_err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->is_single_pass = true; /*defaulted to fast flow*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ctx->flow_mode) {
|
|
|
|
case S_DIN_to_AES:
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CBC &&
|
|
|
|
!IS_ALIGNED(cipherlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
|
|
|
|
goto data_size_err;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_GCTR) {
|
|
|
|
if (areq_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only)
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->is_single_pass = false;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED(assoclen, sizeof(u32)))
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->is_single_pass = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR &&
|
|
|
|
!IS_ALIGNED(cipherlen, sizeof(u32)))
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->is_single_pass = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case S_DIN_to_DES:
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED(cipherlen, DES_BLOCK_SIZE))
|
|
|
|
goto data_size_err;
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED(assoclen, DES_BLOCK_SIZE))
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->is_single_pass = false;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "Unexpected flow mode (%d)\n", ctx->flow_mode);
|
|
|
|
goto data_size_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data_size_err:
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int format_ccm_a0(u8 *pa0_buff, u32 header_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int len = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (header_size == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (header_size < ((1UL << 16) - (1UL << 8))) {
|
|
|
|
len = 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pa0_buff[0] = (header_size >> 8) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
pa0_buff[1] = header_size & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
len = 6;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pa0_buff[0] = 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
pa0_buff[1] = 0xFE;
|
|
|
|
pa0_buff[2] = (header_size >> 24) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
pa0_buff[3] = (header_size >> 16) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
pa0_buff[4] = (header_size >> 8) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
pa0_buff[5] = header_size & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int set_msg_len(u8 *block, unsigned int msglen, unsigned int csize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
__be32 data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(block, 0, csize);
|
|
|
|
block += csize;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (csize >= 4)
|
|
|
|
csize = 4;
|
|
|
|
else if (msglen > (1 << (8 * csize)))
|
|
|
|
return -EOVERFLOW;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data = cpu_to_be32(msglen);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(block - csize, (u8 *)&data + 4 - csize, csize);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_ccm(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int cipher_flow_mode;
|
|
|
|
dma_addr_t mac_result;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
|
|
|
|
cipher_flow_mode = AES_to_HASH_and_DOUT;
|
|
|
|
mac_result = req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr;
|
|
|
|
} else { /* Encrypt */
|
|
|
|
cipher_flow_mode = AES_and_HASH;
|
|
|
|
mac_result = req_ctx->icv_dma_addr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* load key */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_CTR);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, ctx->enckey_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
((ctx->enc_keylen == 24) ? CC_AES_KEY_SIZE_MAX :
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen), NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* load ctr state */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_CTR);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
req_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* load MAC key */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_CBC_MAC);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, ctx->enckey_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
((ctx->enc_keylen == 24) ? CC_AES_KEY_SIZE_MAX :
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen), NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* load MAC state */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_CBC_MAC);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* process assoc data */
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->assoclen > 0) {
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
cc_set_assoc_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, &idx);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
sg_dma_address(&req_ctx->ccm_adata_sg),
|
|
|
|
AES_BLOCK_SIZE + req_ctx->ccm_hdr_size, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_HASH);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* process the cipher */
|
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->cryptlen)
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_cipher_desc(req, cipher_flow_mode, desc, &idx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read temporal MAC */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_CBC_MAC);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr, ctx->authsize,
|
|
|
|
NS_BIT, 0);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], HASH_DIGEST_RESULT_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* load AES-CTR state (for last MAC calculation)*/
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_CTR);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->ccm_iv0_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* encrypt the "T" value and store MAC in mac_state */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
ctx->authsize, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], mac_result, ctx->authsize, NS_BIT, 1);
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
set_queue_last_ind(ctx->drvdata, &desc[idx]);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_AES_DOUT);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = idx;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int config_ccm_adata(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
//unsigned int size_of_a = 0, rem_a_size = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int lp = req->iv[0];
|
|
|
|
/* Note: The code assume that req->iv[0] already contains the value
|
|
|
|
* of L' of RFC3610
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
unsigned int l = lp + 1; /* This is L' of RFC 3610. */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int m = ctx->authsize; /* This is M' of RFC 3610. */
|
|
|
|
u8 *b0 = req_ctx->ccm_config + CCM_B0_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
u8 *a0 = req_ctx->ccm_config + CCM_A0_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
u8 *ctr_count_0 = req_ctx->ccm_config + CCM_CTR_COUNT_0_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int cryptlen = (req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type ==
|
|
|
|
DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ?
|
|
|
|
req->cryptlen :
|
|
|
|
(req->cryptlen - ctx->authsize);
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(req_ctx->mac_buf, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
memset(req_ctx->ccm_config, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 3);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* taken from crypto/ccm.c */
|
|
|
|
/* 2 <= L <= 8, so 1 <= L' <= 7. */
|
|
|
|
if (l < 2 || l > 8) {
|
2020-01-16 17:14:39 +07:00
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "illegal iv value %X\n", req->iv[0]);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(b0, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* format control info per RFC 3610 and
|
|
|
|
* NIST Special Publication 800-38C
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
*b0 |= (8 * ((m - 2) / 2));
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->assoclen > 0)
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
*b0 |= 64; /* Enable bit 6 if Adata exists. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = set_msg_len(b0 + 16 - l, cryptlen, l); /* Write L'. */
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "message len overflow detected");
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* END of "taken from crypto/ccm.c" */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* l(a) - size of associated data. */
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
req_ctx->ccm_hdr_size = format_ccm_a0(a0, req_ctx->assoclen);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(req->iv + 15 - req->iv[0], 0, req->iv[0] + 1);
|
|
|
|
req->iv[15] = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ctr_count_0, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
ctr_count_0[15] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_proc_rfc4309_ccm(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* L' */
|
|
|
|
memset(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
/* For RFC 4309, always use 4 bytes for message length
|
|
|
|
* (at most 2^32-1 bytes).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->ctr_iv[0] = 3;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* In RFC 4309 there is an 11-bytes nonce+IV part,
|
|
|
|
* that we build here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CCM_BLOCK_NONCE_OFFSET, ctx->ctr_nonce,
|
|
|
|
CCM_BLOCK_NONCE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET, req->iv,
|
|
|
|
CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
req->iv = areq_ctx->ctr_iv;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_set_ghash_desc(struct aead_request *req,
|
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[], unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* load key to AES*/
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_ECB);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, ctx->enckey_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* process one zero block to generate hkey */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0x0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], req_ctx->hkey_dma_addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
NS_BIT, 0);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_AES_DOUT);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Memory Barrier */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Load GHASH subkey */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->hkey_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_HASH_HW_GHASH);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_ENABLED);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Configure Hash Engine to work with GHASH.
|
|
|
|
* Since it was not possible to extend HASH submodes to add GHASH,
|
|
|
|
* The following command is necessary in order to
|
|
|
|
* select GHASH (according to HW designers)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_HASH_HW_GHASH);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_do(&desc[idx], 1); //1=AES_SK RKEK
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_ENABLED);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Load GHASH initial STATE (which is 0). (for any hash there is an
|
|
|
|
* initial state)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0x0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_HASH_HW_GHASH);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_ENABLED);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = idx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_set_gctr_desc(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* load key to AES*/
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_GCTR);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, ctx->enckey_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc_keylen, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->cryptlen && !req_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only) {
|
|
|
|
/* load AES/CTR initial CTR value inc by 2*/
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_GCTR);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
|
|
|
|
req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2_dma_addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = idx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_proc_gcm_result(struct aead_request *req,
|
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
dma_addr_t mac_result;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
|
|
|
|
mac_result = req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr;
|
|
|
|
} else { /* Encrypt */
|
|
|
|
mac_result = req_ctx->icv_dma_addr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* process(ghash) gcm_block_len */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->gcm_block_len_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_HASH);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Store GHASH state after GHASH(Associated Data + Cipher +LenBlock) */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_HASH_HW_GHASH);
|
|
|
|
set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
NS_BIT, 0);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
|
|
|
|
set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* load AES/CTR initial CTR value inc by 1*/
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_GCTR);
|
|
|
|
set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
|
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Memory Barrier */
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* process GCTR on stored GHASH and store MAC in mac_state*/
|
|
|
|
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
|
|
|
|
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_GCTR);
|
|
|
|
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr,
|
|
|
|
AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], mac_result, ctx->authsize, NS_BIT, 1);
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
set_queue_last_ind(ctx->drvdata, &desc[idx]);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_AES_DOUT);
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*seq_size = idx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_gcm(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *seq_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
unsigned int cipher_flow_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//in RFC4543 no data to encrypt. just copy data from src to dest.
|
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only) {
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_cipher_desc(req, BYPASS, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_set_ghash_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
/* process(ghash) assoc data */
|
|
|
|
cc_set_assoc_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_set_gctr_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_gcm_result(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-08 22:57:07 +07:00
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
|
|
|
|
cipher_flow_mode = AES_and_HASH;
|
|
|
|
} else { /* Encrypt */
|
|
|
|
cipher_flow_mode = AES_to_HASH_and_DOUT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
// for gcm and rfc4106.
|
|
|
|
cc_set_ghash_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
/* process(ghash) assoc data */
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->assoclen > 0)
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
cc_set_assoc_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_set_gctr_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
/* process(gctr+ghash) */
|
|
|
|
if (req_ctx->cryptlen)
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_cipher_desc(req, cipher_flow_mode, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_gcm_result(req, desc, seq_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int config_gcm_context(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int cryptlen = (req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type ==
|
|
|
|
DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ?
|
|
|
|
req->cryptlen :
|
|
|
|
(req->cryptlen - ctx->authsize);
|
|
|
|
__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(2);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "%s() cryptlen = %d, req_ctx->assoclen = %d ctx->authsize = %d\n",
|
|
|
|
__func__, cryptlen, req_ctx->assoclen, ctx->authsize);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(req_ctx->hkey, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(req_ctx->mac_buf, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(req->iv + 12, &counter, 4);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2, req->iv, 16);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(req->iv + 12, &counter, 4);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1, req->iv, 16);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!req_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only) {
|
|
|
|
__be64 temp64;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
temp64 = cpu_to_be64(req_ctx->assoclen * 8);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_a, &temp64, sizeof(temp64));
|
|
|
|
temp64 = cpu_to_be64(cryptlen * 8);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_c, &temp64, 8);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* rfc4543=> all data(AAD,IV,Plain) are considered additional
|
|
|
|
* data that is nothing is encrypted.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
__be64 temp64;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-08 22:57:09 +07:00
|
|
|
temp64 = cpu_to_be64((req_ctx->assoclen + cryptlen) * 8);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_a, &temp64, sizeof(temp64));
|
|
|
|
temp64 = 0;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_c, &temp64, 8);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cc_proc_rfc4_gcm(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_NONCE_OFFSET,
|
|
|
|
ctx->ctr_nonce, GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_NONCE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_OFFSET, req->iv,
|
|
|
|
GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
req->iv = areq_ctx->ctr_iv;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_proc_aead(struct aead_request *req,
|
|
|
|
enum drv_crypto_direction direct)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
int seq_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct cc_hw_desc desc[MAX_AEAD_PROCESS_SEQ];
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
struct cc_crypto_req cc_req = {};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "%s context=%p req=%p iv=%p src=%p src_ofs=%d dst=%p dst_ofs=%d cryptolen=%d\n",
|
|
|
|
((direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ? "Enc" : "Dec"),
|
|
|
|
ctx, req, req->iv, sg_virt(req->src), req->src->offset,
|
|
|
|
sg_virt(req->dst), req->dst->offset, req->cryptlen);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* STAT_PHASE_0: Init and sanity checks */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check data length according to mode */
|
|
|
|
if (validate_data_size(ctx, direct, req)) {
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "Unsupported crypt/assoc len %d/%d.\n",
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
req->cryptlen, areq_ctx->assoclen);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup request structure */
|
2020-02-12 01:18:58 +07:00
|
|
|
cc_req.user_cb = cc_aead_complete;
|
|
|
|
cc_req.user_arg = req;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup request context */
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type = direct;
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->req_authsize = ctx->authsize;
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->cipher_mode = ctx->cipher_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* STAT_PHASE_1: Map buffers */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR) {
|
|
|
|
/* Build CTR IV - Copy nonce from last 4 bytes in
|
|
|
|
* CTR key to first 4 bytes in CTR IV
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, ctx->ctr_nonce,
|
|
|
|
CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
|
2019-07-02 18:39:18 +07:00
|
|
|
memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE, req->iv,
|
|
|
|
CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Initialize counter portion of counter block */
|
|
|
|
*(__be32 *)(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE +
|
|
|
|
CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE) = cpu_to_be32(1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Replace with counter iv */
|
|
|
|
req->iv = areq_ctx->ctr_iv;
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->hw_iv_size = CTR_RFC3686_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
} else if ((ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM) ||
|
|
|
|
(ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_GCTR)) {
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->hw_iv_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
if (areq_ctx->ctr_iv != req->iv) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, req->iv,
|
|
|
|
crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm));
|
|
|
|
req->iv = areq_ctx->ctr_iv;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->hw_iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM) {
|
|
|
|
rc = config_ccm_adata(req);
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "config_ccm_adata() returned with a failure %d!",
|
|
|
|
rc);
|
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->ccm_hdr_size = ccm_header_size_null;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_GCTR) {
|
|
|
|
rc = config_gcm_context(req);
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "config_gcm_context() returned with a failure %d!",
|
|
|
|
rc);
|
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = cc_map_aead_request(ctx->drvdata, req);
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "map_request() failed\n");
|
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* STAT_PHASE_2: Create sequence */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Load MLLI tables to SRAM if necessary */
|
|
|
|
cc_mlli_to_sram(req, desc, &seq_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ctx->auth_mode) {
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_SHA1:
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_SHA256:
|
|
|
|
cc_hmac_authenc(req, desc, &seq_len);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC:
|
|
|
|
cc_xcbc_authenc(req, desc, &seq_len);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DRV_HASH_NULL:
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM)
|
|
|
|
cc_ccm(req, desc, &seq_len);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_GCTR)
|
|
|
|
cc_gcm(req, desc, &seq_len);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "Unsupported authenc (%d)\n", ctx->auth_mode);
|
|
|
|
cc_unmap_aead_request(dev, req);
|
|
|
|
rc = -ENOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* STAT_PHASE_3: Lock HW and push sequence */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = cc_send_request(ctx->drvdata, &cc_req, desc, seq_len, &req->base);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY) {
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "send_request() failed (rc=%d)\n", rc);
|
|
|
|
cc_unmap_aead_request(dev, req);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
exit:
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-18 20:38:54 +07:00
|
|
|
memset(areq_ctx, 0, sizeof(*areq_ctx));
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
/* No generated IV required */
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
areq_ctx->assoclen = req->assoclen;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
|
|
|
|
req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_rfc4309_ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Very similar to cc_aead_encrypt() above. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
|
|
|
rc = crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(req->assoclen);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-18 20:38:54 +07:00
|
|
|
memset(areq_ctx, 0, sizeof(*areq_ctx));
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
/* No generated IV required */
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
|
2020-03-08 22:57:09 +07:00
|
|
|
areq_ctx->assoclen = req->assoclen - CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_rfc4309_ccm(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
|
|
|
|
req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-18 20:38:54 +07:00
|
|
|
memset(areq_ctx, 0, sizeof(*areq_ctx));
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
/* No generated IV required */
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
areq_ctx->assoclen = req->assoclen;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT);
|
|
|
|
if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
|
|
|
|
req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_rfc4309_ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
|
|
|
rc = crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(req->assoclen);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-18 20:38:54 +07:00
|
|
|
memset(areq_ctx, 0, sizeof(*areq_ctx));
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
/* No generated IV required */
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
|
2020-03-08 22:57:09 +07:00
|
|
|
areq_ctx->assoclen = req->assoclen - CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_rfc4309_ccm(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT);
|
|
|
|
if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
|
|
|
|
req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_rfc4106_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "%s() keylen %d, key %p\n", __func__, keylen, key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keylen < 4)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
keylen -= 4;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key + keylen, 4);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return cc_aead_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_rfc4543_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "%s() keylen %d, key %p\n", __func__, keylen, key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keylen < 4)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
keylen -= 4;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key + keylen, 4);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return cc_aead_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int authsize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (authsize) {
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
|
|
|
case 8:
|
|
|
|
case 12:
|
|
|
|
case 13:
|
|
|
|
case 14:
|
|
|
|
case 15:
|
|
|
|
case 16:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return cc_aead_setauthsize(authenc, authsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_rfc4106_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int authsize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "authsize %d\n", authsize);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (authsize) {
|
|
|
|
case 8:
|
|
|
|
case 12:
|
|
|
|
case 16:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return cc_aead_setauthsize(authenc, authsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_rfc4543_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int authsize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "authsize %d\n", authsize);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (authsize != 16)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return cc_aead_setauthsize(authenc, authsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_rfc4106_gcm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
|
|
|
rc = crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(req->assoclen);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-18 20:38:54 +07:00
|
|
|
memset(areq_ctx, 0, sizeof(*areq_ctx));
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
/* No generated IV required */
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
|
2020-03-08 22:57:09 +07:00
|
|
|
areq_ctx->assoclen = req->assoclen - GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_rfc4_gcm(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
|
|
|
|
req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_rfc4543_gcm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2019-07-19 14:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
|
|
|
rc = crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(req->assoclen);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
2019-07-19 14:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-18 20:38:54 +07:00
|
|
|
memset(areq_ctx, 0, sizeof(*areq_ctx));
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
//plaintext is not encryped with rfc4543
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only = true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* No generated IV required */
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
areq_ctx->assoclen = req->assoclen;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_rfc4_gcm(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
|
|
|
|
req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
|
2019-07-19 14:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_rfc4106_gcm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
|
|
|
rc = crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(req->assoclen);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-18 20:38:54 +07:00
|
|
|
memset(areq_ctx, 0, sizeof(*areq_ctx));
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
/* No generated IV required */
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
|
2020-03-08 22:57:09 +07:00
|
|
|
areq_ctx->assoclen = req->assoclen - GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_rfc4_gcm(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT);
|
|
|
|
if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
|
|
|
|
req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cc_rfc4543_gcm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2019-07-19 14:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-03-08 22:57:08 +07:00
|
|
|
rc = crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(req->assoclen);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
2019-07-19 14:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-18 20:38:54 +07:00
|
|
|
memset(areq_ctx, 0, sizeof(*areq_ctx));
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
//plaintext is not decryped with rfc4543
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only = true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* No generated IV required */
|
|
|
|
areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
|
2019-04-18 20:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
areq_ctx->assoclen = req->assoclen;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cc_proc_rfc4_gcm(req);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT);
|
|
|
|
if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
|
|
|
|
req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
|
2019-07-19 14:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* aead alg */
|
|
|
|
static struct cc_alg_template aead_algs[] = {
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CBC,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA1,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des3_ede))",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-des3-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
2019-04-11 15:51:06 +07:00
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_des3_aead_setkey,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CBC,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_DES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA1,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-aes-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CBC,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA256,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des3_ede))",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-des3-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
2019-04-11 15:51:06 +07:00
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_des3_aead_setkey,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CBC,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_DES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA256,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "authenc(xcbc(aes),cbc(aes))",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "authenc-xcbc-aes-cbc-aes-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CBC,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-rfc3686-ctr-aes-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = 1,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CTR,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA1,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-rfc3686-ctr-aes-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = 1,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CTR,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA256,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "authenc(xcbc(aes),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "authenc-xcbc-aes-rfc3686-ctr-aes-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = 1,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CTR,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "ccm(aes)",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "ccm-aes-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = 1,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_ccm_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CCM,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_NULL,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "rfc4309(ccm(aes))",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "rfc4309-ccm-aes-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = 1,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_rfc4309_ccm_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_rfc4309_ccm_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_rfc4309_ccm_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_rfc4309_ccm_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CCM,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_NULL,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "gcm(aes)",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "gcm-aes-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = 1,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_gcm_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = 12,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_GCTR,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_NULL,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "rfc4106(gcm(aes))",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "rfc4106-gcm-aes-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = 1,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_rfc4106_gcm_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_rfc4106_gcm_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_rfc4106_gcm_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_rfc4106_gcm_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_GCTR,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_NULL,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "rfc4543(gcm(aes))",
|
|
|
|
.driver_name = "rfc4543-gcm-aes-ccree",
|
|
|
|
.blocksize = 1,
|
|
|
|
.template_aead = {
|
|
|
|
.setkey = cc_rfc4543_gcm_setkey,
|
|
|
|
.setauthsize = cc_rfc4543_gcm_setauthsize,
|
|
|
|
.encrypt = cc_rfc4543_gcm_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
.decrypt = cc_rfc4543_gcm_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.init = cc_aead_init,
|
|
|
|
.exit = cc_aead_exit,
|
|
|
|
.ivsize = GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_GCTR,
|
|
|
|
.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
|
|
|
|
.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_NULL,
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_hw_rev = CC_HW_REV_630,
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
.std_body = CC_STD_NIST,
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct cc_crypto_alg *cc_create_aead_alg(struct cc_alg_template *tmpl,
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cc_crypto_alg *t_alg;
|
|
|
|
struct aead_alg *alg;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-12 01:19:26 +07:00
|
|
|
t_alg = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*t_alg), GFP_KERNEL);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!t_alg)
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
alg = &tmpl->template_aead;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
snprintf(alg->base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", tmpl->name);
|
|
|
|
snprintf(alg->base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s",
|
|
|
|
tmpl->driver_name);
|
|
|
|
alg->base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
|
|
|
|
alg->base.cra_priority = CC_CRA_PRIO;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
alg->base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct cc_aead_ctx);
|
2018-07-24 21:12:43 +07:00
|
|
|
alg->base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY;
|
2020-01-29 21:37:57 +07:00
|
|
|
alg->base.cra_blocksize = tmpl->blocksize;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
alg->init = cc_aead_init;
|
|
|
|
alg->exit = cc_aead_exit;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
t_alg->aead_alg = *alg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
t_alg->cipher_mode = tmpl->cipher_mode;
|
|
|
|
t_alg->flow_mode = tmpl->flow_mode;
|
|
|
|
t_alg->auth_mode = tmpl->auth_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return t_alg;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int cc_aead_free(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cc_crypto_alg *t_alg, *n;
|
2020-02-12 01:19:26 +07:00
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_handle *aead_handle = drvdata->aead_handle;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Remove registered algs */
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(t_alg, n, &aead_handle->aead_list, entry) {
|
|
|
|
crypto_unregister_aead(&t_alg->aead_alg);
|
|
|
|
list_del(&t_alg->entry);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int cc_aead_alloc(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cc_aead_handle *aead_handle;
|
|
|
|
struct cc_crypto_alg *t_alg;
|
|
|
|
int rc = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
int alg;
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(drvdata);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-12 01:19:26 +07:00
|
|
|
aead_handle = devm_kmalloc(dev, sizeof(*aead_handle), GFP_KERNEL);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!aead_handle) {
|
|
|
|
rc = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto fail0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&aead_handle->aead_list);
|
|
|
|
drvdata->aead_handle = aead_handle;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
aead_handle->sram_workspace_addr = cc_sram_alloc(drvdata,
|
|
|
|
MAX_HMAC_DIGEST_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (aead_handle->sram_workspace_addr == NULL_SRAM_ADDR) {
|
|
|
|
rc = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto fail1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Linux crypto */
|
|
|
|
for (alg = 0; alg < ARRAY_SIZE(aead_algs); alg++) {
|
2018-11-13 16:40:35 +07:00
|
|
|
if ((aead_algs[alg].min_hw_rev > drvdata->hw_rev) ||
|
|
|
|
!(drvdata->std_bodies & aead_algs[alg].std_body))
|
2018-02-19 21:51:23 +07:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
t_alg = cc_create_aead_alg(&aead_algs[alg], dev);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(t_alg)) {
|
|
|
|
rc = PTR_ERR(t_alg);
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "%s alg allocation failed\n",
|
|
|
|
aead_algs[alg].driver_name);
|
|
|
|
goto fail1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
t_alg->drvdata = drvdata;
|
|
|
|
rc = crypto_register_aead(&t_alg->aead_alg);
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
dev_err(dev, "%s alg registration failed\n",
|
|
|
|
t_alg->aead_alg.base.cra_driver_name);
|
2020-02-12 01:19:26 +07:00
|
|
|
goto fail1;
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-12 01:19:26 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&t_alg->entry, &aead_handle->aead_list);
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(dev, "Registered %s\n",
|
|
|
|
t_alg->aead_alg.base.cra_driver_name);
|
2018-01-22 16:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fail1:
|
|
|
|
cc_aead_free(drvdata);
|
|
|
|
fail0:
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|