linux_dsm_epyc7002/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c

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/*
BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
Copyright (C) 2000-2001 Qualcomm Incorporated
Written 2000,2001 by Maxim Krasnyansky <maxk@qualcomm.com>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
published by the Free Software Foundation;
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
*/
/* Bluetooth address family and sockets. */
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/stringify.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <asm/ioctls.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include "leds.h"
#include "selftest.h"
/* Bluetooth sockets */
#define BT_MAX_PROTO 8
static const struct net_proto_family *bt_proto[BT_MAX_PROTO];
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(bt_proto_lock);
bluetooth : use lockdep sub-classes for diffrent bluetooth protocol 'rfcomm connect' will trigger lockdep warnings which is caused by locking diffrent kinds of bluetooth sockets at the same time. So using sub-classes per AF_BLUETOOTH sub-type for lockdep. Thanks for the hints from dave jones. --- > From: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> > Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2008 12:21:56 -0400 > > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: Pid: 3611, comm: obex-data-serve Not tainted 2.6.25-0.121.rc5.git4.fc9 #1 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [__lock_acquire+2287/3089] __lock_acquire+0x8ef/0xc11 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [sched_clock+8/11] ? sched_clock+0x8/0xb > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [lock_acquire+106/144] lock_acquire+0x6a/0x90 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8bd9321>] ? l2cap_sock_bind+0x29/0x108 [l2cap] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [lock_sock_nested+182/198] lock_sock_nested+0xb6/0xc6 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8bd9321>] ? l2cap_sock_bind+0x29/0x108 [l2cap] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [security_socket_post_create+22/27] ? security_socket_post_create+0x16/0x1b > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [__sock_create+388/472] ? __sock_create+0x184/0x1d8 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8bd9321>] l2cap_sock_bind+0x29/0x108 [l2cap] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [kernel_bind+10/13] kernel_bind+0xa/0xd > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8dad3d7>] rfcomm_dlc_open+0xc8/0x294 [rfcomm] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [lock_sock_nested+187/198] ? lock_sock_nested+0xbb/0xc6 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8dae18c>] rfcomm_sock_connect+0x8b/0xc2 [rfcomm] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [sys_connect+96/125] sys_connect+0x60/0x7d > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [__lock_acquire+1370/3089] ? __lock_acquire+0x55a/0xc11 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [sys_socketcall+140/392] sys_socketcall+0x8c/0x188 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [syscall_call+7/11] syscall_call+0x7/0xb --- Signed-off-by: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-04-02 13:58:35 +07:00
static struct lock_class_key bt_lock_key[BT_MAX_PROTO];
static const char *const bt_key_strings[BT_MAX_PROTO] = {
bluetooth : use lockdep sub-classes for diffrent bluetooth protocol 'rfcomm connect' will trigger lockdep warnings which is caused by locking diffrent kinds of bluetooth sockets at the same time. So using sub-classes per AF_BLUETOOTH sub-type for lockdep. Thanks for the hints from dave jones. --- > From: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> > Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2008 12:21:56 -0400 > > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: Pid: 3611, comm: obex-data-serve Not tainted 2.6.25-0.121.rc5.git4.fc9 #1 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [__lock_acquire+2287/3089] __lock_acquire+0x8ef/0xc11 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [sched_clock+8/11] ? sched_clock+0x8/0xb > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [lock_acquire+106/144] lock_acquire+0x6a/0x90 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8bd9321>] ? l2cap_sock_bind+0x29/0x108 [l2cap] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [lock_sock_nested+182/198] lock_sock_nested+0xb6/0xc6 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8bd9321>] ? l2cap_sock_bind+0x29/0x108 [l2cap] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [security_socket_post_create+22/27] ? security_socket_post_create+0x16/0x1b > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [__sock_create+388/472] ? __sock_create+0x184/0x1d8 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8bd9321>] l2cap_sock_bind+0x29/0x108 [l2cap] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [kernel_bind+10/13] kernel_bind+0xa/0xd > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8dad3d7>] rfcomm_dlc_open+0xc8/0x294 [rfcomm] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [lock_sock_nested+187/198] ? lock_sock_nested+0xbb/0xc6 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8dae18c>] rfcomm_sock_connect+0x8b/0xc2 [rfcomm] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [sys_connect+96/125] sys_connect+0x60/0x7d > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [__lock_acquire+1370/3089] ? __lock_acquire+0x55a/0xc11 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [sys_socketcall+140/392] sys_socketcall+0x8c/0x188 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [syscall_call+7/11] syscall_call+0x7/0xb --- Signed-off-by: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-04-02 13:58:35 +07:00
"sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP",
"sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_HCI",
"sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO",
"sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM",
"sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_BNEP",
"sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_CMTP",
"sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_HIDP",
"sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_AVDTP",
};
static struct lock_class_key bt_slock_key[BT_MAX_PROTO];
static const char *const bt_slock_key_strings[BT_MAX_PROTO] = {
bluetooth : use lockdep sub-classes for diffrent bluetooth protocol 'rfcomm connect' will trigger lockdep warnings which is caused by locking diffrent kinds of bluetooth sockets at the same time. So using sub-classes per AF_BLUETOOTH sub-type for lockdep. Thanks for the hints from dave jones. --- > From: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> > Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2008 12:21:56 -0400 > > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: Pid: 3611, comm: obex-data-serve Not tainted 2.6.25-0.121.rc5.git4.fc9 #1 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [__lock_acquire+2287/3089] __lock_acquire+0x8ef/0xc11 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [sched_clock+8/11] ? sched_clock+0x8/0xb > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [lock_acquire+106/144] lock_acquire+0x6a/0x90 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8bd9321>] ? l2cap_sock_bind+0x29/0x108 [l2cap] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [lock_sock_nested+182/198] lock_sock_nested+0xb6/0xc6 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8bd9321>] ? l2cap_sock_bind+0x29/0x108 [l2cap] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [security_socket_post_create+22/27] ? security_socket_post_create+0x16/0x1b > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [__sock_create+388/472] ? __sock_create+0x184/0x1d8 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8bd9321>] l2cap_sock_bind+0x29/0x108 [l2cap] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [kernel_bind+10/13] kernel_bind+0xa/0xd > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8dad3d7>] rfcomm_dlc_open+0xc8/0x294 [rfcomm] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [lock_sock_nested+187/198] ? lock_sock_nested+0xbb/0xc6 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [<f8dae18c>] rfcomm_sock_connect+0x8b/0xc2 [rfcomm] > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [sys_connect+96/125] sys_connect+0x60/0x7d > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [__lock_acquire+1370/3089] ? __lock_acquire+0x55a/0xc11 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [sys_socketcall+140/392] sys_socketcall+0x8c/0x188 > > Mar 27 08:10:57 localhost kernel: [syscall_call+7/11] syscall_call+0x7/0xb --- Signed-off-by: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-04-02 13:58:35 +07:00
"slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP",
"slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_HCI",
"slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO",
"slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM",
"slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_BNEP",
"slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_CMTP",
"slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_HIDP",
"slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_AVDTP",
};
Bluetooth: silence lockdep warning Since bluetooth uses multiple protocols types, to avoid lockdep warnings, we need to use different lockdep classes (one for each protocol type). This is already done in bt_sock_create but it misses a couple of cases when new connections are created. This patch corrects that to fix the following warning: <4>[ 1864.732366] ======================================================= <4>[ 1864.733030] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] <4>[ 1864.733544] 3.0.16-mid3-00007-gc9a0f62 #3 <4>[ 1864.733883] ------------------------------------------------------- <4>[ 1864.734408] t.android.btclc/4204 is trying to acquire lock: <4>[ 1864.734869] (rfcomm_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c14970ea>] rfcomm_dlc_close+0x15/0x30 <4>[ 1864.735541] <4>[ 1864.735549] but task is already holding lock: <4>[ 1864.736045] (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.+.}, at: [<c1498bf7>] lock_sock+0xa/0xc <4>[ 1864.736732] <4>[ 1864.736740] which lock already depends on the new lock. <4>[ 1864.736750] <4>[ 1864.737428] <4>[ 1864.737437] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: <4>[ 1864.738016] <4>[ 1864.738023] -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.+.}: <4>[ 1864.738549] [<c1062273>] lock_acquire+0x104/0x140 <4>[ 1864.738977] [<c13d35c1>] lock_sock_nested+0x58/0x68 <4>[ 1864.739411] [<c1493c33>] l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x3e/0x76 <4>[ 1864.739858] [<c13d06c3>] __sock_sendmsg+0x50/0x59 <4>[ 1864.740279] [<c13d0ea2>] sock_sendmsg+0x94/0xa8 <4>[ 1864.740687] [<c13d0ede>] kernel_sendmsg+0x28/0x37 <4>[ 1864.741106] [<c14969ca>] rfcomm_send_frame+0x30/0x38 <4>[ 1864.741542] [<c1496a2a>] rfcomm_send_ua+0x58/0x5a <4>[ 1864.741959] [<c1498447>] rfcomm_run+0x441/0xb52 <4>[ 1864.742365] [<c104f095>] kthread+0x63/0x68 <4>[ 1864.742742] [<c14d5182>] kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0xd <4>[ 1864.743187] <4>[ 1864.743193] -> #0 (rfcomm_mutex){+.+.+.}: <4>[ 1864.743667] [<c1061ada>] __lock_acquire+0x988/0xc00 <4>[ 1864.744100] [<c1062273>] lock_acquire+0x104/0x140 <4>[ 1864.744519] [<c14d2c70>] __mutex_lock_common+0x3b/0x33f <4>[ 1864.744975] [<c14d303e>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2d/0x36 <4>[ 1864.745412] [<c14970ea>] rfcomm_dlc_close+0x15/0x30 <4>[ 1864.745842] [<c14990d9>] __rfcomm_sock_close+0x5f/0x6b <4>[ 1864.746288] [<c1499114>] rfcomm_sock_shutdown+0x2f/0x62 <4>[ 1864.746737] [<c13d275d>] sys_socketcall+0x1db/0x422 <4>[ 1864.747165] [<c14d42f0>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb Signed-off-by: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2012-01-22 05:28:34 +07:00
void bt_sock_reclassify_lock(struct sock *sk, int proto)
{
Bluetooth: silence lockdep warning Since bluetooth uses multiple protocols types, to avoid lockdep warnings, we need to use different lockdep classes (one for each protocol type). This is already done in bt_sock_create but it misses a couple of cases when new connections are created. This patch corrects that to fix the following warning: <4>[ 1864.732366] ======================================================= <4>[ 1864.733030] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] <4>[ 1864.733544] 3.0.16-mid3-00007-gc9a0f62 #3 <4>[ 1864.733883] ------------------------------------------------------- <4>[ 1864.734408] t.android.btclc/4204 is trying to acquire lock: <4>[ 1864.734869] (rfcomm_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c14970ea>] rfcomm_dlc_close+0x15/0x30 <4>[ 1864.735541] <4>[ 1864.735549] but task is already holding lock: <4>[ 1864.736045] (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.+.}, at: [<c1498bf7>] lock_sock+0xa/0xc <4>[ 1864.736732] <4>[ 1864.736740] which lock already depends on the new lock. <4>[ 1864.736750] <4>[ 1864.737428] <4>[ 1864.737437] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: <4>[ 1864.738016] <4>[ 1864.738023] -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.+.}: <4>[ 1864.738549] [<c1062273>] lock_acquire+0x104/0x140 <4>[ 1864.738977] [<c13d35c1>] lock_sock_nested+0x58/0x68 <4>[ 1864.739411] [<c1493c33>] l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x3e/0x76 <4>[ 1864.739858] [<c13d06c3>] __sock_sendmsg+0x50/0x59 <4>[ 1864.740279] [<c13d0ea2>] sock_sendmsg+0x94/0xa8 <4>[ 1864.740687] [<c13d0ede>] kernel_sendmsg+0x28/0x37 <4>[ 1864.741106] [<c14969ca>] rfcomm_send_frame+0x30/0x38 <4>[ 1864.741542] [<c1496a2a>] rfcomm_send_ua+0x58/0x5a <4>[ 1864.741959] [<c1498447>] rfcomm_run+0x441/0xb52 <4>[ 1864.742365] [<c104f095>] kthread+0x63/0x68 <4>[ 1864.742742] [<c14d5182>] kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0xd <4>[ 1864.743187] <4>[ 1864.743193] -> #0 (rfcomm_mutex){+.+.+.}: <4>[ 1864.743667] [<c1061ada>] __lock_acquire+0x988/0xc00 <4>[ 1864.744100] [<c1062273>] lock_acquire+0x104/0x140 <4>[ 1864.744519] [<c14d2c70>] __mutex_lock_common+0x3b/0x33f <4>[ 1864.744975] [<c14d303e>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2d/0x36 <4>[ 1864.745412] [<c14970ea>] rfcomm_dlc_close+0x15/0x30 <4>[ 1864.745842] [<c14990d9>] __rfcomm_sock_close+0x5f/0x6b <4>[ 1864.746288] [<c1499114>] rfcomm_sock_shutdown+0x2f/0x62 <4>[ 1864.746737] [<c13d275d>] sys_socketcall+0x1db/0x422 <4>[ 1864.747165] [<c14d42f0>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb Signed-off-by: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2012-01-22 05:28:34 +07:00
BUG_ON(!sk);
BUG_ON(!sock_allow_reclassification(sk));
sock_lock_init_class_and_name(sk,
bt_slock_key_strings[proto], &bt_slock_key[proto],
bt_key_strings[proto], &bt_lock_key[proto]);
}
Bluetooth: silence lockdep warning Since bluetooth uses multiple protocols types, to avoid lockdep warnings, we need to use different lockdep classes (one for each protocol type). This is already done in bt_sock_create but it misses a couple of cases when new connections are created. This patch corrects that to fix the following warning: <4>[ 1864.732366] ======================================================= <4>[ 1864.733030] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] <4>[ 1864.733544] 3.0.16-mid3-00007-gc9a0f62 #3 <4>[ 1864.733883] ------------------------------------------------------- <4>[ 1864.734408] t.android.btclc/4204 is trying to acquire lock: <4>[ 1864.734869] (rfcomm_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c14970ea>] rfcomm_dlc_close+0x15/0x30 <4>[ 1864.735541] <4>[ 1864.735549] but task is already holding lock: <4>[ 1864.736045] (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.+.}, at: [<c1498bf7>] lock_sock+0xa/0xc <4>[ 1864.736732] <4>[ 1864.736740] which lock already depends on the new lock. <4>[ 1864.736750] <4>[ 1864.737428] <4>[ 1864.737437] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: <4>[ 1864.738016] <4>[ 1864.738023] -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.+.}: <4>[ 1864.738549] [<c1062273>] lock_acquire+0x104/0x140 <4>[ 1864.738977] [<c13d35c1>] lock_sock_nested+0x58/0x68 <4>[ 1864.739411] [<c1493c33>] l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x3e/0x76 <4>[ 1864.739858] [<c13d06c3>] __sock_sendmsg+0x50/0x59 <4>[ 1864.740279] [<c13d0ea2>] sock_sendmsg+0x94/0xa8 <4>[ 1864.740687] [<c13d0ede>] kernel_sendmsg+0x28/0x37 <4>[ 1864.741106] [<c14969ca>] rfcomm_send_frame+0x30/0x38 <4>[ 1864.741542] [<c1496a2a>] rfcomm_send_ua+0x58/0x5a <4>[ 1864.741959] [<c1498447>] rfcomm_run+0x441/0xb52 <4>[ 1864.742365] [<c104f095>] kthread+0x63/0x68 <4>[ 1864.742742] [<c14d5182>] kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0xd <4>[ 1864.743187] <4>[ 1864.743193] -> #0 (rfcomm_mutex){+.+.+.}: <4>[ 1864.743667] [<c1061ada>] __lock_acquire+0x988/0xc00 <4>[ 1864.744100] [<c1062273>] lock_acquire+0x104/0x140 <4>[ 1864.744519] [<c14d2c70>] __mutex_lock_common+0x3b/0x33f <4>[ 1864.744975] [<c14d303e>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2d/0x36 <4>[ 1864.745412] [<c14970ea>] rfcomm_dlc_close+0x15/0x30 <4>[ 1864.745842] [<c14990d9>] __rfcomm_sock_close+0x5f/0x6b <4>[ 1864.746288] [<c1499114>] rfcomm_sock_shutdown+0x2f/0x62 <4>[ 1864.746737] [<c13d275d>] sys_socketcall+0x1db/0x422 <4>[ 1864.747165] [<c14d42f0>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb Signed-off-by: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2012-01-22 05:28:34 +07:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_sock_reclassify_lock);
int bt_sock_register(int proto, const struct net_proto_family *ops)
{
int err = 0;
if (proto < 0 || proto >= BT_MAX_PROTO)
return -EINVAL;
write_lock(&bt_proto_lock);
if (bt_proto[proto])
err = -EEXIST;
else
bt_proto[proto] = ops;
write_unlock(&bt_proto_lock);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_sock_register);
void bt_sock_unregister(int proto)
{
if (proto < 0 || proto >= BT_MAX_PROTO)
return;
write_lock(&bt_proto_lock);
bt_proto[proto] = NULL;
write_unlock(&bt_proto_lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_sock_unregister);
static int bt_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int proto,
int kern)
{
int err;
if (net != &init_net)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (proto < 0 || proto >= BT_MAX_PROTO)
return -EINVAL;
if (!bt_proto[proto])
request_module("bt-proto-%d", proto);
err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
read_lock(&bt_proto_lock);
if (bt_proto[proto] && try_module_get(bt_proto[proto]->owner)) {
err = bt_proto[proto]->create(net, sock, proto, kern);
Bluetooth: silence lockdep warning Since bluetooth uses multiple protocols types, to avoid lockdep warnings, we need to use different lockdep classes (one for each protocol type). This is already done in bt_sock_create but it misses a couple of cases when new connections are created. This patch corrects that to fix the following warning: <4>[ 1864.732366] ======================================================= <4>[ 1864.733030] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] <4>[ 1864.733544] 3.0.16-mid3-00007-gc9a0f62 #3 <4>[ 1864.733883] ------------------------------------------------------- <4>[ 1864.734408] t.android.btclc/4204 is trying to acquire lock: <4>[ 1864.734869] (rfcomm_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c14970ea>] rfcomm_dlc_close+0x15/0x30 <4>[ 1864.735541] <4>[ 1864.735549] but task is already holding lock: <4>[ 1864.736045] (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.+.}, at: [<c1498bf7>] lock_sock+0xa/0xc <4>[ 1864.736732] <4>[ 1864.736740] which lock already depends on the new lock. <4>[ 1864.736750] <4>[ 1864.737428] <4>[ 1864.737437] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: <4>[ 1864.738016] <4>[ 1864.738023] -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.+.}: <4>[ 1864.738549] [<c1062273>] lock_acquire+0x104/0x140 <4>[ 1864.738977] [<c13d35c1>] lock_sock_nested+0x58/0x68 <4>[ 1864.739411] [<c1493c33>] l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x3e/0x76 <4>[ 1864.739858] [<c13d06c3>] __sock_sendmsg+0x50/0x59 <4>[ 1864.740279] [<c13d0ea2>] sock_sendmsg+0x94/0xa8 <4>[ 1864.740687] [<c13d0ede>] kernel_sendmsg+0x28/0x37 <4>[ 1864.741106] [<c14969ca>] rfcomm_send_frame+0x30/0x38 <4>[ 1864.741542] [<c1496a2a>] rfcomm_send_ua+0x58/0x5a <4>[ 1864.741959] [<c1498447>] rfcomm_run+0x441/0xb52 <4>[ 1864.742365] [<c104f095>] kthread+0x63/0x68 <4>[ 1864.742742] [<c14d5182>] kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0xd <4>[ 1864.743187] <4>[ 1864.743193] -> #0 (rfcomm_mutex){+.+.+.}: <4>[ 1864.743667] [<c1061ada>] __lock_acquire+0x988/0xc00 <4>[ 1864.744100] [<c1062273>] lock_acquire+0x104/0x140 <4>[ 1864.744519] [<c14d2c70>] __mutex_lock_common+0x3b/0x33f <4>[ 1864.744975] [<c14d303e>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2d/0x36 <4>[ 1864.745412] [<c14970ea>] rfcomm_dlc_close+0x15/0x30 <4>[ 1864.745842] [<c14990d9>] __rfcomm_sock_close+0x5f/0x6b <4>[ 1864.746288] [<c1499114>] rfcomm_sock_shutdown+0x2f/0x62 <4>[ 1864.746737] [<c13d275d>] sys_socketcall+0x1db/0x422 <4>[ 1864.747165] [<c14d42f0>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb Signed-off-by: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2012-01-22 05:28:34 +07:00
if (!err)
bt_sock_reclassify_lock(sock->sk, proto);
module_put(bt_proto[proto]->owner);
}
read_unlock(&bt_proto_lock);
return err;
}
void bt_sock_link(struct bt_sock_list *l, struct sock *sk)
{
write_lock(&l->lock);
sk_add_node(sk, &l->head);
write_unlock(&l->lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_sock_link);
void bt_sock_unlink(struct bt_sock_list *l, struct sock *sk)
{
write_lock(&l->lock);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
write_unlock(&l->lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_sock_unlink);
void bt_accept_enqueue(struct sock *parent, struct sock *sk)
{
BT_DBG("parent %p, sk %p", parent, sk);
sock_hold(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
list_add_tail(&bt_sk(sk)->accept_q, &bt_sk(parent)->accept_q);
bt_sk(sk)->parent = parent;
release_sock(sk);
parent->sk_ack_backlog++;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_accept_enqueue);
Bluetooth: Avoid bt_accept_unlink() double unlinking There is a race condition between a thread calling bt_accept_dequeue() and a different thread calling bt_accept_unlink(). Protection against concurrency is implemented using sk locking. However, sk locking causes serialisation of the bt_accept_dequeue() and bt_accept_unlink() threads. This serialisation can cause bt_accept_dequeue() to obtain the sk from the parent list but becomes blocked waiting for the sk lock held by the bt_accept_unlink() thread. bt_accept_unlink() unlinks sk and this thread releases the sk lock unblocking bt_accept_dequeue() which potentially runs bt_accept_unlink() again on the same sk causing a crash. The attempt to double unlink the same sk from the parent list can cause a NULL pointer dereference crash due to bt_sk(sk)->parent becoming NULL on the first unlink, followed by the second unlink trying to execute bt_sk(sk)->parent->sk_ack_backlog-- in bt_accept_unlink() which crashes. When sk is in the parent list, bt_sk(sk)->parent will be not be NULL. When sk is removed from the parent list, bt_sk(sk)->parent is set to NULL. Therefore, add a defensive check for bt_sk(sk)->parent not being NULL to ensure that sk is still in the parent list after the sk lock has been taken in bt_accept_dequeue(). If bt_sk(sk)->parent is detected as being NULL then restart the loop so that the loop variables are refreshed to use the latest values. This is necessary as list_for_each_entry_safe() is not thread safe so causing a risk of an infinite loop occurring as sk could point to itself. In addition, in bt_accept_dequeue() increase the sk reference count to protect against early freeing of sk. Early freeing can be possible if the bt_accept_unlink() thread calls l2cap_sock_kill() or rfcomm_sock_kill() functions before bt_accept_dequeue() gets the sk lock. For test purposes, the probability of failure can be increased by putting a msleep of 1 second in bt_accept_dequeue() between getting the sk and waiting for the sk lock. This exposes the fact that the loop list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, &bt_sk(parent)->accept_q) is not safe from threads that unlink sk from the list in parallel with the loop which can cause sk to become stale within the loop. Signed-off-by: Dean Jenkins <Dean_Jenkins@mentor.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2017-03-10 18:34:46 +07:00
/* Calling function must hold the sk lock.
* bt_sk(sk)->parent must be non-NULL meaning sk is in the parent list.
*/
void bt_accept_unlink(struct sock *sk)
{
BT_DBG("sk %p state %d", sk, sk->sk_state);
list_del_init(&bt_sk(sk)->accept_q);
bt_sk(sk)->parent->sk_ack_backlog--;
bt_sk(sk)->parent = NULL;
sock_put(sk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_accept_unlink);
struct sock *bt_accept_dequeue(struct sock *parent, struct socket *newsock)
{
struct bt_sock *s, *n;
struct sock *sk;
BT_DBG("parent %p", parent);
Bluetooth: Avoid bt_accept_unlink() double unlinking There is a race condition between a thread calling bt_accept_dequeue() and a different thread calling bt_accept_unlink(). Protection against concurrency is implemented using sk locking. However, sk locking causes serialisation of the bt_accept_dequeue() and bt_accept_unlink() threads. This serialisation can cause bt_accept_dequeue() to obtain the sk from the parent list but becomes blocked waiting for the sk lock held by the bt_accept_unlink() thread. bt_accept_unlink() unlinks sk and this thread releases the sk lock unblocking bt_accept_dequeue() which potentially runs bt_accept_unlink() again on the same sk causing a crash. The attempt to double unlink the same sk from the parent list can cause a NULL pointer dereference crash due to bt_sk(sk)->parent becoming NULL on the first unlink, followed by the second unlink trying to execute bt_sk(sk)->parent->sk_ack_backlog-- in bt_accept_unlink() which crashes. When sk is in the parent list, bt_sk(sk)->parent will be not be NULL. When sk is removed from the parent list, bt_sk(sk)->parent is set to NULL. Therefore, add a defensive check for bt_sk(sk)->parent not being NULL to ensure that sk is still in the parent list after the sk lock has been taken in bt_accept_dequeue(). If bt_sk(sk)->parent is detected as being NULL then restart the loop so that the loop variables are refreshed to use the latest values. This is necessary as list_for_each_entry_safe() is not thread safe so causing a risk of an infinite loop occurring as sk could point to itself. In addition, in bt_accept_dequeue() increase the sk reference count to protect against early freeing of sk. Early freeing can be possible if the bt_accept_unlink() thread calls l2cap_sock_kill() or rfcomm_sock_kill() functions before bt_accept_dequeue() gets the sk lock. For test purposes, the probability of failure can be increased by putting a msleep of 1 second in bt_accept_dequeue() between getting the sk and waiting for the sk lock. This exposes the fact that the loop list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, &bt_sk(parent)->accept_q) is not safe from threads that unlink sk from the list in parallel with the loop which can cause sk to become stale within the loop. Signed-off-by: Dean Jenkins <Dean_Jenkins@mentor.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2017-03-10 18:34:46 +07:00
restart:
list_for_each_entry_safe(s, n, &bt_sk(parent)->accept_q, accept_q) {
sk = (struct sock *)s;
Bluetooth: Avoid bt_accept_unlink() double unlinking There is a race condition between a thread calling bt_accept_dequeue() and a different thread calling bt_accept_unlink(). Protection against concurrency is implemented using sk locking. However, sk locking causes serialisation of the bt_accept_dequeue() and bt_accept_unlink() threads. This serialisation can cause bt_accept_dequeue() to obtain the sk from the parent list but becomes blocked waiting for the sk lock held by the bt_accept_unlink() thread. bt_accept_unlink() unlinks sk and this thread releases the sk lock unblocking bt_accept_dequeue() which potentially runs bt_accept_unlink() again on the same sk causing a crash. The attempt to double unlink the same sk from the parent list can cause a NULL pointer dereference crash due to bt_sk(sk)->parent becoming NULL on the first unlink, followed by the second unlink trying to execute bt_sk(sk)->parent->sk_ack_backlog-- in bt_accept_unlink() which crashes. When sk is in the parent list, bt_sk(sk)->parent will be not be NULL. When sk is removed from the parent list, bt_sk(sk)->parent is set to NULL. Therefore, add a defensive check for bt_sk(sk)->parent not being NULL to ensure that sk is still in the parent list after the sk lock has been taken in bt_accept_dequeue(). If bt_sk(sk)->parent is detected as being NULL then restart the loop so that the loop variables are refreshed to use the latest values. This is necessary as list_for_each_entry_safe() is not thread safe so causing a risk of an infinite loop occurring as sk could point to itself. In addition, in bt_accept_dequeue() increase the sk reference count to protect against early freeing of sk. Early freeing can be possible if the bt_accept_unlink() thread calls l2cap_sock_kill() or rfcomm_sock_kill() functions before bt_accept_dequeue() gets the sk lock. For test purposes, the probability of failure can be increased by putting a msleep of 1 second in bt_accept_dequeue() between getting the sk and waiting for the sk lock. This exposes the fact that the loop list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, &bt_sk(parent)->accept_q) is not safe from threads that unlink sk from the list in parallel with the loop which can cause sk to become stale within the loop. Signed-off-by: Dean Jenkins <Dean_Jenkins@mentor.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2017-03-10 18:34:46 +07:00
/* Prevent early freeing of sk due to unlink and sock_kill */
sock_hold(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
Bluetooth: Avoid bt_accept_unlink() double unlinking There is a race condition between a thread calling bt_accept_dequeue() and a different thread calling bt_accept_unlink(). Protection against concurrency is implemented using sk locking. However, sk locking causes serialisation of the bt_accept_dequeue() and bt_accept_unlink() threads. This serialisation can cause bt_accept_dequeue() to obtain the sk from the parent list but becomes blocked waiting for the sk lock held by the bt_accept_unlink() thread. bt_accept_unlink() unlinks sk and this thread releases the sk lock unblocking bt_accept_dequeue() which potentially runs bt_accept_unlink() again on the same sk causing a crash. The attempt to double unlink the same sk from the parent list can cause a NULL pointer dereference crash due to bt_sk(sk)->parent becoming NULL on the first unlink, followed by the second unlink trying to execute bt_sk(sk)->parent->sk_ack_backlog-- in bt_accept_unlink() which crashes. When sk is in the parent list, bt_sk(sk)->parent will be not be NULL. When sk is removed from the parent list, bt_sk(sk)->parent is set to NULL. Therefore, add a defensive check for bt_sk(sk)->parent not being NULL to ensure that sk is still in the parent list after the sk lock has been taken in bt_accept_dequeue(). If bt_sk(sk)->parent is detected as being NULL then restart the loop so that the loop variables are refreshed to use the latest values. This is necessary as list_for_each_entry_safe() is not thread safe so causing a risk of an infinite loop occurring as sk could point to itself. In addition, in bt_accept_dequeue() increase the sk reference count to protect against early freeing of sk. Early freeing can be possible if the bt_accept_unlink() thread calls l2cap_sock_kill() or rfcomm_sock_kill() functions before bt_accept_dequeue() gets the sk lock. For test purposes, the probability of failure can be increased by putting a msleep of 1 second in bt_accept_dequeue() between getting the sk and waiting for the sk lock. This exposes the fact that the loop list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, &bt_sk(parent)->accept_q) is not safe from threads that unlink sk from the list in parallel with the loop which can cause sk to become stale within the loop. Signed-off-by: Dean Jenkins <Dean_Jenkins@mentor.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2017-03-10 18:34:46 +07:00
/* Check sk has not already been unlinked via
* bt_accept_unlink() due to serialisation caused by sk locking
*/
if (!bt_sk(sk)->parent) {
BT_DBG("sk %p, already unlinked", sk);
release_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
/* Restart the loop as sk is no longer in the list
* and also avoid a potential infinite loop because
* list_for_each_entry_safe() is not thread safe.
*/
goto restart;
}
/* sk is safely in the parent list so reduce reference count */
sock_put(sk);
/* FIXME: Is this check still needed */
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CLOSED) {
bt_accept_unlink(sk);
Bluetooth: Fix locking in bt_accept_dequeue after disconnection Fix a crash that may happen when bt_accept_dequeue is run after a Bluetooth connection has been disconnected. bt_accept_unlink was called after release_sock, permitting bt_accept_unlink to run twice on the same socket and cause a NULL pointer dereference. [50510.241632] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001a8 [50510.241694] IP: [<ffffffffc01243f7>] bt_accept_unlink+0x47/0xa0 [bluetooth] [50510.241759] PGD 0 [50510.241776] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP [50510.241802] Modules linked in: rtl8192cu rtl_usb rtlwifi rtl8192c_common 8021q garp stp mrp llc rfcomm bnep nls_iso8859_1 intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp arc4 ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath kvm eeepc_wmi asus_wmi mac80211 snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek sparse_keymap crct10dif_pclmul snd_hda_codec_generic crc32_pclmul snd_hda_intel snd_hda_controller cfg80211 snd_hda_codec i915 snd_hwdep snd_pcm ghash_clmulni_intel snd_timer snd soundcore serio_raw cryptd drm_kms_helper drm i2c_algo_bit shpchp ath3k mei_me lpc_ich btusb bluetooth 6lowpan_iphc mei lp parport wmi video mac_hid psmouse ahci libahci r8169 mii [50510.242279] CPU: 0 PID: 934 Comm: krfcommd Not tainted 3.16.0-49-generic #65~14.04.1-Ubuntu [50510.242327] Hardware name: ASUSTeK Computer INC. VM40B/VM40B, BIOS 1501 12/09/2014 [50510.242370] task: ffff8800d9068a30 ti: ffff8800d7a54000 task.ti: ffff8800d7a54000 [50510.242413] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffc01243f7>] [<ffffffffc01243f7>] bt_accept_unlink+0x47/0xa0 [bluetooth] [50510.242480] RSP: 0018:ffff8800d7a57d58 EFLAGS: 00010246 [50510.242511] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880119bb8c00 RCX: ffff880119bb8eb0 [50510.242552] RDX: ffff880119bb8eb0 RSI: 00000000fffffe01 RDI: ffff880119bb8c00 [50510.242592] RBP: ffff8800d7a57d60 R08: 0000000000000283 R09: 0000000000000001 [50510.242633] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800d8da9eb0 [50510.242673] R13: ffff8800d74fdb80 R14: ffff880119bb8c00 R15: ffff8800d8da9c00 [50510.242715] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [50510.242761] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [50510.242794] CR2: 00000000000001a8 CR3: 0000000001c13000 CR4: 00000000001407f0 [50510.242835] Stack: [50510.242849] ffff880119bb8eb0 ffff8800d7a57da0 ffffffffc0124506 ffff8800d8da9eb0 [50510.242899] ffff8800d8da9c00 ffff8800d9068a30 0000000000000000 ffff8800d74fdb80 [50510.242949] ffff8800d6f85208 ffff8800d7a57e08 ffffffffc0159985 000000000000001f [50510.242999] Call Trace: [50510.243027] [<ffffffffc0124506>] bt_accept_dequeue+0xb6/0x180 [bluetooth] [50510.243085] [<ffffffffc0159985>] l2cap_sock_accept+0x125/0x220 [bluetooth] [50510.243128] [<ffffffff810a1b30>] ? wake_up_state+0x20/0x20 [50510.243163] [<ffffffff8164946e>] kernel_accept+0x4e/0xa0 [50510.243200] [<ffffffffc05b97cd>] rfcomm_run+0x1ad/0x890 [rfcomm] [50510.243238] [<ffffffffc05b9620>] ? rfcomm_process_rx+0x8a0/0x8a0 [rfcomm] [50510.243281] [<ffffffff81091572>] kthread+0xd2/0xf0 [50510.243312] [<ffffffff810914a0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c0/0x1c0 [50510.243353] [<ffffffff8176e9d8>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90 [50510.243387] [<ffffffff810914a0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c0/0x1c0 [50510.243424] Code: 00 48 8b 93 b8 02 00 00 48 8d 83 b0 02 00 00 48 89 51 08 48 89 0a 48 89 83 b0 02 00 00 48 89 83 b8 02 00 00 48 8b 83 c0 02 00 00 <66> 83 a8 a8 01 00 00 01 48 c7 83 c0 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 ff [50510.243685] RIP [<ffffffffc01243f7>] bt_accept_unlink+0x47/0xa0 [bluetooth] [50510.243737] RSP <ffff8800d7a57d58> [50510.243758] CR2: 00000000000001a8 [50510.249457] ---[ end trace bb984f932c4e3ab3 ]--- Signed-off-by: Yichen Zhao <zhaoyichen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2015-12-02 02:11:01 +07:00
release_sock(sk);
continue;
}
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED || !newsock ||
test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(parent)->flags)) {
bt_accept_unlink(sk);
if (newsock)
sock_graft(sk, newsock);
Bluetooth: fix crash by disabling tasklet in sock accept Crash can happen when tasklet handling connect/disconnect requests preempts socket accept. Can be reproduced with "l2test -r" on one side and several "l2test -c -b 1000 -i hci0 -P 10 <bdaddr>" on the other side. disable taskets in socket accept and change lock_sock and release_sock to bh_lock_sock and bh_unlock_sock since we have to use spinlocks and there is no need to mark sock as owned by user. ... [ 3555.897247] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000bc [ 3555.915039] pgd = cab9c000 [ 3555.917785] [000000bc] *pgd=8bf3d031, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 [ 3555.928314] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT [ 3555.999786] CPU: 0 Not tainted (2.6.32.21-13874-g67918ef #65) ... [ 3556.005981] PC is at bt_accept_unlink+0x20/0x58 [bluetooth] [ 3556.011627] LR is at bt_accept_dequeue+0x3c/0xe8 [bluetooth] ... [ 3556.161285] [<bf0007fc>] (bt_accept_unlink+0x20/0x58 [bluetooth]) from [<bf000870>] (bt_accept_dequeue+0x3c/0xe8 [bluetooth]) [ 3556.172729] [<bf000870>] (bt_accept_dequeue+0x3c/0xe8 [bluetooth]) from [<bf324df8>] (l2cap_sock_accept+0x100/0x15c [l2cap]) [ 3556.184082] [<bf324df8>] (l2cap_sock_accept+0x100/0x15c [l2cap]) from [<c026a0a8>] (sys_accept4+0x120/0x1e0) [ 3556.193969] [<c026a0a8>] (sys_accept4+0x120/0x1e0) from [<c002c9a0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x2c) [ 3556.202819] Code: e5813000 e5901164 e580c160 e580c15c (e1d13bbc) ... Signed-off-by: Andrei Emeltchenko <andrei.emeltchenko@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
2011-01-24 15:53:24 +07:00
release_sock(sk);
return sk;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
Bluetooth: fix crash by disabling tasklet in sock accept Crash can happen when tasklet handling connect/disconnect requests preempts socket accept. Can be reproduced with "l2test -r" on one side and several "l2test -c -b 1000 -i hci0 -P 10 <bdaddr>" on the other side. disable taskets in socket accept and change lock_sock and release_sock to bh_lock_sock and bh_unlock_sock since we have to use spinlocks and there is no need to mark sock as owned by user. ... [ 3555.897247] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000bc [ 3555.915039] pgd = cab9c000 [ 3555.917785] [000000bc] *pgd=8bf3d031, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 [ 3555.928314] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT [ 3555.999786] CPU: 0 Not tainted (2.6.32.21-13874-g67918ef #65) ... [ 3556.005981] PC is at bt_accept_unlink+0x20/0x58 [bluetooth] [ 3556.011627] LR is at bt_accept_dequeue+0x3c/0xe8 [bluetooth] ... [ 3556.161285] [<bf0007fc>] (bt_accept_unlink+0x20/0x58 [bluetooth]) from [<bf000870>] (bt_accept_dequeue+0x3c/0xe8 [bluetooth]) [ 3556.172729] [<bf000870>] (bt_accept_dequeue+0x3c/0xe8 [bluetooth]) from [<bf324df8>] (l2cap_sock_accept+0x100/0x15c [l2cap]) [ 3556.184082] [<bf324df8>] (l2cap_sock_accept+0x100/0x15c [l2cap]) from [<c026a0a8>] (sys_accept4+0x120/0x1e0) [ 3556.193969] [<c026a0a8>] (sys_accept4+0x120/0x1e0) from [<c002c9a0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x2c) [ 3556.202819] Code: e5813000 e5901164 e580c160 e580c15c (e1d13bbc) ... Signed-off-by: Andrei Emeltchenko <andrei.emeltchenko@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
2011-01-24 15:53:24 +07:00
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_accept_dequeue);
int bt_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t copied;
size_t skblen;
int err;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p len %zu", sock, sk, len);
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) to return msg_name to the user. This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak uninitialized memory. Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets msg_name to NULL. Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David Miller. Changes since RFC: Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of verify_iovec. With this change in place I could remove " if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0) msg->msg_name = NULL ". This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL. Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change comments to netdev style. Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-21 09:14:22 +07:00
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) to return msg_name to the user. This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak uninitialized memory. Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets msg_name to NULL. Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David Miller. Changes since RFC: Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of verify_iovec. With this change in place I could remove " if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0) msg->msg_name = NULL ". This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL. Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change comments to netdev style. Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-21 09:14:22 +07:00
return err;
}
skblen = skb->len;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, 0, msg, copied);
if (err == 0) {
net: Generalize socket rx gap / receive queue overflow cmsg Create a new socket level option to report number of queue overflows Recently I augmented the AF_PACKET protocol to report the number of frames lost on the socket receive queue between any two enqueued frames. This value was exported via a SOL_PACKET level cmsg. AFter I completed that work it was requested that this feature be generalized so that any datagram oriented socket could make use of this option. As such I've created this patch, It creates a new SOL_SOCKET level option called SO_RXQ_OVFL, which when enabled exports a SOL_SOCKET level cmsg that reports the nubmer of times the sk_receive_queue overflowed between any two given frames. It also augments the AF_PACKET protocol to take advantage of this new feature (as it previously did not touch sk->sk_drops, which this patch uses to record the overflow count). Tested successfully by me. Notes: 1) Unlike my previous patch, this patch simply records the sk_drops value, which is not a number of drops between packets, but rather a total number of drops. Deltas must be computed in user space. 2) While this patch currently works with datagram oriented protocols, it will also be accepted by non-datagram oriented protocols. I'm not sure if thats agreeable to everyone, but my argument in favor of doing so is that, for those protocols which aren't applicable to this option, sk_drops will always be zero, and reporting no drops on a receive queue that isn't used for those non-participating protocols seems reasonable to me. This also saves us having to code in a per-protocol opt in mechanism. 3) This applies cleanly to net-next assuming that commit 977750076d98c7ff6cbda51858bb5a5894a9d9ab (my af packet cmsg patch) is reverted Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-10-13 03:26:31 +07:00
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
Bluetooth: Fix NULL pointer dereference in bt_sock_recvmsg As per the comment in include/linux/net.h, the recvfrom handlers should expect msg_name to be NULL. However, bt_sock_recvmsg() is currently not checking it, which could lead to a NULL pointer dereference. The following NULL pointer dereference was produced while testing L2CAP datagram reception. Note that the kernel is tainted due to the r8723bs module being inserted. However, it seems the fix still applies. $ l2test -r -G l2test[326]: Receiving ... Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 pgd = ee008000 [00000000] *pgd=7f896835 Internal error: Oops: 817 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: r8723bs(O) CPU: 0 PID: 326 Comm: l2test Tainted: G O 4.8.0 #1 Hardware name: Allwinner sun7i (A20) Family task: ef1c6880 task.stack: eea70000 PC is at __memzero+0x58/0x80 LR is at l2cap_skb_msg_name+0x1c/0x4c pc : [<c02c47d8>] lr : [<c0506278>] psr: 00070013 sp : eea71e60 ip : 00000000 fp : 00034e1c r10: 00000000 r9 : 00000000 r8 : eea71ed4 r7 : 000002a0 r6 : eea71ed8 r5 : 00000000 r4 : ee4a5d80 r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 0000000e r0 : 00000000 Flags: nzcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 10c5387d Table: 7600806a DAC: 00000051 Process l2test (pid: 326, stack limit = 0xeea70210) Stack: (0xeea71e60 to 0xeea72000) 1e60: ee4a5d80 eeac2800 000002a0 c04d7114 173eefa0 00000000 c06ca68e 00000000 1e80: 00000001 eeac2800 eef23500 00000000 000002a0 eea71ed4 eea70000 c0504d50 1ea0: 00000000 00000000 eef23500 00000000 00000000 c044e8a0 eea71edc eea9f904 1ec0: bef89aa0 fffffff7 00000000 00035008 000002a0 00000000 00000000 00000000 1ee0: 00000000 00000000 eea71ed4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00004000 00000000 1f00: 0000011b c01078c4 eea70000 c044e5e4 00000000 00000000 642f0001 6c2f7665 1f20: 0000676f 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 1f40: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001 bef89ad8 1f60: 000000a8 c01078c4 eea70000 00000000 00034e1c c01e6c74 00000000 00000000 1f80: 00034e1c 000341f8 00000000 00000123 c01078c4 c044e90c 00000000 00000000 1fa0: 000002a0 c0107700 00034e1c 000341f8 00000003 00035008 000002a0 00000000 1fc0: 00034e1c 000341f8 00000000 00000123 00000000 00000000 00011ffc 00034e1c 1fe0: 00000000 bef89aa4 0001211c b6eebb60 60070010 00000003 00000000 00000000 [<c02c47d8>] (__memzero) from [<c0506278>] (l2cap_skb_msg_name+0x1c/0x4c) [<c0506278>] (l2cap_skb_msg_name) from [<c04d7114>] (bt_sock_recvmsg+0x128/0x160) [<c04d7114>] (bt_sock_recvmsg) from [<c0504d50>] (l2cap_sock_recvmsg+0x98/0x134) [<c0504d50>] (l2cap_sock_recvmsg) from [<c044e8a0>] (SyS_recvfrom+0x94/0xec) [<c044e8a0>] (SyS_recvfrom) from [<c044e90c>] (SyS_recv+0x14/0x1c) [<c044e90c>] (SyS_recv) from [<c0107700>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x3c) Code: e3110010 18a0500c e49de004 e3110008 (18a0000c) ---[ end trace 224e35e79fe06b42 ]--- Signed-off-by: Ezequiel Garcia <ezequiel@vanguardiasur.com.ar> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2016-12-29 19:51:19 +07:00
if (msg->msg_name && bt_sk(sk)->skb_msg_name)
bt_sk(sk)->skb_msg_name(skb, msg->msg_name,
&msg->msg_namelen);
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
copied = skblen;
return err ? : copied;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_sock_recvmsg);
static long bt_sock_data_wait(struct sock *sk, long timeo)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
break;
if (sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
break;
if (signal_pending(current) || !timeo)
break;
sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
release_sock(sk);
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
lock_sock(sk);
sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
return timeo;
}
int bt_sock_stream_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
size_t target, copied = 0;
long timeo;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
BT_DBG("sk %p size %zu", sk, size);
lock_sock(sk);
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, size);
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
do {
struct sk_buff *skb;
int chunk;
skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (!skb) {
if (copied >= target)
break;
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
break;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
break;
timeo = bt_sock_data_wait(sk, timeo);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
goto out;
}
continue;
}
chunk = min_t(unsigned int, skb->len, size);
if (skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, 0, msg, chunk)) {
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
if (!copied)
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
copied += chunk;
size -= chunk;
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
int skb_len = skb_headlen(skb);
if (chunk <= skb_len) {
__skb_pull(skb, chunk);
} else {
struct sk_buff *frag;
__skb_pull(skb, skb_len);
chunk -= skb_len;
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag) {
if (chunk <= frag->len) {
/* Pulling partial data */
skb->len -= chunk;
skb->data_len -= chunk;
__skb_pull(frag, chunk);
break;
} else if (frag->len) {
/* Pulling all frag data */
chunk -= frag->len;
skb->len -= frag->len;
skb->data_len -= frag->len;
__skb_pull(frag, frag->len);
}
}
}
if (skb->len) {
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
break;
}
kfree_skb(skb);
} else {
/* put message back and return */
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
break;
}
} while (size);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return copied ? : err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_sock_stream_recvmsg);
static inline unsigned int bt_accept_poll(struct sock *parent)
{
struct bt_sock *s, *n;
struct sock *sk;
list_for_each_entry_safe(s, n, &bt_sk(parent)->accept_q, accept_q) {
sk = (struct sock *)s;
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED ||
(test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(parent)->flags) &&
sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2))
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
}
return 0;
}
unsigned int bt_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
poll_table *wait)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
unsigned int mask = 0;
BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
poll_wait(file, sk_sleep(sk), wait);
if (sk->sk_state == BT_LISTEN)
return bt_accept_poll(sk);
if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue))
mask |= POLLERR |
(sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0);
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
mask |= POLLRDHUP | POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (sk->sk_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK)
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CLOSED)
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT ||
sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2 ||
sk->sk_state == BT_CONFIG)
return mask;
if (!test_bit(BT_SK_SUSPEND, &bt_sk(sk)->flags) && sock_writeable(sk))
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND;
else
sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk);
return mask;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_sock_poll);
int bt_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
long amount;
int err;
BT_DBG("sk %p cmd %x arg %lx", sk, cmd, arg);
switch (cmd) {
case TIOCOUTQ:
if (sk->sk_state == BT_LISTEN)
return -EINVAL;
amount = sk->sk_sndbuf - sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk);
if (amount < 0)
amount = 0;
err = put_user(amount, (int __user *) arg);
break;
case TIOCINQ:
if (sk->sk_state == BT_LISTEN)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
amount = skb ? skb->len : 0;
release_sock(sk);
err = put_user(amount, (int __user *) arg);
break;
case SIOCGSTAMP:
err = sock_get_timestamp(sk, (struct timeval __user *) arg);
break;
case SIOCGSTAMPNS:
err = sock_get_timestampns(sk, (struct timespec __user *) arg);
break;
default:
err = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
break;
}
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_sock_ioctl);
/* This function expects the sk lock to be held when called */
int bt_sock_wait_state(struct sock *sk, int state, unsigned long timeo)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
while (sk->sk_state != state) {
if (!timeo) {
err = -EINPROGRESS;
break;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
lock_sock(sk);
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
break;
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_sock_wait_state);
/* This function expects the sk lock to be held when called */
int bt_sock_wait_ready(struct sock *sk, unsigned long flags)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
unsigned long timeo;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & O_NONBLOCK);
add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
while (test_bit(BT_SK_SUSPEND, &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) {
if (!timeo) {
err = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
lock_sock(sk);
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
break;
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_sock_wait_ready);
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
struct bt_seq_state {
struct bt_sock_list *l;
};
static void *bt_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
__acquires(seq->private->l->lock)
{
struct bt_seq_state *s = seq->private;
struct bt_sock_list *l = s->l;
read_lock(&l->lock);
return seq_hlist_start_head(&l->head, *pos);
}
static void *bt_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct bt_seq_state *s = seq->private;
struct bt_sock_list *l = s->l;
return seq_hlist_next(v, &l->head, pos);
}
static void bt_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
__releases(seq->private->l->lock)
{
struct bt_seq_state *s = seq->private;
struct bt_sock_list *l = s->l;
read_unlock(&l->lock);
}
static int bt_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct bt_seq_state *s = seq->private;
struct bt_sock_list *l = s->l;
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(seq ,"sk RefCnt Rmem Wmem User Inode Parent");
if (l->custom_seq_show) {
seq_putc(seq, ' ');
l->custom_seq_show(seq, v);
}
seq_putc(seq, '\n');
} else {
struct sock *sk = sk_entry(v);
struct bt_sock *bt = bt_sk(sk);
seq_printf(seq,
"%pK %-6d %-6u %-6u %-6u %-6lu %-6lu",
sk,
refcount_read(&sk->sk_refcnt),
sk_rmem_alloc_get(sk),
sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk),
from_kuid(seq_user_ns(seq), sock_i_uid(sk)),
sock_i_ino(sk),
bt->parent? sock_i_ino(bt->parent): 0LU);
if (l->custom_seq_show) {
seq_putc(seq, ' ');
l->custom_seq_show(seq, v);
}
seq_putc(seq, '\n');
}
return 0;
}
static const struct seq_operations bt_seq_ops = {
.start = bt_seq_start,
.next = bt_seq_next,
.stop = bt_seq_stop,
.show = bt_seq_show,
};
static int bt_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct bt_sock_list *sk_list;
struct bt_seq_state *s;
sk_list = PDE_DATA(inode);
s = __seq_open_private(file, &bt_seq_ops,
sizeof(struct bt_seq_state));
if (!s)
return -ENOMEM;
s->l = sk_list;
return 0;
}
static const struct file_operations bt_fops = {
.open = bt_seq_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = seq_release_private
};
int bt_procfs_init(struct net *net, const char *name,
struct bt_sock_list *sk_list,
int (* seq_show)(struct seq_file *, void *))
{
sk_list->custom_seq_show = seq_show;
if (!proc_create_data(name, 0, net->proc_net, &bt_fops, sk_list))
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
void bt_procfs_cleanup(struct net *net, const char *name)
{
remove_proc_entry(name, net->proc_net);
}
#else
int bt_procfs_init(struct net *net, const char *name,
struct bt_sock_list *sk_list,
int (* seq_show)(struct seq_file *, void *))
{
return 0;
}
void bt_procfs_cleanup(struct net *net, const char *name)
{
}
#endif
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_procfs_init);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_procfs_cleanup);
static const struct net_proto_family bt_sock_family_ops = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.family = PF_BLUETOOTH,
.create = bt_sock_create,
};
struct dentry *bt_debugfs;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bt_debugfs);
#define VERSION __stringify(BT_SUBSYS_VERSION) "." \
__stringify(BT_SUBSYS_REVISION)
static int __init bt_init(void)
{
int err;
sock_skb_cb_check_size(sizeof(struct bt_skb_cb));
BT_INFO("Core ver %s", VERSION);
err = bt_selftest();
if (err < 0)
return err;
bt_debugfs = debugfs_create_dir("bluetooth", NULL);
bt_leds_init();
err = bt_sysfs_init();
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = sock_register(&bt_sock_family_ops);
if (err < 0) {
bt_sysfs_cleanup();
return err;
}
BT_INFO("HCI device and connection manager initialized");
err = hci_sock_init();
if (err < 0)
goto error;
err = l2cap_init();
if (err < 0)
goto sock_err;
err = sco_init();
if (err < 0) {
l2cap_exit();
goto sock_err;
}
err = mgmt_init();
if (err < 0) {
sco_exit();
l2cap_exit();
goto sock_err;
}
return 0;
sock_err:
hci_sock_cleanup();
error:
sock_unregister(PF_BLUETOOTH);
bt_sysfs_cleanup();
return err;
}
static void __exit bt_exit(void)
{
mgmt_exit();
sco_exit();
l2cap_exit();
hci_sock_cleanup();
sock_unregister(PF_BLUETOOTH);
bt_sysfs_cleanup();
bt_leds_cleanup();
debugfs_remove_recursive(bt_debugfs);
}
subsys_initcall(bt_init);
module_exit(bt_exit);
MODULE_AUTHOR("Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Bluetooth Core ver " VERSION);
MODULE_VERSION(VERSION);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_ALIAS_NETPROTO(PF_BLUETOOTH);