linux_dsm_epyc7002/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h

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/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H
#define _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H 1
#include <linux/bpf.h> /* for enum bpf_reg_type */
#include <linux/filter.h> /* for MAX_BPF_STACK */
#include <linux/tnum.h>
/* Maximum variable offset umax_value permitted when resolving memory accesses.
* In practice this is far bigger than any realistic pointer offset; this limit
* ensures that umax_value + (int)off + (int)size cannot overflow a u64.
*/
#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1 << 29)
/* Maximum variable size permitted for ARG_CONST_SIZE[_OR_ZERO]. This ensures
* that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow.
*/
#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ (1 << 29)
/* Liveness marks, used for registers and spilled-regs (in stack slots).
* Read marks propagate upwards until they find a write mark; they record that
* "one of this state's descendants read this reg" (and therefore the reg is
* relevant for states_equal() checks).
* Write marks collect downwards and do not propagate; they record that "the
* straight-line code that reached this state (from its parent) wrote this reg"
* (and therefore that reads propagated from this state or its descendants
* should not propagate to its parent).
* A state with a write mark can receive read marks; it just won't propagate
* them to its parent, since the write mark is a property, not of the state,
* but of the link between it and its parent. See mark_reg_read() and
* mark_stack_slot_read() in kernel/bpf/verifier.c.
*/
enum bpf_reg_liveness {
REG_LIVE_NONE = 0, /* reg hasn't been read or written this branch */
REG_LIVE_READ, /* reg was read, so we're sensitive to initial value */
REG_LIVE_WRITTEN, /* reg was written first, screening off later reads */
};
struct bpf_reg_state {
enum bpf_reg_type type;
union {
/* valid when type == PTR_TO_PACKET */
u16 range;
/* valid when type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP | PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE |
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
*/
struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
};
/* Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only */
s32 off;
/* For PTR_TO_PACKET, used to find other pointers with the same variable
* offset, so they can share range knowledge.
* For PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL this is used to share which map value we
* came from, when one is tested for != NULL.
*/
u32 id;
/* Ordering of fields matters. See states_equal() */
/* For scalar types (SCALAR_VALUE), this represents our knowledge of
* the actual value.
* For pointer types, this represents the variable part of the offset
* from the pointed-to object, and is shared with all bpf_reg_states
* with the same id as us.
*/
struct tnum var_off;
/* Used to determine if any memory access using this register will
* result in a bad access.
* These refer to the same value as var_off, not necessarily the actual
* contents of the register.
*/
s64 smin_value; /* minimum possible (s64)value */
s64 smax_value; /* maximum possible (s64)value */
u64 umin_value; /* minimum possible (u64)value */
u64 umax_value; /* maximum possible (u64)value */
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 08:55:06 +07:00
/* Inside the callee two registers can be both PTR_TO_STACK like
* R1=fp-8 and R2=fp-8, but one of them points to this function stack
* while another to the caller's stack. To differentiate them 'frameno'
* is used which is an index in bpf_verifier_state->frame[] array
* pointing to bpf_func_state.
* This field must be second to last, for states_equal() reasons.
*/
u32 frameno;
/* This field must be last, for states_equal() reasons. */
enum bpf_reg_liveness live;
};
enum bpf_stack_slot_type {
STACK_INVALID, /* nothing was stored in this stack slot */
STACK_SPILL, /* register spilled into stack */
bpf: teach verifier to recognize zero initialized stack programs with function calls are often passing various pointers via stack. When all calls are inlined llvm flattens stack accesses and optimizes away extra branches. When functions are not inlined it becomes the job of the verifier to recognize zero initialized stack to avoid exploring paths that program will not take. The following program would fail otherwise: ptr = &buffer_on_stack; *ptr = 0; ... func_call(.., ptr, ...) { if (..) *ptr = bpf_map_lookup(); } ... if (*ptr != 0) { // Access (*ptr)->field is valid. // Without stack_zero tracking such (*ptr)->field access // will be rejected } since stack slots are no longer uniform invalid | spill | misc add liveness marking to all slots, but do it in 8 byte chunks. So if nothing was read or written in [fp-16, fp-9] range it will be marked as LIVE_NONE. If any byte in that range was read, it will be marked LIVE_READ and stacksafe() check will perform byte-by-byte verification. If all bytes in the range were written the slot will be marked as LIVE_WRITTEN. This significantly speeds up state equality comparison and reduces total number of states processed. before after bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 2051 2003 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3287 3164 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1080 1080 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 24980 12361 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34308 16605 bpf_netdev.o 15404 10962 bpf_overlay.o 7191 6679 Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 08:55:08 +07:00
STACK_MISC, /* BPF program wrote some data into this slot */
STACK_ZERO, /* BPF program wrote constant zero */
};
#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8 /* size of eBPF register in bytes */
struct bpf_stack_state {
struct bpf_reg_state spilled_ptr;
u8 slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE];
};
/* state of the program:
* type of all registers and stack info
*/
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 08:55:06 +07:00
struct bpf_func_state {
struct bpf_reg_state regs[MAX_BPF_REG];
struct bpf_verifier_state *parent;
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 08:55:06 +07:00
/* index of call instruction that called into this func */
int callsite;
/* stack frame number of this function state from pov of
* enclosing bpf_verifier_state.
* 0 = main function, 1 = first callee.
*/
u32 frameno;
/* subprog number == index within subprog_stack_depth
* zero == main subprog
*/
u32 subprogno;
/* should be second to last. See copy_func_state() */
int allocated_stack;
struct bpf_stack_state *stack;
};
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 08:55:06 +07:00
#define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8
struct bpf_verifier_state {
/* call stack tracking */
struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
struct bpf_verifier_state *parent;
u32 curframe;
};
/* linked list of verifier states used to prune search */
struct bpf_verifier_state_list {
struct bpf_verifier_state state;
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *next;
};
struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
union {
enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
bpf: properly enforce index mask to prevent out-of-bounds speculation While reviewing the verifier code, I recently noticed that the following two program variants in relation to tail calls can be loaded. Variant 1: # bpftool p d x i 15 0: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+3 1: (18) r2 = map[id:5] 3: (05) goto pc+2 4: (18) r2 = map[id:6] 6: (b7) r3 = 7 7: (35) if r3 >= 0xa0 goto pc+2 8: (54) (u32) r3 &= (u32) 255 9: (85) call bpf_tail_call#12 10: (b7) r0 = 1 11: (95) exit # bpftool m s i 5 5: prog_array flags 0x0 key 4B value 4B max_entries 4 memlock 4096B # bpftool m s i 6 6: prog_array flags 0x0 key 4B value 4B max_entries 160 memlock 4096B Variant 2: # bpftool p d x i 20 0: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+3 1: (18) r2 = map[id:8] 3: (05) goto pc+2 4: (18) r2 = map[id:7] 6: (b7) r3 = 7 7: (35) if r3 >= 0x4 goto pc+2 8: (54) (u32) r3 &= (u32) 3 9: (85) call bpf_tail_call#12 10: (b7) r0 = 1 11: (95) exit # bpftool m s i 8 8: prog_array flags 0x0 key 4B value 4B max_entries 160 memlock 4096B # bpftool m s i 7 7: prog_array flags 0x0 key 4B value 4B max_entries 4 memlock 4096B In both cases the index masking inserted by the verifier in order to control out of bounds speculation from a CPU via b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") seems to be incorrect in what it is enforcing. In the 1st variant, the mask is applied from the map with the significantly larger number of entries where we would allow to a certain degree out of bounds speculation for the smaller map, and in the 2nd variant where the mask is applied from the map with the smaller number of entries, we get buggy behavior since we truncate the index of the larger map. The original intent from commit b2157399cc98 is to reject such occasions where two or more different tail call maps are used in the same tail call helper invocation. However, the check on the BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON is never hit since we never poisoned the saved pointer in the first place! We do this explicitly for map lookups but in case of tail calls we basically used the tail call map in insn_aux_data that was processed in the most recent path which the verifier walked. Thus any prior path that stored a pointer in insn_aux_data at the helper location was always overridden. Fix it by moving the map pointer poison logic into a small helper that covers both BPF helpers with the same logic. After that in fixup_bpf_calls() the poison check is then hit for tail calls and the program rejected. Latter only happens in unprivileged case since this is the *only* occasion where a rewrite needs to happen, and where such rewrite is specific to the map (max_entries, index_mask). In the privileged case the rewrite is generic for the insn->imm / insn->code update so multiple maps from different paths can be handled just fine since all the remaining logic happens in the instruction processing itself. This is similar to the case of map lookups: in case there is a collision of maps in fixup_bpf_calls() we must skip the inlined rewrite since this will turn the generic instruction sequence into a non- generic one. Thus the patch_call_imm will simply update the insn->imm location where the bpf_map_lookup_elem() will later take care of the dispatch. Given we need this 'poison' state as a check, the information of whether a map is an unpriv_array gets lost, so enforcing it prior to that needs an additional state. In general this check is needed since there are some complex and tail call intensive BPF programs out there where LLVM tends to generate such code occasionally. We therefore convert the map_ptr rather into map_state to store all this w/o extra memory overhead, and the bit whether one of the maps involved in the collision was from an unpriv_array thus needs to be retained as well there. Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-24 07:32:53 +07:00
unsigned long map_state; /* pointer/poison value for maps */
bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs Typical JIT does several passes over bpf instructions to compute total size and relative offsets of jumps and calls. With multitple bpf functions calling each other all relative calls will have invalid offsets intially therefore we need to additional last pass over the program to emit calls with correct offsets. For example in case of three bpf functions: main: call foo call bpf_map_lookup exit foo: call bar exit bar: exit We will call bpf_int_jit_compile() indepedently for main(), foo() and bar() x64 JIT typically does 4-5 passes to converge. After these initial passes the image for these 3 functions will be good except call targets, since start addresses of foo() and bar() are unknown when we were JITing main() (note that call bpf_map_lookup will be resolved properly during initial passes). Once start addresses of 3 functions are known we patch call_insn->imm to point to right functions and call bpf_int_jit_compile() again which needs only one pass. Additional safety checks are done to make sure this last pass doesn't produce image that is larger or smaller than previous pass. When constant blinding is on it's applied to all functions at the first pass, since doing it once again at the last pass can change size of the JITed code. Tested on x64 and arm64 hw with JIT on/off, blinding on/off. x64 jits bpf-to-bpf calls correctly while arm64 falls back to interpreter. All other JITs that support normal BPF_CALL will behave the same way since bpf-to-bpf call is equivalent to bpf-to-kernel call from JITs point of view. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 08:55:15 +07:00
s32 call_imm; /* saved imm field of call insn */
};
int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
int sanitize_stack_off; /* stack slot to be cleared */
bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */
};
#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
#define BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE 1024
struct bpf_verifier_log {
u32 level;
char kbuf[BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE];
char __user *ubuf;
u32 len_used;
u32 len_total;
};
static inline bool bpf_verifier_log_full(const struct bpf_verifier_log *log)
{
return log->len_used >= log->len_total - 1;
}
static inline bool bpf_verifier_log_needed(const struct bpf_verifier_log *log)
{
return log->level && log->ubuf && !bpf_verifier_log_full(log);
}
bpf: introduce function calls (function boundaries) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. Since the beginning of bpf all bpf programs were represented as a single function and program authors were forced to use always_inline for all functions in their C code. That was causing llvm to unnecessary inflate the code size and forcing developers to move code to header files with little code reuse. With a bit of additional complexity teach verifier to recognize arbitrary function calls from one bpf function to another as long as all of functions are presented to the verifier as a single bpf program. New program layout: r6 = r1 // some code .. r1 = .. // arg1 r2 = .. // arg2 call pc+1 // function call pc-relative exit .. = r1 // access arg1 .. = r2 // access arg2 .. call pc+20 // second level of function call ... It allows for better optimized code and finally allows to introduce the core bpf libraries that can be reused in different projects, since programs are no longer limited by single elf file. With function calls bpf can be compiled into multiple .o files. This patch is the first step. It detects programs that contain multiple functions and checks that calls between them are valid. It splits the sequence of bpf instructions (one program) into a set of bpf functions that call each other. Calls to only known functions are allowed. In the future the verifier may allow calls to unresolved functions and will do dynamic linking. This logic supports statically linked bpf functions only. Such function boundary detection could have been done as part of control flow graph building in check_cfg(), but it's cleaner to separate function boundary detection vs control flow checks within a subprogram (function) into logically indepedent steps. Follow up patches may split check_cfg() further, but not check_subprogs(). Only allow bpf-to-bpf calls for root only and for non-hw-offloaded programs. These restrictions can be relaxed in the future. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 08:55:05 +07:00
#define BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS 256
struct bpf_subprog_info {
u32 start; /* insn idx of function entry point */
u16 stack_depth; /* max. stack depth used by this function */
};
/* single container for all structs
* one verifier_env per bpf_check() call
*/
struct bpf_verifier_env {
struct bpf_prog *prog; /* eBPF program being verified */
const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops;
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *head; /* stack of verifier states to be processed */
int stack_size; /* number of states to be processed */
bool strict_alignment; /* perform strict pointer alignment checks */
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_state; /* current verifier state */
struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_states; /* search pruning optimization */
struct bpf_map *used_maps[MAX_USED_MAPS]; /* array of map's used by eBPF program */
u32 used_map_cnt; /* number of used maps */
u32 id_gen; /* used to generate unique reg IDs */
bool allow_ptr_leaks;
bool seen_direct_write;
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
struct bpf_verifier_log log;
struct bpf_subprog_info subprog_info[BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS + 1];
bpf: introduce function calls (function boundaries) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. Since the beginning of bpf all bpf programs were represented as a single function and program authors were forced to use always_inline for all functions in their C code. That was causing llvm to unnecessary inflate the code size and forcing developers to move code to header files with little code reuse. With a bit of additional complexity teach verifier to recognize arbitrary function calls from one bpf function to another as long as all of functions are presented to the verifier as a single bpf program. New program layout: r6 = r1 // some code .. r1 = .. // arg1 r2 = .. // arg2 call pc+1 // function call pc-relative exit .. = r1 // access arg1 .. = r2 // access arg2 .. call pc+20 // second level of function call ... It allows for better optimized code and finally allows to introduce the core bpf libraries that can be reused in different projects, since programs are no longer limited by single elf file. With function calls bpf can be compiled into multiple .o files. This patch is the first step. It detects programs that contain multiple functions and checks that calls between them are valid. It splits the sequence of bpf instructions (one program) into a set of bpf functions that call each other. Calls to only known functions are allowed. In the future the verifier may allow calls to unresolved functions and will do dynamic linking. This logic supports statically linked bpf functions only. Such function boundary detection could have been done as part of control flow graph building in check_cfg(), but it's cleaner to separate function boundary detection vs control flow checks within a subprogram (function) into logically indepedent steps. Follow up patches may split check_cfg() further, but not check_subprogs(). Only allow bpf-to-bpf calls for root only and for non-hw-offloaded programs. These restrictions can be relaxed in the future. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 08:55:05 +07:00
u32 subprog_cnt;
};
__printf(2, 0) void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
const char *fmt, va_list args);
__printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const char *fmt, ...);
static inline struct bpf_reg_state *cur_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 08:55:06 +07:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
return cur->frame[cur->curframe]->regs;
}
int bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
int bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx);
#endif /* _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H */