License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 21:07:57 +07:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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/*
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* sysctl_net_ipv4.c: sysctl interface to net IPV4 subsystem.
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*
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* Begun April 1, 1996, Mike Shaver.
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* Added /proc/sys/net/ipv4 directory entry (empty =) ). [MS]
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*/
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/sysctl.h>
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2005-08-16 12:18:02 +07:00
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#include <linux/igmp.h>
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2005-12-27 11:43:12 +07:00
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#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
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2007-10-11 07:30:46 +07:00
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#include <linux/seqlock.h>
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2007-12-05 16:41:26 +07:00
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#include <linux/init.h>
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include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 15:04:11 +07:00
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
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#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
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2011-12-12 04:47:05 +07:00
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#include <linux/swap.h>
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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#include <net/snmp.h>
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2005-08-16 12:18:02 +07:00
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#include <net/icmp.h>
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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#include <net/ip.h>
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#include <net/route.h>
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#include <net/tcp.h>
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2007-12-31 15:29:24 +07:00
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#include <net/udp.h>
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2006-08-04 06:48:06 +07:00
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#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
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2007-10-15 16:33:45 +07:00
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#include <net/inet_frag.h>
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net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
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#include <net/ping.h>
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2017-03-24 02:34:16 +07:00
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#include <net/protocol.h>
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2017-11-02 23:14:05 +07:00
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#include <net/netevent.h>
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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2005-12-14 14:14:27 +07:00
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static int zero;
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2013-01-24 03:35:28 +07:00
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static int one = 1;
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tcp: Tail loss probe (TLP)
This patch series implement the Tail loss probe (TLP) algorithm described
in http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dukkipati-tcpm-tcp-loss-probe-01. The
first patch implements the basic algorithm.
TLP's goal is to reduce tail latency of short transactions. It achieves
this by converting retransmission timeouts (RTOs) occuring due
to tail losses (losses at end of transactions) into fast recovery.
TLP transmits one packet in two round-trips when a connection is in
Open state and isn't receiving any ACKs. The transmitted packet, aka
loss probe, can be either new or a retransmission. When there is tail
loss, the ACK from a loss probe triggers FACK/early-retransmit based
fast recovery, thus avoiding a costly RTO. In the absence of loss,
there is no change in the connection state.
PTO stands for probe timeout. It is a timer event indicating
that an ACK is overdue and triggers a loss probe packet. The PTO value
is set to max(2*SRTT, 10ms) and is adjusted to account for delayed
ACK timer when there is only one oustanding packet.
TLP Algorithm
On transmission of new data in Open state:
-> packets_out > 1: schedule PTO in max(2*SRTT, 10ms).
-> packets_out == 1: schedule PTO in max(2*RTT, 1.5*RTT + 200ms)
-> PTO = min(PTO, RTO)
Conditions for scheduling PTO:
-> Connection is in Open state.
-> Connection is either cwnd limited or no new data to send.
-> Number of probes per tail loss episode is limited to one.
-> Connection is SACK enabled.
When PTO fires:
new_segment_exists:
-> transmit new segment.
-> packets_out++. cwnd remains same.
no_new_packet:
-> retransmit the last segment.
Its ACK triggers FACK or early retransmit based recovery.
ACK path:
-> rearm RTO at start of ACK processing.
-> reschedule PTO if need be.
In addition, the patch includes a small variation to the Early Retransmit
(ER) algorithm, such that ER and TLP together can in principle recover any
N-degree of tail loss through fast recovery. TLP is controlled by the same
sysctl as ER, tcp_early_retrans sysctl.
tcp_early_retrans==0; disables TLP and ER.
==1; enables RFC5827 ER.
==2; delayed ER.
==3; TLP and delayed ER. [DEFAULT]
==4; TLP only.
The TLP patch series have been extensively tested on Google Web servers.
It is most effective for short Web trasactions, where it reduced RTOs by 15%
and improved HTTP response time (average by 6%, 99th percentile by 10%).
The transmitted probes account for <0.5% of the overall transmissions.
Signed-off-by: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-03-11 17:00:43 +07:00
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static int four = 4;
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2015-08-22 07:38:02 +07:00
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static int thousand = 1000;
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tcp: TSO packets automatic sizing
After hearing many people over past years complaining against TSO being
bursty or even buggy, we are proud to present automatic sizing of TSO
packets.
One part of the problem is that tcp_tso_should_defer() uses an heuristic
relying on upcoming ACKS instead of a timer, but more generally, having
big TSO packets makes little sense for low rates, as it tends to create
micro bursts on the network, and general consensus is to reduce the
buffering amount.
This patch introduces a per socket sk_pacing_rate, that approximates
the current sending rate, and allows us to size the TSO packets so
that we try to send one packet every ms.
This field could be set by other transports.
Patch has no impact for high speed flows, where having large TSO packets
makes sense to reach line rate.
For other flows, this helps better packet scheduling and ACK clocking.
This patch increases performance of TCP flows in lossy environments.
A new sysctl (tcp_min_tso_segs) is added, to specify the
minimal size of a TSO packet (default being 2).
A follow-up patch will provide a new packet scheduler (FQ), using
sk_pacing_rate as an input to perform optional per flow pacing.
This explains why we chose to set sk_pacing_rate to twice the current
rate, allowing 'slow start' ramp up.
sk_pacing_rate = 2 * cwnd * mss / srtt
v2: Neal Cardwell reported a suspect deferring of last two segments on
initial write of 10 MSS, I had to change tcp_tso_should_defer() to take
into account tp->xmit_size_goal_segs
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Van Jacobson <vanj@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-27 19:46:32 +07:00
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static int gso_max_segs = GSO_MAX_SEGS;
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2007-02-09 21:24:47 +07:00
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static int tcp_retr1_max = 255;
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2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
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static int ip_local_port_range_min[] = { 1, 1 };
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static int ip_local_port_range_max[] = { 65535, 65535 };
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2010-11-22 19:54:21 +07:00
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static int tcp_adv_win_scale_min = -31;
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static int tcp_adv_win_scale_max = 31;
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2017-01-21 08:49:11 +07:00
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static int ip_privileged_port_min;
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static int ip_privileged_port_max = 65535;
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2010-12-14 03:16:14 +07:00
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static int ip_ttl_min = 1;
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static int ip_ttl_max = 255;
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2013-07-19 19:09:01 +07:00
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static int tcp_syn_retries_min = 1;
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static int tcp_syn_retries_max = MAX_TCP_SYNCNT;
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
static int ip_ping_group_range_min[] = { 0, 0 };
|
|
|
|
static int ip_ping_group_range_max[] = { GID_T_MAX, GID_T_MAX };
|
2018-05-18 04:47:29 +07:00
|
|
|
static int comp_sack_nr_max = 255;
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-07-30 08:57:20 +07:00
|
|
|
/* obsolete */
|
|
|
|
static int sysctl_tcp_low_latency __read_mostly;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-11 07:30:46 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Update system visible IP port range */
|
2013-09-29 04:10:59 +07:00
|
|
|
static void set_local_port_range(struct net *net, int range[2])
|
2007-10-11 07:30:46 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-05-28 01:34:37 +07:00
|
|
|
bool same_parity = !((range[0] ^ range[1]) & 1);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-04 05:32:57 +07:00
|
|
|
write_seqlock_bh(&net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.lock);
|
2015-05-28 01:34:37 +07:00
|
|
|
if (same_parity && !net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.warned) {
|
|
|
|
net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.warned = true;
|
|
|
|
pr_err_ratelimited("ip_local_port_range: prefer different parity for start/end values.\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-05-07 01:02:49 +07:00
|
|
|
net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[0] = range[0];
|
|
|
|
net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[1] = range[1];
|
2015-11-04 05:32:57 +07:00
|
|
|
write_sequnlock_bh(&net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.lock);
|
2007-10-11 07:30:46 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Validate changes from /proc interface. */
|
2013-06-12 13:04:25 +07:00
|
|
|
static int ipv4_local_port_range(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2007-10-11 07:30:46 +07:00
|
|
|
void __user *buffer,
|
|
|
|
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-09-29 04:10:59 +07:00
|
|
|
struct net *net =
|
2014-05-07 01:02:49 +07:00
|
|
|
container_of(table->data, struct net, ipv4.ip_local_ports.range);
|
2007-10-11 07:30:46 +07:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2008-10-09 04:18:04 +07:00
|
|
|
int range[2];
|
2013-06-12 13:04:25 +07:00
|
|
|
struct ctl_table tmp = {
|
2007-10-11 07:30:46 +07:00
|
|
|
.data = &range,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(range),
|
|
|
|
.mode = table->mode,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &ip_local_port_range_min,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &ip_local_port_range_max,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-29 04:10:59 +07:00
|
|
|
inet_get_local_port_range(net, &range[0], &range[1]);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-09-24 05:57:19 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
2007-10-11 07:30:46 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write && ret == 0) {
|
2017-01-21 08:49:11 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Ensure that the upper limit is not smaller than the lower,
|
|
|
|
* and that the lower does not encroach upon the privileged
|
|
|
|
* port limit.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((range[1] < range[0]) ||
|
|
|
|
(range[0] < net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock))
|
2007-10-11 07:30:46 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
else
|
2013-09-29 04:10:59 +07:00
|
|
|
set_local_port_range(net, range);
|
2007-10-11 07:30:46 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-21 08:49:11 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Validate changes from /proc interface. */
|
|
|
|
static int ipv4_privileged_ports(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
|
|
|
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
|
|
|
|
ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock);
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
int pports;
|
|
|
|
int range[2];
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table tmp = {
|
|
|
|
.data = &pports,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(pports),
|
|
|
|
.mode = table->mode,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &ip_privileged_port_min,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &ip_privileged_port_max,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pports = net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write && ret == 0) {
|
|
|
|
inet_get_local_port_range(net, &range[0], &range[1]);
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure that the local port range doesn't overlap with the
|
|
|
|
* privileged port range.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (range[0] < pports)
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock = pports;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-24 23:34:21 +07:00
|
|
|
static void inet_get_ping_group_range_table(struct ctl_table *table, kgid_t *low, kgid_t *high)
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-05-24 23:34:21 +07:00
|
|
|
kgid_t *data = table->data;
|
2013-09-29 04:10:59 +07:00
|
|
|
struct net *net =
|
2014-05-07 01:02:50 +07:00
|
|
|
container_of(table->data, struct net, ipv4.ping_group_range.range);
|
2012-04-15 12:58:06 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int seq;
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
do {
|
2016-10-21 04:19:46 +07:00
|
|
|
seq = read_seqbegin(&net->ipv4.ping_group_range.lock);
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*low = data[0];
|
|
|
|
*high = data[1];
|
2016-10-21 04:19:46 +07:00
|
|
|
} while (read_seqretry(&net->ipv4.ping_group_range.lock, seq));
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Update system visible IP port range */
|
2012-05-24 23:34:21 +07:00
|
|
|
static void set_ping_group_range(struct ctl_table *table, kgid_t low, kgid_t high)
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-05-24 23:34:21 +07:00
|
|
|
kgid_t *data = table->data;
|
2013-09-29 04:10:59 +07:00
|
|
|
struct net *net =
|
2014-05-07 01:02:50 +07:00
|
|
|
container_of(table->data, struct net, ipv4.ping_group_range.range);
|
2016-10-21 04:19:46 +07:00
|
|
|
write_seqlock(&net->ipv4.ping_group_range.lock);
|
2012-05-24 23:34:21 +07:00
|
|
|
data[0] = low;
|
|
|
|
data[1] = high;
|
2016-10-21 04:19:46 +07:00
|
|
|
write_sequnlock(&net->ipv4.ping_group_range.lock);
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Validate changes from /proc interface. */
|
2013-06-12 13:04:25 +07:00
|
|
|
static int ipv4_ping_group_range(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
void __user *buffer,
|
|
|
|
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-05-24 23:34:21 +07:00
|
|
|
struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2012-05-24 23:34:21 +07:00
|
|
|
gid_t urange[2];
|
|
|
|
kgid_t low, high;
|
2013-06-12 13:04:25 +07:00
|
|
|
struct ctl_table tmp = {
|
2012-05-24 23:34:21 +07:00
|
|
|
.data = &urange,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(urange),
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
.mode = table->mode,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &ip_ping_group_range_min,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &ip_ping_group_range_max,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2012-05-24 23:34:21 +07:00
|
|
|
inet_get_ping_group_range_table(table, &low, &high);
|
|
|
|
urange[0] = from_kgid_munged(user_ns, low);
|
|
|
|
urange[1] = from_kgid_munged(user_ns, high);
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
|
|
|
|
2012-05-24 23:34:21 +07:00
|
|
|
if (write && ret == 0) {
|
|
|
|
low = make_kgid(user_ns, urange[0]);
|
|
|
|
high = make_kgid(user_ns, urange[1]);
|
|
|
|
if (!gid_valid(low) || !gid_valid(high) ||
|
|
|
|
(urange[1] < urange[0]) || gid_lt(high, low)) {
|
|
|
|
low = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, 1);
|
|
|
|
high = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
set_ping_group_range(table, low, high);
|
|
|
|
}
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-12 13:04:25 +07:00
|
|
|
static int proc_tcp_congestion_control(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
|
2005-06-24 02:19:55 +07:00
|
|
|
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-11-14 23:25:49 +07:00
|
|
|
struct net *net = container_of(ctl->data, struct net,
|
|
|
|
ipv4.tcp_congestion_control);
|
2005-06-24 02:19:55 +07:00
|
|
|
char val[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
|
2013-06-12 13:04:25 +07:00
|
|
|
struct ctl_table tbl = {
|
2005-06-24 02:19:55 +07:00
|
|
|
.data = val,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = TCP_CA_NAME_MAX,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-14 23:25:49 +07:00
|
|
|
tcp_get_default_congestion_control(net, val);
|
2005-06-24 02:19:55 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2009-09-24 05:57:19 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
2005-06-24 02:19:55 +07:00
|
|
|
if (write && ret == 0)
|
2017-11-14 23:25:49 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = tcp_set_default_congestion_control(net, val);
|
2005-06-24 02:19:55 +07:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-12 13:04:25 +07:00
|
|
|
static int proc_tcp_available_congestion_control(struct ctl_table *ctl,
|
2009-09-24 05:57:19 +07:00
|
|
|
int write,
|
2006-11-10 07:32:06 +07:00
|
|
|
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
|
|
|
|
loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-06-12 13:04:25 +07:00
|
|
|
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = TCP_CA_BUF_MAX, };
|
2006-11-10 07:32:06 +07:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_USER);
|
|
|
|
if (!tbl.data)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
tcp_get_available_congestion_control(tbl.data, TCP_CA_BUF_MAX);
|
2009-09-24 05:57:19 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
2006-11-10 07:32:06 +07:00
|
|
|
kfree(tbl.data);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-12 13:04:25 +07:00
|
|
|
static int proc_allowed_congestion_control(struct ctl_table *ctl,
|
2009-09-24 05:57:19 +07:00
|
|
|
int write,
|
2006-11-10 07:35:15 +07:00
|
|
|
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
|
|
|
|
loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-06-12 13:04:25 +07:00
|
|
|
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = TCP_CA_BUF_MAX };
|
2006-11-10 07:35:15 +07:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_USER);
|
|
|
|
if (!tbl.data)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tcp_get_allowed_congestion_control(tbl.data, tbl.maxlen);
|
2009-09-24 05:57:19 +07:00
|
|
|
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
2006-11-10 07:35:15 +07:00
|
|
|
if (write && ret == 0)
|
|
|
|
ret = tcp_set_allowed_congestion_control(tbl.data);
|
|
|
|
kfree(tbl.data);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-27 10:35:42 +07:00
|
|
|
static int proc_tcp_fastopen_key(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2013-06-12 13:04:25 +07:00
|
|
|
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
|
|
|
|
loff_t *ppos)
|
2012-08-31 19:29:11 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-09-27 10:35:42 +07:00
|
|
|
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
|
|
|
|
ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen);
|
2013-06-12 13:04:25 +07:00
|
|
|
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = (TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH * 2 + 10) };
|
2012-08-31 19:29:11 +07:00
|
|
|
struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctxt;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
u32 user_key[4]; /* 16 bytes, matching TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!tbl.data)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
2017-09-27 10:35:42 +07:00
|
|
|
ctxt = rcu_dereference(net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx);
|
2012-08-31 19:29:11 +07:00
|
|
|
if (ctxt)
|
|
|
|
memcpy(user_key, ctxt->key, TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH);
|
2012-10-11 13:24:14 +07:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
memset(user_key, 0, sizeof(user_key));
|
2012-08-31 19:29:11 +07:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
snprintf(tbl.data, tbl.maxlen, "%08x-%08x-%08x-%08x",
|
|
|
|
user_key[0], user_key[1], user_key[2], user_key[3]);
|
|
|
|
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write && ret == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (sscanf(tbl.data, "%x-%x-%x-%x", user_key, user_key + 1,
|
|
|
|
user_key + 2, user_key + 3) != 4) {
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto bad_key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-10-19 01:22:51 +07:00
|
|
|
tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(net, NULL, user_key,
|
|
|
|
TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH);
|
2012-08-31 19:29:11 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bad_key:
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("proc FO key set 0x%x-%x-%x-%x <- 0x%s: %u\n",
|
|
|
|
user_key[0], user_key[1], user_key[2], user_key[3],
|
|
|
|
(char *)tbl.data, ret);
|
|
|
|
kfree(tbl.data);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-24 02:34:16 +07:00
|
|
|
static void proc_configure_early_demux(int enabled, int protocol)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct net_protocol *ipprot;
|
|
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
|
|
|
|
struct inet6_protocol *ip6prot;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-22 23:33:16 +07:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-24 02:34:16 +07:00
|
|
|
ipprot = rcu_dereference(inet_protos[protocol]);
|
|
|
|
if (ipprot)
|
|
|
|
ipprot->early_demux = enabled ? ipprot->early_demux_handler :
|
|
|
|
NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
|
|
|
|
ip6prot = rcu_dereference(inet6_protos[protocol]);
|
|
|
|
if (ip6prot)
|
|
|
|
ip6prot->early_demux = enabled ? ip6prot->early_demux_handler :
|
|
|
|
NULL;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2017-04-22 23:33:16 +07:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2017-03-24 02:34:16 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int proc_tcp_early_demux(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
|
|
|
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write && !ret) {
|
|
|
|
int enabled = init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_early_demux;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proc_configure_early_demux(enabled, IPPROTO_TCP);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int proc_udp_early_demux(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
|
|
|
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write && !ret) {
|
|
|
|
int enabled = init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_early_demux;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proc_configure_early_demux(enabled, IPPROTO_UDP);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
net/tcp_fastopen: Disable active side TFO in certain scenarios
Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being
blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related
reports from Apple:
https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf
Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data
sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped.
C ---> syn-data ---> S
C <--- syn/ack ----- S
C (accept & write)
C <---- data ------- S
C ----- ACK -> X S
[retry and timeout]
https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf
Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped
after 3WHS.
C ---- syn-data ---> S
C <--- syn/ack ----- S
C ---- ack --------> S
S (accept & write)
C? X <- data ------ S
[retry and timeout]
This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to
mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the
application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO
again, and the process repeats indefinitely.
The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the
following circumstances:
1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN
2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST
We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it
happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ...
And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened
on loopback has successfully received data segs from server.
And we examine this condition during close().
The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens,
application running on the client should eventually close the socket as
it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running
on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any
response from client.
In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client
given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those
frames.
And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box
is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to
fail.
Also, add a debug sysctl:
tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec:
the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens.
This can be set and read.
When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic.
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-21 04:45:46 +07:00
|
|
|
static int proc_tfo_blackhole_detect_timeout(struct ctl_table *table,
|
|
|
|
int write,
|
|
|
|
void __user *buffer,
|
|
|
|
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-09-27 10:35:43 +07:00
|
|
|
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
|
|
|
|
ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout);
|
net/tcp_fastopen: Disable active side TFO in certain scenarios
Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being
blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related
reports from Apple:
https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf
Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data
sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped.
C ---> syn-data ---> S
C <--- syn/ack ----- S
C (accept & write)
C <---- data ------- S
C ----- ACK -> X S
[retry and timeout]
https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf
Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped
after 3WHS.
C ---- syn-data ---> S
C <--- syn/ack ----- S
C ---- ack --------> S
S (accept & write)
C? X <- data ------ S
[retry and timeout]
This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to
mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the
application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO
again, and the process repeats indefinitely.
The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the
following circumstances:
1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN
2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST
We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it
happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ...
And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened
on loopback has successfully received data segs from server.
And we examine this condition during close().
The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens,
application running on the client should eventually close the socket as
it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running
on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any
response from client.
In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client
given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those
frames.
And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box
is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to
fail.
Also, add a debug sysctl:
tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec:
the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens.
This can be set and read.
When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic.
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-21 04:45:46 +07:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
|
|
|
if (write && ret == 0)
|
2017-09-27 10:35:43 +07:00
|
|
|
atomic_set(&net->ipv4.tfo_active_disable_times, 0);
|
2017-06-15 01:37:14 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int proc_tcp_available_ulp(struct ctl_table *ctl,
|
|
|
|
int write,
|
|
|
|
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
|
|
|
|
loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = TCP_ULP_BUF_MAX, };
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_USER);
|
|
|
|
if (!tbl.data)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
tcp_get_available_ulp(tbl.data, TCP_ULP_BUF_MAX);
|
|
|
|
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
|
|
|
kfree(tbl.data);
|
|
|
|
|
net/tcp_fastopen: Disable active side TFO in certain scenarios
Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being
blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related
reports from Apple:
https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf
Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data
sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped.
C ---> syn-data ---> S
C <--- syn/ack ----- S
C (accept & write)
C <---- data ------- S
C ----- ACK -> X S
[retry and timeout]
https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf
Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped
after 3WHS.
C ---- syn-data ---> S
C <--- syn/ack ----- S
C ---- ack --------> S
S (accept & write)
C? X <- data ------ S
[retry and timeout]
This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to
mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the
application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO
again, and the process repeats indefinitely.
The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the
following circumstances:
1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN
2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST
We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it
happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ...
And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened
on loopback has successfully received data segs from server.
And we examine this condition during close().
The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens,
application running on the client should eventually close the socket as
it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running
on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any
response from client.
In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client
given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those
frames.
And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box
is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to
fail.
Also, add a debug sysctl:
tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec:
the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens.
This can be set and read.
When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic.
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-21 04:45:46 +07:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-02 23:14:05 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH
|
|
|
|
static int proc_fib_multipath_hash_policy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
|
|
|
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
|
|
|
|
loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
|
|
|
|
ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_policy);
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
|
|
|
if (write && ret == 0)
|
2018-03-02 23:32:16 +07:00
|
|
|
call_netevent_notifiers(NETEVENT_IPV4_MPATH_HASH_UPDATE, net);
|
2017-11-02 23:14:05 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-05 16:41:26 +07:00
|
|
|
static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = {
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_max_orphans",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_tcp_max_orphans,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "inet_peer_threshold",
|
|
|
|
.data = &inet_peer_threshold,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "inet_peer_minttl",
|
|
|
|
.data = &inet_peer_minttl,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "inet_peer_maxttl",
|
|
|
|
.data = &inet_peer_maxttl,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
2013-10-20 06:25:36 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_mem",
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_tcp_mem),
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_tcp_mem,
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_low_latency",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_tcp_low_latency,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
2006-08-04 06:48:06 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "cipso_cache_enable",
|
|
|
|
.data = &cipso_v4_cache_enabled,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
2006-08-04 06:48:06 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "cipso_cache_bucket_size",
|
|
|
|
.data = &cipso_v4_cache_bucketsize,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
2006-08-04 06:48:06 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "cipso_rbm_optfmt",
|
|
|
|
.data = &cipso_v4_rbm_optfmt,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
2006-08-04 06:48:06 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "cipso_rbm_strictvalid",
|
|
|
|
.data = &cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
2006-08-04 06:48:06 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
|
2006-11-10 07:32:06 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_available_congestion_control",
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = TCP_CA_BUF_MAX,
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0444,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_available_congestion_control,
|
2006-11-10 07:32:06 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
2006-11-10 07:35:15 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_allowed_congestion_control",
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = TCP_CA_BUF_MAX,
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_allowed_congestion_control,
|
2006-11-10 07:35:15 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
2017-06-15 01:37:14 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_available_ulp",
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = TCP_ULP_BUF_MAX,
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0444,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_available_ulp,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2014-09-19 21:38:40 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "icmp_msgs_per_sec",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_icmp_msgs_per_sec,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &zero,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "icmp_msgs_burst",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_icmp_msgs_burst,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &zero,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2007-12-31 15:29:24 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "udp_mem",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_udp_mem,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_udp_mem),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2010-11-10 06:24:26 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
|
2007-12-31 15:29:24 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
2009-11-06 04:32:03 +07:00
|
|
|
{ }
|
2005-04-17 05:20:36 +07:00
|
|
|
};
|
2007-12-05 16:41:26 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = {
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "icmp_echo_ignore_all",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "icmp_ratelimit",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratelimit,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies,
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "icmp_ratemask",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratemask,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2008-11-04 09:21:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ping_group_range",
|
2014-05-07 01:02:50 +07:00
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.ping_group_range.range,
|
2012-05-24 23:34:21 +07:00
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(gid_t)*2,
|
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind
This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send
ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages
without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it
possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In
order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality
is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux
distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range
(see below).
Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X:
http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/
A new ping socket is created with
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP)
Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local
ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are
reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the
kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote
port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored.
Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to:
1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by
other means.
2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets.
ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be
ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this,
see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the
checksum is always recomputed.
ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according
to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications.
IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained
via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source
quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue
(IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in
network order).
socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning
that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100
100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make
/sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the
"netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it)
extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages
(Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply
etc.).
Userspace ping util & patch for it:
http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping
For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the
setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels)
is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs:
http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/
Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for
Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public.
All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with
the patch.
PATCH v3:
- switched to flowi4.
- minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code.
PATCH v2:
- changed ping_debug() to pr_debug().
- removed CONFIG_IP_PING.
- removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs).
- switched to proc_net_fops_create().
- switched to %pK in seq_printf().
PATCH v1:
- fixed checksumming bug.
- CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore.
RFC v2:
- minor cleanups.
- introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2).
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 17:01:00 +07:00
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = ipv4_ping_group_range,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2013-01-05 23:10:48 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_ecn",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
tcp: add rfc3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback
This work as a follow-up of commit f7b3bec6f516 ("net: allow setting ecn
via routing table") and adds RFC3168 section 6.1.1.1. fallback for outgoing
ECN connections. In other words, this work adds a retry with a non-ECN
setup SYN packet, as suggested from the RFC on the first timeout:
[...] A host that receives no reply to an ECN-setup SYN within the
normal SYN retransmission timeout interval MAY resend the SYN and
any subsequent SYN retransmissions with CWR and ECE cleared. [...]
Schematic client-side view when assuming the server is in tcp_ecn=2 mode,
that is, Linux default since 2009 via commit 255cac91c3c9 ("tcp: extend
ECN sysctl to allow server-side only ECN"):
1) Normal ECN-capable path:
SYN ECE CWR ----->
<----- SYN ACK ECE
ACK ----->
2) Path with broken middlebox, when client has fallback:
SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet
(timeout, rtx)
SYN ----->
<----- SYN ACK
ACK ----->
In case we would not have the fallback implemented, the middlebox drop
point would basically end up as:
SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet
(timeout, rtx)
SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet
(timeout, rtx)
SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet
(timeout, rtx)
In any case, it's rather a smaller percentage of sites where there would
occur such additional setup latency: it was found in end of 2014 that ~56%
of IPv4 and 65% of IPv6 servers of Alexa 1 million list would negotiate
ECN (aka tcp_ecn=2 default), 0.42% of these webservers will fail to connect
when trying to negotiate with ECN (tcp_ecn=1) due to timeouts, which the
fallback would mitigate with a slight latency trade-off. Recent related
paper on this topic:
Brian Trammell, Mirja Kühlewind, Damiano Boppart, Iain Learmonth,
Gorry Fairhurst, and Richard Scheffenegger:
"Enabling Internet-Wide Deployment of Explicit Congestion Notification."
Proc. PAM 2015, New York.
http://ecn.ethz.ch/ecn-pam15.pdf
Thus, when net.ipv4.tcp_ecn=1 is being set, the patch will perform RFC3168,
section 6.1.1.1. fallback on timeout. For users explicitly not wanting this
which can be in DC use case, we add a net.ipv4.tcp_ecn_fallback knob that
allows for disabling the fallback.
tp->ecn_flags are not being cleared in tcp_ecn_clear_syn() on output, but
rather we let tcp_ecn_rcv_synack() take that over on input path in case a
SYN ACK ECE was delayed. Thus a spurious SYN retransmission will not prevent
ECN being negotiated eventually in that case.
Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-iccrg-1.pdf
Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/89/slides/slides-89-tsvarea-1.pdf
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
Signed-off-by: Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Dave That <dave.taht@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 02:04:22 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_ecn_fallback",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn_fallback,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-15 17:11:29 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ip_dynaddr",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-15 17:11:30 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ip_early_demux",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_early_demux,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-03-24 02:34:16 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "udp_early_demux",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_early_demux,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_udp_early_demux
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_early_demux",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_early_demux,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_early_demux
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-15 17:11:27 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ip_default_ttl",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_default_ttl,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &ip_ttl_min,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &ip_ttl_max,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2013-09-29 04:10:59 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ip_local_port_range",
|
2014-05-07 01:02:49 +07:00
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.ip_local_ports.range),
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.ip_local_ports.range,
|
2013-09-29 04:10:59 +07:00
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = ipv4_local_port_range,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2014-05-13 06:04:53 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ip_local_reserved_ports",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = 65536,
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_do_large_bitmap,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2013-12-14 11:13:38 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ip_no_pmtu_disc",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2014-01-09 16:01:15 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ip_forward_use_pmtu",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2014-09-05 20:09:03 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ip_nonlocal_bind",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2014-05-14 00:17:33 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "fwmark_reflect",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_fwmark_reflect,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
net: support marking accepting TCP sockets
When using mark-based routing, sockets returned from accept()
may need to be marked differently depending on the incoming
connection request.
This is the case, for example, if different socket marks identify
different networks: a listening socket may want to accept
connections from all networks, but each connection should be
marked with the network that the request came in on, so that
subsequent packets are sent on the correct network.
This patch adds a sysctl to mark TCP sockets based on the fwmark
of the incoming SYN packet. If enabled, and an unmarked socket
receives a SYN, then the SYN packet's fwmark is written to the
connection's inet_request_sock, and later written back to the
accepted socket when the connection is established. If the
socket already has a nonzero mark, then the behaviour is the same
as it is today, i.e., the listening socket's fwmark is used.
Black-box tested using user-mode linux:
- IPv4/IPv6 SYN+ACK, FIN, etc. packets are routed based on the
mark of the incoming SYN packet.
- The socket returned by accept() is marked with the mark of the
incoming SYN packet.
- Tested with syncookies=1 and syncookies=2.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-14 00:17:35 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_fwmark_accept",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2015-12-17 04:20:44 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_l3mdev_accept",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_l3mdev_accept,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &zero,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &one,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2015-02-10 08:53:16 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_mtu_probing",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_base_mss",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_base_mss,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2015-03-06 10:18:23 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_probe_threshold",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_threshold,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2015-03-06 10:18:24 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_probe_interval",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_interval,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2015-08-27 22:46:26 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "igmp_link_local_mcast_reports",
|
2016-02-09 05:13:50 +07:00
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports,
|
2015-08-27 22:46:26 +07:00
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-09 04:29:21 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "igmp_max_memberships",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_igmp_max_memberships,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-09 04:29:22 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "igmp_max_msf",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_igmp_max_msf,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-09 04:29:24 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "igmp_qrv",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &one
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2017-11-14 23:25:49 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_congestion_control",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control,
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = TCP_CA_NAME_MAX,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_congestion_control,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-01-07 21:38:43 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_keepalive_time",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_keepalive_time,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-01-07 21:38:44 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_keepalive_probes",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_keepalive_probes,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-01-07 21:38:45 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_keepalive_intvl",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_keepalive_intvl,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-03 14:46:49 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_syn_retries",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syn_retries,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &tcp_syn_retries_min,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &tcp_syn_retries_max
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-03 14:46:50 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_synack_retries",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_synack_retries,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-03 14:46:51 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_syncookies",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2016-02-03 14:46:52 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_reordering",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-03 14:46:53 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_retries1",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries1,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &tcp_retr1_max
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-03 14:46:54 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_retries2",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries2,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-03 14:46:55 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_orphan_retries",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_orphan_retries,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-03 14:46:56 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_fin_timeout",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fin_timeout,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-03 14:46:57 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_notsent_lowat",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_notsent_lowat,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2017-01-09 14:45:49 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_douintvec,
|
2016-02-03 14:46:57 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
2016-12-25 13:33:16 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_tw_reuse",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_tw_reuse,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-12-28 16:52:32 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_max_tw_buckets",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.tcp_death_row.sysctl_max_tw_buckets,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-12-28 16:52:33 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_max_syn_backlog",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_max_syn_backlog,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-09-27 10:35:40 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_fastopen",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-09-27 10:35:42 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_fastopen_key",
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0600,
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = ((TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH * 2) + 10),
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_fastopen_key,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-09-27 10:35:43 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout_sec",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_tfo_blackhole_detect_timeout,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &zero,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-04-07 21:21:00 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "fib_multipath_use_neigh",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
2017-03-16 20:28:00 +07:00
|
|
|
.extra1 = &zero,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &one,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "fib_multipath_hash_policy",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_policy,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2017-11-02 23:14:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_fib_multipath_hash_policy,
|
2016-04-07 21:21:00 +07:00
|
|
|
.extra1 = &zero,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &one,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2017-01-21 08:49:11 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ip_unprivileged_port_start",
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock,
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = ipv4_privileged_ports,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-01-27 01:02:24 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "udp_l3mdev_accept",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_l3mdev_accept,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &zero,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &one,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2017-06-08 00:34:37 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_sack",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_sack,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-06-08 00:34:38 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_window_scaling",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-06-08 00:34:39 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_timestamps",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:54:56 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_early_retrans",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_early_retrans,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &zero,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &four,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:54:57 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_recovery",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_recovery,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:54:58 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_thin_linear_timeouts",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_thin_linear_timeouts,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:54:59 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_slow_start_after_idle",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:55:00 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_retrans_collapse",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retrans_collapse,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:55:01 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_stdurg",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_stdurg,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:55:02 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_rfc1337",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rfc1337,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:55:03 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_abort_on_overflow",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_abort_on_overflow,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:55:04 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_fack",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fack,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:55:06 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_max_reordering",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_max_reordering,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:55:07 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_dsack",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_dsack,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:55:08 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_app_win",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_app_win,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:55:09 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_adv_win_scale",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &tcp_adv_win_scale_min,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &tcp_adv_win_scale_max,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 11:55:10 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_frto",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_frto,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 21:47:21 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_no_metrics_save",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 21:47:22 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_moderate_rcvbuf",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_moderate_rcvbuf,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 21:47:23 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_tso_win_divisor",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_tso_win_divisor,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 21:47:24 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_workaround_signed_windows",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_workaround_signed_windows,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 21:47:25 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_limit_output_bytes",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_limit_output_bytes,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 21:47:26 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_challenge_ack_limit",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 21:47:27 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_min_tso_segs",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &one,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &gso_max_segs,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 21:47:28 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_min_rtt_wlen",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 21:47:29 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_autocorking",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_autocorking,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &zero,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &one,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 21:47:30 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_invalid_ratelimit",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 21:47:31 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_pacing_ss_ratio",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_pacing_ss_ratio,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &zero,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &thousand,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-10-27 21:47:32 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_pacing_ca_ratio",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_pacing_ca_ratio,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &zero,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &thousand,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-11-07 15:29:28 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_wmem",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_wmem,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_wmem),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &one,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_rmem",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &one,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2018-05-18 04:47:28 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2018-05-18 04:47:29 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tcp_comp_sack_nr",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &zero,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &comp_sack_nr_max,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2018-03-14 11:57:16 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "udp_rmem_min",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_rmem_min,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_rmem_min),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &one
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "udp_wmem_min",
|
|
|
|
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_wmem_min,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_wmem_min),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &one
|
|
|
|
},
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
{ }
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-26 15:54:18 +07:00
|
|
|
static __net_init int ipv4_sysctl_init_net(struct net *net)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
struct ctl_table *table;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
table = ipv4_net_table;
|
2009-11-26 06:14:13 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) {
|
2013-10-20 06:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
table = kmemdup(table, sizeof(ipv4_net_table), GFP_KERNEL);
|
2015-04-03 15:17:26 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!table)
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
goto err_alloc;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-20 06:27:03 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Update the variables to point into the current struct net */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ipv4_net_table) - 1; i++)
|
|
|
|
table[i].data += (void *)net - (void *)&init_net;
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-19 20:44:49 +07:00
|
|
|
net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr = register_net_sysctl(net, "net/ipv4", table);
|
2015-04-03 15:17:26 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr)
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
goto err_reg;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-13 06:04:53 +07:00
|
|
|
net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports = kzalloc(65536 / 8, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports)
|
|
|
|
goto err_ports;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-26 15:54:18 +07:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-13 06:04:53 +07:00
|
|
|
err_ports:
|
|
|
|
unregister_net_sysctl_table(net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr);
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
err_reg:
|
2009-11-26 06:14:13 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
kfree(table);
|
|
|
|
err_alloc:
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
2008-03-26 15:54:18 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static __net_exit void ipv4_sysctl_exit_net(struct net *net)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
struct ctl_table *table;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-13 06:04:53 +07:00
|
|
|
kfree(net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports);
|
2008-03-26 15:56:24 +07:00
|
|
|
table = net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr->ctl_table_arg;
|
|
|
|
unregister_net_sysctl_table(net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr);
|
|
|
|
kfree(table);
|
2008-03-26 15:54:18 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static __net_initdata struct pernet_operations ipv4_sysctl_ops = {
|
|
|
|
.init = ipv4_sysctl_init_net,
|
|
|
|
.exit = ipv4_sysctl_exit_net,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-05 16:41:26 +07:00
|
|
|
static __init int sysctl_ipv4_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table_header *hdr;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-19 20:44:49 +07:00
|
|
|
hdr = register_net_sysctl(&init_net, "net/ipv4", ipv4_table);
|
2015-04-03 15:17:26 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!hdr)
|
2008-03-26 15:54:18 +07:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (register_pernet_subsys(&ipv4_sysctl_ops)) {
|
2012-04-19 20:24:33 +07:00
|
|
|
unregister_net_sysctl_table(hdr);
|
2008-03-26 15:54:18 +07:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-12-05 16:41:26 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__initcall(sysctl_ipv4_init);
|