linux_dsm_epyc7002/kernel/fork.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* linux/kernel/fork.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
*/
/*
* 'fork.c' contains the help-routines for the 'fork' system call
* (see also entry.S and others).
* Fork is rather simple, once you get the hang of it, but the memory
* management can be a bitch. See 'mm/memory.c': 'copy_page_range()'
*/
clone: add CLONE_PIDFD This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call. As spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left. CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new mount api. They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids. Logically, this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending). Thus, a pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege. This does not imply it cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case. A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d". As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the parent_tidptr argument of clone. This has the advantage that we can give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time. To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process metadata through /proc/<pid>. The sample program can easily be translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-27 19:04:15 +07:00
#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/sched/autogroup.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
#include <linux/sched/user.h>
#include <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h>
#include <linux/sched/stat.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/sched/cputime.h>
clone: add CLONE_PIDFD This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call. As spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left. CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new mount api. They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids. Logically, this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending). Thus, a pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege. This does not imply it cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case. A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d". As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the parent_tidptr argument of clone. This has the advantage that we can give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time. To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process metadata through /proc/<pid>. The sample program can easily be translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-27 19:04:15 +07:00
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/rtmutex.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
#include <linux/sem.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/iocontext.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
mmu-notifiers: core With KVM/GFP/XPMEM there isn't just the primary CPU MMU pointing to pages. There are secondary MMUs (with secondary sptes and secondary tlbs) too. sptes in the kvm case are shadow pagetables, but when I say spte in mmu-notifier context, I mean "secondary pte". In GRU case there's no actual secondary pte and there's only a secondary tlb because the GRU secondary MMU has no knowledge about sptes and every secondary tlb miss event in the MMU always generates a page fault that has to be resolved by the CPU (this is not the case of KVM where the a secondary tlb miss will walk sptes in hardware and it will refill the secondary tlb transparently to software if the corresponding spte is present). The same way zap_page_range has to invalidate the pte before freeing the page, the spte (and secondary tlb) must also be invalidated before any page is freed and reused. Currently we take a page_count pin on every page mapped by sptes, but that means the pages can't be swapped whenever they're mapped by any spte because they're part of the guest working set. Furthermore a spte unmap event can immediately lead to a page to be freed when the pin is released (so requiring the same complex and relatively slow tlb_gather smp safe logic we have in zap_page_range and that can be avoided completely if the spte unmap event doesn't require an unpin of the page previously mapped in the secondary MMU). The mmu notifiers allow kvm/GRU/XPMEM to attach to the tsk->mm and know when the VM is swapping or freeing or doing anything on the primary MMU so that the secondary MMU code can drop sptes before the pages are freed, avoiding all page pinning and allowing 100% reliable swapping of guest physical address space. Furthermore it avoids the code that teardown the mappings of the secondary MMU, to implement a logic like tlb_gather in zap_page_range that would require many IPI to flush other cpu tlbs, for each fixed number of spte unmapped. To make an example: if what happens on the primary MMU is a protection downgrade (from writeable to wrprotect) the secondary MMU mappings will be invalidated, and the next secondary-mmu-page-fault will call get_user_pages and trigger a do_wp_page through get_user_pages if it called get_user_pages with write=1, and it'll re-establishing an updated spte or secondary-tlb-mapping on the copied page. Or it will setup a readonly spte or readonly tlb mapping if it's a guest-read, if it calls get_user_pages with write=0. This is just an example. This allows to map any page pointed by any pte (and in turn visible in the primary CPU MMU), into a secondary MMU (be it a pure tlb like GRU, or an full MMU with both sptes and secondary-tlb like the shadow-pagetable layer with kvm), or a remote DMA in software like XPMEM (hence needing of schedule in XPMEM code to send the invalidate to the remote node, while no need to schedule in kvm/gru as it's an immediate event like invalidating primary-mmu pte). At least for KVM without this patch it's impossible to swap guests reliably. And having this feature and removing the page pin allows several other optimizations that simplify life considerably. Dependencies: 1) mm_take_all_locks() to register the mmu notifier when the whole VM isn't doing anything with "mm". This allows mmu notifier users to keep track if the VM is in the middle of the invalidate_range_begin/end critical section with an atomic counter incraese in range_begin and decreased in range_end. No secondary MMU page fault is allowed to map any spte or secondary tlb reference, while the VM is in the middle of range_begin/end as any page returned by get_user_pages in that critical section could later immediately be freed without any further ->invalidate_page notification (invalidate_range_begin/end works on ranges and ->invalidate_page isn't called immediately before freeing the page). To stop all page freeing and pagetable overwrites the mmap_sem must be taken in write mode and all other anon_vma/i_mmap locks must be taken too. 2) It'd be a waste to add branches in the VM if nobody could possibly run KVM/GRU/XPMEM on the kernel, so mmu notifiers will only enabled if CONFIG_KVM=m/y. In the current kernel kvm won't yet take advantage of mmu notifiers, but this already allows to compile a KVM external module against a kernel with mmu notifiers enabled and from the next pull from kvm.git we'll start using them. And GRU/XPMEM will also be able to continue the development by enabling KVM=m in their config, until they submit all GRU/XPMEM GPLv2 code to the mainline kernel. Then they can also enable MMU_NOTIFIERS in the same way KVM does it (even if KVM=n). This guarantees nobody selects MMU_NOTIFIER=y if KVM and GRU and XPMEM are all =n. The mmu_notifier_register call can fail because mm_take_all_locks may be interrupted by a signal and return -EINTR. Because mmu_notifier_reigster is used when a driver startup, a failure can be gracefully handled. Here an example of the change applied to kvm to register the mmu notifiers. Usually when a driver startups other allocations are required anyway and -ENOMEM failure paths exists already. struct kvm *kvm_arch_create_vm(void) { struct kvm *kvm = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm), GFP_KERNEL); + int err; if (!kvm) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages); + kvm->arch.mmu_notifier.ops = &kvm_mmu_notifier_ops; + err = mmu_notifier_register(&kvm->arch.mmu_notifier, current->mm); + if (err) { + kfree(kvm); + return ERR_PTR(err); + } + return kvm; } mmu_notifier_unregister returns void and it's reliable. The patch also adds a few needed but missing includes that would prevent kernel to compile after these changes on non-x86 archs (x86 didn't need them by luck). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mm/filemap_xip.c build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mm/mmu_notifier.c build] Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@qumranet.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jack Steiner <steiner@sgi.com> Cc: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Kanoj Sarcar <kanojsarcar@yahoo.com> Cc: Roland Dreier <rdreier@cisco.com> Cc: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@qumranet.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@redhat.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <marcelo@kvack.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com> Cc: Izik Eidus <izike@qumranet.com> Cc: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-29 05:46:29 +07:00
#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
#include <linux/hmm.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
mm: per-thread vma caching This patch is a continuation of efforts trying to optimize find_vma(), avoiding potentially expensive rbtree walks to locate a vma upon faults. The original approach (https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/11/1/410), where the largest vma was also cached, ended up being too specific and random, thus further comparison with other approaches were needed. There are two things to consider when dealing with this, the cache hit rate and the latency of find_vma(). Improving the hit-rate does not necessarily translate in finding the vma any faster, as the overhead of any fancy caching schemes can be too high to consider. We currently cache the last used vma for the whole address space, which provides a nice optimization, reducing the total cycles in find_vma() by up to 250%, for workloads with good locality. On the other hand, this simple scheme is pretty much useless for workloads with poor locality. Analyzing ebizzy runs shows that, no matter how many threads are running, the mmap_cache hit rate is less than 2%, and in many situations below 1%. The proposed approach is to replace this scheme with a small per-thread cache, maximizing hit rates at a very low maintenance cost. Invalidations are performed by simply bumping up a 32-bit sequence number. The only expensive operation is in the rare case of a seq number overflow, where all caches that share the same address space are flushed. Upon a miss, the proposed replacement policy is based on the page number that contains the virtual address in question. Concretely, the following results are seen on an 80 core, 8 socket x86-64 box: 1) System bootup: Most programs are single threaded, so the per-thread scheme does improve ~50% hit rate by just adding a few more slots to the cache. +----------------+----------+------------------+ | caching scheme | hit-rate | cycles (billion) | +----------------+----------+------------------+ | baseline | 50.61% | 19.90 | | patched | 73.45% | 13.58 | +----------------+----------+------------------+ 2) Kernel build: This one is already pretty good with the current approach as we're dealing with good locality. +----------------+----------+------------------+ | caching scheme | hit-rate | cycles (billion) | +----------------+----------+------------------+ | baseline | 75.28% | 11.03 | | patched | 88.09% | 9.31 | +----------------+----------+------------------+ 3) Oracle 11g Data Mining (4k pages): Similar to the kernel build workload. +----------------+----------+------------------+ | caching scheme | hit-rate | cycles (billion) | +----------------+----------+------------------+ | baseline | 70.66% | 17.14 | | patched | 91.15% | 12.57 | +----------------+----------+------------------+ 4) Ebizzy: There's a fair amount of variation from run to run, but this approach always shows nearly perfect hit rates, while baseline is just about non-existent. The amounts of cycles can fluctuate between anywhere from ~60 to ~116 for the baseline scheme, but this approach reduces it considerably. For instance, with 80 threads: +----------------+----------+------------------+ | caching scheme | hit-rate | cycles (billion) | +----------------+----------+------------------+ | baseline | 1.06% | 91.54 | | patched | 99.97% | 14.18 | +----------------+----------+------------------+ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix nommu build, per Davidlohr] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: document vmacache_valid() logic] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: attempt to untangle header files] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add vmacache_find() BUG_ON] [hughd@google.com: add vmacache_valid_mm() (from Oleg)] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: adjust and enhance comments] Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Tested-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 05:37:25 +07:00
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/vmacache.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/cgroup.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
hugetlb: reserve huge pages for reliable MAP_PRIVATE hugetlbfs mappings until fork() This patch reserves huge pages at mmap() time for MAP_PRIVATE mappings in a similar manner to the reservations taken for MAP_SHARED mappings. The reserve count is accounted both globally and on a per-VMA basis for private mappings. This guarantees that a process that successfully calls mmap() will successfully fault all pages in the future unless fork() is called. The characteristics of private mappings of hugetlbfs files behaviour after this patch are; 1. The process calling mmap() is guaranteed to succeed all future faults until it forks(). 2. On fork(), the parent may die due to SIGKILL on writes to the private mapping if enough pages are not available for the COW. For reasonably reliable behaviour in the face of a small huge page pool, children of hugepage-aware processes should not reference the mappings; such as might occur when fork()ing to exec(). 3. On fork(), the child VMAs inherit no reserves. Reads on pages already faulted by the parent will succeed. Successful writes will depend on enough huge pages being free in the pool. 4. Quotas of the hugetlbfs mount are checked at reserve time for the mapper and at fault time otherwise. Before this patch, all reads or writes in the child potentially needs page allocations that can later lead to the death of the parent. This applies to reads and writes of uninstantiated pages as well as COW. After the patch it is only a write to an instantiated page that causes problems. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Acked-by: Adam Litke <agl@us.ibm.com> Cc: Andy Whitcroft <apw@shadowen.org> Cc: William Lee Irwin III <wli@holomorphy.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24 11:27:23 +07:00
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF [This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264 The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp Complete diff here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp ] This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2. Mode 2 introduces the ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program. This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format of struct seccomp_data. A filter program may be installed by calling: struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... }; ... prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog); The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is allowed to proceed or denied. If the first filter program installed allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel. All attached programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to proceed. Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve. However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged (!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task. This ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary). There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are as follows: - BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time - BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood - Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired arguments - No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible. - system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying required for system call policy decisions. Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. In this patch, the primary dependency is on syscall_get_arguments(). The full desired scope of this feature will add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series. Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be the desired additional functionality. No architectures are enabled in this patch. Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> v18: - rebase to v3.4-rc2 - s/chk/check/ (akpm@linux-foundation.org,jmorris@namei.org) - allocate with GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN (indan@nul.nu) - add a comment for get_u32 regarding endianness (akpm@) - fix other typos, style mistakes (akpm@) - added acked-by v17: - properly guard seccomp filter needed headers (leann@ubuntu.com) - tighten return mask to 0x7fff0000 v16: - no change v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter size (indan@nul.nu) - drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu) - return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu) - move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu) - drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu) - only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu) - exit_code -> exit_sig v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct (indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org) - adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user - add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c - lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB - moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation (all of the above: indan@nul.nu) v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com) - removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu) - reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu) v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com) - style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu) - do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu) - pare down Kconfig doc reference. - extra comment clean up v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing (hpa@zytor.com) - calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch. This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters. (hpa@zytor.com) - lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!) v9: - n/a v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns - Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu: -- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code, -- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat. -- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch dependencies v7: (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others) - added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - merged into seccomp.c - minimal seccomp_filter.h - no config option (part of seccomp) - no new prctl - doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h (works but arg access always fails) - dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ... - dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths - merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter installation. (luto@mit.edu) - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com) - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com) - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something) v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org) - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to handle endianness. Compromises between the two alternate proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof(). (mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu) - update Kconfig description - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading - drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com) v4: - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS - now uses current->no_new_privs (luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com) - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net) v3: - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com) - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com) - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com) - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com) - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu v2: - (patch 2 only) Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 04:47:57 +07:00
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/futex.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
[PATCH] io-accounting: core statistics The present per-task IO accounting isn't very useful. It simply counts the number of bytes passed into read() and write(). So if a process reads 1MB from an already-cached file, it is accused of having performed 1MB of I/O, which is wrong. (David Wright had some comments on the applicability of the present logical IO accounting: For billing purposes it is useless but for workload analysis it is very useful read_bytes/read_calls average read request size write_bytes/write_calls average write request size read_bytes/read_blocks ie logical/physical can indicate hit rate or thrashing write_bytes/write_blocks ie logical/physical guess since pdflush writes can be missed I often look for logical larger than physical to see filesystem cache problems. And the bytes/cpusec can help find applications that are dominating the cache and causing slow interactive response from page cache contention. I want to find the IO intensive applications and make sure they are doing efficient IO. Thus the acctcms(sysV) or csacms command would give the high IO commands). This patchset adds new accounting which tries to be more accurate. We account for three things: reads: attempt to count the number of bytes which this process really did cause to be fetched from the storage layer. Done at the submit_bio() level, so it is accurate for block-backed filesystems. I also attempt to wire up NFS and CIFS. writes: attempt to count the number of bytes which this process caused to be sent to the storage layer. This is done at page-dirtying time. The big inaccuracy here is truncate. If a process writes 1MB to a file and then deletes the file, it will in fact perform no writeout. But it will have been accounted as having caused 1MB of write. So... cancelled_writes: account the number of bytes which this process caused to not happen, by truncating pagecache. We _could_ just subtract this from the process's `write' accounting. But that means that some processes would be reported to have done negative amounts of write IO, which is silly. So we just report the raw number and punt this decision up to userspace. Now, we _could_ account for writes at the physical I/O level. But - This would require that we track memory-dirtying tasks at the per-page level (would require a new pointer in struct page). - It would mean that IO statistics for a process are usually only available long after that process has exitted. Which means that we probably cannot communicate this info via taskstats. This patch: Wire up the kernel-private data structures and the accessor functions to manipulate them. Cc: Jay Lan <jlan@sgi.com> Cc: Shailabh Nagar <nagar@watson.ibm.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Cc: Chris Sturtivant <csturtiv@sgi.com> Cc: Tony Ernst <tee@sgi.com> Cc: Guillaume Thouvenin <guillaume.thouvenin@bull.net> Cc: David Wright <daw@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-10 17:19:19 +07:00
#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/memcontrol.h>
#include <linux/ftrace.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/profile.h>
#include <linux/rmap.h>
ksm: the mm interface to ksm This patch presents the mm interface to a dummy version of ksm.c, for better scrutiny of that interface: the real ksm.c follows later. When CONFIG_KSM is not set, madvise(2) reject MADV_MERGEABLE and MADV_UNMERGEABLE with EINVAL, since that seems more helpful than pretending that they can be serviced. But when CONFIG_KSM=y, accept them even if KSM is not currently running, and even on areas which KSM will not touch (e.g. hugetlb or shared file or special driver mappings). Like other madvices, report ENOMEM despite success if any area in the range is unmapped, and use EAGAIN to report out of memory. Define vma flag VM_MERGEABLE to identify an area on which KSM may try merging pages: leave it to ksm_madvise() to decide whether to set it. Define mm flag MMF_VM_MERGEABLE to identify an mm which might contain VM_MERGEABLE areas, to minimize callouts when forking or exiting. Based upon earlier patches by Chris Wright and Izik Eidus. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Izik Eidus <ieidus@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-22 07:01:57 +07:00
#include <linux/ksm.h>
#include <linux/acct.h>
2017-02-23 06:42:27 +07:00
#include <linux/userfaultfd_k.h>
#include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/delayacct.h>
#include <linux/taskstats_kern.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
Audit: add TTY input auditing Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it necessary to audit TTY output as well. Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still work). TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly useless audit events. Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel. The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone). Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY. See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16 13:40:56 +07:00
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 17:02:48 +07:00
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
#include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
#include <linux/oom.h>
2011-01-14 06:46:58 +07:00
#include <linux/khugepaged.h>
epoll: introduce POLLFREE to flush ->signalfd_wqh before kfree() This patch is intentionally incomplete to simplify the review. It ignores ep_unregister_pollwait() which plays with the same wqh. See the next change. epoll assumes that the EPOLL_CTL_ADD'ed file controls everything f_op->poll() needs. In particular it assumes that the wait queue can't go away until eventpoll_release(). This is not true in case of signalfd, the task which does EPOLL_CTL_ADD uses its ->sighand which is not connected to the file. This patch adds the special event, POLLFREE, currently only for epoll. It expects that init_poll_funcptr()'ed hook should do the necessary cleanup. Perhaps it should be defined as EPOLLFREE in eventpoll. __cleanup_sighand() is changed to do wake_up_poll(POLLFREE) if ->signalfd_wqh is not empty, we add the new signalfd_cleanup() helper. ep_poll_callback(POLLFREE) simply does list_del_init(task_list). This make this poll entry inconsistent, but we don't care. If you share epoll fd which contains our sigfd with another process you should blame yourself. signalfd is "really special". I simply do not know how we can define the "right" semantics if it used with epoll. The main problem is, epoll calls signalfd_poll() once to establish the connection with the wait queue, after that signalfd_poll(NULL) returns the different/inconsistent results depending on who does EPOLL_CTL_MOD/signalfd_read/etc. IOW: apart from sigmask, signalfd has nothing to do with the file, it works with the current thread. In short: this patch is the hack which tries to fix the symptoms. It also assumes that nobody can take tasklist_lock under epoll locks, this seems to be true. Note: - we do not have wake_up_all_poll() but wake_up_poll() is fine, poll/epoll doesn't use WQ_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE. - signalfd_cleanup() uses POLLHUP along with POLLFREE, we need a couple of simple changes in eventpoll.c to make sure it can't be "lost". Reported-by: Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-02-25 02:07:11 +07:00
#include <linux/signalfd.h>
uprobes/core: Handle breakpoint and singlestep exceptions Uprobes uses exception notifiers to get to know if a thread hit a breakpoint or a singlestep exception. When a thread hits a uprobe or is singlestepping post a uprobe hit, the uprobe exception notifier sets its TIF_UPROBE bit, which will then be checked on its return to userspace path (do_notify_resume() ->uprobe_notify_resume()), where the consumers handlers are run (in task context) based on the defined filters. Uprobe hits are thread specific and hence we need to maintain information about if a task hit a uprobe, what uprobe was hit, the slot where the original instruction was copied for xol so that it can be singlestepped with appropriate fixups. In some cases, special care is needed for instructions that are executed out of line (xol). These are architecture specific artefacts, such as handling RIP relative instructions on x86_64. Since the instruction at which the uprobe was inserted is executed out of line, architecture specific fixups are added so that the thread continues normal execution in the presence of a uprobe. Postpone the signals until we execute the probed insn. post_xol() path does a recalc_sigpending() before return to user-mode, this ensures the signal can't be lost. Uprobes relies on DIE_DEBUG notification to notify if a singlestep is complete. Adds x86 specific uprobe exception notifiers and appropriate hooks needed to determine a uprobe hit and subsequent post processing. Add requisite x86 fixups for xol for uprobes. Specific cases needing fixups include relative jumps (x86_64), calls, etc. Where possible, we check and skip singlestepping the breakpointed instructions. For now we skip single byte as well as few multibyte nop instructions. However this can be extended to other instructions too. Credits to Oleg Nesterov for suggestions/patches related to signal, breakpoint, singlestep handling code. Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120313180011.29771.89027.sendpatchset@srdronam.in.ibm.com [ Performed various cleanliness edits ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2012-03-14 01:00:11 +07:00
#include <linux/uprobes.h>
#include <linux/aio.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
#include <linux/kcov.h>
livepatch: change to a per-task consistency model Change livepatch to use a basic per-task consistency model. This is the foundation which will eventually enable us to patch those ~10% of security patches which change function or data semantics. This is the biggest remaining piece needed to make livepatch more generally useful. This code stems from the design proposal made by Vojtech [1] in November 2014. It's a hybrid of kGraft and kpatch: it uses kGraft's per-task consistency and syscall barrier switching combined with kpatch's stack trace switching. There are also a number of fallback options which make it quite flexible. Patches are applied on a per-task basis, when the task is deemed safe to switch over. When a patch is enabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where tasks are converging to the patched state. Usually this transition state can complete in a few seconds. The same sequence occurs when a patch is disabled, except the tasks converge from the patched state to the unpatched state. An interrupt handler inherits the patched state of the task it interrupts. The same is true for forked tasks: the child inherits the patched state of the parent. Livepatch uses several complementary approaches to determine when it's safe to patch tasks: 1. The first and most effective approach is stack checking of sleeping tasks. If no affected functions are on the stack of a given task, the task is patched. In most cases this will patch most or all of the tasks on the first try. Otherwise it'll keep trying periodically. This option is only available if the architecture has reliable stacks (HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE). 2. The second approach, if needed, is kernel exit switching. A task is switched when it returns to user space from a system call, a user space IRQ, or a signal. It's useful in the following cases: a) Patching I/O-bound user tasks which are sleeping on an affected function. In this case you have to send SIGSTOP and SIGCONT to force it to exit the kernel and be patched. b) Patching CPU-bound user tasks. If the task is highly CPU-bound then it will get patched the next time it gets interrupted by an IRQ. c) In the future it could be useful for applying patches for architectures which don't yet have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. In this case you would have to signal most of the tasks on the system. However this isn't supported yet because there's currently no way to patch kthreads without HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. 3. For idle "swapper" tasks, since they don't ever exit the kernel, they instead have a klp_update_patch_state() call in the idle loop which allows them to be patched before the CPU enters the idle state. (Note there's not yet such an approach for kthreads.) All the above approaches may be skipped by setting the 'immediate' flag in the 'klp_patch' struct, which will disable per-task consistency and patch all tasks immediately. This can be useful if the patch doesn't change any function or data semantics. Note that, even with this flag set, it's possible that some tasks may still be running with an old version of the function, until that function returns. There's also an 'immediate' flag in the 'klp_func' struct which allows you to specify that certain functions in the patch can be applied without per-task consistency. This might be useful if you want to patch a common function like schedule(), and the function change doesn't need consistency but the rest of the patch does. For architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, the user must set patch->immediate which causes all tasks to be patched immediately. This option should be used with care, only when the patch doesn't change any function or data semantics. In the future, architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE may be allowed to use per-task consistency if we can come up with another way to patch kthreads. The /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/transition file shows whether a patch is in transition. Only a single patch (the topmost patch on the stack) can be in transition at a given time. A patch can remain in transition indefinitely, if any of the tasks are stuck in the initial patch state. A transition can be reversed and effectively canceled by writing the opposite value to the /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/enabled file while the transition is in progress. Then all the tasks will attempt to converge back to the original patch state. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141107140458.GA21774@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> # for the scheduler changes Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2017-02-14 08:42:40 +07:00
#include <linux/livepatch.h>
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls The STACKLEAK feature (initially developed by PaX Team) has the following benefits: 1. Reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak bugs. The idea of erasing the thread stack at the end of syscalls is similar to CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING and memzero_explicit() in kernel crypto, which all comply with FDP_RIP.2 (Full Residual Information Protection) of the Common Criteria standard. 2. Blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2017-17712, CVE-2010-2963). That kind of bugs should be killed by improving C compilers in future, which might take a long time. This commit introduces the code filling the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value before returning to userspace. Full STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which comes in a separate commit. The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: https://grsecurity.net/ https://pax.grsecurity.net/ This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Performance impact: Hardware: Intel Core i7-4770, 16 GB RAM Test #1: building the Linux kernel on a single core 0.91% slowdown Test #2: hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P 4.2% slowdown So the STACKLEAK description in Kconfig includes: "The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it". Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-08-17 05:16:58 +07:00
#include <linux/stackleak.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <trace/events/sched.h>
tracepoint: add tracepoints for debugging oom_score_adj oom_score_adj is used for guarding processes from OOM-Killer. One of problem is that it's inherited at fork(). When a daemon set oom_score_adj and make children, it's hard to know where the value is set. This patch adds some tracepoints useful for debugging. This patch adds 3 trace points. - creating new task - renaming a task (exec) - set oom_score_adj To debug, users need to enable some trace pointer. Maybe filtering is useful as # EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/task/ # echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_newtask/filter # echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_rename/filter # echo 1 > $EVENT/enable # EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/oom/ # echo 1 > $EVENT/enable output will be like this. # grep oom /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace bash-7699 [007] d..3 5140.744510: oom_score_adj_update: pid=7699 comm=bash oom_score_adj=-1000 bash-7699 [007] ...1 5151.818022: task_newtask: pid=7729 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000 ls-7729 [003] ...2 5151.818504: task_rename: pid=7729 oldcomm=bash newcomm=ls oom_score_adj=-1000 bash-7699 [002] ...1 5175.701468: task_newtask: pid=7730 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000 grep-7730 [007] ...2 5175.701993: task_rename: pid=7730 oldcomm=bash newcomm=grep oom_score_adj=-1000 Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-11 06:08:09 +07:00
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <trace/events/task.h>
/*
* Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel
*/
#define MIN_THREADS 20
/*
* Maximum number of threads
*/
#define MAX_THREADS FUTEX_TID_MASK
/*
* Protected counters by write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock)
*/
unsigned long total_forks; /* Handle normal Linux uptimes. */
int nr_threads; /* The idle threads do not count.. */
static int max_threads; /* tunable limit on nr_threads */
fork: improve error message for corrupted page tables When a user process exits, the kernel cleans up the mm_struct of the user process and during cleanup, check_mm() checks the page tables of the user process for corruption (E.g: unexpected page flags set/cleared). For corrupted page tables, the error message printed by check_mm() isn't very clear as it prints the loop index instead of page table type (E.g: Resident file mapping pages vs Resident shared memory pages). The loop index in check_mm() is used to index rss_stat[] which represents individual memory type stats. Hence, instead of printing index, print memory type, thereby improving error message. Without patch: -------------- [ 204.836425] mm/pgtable-generic.c:29: bad p4d 0000000089eb4e92(800000025f941467) [ 204.836544] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000f75895ea idx:0 val:2 [ 204.836615] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000f75895ea idx:1 val:5 [ 204.836685] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: 20480 With patch: ----------- [ 69.815453] mm/pgtable-generic.c:29: bad p4d 0000000084653642(800000025ca37467) [ 69.815872] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000014a6c03 type:MM_FILEPAGES val:2 [ 69.815962] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000014a6c03 type:MM_ANONPAGES val:5 [ 69.816050] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: 20480 Also, change print function (from printk(KERN_ALERT, ..) to pr_alert()) so that it matches the other print statement. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/da75b5153f617f4c5739c08ee6ebeb3d19db0fbc.1565123758.git.sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-26 06:47:27 +07:00
#define NAMED_ARRAY_INDEX(x) [x] = __stringify(x)
static const char * const resident_page_types[] = {
NAMED_ARRAY_INDEX(MM_FILEPAGES),
NAMED_ARRAY_INDEX(MM_ANONPAGES),
NAMED_ARRAY_INDEX(MM_SWAPENTS),
NAMED_ARRAY_INDEX(MM_SHMEMPAGES),
};
DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, process_counts) = 0;
__cacheline_aligned DEFINE_RWLOCK(tasklist_lock); /* outer */
#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_RCU
int lockdep_tasklist_lock_is_held(void)
{
return lockdep_is_held(&tasklist_lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lockdep_tasklist_lock_is_held);
#endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_RCU */
int nr_processes(void)
{
int cpu;
int total = 0;
Correct nr_processes() when CPUs have been unplugged nr_processes() returns the sum of the per cpu counter process_counts for all online CPUs. This counter is incremented for the current CPU on fork() and decremented for the current CPU on exit(). Since a process does not necessarily fork and exit on the same CPU the process_count for an individual CPU can be either positive or negative and effectively has no meaning in isolation. Therefore calculating the sum of process_counts over only the online CPUs omits the processes which were started or stopped on any CPU which has since been unplugged. Only the sum of process_counts across all possible CPUs has meaning. The only caller of nr_processes() is proc_root_getattr() which calculates the number of links to /proc as stat->nlink = proc_root.nlink + nr_processes(); You don't have to be all that unlucky for the nr_processes() to return a negative value leading to a negative number of links (or rather, an apparently enormous number of links). If this happens then you can get failures where things like "ls /proc" start to fail because they got an -EOVERFLOW from some stat() call. Example with some debugging inserted to show what goes on: # ps haux|wc -l nr_processes: CPU0: 90 nr_processes: CPU1: 1030 nr_processes: CPU2: -900 nr_processes: CPU3: -136 nr_processes: TOTAL: 84 proc_root_getattr. nlink 12 + nr_processes() 84 = 96 84 # echo 0 >/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online # ps haux|wc -l nr_processes: CPU0: 85 nr_processes: CPU2: -901 nr_processes: CPU3: -137 nr_processes: TOTAL: -953 proc_root_getattr. nlink 12 + nr_processes() -953 = -941 75 # stat /proc/ nr_processes: CPU0: 84 nr_processes: CPU2: -901 nr_processes: CPU3: -137 nr_processes: TOTAL: -954 proc_root_getattr. nlink 12 + nr_processes() -954 = -942 File: `/proc/' Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 1024 directory Device: 3h/3d Inode: 1 Links: 4294966354 Access: (0555/dr-xr-xr-x) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root) Access: 2009-11-03 09:06:55.000000000 +0000 Modify: 2009-11-03 09:06:55.000000000 +0000 Change: 2009-11-03 09:06:55.000000000 +0000 I'm not 100% convinced that the per_cpu regions remain valid for offline CPUs, although my testing suggests that they do. If not then I think the correct solution would be to aggregate the process_count for a given CPU into a global base value in cpu_down(). This bug appears to pre-date the transition to git and it looks like it may even have been present in linux-2.6.0-test7-bk3 since it looks like the code Rusty patched in http://lwn.net/Articles/64773/ was already wrong. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-11-03 17:11:14 +07:00
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
total += per_cpu(process_counts, cpu);
return total;
}
fork: fix error handling in dup_task() The function dup_task() may fail at the following function calls in the following order. 0) alloc_task_struct_node() 1) alloc_thread_info_node() 2) arch_dup_task_struct() Error by 0) is not a matter, it can just return. But error by 1) requires releasing task_struct allocated by 0) before it returns. Likewise, error by 2) requires releasing task_struct and thread_info allocated by 0) and 1). The existing error handling calls free_task_struct() and free_thread_info() which do not only release task_struct and thread_info, but also call architecture specific arch_release_task_struct() and arch_release_thread_info(). The problem is that task_struct and thread_info are not fully initialized yet at this point, but arch_release_task_struct() and arch_release_thread_info() are called with them. For example, x86 defines its own arch_release_task_struct() that releases a task_xstate. If alloc_thread_info_node() fails in dup_task(), arch_release_task_struct() is called with task_struct which is just allocated and filled with garbage in this error handling. This actually happened with tools/testing/fault-injection/failcmd.sh # env FAILCMD_TYPE=fail_page_alloc \ ./tools/testing/fault-injection/failcmd.sh --times=100 \ --min-order=0 --ignore-gfp-wait=0 \ -- make -C tools/testing/selftests/ run_tests In order to fix this issue, make free_{task_struct,thread_info}() not to call arch_release_{task_struct,thread_info}() and call arch_release_{task_struct,thread_info}() implicitly where needed. Default arch_release_task_struct() and arch_release_thread_info() are defined as empty by default. So this change only affects the architectures which implement their own arch_release_task_struct() or arch_release_thread_info() as listed below. arch_release_task_struct(): x86, sh arch_release_thread_info(): mn10300, tile Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-31 04:42:33 +07:00
void __weak arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
}
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ALLOCATOR
static struct kmem_cache *task_struct_cachep;
static inline struct task_struct *alloc_task_struct_node(int node)
{
return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, GFP_KERNEL, node);
}
static inline void free_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
kmem_cache_free(task_struct_cachep, tsk);
}
#endif
Clarify naming of thread info/stack allocators We've had the thread info allocated together with the thread stack for most architectures for a long time (since the thread_info was split off from the task struct), but that is about to change. But the patches that move the thread info to be off-stack (and a part of the task struct instead) made it clear how confused the allocator and freeing functions are. Because the common case was that we share an allocation with the thread stack and the thread_info, the two pointers were identical. That identity then meant that we would have things like ti = alloc_thread_info_node(tsk, node); ... tsk->stack = ti; which certainly _worked_ (since stack and thread_info have the same value), but is rather confusing: why are we assigning a thread_info to the stack? And if we move the thread_info away, the "confusing" code just gets to be entirely bogus. So remove all this confusion, and make it clear that we are doing the stack allocation by renaming and clarifying the function names to be about the stack. The fact that the thread_info then shares the allocation is an implementation detail, and not really about the allocation itself. This is a pure renaming and type fix: we pass in the same pointer, it's just that we clarify what the pointer means. The ia64 code that actually only has one single allocation (for all of task_struct, thread_info and kernel thread stack) now looks a bit odd, but since "tsk->stack" is actually not even used there, that oddity doesn't matter. It would be a separate thing to clean that up, I intentionally left the ia64 changes as a pure brute-force renaming and type change. Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-25 05:09:37 +07:00
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_THREAD_STACK_ALLOCATOR
/*
* Allocate pages if THREAD_SIZE is >= PAGE_SIZE, otherwise use a
* kmemcache based allocator.
*/
# if THREAD_SIZE >= PAGE_SIZE || defined(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
/*
* vmalloc() is a bit slow, and calling vfree() enough times will force a TLB
* flush. Try to minimize the number of calls by caching stacks.
*/
#define NR_CACHED_STACKS 2
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vm_struct *, cached_stacks[NR_CACHED_STACKS]);
static int free_vm_stack_cache(unsigned int cpu)
{
struct vm_struct **cached_vm_stacks = per_cpu_ptr(cached_stacks, cpu);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < NR_CACHED_STACKS; i++) {
struct vm_struct *vm_stack = cached_vm_stacks[i];
if (!vm_stack)
continue;
vfree(vm_stack->addr);
cached_vm_stacks[i] = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
#endif
static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
void *stack;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < NR_CACHED_STACKS; i++) {
struct vm_struct *s;
s = this_cpu_xchg(cached_stacks[i], NULL);
if (!s)
continue;
/* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */
memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE);
fork: unconditionally clear stack on fork One of the classes of kernel stack content leaks[1] is exposing the contents of prior heap or stack contents when a new process stack is allocated. Normally, those stacks are not zeroed, and the old contents remain in place. In the face of stack content exposure flaws, those contents can leak to userspace. Fixing this will make the kernel no longer vulnerable to these flaws, as the stack will be wiped each time a stack is assigned to a new process. There's not a meaningful change in runtime performance; it almost looks like it provides a benefit. Performing back-to-back kernel builds before: Run times: 157.86 157.09 158.90 160.94 160.80 Mean: 159.12 Std Dev: 1.54 and after: Run times: 159.31 157.34 156.71 158.15 160.81 Mean: 158.46 Std Dev: 1.46 Instead of making this a build or runtime config, Andy Lutomirski recommended this just be enabled by default. [1] A noisy search for many kinds of stack content leaks can be seen here: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=linux+kernel+stack+leak I did some more with perf and cycle counts on running 100,000 execs of /bin/true. before: Cycles: 218858861551 218853036130 214727610969 227656844122 224980542841 Mean: 221015379122.60 Std Dev: 4662486552.47 after: Cycles: 213868945060 213119275204 211820169456 224426673259 225489986348 Mean: 217745009865.40 Std Dev: 5935559279.99 It continues to look like it's faster, though the deviation is rather wide, but I'm not sure what I could do that would be less noisy. I'm open to ideas! Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180221021659.GA37073@beast Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-21 04:55:31 +07:00
tsk->stack_vm_area = s;
tsk->stack = s->addr;
return s->addr;
}
mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is set, kernel stacks are allocated using __vmalloc_node_range() with __GFP_ACCOUNT. So kernel stack pages are charged against corresponding memory cgroups on allocation and uncharged on releasing them. The problem is that we do cache kernel stacks in small per-cpu caches and do reuse them for new tasks, which can belong to different memory cgroups. Each stack page still holds a reference to the original cgroup, so the cgroup can't be released until the vmap area is released. To make this happen we need more than two subsequent exits without forks in between on the current cpu, which makes it very unlikely to happen. As a result, I saw a significant number of dying cgroups (in theory, up to 2 * number_of_cpu + number_of_tasks), which can't be released even by significant memory pressure. As a cgroup structure can take a significant amount of memory (first of all, per-cpu data like memcg statistics), it leads to a noticeable waste of memory. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180827162621.30187-1-guro@fb.com Fixes: ac496bf48d97 ("fork: Optimize task creation by caching two thread stacks per CPU if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:03:19 +07:00
/*
* Allocated stacks are cached and later reused by new threads,
* so memcg accounting is performed manually on assigning/releasing
* stacks to tasks. Drop __GFP_ACCOUNT.
*/
stack = __vmalloc_node_range(THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_ALIGN,
VMALLOC_START, VMALLOC_END,
mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is set, kernel stacks are allocated using __vmalloc_node_range() with __GFP_ACCOUNT. So kernel stack pages are charged against corresponding memory cgroups on allocation and uncharged on releasing them. The problem is that we do cache kernel stacks in small per-cpu caches and do reuse them for new tasks, which can belong to different memory cgroups. Each stack page still holds a reference to the original cgroup, so the cgroup can't be released until the vmap area is released. To make this happen we need more than two subsequent exits without forks in between on the current cpu, which makes it very unlikely to happen. As a result, I saw a significant number of dying cgroups (in theory, up to 2 * number_of_cpu + number_of_tasks), which can't be released even by significant memory pressure. As a cgroup structure can take a significant amount of memory (first of all, per-cpu data like memcg statistics), it leads to a noticeable waste of memory. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180827162621.30187-1-guro@fb.com Fixes: ac496bf48d97 ("fork: Optimize task creation by caching two thread stacks per CPU if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:03:19 +07:00
THREADINFO_GFP & ~__GFP_ACCOUNT,
PAGE_KERNEL,
0, node, __builtin_return_address(0));
/*
* We can't call find_vm_area() in interrupt context, and
* free_thread_stack() can be called in interrupt context,
* so cache the vm_struct.
*/
fork,memcg: fix crash in free_thread_stack on memcg charge fail Commit 9b6f7e163cd0 ("mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting") will result in fork failing if allocating a kernel stack for a task in dup_task_struct exceeds the kernel memory allowance for that cgroup. Unfortunately, it also results in a crash. This is due to the code jumping to free_stack and calling free_thread_stack when the memcg kernel stack charge fails, but without tsk->stack pointing at the freshly allocated stack. This in turn results in the vfree_atomic in free_thread_stack oopsing with a backtrace like this: #5 [ffffc900244efc88] die at ffffffff8101f0ab #6 [ffffc900244efcb8] do_general_protection at ffffffff8101cb86 #7 [ffffc900244efce0] general_protection at ffffffff818ff082 [exception RIP: llist_add_batch+7] RIP: ffffffff8150d487 RSP: ffffc900244efd98 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88085ef55980 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88085ef55980 RSI: 343834343531203a RDI: 343834343531203a RBP: ffffc900244efd98 R8: 0000000000000001 R9: ffff8808578c3600 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88029f6c21c0 R13: 0000000000000286 R14: ffff880147759b00 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffffc900244efda0] vfree_atomic at ffffffff811df2c7 #9 [ffffc900244efdb8] copy_process at ffffffff81086e37 #10 [ffffc900244efe98] _do_fork at ffffffff810884e0 #11 [ffffc900244eff10] sys_vfork at ffffffff810887ff #12 [ffffc900244eff20] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81002a43 RIP: 000000000049b948 RSP: 00007ffcdb307830 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000896030 RCX: 000000000049b948 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffcdb307790 RDI: 00000000005d7421 RBP: 000000000067370f R8: 00007ffcdb3077b0 R9: 000000000001ed00 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040 R13: 000000000000000f R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000088d018 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003a CS: 0033 SS: 002b The simplest fix is to assign tsk->stack right where it is allocated. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181214231726.7ee4843c@imladris.surriel.com Fixes: 9b6f7e163cd0 ("mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting") Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-22 05:30:54 +07:00
if (stack) {
tsk->stack_vm_area = find_vm_area(stack);
fork,memcg: fix crash in free_thread_stack on memcg charge fail Commit 9b6f7e163cd0 ("mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting") will result in fork failing if allocating a kernel stack for a task in dup_task_struct exceeds the kernel memory allowance for that cgroup. Unfortunately, it also results in a crash. This is due to the code jumping to free_stack and calling free_thread_stack when the memcg kernel stack charge fails, but without tsk->stack pointing at the freshly allocated stack. This in turn results in the vfree_atomic in free_thread_stack oopsing with a backtrace like this: #5 [ffffc900244efc88] die at ffffffff8101f0ab #6 [ffffc900244efcb8] do_general_protection at ffffffff8101cb86 #7 [ffffc900244efce0] general_protection at ffffffff818ff082 [exception RIP: llist_add_batch+7] RIP: ffffffff8150d487 RSP: ffffc900244efd98 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88085ef55980 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88085ef55980 RSI: 343834343531203a RDI: 343834343531203a RBP: ffffc900244efd98 R8: 0000000000000001 R9: ffff8808578c3600 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88029f6c21c0 R13: 0000000000000286 R14: ffff880147759b00 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffffc900244efda0] vfree_atomic at ffffffff811df2c7 #9 [ffffc900244efdb8] copy_process at ffffffff81086e37 #10 [ffffc900244efe98] _do_fork at ffffffff810884e0 #11 [ffffc900244eff10] sys_vfork at ffffffff810887ff #12 [ffffc900244eff20] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81002a43 RIP: 000000000049b948 RSP: 00007ffcdb307830 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000896030 RCX: 000000000049b948 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffcdb307790 RDI: 00000000005d7421 RBP: 000000000067370f R8: 00007ffcdb3077b0 R9: 000000000001ed00 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040 R13: 000000000000000f R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000088d018 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003a CS: 0033 SS: 002b The simplest fix is to assign tsk->stack right where it is allocated. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181214231726.7ee4843c@imladris.surriel.com Fixes: 9b6f7e163cd0 ("mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting") Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-22 05:30:54 +07:00
tsk->stack = stack;
}
return stack;
#else
mm: charge/uncharge kmemcg from generic page allocator paths Currently, to charge a non-slab allocation to kmemcg one has to use alloc_kmem_pages helper with __GFP_ACCOUNT flag. A page allocated with this helper should finally be freed using free_kmem_pages, otherwise it won't be uncharged. This API suits its current users fine, but it turns out to be impossible to use along with page reference counting, i.e. when an allocation is supposed to be freed with put_page, as it is the case with pipe or unix socket buffers. To overcome this limitation, this patch moves charging/uncharging to generic page allocator paths, i.e. to __alloc_pages_nodemask and free_pages_prepare, and zaps alloc/free_kmem_pages helpers. This way, one can use any of the available page allocation functions to get the allocated page charged to kmemcg - it's enough to pass __GFP_ACCOUNT, just like in case of kmalloc and friends. A charged page will be automatically uncharged on free. To make it possible, we need to mark pages charged to kmemcg somehow. To avoid introducing a new page flag, we make use of page->_mapcount for marking such pages. Since pages charged to kmemcg are not supposed to be mapped to userspace, it should work just fine. There are other (ab)users of page->_mapcount - buddy and balloon pages - but we don't conflict with them. In case kmemcg is compiled out or not used at runtime, this patch introduces no overhead to generic page allocator paths. If kmemcg is used, it will be plus one gfp flags check on alloc and plus one page->_mapcount check on free, which shouldn't hurt performance, because the data accessed are hot. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a9736d856f895bcb465d9f257b54efe32eda6f99.1464079538.git.vdavydov@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-07-27 05:24:24 +07:00
struct page *page = alloc_pages_node(node, THREADINFO_GFP,
THREAD_SIZE_ORDER);
if (likely(page)) {
tsk->stack = page_address(page);
return tsk->stack;
}
return NULL;
#endif
}
static inline void free_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is set, kernel stacks are allocated using __vmalloc_node_range() with __GFP_ACCOUNT. So kernel stack pages are charged against corresponding memory cgroups on allocation and uncharged on releasing them. The problem is that we do cache kernel stacks in small per-cpu caches and do reuse them for new tasks, which can belong to different memory cgroups. Each stack page still holds a reference to the original cgroup, so the cgroup can't be released until the vmap area is released. To make this happen we need more than two subsequent exits without forks in between on the current cpu, which makes it very unlikely to happen. As a result, I saw a significant number of dying cgroups (in theory, up to 2 * number_of_cpu + number_of_tasks), which can't be released even by significant memory pressure. As a cgroup structure can take a significant amount of memory (first of all, per-cpu data like memcg statistics), it leads to a noticeable waste of memory. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180827162621.30187-1-guro@fb.com Fixes: ac496bf48d97 ("fork: Optimize task creation by caching two thread stacks per CPU if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:03:19 +07:00
struct vm_struct *vm = task_stack_vm_area(tsk);
if (vm) {
int i;
mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is set, kernel stacks are allocated using __vmalloc_node_range() with __GFP_ACCOUNT. So kernel stack pages are charged against corresponding memory cgroups on allocation and uncharged on releasing them. The problem is that we do cache kernel stacks in small per-cpu caches and do reuse them for new tasks, which can belong to different memory cgroups. Each stack page still holds a reference to the original cgroup, so the cgroup can't be released until the vmap area is released. To make this happen we need more than two subsequent exits without forks in between on the current cpu, which makes it very unlikely to happen. As a result, I saw a significant number of dying cgroups (in theory, up to 2 * number_of_cpu + number_of_tasks), which can't be released even by significant memory pressure. As a cgroup structure can take a significant amount of memory (first of all, per-cpu data like memcg statistics), it leads to a noticeable waste of memory. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180827162621.30187-1-guro@fb.com Fixes: ac496bf48d97 ("fork: Optimize task creation by caching two thread stacks per CPU if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:03:19 +07:00
for (i = 0; i < THREAD_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) {
mod_memcg_page_state(vm->pages[i],
MEMCG_KERNEL_STACK_KB,
-(int)(PAGE_SIZE / 1024));
memcg_kmem_uncharge(vm->pages[i], 0);
}
for (i = 0; i < NR_CACHED_STACKS; i++) {
if (this_cpu_cmpxchg(cached_stacks[i],
NULL, tsk->stack_vm_area) != NULL)
continue;
return;
}
vfree_atomic(tsk->stack);
return;
}
#endif
__free_pages(virt_to_page(tsk->stack), THREAD_SIZE_ORDER);
}
# else
Clarify naming of thread info/stack allocators We've had the thread info allocated together with the thread stack for most architectures for a long time (since the thread_info was split off from the task struct), but that is about to change. But the patches that move the thread info to be off-stack (and a part of the task struct instead) made it clear how confused the allocator and freeing functions are. Because the common case was that we share an allocation with the thread stack and the thread_info, the two pointers were identical. That identity then meant that we would have things like ti = alloc_thread_info_node(tsk, node); ... tsk->stack = ti; which certainly _worked_ (since stack and thread_info have the same value), but is rather confusing: why are we assigning a thread_info to the stack? And if we move the thread_info away, the "confusing" code just gets to be entirely bogus. So remove all this confusion, and make it clear that we are doing the stack allocation by renaming and clarifying the function names to be about the stack. The fact that the thread_info then shares the allocation is an implementation detail, and not really about the allocation itself. This is a pure renaming and type fix: we pass in the same pointer, it's just that we clarify what the pointer means. The ia64 code that actually only has one single allocation (for all of task_struct, thread_info and kernel thread stack) now looks a bit odd, but since "tsk->stack" is actually not even used there, that oddity doesn't matter. It would be a separate thing to clean that up, I intentionally left the ia64 changes as a pure brute-force renaming and type change. Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-25 05:09:37 +07:00
static struct kmem_cache *thread_stack_cache;
static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk,
int node)
{
fork,memcg: fix crash in free_thread_stack on memcg charge fail Commit 9b6f7e163cd0 ("mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting") will result in fork failing if allocating a kernel stack for a task in dup_task_struct exceeds the kernel memory allowance for that cgroup. Unfortunately, it also results in a crash. This is due to the code jumping to free_stack and calling free_thread_stack when the memcg kernel stack charge fails, but without tsk->stack pointing at the freshly allocated stack. This in turn results in the vfree_atomic in free_thread_stack oopsing with a backtrace like this: #5 [ffffc900244efc88] die at ffffffff8101f0ab #6 [ffffc900244efcb8] do_general_protection at ffffffff8101cb86 #7 [ffffc900244efce0] general_protection at ffffffff818ff082 [exception RIP: llist_add_batch+7] RIP: ffffffff8150d487 RSP: ffffc900244efd98 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88085ef55980 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88085ef55980 RSI: 343834343531203a RDI: 343834343531203a RBP: ffffc900244efd98 R8: 0000000000000001 R9: ffff8808578c3600 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88029f6c21c0 R13: 0000000000000286 R14: ffff880147759b00 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffffc900244efda0] vfree_atomic at ffffffff811df2c7 #9 [ffffc900244efdb8] copy_process at ffffffff81086e37 #10 [ffffc900244efe98] _do_fork at ffffffff810884e0 #11 [ffffc900244eff10] sys_vfork at ffffffff810887ff #12 [ffffc900244eff20] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81002a43 RIP: 000000000049b948 RSP: 00007ffcdb307830 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000896030 RCX: 000000000049b948 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffcdb307790 RDI: 00000000005d7421 RBP: 000000000067370f R8: 00007ffcdb3077b0 R9: 000000000001ed00 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040 R13: 000000000000000f R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000088d018 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003a CS: 0033 SS: 002b The simplest fix is to assign tsk->stack right where it is allocated. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181214231726.7ee4843c@imladris.surriel.com Fixes: 9b6f7e163cd0 ("mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting") Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-22 05:30:54 +07:00
unsigned long *stack;
stack = kmem_cache_alloc_node(thread_stack_cache, THREADINFO_GFP, node);
tsk->stack = stack;
return stack;
}
static void free_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
kmem_cache_free(thread_stack_cache, tsk->stack);
}
Clarify naming of thread info/stack allocators We've had the thread info allocated together with the thread stack for most architectures for a long time (since the thread_info was split off from the task struct), but that is about to change. But the patches that move the thread info to be off-stack (and a part of the task struct instead) made it clear how confused the allocator and freeing functions are. Because the common case was that we share an allocation with the thread stack and the thread_info, the two pointers were identical. That identity then meant that we would have things like ti = alloc_thread_info_node(tsk, node); ... tsk->stack = ti; which certainly _worked_ (since stack and thread_info have the same value), but is rather confusing: why are we assigning a thread_info to the stack? And if we move the thread_info away, the "confusing" code just gets to be entirely bogus. So remove all this confusion, and make it clear that we are doing the stack allocation by renaming and clarifying the function names to be about the stack. The fact that the thread_info then shares the allocation is an implementation detail, and not really about the allocation itself. This is a pure renaming and type fix: we pass in the same pointer, it's just that we clarify what the pointer means. The ia64 code that actually only has one single allocation (for all of task_struct, thread_info and kernel thread stack) now looks a bit odd, but since "tsk->stack" is actually not even used there, that oddity doesn't matter. It would be a separate thing to clean that up, I intentionally left the ia64 changes as a pure brute-force renaming and type change. Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-25 05:09:37 +07:00
void thread_stack_cache_init(void)
{
fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the thread_stack slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed. Since the entire thread_stack needs to be available to userspace, the entire slab contents are whitelisted. Note that the slab-based thread stack is only present on systems with THREAD_SIZE < PAGE_SIZE and !CONFIG_VMAP_STACK. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: alloc_thread_stack_node(...): return kmem_cache_alloc_node(thread_stack_cache, ...) dup_task_struct(...): ... stack = alloc_thread_stack_node(...) ... tsk->stack = stack; copy_process(...): ... dup_task_struct(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace] Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2017-06-11 09:50:41 +07:00
thread_stack_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("thread_stack",
THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_SIZE, 0, 0,
THREAD_SIZE, NULL);
Clarify naming of thread info/stack allocators We've had the thread info allocated together with the thread stack for most architectures for a long time (since the thread_info was split off from the task struct), but that is about to change. But the patches that move the thread info to be off-stack (and a part of the task struct instead) made it clear how confused the allocator and freeing functions are. Because the common case was that we share an allocation with the thread stack and the thread_info, the two pointers were identical. That identity then meant that we would have things like ti = alloc_thread_info_node(tsk, node); ... tsk->stack = ti; which certainly _worked_ (since stack and thread_info have the same value), but is rather confusing: why are we assigning a thread_info to the stack? And if we move the thread_info away, the "confusing" code just gets to be entirely bogus. So remove all this confusion, and make it clear that we are doing the stack allocation by renaming and clarifying the function names to be about the stack. The fact that the thread_info then shares the allocation is an implementation detail, and not really about the allocation itself. This is a pure renaming and type fix: we pass in the same pointer, it's just that we clarify what the pointer means. The ia64 code that actually only has one single allocation (for all of task_struct, thread_info and kernel thread stack) now looks a bit odd, but since "tsk->stack" is actually not even used there, that oddity doesn't matter. It would be a separate thing to clean that up, I intentionally left the ia64 changes as a pure brute-force renaming and type change. Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-25 05:09:37 +07:00
BUG_ON(thread_stack_cache == NULL);
}
# endif
#endif
/* SLAB cache for signal_struct structures (tsk->signal) */
static struct kmem_cache *signal_cachep;
/* SLAB cache for sighand_struct structures (tsk->sighand) */
struct kmem_cache *sighand_cachep;
/* SLAB cache for files_struct structures (tsk->files) */
struct kmem_cache *files_cachep;
/* SLAB cache for fs_struct structures (tsk->fs) */
struct kmem_cache *fs_cachep;
/* SLAB cache for vm_area_struct structures */
static struct kmem_cache *vm_area_cachep;
/* SLAB cache for mm_struct structures (tsk->mm) */
static struct kmem_cache *mm_cachep;
struct vm_area_struct *vm_area_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (vma)
vma_init(vma, mm);
return vma;
}
struct vm_area_struct *vm_area_dup(struct vm_area_struct *orig)
{
struct vm_area_struct *new = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (new) {
*new = *orig;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->anon_vma_chain);
}
return new;
}
void vm_area_free(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
}
static void account_kernel_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, int account)
{
void *stack = task_stack_page(tsk);
struct vm_struct *vm = task_stack_vm_area(tsk);
BUILD_BUG_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK) && PAGE_SIZE % 1024 != 0);
if (vm) {
int i;
BUG_ON(vm->nr_pages != THREAD_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE);
for (i = 0; i < THREAD_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) {
mod_zone_page_state(page_zone(vm->pages[i]),
NR_KERNEL_STACK_KB,
PAGE_SIZE / 1024 * account);
}
} else {
/*
* All stack pages are in the same zone and belong to the
* same memcg.
*/
struct page *first_page = virt_to_page(stack);
mod_zone_page_state(page_zone(first_page), NR_KERNEL_STACK_KB,
THREAD_SIZE / 1024 * account);
mod_memcg_page_state(first_page, MEMCG_KERNEL_STACK_KB,
account * (THREAD_SIZE / 1024));
}
}
mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is set, kernel stacks are allocated using __vmalloc_node_range() with __GFP_ACCOUNT. So kernel stack pages are charged against corresponding memory cgroups on allocation and uncharged on releasing them. The problem is that we do cache kernel stacks in small per-cpu caches and do reuse them for new tasks, which can belong to different memory cgroups. Each stack page still holds a reference to the original cgroup, so the cgroup can't be released until the vmap area is released. To make this happen we need more than two subsequent exits without forks in between on the current cpu, which makes it very unlikely to happen. As a result, I saw a significant number of dying cgroups (in theory, up to 2 * number_of_cpu + number_of_tasks), which can't be released even by significant memory pressure. As a cgroup structure can take a significant amount of memory (first of all, per-cpu data like memcg statistics), it leads to a noticeable waste of memory. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180827162621.30187-1-guro@fb.com Fixes: ac496bf48d97 ("fork: Optimize task creation by caching two thread stacks per CPU if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:03:19 +07:00
static int memcg_charge_kernel_stack(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
struct vm_struct *vm = task_stack_vm_area(tsk);
int ret;
if (vm) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < THREAD_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) {
/*
* If memcg_kmem_charge() fails, page->mem_cgroup
* pointer is NULL, and both memcg_kmem_uncharge()
* and mod_memcg_page_state() in free_thread_stack()
* will ignore this page. So it's safe.
*/
ret = memcg_kmem_charge(vm->pages[i], GFP_KERNEL, 0);
if (ret)
return ret;
mod_memcg_page_state(vm->pages[i],
MEMCG_KERNEL_STACK_KB,
PAGE_SIZE / 1024);
}
}
#endif
return 0;
}
static void release_task_stack(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
if (WARN_ON(tsk->state != TASK_DEAD))
return; /* Better to leak the stack than to free prematurely */
account_kernel_stack(tsk, -1);
free_thread_stack(tsk);
tsk->stack = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
tsk->stack_vm_area = NULL;
#endif
}
#ifdef CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
void put_task_stack(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
sched/core: Convert task_struct.stack_refcount to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable task_struct.stack_refcount is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. ** Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the task_struct.stack_refcount it might make a difference in following places: - try_get_task_stack(): increment in refcount_inc_not_zero() only guarantees control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart - put_task_stack(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547814450-18902-6-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-01-18 19:27:30 +07:00
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&tsk->stack_refcount))
release_task_stack(tsk);
}
#endif
void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
/*
* The task is finally done with both the stack and thread_info,
* so free both.
*/
release_task_stack(tsk);
#else
/*
* If the task had a separate stack allocation, it should be gone
* by now.
*/
sched/core: Convert task_struct.stack_refcount to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable task_struct.stack_refcount is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. ** Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the task_struct.stack_refcount it might make a difference in following places: - try_get_task_stack(): increment in refcount_inc_not_zero() only guarantees control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart - put_task_stack(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547814450-18902-6-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-01-18 19:27:30 +07:00
WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&tsk->stack_refcount) != 0);
#endif
rt_mutex_debug_task_free(tsk);
ftrace_graph_exit_task(tsk);
seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF [This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264 The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp Complete diff here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp ] This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2. Mode 2 introduces the ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program. This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format of struct seccomp_data. A filter program may be installed by calling: struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... }; ... prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog); The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is allowed to proceed or denied. If the first filter program installed allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel. All attached programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to proceed. Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve. However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged (!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task. This ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary). There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are as follows: - BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time - BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood - Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired arguments - No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible. - system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying required for system call policy decisions. Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. In this patch, the primary dependency is on syscall_get_arguments(). The full desired scope of this feature will add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series. Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be the desired additional functionality. No architectures are enabled in this patch. Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> v18: - rebase to v3.4-rc2 - s/chk/check/ (akpm@linux-foundation.org,jmorris@namei.org) - allocate with GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN (indan@nul.nu) - add a comment for get_u32 regarding endianness (akpm@) - fix other typos, style mistakes (akpm@) - added acked-by v17: - properly guard seccomp filter needed headers (leann@ubuntu.com) - tighten return mask to 0x7fff0000 v16: - no change v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter size (indan@nul.nu) - drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu) - return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu) - move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu) - drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu) - only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu) - exit_code -> exit_sig v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct (indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org) - adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user - add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c - lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB - moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation (all of the above: indan@nul.nu) v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com) - removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu) - reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu) v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com) - style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu) - do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu) - pare down Kconfig doc reference. - extra comment clean up v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing (hpa@zytor.com) - calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch. This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters. (hpa@zytor.com) - lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!) v9: - n/a v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns - Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu: -- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code, -- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat. -- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch dependencies v7: (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others) - added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - merged into seccomp.c - minimal seccomp_filter.h - no config option (part of seccomp) - no new prctl - doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h (works but arg access always fails) - dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ... - dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths - merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter installation. (luto@mit.edu) - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com) - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com) - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something) v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org) - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to handle endianness. Compromises between the two alternate proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof(). (mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu) - update Kconfig description - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading - drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com) v4: - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS - now uses current->no_new_privs (luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com) - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net) v3: - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com) - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com) - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com) - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com) - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu v2: - (patch 2 only) Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 04:47:57 +07:00
put_seccomp_filter(tsk);
fork: fix error handling in dup_task() The function dup_task() may fail at the following function calls in the following order. 0) alloc_task_struct_node() 1) alloc_thread_info_node() 2) arch_dup_task_struct() Error by 0) is not a matter, it can just return. But error by 1) requires releasing task_struct allocated by 0) before it returns. Likewise, error by 2) requires releasing task_struct and thread_info allocated by 0) and 1). The existing error handling calls free_task_struct() and free_thread_info() which do not only release task_struct and thread_info, but also call architecture specific arch_release_task_struct() and arch_release_thread_info(). The problem is that task_struct and thread_info are not fully initialized yet at this point, but arch_release_task_struct() and arch_release_thread_info() are called with them. For example, x86 defines its own arch_release_task_struct() that releases a task_xstate. If alloc_thread_info_node() fails in dup_task(), arch_release_task_struct() is called with task_struct which is just allocated and filled with garbage in this error handling. This actually happened with tools/testing/fault-injection/failcmd.sh # env FAILCMD_TYPE=fail_page_alloc \ ./tools/testing/fault-injection/failcmd.sh --times=100 \ --min-order=0 --ignore-gfp-wait=0 \ -- make -C tools/testing/selftests/ run_tests In order to fix this issue, make free_{task_struct,thread_info}() not to call arch_release_{task_struct,thread_info}() and call arch_release_{task_struct,thread_info}() implicitly where needed. Default arch_release_task_struct() and arch_release_thread_info() are defined as empty by default. So this change only affects the architectures which implement their own arch_release_task_struct() or arch_release_thread_info() as listed below. arch_release_task_struct(): x86, sh arch_release_thread_info(): mn10300, tile Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-31 04:42:33 +07:00
arch_release_task_struct(tsk);
if (tsk->flags & PF_KTHREAD)
free_kthread_struct(tsk);
free_task_struct(tsk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_task);
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct mm_struct *oldmm)
{
struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, *tmp, *prev, **pprev;
struct rb_node **rb_link, *rb_parent;
int retval;
unsigned long charge;
LIST_HEAD(uf);
uprobe_start_dup_mmap();
if (down_write_killable(&oldmm->mmap_sem)) {
retval = -EINTR;
goto fail_uprobe_end;
}
flush_cache_dup_mm(oldmm);
uprobe_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
/*
* Not linked in yet - no deadlock potential:
*/
down_write_nested(&mm->mmap_sem, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
/* No ordering required: file already has been exposed. */
RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, get_mm_exe_file(oldmm));
mm->total_vm = oldmm->total_vm;
mm->data_vm = oldmm->data_vm;
mm->exec_vm = oldmm->exec_vm;
mm->stack_vm = oldmm->stack_vm;
rb_link = &mm->mm_rb.rb_node;
rb_parent = NULL;
pprev = &mm->mmap;
retval = ksm_fork(mm, oldmm);
if (retval)
goto out;
retval = khugepaged_fork(mm, oldmm);
if (retval)
goto out;
prev = NULL;
for (mpnt = oldmm->mmap; mpnt; mpnt = mpnt->vm_next) {
struct file *file;
if (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_DONTCOPY) {
vm_stat_account(mm, mpnt->vm_flags, -vma_pages(mpnt));
continue;
}
charge = 0;
mm: check for SIGKILL inside dup_mmap() loop As a theoretical problem, dup_mmap() of an mm_struct with 60000+ vmas can loop while potentially allocating memory, with mm->mmap_sem held for write by current thread. This is bad if current thread was selected as an OOM victim, for current thread will continue allocations using memory reserves while OOM reaper is unable to reclaim memory. As an actually observable problem, it is not difficult to make OOM reaper unable to reclaim memory if the OOM victim is blocked at i_mmap_lock_write() in this loop. Unfortunately, since nobody can explain whether it is safe to use killable wait there, let's check for SIGKILL before trying to allocate memory. Even without an OOM event, there is no point with continuing the loop from the beginning if current thread is killed. I tested with debug printk(). This patch should be safe because we already fail if security_vm_enough_memory_mm() or kmem_cache_alloc(GFP_KERNEL) fails and exit_mmap() handles it. ***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL ***** ***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL ***** ***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL ***** ***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL ***** ***** Aborting exit_mmap() due to NULL mmap ***** [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201804071938.CDE04681.SOFVQJFtMHOOLF@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-15 05:26:34 +07:00
/*
* Don't duplicate many vmas if we've been oom-killed (for
* example)
*/
if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
retval = -EINTR;
goto out;
}
if (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) {
unsigned long len = vma_pages(mpnt);
if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(oldmm, len)) /* sic */
goto fail_nomem;
charge = len;
}
tmp = vm_area_dup(mpnt);
if (!tmp)
goto fail_nomem;
retval = vma_dup_policy(mpnt, tmp);
if (retval)
goto fail_nomem_policy;
tmp->vm_mm = mm;
retval = dup_userfaultfd(tmp, &uf);
if (retval)
goto fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork;
if (tmp->vm_flags & VM_WIPEONFORK) {
/* VM_WIPEONFORK gets a clean slate in the child. */
tmp->anon_vma = NULL;
if (anon_vma_prepare(tmp))
goto fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork;
} else if (anon_vma_fork(tmp, mpnt))
goto fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork;
tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT);
tmp->vm_next = tmp->vm_prev = NULL;
file = tmp->vm_file;
if (file) {
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
get_file(file);
if (tmp->vm_flags & VM_DENYWRITE)
atomic_dec(&inode->i_writecount);
i_mmap_lock_write(mapping);
if (tmp->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
atomic_inc(&mapping->i_mmap_writable);
flush_dcache_mmap_lock(mapping);
/* insert tmp into the share list, just after mpnt */
vma_interval_tree_insert_after(tmp, mpnt,
&mapping->i_mmap);
flush_dcache_mmap_unlock(mapping);
i_mmap_unlock_write(mapping);
}
/*
* Clear hugetlb-related page reserves for children. This only
* affects MAP_PRIVATE mappings. Faults generated by the child
* are not guaranteed to succeed, even if read-only
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(tmp))
reset_vma_resv_huge_pages(tmp);
/*
* Link in the new vma and copy the page table entries.
*/
*pprev = tmp;
pprev = &tmp->vm_next;
tmp->vm_prev = prev;
prev = tmp;
__vma_link_rb(mm, tmp, rb_link, rb_parent);
rb_link = &tmp->vm_rb.rb_right;
rb_parent = &tmp->vm_rb;
mm->map_count++;
if (!(tmp->vm_flags & VM_WIPEONFORK))
retval = copy_page_range(mm, oldmm, mpnt);
if (tmp->vm_ops && tmp->vm_ops->open)
tmp->vm_ops->open(tmp);
if (retval)
goto out;
}
/* a new mm has just been created */
retval = arch_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
out:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
flush_tlb_mm(oldmm);
up_write(&oldmm->mmap_sem);
dup_userfaultfd_complete(&uf);
fail_uprobe_end:
uprobe_end_dup_mmap();
return retval;
fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork:
mpol_put(vma_policy(tmp));
fail_nomem_policy:
vm_area_free(tmp);
fail_nomem:
retval = -ENOMEM;
vm_unacct_memory(charge);
goto out;
}
static inline int mm_alloc_pgd(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
mm->pgd = pgd_alloc(mm);
if (unlikely(!mm->pgd))
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
static inline void mm_free_pgd(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
pgd_free(mm, mm->pgd);
}
#else
static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm)
{
down_write(&oldmm->mmap_sem);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, get_mm_exe_file(oldmm));
up_write(&oldmm->mmap_sem);
return 0;
}
#define mm_alloc_pgd(mm) (0)
#define mm_free_pgd(mm)
#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
static void check_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
int i;
fork: improve error message for corrupted page tables When a user process exits, the kernel cleans up the mm_struct of the user process and during cleanup, check_mm() checks the page tables of the user process for corruption (E.g: unexpected page flags set/cleared). For corrupted page tables, the error message printed by check_mm() isn't very clear as it prints the loop index instead of page table type (E.g: Resident file mapping pages vs Resident shared memory pages). The loop index in check_mm() is used to index rss_stat[] which represents individual memory type stats. Hence, instead of printing index, print memory type, thereby improving error message. Without patch: -------------- [ 204.836425] mm/pgtable-generic.c:29: bad p4d 0000000089eb4e92(800000025f941467) [ 204.836544] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000f75895ea idx:0 val:2 [ 204.836615] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000f75895ea idx:1 val:5 [ 204.836685] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: 20480 With patch: ----------- [ 69.815453] mm/pgtable-generic.c:29: bad p4d 0000000084653642(800000025ca37467) [ 69.815872] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000014a6c03 type:MM_FILEPAGES val:2 [ 69.815962] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000014a6c03 type:MM_ANONPAGES val:5 [ 69.816050] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: 20480 Also, change print function (from printk(KERN_ALERT, ..) to pr_alert()) so that it matches the other print statement. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/da75b5153f617f4c5739c08ee6ebeb3d19db0fbc.1565123758.git.sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-26 06:47:27 +07:00
BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(ARRAY_SIZE(resident_page_types) != NR_MM_COUNTERS,
"Please make sure 'struct resident_page_types[]' is updated as well");
for (i = 0; i < NR_MM_COUNTERS; i++) {
long x = atomic_long_read(&mm->rss_stat.count[i]);
if (unlikely(x))
fork: improve error message for corrupted page tables When a user process exits, the kernel cleans up the mm_struct of the user process and during cleanup, check_mm() checks the page tables of the user process for corruption (E.g: unexpected page flags set/cleared). For corrupted page tables, the error message printed by check_mm() isn't very clear as it prints the loop index instead of page table type (E.g: Resident file mapping pages vs Resident shared memory pages). The loop index in check_mm() is used to index rss_stat[] which represents individual memory type stats. Hence, instead of printing index, print memory type, thereby improving error message. Without patch: -------------- [ 204.836425] mm/pgtable-generic.c:29: bad p4d 0000000089eb4e92(800000025f941467) [ 204.836544] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000f75895ea idx:0 val:2 [ 204.836615] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000f75895ea idx:1 val:5 [ 204.836685] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: 20480 With patch: ----------- [ 69.815453] mm/pgtable-generic.c:29: bad p4d 0000000084653642(800000025ca37467) [ 69.815872] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000014a6c03 type:MM_FILEPAGES val:2 [ 69.815962] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000014a6c03 type:MM_ANONPAGES val:5 [ 69.816050] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: 20480 Also, change print function (from printk(KERN_ALERT, ..) to pr_alert()) so that it matches the other print statement. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/da75b5153f617f4c5739c08ee6ebeb3d19db0fbc.1565123758.git.sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-26 06:47:27 +07:00
pr_alert("BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:%p type:%s val:%ld\n",
mm, resident_page_types[i], x);
}
if (mm_pgtables_bytes(mm))
pr_alert("BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: %ld\n",
mm_pgtables_bytes(mm));
#if defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) && !USE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCKS
VM_BUG_ON_MM(mm->pmd_huge_pte, mm);
#endif
}
#define allocate_mm() (kmem_cache_alloc(mm_cachep, GFP_KERNEL))
#define free_mm(mm) (kmem_cache_free(mm_cachep, (mm)))
/*
* Called when the last reference to the mm
* is dropped: either by a lazy thread or by
* mmput. Free the page directory and the mm.
*/
void __mmdrop(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
BUG_ON(mm == &init_mm);
WARN_ON_ONCE(mm == current->mm);
WARN_ON_ONCE(mm == current->active_mm);
mm_free_pgd(mm);
destroy_context(mm);
mmu_notifier_mm_destroy(mm);
check_mm(mm);
put_user_ns(mm->user_ns);
free_mm(mm);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__mmdrop);
static void mmdrop_async_fn(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
mm = container_of(work, struct mm_struct, async_put_work);
__mmdrop(mm);
}
static void mmdrop_async(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&mm->mm_count))) {
INIT_WORK(&mm->async_put_work, mmdrop_async_fn);
schedule_work(&mm->async_put_work);
}
}
static inline void free_signal_struct(struct signal_struct *sig)
{
taskstats_tgid_free(sig);
sched_autogroup_exit(sig);
kernel, oom: fix potential pgd_lock deadlock from __mmdrop Lockdep complains that __mmdrop is not safe from the softirq context: ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.6.0-oomfortification2-00011-geeb3eadeab96-dirty #949 Tainted: G W --------------------------------- inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. swapper/1/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: (pgd_lock){+.?...}, at: pgd_free+0x19/0x6b {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: __lock_acquire+0xa06/0x196e lock_acquire+0x139/0x1e1 _raw_spin_lock+0x32/0x41 __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x2a5/0xacd change_page_attr_set_clr+0x16f/0x32c set_memory_nx+0x37/0x3a free_init_pages+0x9e/0xc7 alternative_instructions+0xa2/0xb3 check_bugs+0xe/0x2d start_kernel+0x3ce/0x3ea x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c x86_64_start_kernel+0x17a/0x18d irq event stamp: 105916 hardirqs last enabled at (105916): free_hot_cold_page+0x37e/0x390 hardirqs last disabled at (105915): free_hot_cold_page+0x2c1/0x390 softirqs last enabled at (105878): _local_bh_enable+0x42/0x44 softirqs last disabled at (105879): irq_exit+0x6f/0xd1 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(pgd_lock); <Interrupt> lock(pgd_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by swapper/1/0: #0: (rcu_callback){......}, at: rcu_process_callbacks+0x390/0x800 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G W 4.6.0-oomfortification2-00011-geeb3eadeab96-dirty #949 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Debian-1.8.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> print_usage_bug.part.25+0x259/0x268 mark_lock+0x381/0x567 __lock_acquire+0x993/0x196e lock_acquire+0x139/0x1e1 _raw_spin_lock+0x32/0x41 pgd_free+0x19/0x6b __mmdrop+0x25/0xb9 __put_task_struct+0x103/0x11e delayed_put_task_struct+0x157/0x15e rcu_process_callbacks+0x660/0x800 __do_softirq+0x1ec/0x4d5 irq_exit+0x6f/0xd1 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x42/0x4d apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xa0 <EOI> arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x11 default_idle_call+0x32/0x34 cpu_startup_entry+0x20c/0x399 start_secondary+0xfe/0x101 More over commit a79e53d85683 ("x86/mm: Fix pgd_lock deadlock") was explicit about pgd_lock not to be called from the irq context. This means that __mmdrop called from free_signal_struct has to be postponed to a user context. We already have a similar mechanism for mmput_async so we can use it here as well. This is safe because mm_count is pinned by mm_users. This fixes bug introduced by "oom: keep mm of the killed task available" Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1472119394-11342-5-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-08 06:58:54 +07:00
/*
* __mmdrop is not safe to call from softirq context on x86 due to
* pgd_dtor so postpone it to the async context
*/
oom: keep mm of the killed task available oom_reap_task has to call exit_oom_victim in order to make sure that the oom vicim will not block the oom killer for ever. This is, however, opening new problems (e.g oom_killer_disable exclusion - see commit 74070542099c ("oom, suspend: fix oom_reaper vs. oom_killer_disable race")). exit_oom_victim should be only called from the victim's context ideally. One way to achieve this would be to rely on per mm_struct flags. We already have MMF_OOM_REAPED to hide a task from the oom killer since "mm, oom: hide mm which is shared with kthread or global init". The problem is that the exit path: do_exit exit_mm tsk->mm = NULL; mmput __mmput exit_oom_victim doesn't guarantee that exit_oom_victim will get called in a bounded amount of time. At least exit_aio depends on IO which might get blocked due to lack of memory and who knows what else is lurking there. This patch takes a different approach. We remember tsk->mm into the signal_struct and bind it to the signal struct life time for all oom victims. __oom_reap_task_mm as well as oom_scan_process_thread do not have to rely on find_lock_task_mm anymore and they will have a reliable reference to the mm struct. As a result all the oom specific communication inside the OOM killer can be done via tsk->signal->oom_mm. Increasing the signal_struct for something as unlikely as the oom killer is far from ideal but this approach will make the code much more reasonable and long term we even might want to move task->mm into the signal_struct anyway. In the next step we might want to make the oom killer exclusion and access to memory reserves completely independent which would be also nice. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1472119394-11342-4-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-08 06:58:51 +07:00
if (sig->oom_mm)
kernel, oom: fix potential pgd_lock deadlock from __mmdrop Lockdep complains that __mmdrop is not safe from the softirq context: ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.6.0-oomfortification2-00011-geeb3eadeab96-dirty #949 Tainted: G W --------------------------------- inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. swapper/1/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: (pgd_lock){+.?...}, at: pgd_free+0x19/0x6b {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: __lock_acquire+0xa06/0x196e lock_acquire+0x139/0x1e1 _raw_spin_lock+0x32/0x41 __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x2a5/0xacd change_page_attr_set_clr+0x16f/0x32c set_memory_nx+0x37/0x3a free_init_pages+0x9e/0xc7 alternative_instructions+0xa2/0xb3 check_bugs+0xe/0x2d start_kernel+0x3ce/0x3ea x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c x86_64_start_kernel+0x17a/0x18d irq event stamp: 105916 hardirqs last enabled at (105916): free_hot_cold_page+0x37e/0x390 hardirqs last disabled at (105915): free_hot_cold_page+0x2c1/0x390 softirqs last enabled at (105878): _local_bh_enable+0x42/0x44 softirqs last disabled at (105879): irq_exit+0x6f/0xd1 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(pgd_lock); <Interrupt> lock(pgd_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by swapper/1/0: #0: (rcu_callback){......}, at: rcu_process_callbacks+0x390/0x800 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G W 4.6.0-oomfortification2-00011-geeb3eadeab96-dirty #949 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Debian-1.8.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> print_usage_bug.part.25+0x259/0x268 mark_lock+0x381/0x567 __lock_acquire+0x993/0x196e lock_acquire+0x139/0x1e1 _raw_spin_lock+0x32/0x41 pgd_free+0x19/0x6b __mmdrop+0x25/0xb9 __put_task_struct+0x103/0x11e delayed_put_task_struct+0x157/0x15e rcu_process_callbacks+0x660/0x800 __do_softirq+0x1ec/0x4d5 irq_exit+0x6f/0xd1 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x42/0x4d apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xa0 <EOI> arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x11 default_idle_call+0x32/0x34 cpu_startup_entry+0x20c/0x399 start_secondary+0xfe/0x101 More over commit a79e53d85683 ("x86/mm: Fix pgd_lock deadlock") was explicit about pgd_lock not to be called from the irq context. This means that __mmdrop called from free_signal_struct has to be postponed to a user context. We already have a similar mechanism for mmput_async so we can use it here as well. This is safe because mm_count is pinned by mm_users. This fixes bug introduced by "oom: keep mm of the killed task available" Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1472119394-11342-5-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-08 06:58:54 +07:00
mmdrop_async(sig->oom_mm);
kmem_cache_free(signal_cachep, sig);
}
static inline void put_signal_struct(struct signal_struct *sig)
{
sched/core: Convert signal_struct.sigcnt to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable signal_struct.sigcnt is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. ** Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the signal_struct.sigcnt it might make a difference in following places: - put_signal_struct(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547814450-18902-3-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-01-18 19:27:27 +07:00
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&sig->sigcnt))
free_signal_struct(sig);
}
void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
WARN_ON(!tsk->exit_state);
sched/core: Convert task_struct.usage to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable task_struct.usage is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. ** Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the task_struct.usage it might make a difference in following places: - put_task_struct(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547814450-18902-5-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-01-18 19:27:29 +07:00
WARN_ON(refcount_read(&tsk->usage));
WARN_ON(tsk == current);
cgroup: keep zombies associated with their original cgroups cgroup_exit() is called when a task exits and disassociates the exiting task from its cgroups and half-attach it to the root cgroup. This is unnecessary and undesirable. No controller actually needs an exiting task to be disassociated with non-root cgroups. Both cpu and perf_event controllers update the association to the root cgroup from their exit callbacks just to keep consistent with the cgroup core behavior. Also, this disassociation makes it difficult to track resources held by zombies or determine where the zombies came from. Currently, pids controller is completely broken as it uncharges on exit and zombies always escape the resource restriction. With cgroup association being reset on exit, fixing it is pretty painful. There's no reason to reset cgroup membership on exit. The zombie can be removed from its css_set so that it doesn't show up on "cgroup.procs" and thus can't be migrated or interfere with cgroup removal. It can still pin and point to the css_set so that its cgroup membership is maintained. This patch makes cgroup core keep zombies associated with their cgroups at the time of exit. * Previous patches decoupled populated_cnt tracking from css_set lifetime, so a dying task can be simply unlinked from its css_set while pinning and pointing to the css_set. This keeps css_set association from task side alive while hiding it from "cgroup.procs" and populated_cnt tracking. The css_set reference is dropped when the task_struct is freed. * ->exit() callback no longer needs the css arguments as the associated css never changes once PF_EXITING is set. Removed. * cpu and perf_events controllers no longer need ->exit() callbacks. There's no reason to explicitly switch away on exit. The final schedule out is enough. The callbacks are removed. * On traditional hierarchies, nothing changes. "/proc/PID/cgroup" still reports "/" for all zombies. On the default hierarchy, "/proc/PID/cgroup" keeps reporting the cgroup that the task belonged to at the time of exit. If the cgroup gets removed before the task is reaped, " (deleted)" is appended. v2: Build brekage due to missing dummy cgroup_free() when !CONFIG_CGROUP fixed. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
2015-10-16 03:41:53 +07:00
cgroup_free(tsk);
task_numa_free(tsk, true);
security_task_free(tsk);
exit_creds(tsk);
delayacct_tsk_free(tsk);
put_signal_struct(tsk->signal);
if (!profile_handoff_task(tsk))
free_task(tsk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__put_task_struct);
void __init __weak arch_task_cache_init(void) { }
/*
* set_max_threads
*/
static void set_max_threads(unsigned int max_threads_suggested)
{
u64 threads;
unsigned long nr_pages = totalram_pages();
/*
* The number of threads shall be limited such that the thread
* structures may only consume a small part of the available memory.
*/
mm: reference totalram_pages and managed_pages once per function Patch series "mm: convert totalram_pages, totalhigh_pages and managed pages to atomic", v5. This series converts totalram_pages, totalhigh_pages and zone->managed_pages to atomic variables. totalram_pages, zone->managed_pages and totalhigh_pages updates are protected by managed_page_count_lock, but readers never care about it. Convert these variables to atomic to avoid readers potentially seeing a store tear. Main motivation was that managed_page_count_lock handling was complicating things. It was discussed in length here, https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/995739/#1181785 It seemes better to remove the lock and convert variables to atomic. With the change, preventing poteintial store-to-read tearing comes as a bonus. This patch (of 4): This is in preparation to a later patch which converts totalram_pages and zone->managed_pages to atomic variables. Please note that re-reading the value might lead to a different value and as such it could lead to unexpected behavior. There are no known bugs as a result of the current code but it is better to prevent from them in principle. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542090790-21750-2-git-send-email-arunks@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org> Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 15:34:20 +07:00
if (fls64(nr_pages) + fls64(PAGE_SIZE) > 64)
threads = MAX_THREADS;
else
mm: reference totalram_pages and managed_pages once per function Patch series "mm: convert totalram_pages, totalhigh_pages and managed pages to atomic", v5. This series converts totalram_pages, totalhigh_pages and zone->managed_pages to atomic variables. totalram_pages, zone->managed_pages and totalhigh_pages updates are protected by managed_page_count_lock, but readers never care about it. Convert these variables to atomic to avoid readers potentially seeing a store tear. Main motivation was that managed_page_count_lock handling was complicating things. It was discussed in length here, https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/995739/#1181785 It seemes better to remove the lock and convert variables to atomic. With the change, preventing poteintial store-to-read tearing comes as a bonus. This patch (of 4): This is in preparation to a later patch which converts totalram_pages and zone->managed_pages to atomic variables. Please note that re-reading the value might lead to a different value and as such it could lead to unexpected behavior. There are no known bugs as a result of the current code but it is better to prevent from them in principle. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542090790-21750-2-git-send-email-arunks@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org> Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 15:34:20 +07:00
threads = div64_u64((u64) nr_pages * (u64) PAGE_SIZE,
(u64) THREAD_SIZE * 8UL);
if (threads > max_threads_suggested)
threads = max_threads_suggested;
max_threads = clamp_t(u64, threads, MIN_THREADS, MAX_THREADS);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT
/* Initialized by the architecture: */
int arch_task_struct_size __read_mostly;
#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ALLOCATOR
fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct While the blocked and saved_sigmask fields of task_struct are copied to userspace (via sigmask_to_save() and setup_rt_frame()), it is always copied with a static length (i.e. sizeof(sigset_t)). The only portion of task_struct that is potentially dynamically sized and may be copied to userspace is in the architecture-specific thread_struct at the end of task_struct. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: alloc_task_struct_node(...): return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, ...); dup_task_struct(...): ... tsk = alloc_task_struct_node(node); copy_process(...): ... dup_task_struct(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) example usage trace: arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c: __fpu__restore_sig(...): ... struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu; ... __copy_from_user(&fpu->state.xsave, ..., state_size); fpu__restore_sig(...): ... return __fpu__restore_sig(...); arch/x86/kernel/signal.c: restore_sigcontext(...): ... fpu__restore_sig(...) This introduces arch_thread_struct_whitelist() to let an architecture declare specifically where the whitelist should be within thread_struct. If undefined, the entire thread_struct field is left whitelisted. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2017-08-17 03:00:58 +07:00
static void task_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset, unsigned long *size)
{
/* Fetch thread_struct whitelist for the architecture. */
arch_thread_struct_whitelist(offset, size);
/*
* Handle zero-sized whitelist or empty thread_struct, otherwise
* adjust offset to position of thread_struct in task_struct.
*/
if (unlikely(*size == 0))
*offset = 0;
else
*offset += offsetof(struct task_struct, thread);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ALLOCATOR */
fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct While the blocked and saved_sigmask fields of task_struct are copied to userspace (via sigmask_to_save() and setup_rt_frame()), it is always copied with a static length (i.e. sizeof(sigset_t)). The only portion of task_struct that is potentially dynamically sized and may be copied to userspace is in the architecture-specific thread_struct at the end of task_struct. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: alloc_task_struct_node(...): return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, ...); dup_task_struct(...): ... tsk = alloc_task_struct_node(node); copy_process(...): ... dup_task_struct(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) example usage trace: arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c: __fpu__restore_sig(...): ... struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu; ... __copy_from_user(&fpu->state.xsave, ..., state_size); fpu__restore_sig(...): ... return __fpu__restore_sig(...); arch/x86/kernel/signal.c: restore_sigcontext(...): ... fpu__restore_sig(...) This introduces arch_thread_struct_whitelist() to let an architecture declare specifically where the whitelist should be within thread_struct. If undefined, the entire thread_struct field is left whitelisted. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2017-08-17 03:00:58 +07:00
void __init fork_init(void)
{
int i;
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ALLOCATOR
#ifndef ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN
#define ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN 0
#endif
int align = max_t(int, L1_CACHE_BYTES, ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN);
fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct While the blocked and saved_sigmask fields of task_struct are copied to userspace (via sigmask_to_save() and setup_rt_frame()), it is always copied with a static length (i.e. sizeof(sigset_t)). The only portion of task_struct that is potentially dynamically sized and may be copied to userspace is in the architecture-specific thread_struct at the end of task_struct. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: alloc_task_struct_node(...): return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, ...); dup_task_struct(...): ... tsk = alloc_task_struct_node(node); copy_process(...): ... dup_task_struct(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) example usage trace: arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c: __fpu__restore_sig(...): ... struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu; ... __copy_from_user(&fpu->state.xsave, ..., state_size); fpu__restore_sig(...): ... return __fpu__restore_sig(...); arch/x86/kernel/signal.c: restore_sigcontext(...): ... fpu__restore_sig(...) This introduces arch_thread_struct_whitelist() to let an architecture declare specifically where the whitelist should be within thread_struct. If undefined, the entire thread_struct field is left whitelisted. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2017-08-17 03:00:58 +07:00
unsigned long useroffset, usersize;
/* create a slab on which task_structs can be allocated */
fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct While the blocked and saved_sigmask fields of task_struct are copied to userspace (via sigmask_to_save() and setup_rt_frame()), it is always copied with a static length (i.e. sizeof(sigset_t)). The only portion of task_struct that is potentially dynamically sized and may be copied to userspace is in the architecture-specific thread_struct at the end of task_struct. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: alloc_task_struct_node(...): return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, ...); dup_task_struct(...): ... tsk = alloc_task_struct_node(node); copy_process(...): ... dup_task_struct(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) example usage trace: arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c: __fpu__restore_sig(...): ... struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu; ... __copy_from_user(&fpu->state.xsave, ..., state_size); fpu__restore_sig(...): ... return __fpu__restore_sig(...); arch/x86/kernel/signal.c: restore_sigcontext(...): ... fpu__restore_sig(...) This introduces arch_thread_struct_whitelist() to let an architecture declare specifically where the whitelist should be within thread_struct. If undefined, the entire thread_struct field is left whitelisted. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2017-08-17 03:00:58 +07:00
task_struct_whitelist(&useroffset, &usersize);
task_struct_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("task_struct",
arch_task_struct_size, align,
fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct While the blocked and saved_sigmask fields of task_struct are copied to userspace (via sigmask_to_save() and setup_rt_frame()), it is always copied with a static length (i.e. sizeof(sigset_t)). The only portion of task_struct that is potentially dynamically sized and may be copied to userspace is in the architecture-specific thread_struct at the end of task_struct. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: alloc_task_struct_node(...): return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, ...); dup_task_struct(...): ... tsk = alloc_task_struct_node(node); copy_process(...): ... dup_task_struct(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) example usage trace: arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c: __fpu__restore_sig(...): ... struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu; ... __copy_from_user(&fpu->state.xsave, ..., state_size); fpu__restore_sig(...): ... return __fpu__restore_sig(...); arch/x86/kernel/signal.c: restore_sigcontext(...): ... fpu__restore_sig(...) This introduces arch_thread_struct_whitelist() to let an architecture declare specifically where the whitelist should be within thread_struct. If undefined, the entire thread_struct field is left whitelisted. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2017-08-17 03:00:58 +07:00
SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
useroffset, usersize, NULL);
#endif
/* do the arch specific task caches init */
arch_task_cache_init();
set_max_threads(MAX_THREADS);
init_task.signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur = max_threads/2;
init_task.signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_max = max_threads/2;
init_task.signal->rlim[RLIMIT_SIGPENDING] =
init_task.signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC];
for (i = 0; i < UCOUNT_COUNTS; i++) {
init_user_ns.ucount_max[i] = max_threads/2;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN, "fork:vm_stack_cache",
NULL, free_vm_stack_cache);
#endif
lockdep_init_task(&init_task);
uprobes: Initialize uprobes earlier In order to have a separate address space for text poking, we need to duplicate init_mm early during start_kernel(). This, however, introduces a problem since uprobes functions are called from dup_mmap(), but uprobes is still not initialized in this early stage. Since uprobes initialization is necassary for fork, and since all the dependant initialization has been done when fork is initialized (percpu and vmalloc), move uprobes initialization to fork_init(). It does not seem uprobes introduces any security problem for the poking_mm. Crash and burn if uprobes initialization fails, similarly to other early initializations. Change the init_probes() name to probes_init() to match other early initialization functions name convention. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: deneen.t.dock@intel.com Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: kristen@linux.intel.com Cc: linux_dti@icloud.com Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426232303.28381-6-nadav.amit@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-27 06:22:44 +07:00
uprobes_init();
}
int __weak arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst,
struct task_struct *src)
{
*dst = *src;
return 0;
}
init/main.c: Give init_task a canary Tasks get their end of stack set to STACK_END_MAGIC with the aim to catch stack overruns. Currently this feature does not apply to init_task. This patch removes this restriction. Note that a similar patch was posted by Prarit Bhargava some time ago but was never merged: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=127144305403241&w=2 Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: dzickus@redhat.com Cc: bmr@redhat.com Cc: jcastillo@redhat.com Cc: jgh@redhat.com Cc: minchan@kernel.org Cc: tglx@linutronix.de Cc: hannes@cmpxchg.org Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michael Opdenacker <michael.opdenacker@free-electrons.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1410527779-8133-2-git-send-email-atomlin@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-09-12 20:16:17 +07:00
void set_task_stack_end_magic(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
unsigned long *stackend;
stackend = end_of_stack(tsk);
*stackend = STACK_END_MAGIC; /* for overflow detection */
}
static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
Clarify naming of thread info/stack allocators We've had the thread info allocated together with the thread stack for most architectures for a long time (since the thread_info was split off from the task struct), but that is about to change. But the patches that move the thread info to be off-stack (and a part of the task struct instead) made it clear how confused the allocator and freeing functions are. Because the common case was that we share an allocation with the thread stack and the thread_info, the two pointers were identical. That identity then meant that we would have things like ti = alloc_thread_info_node(tsk, node); ... tsk->stack = ti; which certainly _worked_ (since stack and thread_info have the same value), but is rather confusing: why are we assigning a thread_info to the stack? And if we move the thread_info away, the "confusing" code just gets to be entirely bogus. So remove all this confusion, and make it clear that we are doing the stack allocation by renaming and clarifying the function names to be about the stack. The fact that the thread_info then shares the allocation is an implementation detail, and not really about the allocation itself. This is a pure renaming and type fix: we pass in the same pointer, it's just that we clarify what the pointer means. The ia64 code that actually only has one single allocation (for all of task_struct, thread_info and kernel thread stack) now looks a bit odd, but since "tsk->stack" is actually not even used there, that oddity doesn't matter. It would be a separate thing to clean that up, I intentionally left the ia64 changes as a pure brute-force renaming and type change. Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-25 05:09:37 +07:00
unsigned long *stack;
struct vm_struct *stack_vm_area __maybe_unused;
int err;
if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE)
node = tsk_fork_get_node(orig);
tsk = alloc_task_struct_node(node);
if (!tsk)
return NULL;
Clarify naming of thread info/stack allocators We've had the thread info allocated together with the thread stack for most architectures for a long time (since the thread_info was split off from the task struct), but that is about to change. But the patches that move the thread info to be off-stack (and a part of the task struct instead) made it clear how confused the allocator and freeing functions are. Because the common case was that we share an allocation with the thread stack and the thread_info, the two pointers were identical. That identity then meant that we would have things like ti = alloc_thread_info_node(tsk, node); ... tsk->stack = ti; which certainly _worked_ (since stack and thread_info have the same value), but is rather confusing: why are we assigning a thread_info to the stack? And if we move the thread_info away, the "confusing" code just gets to be entirely bogus. So remove all this confusion, and make it clear that we are doing the stack allocation by renaming and clarifying the function names to be about the stack. The fact that the thread_info then shares the allocation is an implementation detail, and not really about the allocation itself. This is a pure renaming and type fix: we pass in the same pointer, it's just that we clarify what the pointer means. The ia64 code that actually only has one single allocation (for all of task_struct, thread_info and kernel thread stack) now looks a bit odd, but since "tsk->stack" is actually not even used there, that oddity doesn't matter. It would be a separate thing to clean that up, I intentionally left the ia64 changes as a pure brute-force renaming and type change. Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-25 05:09:37 +07:00
stack = alloc_thread_stack_node(tsk, node);
if (!stack)
fork: fix error handling in dup_task() The function dup_task() may fail at the following function calls in the following order. 0) alloc_task_struct_node() 1) alloc_thread_info_node() 2) arch_dup_task_struct() Error by 0) is not a matter, it can just return. But error by 1) requires releasing task_struct allocated by 0) before it returns. Likewise, error by 2) requires releasing task_struct and thread_info allocated by 0) and 1). The existing error handling calls free_task_struct() and free_thread_info() which do not only release task_struct and thread_info, but also call architecture specific arch_release_task_struct() and arch_release_thread_info(). The problem is that task_struct and thread_info are not fully initialized yet at this point, but arch_release_task_struct() and arch_release_thread_info() are called with them. For example, x86 defines its own arch_release_task_struct() that releases a task_xstate. If alloc_thread_info_node() fails in dup_task(), arch_release_task_struct() is called with task_struct which is just allocated and filled with garbage in this error handling. This actually happened with tools/testing/fault-injection/failcmd.sh # env FAILCMD_TYPE=fail_page_alloc \ ./tools/testing/fault-injection/failcmd.sh --times=100 \ --min-order=0 --ignore-gfp-wait=0 \ -- make -C tools/testing/selftests/ run_tests In order to fix this issue, make free_{task_struct,thread_info}() not to call arch_release_{task_struct,thread_info}() and call arch_release_{task_struct,thread_info}() implicitly where needed. Default arch_release_task_struct() and arch_release_thread_info() are defined as empty by default. So this change only affects the architectures which implement their own arch_release_task_struct() or arch_release_thread_info() as listed below. arch_release_task_struct(): x86, sh arch_release_thread_info(): mn10300, tile Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-31 04:42:33 +07:00
goto free_tsk;
mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is set, kernel stacks are allocated using __vmalloc_node_range() with __GFP_ACCOUNT. So kernel stack pages are charged against corresponding memory cgroups on allocation and uncharged on releasing them. The problem is that we do cache kernel stacks in small per-cpu caches and do reuse them for new tasks, which can belong to different memory cgroups. Each stack page still holds a reference to the original cgroup, so the cgroup can't be released until the vmap area is released. To make this happen we need more than two subsequent exits without forks in between on the current cpu, which makes it very unlikely to happen. As a result, I saw a significant number of dying cgroups (in theory, up to 2 * number_of_cpu + number_of_tasks), which can't be released even by significant memory pressure. As a cgroup structure can take a significant amount of memory (first of all, per-cpu data like memcg statistics), it leads to a noticeable waste of memory. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180827162621.30187-1-guro@fb.com Fixes: ac496bf48d97 ("fork: Optimize task creation by caching two thread stacks per CPU if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:03:19 +07:00
if (memcg_charge_kernel_stack(tsk))
goto free_stack;
stack_vm_area = task_stack_vm_area(tsk);
err = arch_dup_task_struct(tsk, orig);
/*
* arch_dup_task_struct() clobbers the stack-related fields. Make
* sure they're properly initialized before using any stack-related
* functions again.
*/
tsk->stack = stack;
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
tsk->stack_vm_area = stack_vm_area;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
sched/core: Convert task_struct.stack_refcount to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable task_struct.stack_refcount is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. ** Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the task_struct.stack_refcount it might make a difference in following places: - try_get_task_stack(): increment in refcount_inc_not_zero() only guarantees control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart - put_task_stack(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547814450-18902-6-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-01-18 19:27:30 +07:00
refcount_set(&tsk->stack_refcount, 1);
#endif
if (err)
Clarify naming of thread info/stack allocators We've had the thread info allocated together with the thread stack for most architectures for a long time (since the thread_info was split off from the task struct), but that is about to change. But the patches that move the thread info to be off-stack (and a part of the task struct instead) made it clear how confused the allocator and freeing functions are. Because the common case was that we share an allocation with the thread stack and the thread_info, the two pointers were identical. That identity then meant that we would have things like ti = alloc_thread_info_node(tsk, node); ... tsk->stack = ti; which certainly _worked_ (since stack and thread_info have the same value), but is rather confusing: why are we assigning a thread_info to the stack? And if we move the thread_info away, the "confusing" code just gets to be entirely bogus. So remove all this confusion, and make it clear that we are doing the stack allocation by renaming and clarifying the function names to be about the stack. The fact that the thread_info then shares the allocation is an implementation detail, and not really about the allocation itself. This is a pure renaming and type fix: we pass in the same pointer, it's just that we clarify what the pointer means. The ia64 code that actually only has one single allocation (for all of task_struct, thread_info and kernel thread stack) now looks a bit odd, but since "tsk->stack" is actually not even used there, that oddity doesn't matter. It would be a separate thing to clean that up, I intentionally left the ia64 changes as a pure brute-force renaming and type change. Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-25 05:09:37 +07:00
goto free_stack;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
/*
* We must handle setting up seccomp filters once we're under
* the sighand lock in case orig has changed between now and
* then. Until then, filter must be NULL to avoid messing up
* the usage counts on the error path calling free_task.
*/
tsk->seccomp.filter = NULL;
#endif
setup_thread_stack(tsk, orig);
clear_user_return_notifier(tsk);
clear_tsk_need_resched(tsk);
init/main.c: Give init_task a canary Tasks get their end of stack set to STACK_END_MAGIC with the aim to catch stack overruns. Currently this feature does not apply to init_task. This patch removes this restriction. Note that a similar patch was posted by Prarit Bhargava some time ago but was never merged: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=127144305403241&w=2 Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: dzickus@redhat.com Cc: bmr@redhat.com Cc: jcastillo@redhat.com Cc: jgh@redhat.com Cc: minchan@kernel.org Cc: tglx@linutronix.de Cc: hannes@cmpxchg.org Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michael Opdenacker <michael.opdenacker@free-electrons.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1410527779-8133-2-git-send-email-atomlin@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-09-12 20:16:17 +07:00
set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk);
Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler supported. That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support directly. HOWEVER. It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file, the sane stack protector configuration would look like CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes, it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would disable it in the new config, resulting in: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing. The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users). This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes. The end result would generally look like this: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler infrastructure, not the user selections. Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14 10:21:18 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
tsk->stack_canary = get_random_canary();
#endif
if (orig->cpus_ptr == &orig->cpus_mask)
tsk->cpus_ptr = &tsk->cpus_mask;
/*
tasks, sched/core: Ensure tasks are available for a grace period after leaving the runqueue In the ordinary case today the RCU grace period for a task_struct is triggered when another process wait's for it's zombine and causes the kernel to call release_task(). As the waiting task has to receive a signal and then act upon it before this happens, typically this will occur after the original task as been removed from the runqueue. Unfortunaty in some cases such as self reaping tasks it can be shown that release_task() will be called starting the grace period for task_struct long before the task leaves the runqueue. Therefore use put_task_struct_rcu_user() in finish_task_switch() to guarantee that the there is a RCU lifetime after the task leaves the runqueue. Besides the change in the start of the RCU grace period for the task_struct this change may cause perf_event_delayed_put and trace_sched_process_free. The function perf_event_delayed_put boils down to just a WARN_ON for cases that I assume never show happen. So I don't see any problem with delaying it. The function trace_sched_process_free is a trace point and thus visible to user space. Occassionally userspace has the strangest dependencies so this has a miniscule chance of causing a regression. This change only changes the timing of when the tracepoint is called. The change in timing arguably gives userspace a more accurate picture of what is going on. So I don't expect there to be a regression. In the case where a task self reaps we are pretty much guaranteed that the RCU grace period is delayed. So we should get quite a bit of coverage in of this worst case for the change in a normal threaded workload. So I expect any issues to turn up quickly or not at all. I have lightly tested this change and everything appears to work fine. Inspired-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Inspired-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <tkhai@yandex.ru> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russell King - ARM Linux admin <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87r24jdpl5.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-09-14 19:33:58 +07:00
* One for the user space visible state that goes away when reaped.
* One for the scheduler.
*/
tasks, sched/core: Ensure tasks are available for a grace period after leaving the runqueue In the ordinary case today the RCU grace period for a task_struct is triggered when another process wait's for it's zombine and causes the kernel to call release_task(). As the waiting task has to receive a signal and then act upon it before this happens, typically this will occur after the original task as been removed from the runqueue. Unfortunaty in some cases such as self reaping tasks it can be shown that release_task() will be called starting the grace period for task_struct long before the task leaves the runqueue. Therefore use put_task_struct_rcu_user() in finish_task_switch() to guarantee that the there is a RCU lifetime after the task leaves the runqueue. Besides the change in the start of the RCU grace period for the task_struct this change may cause perf_event_delayed_put and trace_sched_process_free. The function perf_event_delayed_put boils down to just a WARN_ON for cases that I assume never show happen. So I don't see any problem with delaying it. The function trace_sched_process_free is a trace point and thus visible to user space. Occassionally userspace has the strangest dependencies so this has a miniscule chance of causing a regression. This change only changes the timing of when the tracepoint is called. The change in timing arguably gives userspace a more accurate picture of what is going on. So I don't expect there to be a regression. In the case where a task self reaps we are pretty much guaranteed that the RCU grace period is delayed. So we should get quite a bit of coverage in of this worst case for the change in a normal threaded workload. So I expect any issues to turn up quickly or not at all. I have lightly tested this change and everything appears to work fine. Inspired-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Inspired-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <tkhai@yandex.ru> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russell King - ARM Linux admin <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87r24jdpl5.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-09-14 19:33:58 +07:00
refcount_set(&tsk->rcu_users, 2);
/* One for the rcu users */
refcount_set(&tsk->usage, 1);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_IO_TRACE
tsk->btrace_seq = 0;
#endif
tsk->splice_pipe = NULL;
net: use a per task frag allocator We currently use a per socket order-0 page cache for tcp_sendmsg() operations. This page is used to build fragments for skbs. Its done to increase probability of coalescing small write() into single segments in skbs still in write queue (not yet sent) But it wastes a lot of memory for applications handling many mostly idle sockets, since each socket holds one page in sk->sk_sndmsg_page Its also quite inefficient to build TSO 64KB packets, because we need about 16 pages per skb on arches where PAGE_SIZE = 4096, so we hit page allocator more than wanted. This patch adds a per task frag allocator and uses bigger pages, if available. An automatic fallback is done in case of memory pressure. (up to 32768 bytes per frag, thats order-3 pages on x86) This increases TCP stream performance by 20% on loopback device, but also benefits on other network devices, since 8x less frags are mapped on transmit and unmapped on tx completion. Alexander Duyck mentioned a probable performance win on systems with IOMMU enabled. Its possible some SG enabled hardware cant cope with bigger fragments, but their ndo_start_xmit() should already handle this, splitting a fragment in sub fragments, since some arches have PAGE_SIZE=65536 Successfully tested on various ethernet devices. (ixgbe, igb, bnx2x, tg3, mellanox mlx4) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-24 06:04:42 +07:00
tsk->task_frag.page = NULL;
tsk->wake_q.next = NULL;
account_kernel_stack(tsk, 1);
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 04:27:30 +07:00
kcov_task_init(tsk);
fault-inject: support systematic fault injection Add /proc/self/task/<current-tid>/fail-nth file that allows failing 0-th, 1-st, 2-nd and so on calls systematically. Excerpt from the added documentation: "Write to this file of integer N makes N-th call in the current task fail (N is 0-based). Read from this file returns a single char 'Y' or 'N' that says if the fault setup with a previous write to this file was injected or not, and disables the fault if it wasn't yet injected. Note that this file enables all types of faults (slab, futex, etc). This setting takes precedence over all other generic settings like probability, interval, times, etc. But per-capability settings (e.g. fail_futex/ignore-private) take precedence over it. This feature is intended for systematic testing of faults in a single system call. See an example below" Why add a new setting: 1. Existing settings are global rather than per-task. So parallel testing is not possible. 2. attr->interval is close but it depends on attr->count which is non reset to 0, so interval does not work as expected. 3. Trying to model this with existing settings requires manipulations of all of probability, interval, times, space, task-filter and unexposed count and per-task make-it-fail files. 4. Existing settings are per-failure-type, and the set of failure types is potentially expanding. 5. make-it-fail can't be changed by unprivileged user and aggressive stress testing better be done from an unprivileged user. Similarly, this would require opening the debugfs files to the unprivileged user, as he would need to reopen at least times file (not possible to pre-open before dropping privs). The proposed interface solves all of the above (see the example). We want to integrate this into syzkaller fuzzer. A prototype has found 10 bugs in kernel in first day of usage: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/syzkaller/%22FAULT_INJECTION%22%7Csort:relevance I've made the current interface work with all types of our sandboxes. For setuid the secret sauce was prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1, 0, 0, 0) to make /proc entries non-root owned. So I am fine with the current version of the code. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170328130128.101773-1-dvyukov@google.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-13 04:34:35 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
tsk->fail_nth = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP
tsk->throttle_queue = NULL;
tsk->use_memdelay = 0;
#endif
fs: fsnotify: account fsnotify metadata to kmemcg Patch series "Directed kmem charging", v8. The Linux kernel's memory cgroup allows limiting the memory usage of the jobs running on the system to provide isolation between the jobs. All the kernel memory allocated in the context of the job and marked with __GFP_ACCOUNT will also be included in the memory usage and be limited by the job's limit. The kernel memory can only be charged to the memcg of the process in whose context kernel memory was allocated. However there are cases where the allocated kernel memory should be charged to the memcg different from the current processes's memcg. This patch series contains two such concrete use-cases i.e. fsnotify and buffer_head. The fsnotify event objects can consume a lot of system memory for large or unlimited queues if there is either no or slow listener. The events are allocated in the context of the event producer. However they should be charged to the event consumer. Similarly the buffer_head objects can be allocated in a memcg different from the memcg of the page for which buffer_head objects are being allocated. To solve this issue, this patch series introduces mechanism to charge kernel memory to a given memcg. In case of fsnotify events, the memcg of the consumer can be used for charging and for buffer_head, the memcg of the page can be charged. For directed charging, the caller can use the scope API memalloc_[un]use_memcg() to specify the memcg to charge for all the __GFP_ACCOUNT allocations within the scope. This patch (of 2): A lot of memory can be consumed by the events generated for the huge or unlimited queues if there is either no or slow listener. This can cause system level memory pressure or OOMs. So, it's better to account the fsnotify kmem caches to the memcg of the listener. However the listener can be in a different memcg than the memcg of the producer and these allocations happen in the context of the event producer. This patch introduces remote memcg charging API which the producer can use to charge the allocations to the memcg of the listener. There are seven fsnotify kmem caches and among them allocations from dnotify_struct_cache, dnotify_mark_cache, fanotify_mark_cache and inotify_inode_mark_cachep happens in the context of syscall from the listener. So, SLAB_ACCOUNT is enough for these caches. The objects from fsnotify_mark_connector_cachep are not accounted as they are small compared to the notification mark or events and it is unclear whom to account connector to since it is shared by all events attached to the inode. The allocations from the event caches happen in the context of the event producer. For such caches we will need to remote charge the allocations to the listener's memcg. Thus we save the memcg reference in the fsnotify_group structure of the listener. This patch has also moved the members of fsnotify_group to keep the size same, at least for 64 bit build, even with additional member by filling the holes. [shakeelb@google.com: use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT rather than open-coding it] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702215439.211597-1-shakeelb@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627191250.209150-2-shakeelb@google.com Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-18 05:46:39 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
tsk->active_memcg = NULL;
#endif
return tsk;
Clarify naming of thread info/stack allocators We've had the thread info allocated together with the thread stack for most architectures for a long time (since the thread_info was split off from the task struct), but that is about to change. But the patches that move the thread info to be off-stack (and a part of the task struct instead) made it clear how confused the allocator and freeing functions are. Because the common case was that we share an allocation with the thread stack and the thread_info, the two pointers were identical. That identity then meant that we would have things like ti = alloc_thread_info_node(tsk, node); ... tsk->stack = ti; which certainly _worked_ (since stack and thread_info have the same value), but is rather confusing: why are we assigning a thread_info to the stack? And if we move the thread_info away, the "confusing" code just gets to be entirely bogus. So remove all this confusion, and make it clear that we are doing the stack allocation by renaming and clarifying the function names to be about the stack. The fact that the thread_info then shares the allocation is an implementation detail, and not really about the allocation itself. This is a pure renaming and type fix: we pass in the same pointer, it's just that we clarify what the pointer means. The ia64 code that actually only has one single allocation (for all of task_struct, thread_info and kernel thread stack) now looks a bit odd, but since "tsk->stack" is actually not even used there, that oddity doesn't matter. It would be a separate thing to clean that up, I intentionally left the ia64 changes as a pure brute-force renaming and type change. Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-25 05:09:37 +07:00
free_stack:
free_thread_stack(tsk);
fork: fix error handling in dup_task() The function dup_task() may fail at the following function calls in the following order. 0) alloc_task_struct_node() 1) alloc_thread_info_node() 2) arch_dup_task_struct() Error by 0) is not a matter, it can just return. But error by 1) requires releasing task_struct allocated by 0) before it returns. Likewise, error by 2) requires releasing task_struct and thread_info allocated by 0) and 1). The existing error handling calls free_task_struct() and free_thread_info() which do not only release task_struct and thread_info, but also call architecture specific arch_release_task_struct() and arch_release_thread_info(). The problem is that task_struct and thread_info are not fully initialized yet at this point, but arch_release_task_struct() and arch_release_thread_info() are called with them. For example, x86 defines its own arch_release_task_struct() that releases a task_xstate. If alloc_thread_info_node() fails in dup_task(), arch_release_task_struct() is called with task_struct which is just allocated and filled with garbage in this error handling. This actually happened with tools/testing/fault-injection/failcmd.sh # env FAILCMD_TYPE=fail_page_alloc \ ./tools/testing/fault-injection/failcmd.sh --times=100 \ --min-order=0 --ignore-gfp-wait=0 \ -- make -C tools/testing/selftests/ run_tests In order to fix this issue, make free_{task_struct,thread_info}() not to call arch_release_{task_struct,thread_info}() and call arch_release_{task_struct,thread_info}() implicitly where needed. Default arch_release_task_struct() and arch_release_thread_info() are defined as empty by default. So this change only affects the architectures which implement their own arch_release_task_struct() or arch_release_thread_info() as listed below. arch_release_task_struct(): x86, sh arch_release_thread_info(): mn10300, tile Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-31 04:42:33 +07:00
free_tsk:
free_task_struct(tsk);
return NULL;
}
__cacheline_aligned_in_smp DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mmlist_lock);
static unsigned long default_dump_filter = MMF_DUMP_FILTER_DEFAULT;
static int __init coredump_filter_setup(char *s)
{
default_dump_filter =
(simple_strtoul(s, NULL, 0) << MMF_DUMP_FILTER_SHIFT) &
MMF_DUMP_FILTER_MASK;
return 1;
}
__setup("coredump_filter=", coredump_filter_setup);
#include <linux/init_task.h>
static void mm_init_aio(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_AIO
spin_lock_init(&mm->ioctx_lock);
aio: convert the ioctx list to table lookup v3 On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 11:14:40AM -0700, Kent Overstreet wrote: > On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 02:40:55PM +0300, Octavian Purdila wrote: > > When using a large number of threads performing AIO operations the > > IOCTX list may get a significant number of entries which will cause > > significant overhead. For example, when running this fio script: > > > > rw=randrw; size=256k ;directory=/mnt/fio; ioengine=libaio; iodepth=1 > > blocksize=1024; numjobs=512; thread; loops=100 > > > > on an EXT2 filesystem mounted on top of a ramdisk we can observe up to > > 30% CPU time spent by lookup_ioctx: > > > > 32.51% [guest.kernel] [g] lookup_ioctx > > 9.19% [guest.kernel] [g] __lock_acquire.isra.28 > > 4.40% [guest.kernel] [g] lock_release > > 4.19% [guest.kernel] [g] sched_clock_local > > 3.86% [guest.kernel] [g] local_clock > > 3.68% [guest.kernel] [g] native_sched_clock > > 3.08% [guest.kernel] [g] sched_clock_cpu > > 2.64% [guest.kernel] [g] lock_release_holdtime.part.11 > > 2.60% [guest.kernel] [g] memcpy > > 2.33% [guest.kernel] [g] lock_acquired > > 2.25% [guest.kernel] [g] lock_acquire > > 1.84% [guest.kernel] [g] do_io_submit > > > > This patchs converts the ioctx list to a radix tree. For a performance > > comparison the above FIO script was run on a 2 sockets 8 core > > machine. This are the results (average and %rsd of 10 runs) for the > > original list based implementation and for the radix tree based > > implementation: > > > > cores 1 2 4 8 16 32 > > list 109376 ms 69119 ms 35682 ms 22671 ms 19724 ms 16408 ms > > %rsd 0.69% 1.15% 1.17% 1.21% 1.71% 1.43% > > radix 73651 ms 41748 ms 23028 ms 16766 ms 15232 ms 13787 ms > > %rsd 1.19% 0.98% 0.69% 1.13% 0.72% 0.75% > > % of radix > > relative 66.12% 65.59% 66.63% 72.31% 77.26% 83.66% > > to list > > > > To consider the impact of the patch on the typical case of having > > only one ctx per process the following FIO script was run: > > > > rw=randrw; size=100m ;directory=/mnt/fio; ioengine=libaio; iodepth=1 > > blocksize=1024; numjobs=1; thread; loops=100 > > > > on the same system and the results are the following: > > > > list 58892 ms > > %rsd 0.91% > > radix 59404 ms > > %rsd 0.81% > > % of radix > > relative 100.87% > > to list > > So, I was just doing some benchmarking/profiling to get ready to send > out the aio patches I've got for 3.11 - and it looks like your patch is > causing a ~1.5% throughput regression in my testing :/ ... <snip> I've got an alternate approach for fixing this wart in lookup_ioctx()... Instead of using an rbtree, just use the reserved id in the ring buffer header to index an array pointing the ioctx. It's not finished yet, and it needs to be tidied up, but is most of the way there. -ben -- "Thought is the essence of where you are now." -- kmo> And, a rework of Ben's code, but this was entirely his idea kmo> -Kent bcrl> And fix the code to use the right mm_struct in kill_ioctx(), actually free memory. Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
2013-07-30 23:54:40 +07:00
mm->ioctx_table = NULL;
#endif
}
userfaultfd: use RCU to free the task struct when fork fails The task structure is freed while get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() holds rcu_read_lock() and dereferences mm->owner. get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() failing fork() ---- --- task = mm->owner mm->owner = NULL; free(task) if (task) *task; /* use after free */ The fix consists in freeing the task with RCU also in the fork failure case, exactly like it always happens for the regular exit(2) path. That is enough to make the rcu_read_lock hold in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() (left side above) effective to avoid a use after free when dereferencing the task structure. An alternate possible fix would be to defer the delivery of the userfaultfd contexts to the monitor until after fork() is guaranteed to succeed. Such a change would require more changes because it would create a strict ordering dependency where the uffd methods would need to be called beyond the last potentially failing branch in order to be safe. This solution as opposed only adds the dependency to common code to set mm->owner to NULL and to free the task struct that was pointed by mm->owner with RCU, if fork ends up failing. The userfaultfd methods can still be called anywhere during the fork runtime and the monitor will keep discarding orphaned "mm" coming from failed forks in userland. This race condition couldn't trigger if CONFIG_MEMCG was set =n at build time. [aarcange@redhat.com: improve changelog, reduce #ifdefs per Michal] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190429035752.4508-1-aarcange@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325225636.11635-2-aarcange@redhat.com Fixes: 893e26e61d04 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event") Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Tested-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Reported-by: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Cc: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-15 05:40:46 +07:00
static __always_inline void mm_clear_owner(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct task_struct *p)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
if (mm->owner == p)
WRITE_ONCE(mm->owner, NULL);
#endif
}
static void mm_init_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
mm->owner = p;
#endif
}
mm, uprobes: fix multiple free of ->uprobes_state.xol_area Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap(). However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before the new mm_struct's ->uprobes_state.xol_area has been set to NULL after being copied from the old mm_struct by the memcpy in dup_mm(). For a task that has previously hit a uprobe tracepoint, this resulted in the 'struct xol_area' being freed multiple times if the task was killed at just the right time while forking. Fix it by setting ->uprobes_state.xol_area to NULL in mm_init() rather than in uprobe_dup_mmap(). With CONFIG_UPROBE_EVENTS=y, the bug can be reproduced by the same C program given by commit 2b7e8665b4ff ("fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free"), provided that a uprobe tracepoint has been set on the fork_thread() function. For example: $ gcc reproducer.c -o reproducer -lpthread $ nm reproducer | grep fork_thread 0000000000400719 t fork_thread $ echo "p $PWD/reproducer:0x719" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/uprobe_events $ echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/uprobes/enable $ ./reproducer Here is the use-after-free reported by KASAN: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in uprobe_clear_state+0x1c4/0x200 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8800320a8b88 by task reproducer/198 CPU: 1 PID: 198 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.13.0-rc7-00015-g36fde05f3fb5 #255 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xdb/0x185 print_address_description+0x7e/0x290 kasan_report+0x23b/0x350 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 uprobe_clear_state+0x1c4/0x200 mmput+0xd6/0x360 do_exit+0x740/0x1670 do_group_exit+0x13f/0x380 get_signal+0x597/0x17d0 do_signal+0x99/0x1df0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x166/0x1e0 syscall_return_slowpath+0x258/0x2c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xbc/0xbe ... Allocated by task 199: save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 kasan_kmalloc+0xfc/0x180 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xf3/0x330 __create_xol_area+0x10f/0x780 uprobe_notify_resume+0x1674/0x2210 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x150/0x1e0 prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x14b/0x180 retint_user+0x8/0x20 Freed by task 199: save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 kasan_slab_free+0xa8/0x1a0 kfree+0xba/0x210 uprobe_clear_state+0x151/0x200 mmput+0xd6/0x360 copy_process.part.8+0x605f/0x65d0 _do_fork+0x1a5/0xbd0 SyS_clone+0x19/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x22f/0x660 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a Note: without KASAN, you may instead see a "Bad page state" message, or simply a general protection fault. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170830033303.17927-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.7+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-09-01 06:15:26 +07:00
static void mm_init_uprobes_state(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_UPROBES
mm->uprobes_state.xol_area = NULL;
#endif
}
mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is not readable by the user executing the file. A bug in ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER), unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER). This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec, so it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present in to be able to safely give read permission to the executable. The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns. This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate user namespace it does not become ptraceable. The function ptrace_attach is modified to only set PT_PTRACE_CAP when CAP_SYS_PTRACE is held over task->mm->user_ns. The intent of PT_PTRACE_CAP is to be a flag to note that whatever permission changes the task might go through the tracer has sufficient permissions for it not to be an issue. task->cred->user_ns is always the same as or descendent of mm->user_ns. Which guarantees that having CAP_SYS_PTRACE over mm->user_ns is the worst case for the tasks credentials. To prevent regressions mm->dumpable and mm->user_ns are not considered when a task has no mm. As simply failing ptrace_may_attach causes regressions in privileged applications attempting to read things such as /proc/<pid>/stat Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Fixes: 8409cca70561 ("userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-10-14 09:23:16 +07:00
static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p,
struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
mm->mmap = NULL;
mm->mm_rb = RB_ROOT;
mm->vmacache_seqnum = 0;
atomic_set(&mm->mm_users, 1);
atomic_set(&mm->mm_count, 1);
init_rwsem(&mm->mmap_sem);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mm->mmlist);
mm->core_state = NULL;
mm: consolidate page table accounting Currently, we account page tables separately for each page table level, but that's redundant -- we only make use of total memory allocated to page tables for oom_badness calculation. We also provide the information to userspace, but it has dubious value there too. This patch switches page table accounting to single counter. mm->pgtables_bytes is now used to account all page table levels. We use bytes, because page table size for different levels of page table tree may be different. The change has user-visible effect: we don't have VmPMD and VmPUD reported in /proc/[pid]/status. Not sure if anybody uses them. (As alternative, we can always report 0 kB for them.) OOM-killer report is also slightly changed: we now report pgtables_bytes instead of nr_ptes, nr_pmd, nr_puds. Apart from reducing number of counters per-mm, the benefit is that we now calculate oom_badness() more correctly for machines which have different size of page tables depending on level or where page tables are less than a page in size. The only downside can be debuggability because we do not know which page table level could leak. But I do not remember many bugs that would be caught by separate counters so I wouldn't lose sleep over this. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mm/huge_memory.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171006100651.44742-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> [kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com: fix build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016150113.ikfxy3e7zzfvsr4w@black.fi.intel.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-16 08:35:40 +07:00
mm_pgtables_bytes_init(mm);
mm->map_count = 0;
mm->locked_vm = 0;
atomic64_set(&mm->pinned_vm, 0);
memset(&mm->rss_stat, 0, sizeof(mm->rss_stat));
spin_lock_init(&mm->page_table_lock);
mm: introduce arg_lock to protect arg_start|end and env_start|end in mm_struct mmap_sem is on the hot path of kernel, and it very contended, but it is abused too. It is used to protect arg_start|end and evn_start|end when reading /proc/$PID/cmdline and /proc/$PID/environ, but it doesn't make sense since those proc files just expect to read 4 values atomically and not related to VM, they could be set to arbitrary values by C/R. And, the mmap_sem contention may cause unexpected issue like below: INFO: task ps:14018 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Tainted: G E 4.9.79-009.ali3000.alios7.x86_64 #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. ps D 0 14018 1 0x00000004 Call Trace: schedule+0x36/0x80 rwsem_down_read_failed+0xf0/0x150 call_rwsem_down_read_failed+0x18/0x30 down_read+0x20/0x40 proc_pid_cmdline_read+0xd9/0x4e0 __vfs_read+0x37/0x150 vfs_read+0x96/0x130 SyS_read+0x55/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xc5 Both Alexey Dobriyan and Michal Hocko suggested to use dedicated lock for them to mitigate the abuse of mmap_sem. So, introduce a new spinlock in mm_struct to protect the concurrent access to arg_start|end, env_start|end and others, as well as replace write map_sem to read to protect the race condition between prctl and sys_brk which might break check_data_rlimit(), and makes prctl more friendly to other VM operations. This patch just eliminates the abuse of mmap_sem, but it can't resolve the above hung task warning completely since the later access_remote_vm() call needs acquire mmap_sem. The mmap_sem scalability issue will be solved in the future. [yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com: add comment about mmap_sem and arg_lock] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524077799-80690-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1523730291-109696-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-08 07:05:28 +07:00
spin_lock_init(&mm->arg_lock);
mm_init_cpumask(mm);
mm_init_aio(mm);
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 15:00:16 +07:00
mm_init_owner(mm, p);
fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap(). However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the ->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never taken. This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely. Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same place it clears other things like the list of mmaps. This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the following C program: #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <pthread.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg) { for (;;) { mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ, MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); } } static void *fork_thread(void *_arg) { usleep(rand() % 10000); fork(); } int main(void) { fork(); fork(); fork(); for (;;) { if (fork() == 0) { pthread_t t; pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL); pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL); usleep(rand() % 10000); syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0); } wait(NULL); } } No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork. Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's already been freed. Google Bug Id: 64772007 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-08-26 05:55:43 +07:00
RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, NULL);
mmu_notifier_mm_init(mm);
mm: migrate: prevent racy access to tlb_flush_pending Patch series "fixes of TLB batching races", v6. It turns out that Linux TLB batching mechanism suffers from various races. Races that are caused due to batching during reclamation were recently handled by Mel and this patch-set deals with others. The more fundamental issue is that concurrent updates of the page-tables allow for TLB flushes to be batched on one core, while another core changes the page-tables. This other core may assume a PTE change does not require a flush based on the updated PTE value, while it is unaware that TLB flushes are still pending. This behavior affects KSM (which may result in memory corruption) and MADV_FREE and MADV_DONTNEED (which may result in incorrect behavior). A proof-of-concept can easily produce the wrong behavior of MADV_DONTNEED. Memory corruption in KSM is harder to produce in practice, but was observed by hacking the kernel and adding a delay before flushing and replacing the KSM page. Finally, there is also one memory barrier missing, which may affect architectures with weak memory model. This patch (of 7): Setting and clearing mm->tlb_flush_pending can be performed by multiple threads, since mmap_sem may only be acquired for read in task_numa_work(). If this happens, tlb_flush_pending might be cleared while one of the threads still changes PTEs and batches TLB flushes. This can lead to the same race between migration and change_protection_range() that led to the introduction of tlb_flush_pending. The result of this race was data corruption, which means that this patch also addresses a theoretically possible data corruption. An actual data corruption was not observed, yet the race was was confirmed by adding assertion to check tlb_flush_pending is not set by two threads, adding artificial latency in change_protection_range() and using sysctl to reduce kernel.numa_balancing_scan_delay_ms. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170802000818.4760-2-namit@vmware.com Fixes: 20841405940e ("mm: fix TLB flush race between migration, and change_protection_range") Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-08-11 05:23:56 +07:00
init_tlb_flush_pending(mm);
#if defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) && !USE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCKS
mm->pmd_huge_pte = NULL;
#endif
mm, uprobes: fix multiple free of ->uprobes_state.xol_area Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap(). However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before the new mm_struct's ->uprobes_state.xol_area has been set to NULL after being copied from the old mm_struct by the memcpy in dup_mm(). For a task that has previously hit a uprobe tracepoint, this resulted in the 'struct xol_area' being freed multiple times if the task was killed at just the right time while forking. Fix it by setting ->uprobes_state.xol_area to NULL in mm_init() rather than in uprobe_dup_mmap(). With CONFIG_UPROBE_EVENTS=y, the bug can be reproduced by the same C program given by commit 2b7e8665b4ff ("fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free"), provided that a uprobe tracepoint has been set on the fork_thread() function. For example: $ gcc reproducer.c -o reproducer -lpthread $ nm reproducer | grep fork_thread 0000000000400719 t fork_thread $ echo "p $PWD/reproducer:0x719" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/uprobe_events $ echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/uprobes/enable $ ./reproducer Here is the use-after-free reported by KASAN: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in uprobe_clear_state+0x1c4/0x200 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8800320a8b88 by task reproducer/198 CPU: 1 PID: 198 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.13.0-rc7-00015-g36fde05f3fb5 #255 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xdb/0x185 print_address_description+0x7e/0x290 kasan_report+0x23b/0x350 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 uprobe_clear_state+0x1c4/0x200 mmput+0xd6/0x360 do_exit+0x740/0x1670 do_group_exit+0x13f/0x380 get_signal+0x597/0x17d0 do_signal+0x99/0x1df0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x166/0x1e0 syscall_return_slowpath+0x258/0x2c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xbc/0xbe ... Allocated by task 199: save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 kasan_kmalloc+0xfc/0x180 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xf3/0x330 __create_xol_area+0x10f/0x780 uprobe_notify_resume+0x1674/0x2210 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x150/0x1e0 prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x14b/0x180 retint_user+0x8/0x20 Freed by task 199: save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 kasan_slab_free+0xa8/0x1a0 kfree+0xba/0x210 uprobe_clear_state+0x151/0x200 mmput+0xd6/0x360 copy_process.part.8+0x605f/0x65d0 _do_fork+0x1a5/0xbd0 SyS_clone+0x19/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x22f/0x660 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a Note: without KASAN, you may instead see a "Bad page state" message, or simply a general protection fault. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170830033303.17927-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.7+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-09-01 06:15:26 +07:00
mm_init_uprobes_state(mm);
if (current->mm) {
mm->flags = current->mm->flags & MMF_INIT_MASK;
mm->def_flags = current->mm->def_flags & VM_INIT_DEF_MASK;
} else {
mm->flags = default_dump_filter;
mm->def_flags = 0;
}
if (mm_alloc_pgd(mm))
goto fail_nopgd;
if (init_new_context(p, mm))
goto fail_nocontext;
mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is not readable by the user executing the file. A bug in ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER), unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER). This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec, so it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present in to be able to safely give read permission to the executable. The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns. This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate user namespace it does not become ptraceable. The function ptrace_attach is modified to only set PT_PTRACE_CAP when CAP_SYS_PTRACE is held over task->mm->user_ns. The intent of PT_PTRACE_CAP is to be a flag to note that whatever permission changes the task might go through the tracer has sufficient permissions for it not to be an issue. task->cred->user_ns is always the same as or descendent of mm->user_ns. Which guarantees that having CAP_SYS_PTRACE over mm->user_ns is the worst case for the tasks credentials. To prevent regressions mm->dumpable and mm->user_ns are not considered when a task has no mm. As simply failing ptrace_may_attach causes regressions in privileged applications attempting to read things such as /proc/<pid>/stat Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Fixes: 8409cca70561 ("userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-10-14 09:23:16 +07:00
mm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
return mm;
fail_nocontext:
mm_free_pgd(mm);
fail_nopgd:
free_mm(mm);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Allocate and initialize an mm_struct.
*/
struct mm_struct *mm_alloc(void)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
mm = allocate_mm();
if (!mm)
return NULL;
memset(mm, 0, sizeof(*mm));
mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is not readable by the user executing the file. A bug in ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER), unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER). This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec, so it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present in to be able to safely give read permission to the executable. The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns. This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate user namespace it does not become ptraceable. The function ptrace_attach is modified to only set PT_PTRACE_CAP when CAP_SYS_PTRACE is held over task->mm->user_ns. The intent of PT_PTRACE_CAP is to be a flag to note that whatever permission changes the task might go through the tracer has sufficient permissions for it not to be an issue. task->cred->user_ns is always the same as or descendent of mm->user_ns. Which guarantees that having CAP_SYS_PTRACE over mm->user_ns is the worst case for the tasks credentials. To prevent regressions mm->dumpable and mm->user_ns are not considered when a task has no mm. As simply failing ptrace_may_attach causes regressions in privileged applications attempting to read things such as /proc/<pid>/stat Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Fixes: 8409cca70561 ("userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-10-14 09:23:16 +07:00
return mm_init(mm, current, current_user_ns());
}
static inline void __mmput(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
VM_BUG_ON(atomic_read(&mm->mm_users));
uprobe_clear_state(mm);
exit_aio(mm);
ksm_exit(mm);
khugepaged_exit(mm); /* must run before exit_mmap */
exit_mmap(mm);
thp: reduce usage of huge zero page's atomic counter The global zero page is used to satisfy an anonymous read fault. If THP(Transparent HugePage) is enabled then the global huge zero page is used. The global huge zero page uses an atomic counter for reference counting and is allocated/freed dynamically according to its counter value. CPU time spent on that counter will greatly increase if there are a lot of processes doing anonymous read faults. This patch proposes a way to reduce the access to the global counter so that the CPU load can be reduced accordingly. To do this, a new flag of the mm_struct is introduced: MMF_USED_HUGE_ZERO_PAGE. With this flag, the process only need to touch the global counter in two cases: 1 The first time it uses the global huge zero page; 2 The time when mm_user of its mm_struct reaches zero. Note that right now, the huge zero page is eligible to be freed as soon as its last use goes away. With this patch, the page will not be eligible to be freed until the exit of the last process from which it was ever used. And with the use of mm_user, the kthread is not eligible to use huge zero page either. Since no kthread is using huge zero page today, there is no difference after applying this patch. But if that is not desired, I can change it to when mm_count reaches zero. Case used for test on Haswell EP: usemem -n 72 --readonly -j 0x200000 100G Which spawns 72 processes and each will mmap 100G anonymous space and then do read only access to that space sequentially with a step of 2MB. CPU cycles from perf report for base commit: 54.03% usemem [kernel.kallsyms] [k] get_huge_zero_page CPU cycles from perf report for this commit: 0.11% usemem [kernel.kallsyms] [k] mm_get_huge_zero_page Performance(throughput) of the workload for base commit: 1784430792 Performance(throughput) of the workload for this commit: 4726928591 164% increase. Runtime of the workload for base commit: 707592 us Runtime of the workload for this commit: 303970 us 50% drop. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/fe51a88f-446a-4622-1363-ad1282d71385@intel.com Signed-off-by: Aaron Lu <aaron.lu@intel.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Ebru Akagunduz <ebru.akagunduz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-08 07:00:08 +07:00
mm_put_huge_zero_page(mm);
set_mm_exe_file(mm, NULL);
if (!list_empty(&mm->mmlist)) {
spin_lock(&mmlist_lock);
list_del(&mm->mmlist);
spin_unlock(&mmlist_lock);
}
if (mm->binfmt)
module_put(mm->binfmt->module);
mmdrop(mm);
}
/*
* Decrement the use count and release all resources for an mm.
*/
void mmput(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
might_sleep();
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mm->mm_users))
__mmput(mm);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmput);
android: binder: drop lru lock in isolate callback Drop the global lru lock in isolate callback before calling zap_page_range which calls cond_resched, and re-acquire the global lru lock before returning. Also change return code to LRU_REMOVED_RETRY. Use mmput_async when fail to acquire mmap sem in an atomic context. Fix "BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context" errors when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is enabled. Also restore mmput_async, which was initially introduced in commit ec8d7c14ea14 ("mm, oom_reaper: do not mmput synchronously from the oom reaper context"), and was removed in commit 212925802454 ("mm: oom: let oom_reap_task and exit_mmap run concurrently"). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170914182231.90908-1-sherryy@android.com Fixes: f2517eb76f1f2 ("android: binder: Add global lru shrinker to binder") Signed-off-by: Sherry Yang <sherryy@android.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reported-by: Kyle Yan <kyan@codeaurora.org> Acked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Martijn Coenen <maco@google.com> Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Cc: Riley Andrews <riandrews@android.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Hoeun Ryu <hoeun.ryu@gmail.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-10-04 06:15:00 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
static void mmput_async_fn(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = container_of(work, struct mm_struct,
async_put_work);
__mmput(mm);
}
void mmput_async(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mm->mm_users)) {
INIT_WORK(&mm->async_put_work, mmput_async_fn);
schedule_work(&mm->async_put_work);
}
}
#endif
/**
* set_mm_exe_file - change a reference to the mm's executable file
*
* This changes mm's executable file (shown as symlink /proc/[pid]/exe).
*
* Main users are mmput() and sys_execve(). Callers prevent concurrent
* invocations: in mmput() nobody alive left, in execve task is single
* threaded. sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) also needs to set the
* mm->exe_file, but does so without using set_mm_exe_file() in order
* to do avoid the need for any locks.
*/
void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
{
struct file *old_exe_file;
/*
* It is safe to dereference the exe_file without RCU as
* this function is only called if nobody else can access
* this mm -- see comment above for justification.
*/
old_exe_file = rcu_dereference_raw(mm->exe_file);
if (new_exe_file)
get_file(new_exe_file);
rcu_assign_pointer(mm->exe_file, new_exe_file);
if (old_exe_file)
fput(old_exe_file);
}
/**
* get_mm_exe_file - acquire a reference to the mm's executable file
*
* Returns %NULL if mm has no associated executable file.
* User must release file via fput().
*/
struct file *get_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct file *exe_file;
rcu_read_lock();
exe_file = rcu_dereference(mm->exe_file);
if (exe_file && !get_file_rcu(exe_file))
exe_file = NULL;
rcu_read_unlock();
return exe_file;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_mm_exe_file);
/**
* get_task_exe_file - acquire a reference to the task's executable file
*
* Returns %NULL if task's mm (if any) has no associated executable file or
* this is a kernel thread with borrowed mm (see the comment above get_task_mm).
* User must release file via fput().
*/
struct file *get_task_exe_file(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct file *exe_file = NULL;
struct mm_struct *mm;
task_lock(task);
mm = task->mm;
if (mm) {
if (!(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
}
task_unlock(task);
return exe_file;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_task_exe_file);
/**
* get_task_mm - acquire a reference to the task's mm
*
* Returns %NULL if the task has no mm. Checks PF_KTHREAD (meaning
* this kernel workthread has transiently adopted a user mm with use_mm,
* to do its AIO) is not set and if so returns a reference to it, after
* bumping up the use count. User must release the mm via mmput()
* after use. Typically used by /proc and ptrace.
*/
struct mm_struct *get_task_mm(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
task_lock(task);
mm = task->mm;
if (mm) {
if (task->flags & PF_KTHREAD)
mm = NULL;
else
mmget(mm);
}
task_unlock(task);
return mm;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_task_mm);
struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
int err;
err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm && mm != current->mm &&
!ptrace_may_access(task, mode)) {
mmput(mm);
mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
}
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
return mm;
}
static void complete_vfork_done(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct completion *vfork;
task_lock(tsk);
vfork = tsk->vfork_done;
if (likely(vfork)) {
tsk->vfork_done = NULL;
complete(vfork);
}
task_unlock(tsk);
}
static int wait_for_vfork_done(struct task_struct *child,
struct completion *vfork)
{
int killed;
freezer_do_not_count();
cgroup: cgroup v2 freezer Cgroup v1 implements the freezer controller, which provides an ability to stop the workload in a cgroup and temporarily free up some resources (cpu, io, network bandwidth and, potentially, memory) for some other tasks. Cgroup v2 lacks this functionality. This patch implements freezer for cgroup v2. Cgroup v2 freezer tries to put tasks into a state similar to jobctl stop. This means that tasks can be killed, ptraced (using PTRACE_SEIZE*), and interrupted. It is possible to attach to a frozen task, get some information (e.g. read registers) and detach. It's also possible to migrate a frozen tasks to another cgroup. This differs cgroup v2 freezer from cgroup v1 freezer, which mostly tried to imitate the system-wide freezer. However uninterruptible sleep is fine when all tasks are going to be frozen (hibernation case), it's not the acceptable state for some subset of the system. Cgroup v2 freezer is not supporting freezing kthreads. If a non-root cgroup contains kthread, the cgroup still can be frozen, but the kthread will remain running, the cgroup will be shown as non-frozen, and the notification will not be delivered. * PTRACE_ATTACH is not working because non-fatal signal delivery is blocked in frozen state. There are some interface differences between cgroup v1 and cgroup v2 freezer too, which are required to conform the cgroup v2 interface design principles: 1) There is no separate controller, which has to be turned on: the functionality is always available and is represented by cgroup.freeze and cgroup.events cgroup control files. 2) The desired state is defined by the cgroup.freeze control file. Any hierarchical configuration is allowed. 3) The interface is asynchronous. The actual state is available using cgroup.events control file ("frozen" field). There are no dedicated transitional states. 4) It's allowed to make any changes with the cgroup hierarchy (create new cgroups, remove old cgroups, move tasks between cgroups) no matter if some cgroups are frozen. Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> No-objection-from-me-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
2019-04-20 00:03:04 +07:00
cgroup_enter_frozen();
killed = wait_for_completion_killable(vfork);
cgroup: cgroup v2 freezer Cgroup v1 implements the freezer controller, which provides an ability to stop the workload in a cgroup and temporarily free up some resources (cpu, io, network bandwidth and, potentially, memory) for some other tasks. Cgroup v2 lacks this functionality. This patch implements freezer for cgroup v2. Cgroup v2 freezer tries to put tasks into a state similar to jobctl stop. This means that tasks can be killed, ptraced (using PTRACE_SEIZE*), and interrupted. It is possible to attach to a frozen task, get some information (e.g. read registers) and detach. It's also possible to migrate a frozen tasks to another cgroup. This differs cgroup v2 freezer from cgroup v1 freezer, which mostly tried to imitate the system-wide freezer. However uninterruptible sleep is fine when all tasks are going to be frozen (hibernation case), it's not the acceptable state for some subset of the system. Cgroup v2 freezer is not supporting freezing kthreads. If a non-root cgroup contains kthread, the cgroup still can be frozen, but the kthread will remain running, the cgroup will be shown as non-frozen, and the notification will not be delivered. * PTRACE_ATTACH is not working because non-fatal signal delivery is blocked in frozen state. There are some interface differences between cgroup v1 and cgroup v2 freezer too, which are required to conform the cgroup v2 interface design principles: 1) There is no separate controller, which has to be turned on: the functionality is always available and is represented by cgroup.freeze and cgroup.events cgroup control files. 2) The desired state is defined by the cgroup.freeze control file. Any hierarchical configuration is allowed. 3) The interface is asynchronous. The actual state is available using cgroup.events control file ("frozen" field). There are no dedicated transitional states. 4) It's allowed to make any changes with the cgroup hierarchy (create new cgroups, remove old cgroups, move tasks between cgroups) no matter if some cgroups are frozen. Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> No-objection-from-me-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
2019-04-20 00:03:04 +07:00
cgroup_leave_frozen(false);
freezer_count();
if (killed) {
task_lock(child);
child->vfork_done = NULL;
task_unlock(child);
}
put_task_struct(child);
return killed;
}
/* Please note the differences between mmput and mm_release.
* mmput is called whenever we stop holding onto a mm_struct,
* error success whatever.
*
* mm_release is called after a mm_struct has been removed
* from the current process.
*
* This difference is important for error handling, when we
* only half set up a mm_struct for a new process and need to restore
* the old one. Because we mmput the new mm_struct before
* restoring the old one. . .
* Eric Biederman 10 January 1998
*/
void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
/* Get rid of any futexes when releasing the mm */
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list)) {
exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->robust_list = NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list)) {
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->compat_robust_list = NULL;
}
#endif
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&tsk->pi_state_list)))
exit_pi_state_list(tsk);
#endif
uprobes/core: Handle breakpoint and singlestep exceptions Uprobes uses exception notifiers to get to know if a thread hit a breakpoint or a singlestep exception. When a thread hits a uprobe or is singlestepping post a uprobe hit, the uprobe exception notifier sets its TIF_UPROBE bit, which will then be checked on its return to userspace path (do_notify_resume() ->uprobe_notify_resume()), where the consumers handlers are run (in task context) based on the defined filters. Uprobe hits are thread specific and hence we need to maintain information about if a task hit a uprobe, what uprobe was hit, the slot where the original instruction was copied for xol so that it can be singlestepped with appropriate fixups. In some cases, special care is needed for instructions that are executed out of line (xol). These are architecture specific artefacts, such as handling RIP relative instructions on x86_64. Since the instruction at which the uprobe was inserted is executed out of line, architecture specific fixups are added so that the thread continues normal execution in the presence of a uprobe. Postpone the signals until we execute the probed insn. post_xol() path does a recalc_sigpending() before return to user-mode, this ensures the signal can't be lost. Uprobes relies on DIE_DEBUG notification to notify if a singlestep is complete. Adds x86 specific uprobe exception notifiers and appropriate hooks needed to determine a uprobe hit and subsequent post processing. Add requisite x86 fixups for xol for uprobes. Specific cases needing fixups include relative jumps (x86_64), calls, etc. Where possible, we check and skip singlestepping the breakpointed instructions. For now we skip single byte as well as few multibyte nop instructions. However this can be extended to other instructions too. Credits to Oleg Nesterov for suggestions/patches related to signal, breakpoint, singlestep handling code. Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120313180011.29771.89027.sendpatchset@srdronam.in.ibm.com [ Performed various cleanliness edits ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2012-03-14 01:00:11 +07:00
uprobe_free_utask(tsk);
/* Get rid of any cached register state */
deactivate_mm(tsk, mm);
/*
kernel/fork: fix CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID regression in nscd Commit fec1d0115240 ("[PATCH] Disable CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID for abnormal exit") has caused a subtle regression in nscd which uses CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID to clear the nscd_certainly_running flag in the shared databases, so that the clients are notified when nscd is restarted. Now, when nscd uses a non-persistent database, clients that have it mapped keep thinking the database is being updated by nscd, when in fact nscd has created a new (anonymous) one (for non-persistent databases it uses an unlinked file as backend). The original proposal for the CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID change claimed (https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/10/25/233): : The NPTL library uses the CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID flag on clone() syscalls : on behalf of pthread_create() library calls. This feature is used to : request that the kernel clear the thread-id in user space (at an address : provided in the syscall) when the thread disassociates itself from the : address space, which is done in mm_release(). : : Unfortunately, when a multi-threaded process incurs a core dump (such as : from a SIGSEGV), the core-dumping thread sends SIGKILL signals to all of : the other threads, which then proceed to clear their user-space tids : before synchronizing in exit_mm() with the start of core dumping. This : misrepresents the state of process's address space at the time of the : SIGSEGV and makes it more difficult for someone to debug NPTL and glibc : problems (misleading him/her to conclude that the threads had gone away : before the fault). : : The fix below is to simply avoid the CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID action if a : core dump has been initiated. The resulting patch from Roland (https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/10/26/269) seems to have a larger scope than the original patch asked for. It seems that limitting the scope of the check to core dumping should work for SIGSEGV issue describe above. [Changelog partly based on Andreas' description] Fixes: fec1d0115240 ("[PATCH] Disable CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID for abnormal exit") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1471968749-26173-1-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Tested-by: William Preston <wpreston@suse.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-09-02 06:15:13 +07:00
* Signal userspace if we're not exiting with a core dump
* because we want to leave the value intact for debugging
* purposes.
*/
execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid While looking at Jens Rosenboom bug report (http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/7/27/35) about strange sys_futex call done from a dying "ps" program, we found following problem. clone() syscall has special support for TID of created threads. This support includes two features. One (CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) is to set an integer into user memory with the TID value. One (CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) is to clear this same integer once the created thread dies. The integer location is a user provided pointer, provided at clone() time. kernel keeps this pointer value into current->clear_child_tid. At execve() time, we should make sure kernel doesnt keep this user provided pointer, as full user memory is replaced by a new one. As glibc fork() actually uses clone() syscall with CLONE_CHILD_SETTID and CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID set, chances are high that we might corrupt user memory in forked processes. Following sequence could happen: 1) bash (or any program) starts a new process, by a fork() call that glibc maps to a clone( ... CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID ...) syscall 2) When new process starts, its current->clear_child_tid is set to a location that has a meaning only in bash (or initial program) context (&THREAD_SELF->tid) 3) This new process does the execve() syscall to start a new program. current->clear_child_tid is left unchanged (a non NULL value) 4) If this new program creates some threads, and initial thread exits, kernel will attempt to clear the integer pointed by current->clear_child_tid from mm_release() : if (tsk->clear_child_tid && !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) { u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid; tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL; /* * We don't check the error code - if userspace has * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. */ << here >> put_user(0, tidptr); sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0); } 5) OR : if new program is not multi-threaded, but spied by /proc/pid users (ps command for example), mm_users > 1, and the exiting program could corrupt 4 bytes in a persistent memory area (shm or memory mapped file) If current->clear_child_tid points to a writeable portion of memory of the new program, kernel happily and silently corrupts 4 bytes of memory, with unexpected effects. Fix is straightforward and should not break any sane program. Reported-by: Jens Rosenboom <jens@mcbone.net> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@us.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-08-07 05:09:28 +07:00
if (tsk->clear_child_tid) {
kernel/fork: fix CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID regression in nscd Commit fec1d0115240 ("[PATCH] Disable CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID for abnormal exit") has caused a subtle regression in nscd which uses CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID to clear the nscd_certainly_running flag in the shared databases, so that the clients are notified when nscd is restarted. Now, when nscd uses a non-persistent database, clients that have it mapped keep thinking the database is being updated by nscd, when in fact nscd has created a new (anonymous) one (for non-persistent databases it uses an unlinked file as backend). The original proposal for the CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID change claimed (https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/10/25/233): : The NPTL library uses the CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID flag on clone() syscalls : on behalf of pthread_create() library calls. This feature is used to : request that the kernel clear the thread-id in user space (at an address : provided in the syscall) when the thread disassociates itself from the : address space, which is done in mm_release(). : : Unfortunately, when a multi-threaded process incurs a core dump (such as : from a SIGSEGV), the core-dumping thread sends SIGKILL signals to all of : the other threads, which then proceed to clear their user-space tids : before synchronizing in exit_mm() with the start of core dumping. This : misrepresents the state of process's address space at the time of the : SIGSEGV and makes it more difficult for someone to debug NPTL and glibc : problems (misleading him/her to conclude that the threads had gone away : before the fault). : : The fix below is to simply avoid the CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID action if a : core dump has been initiated. The resulting patch from Roland (https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/10/26/269) seems to have a larger scope than the original patch asked for. It seems that limitting the scope of the check to core dumping should work for SIGSEGV issue describe above. [Changelog partly based on Andreas' description] Fixes: fec1d0115240 ("[PATCH] Disable CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID for abnormal exit") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1471968749-26173-1-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Tested-by: William Preston <wpreston@suse.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-09-02 06:15:13 +07:00
if (!(tsk->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_COREDUMP) &&
execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid While looking at Jens Rosenboom bug report (http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/7/27/35) about strange sys_futex call done from a dying "ps" program, we found following problem. clone() syscall has special support for TID of created threads. This support includes two features. One (CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) is to set an integer into user memory with the TID value. One (CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) is to clear this same integer once the created thread dies. The integer location is a user provided pointer, provided at clone() time. kernel keeps this pointer value into current->clear_child_tid. At execve() time, we should make sure kernel doesnt keep this user provided pointer, as full user memory is replaced by a new one. As glibc fork() actually uses clone() syscall with CLONE_CHILD_SETTID and CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID set, chances are high that we might corrupt user memory in forked processes. Following sequence could happen: 1) bash (or any program) starts a new process, by a fork() call that glibc maps to a clone( ... CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID ...) syscall 2) When new process starts, its current->clear_child_tid is set to a location that has a meaning only in bash (or initial program) context (&THREAD_SELF->tid) 3) This new process does the execve() syscall to start a new program. current->clear_child_tid is left unchanged (a non NULL value) 4) If this new program creates some threads, and initial thread exits, kernel will attempt to clear the integer pointed by current->clear_child_tid from mm_release() : if (tsk->clear_child_tid && !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) { u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid; tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL; /* * We don't check the error code - if userspace has * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. */ << here >> put_user(0, tidptr); sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0); } 5) OR : if new program is not multi-threaded, but spied by /proc/pid users (ps command for example), mm_users > 1, and the exiting program could corrupt 4 bytes in a persistent memory area (shm or memory mapped file) If current->clear_child_tid points to a writeable portion of memory of the new program, kernel happily and silently corrupts 4 bytes of memory, with unexpected effects. Fix is straightforward and should not break any sane program. Reported-by: Jens Rosenboom <jens@mcbone.net> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@us.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-08-07 05:09:28 +07:00
atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
/*
* We don't check the error code - if userspace has
* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
*/
put_user(0, tsk->clear_child_tid);
do_futex(tsk->clear_child_tid, FUTEX_WAKE,
1, NULL, NULL, 0, 0);
execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid While looking at Jens Rosenboom bug report (http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/7/27/35) about strange sys_futex call done from a dying "ps" program, we found following problem. clone() syscall has special support for TID of created threads. This support includes two features. One (CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) is to set an integer into user memory with the TID value. One (CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) is to clear this same integer once the created thread dies. The integer location is a user provided pointer, provided at clone() time. kernel keeps this pointer value into current->clear_child_tid. At execve() time, we should make sure kernel doesnt keep this user provided pointer, as full user memory is replaced by a new one. As glibc fork() actually uses clone() syscall with CLONE_CHILD_SETTID and CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID set, chances are high that we might corrupt user memory in forked processes. Following sequence could happen: 1) bash (or any program) starts a new process, by a fork() call that glibc maps to a clone( ... CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID ...) syscall 2) When new process starts, its current->clear_child_tid is set to a location that has a meaning only in bash (or initial program) context (&THREAD_SELF->tid) 3) This new process does the execve() syscall to start a new program. current->clear_child_tid is left unchanged (a non NULL value) 4) If this new program creates some threads, and initial thread exits, kernel will attempt to clear the integer pointed by current->clear_child_tid from mm_release() : if (tsk->clear_child_tid && !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) { u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid; tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL; /* * We don't check the error code - if userspace has * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. */ << here >> put_user(0, tidptr); sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0); } 5) OR : if new program is not multi-threaded, but spied by /proc/pid users (ps command for example), mm_users > 1, and the exiting program could corrupt 4 bytes in a persistent memory area (shm or memory mapped file) If current->clear_child_tid points to a writeable portion of memory of the new program, kernel happily and silently corrupts 4 bytes of memory, with unexpected effects. Fix is straightforward and should not break any sane program. Reported-by: Jens Rosenboom <jens@mcbone.net> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@us.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-08-07 05:09:28 +07:00
}
tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;
}
/*
* All done, finally we can wake up parent and return this mm to him.
* Also kthread_stop() uses this completion for synchronization.
*/
if (tsk->vfork_done)
complete_vfork_done(tsk);
}
/**
* dup_mm() - duplicates an existing mm structure
* @tsk: the task_struct with which the new mm will be associated.
* @oldmm: the mm to duplicate.
*
* Allocates a new mm structure and duplicates the provided @oldmm structure
* content into it.
*
* Return: the duplicated mm or NULL on failure.
*/
static struct mm_struct *dup_mm(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct mm_struct *oldmm)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
int err;
mm = allocate_mm();
if (!mm)
goto fail_nomem;
memcpy(mm, oldmm, sizeof(*mm));
mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is not readable by the user executing the file. A bug in ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER), unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER). This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec, so it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present in to be able to safely give read permission to the executable. The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns. This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate user namespace it does not become ptraceable. The function ptrace_attach is modified to only set PT_PTRACE_CAP when CAP_SYS_PTRACE is held over task->mm->user_ns. The intent of PT_PTRACE_CAP is to be a flag to note that whatever permission changes the task might go through the tracer has sufficient permissions for it not to be an issue. task->cred->user_ns is always the same as or descendent of mm->user_ns. Which guarantees that having CAP_SYS_PTRACE over mm->user_ns is the worst case for the tasks credentials. To prevent regressions mm->dumpable and mm->user_ns are not considered when a task has no mm. As simply failing ptrace_may_attach causes regressions in privileged applications attempting to read things such as /proc/<pid>/stat Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Fixes: 8409cca70561 ("userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-10-14 09:23:16 +07:00
if (!mm_init(mm, tsk, mm->user_ns))
goto fail_nomem;
err = dup_mmap(mm, oldmm);
if (err)
goto free_pt;
mm->hiwater_rss = get_mm_rss(mm);
mm->hiwater_vm = mm->total_vm;
if (mm->binfmt && !try_module_get(mm->binfmt->module))
goto free_pt;
return mm;
free_pt:
/* don't put binfmt in mmput, we haven't got module yet */
mm->binfmt = NULL;
userfaultfd: use RCU to free the task struct when fork fails The task structure is freed while get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() holds rcu_read_lock() and dereferences mm->owner. get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() failing fork() ---- --- task = mm->owner mm->owner = NULL; free(task) if (task) *task; /* use after free */ The fix consists in freeing the task with RCU also in the fork failure case, exactly like it always happens for the regular exit(2) path. That is enough to make the rcu_read_lock hold in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() (left side above) effective to avoid a use after free when dereferencing the task structure. An alternate possible fix would be to defer the delivery of the userfaultfd contexts to the monitor until after fork() is guaranteed to succeed. Such a change would require more changes because it would create a strict ordering dependency where the uffd methods would need to be called beyond the last potentially failing branch in order to be safe. This solution as opposed only adds the dependency to common code to set mm->owner to NULL and to free the task struct that was pointed by mm->owner with RCU, if fork ends up failing. The userfaultfd methods can still be called anywhere during the fork runtime and the monitor will keep discarding orphaned "mm" coming from failed forks in userland. This race condition couldn't trigger if CONFIG_MEMCG was set =n at build time. [aarcange@redhat.com: improve changelog, reduce #ifdefs per Michal] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190429035752.4508-1-aarcange@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325225636.11635-2-aarcange@redhat.com Fixes: 893e26e61d04 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event") Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Tested-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Reported-by: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Cc: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-15 05:40:46 +07:00
mm_init_owner(mm, NULL);
mmput(mm);
fail_nomem:
return NULL;
}
static int copy_mm(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct mm_struct *mm, *oldmm;
int retval;
tsk->min_flt = tsk->maj_flt = 0;
tsk->nvcsw = tsk->nivcsw = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK
tsk->last_switch_count = tsk->nvcsw + tsk->nivcsw;
kernel/hung_task.c: allow to set checking interval separately from timeout Currently task hung checking interval is equal to timeout, as the result hung is detected anywhere between timeout and 2*timeout. This is fine for most interactive environments, but this hurts automated testing setups (syzbot). In an automated setup we need to strictly order CPU lockup < RCU stall < workqueue lockup < task hung < silent loss, so that RCU stall is not detected as task hung and task hung is not detected as silent machine loss. The large variance in task hung detection timeout requires setting silent machine loss timeout to a very large value (e.g. if task hung is 3 mins, then silent loss need to be set to ~7 mins). The additional 3 minutes significantly reduce testing efficiency because usually we crash kernel within a minute, and this can add hours to bug localization process as it needs to do dozens of tests. Allow setting checking interval separately from timeout. This allows to set timeout to, say, 3 minutes, but checking interval to 10 secs. The interval is controlled via a new hung_task_check_interval_secs sysctl, similar to the existing hung_task_timeout_secs sysctl. The default value of 0 results in the current behavior: checking interval is equal to timeout. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: update hung_task_timeout_max's comment] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180611111004.203513-1-dvyukov@google.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-22 11:55:52 +07:00
tsk->last_switch_time = 0;
#endif
tsk->mm = NULL;
tsk->active_mm = NULL;
/*
* Are we cloning a kernel thread?
*
* We need to steal a active VM for that..
*/
oldmm = current->mm;
if (!oldmm)
return 0;
mm: per-thread vma caching This patch is a continuation of efforts trying to optimize find_vma(), avoiding potentially expensive rbtree walks to locate a vma upon faults. The original approach (https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/11/1/410), where the largest vma was also cached, ended up being too specific and random, thus further comparison with other approaches were needed. There are two things to consider when dealing with this, the cache hit rate and the latency of find_vma(). Improving the hit-rate does not necessarily translate in finding the vma any faster, as the overhead of any fancy caching schemes can be too high to consider. We currently cache the last used vma for the whole address space, which provides a nice optimization, reducing the total cycles in find_vma() by up to 250%, for workloads with good locality. On the other hand, this simple scheme is pretty much useless for workloads with poor locality. Analyzing ebizzy runs shows that, no matter how many threads are running, the mmap_cache hit rate is less than 2%, and in many situations below 1%. The proposed approach is to replace this scheme with a small per-thread cache, maximizing hit rates at a very low maintenance cost. Invalidations are performed by simply bumping up a 32-bit sequence number. The only expensive operation is in the rare case of a seq number overflow, where all caches that share the same address space are flushed. Upon a miss, the proposed replacement policy is based on the page number that contains the virtual address in question. Concretely, the following results are seen on an 80 core, 8 socket x86-64 box: 1) System bootup: Most programs are single threaded, so the per-thread scheme does improve ~50% hit rate by just adding a few more slots to the cache. +----------------+----------+------------------+ | caching scheme | hit-rate | cycles (billion) | +----------------+----------+------------------+ | baseline | 50.61% | 19.90 | | patched | 73.45% | 13.58 | +----------------+----------+------------------+ 2) Kernel build: This one is already pretty good with the current approach as we're dealing with good locality. +----------------+----------+------------------+ | caching scheme | hit-rate | cycles (billion) | +----------------+----------+------------------+ | baseline | 75.28% | 11.03 | | patched | 88.09% | 9.31 | +----------------+----------+------------------+ 3) Oracle 11g Data Mining (4k pages): Similar to the kernel build workload. +----------------+----------+------------------+ | caching scheme | hit-rate | cycles (billion) | +----------------+----------+------------------+ | baseline | 70.66% | 17.14 | | patched | 91.15% | 12.57 | +----------------+----------+------------------+ 4) Ebizzy: There's a fair amount of variation from run to run, but this approach always shows nearly perfect hit rates, while baseline is just about non-existent. The amounts of cycles can fluctuate between anywhere from ~60 to ~116 for the baseline scheme, but this approach reduces it considerably. For instance, with 80 threads: +----------------+----------+------------------+ | caching scheme | hit-rate | cycles (billion) | +----------------+----------+------------------+ | baseline | 1.06% | 91.54 | | patched | 99.97% | 14.18 | +----------------+----------+------------------+ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix nommu build, per Davidlohr] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: document vmacache_valid() logic] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: attempt to untangle header files] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add vmacache_find() BUG_ON] [hughd@google.com: add vmacache_valid_mm() (from Oleg)] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: adjust and enhance comments] Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Tested-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 05:37:25 +07:00
/* initialize the new vmacache entries */
vmacache_flush(tsk);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_VM) {
mmget(oldmm);
mm = oldmm;
goto good_mm;
}
retval = -ENOMEM;
mm = dup_mm(tsk, current->mm);
if (!mm)
goto fail_nomem;
good_mm:
tsk->mm = mm;
tsk->active_mm = mm;
return 0;
fail_nomem:
return retval;
}
static int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_FS) {
/* tsk->fs is already what we want */
spin_lock(&fs->lock);
if (fs->in_exec) {
spin_unlock(&fs->lock);
return -EAGAIN;
}
fs->users++;
spin_unlock(&fs->lock);
return 0;
}
tsk->fs = copy_fs_struct(fs);
if (!tsk->fs)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
static int copy_files(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct files_struct *oldf, *newf;
int error = 0;
/*
* A background process may not have any files ...
*/
oldf = current->files;
if (!oldf)
goto out;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_FILES) {
atomic_inc(&oldf->count);
goto out;
}
newf = dup_fd(oldf, &error);
if (!newf)
goto out;
tsk->files = newf;
error = 0;
out:
return error;
}
static int copy_io(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
struct io_context *ioc = current->io_context;
block: make ioc get/put interface more conventional and fix race on alloction Ignoring copy_io() during fork, io_context can be allocated from two places - current_io_context() and set_task_ioprio(). The former is always called from local task while the latter can be called from different task. The synchornization between them are peculiar and dubious. * current_io_context() doesn't grab task_lock() and assumes that if it saw %NULL ->io_context, it would stay that way until allocation and assignment is complete. It has smp_wmb() between alloc/init and assignment. * set_task_ioprio() grabs task_lock() for assignment and does smp_read_barrier_depends() between "ioc = task->io_context" and "if (ioc)". Unfortunately, this doesn't achieve anything - the latter is not a dependent load of the former. ie, if ioc itself were being dereferenced "ioc->xxx", it would mean something (not sure what tho) but as the code currently stands, the dependent read barrier is noop. As only one of the the two test-assignment sequences is task_lock() protected, the task_lock() can't do much about race between the two. Nothing prevents current_io_context() and set_task_ioprio() allocating its own ioc for the same task and overwriting the other's. Also, set_task_ioprio() can race with exiting task and create a new ioc after exit_io_context() is finished. ioc get/put doesn't have any reason to be complex. The only hot path is accessing the existing ioc of %current, which is simple to achieve given that ->io_context is never destroyed as long as the task is alive. All other paths can happily go through task_lock() like all other task sub structures without impacting anything. This patch updates ioc get/put so that it becomes more conventional. * alloc_io_context() is replaced with get_task_io_context(). This is the only interface which can acquire access to ioc of another task. On return, the caller has an explicit reference to the object which should be put using put_io_context() afterwards. * The functionality of current_io_context() remains the same but when creating a new ioc, it shares the code path with get_task_io_context() and always goes through task_lock(). * get_io_context() now means incrementing ref on an ioc which the caller already has access to (be that an explicit refcnt or implicit %current one). * PF_EXITING inhibits creation of new io_context and once exit_io_context() is finished, it's guaranteed that both ioc acquisition functions return %NULL. * All users are updated. Most are trivial but smp_read_barrier_depends() removal from cfq_get_io_context() needs a bit of explanation. I suppose the original intention was to ensure ioc->ioprio is visible when set_task_ioprio() allocates new io_context and installs it; however, this wouldn't have worked because set_task_ioprio() doesn't have wmb between init and install. There are other problems with this which will be fixed in another patch. * While at it, use NUMA_NO_NODE instead of -1 for wildcard node specification. -v2: Vivek spotted contamination from debug patch. Removed. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2011-12-14 06:33:38 +07:00
struct io_context *new_ioc;
if (!ioc)
return 0;
/*
* Share io context with parent, if CLONE_IO is set
*/
if (clone_flags & CLONE_IO) {
ioc_task_link(ioc);
tsk->io_context = ioc;
} else if (ioprio_valid(ioc->ioprio)) {
block: make ioc get/put interface more conventional and fix race on alloction Ignoring copy_io() during fork, io_context can be allocated from two places - current_io_context() and set_task_ioprio(). The former is always called from local task while the latter can be called from different task. The synchornization between them are peculiar and dubious. * current_io_context() doesn't grab task_lock() and assumes that if it saw %NULL ->io_context, it would stay that way until allocation and assignment is complete. It has smp_wmb() between alloc/init and assignment. * set_task_ioprio() grabs task_lock() for assignment and does smp_read_barrier_depends() between "ioc = task->io_context" and "if (ioc)". Unfortunately, this doesn't achieve anything - the latter is not a dependent load of the former. ie, if ioc itself were being dereferenced "ioc->xxx", it would mean something (not sure what tho) but as the code currently stands, the dependent read barrier is noop. As only one of the the two test-assignment sequences is task_lock() protected, the task_lock() can't do much about race between the two. Nothing prevents current_io_context() and set_task_ioprio() allocating its own ioc for the same task and overwriting the other's. Also, set_task_ioprio() can race with exiting task and create a new ioc after exit_io_context() is finished. ioc get/put doesn't have any reason to be complex. The only hot path is accessing the existing ioc of %current, which is simple to achieve given that ->io_context is never destroyed as long as the task is alive. All other paths can happily go through task_lock() like all other task sub structures without impacting anything. This patch updates ioc get/put so that it becomes more conventional. * alloc_io_context() is replaced with get_task_io_context(). This is the only interface which can acquire access to ioc of another task. On return, the caller has an explicit reference to the object which should be put using put_io_context() afterwards. * The functionality of current_io_context() remains the same but when creating a new ioc, it shares the code path with get_task_io_context() and always goes through task_lock(). * get_io_context() now means incrementing ref on an ioc which the caller already has access to (be that an explicit refcnt or implicit %current one). * PF_EXITING inhibits creation of new io_context and once exit_io_context() is finished, it's guaranteed that both ioc acquisition functions return %NULL. * All users are updated. Most are trivial but smp_read_barrier_depends() removal from cfq_get_io_context() needs a bit of explanation. I suppose the original intention was to ensure ioc->ioprio is visible when set_task_ioprio() allocates new io_context and installs it; however, this wouldn't have worked because set_task_ioprio() doesn't have wmb between init and install. There are other problems with this which will be fixed in another patch. * While at it, use NUMA_NO_NODE instead of -1 for wildcard node specification. -v2: Vivek spotted contamination from debug patch. Removed. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2011-12-14 06:33:38 +07:00
new_ioc = get_task_io_context(tsk, GFP_KERNEL, NUMA_NO_NODE);
if (unlikely(!new_ioc))
return -ENOMEM;
block: make ioc get/put interface more conventional and fix race on alloction Ignoring copy_io() during fork, io_context can be allocated from two places - current_io_context() and set_task_ioprio(). The former is always called from local task while the latter can be called from different task. The synchornization between them are peculiar and dubious. * current_io_context() doesn't grab task_lock() and assumes that if it saw %NULL ->io_context, it would stay that way until allocation and assignment is complete. It has smp_wmb() between alloc/init and assignment. * set_task_ioprio() grabs task_lock() for assignment and does smp_read_barrier_depends() between "ioc = task->io_context" and "if (ioc)". Unfortunately, this doesn't achieve anything - the latter is not a dependent load of the former. ie, if ioc itself were being dereferenced "ioc->xxx", it would mean something (not sure what tho) but as the code currently stands, the dependent read barrier is noop. As only one of the the two test-assignment sequences is task_lock() protected, the task_lock() can't do much about race between the two. Nothing prevents current_io_context() and set_task_ioprio() allocating its own ioc for the same task and overwriting the other's. Also, set_task_ioprio() can race with exiting task and create a new ioc after exit_io_context() is finished. ioc get/put doesn't have any reason to be complex. The only hot path is accessing the existing ioc of %current, which is simple to achieve given that ->io_context is never destroyed as long as the task is alive. All other paths can happily go through task_lock() like all other task sub structures without impacting anything. This patch updates ioc get/put so that it becomes more conventional. * alloc_io_context() is replaced with get_task_io_context(). This is the only interface which can acquire access to ioc of another task. On return, the caller has an explicit reference to the object which should be put using put_io_context() afterwards. * The functionality of current_io_context() remains the same but when creating a new ioc, it shares the code path with get_task_io_context() and always goes through task_lock(). * get_io_context() now means incrementing ref on an ioc which the caller already has access to (be that an explicit refcnt or implicit %current one). * PF_EXITING inhibits creation of new io_context and once exit_io_context() is finished, it's guaranteed that both ioc acquisition functions return %NULL. * All users are updated. Most are trivial but smp_read_barrier_depends() removal from cfq_get_io_context() needs a bit of explanation. I suppose the original intention was to ensure ioc->ioprio is visible when set_task_ioprio() allocates new io_context and installs it; however, this wouldn't have worked because set_task_ioprio() doesn't have wmb between init and install. There are other problems with this which will be fixed in another patch. * While at it, use NUMA_NO_NODE instead of -1 for wildcard node specification. -v2: Vivek spotted contamination from debug patch. Removed. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2011-12-14 06:33:38 +07:00
new_ioc->ioprio = ioc->ioprio;
put_io_context(new_ioc);
}
#endif
return 0;
}
static int copy_sighand(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct sighand_struct *sig;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND) {
sched/core: Convert sighand_struct.count to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable sighand_struct.count is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. ** Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the sighand_struct.count it might make a difference in following places: - __cleanup_sighand: decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547814450-18902-2-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-01-18 19:27:26 +07:00
refcount_inc(&current->sighand->count);
return 0;
}
sig = kmem_cache_alloc(sighand_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
rcu_assign_pointer(tsk->sighand, sig);
if (!sig)
return -ENOMEM;
sched/core: Convert sighand_struct.count to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable sighand_struct.count is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. ** Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the sighand_struct.count it might make a difference in following places: - __cleanup_sighand: decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547814450-18902-2-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-01-18 19:27:26 +07:00
refcount_set(&sig->count, 1);
spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
memcpy(sig->action, current->sighand->action, sizeof(sig->action));
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
return 0;
}
void __cleanup_sighand(struct sighand_struct *sighand)
{
sched/core: Convert sighand_struct.count to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable sighand_struct.count is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. ** Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the sighand_struct.count it might make a difference in following places: - __cleanup_sighand: decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547814450-18902-2-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-01-18 19:27:26 +07:00
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&sighand->count)) {
epoll: introduce POLLFREE to flush ->signalfd_wqh before kfree() This patch is intentionally incomplete to simplify the review. It ignores ep_unregister_pollwait() which plays with the same wqh. See the next change. epoll assumes that the EPOLL_CTL_ADD'ed file controls everything f_op->poll() needs. In particular it assumes that the wait queue can't go away until eventpoll_release(). This is not true in case of signalfd, the task which does EPOLL_CTL_ADD uses its ->sighand which is not connected to the file. This patch adds the special event, POLLFREE, currently only for epoll. It expects that init_poll_funcptr()'ed hook should do the necessary cleanup. Perhaps it should be defined as EPOLLFREE in eventpoll. __cleanup_sighand() is changed to do wake_up_poll(POLLFREE) if ->signalfd_wqh is not empty, we add the new signalfd_cleanup() helper. ep_poll_callback(POLLFREE) simply does list_del_init(task_list). This make this poll entry inconsistent, but we don't care. If you share epoll fd which contains our sigfd with another process you should blame yourself. signalfd is "really special". I simply do not know how we can define the "right" semantics if it used with epoll. The main problem is, epoll calls signalfd_poll() once to establish the connection with the wait queue, after that signalfd_poll(NULL) returns the different/inconsistent results depending on who does EPOLL_CTL_MOD/signalfd_read/etc. IOW: apart from sigmask, signalfd has nothing to do with the file, it works with the current thread. In short: this patch is the hack which tries to fix the symptoms. It also assumes that nobody can take tasklist_lock under epoll locks, this seems to be true. Note: - we do not have wake_up_all_poll() but wake_up_poll() is fine, poll/epoll doesn't use WQ_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE. - signalfd_cleanup() uses POLLHUP along with POLLFREE, we need a couple of simple changes in eventpoll.c to make sure it can't be "lost". Reported-by: Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-02-25 02:07:11 +07:00
signalfd_cleanup(sighand);
/*
* sighand_cachep is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU so we can free it
* without an RCU grace period, see __lock_task_sighand().
*/
kmem_cache_free(sighand_cachep, sighand);
epoll: introduce POLLFREE to flush ->signalfd_wqh before kfree() This patch is intentionally incomplete to simplify the review. It ignores ep_unregister_pollwait() which plays with the same wqh. See the next change. epoll assumes that the EPOLL_CTL_ADD'ed file controls everything f_op->poll() needs. In particular it assumes that the wait queue can't go away until eventpoll_release(). This is not true in case of signalfd, the task which does EPOLL_CTL_ADD uses its ->sighand which is not connected to the file. This patch adds the special event, POLLFREE, currently only for epoll. It expects that init_poll_funcptr()'ed hook should do the necessary cleanup. Perhaps it should be defined as EPOLLFREE in eventpoll. __cleanup_sighand() is changed to do wake_up_poll(POLLFREE) if ->signalfd_wqh is not empty, we add the new signalfd_cleanup() helper. ep_poll_callback(POLLFREE) simply does list_del_init(task_list). This make this poll entry inconsistent, but we don't care. If you share epoll fd which contains our sigfd with another process you should blame yourself. signalfd is "really special". I simply do not know how we can define the "right" semantics if it used with epoll. The main problem is, epoll calls signalfd_poll() once to establish the connection with the wait queue, after that signalfd_poll(NULL) returns the different/inconsistent results depending on who does EPOLL_CTL_MOD/signalfd_read/etc. IOW: apart from sigmask, signalfd has nothing to do with the file, it works with the current thread. In short: this patch is the hack which tries to fix the symptoms. It also assumes that nobody can take tasklist_lock under epoll locks, this seems to be true. Note: - we do not have wake_up_all_poll() but wake_up_poll() is fine, poll/epoll doesn't use WQ_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE. - signalfd_cleanup() uses POLLHUP along with POLLFREE, we need a couple of simple changes in eventpoll.c to make sure it can't be "lost". Reported-by: Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-02-25 02:07:11 +07:00
}
}
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang Overview This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code. The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse. Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at which point things degrade rather quickly. This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF." Code Changes This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single- or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function uses those fields to make its decisions. We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and scheduler times and use these in appropriate places: struct task_cputime { cputime_t utime; cputime_t stime; unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime; }; This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer: struct thread_group_cputime { struct task_cputime totals; }; struct thread_group_cputime { struct task_cputime *totals; }; We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr(). We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init() function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task. The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free() function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields; in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and, if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure. Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further. The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal(). It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from cleanup_signal(). All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated. Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting. With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest expiration; this is checked in the fast path. Performance The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those two cases. I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system. Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system, all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many voluntary context switches with the fix as without it. Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023 seconds per tick). Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel. With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus 5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel. Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits. Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results were essentially the same with no itimer running. Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds (where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running, the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise, performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases. In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below. On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720 for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of 0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this test computed the primes up to 25,000,000. I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at 1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of 629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix. Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-09-12 23:54:39 +07:00
/*
* Initialize POSIX timer handling for a thread group.
*/
static void posix_cpu_timers_init_group(struct signal_struct *sig)
{
struct posix_cputimers *pct = &sig->posix_cputimers;
unsigned long cpu_limit;
cpu_limit = READ_ONCE(sig->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur);
posix_cputimers_group_init(pct, cpu_limit);
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang Overview This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code. The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse. Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at which point things degrade rather quickly. This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF." Code Changes This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single- or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function uses those fields to make its decisions. We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and scheduler times and use these in appropriate places: struct task_cputime { cputime_t utime; cputime_t stime; unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime; }; This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer: struct thread_group_cputime { struct task_cputime totals; }; struct thread_group_cputime { struct task_cputime *totals; }; We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr(). We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init() function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task. The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free() function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields; in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and, if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure. Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further. The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal(). It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from cleanup_signal(). All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated. Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting. With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest expiration; this is checked in the fast path. Performance The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those two cases. I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system. Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system, all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many voluntary context switches with the fix as without it. Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023 seconds per tick). Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel. With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus 5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel. Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits. Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results were essentially the same with no itimer running. Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds (where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running, the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise, performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases. In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below. On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720 for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of 0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this test computed the primes up to 25,000,000. I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at 1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of 629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix. Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-09-12 23:54:39 +07:00
}
static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct signal_struct *sig;
clone(): fix race between copy_process() and de_thread() Spotted by Hiroshi Shimamoto who also provided the test-case below. copy_process() uses signal->count as a reference counter, but it is not. This test case #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <pthread.h> void *null_thread(void *p) { for (;;) sleep(1); return NULL; } void *exec_thread(void *p) { execl("/bin/true", "/bin/true", NULL); return null_thread(p); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { for (;;) { pid_t pid; int ret, status; pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) break; if (!pid) { pthread_t tid; pthread_create(&tid, NULL, exec_thread, NULL); for (;;) pthread_create(&tid, NULL, null_thread, NULL); } do { ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0); } while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR); } return 0; } quickly creates an unkillable task. If copy_process(CLONE_THREAD) races with de_thread() copy_signal()->atomic(signal->count) breaks the signal->notify_count logic, and the execing thread can hang forever in kernel space. Change copy_process() to increment count/live only when we know for sure we can't fail. In this case the forked thread will take care of its reference to signal correctly. If copy_process() fails, check CLONE_THREAD flag. If it it set - do nothing, the counters were not changed and current belongs to the same thread group. If it is not set, ->signal must be released in any case (and ->count must be == 1), the forked child is the only thread in the thread group. We need more cleanups here, in particular signal->count should not be used by de_thread/__exit_signal at all. This patch only fixes the bug. Reported-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com> Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-08-27 04:29:24 +07:00
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
return 0;
sig = kmem_cache_zalloc(signal_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
tsk->signal = sig;
if (!sig)
return -ENOMEM;
sig->nr_threads = 1;
atomic_set(&sig->live, 1);
sched/core: Convert signal_struct.sigcnt to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable signal_struct.sigcnt is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. ** Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the signal_struct.sigcnt it might make a difference in following places: - put_signal_struct(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547814450-18902-3-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-01-18 19:27:27 +07:00
refcount_set(&sig->sigcnt, 1);
introduce for_each_thread() to replace the buggy while_each_thread() while_each_thread() and next_thread() should die, almost every lockless usage is wrong. 1. Unless g == current, the lockless while_each_thread() is not safe. while_each_thread(g, t) can loop forever if g exits, next_thread() can't reach the unhashed thread in this case. Note that this can happen even if g is the group leader, it can exec. 2. Even if while_each_thread() itself was correct, people often use it wrongly. It was never safe to just take rcu_read_lock() and loop unless you verify that pid_alive(g) == T, even the first next_thread() can point to the already freed/reused memory. This patch adds signal_struct->thread_head and task->thread_node to create the normal rcu-safe list with the stable head. The new for_each_thread(g, t) helper is always safe under rcu_read_lock() as long as this task_struct can't go away. Note: of course it is ugly to have both task_struct->thread_node and the old task_struct->thread_group, we will kill it later, after we change the users of while_each_thread() to use for_each_thread(). Perhaps we can kill it even before we convert all users, we can reimplement next_thread(t) using the new thread_head/thread_node. But we can't do this right now because this will lead to subtle behavioural changes. For example, do/while_each_thread() always sees at least one task, while for_each_thread() can do nothing if the whole thread group has died. Or thread_group_empty(), currently its semantics is not clear unless thread_group_leader(p) and we need to audit the callers before we can change it. So this patch adds the new interface which has to coexist with the old one for some time, hopefully the next changes will be more or less straightforward and the old one will go away soon. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org> Cc: "Ma, Xindong" <xindong.ma@intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: "Tu, Xiaobing" <xiaobing.tu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-01-22 06:49:56 +07:00
/* list_add(thread_node, thread_head) without INIT_LIST_HEAD() */
sig->thread_head = (struct list_head)LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk->thread_node);
tsk->thread_node = (struct list_head)LIST_HEAD_INIT(sig->thread_head);
init_waitqueue_head(&sig->wait_chldexit);
sig->curr_target = tsk;
init_sigpending(&sig->shared_pending);
signal: Don't restart fork when signals come in. Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> and majiang <ma.jiang@zte.com.cn> report that a periodic signal received during fork can cause fork to continually restart preventing an application from making progress. The code was being overly pessimistic. Fork needs to guarantee that a signal sent to multiple processes is logically delivered before the fork and just to the forking process or logically delivered after the fork to both the forking process and it's newly spawned child. For signals like periodic timers that are always delivered to a single process fork can safely complete and let them appear to logically delivered after the fork(). While examining this issue I also discovered that fork today will miss signals delivered to multiple processes during the fork and handled by another thread. Similarly the current code will also miss blocked signals that are delivered to multiple process, as those signals will not appear pending during fork. Add a list of each thread that is currently forking, and keep on that list a signal set that records all of the signals sent to multiple processes. When fork completes initialize the new processes shared_pending signal set with it. The calculate_sigpending function will see those signals and set TIF_SIGPENDING causing the new task to take the slow path to userspace to handle those signals. Making it appear as if those signals were received immediately after the fork. It is not possible to send real time signals to multiple processes and exceptions don't go to multiple processes, which means that that are no signals sent to multiple processes that require siginfo. This means it is safe to not bother collecting siginfo on signals sent during fork. The sigaction of a child of fork is initially the same as the sigaction of the parent process. So a signal the parent ignores the child will also initially ignore. Therefore it is safe to ignore signals sent to multiple processes and ignored by the forking process. Signals sent to only a single process or only a single thread and delivered during fork are treated as if they are received after the fork, and generally not dealt with. They won't cause any problems. V2: Added removal from the multiprocess list on failure. V3: Use -ERESTARTNOINTR directly V4: - Don't queue both SIGCONT and SIGSTOP - Initialize signal_struct.multiprocess in init_task - Move setting of shared_pending to before the new task is visible to signals. This prevents signals from comming in before shared_pending.signal is set to delayed.signal and being lost. V5: - rework list add and delete to account for idle threads v6: - Use sigdelsetmask when removing stop signals Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200447 Reported-by: Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> and Reported-by: majiang <ma.jiang@zte.com.cn> Fixes: 4a2c7a7837da ("[PATCH] make fork() atomic wrt pgrp/session signals") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-07-24 03:20:37 +07:00
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sig->multiprocess);
time, signal: Protect resource use statistics with seqlock Both times() and clock_gettime(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID) have scalability issues on large systems, due to both functions being serialized with a lock. The lock protects against reporting a wrong value, due to a thread in the task group exiting, its statistics reporting up to the signal struct, and that exited task's statistics being counted twice (or not at all). Protecting that with a lock results in times() and clock_gettime() being completely serialized on large systems. This can be fixed by using a seqlock around the events that gather and propagate statistics. As an additional benefit, the protection code can be moved into thread_group_cputime(), slightly simplifying the calling functions. In the case of posix_cpu_clock_get_task() things can be simplified a lot, because the calling function already ensures that the task sticks around, and the rest is now taken care of in thread_group_cputime(). This way the statistics reporting code can run lockless. Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dongsheng Yang <yangds.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guillaume Morin <guillaume@morinfr.org> Cc: Ionut Alexa <ionut.m.alexa@gmail.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com Cc: fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: srao@redhat.com Cc: lwoodman@redhat.com Cc: atheurer@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140816134010.26a9b572@annuminas.surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-08-17 00:40:10 +07:00
seqlock_init(&sig->stats_lock);
prev_cputime_init(&sig->prev_cputime);
#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sig->posix_timers);
hrtimer_init(&sig->real_timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
sig->real_timer.function = it_real_fn;
#endif
task_lock(current->group_leader);
memcpy(sig->rlim, current->signal->rlim, sizeof sig->rlim);
task_unlock(current->group_leader);
posix_cpu_timers_init_group(sig);
Audit: add TTY input auditing Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it necessary to audit TTY output as well. Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still work). TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly useless audit events. Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel. The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone). Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY. See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16 13:40:56 +07:00
tty_audit_fork(sig);
sched: Add 'autogroup' scheduling feature: automated per session task groups A recurring complaint from CFS users is that parallel kbuild has a negative impact on desktop interactivity. This patch implements an idea from Linus, to automatically create task groups. Currently, only per session autogroups are implemented, but the patch leaves the way open for enhancement. Implementation: each task's signal struct contains an inherited pointer to a refcounted autogroup struct containing a task group pointer, the default for all tasks pointing to the init_task_group. When a task calls setsid(), a new task group is created, the process is moved into the new task group, and a reference to the preveious task group is dropped. Child processes inherit this task group thereafter, and increase it's refcount. When the last thread of a process exits, the process's reference is dropped, such that when the last process referencing an autogroup exits, the autogroup is destroyed. At runqueue selection time, IFF a task has no cgroup assignment, its current autogroup is used. Autogroup bandwidth is controllable via setting it's nice level through the proc filesystem: cat /proc/<pid>/autogroup Displays the task's group and the group's nice level. echo <nice level> > /proc/<pid>/autogroup Sets the task group's shares to the weight of nice <level> task. Setting nice level is rate limited for !admin users due to the abuse risk of task group locking. The feature is enabled from boot by default if CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP=y is selected, but can be disabled via the boot option noautogroup, and can also be turned on/off on the fly via: echo [01] > /proc/sys/kernel/sched_autogroup_enabled ... which will automatically move tasks to/from the root task group. Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> [ Removed the task_group_path() debug code, and fixed !EVENTFD build failure. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> LKML-Reference: <1290281700.28711.9.camel@maggy.simson.net> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-11-30 20:18:03 +07:00
sched_autogroup_fork(sig);
Audit: add TTY input auditing Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it necessary to audit TTY output as well. Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still work). TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly useless audit events. Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel. The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone). Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY. See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16 13:40:56 +07:00
oom: badness heuristic rewrite This a complete rewrite of the oom killer's badness() heuristic which is used to determine which task to kill in oom conditions. The goal is to make it as simple and predictable as possible so the results are better understood and we end up killing the task which will lead to the most memory freeing while still respecting the fine-tuning from userspace. Instead of basing the heuristic on mm->total_vm for each task, the task's rss and swap space is used instead. This is a better indication of the amount of memory that will be freeable if the oom killed task is chosen and subsequently exits. This helps specifically in cases where KDE or GNOME is chosen for oom kill on desktop systems instead of a memory hogging task. The baseline for the heuristic is a proportion of memory that each task is currently using in memory plus swap compared to the amount of "allowable" memory. "Allowable," in this sense, means the system-wide resources for unconstrained oom conditions, the set of mempolicy nodes, the mems attached to current's cpuset, or a memory controller's limit. The proportion is given on a scale of 0 (never kill) to 1000 (always kill), roughly meaning that if a task has a badness() score of 500 that the task consumes approximately 50% of allowable memory resident in RAM or in swap space. The proportion is always relative to the amount of "allowable" memory and not the total amount of RAM systemwide so that mempolicies and cpusets may operate in isolation; they shall not need to know the true size of the machine on which they are running if they are bound to a specific set of nodes or mems, respectively. Root tasks are given 3% extra memory just like __vm_enough_memory() provides in LSMs. In the event of two tasks consuming similar amounts of memory, it is generally better to save root's task. Because of the change in the badness() heuristic's baseline, it is also necessary to introduce a new user interface to tune it. It's not possible to redefine the meaning of /proc/pid/oom_adj with a new scale since the ABI cannot be changed for backward compatability. Instead, a new tunable, /proc/pid/oom_score_adj, is added that ranges from -1000 to +1000. It may be used to polarize the heuristic such that certain tasks are never considered for oom kill while others may always be considered. The value is added directly into the badness() score so a value of -500, for example, means to discount 50% of its memory consumption in comparison to other tasks either on the system, bound to the mempolicy, in the cpuset, or sharing the same memory controller. /proc/pid/oom_adj is changed so that its meaning is rescaled into the units used by /proc/pid/oom_score_adj, and vice versa. Changing one of these per-task tunables will rescale the value of the other to an equivalent meaning. Although /proc/pid/oom_adj was originally defined as a bitshift on the badness score, it now shares the same linear growth as /proc/pid/oom_score_adj but with different granularity. This is required so the ABI is not broken with userspace applications and allows oom_adj to be deprecated for future removal. Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-08-10 07:19:46 +07:00
sig->oom_score_adj = current->signal->oom_score_adj;
sig->oom_score_adj_min = current->signal->oom_score_adj_min;
oom: move oom_adj value from task_struct to signal_struct Currently, OOM logic callflow is here. __out_of_memory() select_bad_process() for each task badness() calculate badness of one task oom_kill_process() search child oom_kill_task() kill target task and mm shared tasks with it example, process-A have two thread, thread-A and thread-B and it have very fat memory and each thread have following oom_adj and oom_score. thread-A: oom_adj = OOM_DISABLE, oom_score = 0 thread-B: oom_adj = 0, oom_score = very-high Then, select_bad_process() select thread-B, but oom_kill_task() refuse kill the task because thread-A have OOM_DISABLE. Thus __out_of_memory() call select_bad_process() again. but select_bad_process() select the same task. It mean kernel fall in livelock. The fact is, select_bad_process() must select killable task. otherwise OOM logic go into livelock. And root cause is, oom_adj shouldn't be per-thread value. it should be per-process value because OOM-killer kill a process, not thread. Thus This patch moves oomkilladj (now more appropriately named oom_adj) from struct task_struct to struct signal_struct. it naturally prevent select_bad_process() choose wrong task. Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-22 07:03:13 +07:00
mutex_init(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
return 0;
}
static void copy_seccomp(struct task_struct *p)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
/*
* Must be called with sighand->lock held, which is common to
* all threads in the group. Holding cred_guard_mutex is not
* needed because this new task is not yet running and cannot
* be racing exec.
*/
assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);
/* Ref-count the new filter user, and assign it. */
get_seccomp_filter(current);
p->seccomp = current->seccomp;
/*
* Explicitly enable no_new_privs here in case it got set
* between the task_struct being duplicated and holding the
* sighand lock. The seccomp state and nnp must be in sync.
*/
if (task_no_new_privs(current))
task_set_no_new_privs(p);
/*
* If the parent gained a seccomp mode after copying thread
* flags and between before we held the sighand lock, we have
* to manually enable the seccomp thread flag here.
*/
if (p->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
set_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SECCOMP);
#endif
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(set_tid_address, int __user *, tidptr)
{
current->clear_child_tid = tidptr;
return task_pid_vnr(current);
}
static void rt_mutex_init_task(struct task_struct *p)
{
raw_spin_lock_init(&p->pi_lock);
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES
p->pi_waiters = RB_ROOT_CACHED;
sched/rtmutex/deadline: Fix a PI crash for deadline tasks A crash happened while I was playing with deadline PI rtmutex. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 IP: [<ffffffff810eeb8f>] rt_mutex_get_top_task+0x1f/0x30 PGD 232a75067 PUD 230947067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 10994 Comm: a.out Not tainted Call Trace: [<ffffffff810b658c>] enqueue_task+0x2c/0x80 [<ffffffff810ba763>] activate_task+0x23/0x30 [<ffffffff810d0ab5>] pull_dl_task+0x1d5/0x260 [<ffffffff810d0be6>] pre_schedule_dl+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff8164e783>] __schedule+0xd3/0x900 [<ffffffff8164efd9>] schedule+0x29/0x70 [<ffffffff8165035b>] __rt_mutex_slowlock+0x4b/0xc0 [<ffffffff81650501>] rt_mutex_slowlock+0xd1/0x190 [<ffffffff810eeb33>] rt_mutex_timed_lock+0x53/0x60 [<ffffffff810ecbfc>] futex_lock_pi.isra.18+0x28c/0x390 [<ffffffff810ed8b0>] do_futex+0x190/0x5b0 [<ffffffff810edd50>] SyS_futex+0x80/0x180 This is because rt_mutex_enqueue_pi() and rt_mutex_dequeue_pi() are only protected by pi_lock when operating pi waiters, while rt_mutex_get_top_task(), will access them with rq lock held but not holding pi_lock. In order to tackle it, we introduce new "pi_top_task" pointer cached in task_struct, and add new rt_mutex_update_top_task() to update its value, it can be called by rt_mutex_setprio() which held both owner's pi_lock and rq lock. Thus "pi_top_task" can be safely accessed by enqueue_task_dl() under rq lock. Originally-From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com Cc: bristot@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170323150216.157682758@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-23 21:56:08 +07:00
p->pi_top_task = NULL;
p->pi_blocked_on = NULL;
#endif
}
static inline void init_task_pid_links(struct task_struct *task)
{
enum pid_type type;
for (type = PIDTYPE_PID; type < PIDTYPE_MAX; ++type) {
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&task->pid_links[type]);
}
}
static inline void
init_task_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type, struct pid *pid)
{
if (type == PIDTYPE_PID)
task->thread_pid = pid;
else
task->signal->pids[type] = pid;
}
static inline void rcu_copy_process(struct task_struct *p)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU
p->rcu_read_lock_nesting = 0;
p->rcu_read_unlock_special.s = 0;
p->rcu_blocked_node = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->rcu_node_entry);
#endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU */
#ifdef CONFIG_TASKS_RCU
p->rcu_tasks_holdout = false;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->rcu_tasks_holdout_list);
p->rcu_tasks_idle_cpu = -1;
#endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_TASKS_RCU */
}
pidfd: add P_PIDFD to waitid() This adds the P_PIDFD type to waitid(). One of the last remaining bits for the pidfd api is to make it possible to wait on pidfds. With P_PIDFD added to waitid() the parts of userspace that want to use the pidfd api to exclusively manage processes can do so now. One of the things this will unblock in the future is the ability to make it possible to retrieve the exit status via waitid(P_PIDFD) for non-parent processes if handed a _suitable_ pidfd that has this feature set. This is similar to what you can do on FreeBSD with kqueue(). It might even end up being possible to wait on a process as a non-parent if an appropriate property is enabled on the pidfd. With P_PIDFD no scoping of the process identified by the pidfd is possible, i.e. it explicitly blocks things such as wait4(-1), wait4(0), waitid(P_ALL), waitid(P_PGID) etc. It only allows for semantics equivalent to wait4(pid), waitid(P_PID). Users that need scoping should rely on pid-based wait*() syscalls for now. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190727222229.6516-2-christian@brauner.io
2019-07-28 05:22:29 +07:00
struct pid *pidfd_pid(const struct file *file)
{
if (file->f_op == &pidfd_fops)
return file->private_data;
return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
}
clone: add CLONE_PIDFD This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call. As spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left. CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new mount api. They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids. Logically, this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending). Thus, a pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege. This does not imply it cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case. A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d". As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the parent_tidptr argument of clone. This has the advantage that we can give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time. To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process metadata through /proc/<pid>. The sample program can easily be translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-27 19:04:15 +07:00
static int pidfd_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct pid *pid = file->private_data;
file->private_data = NULL;
put_pid(pid);
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
static void pidfd_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *f)
{
struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(m->file));
struct pid *pid = f->private_data;
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "Pid:\t", pid_nr_ns(pid, ns));
seq_putc(m, '\n');
}
#endif
pidfd: add polling support This patch adds polling support to pidfd. Android low memory killer (LMK) needs to know when a process dies once it is sent the kill signal. It does so by checking for the existence of /proc/pid which is both racy and slow. For example, if a PID is reused between when LMK sends a kill signal and checks for existence of the PID, since the wrong PID is now possibly checked for existence. Using the polling support, LMK will be able to get notified when a process exists in race-free and fast way, and allows the LMK to do other things (such as by polling on other fds) while awaiting the process being killed to die. For notification to polling processes, we follow the same existing mechanism in the kernel used when the parent of the task group is to be notified of a child's death (do_notify_parent). This is precisely when the tasks waiting on a poll of pidfd are also awakened in this patch. We have decided to include the waitqueue in struct pid for the following reasons: 1. The wait queue has to survive for the lifetime of the poll. Including it in task_struct would not be option in this case because the task can be reaped and destroyed before the poll returns. 2. By including the struct pid for the waitqueue means that during de_thread(), the new thread group leader automatically gets the new waitqueue/pid even though its task_struct is different. Appropriate test cases are added in the second patch to provide coverage of all the cases the patch is handling. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Kowalski <bl0pbl33p@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: kernel-team@android.com Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Co-developed-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
2019-04-30 23:21:53 +07:00
/*
* Poll support for process exit notification.
*/
static unsigned int pidfd_poll(struct file *file, struct poll_table_struct *pts)
{
struct task_struct *task;
struct pid *pid = file->private_data;
int poll_flags = 0;
poll_wait(file, &pid->wait_pidfd, pts);
rcu_read_lock();
task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
/*
* Inform pollers only when the whole thread group exits.
* If the thread group leader exits before all other threads in the
* group, then poll(2) should block, similar to the wait(2) family.
*/
if (!task || (task->exit_state && thread_group_empty(task)))
poll_flags = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
rcu_read_unlock();
return poll_flags;
}
clone: add CLONE_PIDFD This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call. As spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left. CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new mount api. They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids. Logically, this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending). Thus, a pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege. This does not imply it cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case. A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d". As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the parent_tidptr argument of clone. This has the advantage that we can give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time. To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process metadata through /proc/<pid>. The sample program can easily be translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-27 19:04:15 +07:00
const struct file_operations pidfd_fops = {
.release = pidfd_release,
pidfd: add polling support This patch adds polling support to pidfd. Android low memory killer (LMK) needs to know when a process dies once it is sent the kill signal. It does so by checking for the existence of /proc/pid which is both racy and slow. For example, if a PID is reused between when LMK sends a kill signal and checks for existence of the PID, since the wrong PID is now possibly checked for existence. Using the polling support, LMK will be able to get notified when a process exists in race-free and fast way, and allows the LMK to do other things (such as by polling on other fds) while awaiting the process being killed to die. For notification to polling processes, we follow the same existing mechanism in the kernel used when the parent of the task group is to be notified of a child's death (do_notify_parent). This is precisely when the tasks waiting on a poll of pidfd are also awakened in this patch. We have decided to include the waitqueue in struct pid for the following reasons: 1. The wait queue has to survive for the lifetime of the poll. Including it in task_struct would not be option in this case because the task can be reaped and destroyed before the poll returns. 2. By including the struct pid for the waitqueue means that during de_thread(), the new thread group leader automatically gets the new waitqueue/pid even though its task_struct is different. Appropriate test cases are added in the second patch to provide coverage of all the cases the patch is handling. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Kowalski <bl0pbl33p@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: kernel-team@android.com Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Co-developed-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
2019-04-30 23:21:53 +07:00
.poll = pidfd_poll,
clone: add CLONE_PIDFD This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call. As spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left. CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new mount api. They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids. Logically, this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending). Thus, a pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege. This does not imply it cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case. A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d". As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the parent_tidptr argument of clone. This has the advantage that we can give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time. To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process metadata through /proc/<pid>. The sample program can easily be translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-27 19:04:15 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
.show_fdinfo = pidfd_show_fdinfo,
#endif
};
userfaultfd: use RCU to free the task struct when fork fails The task structure is freed while get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() holds rcu_read_lock() and dereferences mm->owner. get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() failing fork() ---- --- task = mm->owner mm->owner = NULL; free(task) if (task) *task; /* use after free */ The fix consists in freeing the task with RCU also in the fork failure case, exactly like it always happens for the regular exit(2) path. That is enough to make the rcu_read_lock hold in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() (left side above) effective to avoid a use after free when dereferencing the task structure. An alternate possible fix would be to defer the delivery of the userfaultfd contexts to the monitor until after fork() is guaranteed to succeed. Such a change would require more changes because it would create a strict ordering dependency where the uffd methods would need to be called beyond the last potentially failing branch in order to be safe. This solution as opposed only adds the dependency to common code to set mm->owner to NULL and to free the task struct that was pointed by mm->owner with RCU, if fork ends up failing. The userfaultfd methods can still be called anywhere during the fork runtime and the monitor will keep discarding orphaned "mm" coming from failed forks in userland. This race condition couldn't trigger if CONFIG_MEMCG was set =n at build time. [aarcange@redhat.com: improve changelog, reduce #ifdefs per Michal] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190429035752.4508-1-aarcange@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325225636.11635-2-aarcange@redhat.com Fixes: 893e26e61d04 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event") Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Tested-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Reported-by: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Cc: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-15 05:40:46 +07:00
static void __delayed_free_task(struct rcu_head *rhp)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = container_of(rhp, struct task_struct, rcu);
free_task(tsk);
}
static __always_inline void delayed_free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MEMCG))
call_rcu(&tsk->rcu, __delayed_free_task);
else
free_task(tsk);
}
/*
* This creates a new process as a copy of the old one,
* but does not actually start it yet.
*
* It copies the registers, and all the appropriate
* parts of the process environment (as per the clone
* flags). The actual kick-off is left to the caller.
*/
static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
struct pid *pid,
clone: support passing tls argument via C rather than pt_regs magic clone has some of the quirkiest syscall handling in the kernel, with a pile of special cases, historical curiosities, and architecture-specific calling conventions. In particular, clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts a parameter "tls" that the C entry point completely ignores and some assembly entry points overwrite; instead, the low-level arch-specific code pulls the tls parameter out of the arch-specific register captured as part of pt_regs on entry to the kernel. That's a massive hack, and it makes the arch-specific code only work when called via the specific existing syscall entry points; because of this hack, any new clone-like system call would have to accept an identical tls argument in exactly the same arch-specific position, rather than providing a unified system call entry point across architectures. The first patch allows architectures to handle the tls argument via normal C parameter passing, if they opt in by selecting HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. The second patch makes 32-bit and 64-bit x86 opt into this. These two patches came out of the clone4 series, which isn't ready for this merge window, but these first two cleanup patches were entirely uncontroversial and have acks. I'd like to go ahead and submit these two so that other architectures can begin building on top of this and opting into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. However, I'm also happy to wait and send these through the next merge window (along with v3 of clone4) if anyone would prefer that. This patch (of 2): clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts an argument to set the thread-local storage area for the new thread. sys_clone declares an int argument tls_val in the appropriate point in the argument list (based on the various CLONE_BACKWARDS variants), but doesn't actually use or pass along that argument. Instead, sys_clone calls do_fork, which calls copy_process, which calls the arch-specific copy_thread, and copy_thread pulls the corresponding syscall argument out of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry (knowing what argument of clone that architecture passes tls in). Apart from being awful and inscrutable, that also only works because only one code path into copy_thread can pass the CLONE_SETTLS flag, and that code path comes from sys_clone with its architecture-specific argument-passing order. This prevents introducing a new version of the clone system call without propagating the same architecture-specific position of the tls argument. However, there's no reason to pull the argument out of pt_regs when sys_clone could just pass it down via C function call arguments. Introduce a new CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS for architectures to opt into, and a new copy_thread_tls that accepts the tls parameter as an additional unsigned long (syscall-argument-sized) argument. Change sys_clone's tls argument to an unsigned long (which does not change the ABI), and pass that down to copy_thread_tls. Architectures that don't opt into copy_thread_tls will continue to ignore the C argument to sys_clone in favor of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry, and thus will be unable to introduce new versions of the clone syscall. Patch co-authored by Josh Triplett and Thiago Macieira. Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-26 05:01:19 +07:00
int trace,
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
int node,
struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
clone: add CLONE_PIDFD This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call. As spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left. CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new mount api. They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids. Logically, this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending). Thus, a pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege. This does not imply it cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case. A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d". As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the parent_tidptr argument of clone. This has the advantage that we can give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time. To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process metadata through /proc/<pid>. The sample program can easily be translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-27 19:04:15 +07:00
int pidfd = -1, retval;
struct task_struct *p;
signal: Don't restart fork when signals come in. Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> and majiang <ma.jiang@zte.com.cn> report that a periodic signal received during fork can cause fork to continually restart preventing an application from making progress. The code was being overly pessimistic. Fork needs to guarantee that a signal sent to multiple processes is logically delivered before the fork and just to the forking process or logically delivered after the fork to both the forking process and it's newly spawned child. For signals like periodic timers that are always delivered to a single process fork can safely complete and let them appear to logically delivered after the fork(). While examining this issue I also discovered that fork today will miss signals delivered to multiple processes during the fork and handled by another thread. Similarly the current code will also miss blocked signals that are delivered to multiple process, as those signals will not appear pending during fork. Add a list of each thread that is currently forking, and keep on that list a signal set that records all of the signals sent to multiple processes. When fork completes initialize the new processes shared_pending signal set with it. The calculate_sigpending function will see those signals and set TIF_SIGPENDING causing the new task to take the slow path to userspace to handle those signals. Making it appear as if those signals were received immediately after the fork. It is not possible to send real time signals to multiple processes and exceptions don't go to multiple processes, which means that that are no signals sent to multiple processes that require siginfo. This means it is safe to not bother collecting siginfo on signals sent during fork. The sigaction of a child of fork is initially the same as the sigaction of the parent process. So a signal the parent ignores the child will also initially ignore. Therefore it is safe to ignore signals sent to multiple processes and ignored by the forking process. Signals sent to only a single process or only a single thread and delivered during fork are treated as if they are received after the fork, and generally not dealt with. They won't cause any problems. V2: Added removal from the multiprocess list on failure. V3: Use -ERESTARTNOINTR directly V4: - Don't queue both SIGCONT and SIGSTOP - Initialize signal_struct.multiprocess in init_task - Move setting of shared_pending to before the new task is visible to signals. This prevents signals from comming in before shared_pending.signal is set to delayed.signal and being lost. V5: - rework list add and delete to account for idle threads v6: - Use sigdelsetmask when removing stop signals Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200447 Reported-by: Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> and Reported-by: majiang <ma.jiang@zte.com.cn> Fixes: 4a2c7a7837da ("[PATCH] make fork() atomic wrt pgrp/session signals") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-07-24 03:20:37 +07:00
struct multiprocess_signals delayed;
struct file *pidfile = NULL;
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
/*
* Don't allow sharing the root directory with processes in a different
* namespace
*/
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
* can only be started up within the thread group.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Shared signal handlers imply shared VM. By way of the above,
* thread groups also imply shared VM. Blocking this case allows
* for various simplifications in other code.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_VM))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Siblings of global init remain as zombies on exit since they are
* not reaped by their parent (swapper). To solve this and to avoid
* multi-rooted process trees, prevent global and container-inits
* from creating siblings.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT) &&
current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* If the new process will be in a different pid or user namespace
* do not allow it to share a thread group with the forking task.
*/
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) {
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWPID)) ||
(task_active_pid_ns(current) !=
current->nsproxy->pid_ns_for_children))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
clone: add CLONE_PIDFD This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call. As spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left. CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new mount api. They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids. Logically, this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending). Thus, a pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege. This does not imply it cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case. A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d". As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the parent_tidptr argument of clone. This has the advantage that we can give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time. To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process metadata through /proc/<pid>. The sample program can easily be translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-27 19:04:15 +07:00
if (clone_flags & CLONE_PIDFD) {
/*
* - CLONE_DETACHED is blocked so that we can potentially
* reuse it later for CLONE_PIDFD.
* - CLONE_THREAD is blocked until someone really needs it.
*/
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
if (clone_flags & (CLONE_DETACHED | CLONE_THREAD))
clone: add CLONE_PIDFD This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call. As spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left. CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new mount api. They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids. Logically, this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending). Thus, a pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege. This does not imply it cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case. A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d". As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the parent_tidptr argument of clone. This has the advantage that we can give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time. To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process metadata through /proc/<pid>. The sample program can easily be translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-27 19:04:15 +07:00
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
signal: Don't restart fork when signals come in. Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> and majiang <ma.jiang@zte.com.cn> report that a periodic signal received during fork can cause fork to continually restart preventing an application from making progress. The code was being overly pessimistic. Fork needs to guarantee that a signal sent to multiple processes is logically delivered before the fork and just to the forking process or logically delivered after the fork to both the forking process and it's newly spawned child. For signals like periodic timers that are always delivered to a single process fork can safely complete and let them appear to logically delivered after the fork(). While examining this issue I also discovered that fork today will miss signals delivered to multiple processes during the fork and handled by another thread. Similarly the current code will also miss blocked signals that are delivered to multiple process, as those signals will not appear pending during fork. Add a list of each thread that is currently forking, and keep on that list a signal set that records all of the signals sent to multiple processes. When fork completes initialize the new processes shared_pending signal set with it. The calculate_sigpending function will see those signals and set TIF_SIGPENDING causing the new task to take the slow path to userspace to handle those signals. Making it appear as if those signals were received immediately after the fork. It is not possible to send real time signals to multiple processes and exceptions don't go to multiple processes, which means that that are no signals sent to multiple processes that require siginfo. This means it is safe to not bother collecting siginfo on signals sent during fork. The sigaction of a child of fork is initially the same as the sigaction of the parent process. So a signal the parent ignores the child will also initially ignore. Therefore it is safe to ignore signals sent to multiple processes and ignored by the forking process. Signals sent to only a single process or only a single thread and delivered during fork are treated as if they are received after the fork, and generally not dealt with. They won't cause any problems. V2: Added removal from the multiprocess list on failure. V3: Use -ERESTARTNOINTR directly V4: - Don't queue both SIGCONT and SIGSTOP - Initialize signal_struct.multiprocess in init_task - Move setting of shared_pending to before the new task is visible to signals. This prevents signals from comming in before shared_pending.signal is set to delayed.signal and being lost. V5: - rework list add and delete to account for idle threads v6: - Use sigdelsetmask when removing stop signals Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200447 Reported-by: Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> and Reported-by: majiang <ma.jiang@zte.com.cn> Fixes: 4a2c7a7837da ("[PATCH] make fork() atomic wrt pgrp/session signals") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-07-24 03:20:37 +07:00
/*
* Force any signals received before this point to be delivered
* before the fork happens. Collect up signals sent to multiple
* processes that happen during the fork and delay them so that
* they appear to happen after the fork.
*/
sigemptyset(&delayed.signal);
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&delayed.node);
spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD))
hlist_add_head(&delayed.node, &current->signal->multiprocess);
recalc_sigpending();
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
if (signal_pending(current))
goto fork_out;
retval = -ENOMEM;
p = dup_task_struct(current, node);
if (!p)
goto fork_out;
kthread: Fix use-after-free if kthread fork fails If a kthread forks (e.g. usermodehelper since commit 1da5c46fa965) but fails in copy_process() between calling dup_task_struct() and setting p->set_child_tid, then the value of p->set_child_tid will be inherited from the parent and get prematurely freed by free_kthread_struct(). kthread() - worker_thread() - process_one_work() | - call_usermodehelper_exec_work() | - kernel_thread() | - _do_fork() | - copy_process() | - dup_task_struct() | - arch_dup_task_struct() | - tsk->set_child_tid = current->set_child_tid // implied | - ... | - goto bad_fork_* | - ... | - free_task(tsk) | - free_kthread_struct(tsk) | - kfree(tsk->set_child_tid) - ... - schedule() - __schedule() - wq_worker_sleeping() - kthread_data(task)->flags // UAF The problem started showing up with commit 1da5c46fa965 since it reused ->set_child_tid for the kthread worker data. A better long-term solution might be to get rid of the ->set_child_tid abuse. The comment in set_kthread_struct() also looks slightly wrong. Debugged-by: Jamie Iles <jamie.iles@oracle.com> Fixes: 1da5c46fa965 ("kthread: Make struct kthread kmalloc'ed") Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jamie Iles <jamie.iles@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170509073959.17858-1-vegard.nossum@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-05-09 14:39:59 +07:00
/*
* This _must_ happen before we call free_task(), i.e. before we jump
* to any of the bad_fork_* labels. This is to avoid freeing
* p->set_child_tid which is (ab)used as a kthread's data pointer for
* kernel threads (PF_KTHREAD).
*/
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? args->child_tid : NULL;
kthread: Fix use-after-free if kthread fork fails If a kthread forks (e.g. usermodehelper since commit 1da5c46fa965) but fails in copy_process() between calling dup_task_struct() and setting p->set_child_tid, then the value of p->set_child_tid will be inherited from the parent and get prematurely freed by free_kthread_struct(). kthread() - worker_thread() - process_one_work() | - call_usermodehelper_exec_work() | - kernel_thread() | - _do_fork() | - copy_process() | - dup_task_struct() | - arch_dup_task_struct() | - tsk->set_child_tid = current->set_child_tid // implied | - ... | - goto bad_fork_* | - ... | - free_task(tsk) | - free_kthread_struct(tsk) | - kfree(tsk->set_child_tid) - ... - schedule() - __schedule() - wq_worker_sleeping() - kthread_data(task)->flags // UAF The problem started showing up with commit 1da5c46fa965 since it reused ->set_child_tid for the kthread worker data. A better long-term solution might be to get rid of the ->set_child_tid abuse. The comment in set_kthread_struct() also looks slightly wrong. Debugged-by: Jamie Iles <jamie.iles@oracle.com> Fixes: 1da5c46fa965 ("kthread: Make struct kthread kmalloc'ed") Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jamie Iles <jamie.iles@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170509073959.17858-1-vegard.nossum@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-05-09 14:39:59 +07:00
/*
* Clear TID on mm_release()?
*/
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
p->clear_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) ? args->child_tid : NULL;
kthread: Fix use-after-free if kthread fork fails If a kthread forks (e.g. usermodehelper since commit 1da5c46fa965) but fails in copy_process() between calling dup_task_struct() and setting p->set_child_tid, then the value of p->set_child_tid will be inherited from the parent and get prematurely freed by free_kthread_struct(). kthread() - worker_thread() - process_one_work() | - call_usermodehelper_exec_work() | - kernel_thread() | - _do_fork() | - copy_process() | - dup_task_struct() | - arch_dup_task_struct() | - tsk->set_child_tid = current->set_child_tid // implied | - ... | - goto bad_fork_* | - ... | - free_task(tsk) | - free_kthread_struct(tsk) | - kfree(tsk->set_child_tid) - ... - schedule() - __schedule() - wq_worker_sleeping() - kthread_data(task)->flags // UAF The problem started showing up with commit 1da5c46fa965 since it reused ->set_child_tid for the kthread worker data. A better long-term solution might be to get rid of the ->set_child_tid abuse. The comment in set_kthread_struct() also looks slightly wrong. Debugged-by: Jamie Iles <jamie.iles@oracle.com> Fixes: 1da5c46fa965 ("kthread: Make struct kthread kmalloc'ed") Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jamie Iles <jamie.iles@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170509073959.17858-1-vegard.nossum@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-05-09 14:39:59 +07:00
ftrace_graph_init_task(p);
rt_mutex_init_task(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled);
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
#endif
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (atomic_read(&p->real_cred->user->processes) >=
task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NPROC)) {
if (p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
goto bad_fork_free;
}
move RLIMIT_NPROC check from set_user() to do_execve_common() The patch http://lkml.org/lkml/2003/7/13/226 introduced an RLIMIT_NPROC check in set_user() to check for NPROC exceeding via setuid() and similar functions. Before the check there was a possibility to greatly exceed the allowed number of processes by an unprivileged user if the program relied on rlimit only. But the check created new security threat: many poorly written programs simply don't check setuid() return code and believe it cannot fail if executed with root privileges. So, the check is removed in this patch because of too often privilege escalations related to buggy programs. The NPROC can still be enforced in the common code flow of daemons spawning user processes. Most of daemons do fork()+setuid()+execve(). The check introduced in execve() (1) enforces the same limit as in setuid() and (2) doesn't create similar security issues. Neil Brown suggested to track what specific process has exceeded the limit by setting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED process flag. With the change only this process would fail on execve(), and other processes' execve() behaviour is not changed. Solar Designer suggested to re-check whether NPROC limit is still exceeded at the moment of execve(). If the process was sleeping for days between set*uid() and execve(), and the NPROC counter step down under the limit, the defered execve() failure because NPROC limit was exceeded days ago would be unexpected. If the limit is not exceeded anymore, we clear the flag on successful calls to execve() and fork(). The flag is also cleared on successful calls to set_user() as the limit was exceeded for the previous user, not the current one. Similar check was introduced in -ow patches (without the process flag). v3 - clear PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED on successful calls to set_user(). Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-08-08 22:02:04 +07:00
current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
retval = copy_creds(p, clone_flags);
if (retval < 0)
goto bad_fork_free;
/*
* If multiple threads are within copy_process(), then this check
* triggers too late. This doesn't hurt, the check is only there
* to stop root fork bombs.
*/
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (nr_threads >= max_threads)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
delayacct_tsk_init(p); /* Must remain after dup_task_struct() */
p->flags &= ~(PF_SUPERPRIV | PF_WQ_WORKER | PF_IDLE);
p->flags |= PF_FORKNOEXEC;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->children);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->sibling);
rcu: Merge preemptable-RCU functionality into hierarchical RCU Create a kernel/rcutree_plugin.h file that contains definitions for preemptable RCU (or, under the #else branch of the #ifdef, empty definitions for the classic non-preemptable semantics). These definitions fit into plugins defined in kernel/rcutree.c for this purpose. This variant of preemptable RCU uses a new algorithm whose read-side expense is roughly that of classic hierarchical RCU under CONFIG_PREEMPT. This new algorithm's update-side expense is similar to that of classic hierarchical RCU, and, in absence of read-side preemption or blocking, is exactly that of classic hierarchical RCU. Perhaps more important, this new algorithm has a much simpler implementation, saving well over 1,000 lines of code compared to mainline's implementation of preemptable RCU, which will hopefully be retired in favor of this new algorithm. The simplifications are obtained by maintaining per-task nesting state for running tasks, and using a simple lock-protected algorithm to handle accounting when tasks block within RCU read-side critical sections, making use of lessons learned while creating numerous user-level RCU implementations over the past 18 months. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: laijs@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: dipankar@in.ibm.com Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca Cc: josht@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: dvhltc@us.ibm.com Cc: niv@us.ibm.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org LKML-Reference: <12509746134003-git-send-email-> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-23 03:56:52 +07:00
rcu_copy_process(p);
p->vfork_done = NULL;
spin_lock_init(&p->alloc_lock);
init_sigpending(&p->pending);
p->utime = p->stime = p->gtime = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SCALED_CPUTIME
p->utimescaled = p->stimescaled = 0;
#endif
prev_cputime_init(&p->prev_cputime);
#ifdef CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN
seqcount_init(&p->vtime.seqcount);
p->vtime.starttime = 0;
p->vtime.state = VTIME_INACTIVE;
#endif
#if defined(SPLIT_RSS_COUNTING)
memset(&p->rss_stat, 0, sizeof(p->rss_stat));
#endif
p->default_timer_slack_ns = current->timer_slack_ns;
psi: pressure stall information for CPU, memory, and IO When systems are overcommitted and resources become contended, it's hard to tell exactly the impact this has on workload productivity, or how close the system is to lockups and OOM kills. In particular, when machines work multiple jobs concurrently, the impact of overcommit in terms of latency and throughput on the individual job can be enormous. In order to maximize hardware utilization without sacrificing individual job health or risk complete machine lockups, this patch implements a way to quantify resource pressure in the system. A kernel built with CONFIG_PSI=y creates files in /proc/pressure/ that expose the percentage of time the system is stalled on CPU, memory, or IO, respectively. Stall states are aggregate versions of the per-task delay accounting delays: cpu: some tasks are runnable but not executing on a CPU memory: tasks are reclaiming, or waiting for swapin or thrashing cache io: tasks are waiting for io completions These percentages of walltime can be thought of as pressure percentages, and they give a general sense of system health and productivity loss incurred by resource overcommit. They can also indicate when the system is approaching lockup scenarios and OOMs. To do this, psi keeps track of the task states associated with each CPU and samples the time they spend in stall states. Every 2 seconds, the samples are averaged across CPUs - weighted by the CPUs' non-idle time to eliminate artifacts from unused CPUs - and translated into percentages of walltime. A running average of those percentages is maintained over 10s, 1m, and 5m periods (similar to the loadaverage). [hannes@cmpxchg.org: doc fixlet, per Randy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828205625.GA14030@cmpxchg.org [hannes@cmpxchg.org: code optimization] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180907175015.GA8479@cmpxchg.org [hannes@cmpxchg.org: rename psi_clock() to psi_update_work(), per Peter] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180907145404.GB11088@cmpxchg.org [hannes@cmpxchg.org: fix build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180913014222.GA2370@cmpxchg.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828172258.3185-9-hannes@cmpxchg.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com> Tested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <jweiner@fb.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Vinayak Menon <vinmenon@codeaurora.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:06:27 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_PSI
p->psi_flags = 0;
#endif
task_io_accounting_init(&p->ioac);
acct_clear_integrals(p);
posix_cputimers_init(&p->posix_cputimers);
p->io_context = NULL;
audit_set_context(p, NULL);
cgroup_fork(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
p->mempolicy = mpol_dup(p->mempolicy);
if (IS_ERR(p->mempolicy)) {
retval = PTR_ERR(p->mempolicy);
p->mempolicy = NULL;
goto bad_fork_cleanup_threadgroup_lock;
}
#endif
cpusets: randomize node rotor used in cpuset_mem_spread_node() [ This patch has already been accepted as commit 0ac0c0d0f837 but later reverted (commit 35926ff5fba8) because it itroduced arch specific __node_random which was defined only for x86 code so it broke other archs. This is a followup without any arch specific code. Other than that there are no functional changes.] Some workloads that create a large number of small files tend to assign too many pages to node 0 (multi-node systems). Part of the reason is that the rotor (in cpuset_mem_spread_node()) used to assign nodes starts at node 0 for newly created tasks. This patch changes the rotor to be initialized to a random node number of the cpuset. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix layout] [Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com: Define stub numa_random() for !NUMA configuration] [mhocko@suse.cz: Make it arch independent] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_NUMA=y, MAX_NUMNODES>1 build] Signed-off-by: Jack Steiner <steiner@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Jack Steiner <steiner@sgi.com> Cc: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Jack Steiner <steiner@sgi.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Cc: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-27 06:08:30 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_CPUSETS
p->cpuset_mem_spread_rotor = NUMA_NO_NODE;
p->cpuset_slab_spread_rotor = NUMA_NO_NODE;
cpuset: mm: reduce large amounts of memory barrier related damage v3 Commit c0ff7453bb5c ("cpuset,mm: fix no node to alloc memory when changing cpuset's mems") wins a super prize for the largest number of memory barriers entered into fast paths for one commit. [get|put]_mems_allowed is incredibly heavy with pairs of full memory barriers inserted into a number of hot paths. This was detected while investigating at large page allocator slowdown introduced some time after 2.6.32. The largest portion of this overhead was shown by oprofile to be at an mfence introduced by this commit into the page allocator hot path. For extra style points, the commit introduced the use of yield() in an implementation of what looks like a spinning mutex. This patch replaces the full memory barriers on both read and write sides with a sequence counter with just read barriers on the fast path side. This is much cheaper on some architectures, including x86. The main bulk of the patch is the retry logic if the nodemask changes in a manner that can cause a false failure. While updating the nodemask, a check is made to see if a false failure is a risk. If it is, the sequence number gets bumped and parallel allocators will briefly stall while the nodemask update takes place. In a page fault test microbenchmark, oprofile samples from __alloc_pages_nodemask went from 4.53% of all samples to 1.15%. The actual results were 3.3.0-rc3 3.3.0-rc3 rc3-vanilla nobarrier-v2r1 Clients 1 UserTime 0.07 ( 0.00%) 0.08 (-14.19%) Clients 2 UserTime 0.07 ( 0.00%) 0.07 ( 2.72%) Clients 4 UserTime 0.08 ( 0.00%) 0.07 ( 3.29%) Clients 1 SysTime 0.70 ( 0.00%) 0.65 ( 6.65%) Clients 2 SysTime 0.85 ( 0.00%) 0.82 ( 3.65%) Clients 4 SysTime 1.41 ( 0.00%) 1.41 ( 0.32%) Clients 1 WallTime 0.77 ( 0.00%) 0.74 ( 4.19%) Clients 2 WallTime 0.47 ( 0.00%) 0.45 ( 3.73%) Clients 4 WallTime 0.38 ( 0.00%) 0.37 ( 1.58%) Clients 1 Flt/sec/cpu 497620.28 ( 0.00%) 520294.53 ( 4.56%) Clients 2 Flt/sec/cpu 414639.05 ( 0.00%) 429882.01 ( 3.68%) Clients 4 Flt/sec/cpu 257959.16 ( 0.00%) 258761.48 ( 0.31%) Clients 1 Flt/sec 495161.39 ( 0.00%) 517292.87 ( 4.47%) Clients 2 Flt/sec 820325.95 ( 0.00%) 850289.77 ( 3.65%) Clients 4 Flt/sec 1020068.93 ( 0.00%) 1022674.06 ( 0.26%) MMTests Statistics: duration Sys Time Running Test (seconds) 135.68 132.17 User+Sys Time Running Test (seconds) 164.2 160.13 Total Elapsed Time (seconds) 123.46 120.87 The overall improvement is small but the System CPU time is much improved and roughly in correlation to what oprofile reported (these performance figures are without profiling so skew is expected). The actual number of page faults is noticeably improved. For benchmarks like kernel builds, the overall benefit is marginal but the system CPU time is slightly reduced. To test the actual bug the commit fixed I opened two terminals. The first ran within a cpuset and continually ran a small program that faulted 100M of anonymous data. In a second window, the nodemask of the cpuset was continually randomised in a loop. Without the commit, the program would fail every so often (usually within 10 seconds) and obviously with the commit everything worked fine. With this patch applied, it also worked fine so the fix should be functionally equivalent. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-22 06:34:11 +07:00
seqcount_init(&p->mems_allowed_seq);
cpusets: randomize node rotor used in cpuset_mem_spread_node() [ This patch has already been accepted as commit 0ac0c0d0f837 but later reverted (commit 35926ff5fba8) because it itroduced arch specific __node_random which was defined only for x86 code so it broke other archs. This is a followup without any arch specific code. Other than that there are no functional changes.] Some workloads that create a large number of small files tend to assign too many pages to node 0 (multi-node systems). Part of the reason is that the rotor (in cpuset_mem_spread_node()) used to assign nodes starts at node 0 for newly created tasks. This patch changes the rotor to be initialized to a random node number of the cpuset. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix layout] [Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com: Define stub numa_random() for !NUMA configuration] [mhocko@suse.cz: Make it arch independent] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_NUMA=y, MAX_NUMNODES>1 build] Signed-off-by: Jack Steiner <steiner@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Jack Steiner <steiner@sgi.com> Cc: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Jack Steiner <steiner@sgi.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Cc: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-27 06:08:30 +07:00
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
p->irq_events = 0;
p->hardirqs_enabled = 0;
p->hardirq_enable_ip = 0;
p->hardirq_enable_event = 0;
p->hardirq_disable_ip = _THIS_IP_;
p->hardirq_disable_event = 0;
p->softirqs_enabled = 1;
p->softirq_enable_ip = _THIS_IP_;
p->softirq_enable_event = 0;
p->softirq_disable_ip = 0;
p->softirq_disable_event = 0;
p->hardirq_context = 0;
p->softirq_context = 0;
#endif
sched/preempt, mm/fault: Count pagefault_disable() levels in pagefault_disabled Until now, pagefault_disable()/pagefault_enabled() used the preempt count to track whether in an environment with pagefaults disabled (can be queried via in_atomic()). This patch introduces a separate counter in task_struct to count the level of pagefault_disable() calls. We'll keep manipulating the preempt count to retain compatibility to existing pagefault handlers. It is now possible to verify whether in a pagefault_disable() envionment by calling pagefault_disabled(). In contrast to in_atomic() it will not be influenced by preempt_enable()/preempt_disable(). This patch is based on a patch from Ingo Molnar. Reviewed-and-tested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David.Laight@ACULAB.COM Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: airlied@linux.ie Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de Cc: borntraeger@de.ibm.com Cc: daniel.vetter@intel.com Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Cc: hocko@suse.cz Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: mst@redhat.com Cc: paulus@samba.org Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com Cc: yang.shi@windriver.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1431359540-32227-2-git-send-email-dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-11 22:52:06 +07:00
p->pagefault_disabled = 0;
[PATCH] lockdep: core Do 'make oldconfig' and accept all the defaults for new config options - reboot into the kernel and if everything goes well it should boot up fine and you should have /proc/lockdep and /proc/lockdep_stats files. Typically if the lock validator finds some problem it will print out voluminous debug output that begins with "BUG: ..." and which syslog output can be used by kernel developers to figure out the precise locking scenario. What does the lock validator do? It "observes" and maps all locking rules as they occur dynamically (as triggered by the kernel's natural use of spinlocks, rwlocks, mutexes and rwsems). Whenever the lock validator subsystem detects a new locking scenario, it validates this new rule against the existing set of rules. If this new rule is consistent with the existing set of rules then the new rule is added transparently and the kernel continues as normal. If the new rule could create a deadlock scenario then this condition is printed out. When determining validity of locking, all possible "deadlock scenarios" are considered: assuming arbitrary number of CPUs, arbitrary irq context and task context constellations, running arbitrary combinations of all the existing locking scenarios. In a typical system this means millions of separate scenarios. This is why we call it a "locking correctness" validator - for all rules that are observed the lock validator proves it with mathematical certainty that a deadlock could not occur (assuming that the lock validator implementation itself is correct and its internal data structures are not corrupted by some other kernel subsystem). [see more details and conditionals of this statement in include/linux/lockdep.h and Documentation/lockdep-design.txt] Furthermore, this "all possible scenarios" property of the validator also enables the finding of complex, highly unlikely multi-CPU multi-context races via single single-context rules, increasing the likelyhood of finding bugs drastically. In practical terms: the lock validator already found a bug in the upstream kernel that could only occur on systems with 3 or more CPUs, and which needed 3 very unlikely code sequences to occur at once on the 3 CPUs. That bug was found and reported on a single-CPU system (!). So in essence a race will be found "piecemail-wise", triggering all the necessary components for the race, without having to reproduce the race scenario itself! In its short existence the lock validator found and reported many bugs before they actually caused a real deadlock. To further increase the efficiency of the validator, the mapping is not per "lock instance", but per "lock-class". For example, all struct inode objects in the kernel have inode->inotify_mutex. If there are 10,000 inodes cached, then there are 10,000 lock objects. But ->inotify_mutex is a single "lock type", and all locking activities that occur against ->inotify_mutex are "unified" into this single lock-class. The advantage of the lock-class approach is that all historical ->inotify_mutex uses are mapped into a single (and as narrow as possible) set of locking rules - regardless of how many different tasks or inode structures it took to build this set of rules. The set of rules persist during the lifetime of the kernel. To see the rough magnitude of checking that the lock validator does, here's a portion of /proc/lockdep_stats, fresh after bootup: lock-classes: 694 [max: 2048] direct dependencies: 1598 [max: 8192] indirect dependencies: 17896 all direct dependencies: 16206 dependency chains: 1910 [max: 8192] in-hardirq chains: 17 in-softirq chains: 105 in-process chains: 1065 stack-trace entries: 38761 [max: 131072] combined max dependencies: 2033928 hardirq-safe locks: 24 hardirq-unsafe locks: 176 softirq-safe locks: 53 softirq-unsafe locks: 137 irq-safe locks: 59 irq-unsafe locks: 176 The lock validator has observed 1598 actual single-thread locking patterns, and has validated all possible 2033928 distinct locking scenarios. More details about the design of the lock validator can be found in Documentation/lockdep-design.txt, which can also found at: http://redhat.com/~mingo/lockdep-patches/lockdep-design.txt [bunk@stusta.de: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-03 14:24:50 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
lockdep_init_task(p);
[PATCH] lockdep: core Do 'make oldconfig' and accept all the defaults for new config options - reboot into the kernel and if everything goes well it should boot up fine and you should have /proc/lockdep and /proc/lockdep_stats files. Typically if the lock validator finds some problem it will print out voluminous debug output that begins with "BUG: ..." and which syslog output can be used by kernel developers to figure out the precise locking scenario. What does the lock validator do? It "observes" and maps all locking rules as they occur dynamically (as triggered by the kernel's natural use of spinlocks, rwlocks, mutexes and rwsems). Whenever the lock validator subsystem detects a new locking scenario, it validates this new rule against the existing set of rules. If this new rule is consistent with the existing set of rules then the new rule is added transparently and the kernel continues as normal. If the new rule could create a deadlock scenario then this condition is printed out. When determining validity of locking, all possible "deadlock scenarios" are considered: assuming arbitrary number of CPUs, arbitrary irq context and task context constellations, running arbitrary combinations of all the existing locking scenarios. In a typical system this means millions of separate scenarios. This is why we call it a "locking correctness" validator - for all rules that are observed the lock validator proves it with mathematical certainty that a deadlock could not occur (assuming that the lock validator implementation itself is correct and its internal data structures are not corrupted by some other kernel subsystem). [see more details and conditionals of this statement in include/linux/lockdep.h and Documentation/lockdep-design.txt] Furthermore, this "all possible scenarios" property of the validator also enables the finding of complex, highly unlikely multi-CPU multi-context races via single single-context rules, increasing the likelyhood of finding bugs drastically. In practical terms: the lock validator already found a bug in the upstream kernel that could only occur on systems with 3 or more CPUs, and which needed 3 very unlikely code sequences to occur at once on the 3 CPUs. That bug was found and reported on a single-CPU system (!). So in essence a race will be found "piecemail-wise", triggering all the necessary components for the race, without having to reproduce the race scenario itself! In its short existence the lock validator found and reported many bugs before they actually caused a real deadlock. To further increase the efficiency of the validator, the mapping is not per "lock instance", but per "lock-class". For example, all struct inode objects in the kernel have inode->inotify_mutex. If there are 10,000 inodes cached, then there are 10,000 lock objects. But ->inotify_mutex is a single "lock type", and all locking activities that occur against ->inotify_mutex are "unified" into this single lock-class. The advantage of the lock-class approach is that all historical ->inotify_mutex uses are mapped into a single (and as narrow as possible) set of locking rules - regardless of how many different tasks or inode structures it took to build this set of rules. The set of rules persist during the lifetime of the kernel. To see the rough magnitude of checking that the lock validator does, here's a portion of /proc/lockdep_stats, fresh after bootup: lock-classes: 694 [max: 2048] direct dependencies: 1598 [max: 8192] indirect dependencies: 17896 all direct dependencies: 16206 dependency chains: 1910 [max: 8192] in-hardirq chains: 17 in-softirq chains: 105 in-process chains: 1065 stack-trace entries: 38761 [max: 131072] combined max dependencies: 2033928 hardirq-safe locks: 24 hardirq-unsafe locks: 176 softirq-safe locks: 53 softirq-unsafe locks: 137 irq-safe locks: 59 irq-unsafe locks: 176 The lock validator has observed 1598 actual single-thread locking patterns, and has validated all possible 2033928 distinct locking scenarios. More details about the design of the lock validator can be found in Documentation/lockdep-design.txt, which can also found at: http://redhat.com/~mingo/lockdep-patches/lockdep-design.txt [bunk@stusta.de: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-03 14:24:50 +07:00
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES
p->blocked_on = NULL; /* not blocked yet */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_BCACHE
p->sequential_io = 0;
p->sequential_io_avg = 0;
#endif
sched: fix copy_namespace() <-> sched_fork() dependency in do_fork Sukadev Bhattiprolu reported a kernel crash with control groups. There are couple of problems discovered by Suka's test: - The test requires the cgroup filesystem to be mounted with atleast the cpu and ns options (i.e both namespace and cpu controllers are active in the same hierarchy). # mkdir /dev/cpuctl # mount -t cgroup -ocpu,ns none cpuctl (or simply) # mount -t cgroup none cpuctl -> Will activate all controllers in same hierarchy. - The test invokes clone() with CLONE_NEWNS set. This causes a a new child to be created, also a new group (do_fork->copy_namespaces->ns_cgroup_clone-> cgroup_clone) and the child is attached to the new group (cgroup_clone-> attach_task->sched_move_task). At this point in time, the child's scheduler related fields are uninitialized (including its on_rq field, which it has inherited from parent). As a result sched_move_task thinks its on runqueue, when it isn't. As a solution to this problem, I moved sched_fork() call, which initializes scheduler related fields on a new task, before copy_namespaces(). I am not sure though whether moving up will cause other side-effects. Do you see any issue? - The second problem exposed by this test is that task_new_fair() assumes that parent and child will be part of the same group (which needn't be as this test shows). As a result, cfs_rq->curr can be NULL for the child. The solution is to test for curr pointer being NULL in task_new_fair(). With the patch below, I could run ns_exec() fine w/o a crash. Reported-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2007-11-10 04:39:39 +07:00
/* Perform scheduler related setup. Assign this task to a CPU. */
sched/deadline: Add SCHED_DEADLINE structures & implementation Introduces the data structures, constants and symbols needed for SCHED_DEADLINE implementation. Core data structure of SCHED_DEADLINE are defined, along with their initializers. Hooks for checking if a task belong to the new policy are also added where they are needed. Adds a scheduling class, in sched/dl.c and a new policy called SCHED_DEADLINE. It is an implementation of the Earliest Deadline First (EDF) scheduling algorithm, augmented with a mechanism (called Constant Bandwidth Server, CBS) that makes it possible to isolate the behaviour of tasks between each other. The typical -deadline task will be made up of a computation phase (instance) which is activated on a periodic or sporadic fashion. The expected (maximum) duration of such computation is called the task's runtime; the time interval by which each instance need to be completed is called the task's relative deadline. The task's absolute deadline is dynamically calculated as the time instant a task (better, an instance) activates plus the relative deadline. The EDF algorithms selects the task with the smallest absolute deadline as the one to be executed first, while the CBS ensures each task to run for at most its runtime every (relative) deadline length time interval, avoiding any interference between different tasks (bandwidth isolation). Thanks to this feature, also tasks that do not strictly comply with the computational model sketched above can effectively use the new policy. To summarize, this patch: - introduces the data structures, constants and symbols needed; - implements the core logic of the scheduling algorithm in the new scheduling class file; - provides all the glue code between the new scheduling class and the core scheduler and refines the interactions between sched/dl and the other existing scheduling classes. Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it> Signed-off-by: Michael Trimarchi <michael@amarulasolutions.com> Signed-off-by: Fabio Checconi <fchecconi@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1383831828-15501-4-git-send-email-juri.lelli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-11-28 17:14:43 +07:00
retval = sched_fork(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 17:02:48 +07:00
retval = perf_event_init_task(p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
retval = audit_alloc(p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_perf;
/* copy all the process information */
shm: make exit_shm work proportional to task activity This is small set of patches our team has had kicking around for a few versions internally that fixes tasks getting hung on shm_exit when there are many threads hammering it at once. Anton wrote a simple test to cause the issue: http://ozlabs.org/~anton/junkcode/bust_shm_exit.c Before applying this patchset, this test code will cause either hanging tracebacks or pthread out of memory errors. After this patchset, it will still produce output like: root@somehost:~# ./bust_shm_exit 1024 160 ... INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: {} (detected by 116, t=2111 jiffies, g=241, c=240, q=7113) INFO: Stall ended before state dump start ... But the task will continue to run along happily, so we consider this an improvement over hanging, even if it's a bit noisy. This patch (of 3): exit_shm obtains the ipc_ns shm rwsem for write and holds it while it walks every shared memory segment in the namespace. Thus the amount of work is related to the number of shm segments in the namespace not the number of segments that might need to be cleaned. In addition, this occurs after the task has been notified the thread has exited, so the number of tasks waiting for the ns shm rwsem can grow without bound until memory is exausted. Add a list to the task struct of all shmids allocated by this task. Init the list head in copy_process. Use the ns->rwsem for locking. Add segments after id is added, remove before removing from id. On unshare of NEW_IPCNS orphan any ids as if the task had exited, similar to handling of semaphore undo. I chose a define for the init sequence since its a simple list init, otherwise it would require a function call to avoid include loops between the semaphore code and the task struct. Converting the list_del to list_del_init for the unshare cases would remove the exit followed by init, but I left it blow up if not inited. Signed-off-by: Milton Miller <miltonm@bga.com> Signed-off-by: Jack Miller <millerjo@us.ibm.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 04:23:19 +07:00
shm_init_task(p);
LSM: Revive security_task_alloc() hook and per "struct task_struct" security blob. We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change. TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob, security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob. We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"-> security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged this patch. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-03-24 18:46:33 +07:00
retval = security_task_alloc(p, clone_flags);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_audit;
LSM: Revive security_task_alloc() hook and per "struct task_struct" security blob. We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change. TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob, security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob. We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"-> security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged this patch. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-03-24 18:46:33 +07:00
retval = copy_semundo(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_security;
retval = copy_files(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;
retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_files;
retval = copy_sighand(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_fs;
retval = copy_signal(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_sighand;
retval = copy_mm(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_signal;
retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 06:39:23 +07:00
goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
retval = copy_io(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
retval = copy_thread_tls(clone_flags, args->stack, args->stack_size, p,
args->tls);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls The STACKLEAK feature (initially developed by PaX Team) has the following benefits: 1. Reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak bugs. The idea of erasing the thread stack at the end of syscalls is similar to CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING and memzero_explicit() in kernel crypto, which all comply with FDP_RIP.2 (Full Residual Information Protection) of the Common Criteria standard. 2. Blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2017-17712, CVE-2010-2963). That kind of bugs should be killed by improving C compilers in future, which might take a long time. This commit introduces the code filling the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value before returning to userspace. Full STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which comes in a separate commit. The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: https://grsecurity.net/ https://pax.grsecurity.net/ This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Performance impact: Hardware: Intel Core i7-4770, 16 GB RAM Test #1: building the Linux kernel on a single core 0.91% slowdown Test #2: hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P 4.2% slowdown So the STACKLEAK description in Kconfig includes: "The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it". Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-08-17 05:16:58 +07:00
stackleak_task_init(p);
if (pid != &init_struct_pid) {
pid = alloc_pid(p->nsproxy->pid_ns_for_children);
fork: report pid reservation failure properly copy_process will report any failure in alloc_pid as ENOMEM currently which is misleading because the pid allocation might fail not only when the memory is short but also when the pid space is consumed already. The current man page even mentions this case: : EAGAIN : : A system-imposed limit on the number of threads was encountered. : There are a number of limits that may trigger this error: the : RLIMIT_NPROC soft resource limit (set via setrlimit(2)), which : limits the number of processes and threads for a real user ID, was : reached; the kernel's system-wide limit on the number of processes : and threads, /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max, was reached (see : proc(5)); or the maximum number of PIDs, /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max, : was reached (see proc(5)). so the current behavior is also incorrect wrt. documentation. POSIX man page also suggest returing EAGAIN when the process count limit is reached. This patch simply propagates error code from alloc_pid and makes sure we return -EAGAIN due to reservation failure. This will make behavior of fork closer to both our documentation and POSIX. alloc_pid might alsoo fail when the reaper in the pid namespace is dead (the namespace basically disallows all new processes) and there is no good error code which would match documented ones. We have traditionally returned ENOMEM for this case which is misleading as well but as per Eric W. Biederman this behavior is documented in man pid_namespaces(7) : If the "init" process of a PID namespace terminates, the kernel : terminates all of the processes in the namespace via a SIGKILL signal. : This behavior reflects the fact that the "init" process is essential for : the correct operation of a PID namespace. In this case, a subsequent : fork(2) into this PID namespace will fail with the error ENOMEM; it is : not possible to create a new processes in a PID namespace whose "init" : process has terminated. and introducing a new error code would be too risky so let's stick to ENOMEM for this case. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 02:47:38 +07:00
if (IS_ERR(pid)) {
retval = PTR_ERR(pid);
fork: free thread in copy_process on failure When using this program (as root): #include <err.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/io.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #define ITER 1000 #define FORKERS 15 #define THREADS (6000/FORKERS) // 1850 is proc max static void fork_100_wait() { unsigned a, to_wait = 0; printf("\t%d forking %d\n", THREADS, getpid()); for (a = 0; a < THREADS; a++) { switch (fork()) { case 0: usleep(1000); exit(0); break; case -1: break; default: to_wait++; break; } } printf("\t%d forked from %d, waiting for %d\n", THREADS, getpid(), to_wait); for (a = 0; a < to_wait; a++) wait(NULL); printf("\t%d waited from %d\n", THREADS, getpid()); } static void run_forkers() { pid_t forkers[FORKERS]; unsigned a; for (a = 0; a < FORKERS; a++) { switch ((forkers[a] = fork())) { case 0: fork_100_wait(); exit(0); break; case -1: err(1, "DIE fork of %d'th forker", a); break; default: break; } } for (a = 0; a < FORKERS; a++) waitpid(forkers[a], NULL, 0); } int main() { unsigned a; int ret; ret = ioperm(10, 20, 0); if (ret < 0) err(1, "ioperm"); for (a = 0; a < ITER; a++) run_forkers(); return 0; } kmemleak reports many occurences of this leak: unreferenced object 0xffff8805917c8000 (size 8192): comm "fork-leak", pid 2932, jiffies 4295354292 (age 1871.028s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff814cfbf5>] kmemdup+0x25/0x50 [<ffffffff8103ab43>] copy_thread_tls+0x6c3/0x9a0 [<ffffffff81150174>] copy_process+0x1a84/0x5790 [<ffffffff811dc375>] wake_up_new_task+0x2d5/0x6f0 [<ffffffff8115411d>] _do_fork+0x12d/0x820 ... Due to the leakage of the memory items which should have been freed in arch/x86/kernel/process.c:exit_thread(). Make sure the memory is freed when fork fails later in copy_process. This is done by calling exit_thread with the thread to kill. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn> Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com> Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com> Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-21 07:00:25 +07:00
goto bad_fork_cleanup_thread;
fork: report pid reservation failure properly copy_process will report any failure in alloc_pid as ENOMEM currently which is misleading because the pid allocation might fail not only when the memory is short but also when the pid space is consumed already. The current man page even mentions this case: : EAGAIN : : A system-imposed limit on the number of threads was encountered. : There are a number of limits that may trigger this error: the : RLIMIT_NPROC soft resource limit (set via setrlimit(2)), which : limits the number of processes and threads for a real user ID, was : reached; the kernel's system-wide limit on the number of processes : and threads, /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max, was reached (see : proc(5)); or the maximum number of PIDs, /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max, : was reached (see proc(5)). so the current behavior is also incorrect wrt. documentation. POSIX man page also suggest returing EAGAIN when the process count limit is reached. This patch simply propagates error code from alloc_pid and makes sure we return -EAGAIN due to reservation failure. This will make behavior of fork closer to both our documentation and POSIX. alloc_pid might alsoo fail when the reaper in the pid namespace is dead (the namespace basically disallows all new processes) and there is no good error code which would match documented ones. We have traditionally returned ENOMEM for this case which is misleading as well but as per Eric W. Biederman this behavior is documented in man pid_namespaces(7) : If the "init" process of a PID namespace terminates, the kernel : terminates all of the processes in the namespace via a SIGKILL signal. : This behavior reflects the fact that the "init" process is essential for : the correct operation of a PID namespace. In this case, a subsequent : fork(2) into this PID namespace will fail with the error ENOMEM; it is : not possible to create a new processes in a PID namespace whose "init" : process has terminated. and introducing a new error code would be too risky so let's stick to ENOMEM for this case. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 02:47:38 +07:00
}
}
clone: add CLONE_PIDFD This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call. As spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left. CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new mount api. They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids. Logically, this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending). Thus, a pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege. This does not imply it cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case. A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d". As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the parent_tidptr argument of clone. This has the advantage that we can give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time. To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process metadata through /proc/<pid>. The sample program can easily be translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-27 19:04:15 +07:00
/*
* This has to happen after we've potentially unshared the file
* descriptor table (so that the pidfd doesn't leak into the child
* if the fd table isn't shared).
*/
if (clone_flags & CLONE_PIDFD) {
retval = get_unused_fd_flags(O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
clone: add CLONE_PIDFD This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call. As spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left. CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new mount api. They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids. Logically, this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending). Thus, a pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege. This does not imply it cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case. A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d". As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the parent_tidptr argument of clone. This has the advantage that we can give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time. To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process metadata through /proc/<pid>. The sample program can easily be translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-27 19:04:15 +07:00
if (retval < 0)
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
pidfd = retval;
pidfile = anon_inode_getfile("[pidfd]", &pidfd_fops, pid,
O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (IS_ERR(pidfile)) {
put_unused_fd(pidfd);
fork: return proper negative error code Make sure to return a proper negative error code from copy_process() when anon_inode_getfile() fails with CLONE_PIDFD. Otherwise _do_fork() will not detect an error and get_task_pid() will operator on a nonsensical pointer: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006dbc2c R13: 00007ffc15fbb0ff R14: 00007ff07e47e9c0 R15: 0000000000000000 kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 7990 Comm: syz-executor290 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6+ #9 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:194 [inline] RIP: 0010:get_task_pid+0xe1/0x210 kernel/pid.c:372 Code: 89 ff e8 62 27 5f 00 49 8b 07 44 89 f1 4c 8d bc c8 90 01 00 00 eb 0c e8 0d fe 25 00 49 81 c7 38 05 00 00 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 18 00 74 08 4c 89 ff e8 31 27 5f 00 4d 8b 37 e8 f9 47 12 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88808a4a7d78 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000000000a7 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffff888088180600 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88808a4a7d90 R08: ffffffff814fb3a8 R09: ffffed1015d66bf8 R10: ffffed1015d66bf8 R11: 1ffff11015d66bf7 R12: 0000000000041ffc R13: 1ffff11011494fbc R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000053d FS: 00007ff07e47e700(0000) GS:ffff8880aeb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004b5100 CR3: 0000000094df2000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: _do_fork+0x1b9/0x5f0 kernel/fork.c:2360 __do_sys_clone kernel/fork.c:2454 [inline] __se_sys_clone kernel/fork.c:2448 [inline] __x64_sys_clone+0xc1/0xd0 kernel/fork.c:2448 do_syscall_64+0xfe/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000e0dc0d058c9e7142@google.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+002e636502bc4b64eb5c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 6fd2fe494b17 ("copy_process(): don't use ksys_close() on cleanups") Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
2019-07-01 21:01:46 +07:00
retval = PTR_ERR(pidfile);
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
}
get_pid(pid); /* held by pidfile now */
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
retval = put_user(pidfd, args->pidfd);
clone: add CLONE_PIDFD This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call. As spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left. CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new mount api. They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids. Logically, this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending). Thus, a pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege. This does not imply it cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case. A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d". As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the parent_tidptr argument of clone. This has the advantage that we can give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time. To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process metadata through /proc/<pid>. The sample program can easily be translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-27 19:04:15 +07:00
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_put_pidfd;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
p->plug = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
p->robust_list = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
p->compat_robust_list = NULL;
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->pi_state_list);
p->pi_state_cache = NULL;
#endif
[PATCH] Fix sigaltstack corruption among cloned threads This patch fixes alternate signal stack corruption among cloned threads with CLONE_SIGHAND (and CLONE_VM) for linux-2.6.16-rc6. The value of alternate signal stack is currently inherited after a call of clone(... CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_VM). But if sigaltstack is set by a parent thread, and then if multiple cloned child threads (+ parent threads) call signal handler at the same time, some threads may be conflicted - because they share to use the same alternative signal stack region. Finally they get sigsegv. It's an undesirable race condition. Note that child threads created from NPTL pthread_create() also hit this conflict when the parent thread uses sigaltstack, without my patch. To fix this problem, this patch clears the child threads' sigaltstack information like exec(). This behavior follows the SUSv3 specification. In SUSv3, pthread_create() says "The alternate stack shall not be inherited (when new threads are initialized)". It means that sigaltstack should be cleared when sigaltstack memory space is shared by cloned threads with CLONE_SIGHAND. Note that I chose "if (clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND)" line because: - If clone_flags line is not existed, fork() does not inherit sigaltstack. - CLONE_VM is another choice, but vfork() does not inherit sigaltstack. - CLONE_SIGHAND implies CLONE_VM, and it looks suitable. - CLONE_THREAD is another candidate, and includes CLONE_SIGHAND + CLONE_VM, but this flag has a bit different semantics. I decided to use CLONE_SIGHAND. [ Changed to test for CLONE_VM && !CLONE_VFORK after discussion --Linus ] Signed-off-by: GOTO Masanori <gotom@sanori.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-14 12:20:44 +07:00
/*
* sigaltstack should be cleared when sharing the same VM
*/
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VM|CLONE_VFORK)) == CLONE_VM)
signals/sigaltstack: Implement SS_AUTODISARM flag This patch implements the SS_AUTODISARM flag that can be OR-ed with SS_ONSTACK when forming ss_flags. When this flag is set, sigaltstack will be disabled when entering the signal handler; more precisely, after saving sas to uc_stack. When leaving the signal handler, the sigaltstack is restored by uc_stack. When this flag is used, it is safe to switch from sighandler with swapcontext(). Without this flag, the subsequent signal will corrupt the state of the switched-away sighandler. To detect the support of this functionality, one can do: err = sigaltstack(SS_DISABLE | SS_AUTODISARM); if (err && errno == EINVAL) unsupported(); Signed-off-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp@list.ru> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Amanieu d'Antras <amanieu@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1460665206-13646-4-git-send-email-stsp@list.ru Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-04-15 03:20:04 +07:00
sas_ss_reset(p);
[PATCH] Fix sigaltstack corruption among cloned threads This patch fixes alternate signal stack corruption among cloned threads with CLONE_SIGHAND (and CLONE_VM) for linux-2.6.16-rc6. The value of alternate signal stack is currently inherited after a call of clone(... CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_VM). But if sigaltstack is set by a parent thread, and then if multiple cloned child threads (+ parent threads) call signal handler at the same time, some threads may be conflicted - because they share to use the same alternative signal stack region. Finally they get sigsegv. It's an undesirable race condition. Note that child threads created from NPTL pthread_create() also hit this conflict when the parent thread uses sigaltstack, without my patch. To fix this problem, this patch clears the child threads' sigaltstack information like exec(). This behavior follows the SUSv3 specification. In SUSv3, pthread_create() says "The alternate stack shall not be inherited (when new threads are initialized)". It means that sigaltstack should be cleared when sigaltstack memory space is shared by cloned threads with CLONE_SIGHAND. Note that I chose "if (clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND)" line because: - If clone_flags line is not existed, fork() does not inherit sigaltstack. - CLONE_VM is another choice, but vfork() does not inherit sigaltstack. - CLONE_SIGHAND implies CLONE_VM, and it looks suitable. - CLONE_THREAD is another candidate, and includes CLONE_SIGHAND + CLONE_VM, but this flag has a bit different semantics. I decided to use CLONE_SIGHAND. [ Changed to test for CLONE_VM && !CLONE_VFORK after discussion --Linus ] Signed-off-by: GOTO Masanori <gotom@sanori.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-14 12:20:44 +07:00
/*
* Syscall tracing and stepping should be turned off in the
* child regardless of CLONE_PTRACE.
*/
user_disable_single_step(p);
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE);
[PATCH] UML Support - Ptrace: adds the host SYSEMU support, for UML and general usage Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>, Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso <blaisorblade_spam@yahoo.it>, Bodo Stroesser <bstroesser@fujitsu-siemens.com> Adds a new ptrace(2) mode, called PTRACE_SYSEMU, resembling PTRACE_SYSCALL except that the kernel does not execute the requested syscall; this is useful to improve performance for virtual environments, like UML, which want to run the syscall on their own. In fact, using PTRACE_SYSCALL means stopping child execution twice, on entry and on exit, and each time you also have two context switches; with SYSEMU you avoid the 2nd stop and so save two context switches per syscall. Also, some architectures don't have support in the host for changing the syscall number via ptrace(), which is currently needed to skip syscall execution (UML turns any syscall into getpid() to avoid it being executed on the host). Fixing that is hard, while SYSEMU is easier to implement. * This version of the patch includes some suggestions of Jeff Dike to avoid adding any instructions to the syscall fast path, plus some other little changes, by myself, to make it work even when the syscall is executed with SYSENTER (but I'm unsure about them). It has been widely tested for quite a lot of time. * Various fixed were included to handle the various switches between various states, i.e. when for instance a syscall entry is traced with one of PT_SYSCALL / _SYSEMU / _SINGLESTEP and another one is used on exit. Basically, this is done by remembering which one of them was used even after the call to ptrace_notify(). * We're combining TIF_SYSCALL_EMU with TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE or TIF_SINGLESTEP to make do_syscall_trace() notice that the current syscall was started with SYSEMU on entry, so that no notification ought to be done in the exit path; this is a bit of a hack, so this problem is solved in another way in next patches. * Also, the effects of the patch: "Ptrace - i386: fix Syscall Audit interaction with singlestep" are cancelled; they are restored back in the last patch of this series. Detailed descriptions of the patches doing this kind of processing follow (but I've already summed everything up). * Fix behaviour when changing interception kind #1. In do_syscall_trace(), we check the status of the TIF_SYSCALL_EMU flag only after doing the debugger notification; but the debugger might have changed the status of this flag because he continued execution with PTRACE_SYSCALL, so this is wrong. This patch fixes it by saving the flag status before calling ptrace_notify(). * Fix behaviour when changing interception kind #2: avoid intercepting syscall on return when using SYSCALL again. A guest process switching from using PTRACE_SYSEMU to PTRACE_SYSCALL crashes. The problem is in arch/i386/kernel/entry.S. The current SYSEMU patch inhibits the syscall-handler to be called, but does not prevent do_syscall_trace() to be called after this for syscall completion interception. The appended patch fixes this. It reuses the flag TIF_SYSCALL_EMU to remember "we come from PTRACE_SYSEMU and now are in PTRACE_SYSCALL", since the flag is unused in the depicted situation. * Fix behaviour when changing interception kind #3: avoid intercepting syscall on return when using SINGLESTEP. When testing 2.6.9 and the skas3.v6 patch, with my latest patch and had problems with singlestepping on UML in SKAS with SYSEMU. It looped receiving SIGTRAPs without moving forward. EIP of the traced process was the same for all SIGTRAPs. What's missing is to handle switching from PTRACE_SYSCALL_EMU to PTRACE_SINGLESTEP in a way very similar to what is done for the change from PTRACE_SYSCALL_EMU to PTRACE_SYSCALL_TRACE. I.e., after calling ptrace(PTRACE_SYSEMU), on the return path, the debugger is notified and then wake ups the process; the syscall is executed (or skipped, when do_syscall_trace() returns 0, i.e. when using PTRACE_SYSEMU), and do_syscall_trace() is called again. Since we are on the return path of a SYSEMU'd syscall, if the wake up is performed through ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL), we must still avoid notifying the parent of the syscall exit. Now, this behaviour is extended even to resuming with PTRACE_SINGLESTEP. Signed-off-by: Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso <blaisorblade@yahoo.it> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-04 05:57:18 +07:00
#ifdef TIF_SYSCALL_EMU
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SYSCALL_EMU);
#endif
clear_tsk_latency_tracing(p);
/* ok, now we should be set up.. */
p->pid = pid_nr(pid);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) {
p->exit_signal = -1;
p->group_leader = current->group_leader;
p->tgid = current->tgid;
} else {
if (clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT)
p->exit_signal = current->group_leader->exit_signal;
else
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
p->exit_signal = args->exit_signal;
p->group_leader = p;
p->tgid = p->pid;
}
writeback: per task dirty rate limit Add two fields to task_struct. 1) account dirtied pages in the individual tasks, for accuracy 2) per-task balance_dirty_pages() call intervals, for flexibility The balance_dirty_pages() call interval (ie. nr_dirtied_pause) will scale near-sqrt to the safety gap between dirty pages and threshold. The main problem of per-task nr_dirtied is, if 1k+ tasks start dirtying pages at exactly the same time, each task will be assigned a large initial nr_dirtied_pause, so that the dirty threshold will be exceeded long before each task reached its nr_dirtied_pause and hence call balance_dirty_pages(). The solution is to watch for the number of pages dirtied on each CPU in between the calls into balance_dirty_pages(). If it exceeds ratelimit_pages (3% dirty threshold), force call balance_dirty_pages() for a chance to set bdi->dirty_exceeded. In normal situations, this safeguarding condition is not expected to trigger at all. On the sqrt in dirty_poll_interval(): It will serve as an initial guess when dirty pages are still in the freerun area. When dirty pages are floating inside the dirty control scope [freerun, limit], a followup patch will use some refined dirty poll interval to get the desired pause time. thresh-dirty (MB) sqrt 1 16 2 22 4 32 8 45 16 64 32 90 64 128 128 181 256 256 512 362 1024 512 The above table means, given 1MB (or 1GB) gap and the dd tasks polling balance_dirty_pages() on every 16 (or 512) pages, the dirty limit won't be exceeded as long as there are less than 16 (or 512) concurrent dd's. So sqrt naturally leads to less overheads and more safe concurrent tasks for large memory servers, which have large (thresh-freerun) gaps. peter: keep the per-CPU ratelimit for safeguarding the 1k+ tasks case CC: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Reviewed-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com> Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
2011-06-12 07:10:12 +07:00
p->nr_dirtied = 0;
p->nr_dirtied_pause = 128 >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
p->dirty_paused_when = 0;
writeback: per task dirty rate limit Add two fields to task_struct. 1) account dirtied pages in the individual tasks, for accuracy 2) per-task balance_dirty_pages() call intervals, for flexibility The balance_dirty_pages() call interval (ie. nr_dirtied_pause) will scale near-sqrt to the safety gap between dirty pages and threshold. The main problem of per-task nr_dirtied is, if 1k+ tasks start dirtying pages at exactly the same time, each task will be assigned a large initial nr_dirtied_pause, so that the dirty threshold will be exceeded long before each task reached its nr_dirtied_pause and hence call balance_dirty_pages(). The solution is to watch for the number of pages dirtied on each CPU in between the calls into balance_dirty_pages(). If it exceeds ratelimit_pages (3% dirty threshold), force call balance_dirty_pages() for a chance to set bdi->dirty_exceeded. In normal situations, this safeguarding condition is not expected to trigger at all. On the sqrt in dirty_poll_interval(): It will serve as an initial guess when dirty pages are still in the freerun area. When dirty pages are floating inside the dirty control scope [freerun, limit], a followup patch will use some refined dirty poll interval to get the desired pause time. thresh-dirty (MB) sqrt 1 16 2 22 4 32 8 45 16 64 32 90 64 128 128 181 256 256 512 362 1024 512 The above table means, given 1MB (or 1GB) gap and the dd tasks polling balance_dirty_pages() on every 16 (or 512) pages, the dirty limit won't be exceeded as long as there are less than 16 (or 512) concurrent dd's. So sqrt naturally leads to less overheads and more safe concurrent tasks for large memory servers, which have large (thresh-freerun) gaps. peter: keep the per-CPU ratelimit for safeguarding the 1k+ tasks case CC: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Reviewed-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com> Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
2011-06-12 07:10:12 +07:00
p->pdeath_signal = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->thread_group);
p->task_works = NULL;
cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin(current);
/*
* Ensure that the cgroup subsystem policies allow the new process to be
* forked. It should be noted the the new process's css_set can be changed
* between here and cgroup_post_fork() if an organisation operation is in
* progress.
*/
retval = cgroup_can_fork(p);
if (retval)
fork: do not release lock that wasn't taken Avoid calling cgroup_threadgroup_change_end() without having called cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin() first. During process creation we need to check whether the cgroup we are in allows us to fork. To perform this check the cgroup needs to guard itself against threadgroup changes and takes a lock. Prior to CLONE_PIDFD the cleanup target "bad_fork_free_pid" would also need to call cgroup_threadgroup_change_end() because said lock had already been taken. However, this is not the case anymore with the addition of CLONE_PIDFD. We are now allocating a pidfd before we check whether the cgroup we're in can fork and thus prior to taking the lock. So when copy_process() fails at the right step it would release a lock we haven't taken. This bug is not even very subtle to be honest. It's just not very clear from the naming of cgroup_threadgroup_change_{begin,end}() that a lock is taken. Here's the relevant splat: entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139 RIP: 0023:0xf7fec849 Code: 85 d2 74 02 89 0a 5b 5d c3 8b 04 24 c3 8b 14 24 c3 8b 3c 24 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 eb 0d 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 002b:00000000ffed5a8c EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000078 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000003ffc RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000200005c0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000012 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ------------[ cut here ]------------ DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(depth <= 0) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7744 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4052 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4052 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7744 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4052 lock_release+0x667/0xa00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4321 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 7744 Comm: syz-executor007 Not tainted 5.1.0+ #4 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x2cb/0x65c kernel/panic.c:214 __warn.cold+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:566 report_bug+0x263/0x2b0 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:179 [inline] fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:272 do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:291 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:972 RIP: 0010:__lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4052 [inline] RIP: 0010:lock_release+0x667/0xa00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4321 Code: 0f 85 a0 03 00 00 8b 35 77 66 08 08 85 f6 75 23 48 c7 c6 a0 55 6b 87 48 c7 c7 40 25 6b 87 4c 89 85 70 ff ff ff e8 b7 a9 eb ff <0f> 0b 4c 8b 85 70 ff ff ff 4c 89 ea 4c 89 e6 4c 89 c7 e8 52 63 ff RSP: 0018:ffff888094117b48 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11012822f6f RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff815af236 RDI: ffffed1012822f5b RBP: ffff888094117c00 R08: ffff888092bfc400 R09: fffffbfff113301d R10: fffffbfff113301c R11: ffffffff889980e3 R12: ffffffff8a451df8 R13: ffffffff8142e71f R14: ffffffff8a44cc80 R15: ffff888094117bd8 percpu_up_read.constprop.0+0xcb/0x110 include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:92 cgroup_threadgroup_change_end include/linux/cgroup-defs.h:712 [inline] copy_process.part.0+0x47ff/0x6710 kernel/fork.c:2222 copy_process kernel/fork.c:1772 [inline] _do_fork+0x25d/0xfd0 kernel/fork.c:2338 __do_compat_sys_x86_clone arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c:240 [inline] __se_compat_sys_x86_clone arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c:236 [inline] __ia32_compat_sys_x86_clone+0xbc/0x140 arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c:236 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:334 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x281/0xd54 arch/x86/entry/common.c:405 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139 RIP: 0023:0xf7fec849 Code: 85 d2 74 02 89 0a 5b 5d c3 8b 04 24 c3 8b 14 24 c3 8b 3c 24 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 eb 0d 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 002b:00000000ffed5a8c EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000078 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000003ffc RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000200005c0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000012 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Kernel Offset: disabled Rebooting in 86400 seconds.. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+3286e58549edc479faae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: b3e583825266 ("clone: add CLONE_PIDFD") Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
2019-05-10 16:53:46 +07:00
goto bad_fork_cgroup_threadgroup_change_end;
fork: record start_time late This changes the fork(2) syscall to record the process start_time after initializing the basic task structure but still before making the new process visible to user-space. Technically, we could record the start_time anytime during fork(2). But this might lead to scenarios where a start_time is recorded long before a process becomes visible to user-space. For instance, with userfaultfd(2) and TLS, user-space can delay the execution of fork(2) for an indefinite amount of time (and will, if this causes network access, or similar). By recording the start_time late, it much closer reflects the point in time where the process becomes live and can be observed by other processes. Lastly, this makes it much harder for user-space to predict and control the start_time they get assigned. Previously, user-space could fork a process and stall it in copy_thread_tls() before its pid is allocated, but after its start_time is recorded. This can be misused to later-on cycle through PIDs and resume the stalled fork(2) yielding a process that has the same pid and start_time as a process that existed before. This can be used to circumvent security systems that identify processes by their pid+start_time combination. Even though user-space was always aware that start_time recording is flaky (but several projects are known to still rely on start_time-based identification), changing the start_time to be recorded late will help mitigate existing attacks and make it much harder for user-space to control the start_time a process gets assigned. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no> Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-08 19:58:52 +07:00
/*
* From this point on we must avoid any synchronous user-space
* communication until we take the tasklist-lock. In particular, we do
* not want user-space to be able to predict the process start-time by
* stalling fork(2) after we recorded the start_time but before it is
* visible to the system.
*/
p->start_time = ktime_get_ns();
p->real_start_time = ktime_get_boottime_ns();
fork: record start_time late This changes the fork(2) syscall to record the process start_time after initializing the basic task structure but still before making the new process visible to user-space. Technically, we could record the start_time anytime during fork(2). But this might lead to scenarios where a start_time is recorded long before a process becomes visible to user-space. For instance, with userfaultfd(2) and TLS, user-space can delay the execution of fork(2) for an indefinite amount of time (and will, if this causes network access, or similar). By recording the start_time late, it much closer reflects the point in time where the process becomes live and can be observed by other processes. Lastly, this makes it much harder for user-space to predict and control the start_time they get assigned. Previously, user-space could fork a process and stall it in copy_thread_tls() before its pid is allocated, but after its start_time is recorded. This can be misused to later-on cycle through PIDs and resume the stalled fork(2) yielding a process that has the same pid and start_time as a process that existed before. This can be used to circumvent security systems that identify processes by their pid+start_time combination. Even though user-space was always aware that start_time recording is flaky (but several projects are known to still rely on start_time-based identification), changing the start_time to be recorded late will help mitigate existing attacks and make it much harder for user-space to control the start_time a process gets assigned. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no> Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-08 19:58:52 +07:00
/*
* Make it visible to the rest of the system, but dont wake it up yet.
* Need tasklist lock for parent etc handling!
*/
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* CLONE_PARENT re-uses the old parent */
if (clone_flags & (CLONE_PARENT|CLONE_THREAD)) {
p->real_parent = current->real_parent;
p->parent_exec_id = current->parent_exec_id;
} else {
p->real_parent = current;
p->parent_exec_id = current->self_exec_id;
}
livepatch: change to a per-task consistency model Change livepatch to use a basic per-task consistency model. This is the foundation which will eventually enable us to patch those ~10% of security patches which change function or data semantics. This is the biggest remaining piece needed to make livepatch more generally useful. This code stems from the design proposal made by Vojtech [1] in November 2014. It's a hybrid of kGraft and kpatch: it uses kGraft's per-task consistency and syscall barrier switching combined with kpatch's stack trace switching. There are also a number of fallback options which make it quite flexible. Patches are applied on a per-task basis, when the task is deemed safe to switch over. When a patch is enabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where tasks are converging to the patched state. Usually this transition state can complete in a few seconds. The same sequence occurs when a patch is disabled, except the tasks converge from the patched state to the unpatched state. An interrupt handler inherits the patched state of the task it interrupts. The same is true for forked tasks: the child inherits the patched state of the parent. Livepatch uses several complementary approaches to determine when it's safe to patch tasks: 1. The first and most effective approach is stack checking of sleeping tasks. If no affected functions are on the stack of a given task, the task is patched. In most cases this will patch most or all of the tasks on the first try. Otherwise it'll keep trying periodically. This option is only available if the architecture has reliable stacks (HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE). 2. The second approach, if needed, is kernel exit switching. A task is switched when it returns to user space from a system call, a user space IRQ, or a signal. It's useful in the following cases: a) Patching I/O-bound user tasks which are sleeping on an affected function. In this case you have to send SIGSTOP and SIGCONT to force it to exit the kernel and be patched. b) Patching CPU-bound user tasks. If the task is highly CPU-bound then it will get patched the next time it gets interrupted by an IRQ. c) In the future it could be useful for applying patches for architectures which don't yet have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. In this case you would have to signal most of the tasks on the system. However this isn't supported yet because there's currently no way to patch kthreads without HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. 3. For idle "swapper" tasks, since they don't ever exit the kernel, they instead have a klp_update_patch_state() call in the idle loop which allows them to be patched before the CPU enters the idle state. (Note there's not yet such an approach for kthreads.) All the above approaches may be skipped by setting the 'immediate' flag in the 'klp_patch' struct, which will disable per-task consistency and patch all tasks immediately. This can be useful if the patch doesn't change any function or data semantics. Note that, even with this flag set, it's possible that some tasks may still be running with an old version of the function, until that function returns. There's also an 'immediate' flag in the 'klp_func' struct which allows you to specify that certain functions in the patch can be applied without per-task consistency. This might be useful if you want to patch a common function like schedule(), and the function change doesn't need consistency but the rest of the patch does. For architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, the user must set patch->immediate which causes all tasks to be patched immediately. This option should be used with care, only when the patch doesn't change any function or data semantics. In the future, architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE may be allowed to use per-task consistency if we can come up with another way to patch kthreads. The /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/transition file shows whether a patch is in transition. Only a single patch (the topmost patch on the stack) can be in transition at a given time. A patch can remain in transition indefinitely, if any of the tasks are stuck in the initial patch state. A transition can be reversed and effectively canceled by writing the opposite value to the /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/enabled file while the transition is in progress. Then all the tasks will attempt to converge back to the original patch state. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141107140458.GA21774@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> # for the scheduler changes Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2017-02-14 08:42:40 +07:00
klp_copy_process(p);
spin_lock(&current->sighand->siglock);
/*
* Copy seccomp details explicitly here, in case they were changed
* before holding sighand lock.
*/
copy_seccomp(p);
rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call Expose a new system call allowing each thread to register one userspace memory area to be used as an ABI between kernel and user-space for two purposes: user-space restartable sequences and quick access to read the current CPU number value from user-space. * Restartable sequences (per-cpu atomics) Restartables sequences allow user-space to perform update operations on per-cpu data without requiring heavy-weight atomic operations. The restartable critical sections (percpu atomics) work has been started by Paul Turner and Andrew Hunter. It lets the kernel handle restart of critical sections. [1] [2] The re-implementation proposed here brings a few simplifications to the ABI which facilitates porting to other architectures and speeds up the user-space fast path. Here are benchmarks of various rseq use-cases. Test hardware: arm32: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) "Cubietruck", 2-core x86-64: Intel E5-2630 v3@2.40GHz, 16-core, hyperthreading The following benchmarks were all performed on a single thread. * Per-CPU statistic counter increment getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 344.0 31.4 11.0 x86-64: 15.3 2.0 7.7 * LTTng-UST: write event 32-bit header, 32-bit payload into tracer per-cpu buffer getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 2502.0 2250.0 1.1 x86-64: 117.4 98.0 1.2 * liburcu percpu: lock-unlock pair, dereference, read/compare word getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 751.0 128.5 5.8 x86-64: 53.4 28.6 1.9 * jemalloc memory allocator adapted to use rseq Using rseq with per-cpu memory pools in jemalloc at Facebook (based on rseq 2016 implementation): The production workload response-time has 1-2% gain avg. latency, and the P99 overall latency drops by 2-3%. * Reading the current CPU number Speeding up reading the current CPU number on which the caller thread is running is done by keeping the current CPU number up do date within the cpu_id field of the memory area registered by the thread. This is done by making scheduler preemption set the TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME flag on the current thread. Upon return to user-space, a notify-resume handler updates the current CPU value within the registered user-space memory area. User-space can then read the current CPU number directly from memory. Keeping the current cpu id in a memory area shared between kernel and user-space is an improvement over current mechanisms available to read the current CPU number, which has the following benefits over alternative approaches: - 35x speedup on ARM vs system call through glibc - 20x speedup on x86 compared to calling glibc, which calls vdso executing a "lsl" instruction, - 14x speedup on x86 compared to inlined "lsl" instruction, - Unlike vdso approaches, this cpu_id value can be read from an inline assembly, which makes it a useful building block for restartable sequences. - The approach of reading the cpu id through memory mapping shared between kernel and user-space is portable (e.g. ARM), which is not the case for the lsl-based x86 vdso. On x86, yet another possible approach would be to use the gs segment selector to point to user-space per-cpu data. This approach performs similarly to the cpu id cache, but it has two disadvantages: it is not portable, and it is incompatible with existing applications already using the gs segment selector for other purposes. Benchmarking various approaches for reading the current CPU number: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) Machine model: Cubietruck - Baseline (empty loop): 8.4 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 16.7 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 19.8 ns - glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6.6 getcpu: 301.8 ns - getcpu system call: 234.9 ns x86-64 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz: - Baseline (empty loop): 0.8 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 0.8 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 0.8 ns - Read using gs segment selector: 0.8 ns - "lsl" inline assembly: 13.0 ns - glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6 getcpu: 16.6 ns - getcpu system call: 53.9 ns - Speed (benchmark taken on v8 of patchset) Running 10 runs of hackbench -l 100000 seems to indicate, contrary to expectations, that enabling CONFIG_RSEQ slightly accelerates the scheduler: Configuration: 2 sockets * 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz (directly on hardware, hyperthreading disabled in BIOS, energy saving disabled in BIOS, turboboost disabled in BIOS, cpuidle.off=1 kernel parameter), with a Linux v4.6 defconfig+localyesconfig, restartable sequences series applied. * CONFIG_RSEQ=n avg.: 41.37 s std.dev.: 0.36 s * CONFIG_RSEQ=y avg.: 40.46 s std.dev.: 0.33 s - Size On x86-64, between CONFIG_RSEQ=n/y, the text size increase of vmlinux is 567 bytes, and the data size increase of vmlinux is 5696 bytes. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/650333/ [2] http://www.linuxplumbersconf.org/2013/ocw/system/presentations/1695/original/LPC%20-%20PerCpu%20Atomics.pdf Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Chris Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@fb.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151027235635.16059.11630.stgit@pjt-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150624222609.6116.86035.stgit@kitami.mtv.corp.google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180602124408.8430-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
2018-06-02 19:43:54 +07:00
rseq_fork(p, clone_flags);
/* Don't start children in a dying pid namespace */
if (unlikely(!(ns_of_pid(pid)->pid_allocated & PIDNS_ADDING))) {
pid_ns: Fix race between setns'ed fork() and zap_pid_ns_processes() Imagine we have a pid namespace and a task from its parent's pid_ns, which made setns() to the pid namespace. The task is doing fork(), while the pid namespace's child reaper is dying. We have the race between them: Task from parent pid_ns Child reaper copy_process() .. alloc_pid() .. .. zap_pid_ns_processes() .. disable_pid_allocation() .. read_lock(&tasklist_lock) .. iterate over pids in pid_ns .. kill tasks linked to pids .. read_unlock(&tasklist_lock) write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); .. attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID); .. .. .. So, just created task p won't receive SIGKILL signal, and the pid namespace will be in contradictory state. Only manual kill will help there, but does the userspace care about this? I suppose, the most users just inject a task into a pid namespace and wait a SIGCHLD from it. The patch fixes the problem. It simply checks for (pid_ns->nr_hashed & PIDNS_HASH_ADDING) in copy_process(). We do it under the tasklist_lock, and can't skip PIDNS_HASH_ADDING as noted by Oleg: "zap_pid_ns_processes() does disable_pid_allocation() and then takes tasklist_lock to kill the whole namespace. Given that copy_process() checks PIDNS_HASH_ADDING under write_lock(tasklist) they can't race; if copy_process() takes this lock first, the new child will be killed, otherwise copy_process() can't miss the change in ->nr_hashed." If allocation is disabled, we just return -ENOMEM like it's made for such cases in alloc_pid(). v2: Do not move disable_pid_allocation(), do not introduce a new variable in copy_process() and simplify the patch as suggested by Oleg Nesterov. Account the problem with double irq enabling found by Eric W. Biederman. Fixes: c876ad768215 ("pidns: Stop pid allocation when init dies") Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> CC: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> CC: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> CC: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> CC: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> CC: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> CC: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-05-12 23:11:31 +07:00
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto bad_fork_cancel_cgroup;
}
/* Let kill terminate clone/fork in the middle */
if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
retval = -EINTR;
goto bad_fork_cancel_cgroup;
}
/* past the last point of failure */
if (pidfile)
fd_install(pidfd, pidfile);
init_task_pid_links(p);
if (likely(p->pid)) {
ptrace_init_task(p, (clone_flags & CLONE_PTRACE) || trace);
init_task_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID, pid);
if (thread_group_leader(p)) {
init_task_pid(p, PIDTYPE_TGID, pid);
init_task_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, task_pgrp(current));
init_task_pid(p, PIDTYPE_SID, task_session(current));
if (is_child_reaper(pid)) {
ns_of_pid(pid)->child_reaper = p;
p->signal->flags |= SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;
}
signal: Don't restart fork when signals come in. Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> and majiang <ma.jiang@zte.com.cn> report that a periodic signal received during fork can cause fork to continually restart preventing an application from making progress. The code was being overly pessimistic. Fork needs to guarantee that a signal sent to multiple processes is logically delivered before the fork and just to the forking process or logically delivered after the fork to both the forking process and it's newly spawned child. For signals like periodic timers that are always delivered to a single process fork can safely complete and let them appear to logically delivered after the fork(). While examining this issue I also discovered that fork today will miss signals delivered to multiple processes during the fork and handled by another thread. Similarly the current code will also miss blocked signals that are delivered to multiple process, as those signals will not appear pending during fork. Add a list of each thread that is currently forking, and keep on that list a signal set that records all of the signals sent to multiple processes. When fork completes initialize the new processes shared_pending signal set with it. The calculate_sigpending function will see those signals and set TIF_SIGPENDING causing the new task to take the slow path to userspace to handle those signals. Making it appear as if those signals were received immediately after the fork. It is not possible to send real time signals to multiple processes and exceptions don't go to multiple processes, which means that that are no signals sent to multiple processes that require siginfo. This means it is safe to not bother collecting siginfo on signals sent during fork. The sigaction of a child of fork is initially the same as the sigaction of the parent process. So a signal the parent ignores the child will also initially ignore. Therefore it is safe to ignore signals sent to multiple processes and ignored by the forking process. Signals sent to only a single process or only a single thread and delivered during fork are treated as if they are received after the fork, and generally not dealt with. They won't cause any problems. V2: Added removal from the multiprocess list on failure. V3: Use -ERESTARTNOINTR directly V4: - Don't queue both SIGCONT and SIGSTOP - Initialize signal_struct.multiprocess in init_task - Move setting of shared_pending to before the new task is visible to signals. This prevents signals from comming in before shared_pending.signal is set to delayed.signal and being lost. V5: - rework list add and delete to account for idle threads v6: - Use sigdelsetmask when removing stop signals Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200447 Reported-by: Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> and Reported-by: majiang <ma.jiang@zte.com.cn> Fixes: 4a2c7a7837da ("[PATCH] make fork() atomic wrt pgrp/session signals") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-07-24 03:20:37 +07:00
p->signal->shared_pending.signal = delayed.signal;
p->signal->tty = tty_kref_get(current->signal->tty);
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant If process forks some children when it has is_child_subreaper flag enabled they will inherit has_child_subreaper flag - first group, when is_child_subreaper is disabled forked children will not inherit it - second group. So child-subreaper does not reparent all his descendants when their parents die. Having these two differently behaving groups can lead to confusion. Also it is a problem for CRIU, as when we restore process tree we need to somehow determine which descendants belong to which group and much harder - to put them exactly to these group. To simplify these we can add a propagation of has_child_subreaper flag on PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER, walking all descendants of child- subreaper to setup has_child_subreaper flag. In common cases when process like systemd first sets itself to be a child-subreaper and only after that forks its services, we will have zero-length list of descendants to walk. Testing with binary subtree of 2^15 processes prctl took < 0.007 sec and has shown close to linear dependency(~0.2 * n * usec) on lower numbers of processes. Moreover, I doubt someone intentionaly pre-forks the children whitch should reparent to init before becoming subreaper, because some our ancestor migh have had is_child_subreaper flag while forking our sub-tree and our childs will all inherit has_child_subreaper flag, and we have no way to influence it. And only way to check if we have no has_child_subreaper flag is to create some childs, kill them and see where they will reparent to. Using walk_process_tree helper to walk subtree, thanks to Oleg! Timing seems to be the same. Optimize: a) When descendant already has has_child_subreaper flag all his subtree has it too already. * for a) to be true need to move has_child_subreaper inheritance under the same tasklist_lock with adding task to its ->real_parent->children as without it process can inherit zero has_child_subreaper, then we set 1 to it's parent flag, check that parent has no more children, and only after child with wrong flag is added to the tree. * Also make these inheritance more clear by using real_parent instead of current, as on clone(CLONE_PARENT) if current has is_child_subreaper and real_parent has no is_child_subreaper or has_child_subreaper, child will have has_child_subreaper flag set without actually having a subreaper in it's ancestors. b) When some descendant is child_reaper, it's subtree is in different pidns from us(original child-subreaper) and processes from other pidns will never reparent to us. So we can skip their(a,b) subtree from walk. v2: switch to walk_process_tree() general helper, move has_child_subreaper inheritance v3: remove csr_descendant leftover, change current to real_parent in has_child_subreaper inheritance v4: small commit message fix Fixes: ebec18a6d3aa ("prctl: add PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER to allow simple process supervision") Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-01-30 22:06:12 +07:00
/*
* Inherit has_child_subreaper flag under the same
* tasklist_lock with adding child to the process tree
* for propagate_has_child_subreaper optimization.
*/
p->signal->has_child_subreaper = p->real_parent->signal->has_child_subreaper ||
p->real_parent->signal->is_child_subreaper;
list_add_tail(&p->sibling, &p->real_parent->children);
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->tasks, &init_task.tasks);
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_TGID);
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID);
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_SID);
__this_cpu_inc(process_counts);
} else {
current->signal->nr_threads++;
atomic_inc(&current->signal->live);
sched/core: Convert signal_struct.sigcnt to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable signal_struct.sigcnt is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. ** Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the signal_struct.sigcnt it might make a difference in following places: - put_signal_struct(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547814450-18902-3-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-01-18 19:27:27 +07:00
refcount_inc(&current->signal->sigcnt);
task_join_group_stop(p);
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->thread_group,
&p->group_leader->thread_group);
introduce for_each_thread() to replace the buggy while_each_thread() while_each_thread() and next_thread() should die, almost every lockless usage is wrong. 1. Unless g == current, the lockless while_each_thread() is not safe. while_each_thread(g, t) can loop forever if g exits, next_thread() can't reach the unhashed thread in this case. Note that this can happen even if g is the group leader, it can exec. 2. Even if while_each_thread() itself was correct, people often use it wrongly. It was never safe to just take rcu_read_lock() and loop unless you verify that pid_alive(g) == T, even the first next_thread() can point to the already freed/reused memory. This patch adds signal_struct->thread_head and task->thread_node to create the normal rcu-safe list with the stable head. The new for_each_thread(g, t) helper is always safe under rcu_read_lock() as long as this task_struct can't go away. Note: of course it is ugly to have both task_struct->thread_node and the old task_struct->thread_group, we will kill it later, after we change the users of while_each_thread() to use for_each_thread(). Perhaps we can kill it even before we convert all users, we can reimplement next_thread(t) using the new thread_head/thread_node. But we can't do this right now because this will lead to subtle behavioural changes. For example, do/while_each_thread() always sees at least one task, while for_each_thread() can do nothing if the whole thread group has died. Or thread_group_empty(), currently its semantics is not clear unless thread_group_leader(p) and we need to audit the callers before we can change it. So this patch adds the new interface which has to coexist with the old one for some time, hopefully the next changes will be more or less straightforward and the old one will go away soon. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org> Cc: "Ma, Xindong" <xindong.ma@intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: "Tu, Xiaobing" <xiaobing.tu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-01-22 06:49:56 +07:00
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->thread_node,
&p->signal->thread_head);
}
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID);
nr_threads++;
}
total_forks++;
signal: Don't restart fork when signals come in. Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> and majiang <ma.jiang@zte.com.cn> report that a periodic signal received during fork can cause fork to continually restart preventing an application from making progress. The code was being overly pessimistic. Fork needs to guarantee that a signal sent to multiple processes is logically delivered before the fork and just to the forking process or logically delivered after the fork to both the forking process and it's newly spawned child. For signals like periodic timers that are always delivered to a single process fork can safely complete and let them appear to logically delivered after the fork(). While examining this issue I also discovered that fork today will miss signals delivered to multiple processes during the fork and handled by another thread. Similarly the current code will also miss blocked signals that are delivered to multiple process, as those signals will not appear pending during fork. Add a list of each thread that is currently forking, and keep on that list a signal set that records all of the signals sent to multiple processes. When fork completes initialize the new processes shared_pending signal set with it. The calculate_sigpending function will see those signals and set TIF_SIGPENDING causing the new task to take the slow path to userspace to handle those signals. Making it appear as if those signals were received immediately after the fork. It is not possible to send real time signals to multiple processes and exceptions don't go to multiple processes, which means that that are no signals sent to multiple processes that require siginfo. This means it is safe to not bother collecting siginfo on signals sent during fork. The sigaction of a child of fork is initially the same as the sigaction of the parent process. So a signal the parent ignores the child will also initially ignore. Therefore it is safe to ignore signals sent to multiple processes and ignored by the forking process. Signals sent to only a single process or only a single thread and delivered during fork are treated as if they are received after the fork, and generally not dealt with. They won't cause any problems. V2: Added removal from the multiprocess list on failure. V3: Use -ERESTARTNOINTR directly V4: - Don't queue both SIGCONT and SIGSTOP - Initialize signal_struct.multiprocess in init_task - Move setting of shared_pending to before the new task is visible to signals. This prevents signals from comming in before shared_pending.signal is set to delayed.signal and being lost. V5: - rework list add and delete to account for idle threads v6: - Use sigdelsetmask when removing stop signals Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200447 Reported-by: Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> and Reported-by: majiang <ma.jiang@zte.com.cn> Fixes: 4a2c7a7837da ("[PATCH] make fork() atomic wrt pgrp/session signals") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-07-24 03:20:37 +07:00
hlist_del_init(&delayed.node);
spin_unlock(&current->sighand->siglock);
syscall_tracepoint_update(p);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
proc_fork_connector(p);
cgroup_post_fork(p);
cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(current);
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 17:02:48 +07:00
perf_event_fork(p);
tracepoint: add tracepoints for debugging oom_score_adj oom_score_adj is used for guarding processes from OOM-Killer. One of problem is that it's inherited at fork(). When a daemon set oom_score_adj and make children, it's hard to know where the value is set. This patch adds some tracepoints useful for debugging. This patch adds 3 trace points. - creating new task - renaming a task (exec) - set oom_score_adj To debug, users need to enable some trace pointer. Maybe filtering is useful as # EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/task/ # echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_newtask/filter # echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_rename/filter # echo 1 > $EVENT/enable # EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/oom/ # echo 1 > $EVENT/enable output will be like this. # grep oom /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace bash-7699 [007] d..3 5140.744510: oom_score_adj_update: pid=7699 comm=bash oom_score_adj=-1000 bash-7699 [007] ...1 5151.818022: task_newtask: pid=7729 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000 ls-7729 [003] ...2 5151.818504: task_rename: pid=7729 oldcomm=bash newcomm=ls oom_score_adj=-1000 bash-7699 [002] ...1 5175.701468: task_newtask: pid=7730 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000 grep-7730 [007] ...2 5175.701993: task_rename: pid=7730 oldcomm=bash newcomm=grep oom_score_adj=-1000 Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-11 06:08:09 +07:00
trace_task_newtask(p, clone_flags);
uprobe_copy_process(p, clone_flags);
tracepoint: add tracepoints for debugging oom_score_adj oom_score_adj is used for guarding processes from OOM-Killer. One of problem is that it's inherited at fork(). When a daemon set oom_score_adj and make children, it's hard to know where the value is set. This patch adds some tracepoints useful for debugging. This patch adds 3 trace points. - creating new task - renaming a task (exec) - set oom_score_adj To debug, users need to enable some trace pointer. Maybe filtering is useful as # EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/task/ # echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_newtask/filter # echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_rename/filter # echo 1 > $EVENT/enable # EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/oom/ # echo 1 > $EVENT/enable output will be like this. # grep oom /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace bash-7699 [007] d..3 5140.744510: oom_score_adj_update: pid=7699 comm=bash oom_score_adj=-1000 bash-7699 [007] ...1 5151.818022: task_newtask: pid=7729 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000 ls-7729 [003] ...2 5151.818504: task_rename: pid=7729 oldcomm=bash newcomm=ls oom_score_adj=-1000 bash-7699 [002] ...1 5175.701468: task_newtask: pid=7730 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000 grep-7730 [007] ...2 5175.701993: task_rename: pid=7730 oldcomm=bash newcomm=grep oom_score_adj=-1000 Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-11 06:08:09 +07:00
return p;
bad_fork_cancel_cgroup:
pid_ns: Fix race between setns'ed fork() and zap_pid_ns_processes() Imagine we have a pid namespace and a task from its parent's pid_ns, which made setns() to the pid namespace. The task is doing fork(), while the pid namespace's child reaper is dying. We have the race between them: Task from parent pid_ns Child reaper copy_process() .. alloc_pid() .. .. zap_pid_ns_processes() .. disable_pid_allocation() .. read_lock(&tasklist_lock) .. iterate over pids in pid_ns .. kill tasks linked to pids .. read_unlock(&tasklist_lock) write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); .. attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID); .. .. .. So, just created task p won't receive SIGKILL signal, and the pid namespace will be in contradictory state. Only manual kill will help there, but does the userspace care about this? I suppose, the most users just inject a task into a pid namespace and wait a SIGCHLD from it. The patch fixes the problem. It simply checks for (pid_ns->nr_hashed & PIDNS_HASH_ADDING) in copy_process(). We do it under the tasklist_lock, and can't skip PIDNS_HASH_ADDING as noted by Oleg: "zap_pid_ns_processes() does disable_pid_allocation() and then takes tasklist_lock to kill the whole namespace. Given that copy_process() checks PIDNS_HASH_ADDING under write_lock(tasklist) they can't race; if copy_process() takes this lock first, the new child will be killed, otherwise copy_process() can't miss the change in ->nr_hashed." If allocation is disabled, we just return -ENOMEM like it's made for such cases in alloc_pid(). v2: Do not move disable_pid_allocation(), do not introduce a new variable in copy_process() and simplify the patch as suggested by Oleg Nesterov. Account the problem with double irq enabling found by Eric W. Biederman. Fixes: c876ad768215 ("pidns: Stop pid allocation when init dies") Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> CC: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> CC: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> CC: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> CC: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> CC: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> CC: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-05-12 23:11:31 +07:00
spin_unlock(&current->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
cgroup_cancel_fork(p);
fork: do not release lock that wasn't taken Avoid calling cgroup_threadgroup_change_end() without having called cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin() first. During process creation we need to check whether the cgroup we are in allows us to fork. To perform this check the cgroup needs to guard itself against threadgroup changes and takes a lock. Prior to CLONE_PIDFD the cleanup target "bad_fork_free_pid" would also need to call cgroup_threadgroup_change_end() because said lock had already been taken. However, this is not the case anymore with the addition of CLONE_PIDFD. We are now allocating a pidfd before we check whether the cgroup we're in can fork and thus prior to taking the lock. So when copy_process() fails at the right step it would release a lock we haven't taken. This bug is not even very subtle to be honest. It's just not very clear from the naming of cgroup_threadgroup_change_{begin,end}() that a lock is taken. Here's the relevant splat: entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139 RIP: 0023:0xf7fec849 Code: 85 d2 74 02 89 0a 5b 5d c3 8b 04 24 c3 8b 14 24 c3 8b 3c 24 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 eb 0d 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 002b:00000000ffed5a8c EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000078 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000003ffc RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000200005c0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000012 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ------------[ cut here ]------------ DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(depth <= 0) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7744 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4052 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4052 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7744 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4052 lock_release+0x667/0xa00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4321 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 7744 Comm: syz-executor007 Not tainted 5.1.0+ #4 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x2cb/0x65c kernel/panic.c:214 __warn.cold+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:566 report_bug+0x263/0x2b0 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:179 [inline] fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:272 do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:291 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:972 RIP: 0010:__lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4052 [inline] RIP: 0010:lock_release+0x667/0xa00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4321 Code: 0f 85 a0 03 00 00 8b 35 77 66 08 08 85 f6 75 23 48 c7 c6 a0 55 6b 87 48 c7 c7 40 25 6b 87 4c 89 85 70 ff ff ff e8 b7 a9 eb ff <0f> 0b 4c 8b 85 70 ff ff ff 4c 89 ea 4c 89 e6 4c 89 c7 e8 52 63 ff RSP: 0018:ffff888094117b48 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11012822f6f RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff815af236 RDI: ffffed1012822f5b RBP: ffff888094117c00 R08: ffff888092bfc400 R09: fffffbfff113301d R10: fffffbfff113301c R11: ffffffff889980e3 R12: ffffffff8a451df8 R13: ffffffff8142e71f R14: ffffffff8a44cc80 R15: ffff888094117bd8 percpu_up_read.constprop.0+0xcb/0x110 include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:92 cgroup_threadgroup_change_end include/linux/cgroup-defs.h:712 [inline] copy_process.part.0+0x47ff/0x6710 kernel/fork.c:2222 copy_process kernel/fork.c:1772 [inline] _do_fork+0x25d/0xfd0 kernel/fork.c:2338 __do_compat_sys_x86_clone arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c:240 [inline] __se_compat_sys_x86_clone arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c:236 [inline] __ia32_compat_sys_x86_clone+0xbc/0x140 arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c:236 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:334 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x281/0xd54 arch/x86/entry/common.c:405 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139 RIP: 0023:0xf7fec849 Code: 85 d2 74 02 89 0a 5b 5d c3 8b 04 24 c3 8b 14 24 c3 8b 3c 24 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 eb 0d 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 002b:00000000ffed5a8c EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000078 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000003ffc RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000200005c0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000012 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Kernel Offset: disabled Rebooting in 86400 seconds.. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+3286e58549edc479faae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: b3e583825266 ("clone: add CLONE_PIDFD") Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
2019-05-10 16:53:46 +07:00
bad_fork_cgroup_threadgroup_change_end:
cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(current);
clone: add CLONE_PIDFD This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call. As spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left. CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new mount api. They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids. Logically, this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending). Thus, a pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege. This does not imply it cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case. A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d". As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the parent_tidptr argument of clone. This has the advantage that we can give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time. To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process metadata through /proc/<pid>. The sample program can easily be translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-27 19:04:15 +07:00
bad_fork_put_pidfd:
if (clone_flags & CLONE_PIDFD) {
fput(pidfile);
put_unused_fd(pidfd);
}
bad_fork_free_pid:
if (pid != &init_struct_pid)
free_pid(pid);
fork: free thread in copy_process on failure When using this program (as root): #include <err.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/io.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #define ITER 1000 #define FORKERS 15 #define THREADS (6000/FORKERS) // 1850 is proc max static void fork_100_wait() { unsigned a, to_wait = 0; printf("\t%d forking %d\n", THREADS, getpid()); for (a = 0; a < THREADS; a++) { switch (fork()) { case 0: usleep(1000); exit(0); break; case -1: break; default: to_wait++; break; } } printf("\t%d forked from %d, waiting for %d\n", THREADS, getpid(), to_wait); for (a = 0; a < to_wait; a++) wait(NULL); printf("\t%d waited from %d\n", THREADS, getpid()); } static void run_forkers() { pid_t forkers[FORKERS]; unsigned a; for (a = 0; a < FORKERS; a++) { switch ((forkers[a] = fork())) { case 0: fork_100_wait(); exit(0); break; case -1: err(1, "DIE fork of %d'th forker", a); break; default: break; } } for (a = 0; a < FORKERS; a++) waitpid(forkers[a], NULL, 0); } int main() { unsigned a; int ret; ret = ioperm(10, 20, 0); if (ret < 0) err(1, "ioperm"); for (a = 0; a < ITER; a++) run_forkers(); return 0; } kmemleak reports many occurences of this leak: unreferenced object 0xffff8805917c8000 (size 8192): comm "fork-leak", pid 2932, jiffies 4295354292 (age 1871.028s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff814cfbf5>] kmemdup+0x25/0x50 [<ffffffff8103ab43>] copy_thread_tls+0x6c3/0x9a0 [<ffffffff81150174>] copy_process+0x1a84/0x5790 [<ffffffff811dc375>] wake_up_new_task+0x2d5/0x6f0 [<ffffffff8115411d>] _do_fork+0x12d/0x820 ... Due to the leakage of the memory items which should have been freed in arch/x86/kernel/process.c:exit_thread(). Make sure the memory is freed when fork fails later in copy_process. This is done by calling exit_thread with the thread to kill. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn> Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com> Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com> Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-21 07:00:25 +07:00
bad_fork_cleanup_thread:
exit_thread(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_io:
if (p->io_context)
exit_io_context(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces:
exit_task_namespaces(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_mm:
userfaultfd: use RCU to free the task struct when fork fails The task structure is freed while get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() holds rcu_read_lock() and dereferences mm->owner. get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() failing fork() ---- --- task = mm->owner mm->owner = NULL; free(task) if (task) *task; /* use after free */ The fix consists in freeing the task with RCU also in the fork failure case, exactly like it always happens for the regular exit(2) path. That is enough to make the rcu_read_lock hold in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() (left side above) effective to avoid a use after free when dereferencing the task structure. An alternate possible fix would be to defer the delivery of the userfaultfd contexts to the monitor until after fork() is guaranteed to succeed. Such a change would require more changes because it would create a strict ordering dependency where the uffd methods would need to be called beyond the last potentially failing branch in order to be safe. This solution as opposed only adds the dependency to common code to set mm->owner to NULL and to free the task struct that was pointed by mm->owner with RCU, if fork ends up failing. The userfaultfd methods can still be called anywhere during the fork runtime and the monitor will keep discarding orphaned "mm" coming from failed forks in userland. This race condition couldn't trigger if CONFIG_MEMCG was set =n at build time. [aarcange@redhat.com: improve changelog, reduce #ifdefs per Michal] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190429035752.4508-1-aarcange@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325225636.11635-2-aarcange@redhat.com Fixes: 893e26e61d04 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event") Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Tested-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Reported-by: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Cc: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-15 05:40:46 +07:00
if (p->mm) {
mm_clear_owner(p->mm, p);
mmput(p->mm);
userfaultfd: use RCU to free the task struct when fork fails The task structure is freed while get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() holds rcu_read_lock() and dereferences mm->owner. get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() failing fork() ---- --- task = mm->owner mm->owner = NULL; free(task) if (task) *task; /* use after free */ The fix consists in freeing the task with RCU also in the fork failure case, exactly like it always happens for the regular exit(2) path. That is enough to make the rcu_read_lock hold in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() (left side above) effective to avoid a use after free when dereferencing the task structure. An alternate possible fix would be to defer the delivery of the userfaultfd contexts to the monitor until after fork() is guaranteed to succeed. Such a change would require more changes because it would create a strict ordering dependency where the uffd methods would need to be called beyond the last potentially failing branch in order to be safe. This solution as opposed only adds the dependency to common code to set mm->owner to NULL and to free the task struct that was pointed by mm->owner with RCU, if fork ends up failing. The userfaultfd methods can still be called anywhere during the fork runtime and the monitor will keep discarding orphaned "mm" coming from failed forks in userland. This race condition couldn't trigger if CONFIG_MEMCG was set =n at build time. [aarcange@redhat.com: improve changelog, reduce #ifdefs per Michal] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190429035752.4508-1-aarcange@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325225636.11635-2-aarcange@redhat.com Fixes: 893e26e61d04 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event") Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Tested-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Reported-by: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Cc: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-15 05:40:46 +07:00
}
bad_fork_cleanup_signal:
clone(): fix race between copy_process() and de_thread() Spotted by Hiroshi Shimamoto who also provided the test-case below. copy_process() uses signal->count as a reference counter, but it is not. This test case #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <pthread.h> void *null_thread(void *p) { for (;;) sleep(1); return NULL; } void *exec_thread(void *p) { execl("/bin/true", "/bin/true", NULL); return null_thread(p); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { for (;;) { pid_t pid; int ret, status; pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) break; if (!pid) { pthread_t tid; pthread_create(&tid, NULL, exec_thread, NULL); for (;;) pthread_create(&tid, NULL, null_thread, NULL); } do { ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0); } while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR); } return 0; } quickly creates an unkillable task. If copy_process(CLONE_THREAD) races with de_thread() copy_signal()->atomic(signal->count) breaks the signal->notify_count logic, and the execing thread can hang forever in kernel space. Change copy_process() to increment count/live only when we know for sure we can't fail. In this case the forked thread will take care of its reference to signal correctly. If copy_process() fails, check CLONE_THREAD flag. If it it set - do nothing, the counters were not changed and current belongs to the same thread group. If it is not set, ->signal must be released in any case (and ->count must be == 1), the forked child is the only thread in the thread group. We need more cleanups here, in particular signal->count should not be used by de_thread/__exit_signal at all. This patch only fixes the bug. Reported-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com> Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-08-27 04:29:24 +07:00
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD))
free_signal_struct(p->signal);
bad_fork_cleanup_sighand:
__cleanup_sighand(p->sighand);
bad_fork_cleanup_fs:
exit_fs(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_files:
exit_files(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_semundo:
exit_sem(p);
LSM: Revive security_task_alloc() hook and per "struct task_struct" security blob. We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change. TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob, security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob. We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"-> security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged this patch. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-03-24 18:46:33 +07:00
bad_fork_cleanup_security:
security_task_free(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_audit:
audit_free(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_perf:
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 17:02:48 +07:00
perf_event_free_task(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_policy:
lockdep_free_task(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
mpol_put(p->mempolicy);
bad_fork_cleanup_threadgroup_lock:
#endif
delayacct_tsk_free(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_count:
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 06:39:23 +07:00
atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes);
exit_creds(p);
bad_fork_free:
p->state = TASK_DEAD;
put_task_stack(p);
userfaultfd: use RCU to free the task struct when fork fails The task structure is freed while get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() holds rcu_read_lock() and dereferences mm->owner. get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() failing fork() ---- --- task = mm->owner mm->owner = NULL; free(task) if (task) *task; /* use after free */ The fix consists in freeing the task with RCU also in the fork failure case, exactly like it always happens for the regular exit(2) path. That is enough to make the rcu_read_lock hold in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() (left side above) effective to avoid a use after free when dereferencing the task structure. An alternate possible fix would be to defer the delivery of the userfaultfd contexts to the monitor until after fork() is guaranteed to succeed. Such a change would require more changes because it would create a strict ordering dependency where the uffd methods would need to be called beyond the last potentially failing branch in order to be safe. This solution as opposed only adds the dependency to common code to set mm->owner to NULL and to free the task struct that was pointed by mm->owner with RCU, if fork ends up failing. The userfaultfd methods can still be called anywhere during the fork runtime and the monitor will keep discarding orphaned "mm" coming from failed forks in userland. This race condition couldn't trigger if CONFIG_MEMCG was set =n at build time. [aarcange@redhat.com: improve changelog, reduce #ifdefs per Michal] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190429035752.4508-1-aarcange@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325225636.11635-2-aarcange@redhat.com Fixes: 893e26e61d04 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event") Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Tested-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Reported-by: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Cc: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-15 05:40:46 +07:00
delayed_free_task(p);
fork_out:
signal: Don't restart fork when signals come in. Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> and majiang <ma.jiang@zte.com.cn> report that a periodic signal received during fork can cause fork to continually restart preventing an application from making progress. The code was being overly pessimistic. Fork needs to guarantee that a signal sent to multiple processes is logically delivered before the fork and just to the forking process or logically delivered after the fork to both the forking process and it's newly spawned child. For signals like periodic timers that are always delivered to a single process fork can safely complete and let them appear to logically delivered after the fork(). While examining this issue I also discovered that fork today will miss signals delivered to multiple processes during the fork and handled by another thread. Similarly the current code will also miss blocked signals that are delivered to multiple process, as those signals will not appear pending during fork. Add a list of each thread that is currently forking, and keep on that list a signal set that records all of the signals sent to multiple processes. When fork completes initialize the new processes shared_pending signal set with it. The calculate_sigpending function will see those signals and set TIF_SIGPENDING causing the new task to take the slow path to userspace to handle those signals. Making it appear as if those signals were received immediately after the fork. It is not possible to send real time signals to multiple processes and exceptions don't go to multiple processes, which means that that are no signals sent to multiple processes that require siginfo. This means it is safe to not bother collecting siginfo on signals sent during fork. The sigaction of a child of fork is initially the same as the sigaction of the parent process. So a signal the parent ignores the child will also initially ignore. Therefore it is safe to ignore signals sent to multiple processes and ignored by the forking process. Signals sent to only a single process or only a single thread and delivered during fork are treated as if they are received after the fork, and generally not dealt with. They won't cause any problems. V2: Added removal from the multiprocess list on failure. V3: Use -ERESTARTNOINTR directly V4: - Don't queue both SIGCONT and SIGSTOP - Initialize signal_struct.multiprocess in init_task - Move setting of shared_pending to before the new task is visible to signals. This prevents signals from comming in before shared_pending.signal is set to delayed.signal and being lost. V5: - rework list add and delete to account for idle threads v6: - Use sigdelsetmask when removing stop signals Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200447 Reported-by: Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> and Reported-by: majiang <ma.jiang@zte.com.cn> Fixes: 4a2c7a7837da ("[PATCH] make fork() atomic wrt pgrp/session signals") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-07-24 03:20:37 +07:00
spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
hlist_del_init(&delayed.node);
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
return ERR_PTR(retval);
}
static inline void init_idle_pids(struct task_struct *idle)
{
enum pid_type type;
for (type = PIDTYPE_PID; type < PIDTYPE_MAX; ++type) {
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&idle->pid_links[type]); /* not really needed */
init_task_pid(idle, type, &init_struct_pid);
}
}
struct task_struct *fork_idle(int cpu)
{
struct task_struct *task;
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
struct kernel_clone_args args = {
.flags = CLONE_VM,
};
task = copy_process(&init_struct_pid, 0, cpu_to_node(cpu), &args);
if (!IS_ERR(task)) {
init_idle_pids(task);
init_idle(task, cpu);
}
return task;
}
struct mm_struct *copy_init_mm(void)
{
return dup_mm(NULL, &init_mm);
}
/*
* Ok, this is the main fork-routine.
*
* It copies the process, and if successful kick-starts
* it and waits for it to finish using the VM if required.
fork: block invalid exit signals with clone3() Previously, higher 32 bits of exit_signal fields were lost when copied to the kernel args structure (that uses int as a type for the respective field). Moreover, as Oleg has noted, exit_signal is used unchecked, so it has to be checked for sanity before use; for the legacy syscalls, applying CSIGNAL mask guarantees that it is at least non-negative; however, there's no such thing is done in clone3() code path, and that can break at least thread_group_leader. This commit adds a check to copy_clone_args_from_user() to verify that the exit signal is limited by CSIGNAL as with legacy clone() and that the signal is valid. With this we don't get the legacy clone behavior were an invalid signal could be handed down and would only be detected and ignored in do_notify_parent(). Users of clone3() will now get a proper error when they pass an invalid exit signal. Note, that this is not user-visible behavior since no kernel with clone3() has been released yet. The following program will cause a splat on a non-fixed clone3() version and will fail correctly on a fixed version: #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <sched.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { pid_t pid = -1; struct clone_args args = {0}; args.exit_signal = -1; pid = syscall(__NR_clone3, &args, sizeof(struct clone_args)); if (pid < 0) exit(EXIT_FAILURE); if (pid == 0) exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); wait(NULL); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } Fixes: 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add clone3") Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4b38fa4ce420b119a4c6345f42fe3cec2de9b0b5.1568223594.git.esyr@redhat.com [christian.brauner@ubuntu.com: simplify check and rework commit message] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2019-09-12 00:45:40 +07:00
*
* args->exit_signal is expected to be checked for sanity by the caller.
*/
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
long _do_fork(struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
struct completion vfork;
struct pid *pid;
struct task_struct *p;
int trace = 0;
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 17:31:42 +07:00
long nr;
/*
* Determine whether and which event to report to ptracer. When
* called from kernel_thread or CLONE_UNTRACED is explicitly
* requested, no event is reported; otherwise, report if the event
* for the type of forking is enabled.
*/
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_UNTRACED)) {
if (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK)
trace = PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK;
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
else if (args->exit_signal != SIGCHLD)
trace = PTRACE_EVENT_CLONE;
else
trace = PTRACE_EVENT_FORK;
if (likely(!ptrace_event_enabled(current, trace)))
trace = 0;
}
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
p = copy_process(NULL, trace, NUMA_NO_NODE, args);
gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation (due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering, thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc). At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals. The need for very-early boot entropy tends to be very architecture or system design specific, so this plugin is more suited for those sorts of special cases. The existing kernel RNG already attempts to extract entropy from reliable runtime variation, but this plugin takes the idea to a logical extreme by permuting a global variable based on any variation in code execution (e.g. a different value (and permutation function) is used to permute the global based on loop count, case statement, if/then/else branching, etc). To do this, the plugin starts by inserting a local variable in every marked function. The plugin then adds logic so that the value of this variable is modified by randomly chosen operations (add, xor and rol) and random values (gcc generates separate static values for each location at compile time and also injects the stack pointer at runtime). The resulting value depends on the control flow path (e.g., loops and branches taken). Before the function returns, the plugin mixes this local variable into the latent_entropy global variable. The value of this global variable is added to the kernel entropy pool in do_one_initcall() and _do_fork(), though it does not credit any bytes of entropy to the pool; the contents of the global are just used to mix the pool. Additionally, the plugin can pre-initialize arrays with build-time random contents, so that two different kernel builds running on identical hardware will not have the same starting values. Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> [kees: expanded commit message and code comments] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2016-06-21 01:41:19 +07:00
add_latent_entropy();
if (IS_ERR(p))
return PTR_ERR(p);
/*
* Do this prior waking up the new thread - the thread pointer
* might get invalid after that point, if the thread exits quickly.
*/
trace_sched_process_fork(current, p);
pid = get_task_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID);
nr = pid_vnr(pid);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT_SETTID)
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
put_user(nr, args->parent_tid);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK) {
p->vfork_done = &vfork;
init_completion(&vfork);
get_task_struct(p);
}
wake_up_new_task(p);
/* forking complete and child started to run, tell ptracer */
if (unlikely(trace))
ptrace_event_pid(trace, pid);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK) {
if (!wait_for_vfork_done(p, &vfork))
ptrace_event_pid(PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE, pid);
}
put_pid(pid);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 17:31:42 +07:00
return nr;
}
bool legacy_clone_args_valid(const struct kernel_clone_args *kargs)
{
/* clone(CLONE_PIDFD) uses parent_tidptr to return a pidfd */
if ((kargs->flags & CLONE_PIDFD) &&
(kargs->flags & CLONE_PARENT_SETTID))
return false;
return true;
}
clone: support passing tls argument via C rather than pt_regs magic clone has some of the quirkiest syscall handling in the kernel, with a pile of special cases, historical curiosities, and architecture-specific calling conventions. In particular, clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts a parameter "tls" that the C entry point completely ignores and some assembly entry points overwrite; instead, the low-level arch-specific code pulls the tls parameter out of the arch-specific register captured as part of pt_regs on entry to the kernel. That's a massive hack, and it makes the arch-specific code only work when called via the specific existing syscall entry points; because of this hack, any new clone-like system call would have to accept an identical tls argument in exactly the same arch-specific position, rather than providing a unified system call entry point across architectures. The first patch allows architectures to handle the tls argument via normal C parameter passing, if they opt in by selecting HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. The second patch makes 32-bit and 64-bit x86 opt into this. These two patches came out of the clone4 series, which isn't ready for this merge window, but these first two cleanup patches were entirely uncontroversial and have acks. I'd like to go ahead and submit these two so that other architectures can begin building on top of this and opting into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. However, I'm also happy to wait and send these through the next merge window (along with v3 of clone4) if anyone would prefer that. This patch (of 2): clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts an argument to set the thread-local storage area for the new thread. sys_clone declares an int argument tls_val in the appropriate point in the argument list (based on the various CLONE_BACKWARDS variants), but doesn't actually use or pass along that argument. Instead, sys_clone calls do_fork, which calls copy_process, which calls the arch-specific copy_thread, and copy_thread pulls the corresponding syscall argument out of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry (knowing what argument of clone that architecture passes tls in). Apart from being awful and inscrutable, that also only works because only one code path into copy_thread can pass the CLONE_SETTLS flag, and that code path comes from sys_clone with its architecture-specific argument-passing order. This prevents introducing a new version of the clone system call without propagating the same architecture-specific position of the tls argument. However, there's no reason to pull the argument out of pt_regs when sys_clone could just pass it down via C function call arguments. Introduce a new CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS for architectures to opt into, and a new copy_thread_tls that accepts the tls parameter as an additional unsigned long (syscall-argument-sized) argument. Change sys_clone's tls argument to an unsigned long (which does not change the ABI), and pass that down to copy_thread_tls. Architectures that don't opt into copy_thread_tls will continue to ignore the C argument to sys_clone in favor of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry, and thus will be unable to introduce new versions of the clone syscall. Patch co-authored by Josh Triplett and Thiago Macieira. Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-26 05:01:19 +07:00
#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS
/* For compatibility with architectures that call do_fork directly rather than
* using the syscall entry points below. */
long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_start,
unsigned long stack_size,
int __user *parent_tidptr,
int __user *child_tidptr)
{
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
struct kernel_clone_args args = {
.flags = (clone_flags & ~CSIGNAL),
.pidfd = parent_tidptr,
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
.child_tid = child_tidptr,
.parent_tid = parent_tidptr,
.exit_signal = (clone_flags & CSIGNAL),
.stack = stack_start,
.stack_size = stack_size,
};
if (!legacy_clone_args_valid(&args))
return -EINVAL;
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
return _do_fork(&args);
clone: support passing tls argument via C rather than pt_regs magic clone has some of the quirkiest syscall handling in the kernel, with a pile of special cases, historical curiosities, and architecture-specific calling conventions. In particular, clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts a parameter "tls" that the C entry point completely ignores and some assembly entry points overwrite; instead, the low-level arch-specific code pulls the tls parameter out of the arch-specific register captured as part of pt_regs on entry to the kernel. That's a massive hack, and it makes the arch-specific code only work when called via the specific existing syscall entry points; because of this hack, any new clone-like system call would have to accept an identical tls argument in exactly the same arch-specific position, rather than providing a unified system call entry point across architectures. The first patch allows architectures to handle the tls argument via normal C parameter passing, if they opt in by selecting HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. The second patch makes 32-bit and 64-bit x86 opt into this. These two patches came out of the clone4 series, which isn't ready for this merge window, but these first two cleanup patches were entirely uncontroversial and have acks. I'd like to go ahead and submit these two so that other architectures can begin building on top of this and opting into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. However, I'm also happy to wait and send these through the next merge window (along with v3 of clone4) if anyone would prefer that. This patch (of 2): clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts an argument to set the thread-local storage area for the new thread. sys_clone declares an int argument tls_val in the appropriate point in the argument list (based on the various CLONE_BACKWARDS variants), but doesn't actually use or pass along that argument. Instead, sys_clone calls do_fork, which calls copy_process, which calls the arch-specific copy_thread, and copy_thread pulls the corresponding syscall argument out of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry (knowing what argument of clone that architecture passes tls in). Apart from being awful and inscrutable, that also only works because only one code path into copy_thread can pass the CLONE_SETTLS flag, and that code path comes from sys_clone with its architecture-specific argument-passing order. This prevents introducing a new version of the clone system call without propagating the same architecture-specific position of the tls argument. However, there's no reason to pull the argument out of pt_regs when sys_clone could just pass it down via C function call arguments. Introduce a new CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS for architectures to opt into, and a new copy_thread_tls that accepts the tls parameter as an additional unsigned long (syscall-argument-sized) argument. Change sys_clone's tls argument to an unsigned long (which does not change the ABI), and pass that down to copy_thread_tls. Architectures that don't opt into copy_thread_tls will continue to ignore the C argument to sys_clone in favor of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry, and thus will be unable to introduce new versions of the clone syscall. Patch co-authored by Josh Triplett and Thiago Macieira. Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-26 05:01:19 +07:00
}
#endif
/*
* Create a kernel thread.
*/
pid_t kernel_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags)
{
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
struct kernel_clone_args args = {
.flags = ((flags | CLONE_VM | CLONE_UNTRACED) & ~CSIGNAL),
.exit_signal = (flags & CSIGNAL),
.stack = (unsigned long)fn,
.stack_size = (unsigned long)arg,
};
return _do_fork(&args);
}
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_FORK
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(fork)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
struct kernel_clone_args args = {
.exit_signal = SIGCHLD,
};
return _do_fork(&args);
#else
/* can not support in nommu mode */
return -EINVAL;
#endif
}
#endif
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_VFORK
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(vfork)
{
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
struct kernel_clone_args args = {
.flags = CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM,
.exit_signal = SIGCHLD,
};
return _do_fork(&args);
}
#endif
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
#ifdef CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(clone, unsigned long, clone_flags, unsigned long, newsp,
int __user *, parent_tidptr,
clone: support passing tls argument via C rather than pt_regs magic clone has some of the quirkiest syscall handling in the kernel, with a pile of special cases, historical curiosities, and architecture-specific calling conventions. In particular, clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts a parameter "tls" that the C entry point completely ignores and some assembly entry points overwrite; instead, the low-level arch-specific code pulls the tls parameter out of the arch-specific register captured as part of pt_regs on entry to the kernel. That's a massive hack, and it makes the arch-specific code only work when called via the specific existing syscall entry points; because of this hack, any new clone-like system call would have to accept an identical tls argument in exactly the same arch-specific position, rather than providing a unified system call entry point across architectures. The first patch allows architectures to handle the tls argument via normal C parameter passing, if they opt in by selecting HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. The second patch makes 32-bit and 64-bit x86 opt into this. These two patches came out of the clone4 series, which isn't ready for this merge window, but these first two cleanup patches were entirely uncontroversial and have acks. I'd like to go ahead and submit these two so that other architectures can begin building on top of this and opting into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. However, I'm also happy to wait and send these through the next merge window (along with v3 of clone4) if anyone would prefer that. This patch (of 2): clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts an argument to set the thread-local storage area for the new thread. sys_clone declares an int argument tls_val in the appropriate point in the argument list (based on the various CLONE_BACKWARDS variants), but doesn't actually use or pass along that argument. Instead, sys_clone calls do_fork, which calls copy_process, which calls the arch-specific copy_thread, and copy_thread pulls the corresponding syscall argument out of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry (knowing what argument of clone that architecture passes tls in). Apart from being awful and inscrutable, that also only works because only one code path into copy_thread can pass the CLONE_SETTLS flag, and that code path comes from sys_clone with its architecture-specific argument-passing order. This prevents introducing a new version of the clone system call without propagating the same architecture-specific position of the tls argument. However, there's no reason to pull the argument out of pt_regs when sys_clone could just pass it down via C function call arguments. Introduce a new CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS for architectures to opt into, and a new copy_thread_tls that accepts the tls parameter as an additional unsigned long (syscall-argument-sized) argument. Change sys_clone's tls argument to an unsigned long (which does not change the ABI), and pass that down to copy_thread_tls. Architectures that don't opt into copy_thread_tls will continue to ignore the C argument to sys_clone in favor of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry, and thus will be unable to introduce new versions of the clone syscall. Patch co-authored by Josh Triplett and Thiago Macieira. Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-26 05:01:19 +07:00
unsigned long, tls,
int __user *, child_tidptr)
#elif defined(CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS2)
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(clone, unsigned long, newsp, unsigned long, clone_flags,
int __user *, parent_tidptr,
int __user *, child_tidptr,
clone: support passing tls argument via C rather than pt_regs magic clone has some of the quirkiest syscall handling in the kernel, with a pile of special cases, historical curiosities, and architecture-specific calling conventions. In particular, clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts a parameter "tls" that the C entry point completely ignores and some assembly entry points overwrite; instead, the low-level arch-specific code pulls the tls parameter out of the arch-specific register captured as part of pt_regs on entry to the kernel. That's a massive hack, and it makes the arch-specific code only work when called via the specific existing syscall entry points; because of this hack, any new clone-like system call would have to accept an identical tls argument in exactly the same arch-specific position, rather than providing a unified system call entry point across architectures. The first patch allows architectures to handle the tls argument via normal C parameter passing, if they opt in by selecting HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. The second patch makes 32-bit and 64-bit x86 opt into this. These two patches came out of the clone4 series, which isn't ready for this merge window, but these first two cleanup patches were entirely uncontroversial and have acks. I'd like to go ahead and submit these two so that other architectures can begin building on top of this and opting into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. However, I'm also happy to wait and send these through the next merge window (along with v3 of clone4) if anyone would prefer that. This patch (of 2): clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts an argument to set the thread-local storage area for the new thread. sys_clone declares an int argument tls_val in the appropriate point in the argument list (based on the various CLONE_BACKWARDS variants), but doesn't actually use or pass along that argument. Instead, sys_clone calls do_fork, which calls copy_process, which calls the arch-specific copy_thread, and copy_thread pulls the corresponding syscall argument out of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry (knowing what argument of clone that architecture passes tls in). Apart from being awful and inscrutable, that also only works because only one code path into copy_thread can pass the CLONE_SETTLS flag, and that code path comes from sys_clone with its architecture-specific argument-passing order. This prevents introducing a new version of the clone system call without propagating the same architecture-specific position of the tls argument. However, there's no reason to pull the argument out of pt_regs when sys_clone could just pass it down via C function call arguments. Introduce a new CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS for architectures to opt into, and a new copy_thread_tls that accepts the tls parameter as an additional unsigned long (syscall-argument-sized) argument. Change sys_clone's tls argument to an unsigned long (which does not change the ABI), and pass that down to copy_thread_tls. Architectures that don't opt into copy_thread_tls will continue to ignore the C argument to sys_clone in favor of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry, and thus will be unable to introduce new versions of the clone syscall. Patch co-authored by Josh Triplett and Thiago Macieira. Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-26 05:01:19 +07:00
unsigned long, tls)
#elif defined(CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS3)
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(clone, unsigned long, clone_flags, unsigned long, newsp,
int, stack_size,
int __user *, parent_tidptr,
int __user *, child_tidptr,
clone: support passing tls argument via C rather than pt_regs magic clone has some of the quirkiest syscall handling in the kernel, with a pile of special cases, historical curiosities, and architecture-specific calling conventions. In particular, clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts a parameter "tls" that the C entry point completely ignores and some assembly entry points overwrite; instead, the low-level arch-specific code pulls the tls parameter out of the arch-specific register captured as part of pt_regs on entry to the kernel. That's a massive hack, and it makes the arch-specific code only work when called via the specific existing syscall entry points; because of this hack, any new clone-like system call would have to accept an identical tls argument in exactly the same arch-specific position, rather than providing a unified system call entry point across architectures. The first patch allows architectures to handle the tls argument via normal C parameter passing, if they opt in by selecting HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. The second patch makes 32-bit and 64-bit x86 opt into this. These two patches came out of the clone4 series, which isn't ready for this merge window, but these first two cleanup patches were entirely uncontroversial and have acks. I'd like to go ahead and submit these two so that other architectures can begin building on top of this and opting into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. However, I'm also happy to wait and send these through the next merge window (along with v3 of clone4) if anyone would prefer that. This patch (of 2): clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts an argument to set the thread-local storage area for the new thread. sys_clone declares an int argument tls_val in the appropriate point in the argument list (based on the various CLONE_BACKWARDS variants), but doesn't actually use or pass along that argument. Instead, sys_clone calls do_fork, which calls copy_process, which calls the arch-specific copy_thread, and copy_thread pulls the corresponding syscall argument out of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry (knowing what argument of clone that architecture passes tls in). Apart from being awful and inscrutable, that also only works because only one code path into copy_thread can pass the CLONE_SETTLS flag, and that code path comes from sys_clone with its architecture-specific argument-passing order. This prevents introducing a new version of the clone system call without propagating the same architecture-specific position of the tls argument. However, there's no reason to pull the argument out of pt_regs when sys_clone could just pass it down via C function call arguments. Introduce a new CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS for architectures to opt into, and a new copy_thread_tls that accepts the tls parameter as an additional unsigned long (syscall-argument-sized) argument. Change sys_clone's tls argument to an unsigned long (which does not change the ABI), and pass that down to copy_thread_tls. Architectures that don't opt into copy_thread_tls will continue to ignore the C argument to sys_clone in favor of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry, and thus will be unable to introduce new versions of the clone syscall. Patch co-authored by Josh Triplett and Thiago Macieira. Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-26 05:01:19 +07:00
unsigned long, tls)
#else
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(clone, unsigned long, clone_flags, unsigned long, newsp,
int __user *, parent_tidptr,
int __user *, child_tidptr,
clone: support passing tls argument via C rather than pt_regs magic clone has some of the quirkiest syscall handling in the kernel, with a pile of special cases, historical curiosities, and architecture-specific calling conventions. In particular, clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts a parameter "tls" that the C entry point completely ignores and some assembly entry points overwrite; instead, the low-level arch-specific code pulls the tls parameter out of the arch-specific register captured as part of pt_regs on entry to the kernel. That's a massive hack, and it makes the arch-specific code only work when called via the specific existing syscall entry points; because of this hack, any new clone-like system call would have to accept an identical tls argument in exactly the same arch-specific position, rather than providing a unified system call entry point across architectures. The first patch allows architectures to handle the tls argument via normal C parameter passing, if they opt in by selecting HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. The second patch makes 32-bit and 64-bit x86 opt into this. These two patches came out of the clone4 series, which isn't ready for this merge window, but these first two cleanup patches were entirely uncontroversial and have acks. I'd like to go ahead and submit these two so that other architectures can begin building on top of this and opting into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. However, I'm also happy to wait and send these through the next merge window (along with v3 of clone4) if anyone would prefer that. This patch (of 2): clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts an argument to set the thread-local storage area for the new thread. sys_clone declares an int argument tls_val in the appropriate point in the argument list (based on the various CLONE_BACKWARDS variants), but doesn't actually use or pass along that argument. Instead, sys_clone calls do_fork, which calls copy_process, which calls the arch-specific copy_thread, and copy_thread pulls the corresponding syscall argument out of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry (knowing what argument of clone that architecture passes tls in). Apart from being awful and inscrutable, that also only works because only one code path into copy_thread can pass the CLONE_SETTLS flag, and that code path comes from sys_clone with its architecture-specific argument-passing order. This prevents introducing a new version of the clone system call without propagating the same architecture-specific position of the tls argument. However, there's no reason to pull the argument out of pt_regs when sys_clone could just pass it down via C function call arguments. Introduce a new CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS for architectures to opt into, and a new copy_thread_tls that accepts the tls parameter as an additional unsigned long (syscall-argument-sized) argument. Change sys_clone's tls argument to an unsigned long (which does not change the ABI), and pass that down to copy_thread_tls. Architectures that don't opt into copy_thread_tls will continue to ignore the C argument to sys_clone in favor of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry, and thus will be unable to introduce new versions of the clone syscall. Patch co-authored by Josh Triplett and Thiago Macieira. Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-26 05:01:19 +07:00
unsigned long, tls)
#endif
{
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
struct kernel_clone_args args = {
.flags = (clone_flags & ~CSIGNAL),
.pidfd = parent_tidptr,
.child_tid = child_tidptr,
.parent_tid = parent_tidptr,
.exit_signal = (clone_flags & CSIGNAL),
.stack = newsp,
.tls = tls,
};
if (!legacy_clone_args_valid(&args))
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
return -EINVAL;
return _do_fork(&args);
}
2019-06-21 06:26:35 +07:00
#endif
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
2019-06-21 06:26:35 +07:00
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
noinline static int copy_clone_args_from_user(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs,
struct clone_args __user *uargs,
size_t usize)
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
{
int err;
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
struct clone_args args;
if (unlikely(usize > PAGE_SIZE))
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
return -E2BIG;
if (unlikely(usize < CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER0))
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
return -EINVAL;
err = copy_struct_from_user(&args, sizeof(args), uargs, usize);
if (err)
return err;
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
fork: block invalid exit signals with clone3() Previously, higher 32 bits of exit_signal fields were lost when copied to the kernel args structure (that uses int as a type for the respective field). Moreover, as Oleg has noted, exit_signal is used unchecked, so it has to be checked for sanity before use; for the legacy syscalls, applying CSIGNAL mask guarantees that it is at least non-negative; however, there's no such thing is done in clone3() code path, and that can break at least thread_group_leader. This commit adds a check to copy_clone_args_from_user() to verify that the exit signal is limited by CSIGNAL as with legacy clone() and that the signal is valid. With this we don't get the legacy clone behavior were an invalid signal could be handed down and would only be detected and ignored in do_notify_parent(). Users of clone3() will now get a proper error when they pass an invalid exit signal. Note, that this is not user-visible behavior since no kernel with clone3() has been released yet. The following program will cause a splat on a non-fixed clone3() version and will fail correctly on a fixed version: #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <sched.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { pid_t pid = -1; struct clone_args args = {0}; args.exit_signal = -1; pid = syscall(__NR_clone3, &args, sizeof(struct clone_args)); if (pid < 0) exit(EXIT_FAILURE); if (pid == 0) exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); wait(NULL); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } Fixes: 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add clone3") Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4b38fa4ce420b119a4c6345f42fe3cec2de9b0b5.1568223594.git.esyr@redhat.com [christian.brauner@ubuntu.com: simplify check and rework commit message] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2019-09-12 00:45:40 +07:00
/*
* Verify that higher 32bits of exit_signal are unset and that
* it is a valid signal
*/
if (unlikely((args.exit_signal & ~((u64)CSIGNAL)) ||
!valid_signal(args.exit_signal)))
return -EINVAL;
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
*kargs = (struct kernel_clone_args){
.flags = args.flags,
.pidfd = u64_to_user_ptr(args.pidfd),
.child_tid = u64_to_user_ptr(args.child_tid),
.parent_tid = u64_to_user_ptr(args.parent_tid),
.exit_signal = args.exit_signal,
.stack = args.stack,
.stack_size = args.stack_size,
.tls = args.tls,
};
return 0;
}
static bool clone3_args_valid(const struct kernel_clone_args *kargs)
{
/*
* All lower bits of the flag word are taken.
* Verify that no other unknown flags are passed along.
*/
if (kargs->flags & ~CLONE_LEGACY_FLAGS)
return false;
/*
* - make the CLONE_DETACHED bit reuseable for clone3
* - make the CSIGNAL bits reuseable for clone3
*/
if (kargs->flags & (CLONE_DETACHED | CSIGNAL))
return false;
if ((kargs->flags & (CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_PARENT)) &&
kargs->exit_signal)
return false;
return true;
}
/**
* clone3 - create a new process with specific properties
* @uargs: argument structure
* @size: size of @uargs
*
* clone3() is the extensible successor to clone()/clone2().
* It takes a struct as argument that is versioned by its size.
*
* Return: On success, a positive PID for the child process.
* On error, a negative errno number.
*/
fork: add clone3 This adds the clone3 system call. As mentioned several times already (cf. [7], [8]) here's the promised patchset for clone3(). We recently merged the CLONE_PIDFD patchset (cf. [1]). It took the last free flag from clone(). Independent of the CLONE_PIDFD patchset a time namespace has been discussed at Linux Plumber Conference last year and has been sent out and reviewed (cf. [5]). It is expected that it will go upstream in the not too distant future. However, it relies on the addition of the CLONE_NEWTIME flag to clone(). The only other good candidate - CLONE_DETACHED - is currently not recyclable as we have identified at least two large or widely used codebases that currently pass this flag (cf. [2], [3], and [4]). Given that CLONE_PIDFD grabbed the last clone() flag the time namespace is effectively blocked. clone3() has the advantage that it will unblock this patchset again. In general, clone3() is extensible and allows for the implementation of new features. The idea is to keep clone3() very simple and close to the original clone(), specifically, to keep on supporting old clone()-based workloads. We know there have been various creative proposals how a new process creation syscall or even api is supposed to look like. Some people even going so far as to argue that the traditional fork()+exec() split should be abandoned in favor of an in-kernel version of spawn(). Independent of whether or not we personally think spawn() is a good idea this patchset has and does not want to have anything to do with this. One stance we take is that there's no real good alternative to clone()+exec() and we need and want to support this model going forward; independent of spawn(). The following requirements guided clone3(): - bump the number of available flags - move arguments that are currently passed as separate arguments in clone() into a dedicated struct clone_args - choose a struct layout that is easy to handle on 32 and on 64 bit - choose a struct layout that is extensible - give new flags that currently need to abuse another flag's dedicated return argument in clone() their own dedicated return argument (e.g. CLONE_PIDFD) - use a separate kernel internal struct kernel_clone_args that is properly typed according to current kernel conventions in fork.c and is different from the uapi struct clone_args - port _do_fork() to use kernel_clone_args so that all process creation syscalls such as fork(), vfork(), clone(), and clone3() behave identical (Arnd suggested, that we can probably also port do_fork() itself in a separate patchset.) - ease of transition for userspace from clone() to clone3() This very much means that we do *not* remove functionality that userspace currently relies on as the latter is a good way of creating a syscall that won't be adopted. - do not try to be clever or complex: keep clone3() as dumb as possible In accordance with Linus suggestions (cf. [11]), clone3() has the following signature: /* uapi */ struct clone_args { __aligned_u64 flags; __aligned_u64 pidfd; __aligned_u64 child_tid; __aligned_u64 parent_tid; __aligned_u64 exit_signal; __aligned_u64 stack; __aligned_u64 stack_size; __aligned_u64 tls; }; /* kernel internal */ struct kernel_clone_args { u64 flags; int __user *pidfd; int __user *child_tid; int __user *parent_tid; int exit_signal; unsigned long stack; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long tls; }; long sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size) clone3() cleanly supports all of the supported flags from clone() and thus all legacy workloads. The advantage of sticking close to the old clone() is the low cost for userspace to switch to this new api. Quite a lot of userspace apis (e.g. pthreads) are based on the clone() syscall. With the new clone3() syscall supporting all of the old workloads and opening up the ability to add new features should make switching to it for userspace more appealing. In essence, glibc can just write a simple wrapper to switch from clone() to clone3(). There has been some interest in this patchset already. We have received a patch from the CRIU corner for clone3() that would set the PID/TID of a restored process without /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid to eliminate a race. /* User visible differences to legacy clone() */ - CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3() - CSIGNAL is deprecated It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal" argument in struct clone_args freeing up space for additional flags. This is based on a suggestion from Andrei and Linus (cf. [9] and [10]) /* References */ [1]: b3e5838252665ee4cfa76b82bdf1198dca81e5be [2]: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp#343 [3]: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/thread/pthread_create.c#n233 [4]: https://sources.debian.org/src/blcr/0.8.5-2.3/cr_module/cr_dump_self.c/?hl=740#L740 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-1-dima@arista.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190425161416.26600-2-dima@arista.com/ [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHrFyr5HxpGXA2YrKza-oB-GGwJCqwPfyhD-Y5wbktWZdt0sGQ@mail.gmail.com/ [8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190524102756.qjsjxukuq2f4t6bo@brauner.io/ [9]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190529222414.GA6492@gmail.com/ [10]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whQP-Ykxi=zSYaV9iXsHsENa+2fdj-zYKwyeyed63Lsfw@mail.gmail.com/ [11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wieuV4hGwznPsX-8E0G2FKhx3NjZ9X3dTKh5zKd+iqOBw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
2019-05-25 16:36:41 +07:00
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clone3, struct clone_args __user *, uargs, size_t, size)
{
int err;
struct kernel_clone_args kargs;
err = copy_clone_args_from_user(&kargs, uargs, size);
if (err)
return err;
if (!clone3_args_valid(&kargs))
return -EINVAL;
return _do_fork(&kargs);
}
#endif
void walk_process_tree(struct task_struct *top, proc_visitor visitor, void *data)
{
struct task_struct *leader, *parent, *child;
int res;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
leader = top = top->group_leader;
down:
for_each_thread(leader, parent) {
list_for_each_entry(child, &parent->children, sibling) {
res = visitor(child, data);
if (res) {
if (res < 0)
goto out;
leader = child;
goto down;
}
up:
;
}
}
if (leader != top) {
child = leader;
parent = child->real_parent;
leader = parent->group_leader;
goto up;
}
out:
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
}
#ifndef ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN
#define ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN 0
#endif
static void sighand_ctor(void *data)
{
struct sighand_struct *sighand = data;
spin_lock_init(&sighand->siglock);
init_waitqueue_head(&sighand->signalfd_wqh);
}
void __init proc_caches_init(void)
{
unsigned int mm_size;
sighand_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sighand_cache",
sizeof(struct sighand_struct), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU|
SLAB_ACCOUNT, sighand_ctor);
signal_cachep = kmem_cache_create("signal_cache",
sizeof(struct signal_struct), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
2016-01-15 06:18:21 +07:00
NULL);
files_cachep = kmem_cache_create("files_cache",
sizeof(struct files_struct), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
2016-01-15 06:18:21 +07:00
NULL);
fs_cachep = kmem_cache_create("fs_cache",
sizeof(struct fs_struct), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
2016-01-15 06:18:21 +07:00
NULL);
/*
* The mm_cpumask is located at the end of mm_struct, and is
* dynamically sized based on the maximum CPU number this system
* can have, taking hotplug into account (nr_cpu_ids).
*/
mm_size = sizeof(struct mm_struct) + cpumask_size();
fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the mm_struct slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed. Only the auxv field is copied to userspace. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: #define allocate_mm() (kmem_cache_alloc(mm_cachep, GFP_KERNEL)) dup_mm(): ... mm = allocate_mm(); copy_mm(...): ... dup_mm(); copy_process(...): ... copy_mm(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) example usage trace: fs/binfmt_elf.c: create_elf_tables(...): ... elf_info = (elf_addr_t *)current->mm->saved_auxv; ... copy_to_user(..., elf_info, ei_index * sizeof(elf_addr_t)) load_elf_binary(...): ... create_elf_tables(...); This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace] Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2017-08-16 06:45:00 +07:00
mm_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("mm_struct",
mm_size, ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the mm_struct slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed. Only the auxv field is copied to userspace. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: #define allocate_mm() (kmem_cache_alloc(mm_cachep, GFP_KERNEL)) dup_mm(): ... mm = allocate_mm(); copy_mm(...): ... dup_mm(); copy_process(...): ... copy_mm(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) example usage trace: fs/binfmt_elf.c: create_elf_tables(...): ... elf_info = (elf_addr_t *)current->mm->saved_auxv; ... copy_to_user(..., elf_info, ei_index * sizeof(elf_addr_t)) load_elf_binary(...): ... create_elf_tables(...); This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace] Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2017-08-16 06:45:00 +07:00
offsetof(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv),
sizeof_field(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv),
2016-01-15 06:18:21 +07:00
NULL);
vm_area_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(vm_area_struct, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT);
NOMMU: Make VMAs per MM as for MMU-mode linux Make VMAs per mm_struct as for MMU-mode linux. This solves two problems: (1) In SYSV SHM where nattch for a segment does not reflect the number of shmat's (and forks) done. (2) In mmap() where the VMA's vm_mm is set to point to the parent mm by an exec'ing process when VM_EXECUTABLE is specified, regardless of the fact that a VMA might be shared and already have its vm_mm assigned to another process or a dead process. A new struct (vm_region) is introduced to track a mapped region and to remember the circumstances under which it may be shared and the vm_list_struct structure is discarded as it's no longer required. This patch makes the following additional changes: (1) Regions are now allocated with alloc_pages() rather than kmalloc() and with no recourse to __GFP_COMP, so the pages are not composite. Instead, each page has a reference on it held by the region. Anything else that is interested in such a page will have to get a reference on it to retain it. When the pages are released due to unmapping, each page is passed to put_page() and will be freed when the page usage count reaches zero. (2) Excess pages are trimmed after an allocation as the allocation must be made as a power-of-2 quantity of pages. (3) VMAs are added to the parent MM's R/B tree and mmap lists. As an MM may end up with overlapping VMAs within the tree, the VMA struct address is appended to the sort key. (4) Non-anonymous VMAs are now added to the backing inode's prio list. (5) Holes may be punched in anonymous VMAs with munmap(), releasing parts of the backing region. The VMA and region structs will be split if necessary. (6) sys_shmdt() only releases one attachment to a SYSV IPC shared memory segment instead of all the attachments at that addresss. Multiple shmat()'s return the same address under NOMMU-mode instead of different virtual addresses as under MMU-mode. (7) Core dumping for ELF-FDPIC requires fewer exceptions for NOMMU-mode. (8) /proc/maps is now the global list of mapped regions, and may list bits that aren't actually mapped anywhere. (9) /proc/meminfo gains a line (tagged "MmapCopy") that indicates the amount of RAM currently allocated by mmap to hold mappable regions that can't be mapped directly. These are copies of the backing device or file if not anonymous. These changes make NOMMU mode more similar to MMU mode. The downside is that NOMMU mode requires some extra memory to track things over NOMMU without this patch (VMAs are no longer shared, and there are now region structs). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier.adi@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
2009-01-08 19:04:47 +07:00
mmap_init();
nsproxy_cache_init();
}
/*
sys_unshare: remove the dead CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM code Cleanup: kill the dead code which does nothing but complicates the code and confuses the reader. sys_unshare(CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM) is not really implemented, and I doubt very much it will ever work. At least, nobody even tried since the original 99d1419d96d7df9cfa56 ("unshare system call -v5: system call handler function") was applied more than 4 years ago. And the code is not consistent. unshare_thread() always fails unconditionally, while unshare_sighand() and unshare_vm() pretend to work if there is nothing to unshare. Remove unshare_thread(), unshare_sighand(), unshare_vm() helpers and related variables and add a simple CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND| CLONE_VM check into check_unshare_flags(). Also, move the "CLONE_NEWNS needs CLONE_FS" check from check_unshare_flags() to sys_unshare(). This looks more consistent and matches the similar do_sysvsem check in sys_unshare(). Note: with or without this patch "atomic_read(mm->mm_users) > 1" can give a false positive due to get_task_mm(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Janak Desai <janak@us.ibm.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-23 06:34:09 +07:00
* Check constraints on flags passed to the unshare system call.
*/
sys_unshare: remove the dead CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM code Cleanup: kill the dead code which does nothing but complicates the code and confuses the reader. sys_unshare(CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM) is not really implemented, and I doubt very much it will ever work. At least, nobody even tried since the original 99d1419d96d7df9cfa56 ("unshare system call -v5: system call handler function") was applied more than 4 years ago. And the code is not consistent. unshare_thread() always fails unconditionally, while unshare_sighand() and unshare_vm() pretend to work if there is nothing to unshare. Remove unshare_thread(), unshare_sighand(), unshare_vm() helpers and related variables and add a simple CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND| CLONE_VM check into check_unshare_flags(). Also, move the "CLONE_NEWNS needs CLONE_FS" check from check_unshare_flags() to sys_unshare(). This looks more consistent and matches the similar do_sysvsem check in sys_unshare(). Note: with or without this patch "atomic_read(mm->mm_users) > 1" can give a false positive due to get_task_mm(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Janak Desai <janak@us.ibm.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-23 06:34:09 +07:00
static int check_unshare_flags(unsigned long unshare_flags)
{
sys_unshare: remove the dead CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM code Cleanup: kill the dead code which does nothing but complicates the code and confuses the reader. sys_unshare(CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM) is not really implemented, and I doubt very much it will ever work. At least, nobody even tried since the original 99d1419d96d7df9cfa56 ("unshare system call -v5: system call handler function") was applied more than 4 years ago. And the code is not consistent. unshare_thread() always fails unconditionally, while unshare_sighand() and unshare_vm() pretend to work if there is nothing to unshare. Remove unshare_thread(), unshare_sighand(), unshare_vm() helpers and related variables and add a simple CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND| CLONE_VM check into check_unshare_flags(). Also, move the "CLONE_NEWNS needs CLONE_FS" check from check_unshare_flags() to sys_unshare(). This looks more consistent and matches the similar do_sysvsem check in sys_unshare(). Note: with or without this patch "atomic_read(mm->mm_users) > 1" can give a false positive due to get_task_mm(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Janak Desai <janak@us.ibm.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-23 06:34:09 +07:00
if (unshare_flags & ~(CLONE_THREAD|CLONE_FS|CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_SIGHAND|
CLONE_VM|CLONE_FILES|CLONE_SYSVSEM|
pidns: Support unsharing the pid namespace. Unsharing of the pid namespace unlike unsharing of other namespaces does not take affect immediately. Instead it affects the children created with fork and clone. The first of these children becomes the init process of the new pid namespace, the rest become oddball children of pid 0. From the point of view of the new pid namespace the process that created it is pid 0, as it's pid does not map. A couple of different semantics were considered but this one was settled on because it is easy to implement and it is usable from pam modules. The core reasons for the existence of unshare. I took a survey of the callers of pam modules and the following appears to be a representative sample of their logic. { setup stuff include pam child = fork(); if (!child) { setuid() exec /bin/bash } waitpid(child); pam and other cleanup } As you can see there is a fork to create the unprivileged user space process. Which means that the unprivileged user space process will appear as pid 1 in the new pid namespace. Further most login processes do not cope with extraneous children which means shifting the duty of reaping extraneous child process to the creator of those extraneous children makes the system more comprehensible. The practical reason for this set of pid namespace semantics is that it is simple to implement and verify they work correctly. Whereas an implementation that requres changing the struct pid on a process comes with a lot more races and pain. Not the least of which is that glibc caches getpid(). These semantics are implemented by having two notions of the pid namespace of a proces. There is task_active_pid_ns which is the pid namspace the process was created with and the pid namespace that all pids are presented to that process in. The task_active_pid_ns is stored in the struct pid of the task. Then there is the pid namespace that will be used for children that pid namespace is stored in task->nsproxy->pid_ns. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2010-03-03 06:41:50 +07:00
CLONE_NEWUTS|CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_NEWNET|
CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWCGROUP))
sys_unshare: remove the dead CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM code Cleanup: kill the dead code which does nothing but complicates the code and confuses the reader. sys_unshare(CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM) is not really implemented, and I doubt very much it will ever work. At least, nobody even tried since the original 99d1419d96d7df9cfa56 ("unshare system call -v5: system call handler function") was applied more than 4 years ago. And the code is not consistent. unshare_thread() always fails unconditionally, while unshare_sighand() and unshare_vm() pretend to work if there is nothing to unshare. Remove unshare_thread(), unshare_sighand(), unshare_vm() helpers and related variables and add a simple CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND| CLONE_VM check into check_unshare_flags(). Also, move the "CLONE_NEWNS needs CLONE_FS" check from check_unshare_flags() to sys_unshare(). This looks more consistent and matches the similar do_sysvsem check in sys_unshare(). Note: with or without this patch "atomic_read(mm->mm_users) > 1" can give a false positive due to get_task_mm(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Janak Desai <janak@us.ibm.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-23 06:34:09 +07:00
return -EINVAL;
/*
unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm In the logic in the initial commit of unshare made creating a new thread group for a process, contingent upon creating a new memory address space for that process. That is wrong. Two separate processes in different thread groups can share a memory address space and clone allows creation of such proceses. This is significant because it was observed that mm_users > 1 does not mean that a process is multi-threaded, as reading /proc/PID/maps temporarily increments mm_users, which allows other processes to (accidentally) interfere with unshare() calls. Correct the check in check_unshare_flags() to test for !thread_group_empty() for CLONE_THREAD, CLONE_SIGHAND, and CLONE_VM. For sighand->count > 1 for CLONE_SIGHAND and CLONE_VM. For !current_is_single_threaded instead of mm_users > 1 for CLONE_VM. By using the correct checks in unshare this removes the possibility of an accidental denial of service attack. Additionally using the correct checks in unshare ensures that only an explicit unshare(CLONE_VM) can possibly trigger the slow path of current_is_single_threaded(). As an explict unshare(CLONE_VM) is pointless it is not expected there are many applications that make that call. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b2e0d98705e60e45bbb3c0032c48824ad7ae0704 userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace Reported-by: Ricky Zhou <rickyz@chromium.org> Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-08-11 05:35:07 +07:00
* Not implemented, but pretend it works if there is nothing
* to unshare. Note that unsharing the address space or the
* signal handlers also need to unshare the signal queues (aka
* CLONE_THREAD).
*/
sys_unshare: remove the dead CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM code Cleanup: kill the dead code which does nothing but complicates the code and confuses the reader. sys_unshare(CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM) is not really implemented, and I doubt very much it will ever work. At least, nobody even tried since the original 99d1419d96d7df9cfa56 ("unshare system call -v5: system call handler function") was applied more than 4 years ago. And the code is not consistent. unshare_thread() always fails unconditionally, while unshare_sighand() and unshare_vm() pretend to work if there is nothing to unshare. Remove unshare_thread(), unshare_sighand(), unshare_vm() helpers and related variables and add a simple CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND| CLONE_VM check into check_unshare_flags(). Also, move the "CLONE_NEWNS needs CLONE_FS" check from check_unshare_flags() to sys_unshare(). This looks more consistent and matches the similar do_sysvsem check in sys_unshare(). Note: with or without this patch "atomic_read(mm->mm_users) > 1" can give a false positive due to get_task_mm(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Janak Desai <janak@us.ibm.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-23 06:34:09 +07:00
if (unshare_flags & (CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_VM)) {
unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm In the logic in the initial commit of unshare made creating a new thread group for a process, contingent upon creating a new memory address space for that process. That is wrong. Two separate processes in different thread groups can share a memory address space and clone allows creation of such proceses. This is significant because it was observed that mm_users > 1 does not mean that a process is multi-threaded, as reading /proc/PID/maps temporarily increments mm_users, which allows other processes to (accidentally) interfere with unshare() calls. Correct the check in check_unshare_flags() to test for !thread_group_empty() for CLONE_THREAD, CLONE_SIGHAND, and CLONE_VM. For sighand->count > 1 for CLONE_SIGHAND and CLONE_VM. For !current_is_single_threaded instead of mm_users > 1 for CLONE_VM. By using the correct checks in unshare this removes the possibility of an accidental denial of service attack. Additionally using the correct checks in unshare ensures that only an explicit unshare(CLONE_VM) can possibly trigger the slow path of current_is_single_threaded(). As an explict unshare(CLONE_VM) is pointless it is not expected there are many applications that make that call. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b2e0d98705e60e45bbb3c0032c48824ad7ae0704 userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace Reported-by: Ricky Zhou <rickyz@chromium.org> Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-08-11 05:35:07 +07:00
if (!thread_group_empty(current))
return -EINVAL;
}
if (unshare_flags & (CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_VM)) {
sched/core: Convert sighand_struct.count to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable sighand_struct.count is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. ** Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the sighand_struct.count it might make a difference in following places: - __cleanup_sighand: decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547814450-18902-2-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-01-18 19:27:26 +07:00
if (refcount_read(&current->sighand->count) > 1)
unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm In the logic in the initial commit of unshare made creating a new thread group for a process, contingent upon creating a new memory address space for that process. That is wrong. Two separate processes in different thread groups can share a memory address space and clone allows creation of such proceses. This is significant because it was observed that mm_users > 1 does not mean that a process is multi-threaded, as reading /proc/PID/maps temporarily increments mm_users, which allows other processes to (accidentally) interfere with unshare() calls. Correct the check in check_unshare_flags() to test for !thread_group_empty() for CLONE_THREAD, CLONE_SIGHAND, and CLONE_VM. For sighand->count > 1 for CLONE_SIGHAND and CLONE_VM. For !current_is_single_threaded instead of mm_users > 1 for CLONE_VM. By using the correct checks in unshare this removes the possibility of an accidental denial of service attack. Additionally using the correct checks in unshare ensures that only an explicit unshare(CLONE_VM) can possibly trigger the slow path of current_is_single_threaded(). As an explict unshare(CLONE_VM) is pointless it is not expected there are many applications that make that call. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b2e0d98705e60e45bbb3c0032c48824ad7ae0704 userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace Reported-by: Ricky Zhou <rickyz@chromium.org> Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-08-11 05:35:07 +07:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_VM) {
if (!current_is_single_threaded())
sys_unshare: remove the dead CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM code Cleanup: kill the dead code which does nothing but complicates the code and confuses the reader. sys_unshare(CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM) is not really implemented, and I doubt very much it will ever work. At least, nobody even tried since the original 99d1419d96d7df9cfa56 ("unshare system call -v5: system call handler function") was applied more than 4 years ago. And the code is not consistent. unshare_thread() always fails unconditionally, while unshare_sighand() and unshare_vm() pretend to work if there is nothing to unshare. Remove unshare_thread(), unshare_sighand(), unshare_vm() helpers and related variables and add a simple CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND| CLONE_VM check into check_unshare_flags(). Also, move the "CLONE_NEWNS needs CLONE_FS" check from check_unshare_flags() to sys_unshare(). This looks more consistent and matches the similar do_sysvsem check in sys_unshare(). Note: with or without this patch "atomic_read(mm->mm_users) > 1" can give a false positive due to get_task_mm(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Janak Desai <janak@us.ibm.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-23 06:34:09 +07:00
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Unshare the filesystem structure if it is being shared
*/
static int unshare_fs(unsigned long unshare_flags, struct fs_struct **new_fsp)
{
struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
if (!(unshare_flags & CLONE_FS) || !fs)
return 0;
/* don't need lock here; in the worst case we'll do useless copy */
if (fs->users == 1)
return 0;
*new_fsp = copy_fs_struct(fs);
if (!*new_fsp)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
/*
* Unshare file descriptor table if it is being shared
*/
static int unshare_fd(unsigned long unshare_flags, struct files_struct **new_fdp)
{
struct files_struct *fd = current->files;
int error = 0;
if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_FILES) &&
(fd && atomic_read(&fd->count) > 1)) {
*new_fdp = dup_fd(fd, &error);
if (!*new_fdp)
return error;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* unshare allows a process to 'unshare' part of the process
* context which was originally shared using clone. copy_*
* functions used by do_fork() cannot be used here directly
* because they modify an inactive task_struct that is being
* constructed. Here we are modifying the current, active,
* task_struct.
*/
int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags)
{
struct fs_struct *fs, *new_fs = NULL;
struct files_struct *fd, *new_fd = NULL;
struct cred *new_cred = NULL;
Make access to task's nsproxy lighter When someone wants to deal with some other taks's namespaces it has to lock the task and then to get the desired namespace if the one exists. This is slow on read-only paths and may be impossible in some cases. E.g. Oleg recently noticed a race between unshare() and the (sent for review in cgroups) pid namespaces - when the task notifies the parent it has to know the parent's namespace, but taking the task_lock() is impossible there - the code is under write locked tasklist lock. On the other hand switching the namespace on task (daemonize) and releasing the namespace (after the last task exit) is rather rare operation and we can sacrifice its speed to solve the issues above. The access to other task namespaces is proposed to be performed like this: rcu_read_lock(); nsproxy = task_nsproxy(tsk); if (nsproxy != NULL) { / * * work with the namespaces here * e.g. get the reference on one of them * / } / * * NULL task_nsproxy() means that this task is * almost dead (zombie) * / rcu_read_unlock(); This patch has passed the review by Eric and Oleg :) and, of course, tested. [clg@fr.ibm.com: fix unshare()] [ebiederm@xmission.com: Update get_net_ns_by_pid] Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-19 13:39:54 +07:00
struct nsproxy *new_nsproxy = NULL;
int do_sysvsem = 0;
sys_unshare: remove the dead CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM code Cleanup: kill the dead code which does nothing but complicates the code and confuses the reader. sys_unshare(CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM) is not really implemented, and I doubt very much it will ever work. At least, nobody even tried since the original 99d1419d96d7df9cfa56 ("unshare system call -v5: system call handler function") was applied more than 4 years ago. And the code is not consistent. unshare_thread() always fails unconditionally, while unshare_sighand() and unshare_vm() pretend to work if there is nothing to unshare. Remove unshare_thread(), unshare_sighand(), unshare_vm() helpers and related variables and add a simple CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND| CLONE_VM check into check_unshare_flags(). Also, move the "CLONE_NEWNS needs CLONE_FS" check from check_unshare_flags() to sys_unshare(). This looks more consistent and matches the similar do_sysvsem check in sys_unshare(). Note: with or without this patch "atomic_read(mm->mm_users) > 1" can give a false positive due to get_task_mm(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Janak Desai <janak@us.ibm.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-23 06:34:09 +07:00
int err;
/*
* If unsharing a user namespace must also unshare the thread group
* and unshare the filesystem root and working directories.
*/
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER)
unshare_flags |= CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_FS;
pidns: Support unsharing the pid namespace. Unsharing of the pid namespace unlike unsharing of other namespaces does not take affect immediately. Instead it affects the children created with fork and clone. The first of these children becomes the init process of the new pid namespace, the rest become oddball children of pid 0. From the point of view of the new pid namespace the process that created it is pid 0, as it's pid does not map. A couple of different semantics were considered but this one was settled on because it is easy to implement and it is usable from pam modules. The core reasons for the existence of unshare. I took a survey of the callers of pam modules and the following appears to be a representative sample of their logic. { setup stuff include pam child = fork(); if (!child) { setuid() exec /bin/bash } waitpid(child); pam and other cleanup } As you can see there is a fork to create the unprivileged user space process. Which means that the unprivileged user space process will appear as pid 1 in the new pid namespace. Further most login processes do not cope with extraneous children which means shifting the duty of reaping extraneous child process to the creator of those extraneous children makes the system more comprehensible. The practical reason for this set of pid namespace semantics is that it is simple to implement and verify they work correctly. Whereas an implementation that requres changing the struct pid on a process comes with a lot more races and pain. Not the least of which is that glibc caches getpid(). These semantics are implemented by having two notions of the pid namespace of a proces. There is task_active_pid_ns which is the pid namspace the process was created with and the pid namespace that all pids are presented to that process in. The task_active_pid_ns is stored in the struct pid of the task. Then there is the pid namespace that will be used for children that pid namespace is stored in task->nsproxy->pid_ns. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2010-03-03 06:41:50 +07:00
/*
* If unsharing vm, must also unshare signal handlers.
*/
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_VM)
unshare_flags |= CLONE_SIGHAND;
unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm In the logic in the initial commit of unshare made creating a new thread group for a process, contingent upon creating a new memory address space for that process. That is wrong. Two separate processes in different thread groups can share a memory address space and clone allows creation of such proceses. This is significant because it was observed that mm_users > 1 does not mean that a process is multi-threaded, as reading /proc/PID/maps temporarily increments mm_users, which allows other processes to (accidentally) interfere with unshare() calls. Correct the check in check_unshare_flags() to test for !thread_group_empty() for CLONE_THREAD, CLONE_SIGHAND, and CLONE_VM. For sighand->count > 1 for CLONE_SIGHAND and CLONE_VM. For !current_is_single_threaded instead of mm_users > 1 for CLONE_VM. By using the correct checks in unshare this removes the possibility of an accidental denial of service attack. Additionally using the correct checks in unshare ensures that only an explicit unshare(CLONE_VM) can possibly trigger the slow path of current_is_single_threaded(). As an explict unshare(CLONE_VM) is pointless it is not expected there are many applications that make that call. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b2e0d98705e60e45bbb3c0032c48824ad7ae0704 userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace Reported-by: Ricky Zhou <rickyz@chromium.org> Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-08-11 05:35:07 +07:00
/*
* If unsharing a signal handlers, must also unshare the signal queues.
*/
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND)
unshare_flags |= CLONE_THREAD;
sys_unshare: remove the dead CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM code Cleanup: kill the dead code which does nothing but complicates the code and confuses the reader. sys_unshare(CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM) is not really implemented, and I doubt very much it will ever work. At least, nobody even tried since the original 99d1419d96d7df9cfa56 ("unshare system call -v5: system call handler function") was applied more than 4 years ago. And the code is not consistent. unshare_thread() always fails unconditionally, while unshare_sighand() and unshare_vm() pretend to work if there is nothing to unshare. Remove unshare_thread(), unshare_sighand(), unshare_vm() helpers and related variables and add a simple CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND| CLONE_VM check into check_unshare_flags(). Also, move the "CLONE_NEWNS needs CLONE_FS" check from check_unshare_flags() to sys_unshare(). This looks more consistent and matches the similar do_sysvsem check in sys_unshare(). Note: with or without this patch "atomic_read(mm->mm_users) > 1" can give a false positive due to get_task_mm(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Janak Desai <janak@us.ibm.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-23 06:34:09 +07:00
/*
* If unsharing namespace, must also unshare filesystem information.
*/
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
pidns: Support unsharing the pid namespace. Unsharing of the pid namespace unlike unsharing of other namespaces does not take affect immediately. Instead it affects the children created with fork and clone. The first of these children becomes the init process of the new pid namespace, the rest become oddball children of pid 0. From the point of view of the new pid namespace the process that created it is pid 0, as it's pid does not map. A couple of different semantics were considered but this one was settled on because it is easy to implement and it is usable from pam modules. The core reasons for the existence of unshare. I took a survey of the callers of pam modules and the following appears to be a representative sample of their logic. { setup stuff include pam child = fork(); if (!child) { setuid() exec /bin/bash } waitpid(child); pam and other cleanup } As you can see there is a fork to create the unprivileged user space process. Which means that the unprivileged user space process will appear as pid 1 in the new pid namespace. Further most login processes do not cope with extraneous children which means shifting the duty of reaping extraneous child process to the creator of those extraneous children makes the system more comprehensible. The practical reason for this set of pid namespace semantics is that it is simple to implement and verify they work correctly. Whereas an implementation that requres changing the struct pid on a process comes with a lot more races and pain. Not the least of which is that glibc caches getpid(). These semantics are implemented by having two notions of the pid namespace of a proces. There is task_active_pid_ns which is the pid namspace the process was created with and the pid namespace that all pids are presented to that process in. The task_active_pid_ns is stored in the struct pid of the task. Then there is the pid namespace that will be used for children that pid namespace is stored in task->nsproxy->pid_ns. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2010-03-03 06:41:50 +07:00
err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
if (err)
goto bad_unshare_out;
/*
* CLONE_NEWIPC must also detach from the undolist: after switching
* to a new ipc namespace, the semaphore arrays from the old
* namespace are unreachable.
*/
if (unshare_flags & (CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_SYSVSEM))
do_sysvsem = 1;
err = unshare_fs(unshare_flags, &new_fs);
if (err)
sys_unshare: remove the dead CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM code Cleanup: kill the dead code which does nothing but complicates the code and confuses the reader. sys_unshare(CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM) is not really implemented, and I doubt very much it will ever work. At least, nobody even tried since the original 99d1419d96d7df9cfa56 ("unshare system call -v5: system call handler function") was applied more than 4 years ago. And the code is not consistent. unshare_thread() always fails unconditionally, while unshare_sighand() and unshare_vm() pretend to work if there is nothing to unshare. Remove unshare_thread(), unshare_sighand(), unshare_vm() helpers and related variables and add a simple CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND| CLONE_VM check into check_unshare_flags(). Also, move the "CLONE_NEWNS needs CLONE_FS" check from check_unshare_flags() to sys_unshare(). This looks more consistent and matches the similar do_sysvsem check in sys_unshare(). Note: with or without this patch "atomic_read(mm->mm_users) > 1" can give a false positive due to get_task_mm(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Janak Desai <janak@us.ibm.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-23 06:34:09 +07:00
goto bad_unshare_out;
err = unshare_fd(unshare_flags, &new_fd);
if (err)
sys_unshare: remove the dead CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM code Cleanup: kill the dead code which does nothing but complicates the code and confuses the reader. sys_unshare(CLONE_THREAD/SIGHAND/VM) is not really implemented, and I doubt very much it will ever work. At least, nobody even tried since the original 99d1419d96d7df9cfa56 ("unshare system call -v5: system call handler function") was applied more than 4 years ago. And the code is not consistent. unshare_thread() always fails unconditionally, while unshare_sighand() and unshare_vm() pretend to work if there is nothing to unshare. Remove unshare_thread(), unshare_sighand(), unshare_vm() helpers and related variables and add a simple CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND| CLONE_VM check into check_unshare_flags(). Also, move the "CLONE_NEWNS needs CLONE_FS" check from check_unshare_flags() to sys_unshare(). This looks more consistent and matches the similar do_sysvsem check in sys_unshare(). Note: with or without this patch "atomic_read(mm->mm_users) > 1" can give a false positive due to get_task_mm(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Janak Desai <janak@us.ibm.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-23 06:34:09 +07:00
goto bad_unshare_cleanup_fs;
err = unshare_userns(unshare_flags, &new_cred);
if (err)
goto bad_unshare_cleanup_fd;
err = unshare_nsproxy_namespaces(unshare_flags, &new_nsproxy,
new_cred, new_fs);
if (err)
goto bad_unshare_cleanup_cred;
if (new_fs || new_fd || do_sysvsem || new_cred || new_nsproxy) {
if (do_sysvsem) {
/*
* CLONE_SYSVSEM is equivalent to sys_exit().
*/
exit_sem(current);
}
shm: make exit_shm work proportional to task activity This is small set of patches our team has had kicking around for a few versions internally that fixes tasks getting hung on shm_exit when there are many threads hammering it at once. Anton wrote a simple test to cause the issue: http://ozlabs.org/~anton/junkcode/bust_shm_exit.c Before applying this patchset, this test code will cause either hanging tracebacks or pthread out of memory errors. After this patchset, it will still produce output like: root@somehost:~# ./bust_shm_exit 1024 160 ... INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: {} (detected by 116, t=2111 jiffies, g=241, c=240, q=7113) INFO: Stall ended before state dump start ... But the task will continue to run along happily, so we consider this an improvement over hanging, even if it's a bit noisy. This patch (of 3): exit_shm obtains the ipc_ns shm rwsem for write and holds it while it walks every shared memory segment in the namespace. Thus the amount of work is related to the number of shm segments in the namespace not the number of segments that might need to be cleaned. In addition, this occurs after the task has been notified the thread has exited, so the number of tasks waiting for the ns shm rwsem can grow without bound until memory is exausted. Add a list to the task struct of all shmids allocated by this task. Init the list head in copy_process. Use the ns->rwsem for locking. Add segments after id is added, remove before removing from id. On unshare of NEW_IPCNS orphan any ids as if the task had exited, similar to handling of semaphore undo. I chose a define for the init sequence since its a simple list init, otherwise it would require a function call to avoid include loops between the semaphore code and the task struct. Converting the list_del to list_del_init for the unshare cases would remove the exit followed by init, but I left it blow up if not inited. Signed-off-by: Milton Miller <miltonm@bga.com> Signed-off-by: Jack Miller <millerjo@us.ibm.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 04:23:19 +07:00
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWIPC) {
/* Orphan segments in old ns (see sem above). */
exit_shm(current);
shm_init_task(current);
}
if (new_nsproxy)
Make access to task's nsproxy lighter When someone wants to deal with some other taks's namespaces it has to lock the task and then to get the desired namespace if the one exists. This is slow on read-only paths and may be impossible in some cases. E.g. Oleg recently noticed a race between unshare() and the (sent for review in cgroups) pid namespaces - when the task notifies the parent it has to know the parent's namespace, but taking the task_lock() is impossible there - the code is under write locked tasklist lock. On the other hand switching the namespace on task (daemonize) and releasing the namespace (after the last task exit) is rather rare operation and we can sacrifice its speed to solve the issues above. The access to other task namespaces is proposed to be performed like this: rcu_read_lock(); nsproxy = task_nsproxy(tsk); if (nsproxy != NULL) { / * * work with the namespaces here * e.g. get the reference on one of them * / } / * * NULL task_nsproxy() means that this task is * almost dead (zombie) * / rcu_read_unlock(); This patch has passed the review by Eric and Oleg :) and, of course, tested. [clg@fr.ibm.com: fix unshare()] [ebiederm@xmission.com: Update get_net_ns_by_pid] Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-19 13:39:54 +07:00
switch_task_namespaces(current, new_nsproxy);
Make access to task's nsproxy lighter When someone wants to deal with some other taks's namespaces it has to lock the task and then to get the desired namespace if the one exists. This is slow on read-only paths and may be impossible in some cases. E.g. Oleg recently noticed a race between unshare() and the (sent for review in cgroups) pid namespaces - when the task notifies the parent it has to know the parent's namespace, but taking the task_lock() is impossible there - the code is under write locked tasklist lock. On the other hand switching the namespace on task (daemonize) and releasing the namespace (after the last task exit) is rather rare operation and we can sacrifice its speed to solve the issues above. The access to other task namespaces is proposed to be performed like this: rcu_read_lock(); nsproxy = task_nsproxy(tsk); if (nsproxy != NULL) { / * * work with the namespaces here * e.g. get the reference on one of them * / } / * * NULL task_nsproxy() means that this task is * almost dead (zombie) * / rcu_read_unlock(); This patch has passed the review by Eric and Oleg :) and, of course, tested. [clg@fr.ibm.com: fix unshare()] [ebiederm@xmission.com: Update get_net_ns_by_pid] Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-19 13:39:54 +07:00
task_lock(current);
if (new_fs) {
fs = current->fs;
spin_lock(&fs->lock);
current->fs = new_fs;
if (--fs->users)
new_fs = NULL;
else
new_fs = fs;
spin_unlock(&fs->lock);
}
if (new_fd) {
fd = current->files;
current->files = new_fd;
new_fd = fd;
}
task_unlock(current);
if (new_cred) {
/* Install the new user namespace */
commit_creds(new_cred);
new_cred = NULL;
}
}
2017-03-08 03:41:36 +07:00
perf_event_namespaces(current);
bad_unshare_cleanup_cred:
if (new_cred)
put_cred(new_cred);
bad_unshare_cleanup_fd:
if (new_fd)
put_files_struct(new_fd);
bad_unshare_cleanup_fs:
if (new_fs)
free_fs_struct(new_fs);
bad_unshare_out:
return err;
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags)
{
return ksys_unshare(unshare_flags);
}
/*
* Helper to unshare the files of the current task.
* We don't want to expose copy_files internals to
* the exec layer of the kernel.
*/
int unshare_files(struct files_struct **displaced)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
struct files_struct *copy = NULL;
int error;
error = unshare_fd(CLONE_FILES, &copy);
if (error || !copy) {
*displaced = NULL;
return error;
}
*displaced = task->files;
task_lock(task);
task->files = copy;
task_unlock(task);
return 0;
}
int sysctl_max_threads(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ctl_table t;
int ret;
int threads = max_threads;
kernel/sysctl.c: do not override max_threads provided by userspace Partially revert 16db3d3f1170 ("kernel/sysctl.c: threads-max observe limits") because the patch is causing a regression to any workload which needs to override the auto-tuning of the limit provided by kernel. set_max_threads is implementing a boot time guesstimate to provide a sensible limit of the concurrently running threads so that runaways will not deplete all the memory. This is a good thing in general but there are workloads which might need to increase this limit for an application to run (reportedly WebSpher MQ is affected) and that is simply not possible after the mentioned change. It is also very dubious to override an admin decision by an estimation that doesn't have any direct relation to correctness of the kernel operation. Fix this by dropping set_max_threads from sysctl_max_threads so any value is accepted as long as it fits into MAX_THREADS which is important to check because allowing more threads could break internal robust futex restriction. While at it, do not use MIN_THREADS as the lower boundary because it is also only a heuristic for automatic estimation and admin might have a good reason to stop new threads to be created even when below this limit. This became more severe when we switched x86 from 4k to 8k kernel stacks. Starting since 6538b8ea886e ("x86_64: expand kernel stack to 16K") (3.16) we use THREAD_SIZE_ORDER = 2 and that halved the auto-tuned value. In the particular case 3.12 kernel.threads-max = 515561 4.4 kernel.threads-max = 200000 Neither of the two values is really insane on 32GB machine. I am not sure we want/need to tune the max_thread value further. If anything the tuning should be removed altogether if proven not useful in general. But we definitely need a way to override this auto-tuning. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190922065801.GB18814@dhcp22.suse.cz Fixes: 16db3d3f1170 ("kernel/sysctl.c: threads-max observe limits") Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-07 07:58:19 +07:00
int min = 1;
int max = MAX_THREADS;
t = *table;
t.data = &threads;
t.extra1 = &min;
t.extra2 = &max;
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (ret || !write)
return ret;
kernel/sysctl.c: do not override max_threads provided by userspace Partially revert 16db3d3f1170 ("kernel/sysctl.c: threads-max observe limits") because the patch is causing a regression to any workload which needs to override the auto-tuning of the limit provided by kernel. set_max_threads is implementing a boot time guesstimate to provide a sensible limit of the concurrently running threads so that runaways will not deplete all the memory. This is a good thing in general but there are workloads which might need to increase this limit for an application to run (reportedly WebSpher MQ is affected) and that is simply not possible after the mentioned change. It is also very dubious to override an admin decision by an estimation that doesn't have any direct relation to correctness of the kernel operation. Fix this by dropping set_max_threads from sysctl_max_threads so any value is accepted as long as it fits into MAX_THREADS which is important to check because allowing more threads could break internal robust futex restriction. While at it, do not use MIN_THREADS as the lower boundary because it is also only a heuristic for automatic estimation and admin might have a good reason to stop new threads to be created even when below this limit. This became more severe when we switched x86 from 4k to 8k kernel stacks. Starting since 6538b8ea886e ("x86_64: expand kernel stack to 16K") (3.16) we use THREAD_SIZE_ORDER = 2 and that halved the auto-tuned value. In the particular case 3.12 kernel.threads-max = 515561 4.4 kernel.threads-max = 200000 Neither of the two values is really insane on 32GB machine. I am not sure we want/need to tune the max_thread value further. If anything the tuning should be removed altogether if proven not useful in general. But we definitely need a way to override this auto-tuning. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190922065801.GB18814@dhcp22.suse.cz Fixes: 16db3d3f1170 ("kernel/sysctl.c: threads-max observe limits") Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-07 07:58:19 +07:00
max_threads = threads;
return 0;
}