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linux_dsm_epyc7002/security/apparmor/include/capability.h

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treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation version 2 of the license extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-01 15:08:55 +07:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-30 04:48:05 +07:00
/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor capability mediation definitions.
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
apparmor: fix capability to not use the current task, during reporting Mediation is based off of the cred but auditing includes the current task which may not be related to the actual request. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-10-08 19:37:18 +07:00
* Copyright 2009-2013 Canonical Ltd.
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-30 04:48:05 +07:00
*/
#ifndef __AA_CAPABILITY_H
#define __AA_CAPABILITY_H
#include <linux/sched.h>
apparmor: export set of capabilities supported by the apparmor module Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-15 01:27:32 +07:00
#include "apparmorfs.h"
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-10 04:07:02 +07:00
struct aa_label;
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-30 04:48:05 +07:00
/* aa_caps - confinement data for capabilities
* @allowed: capabilities mask
* @audit: caps that are to be audited
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-10 04:07:02 +07:00
* @denied: caps that are explicitly denied
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-30 04:48:05 +07:00
* @quiet: caps that should not be audited
* @kill: caps that when requested will result in the task being killed
* @extended: caps that are subject finer grained mediation
*/
struct aa_caps {
kernel_cap_t allow;
kernel_cap_t audit;
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-10 04:07:02 +07:00
kernel_cap_t denied;
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-30 04:48:05 +07:00
kernel_cap_t quiet;
kernel_cap_t kill;
kernel_cap_t extended;
};
apparmor: rename apparmor file fns and data to indicate use prefixes are used for fns/data that are not static to apparmorfs.c with the prefixes being aafs - special magic apparmorfs for policy namespace data aa_sfs - for fns/data that go into securityfs aa_fs - for fns/data that may be used in the either of aafs or securityfs Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-25 20:23:42 +07:00
extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[];
apparmor: export set of capabilities supported by the apparmor module Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-15 01:27:32 +07:00
LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-08 07:10:53 +07:00
int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts);
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-30 04:48:05 +07:00
static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
{
/* NOP */
}
#endif /* __AA_CAPBILITY_H */
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