linux_dsm_epyc7002/mm/slab_common.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 21:07:57 +07:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Slab allocator functions that are independent of the allocator strategy
*
* (C) 2012 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/poison.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
mm, memcg: add a memcg_slabinfo debugfs file There are concerns about memory leaks from extensive use of memory cgroups as each memory cgroup creates its own set of kmem caches. There is a possiblity that the memcg kmem caches may remain even after the memory cgroups have been offlined. Therefore, it will be useful to show the status of each of memcg kmem caches. This patch introduces a new <debugfs>/memcg_slabinfo file which is somewhat similar to /proc/slabinfo in format, but lists only information about kmem caches that have child memcg kmem caches. Information available in /proc/slabinfo are not repeated in memcg_slabinfo. A portion of a sample output of the file was: # <name> <css_id[:dead]> <active_objs> <num_objs> <active_slabs> <num_slabs> rpc_inode_cache root 13 51 1 1 rpc_inode_cache 48 0 0 0 0 fat_inode_cache root 1 45 1 1 fat_inode_cache 41 2 45 1 1 xfs_inode root 770 816 24 24 xfs_inode 92 22 34 1 1 xfs_inode 88:dead 1 34 1 1 xfs_inode 89:dead 23 34 1 1 xfs_inode 85 4 34 1 1 xfs_inode 84 9 34 1 1 The css id of the memcg is also listed. If a memcg is not online, the tag ":dead" will be attached as shown above. [longman@redhat.com: memcg: add ":deact" tag for reparented kmem caches in memcg_slabinfo] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190621173005.31514-1-longman@redhat.com [longman@redhat.com: set the flag in the common code as suggested by Roman] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627184324.5875-1-longman@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190619171621.26209-1-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 10:56:38 +07:00
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <linux/memcontrol.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <trace/events/kmem.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "slab.h"
enum slab_state slab_state;
LIST_HEAD(slab_caches);
DEFINE_MUTEX(slab_mutex);
struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache;
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
bool usercopy_fallback __ro_after_init =
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK);
module_param(usercopy_fallback, bool, 0400);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(usercopy_fallback,
"WARN instead of reject usercopy whitelist violations");
#endif
slab: remove synchronous rcu_barrier() call in memcg cache release path With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches need to flush all RCU operations before destruction because slab pages are freed through RCU and they need to be able to dereference the associated kmem_cache. Currently, it's done synchronously with rcu_barrier(). As rcu_barrier() is expensive time-wise, slab implements a batching mechanism so that rcu_barrier() can be done for multiple caches at the same time. Unfortunately, the rcu_barrier() is in synchronous path which is called while holding cgroup_mutex and the batching is too limited to be actually helpful. This patch updates the cache release path so that the batching is asynchronous and global. All SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches are queued globally and a work item consumes the list. The work item calls rcu_barrier() only once for all caches that are currently queued. * release_caches() is removed and shutdown_cache() now either directly release the cache or schedules a RCU callback to do that. This makes the cache inaccessible once shutdown_cache() is called and makes it impossible for shutdown_memcg_caches() to do memcg-specific cleanups afterwards. Move memcg-specific part into a helper, unlink_memcg_cache(), and make shutdown_cache() call it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-4-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:14 +07:00
static LIST_HEAD(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy);
static void slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_workfn(struct work_struct *work);
static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work,
slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_workfn);
/*
* Set of flags that will prevent slab merging
*/
#define SLAB_NEVER_MERGE (SLAB_RED_ZONE | SLAB_POISON | SLAB_STORE_USER | \
SLAB_TRACE | SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE | \
SLAB_FAILSLAB | SLAB_KASAN)
#define SLAB_MERGE_SAME (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT | SLAB_CACHE_DMA | \
mm: add support for kmem caches in DMA32 zone Patch series "iommu/io-pgtable-arm-v7s: Use DMA32 zone for page tables", v6. This is a followup to the discussion in [1], [2]. IOMMUs using ARMv7 short-descriptor format require page tables (level 1 and 2) to be allocated within the first 4GB of RAM, even on 64-bit systems. For L1 tables that are bigger than a page, we can just use __get_free_pages with GFP_DMA32 (on arm64 systems only, arm would still use GFP_DMA). For L2 tables that only take 1KB, it would be a waste to allocate a full page, so we considered 3 approaches: 1. This series, adding support for GFP_DMA32 slab caches. 2. genalloc, which requires pre-allocating the maximum number of L2 page tables (4096, so 4MB of memory). 3. page_frag, which is not very memory-efficient as it is unable to reuse freed fragments until the whole page is freed. [3] This series is the most memory-efficient approach. stable@ note: We confirmed that this is a regression, and IOMMU errors happen on 4.19 and linux-next/master on MT8173 (elm, Acer Chromebook R13). The issue most likely starts from commit ad67f5a6545f ("arm64: replace ZONE_DMA with ZONE_DMA32"), i.e. 4.15, and presumably breaks a number of Mediatek platforms (and maybe others?). [1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/iommu/2018-November/030876.html [2] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/iommu/2018-December/031696.html [3] https://patchwork.codeaurora.org/patch/671639/ This patch (of 3): IOMMUs using ARMv7 short-descriptor format require page tables to be allocated within the first 4GB of RAM, even on 64-bit systems. On arm64, this is done by passing GFP_DMA32 flag to memory allocation functions. For IOMMU L2 tables that only take 1KB, it would be a waste to allocate a full page using get_free_pages, so we considered 3 approaches: 1. This patch, adding support for GFP_DMA32 slab caches. 2. genalloc, which requires pre-allocating the maximum number of L2 page tables (4096, so 4MB of memory). 3. page_frag, which is not very memory-efficient as it is unable to reuse freed fragments until the whole page is freed. This change makes it possible to create a custom cache in DMA32 zone using kmem_cache_create, then allocate memory using kmem_cache_alloc. We do not create a DMA32 kmalloc cache array, as there are currently no users of kmalloc(..., GFP_DMA32). These calls will continue to trigger a warning, as we keep GFP_DMA32 in GFP_SLAB_BUG_MASK. This implies that calls to kmem_cache_*alloc on a SLAB_CACHE_DMA32 kmem_cache must _not_ use GFP_DMA32 (it is anyway redundant and unnecessary). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181210011504.122604-2-drinkcat@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Nicolas Boichat <drinkcat@chromium.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Sasha Levin <Alexander.Levin@microsoft.com> Cc: Huaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Yong Wu <yong.wu@mediatek.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: Tomasz Figa <tfiga@google.com> Cc: Yingjoe Chen <yingjoe.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-29 10:43:42 +07:00
SLAB_CACHE_DMA32 | SLAB_ACCOUNT)
/*
* Merge control. If this is set then no merging of slab caches will occur.
*/
mm: allow slab_nomerge to be set at build time Some hardened environments want to build kernels with slab_nomerge already set (so that they do not depend on remembering to set the kernel command line option). This is desired to reduce the risk of kernel heap overflows being able to overwrite objects from merged caches and changes the requirements for cache layout control, increasing the difficulty of these attacks. By keeping caches unmerged, these kinds of exploits can usually only damage objects in the same cache (though the risk to metadata exploitation is unchanged). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170620230911.GA25238@beast Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-07 05:36:40 +07:00
static bool slab_nomerge = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT);
static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str)
{
mm: allow slab_nomerge to be set at build time Some hardened environments want to build kernels with slab_nomerge already set (so that they do not depend on remembering to set the kernel command line option). This is desired to reduce the risk of kernel heap overflows being able to overwrite objects from merged caches and changes the requirements for cache layout control, increasing the difficulty of these attacks. By keeping caches unmerged, these kinds of exploits can usually only damage objects in the same cache (though the risk to metadata exploitation is unchanged). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170620230911.GA25238@beast Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-07 05:36:40 +07:00
slab_nomerge = true;
return 1;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB
__setup_param("slub_nomerge", slub_nomerge, setup_slab_nomerge, 0);
#endif
__setup("slab_nomerge", setup_slab_nomerge);
/*
* Determine the size of a slab object
*/
unsigned int kmem_cache_size(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
return s->object_size;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_size);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
static int kmem_cache_sanity_check(const char *name, unsigned int size)
{
mm/slub: fix redzoning for small allocations commit 74c1d3e081533825f2611e46edea1fcdc0701985 upstream. The redzone area for SLUB exists between s->object_size and s->inuse (which is at least the word-aligned object_size). If a cache were created with an object_size smaller than sizeof(void *), the in-object stored freelist pointer would overwrite the redzone (e.g. with boot param "slub_debug=ZF"): BUG test (Tainted: G B ): Right Redzone overwritten ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: 0xffff957ead1c05de-0xffff957ead1c05df @offset=1502. First byte 0x1a instead of 0xbb INFO: Slab 0xffffef3950b47000 objects=170 used=170 fp=0x0000000000000000 flags=0x8000000000000200 INFO: Object 0xffff957ead1c05d8 @offset=1496 fp=0xffff957ead1c0620 Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........ Object (____ptrval____): f6 f4 a5 40 1d e8 ...@.. Redzone (____ptrval____): 1a aa .. Padding (____ptrval____): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........ Store the freelist pointer out of line when object_size is smaller than sizeof(void *) and redzoning is enabled. Additionally remove the "smaller than sizeof(void *)" check under CONFIG_DEBUG_VM in kmem_cache_sanity_check() as it is now redundant: SLAB and SLOB both handle small sizes. (Note that no caches within this size range are known to exist in the kernel currently.) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608183955.280836-3-keescook@chromium.org Fixes: 81819f0fc828 ("SLUB core") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: "Lin, Zhenpeng" <zplin@psu.edu> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-06-16 08:23:22 +07:00
if (!name || in_interrupt() || size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) {
pr_err("kmem_cache_create(%s) integrity check failed\n", name);
return -EINVAL;
}
WARN_ON(strchr(name, ' ')); /* It confuses parsers */
return 0;
}
#else
static inline int kmem_cache_sanity_check(const char *name, unsigned int size)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
void __kmem_cache_free_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t nr, void **p)
{
size_t i;
mm: new API kfree_bulk() for SLAB+SLUB allocators This patch introduce a new API call kfree_bulk() for bulk freeing memory objects not bound to a single kmem_cache. Christoph pointed out that it is possible to implement freeing of objects, without knowing the kmem_cache pointer as that information is available from the object's page->slab_cache. Proposing to remove the kmem_cache argument from the bulk free API. Jesper demonstrated that these extra steps per object comes at a performance cost. It is only in the case CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM is compiled in and activated runtime that these steps are done anyhow. The extra cost is most visible for SLAB allocator, because the SLUB allocator does the page lookup (virt_to_head_page()) anyhow. Thus, the conclusion was to keep the kmem_cache free bulk API with a kmem_cache pointer, but we can still implement a kfree_bulk() API fairly easily. Simply by handling if kmem_cache_free_bulk() gets called with a kmem_cache NULL pointer. This does increase the code size a bit, but implementing a separate kfree_bulk() call would likely increase code size even more. Below benchmarks cost of alloc+free (obj size 256 bytes) on CPU i7-4790K @ 4.00GHz, no PREEMPT and CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM=y. Code size increase for SLAB: add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 1/0 up/down: 74/0 (74) function old new delta kmem_cache_free_bulk 660 734 +74 SLAB fastpath: 87 cycles(tsc) 21.814 sz - fallback - kmem_cache_free_bulk - kfree_bulk 1 - 103 cycles 25.878 ns - 41 cycles 10.498 ns - 81 cycles 20.312 ns 2 - 94 cycles 23.673 ns - 26 cycles 6.682 ns - 42 cycles 10.649 ns 3 - 92 cycles 23.181 ns - 21 cycles 5.325 ns - 39 cycles 9.950 ns 4 - 90 cycles 22.727 ns - 18 cycles 4.673 ns - 26 cycles 6.693 ns 8 - 89 cycles 22.270 ns - 14 cycles 3.664 ns - 23 cycles 5.835 ns 16 - 88 cycles 22.038 ns - 14 cycles 3.503 ns - 22 cycles 5.543 ns 30 - 89 cycles 22.284 ns - 13 cycles 3.310 ns - 20 cycles 5.197 ns 32 - 88 cycles 22.249 ns - 13 cycles 3.420 ns - 20 cycles 5.166 ns 34 - 88 cycles 22.224 ns - 14 cycles 3.643 ns - 20 cycles 5.170 ns 48 - 88 cycles 22.088 ns - 14 cycles 3.507 ns - 20 cycles 5.203 ns 64 - 88 cycles 22.063 ns - 13 cycles 3.428 ns - 20 cycles 5.152 ns 128 - 89 cycles 22.483 ns - 15 cycles 3.891 ns - 23 cycles 5.885 ns 158 - 89 cycles 22.381 ns - 15 cycles 3.779 ns - 22 cycles 5.548 ns 250 - 91 cycles 22.798 ns - 16 cycles 4.152 ns - 23 cycles 5.967 ns SLAB when enabling MEMCG_KMEM runtime: - kmemcg fastpath: 130 cycles(tsc) 32.684 ns (step:0) 1 - 148 cycles 37.220 ns - 66 cycles 16.622 ns - 66 cycles 16.583 ns 2 - 141 cycles 35.510 ns - 51 cycles 12.820 ns - 58 cycles 14.625 ns 3 - 140 cycles 35.017 ns - 37 cycles 9.326 ns - 33 cycles 8.474 ns 4 - 137 cycles 34.507 ns - 31 cycles 7.888 ns - 33 cycles 8.300 ns 8 - 140 cycles 35.069 ns - 25 cycles 6.461 ns - 25 cycles 6.436 ns 16 - 138 cycles 34.542 ns - 23 cycles 5.945 ns - 22 cycles 5.670 ns 30 - 136 cycles 34.227 ns - 22 cycles 5.502 ns - 22 cycles 5.587 ns 32 - 136 cycles 34.253 ns - 21 cycles 5.475 ns - 21 cycles 5.324 ns 34 - 136 cycles 34.254 ns - 21 cycles 5.448 ns - 20 cycles 5.194 ns 48 - 136 cycles 34.075 ns - 21 cycles 5.458 ns - 21 cycles 5.367 ns 64 - 135 cycles 33.994 ns - 21 cycles 5.350 ns - 21 cycles 5.259 ns 128 - 137 cycles 34.446 ns - 23 cycles 5.816 ns - 22 cycles 5.688 ns 158 - 137 cycles 34.379 ns - 22 cycles 5.727 ns - 22 cycles 5.602 ns 250 - 138 cycles 34.755 ns - 24 cycles 6.093 ns - 23 cycles 5.986 ns Code size increase for SLUB: function old new delta kmem_cache_free_bulk 717 799 +82 SLUB benchmark: SLUB fastpath: 46 cycles(tsc) 11.691 ns (step:0) sz - fallback - kmem_cache_free_bulk - kfree_bulk 1 - 61 cycles 15.486 ns - 53 cycles 13.364 ns - 57 cycles 14.464 ns 2 - 54 cycles 13.703 ns - 32 cycles 8.110 ns - 33 cycles 8.482 ns 3 - 53 cycles 13.272 ns - 25 cycles 6.362 ns - 27 cycles 6.947 ns 4 - 51 cycles 12.994 ns - 24 cycles 6.087 ns - 24 cycles 6.078 ns 8 - 50 cycles 12.576 ns - 21 cycles 5.354 ns - 22 cycles 5.513 ns 16 - 49 cycles 12.368 ns - 20 cycles 5.054 ns - 20 cycles 5.042 ns 30 - 49 cycles 12.273 ns - 18 cycles 4.748 ns - 19 cycles 4.758 ns 32 - 49 cycles 12.401 ns - 19 cycles 4.821 ns - 19 cycles 4.810 ns 34 - 98 cycles 24.519 ns - 24 cycles 6.154 ns - 24 cycles 6.157 ns 48 - 83 cycles 20.833 ns - 21 cycles 5.446 ns - 21 cycles 5.429 ns 64 - 75 cycles 18.891 ns - 20 cycles 5.247 ns - 20 cycles 5.238 ns 128 - 93 cycles 23.271 ns - 27 cycles 6.856 ns - 27 cycles 6.823 ns 158 - 102 cycles 25.581 ns - 30 cycles 7.714 ns - 30 cycles 7.695 ns 250 - 107 cycles 26.917 ns - 38 cycles 9.514 ns - 38 cycles 9.506 ns SLUB when enabling MEMCG_KMEM runtime: - kmemcg fastpath: 71 cycles(tsc) 17.897 ns (step:0) 1 - 85 cycles 21.484 ns - 78 cycles 19.569 ns - 75 cycles 18.938 ns 2 - 81 cycles 20.363 ns - 45 cycles 11.258 ns - 44 cycles 11.076 ns 3 - 78 cycles 19.709 ns - 33 cycles 8.354 ns - 32 cycles 8.044 ns 4 - 77 cycles 19.430 ns - 28 cycles 7.216 ns - 28 cycles 7.003 ns 8 - 101 cycles 25.288 ns - 23 cycles 5.849 ns - 23 cycles 5.787 ns 16 - 76 cycles 19.148 ns - 20 cycles 5.162 ns - 20 cycles 5.081 ns 30 - 76 cycles 19.067 ns - 19 cycles 4.868 ns - 19 cycles 4.821 ns 32 - 76 cycles 19.052 ns - 19 cycles 4.857 ns - 19 cycles 4.815 ns 34 - 121 cycles 30.291 ns - 25 cycles 6.333 ns - 25 cycles 6.268 ns 48 - 108 cycles 27.111 ns - 21 cycles 5.498 ns - 21 cycles 5.458 ns 64 - 100 cycles 25.164 ns - 20 cycles 5.242 ns - 20 cycles 5.229 ns 128 - 155 cycles 38.976 ns - 27 cycles 6.886 ns - 27 cycles 6.892 ns 158 - 132 cycles 33.034 ns - 30 cycles 7.711 ns - 30 cycles 7.728 ns 250 - 130 cycles 32.612 ns - 38 cycles 9.560 ns - 38 cycles 9.549 ns Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-16 04:54:00 +07:00
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) {
if (s)
kmem_cache_free(s, p[i]);
else
kfree(p[i]);
}
}
int __kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t nr,
void **p)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) {
void *x = p[i] = kmem_cache_alloc(s, flags);
if (!x) {
__kmem_cache_free_bulk(s, i, p);
return 0;
}
}
return i;
}
/*
* Figure out what the alignment of the objects will be given a set of
* flags, a user specified alignment and the size of the objects.
*/
static unsigned int calculate_alignment(slab_flags_t flags,
unsigned int align, unsigned int size)
{
/*
* If the user wants hardware cache aligned objects then follow that
* suggestion if the object is sufficiently large.
*
* The hardware cache alignment cannot override the specified
* alignment though. If that is greater then use it.
*/
if (flags & SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN) {
unsigned int ralign;
ralign = cache_line_size();
while (size <= ralign / 2)
ralign /= 2;
align = max(align, ralign);
}
if (align < ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN)
align = ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN;
return ALIGN(align, sizeof(void *));
}
/*
* Find a mergeable slab cache
*/
int slab_unmergeable(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
if (slab_nomerge || (s->flags & SLAB_NEVER_MERGE))
return 1;
if (s->ctor)
return 1;
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2017-06-11 09:50:28 +07:00
if (s->usersize)
return 1;
/*
* We may have set a slab to be unmergeable during bootstrap.
*/
if (s->refcount < 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
struct kmem_cache *find_mergeable(unsigned int size, unsigned int align,
slab_flags_t flags, const char *name, void (*ctor)(void *))
{
struct kmem_cache *s;
if (slab_nomerge)
return NULL;
if (ctor)
return NULL;
size = ALIGN(size, sizeof(void *));
align = calculate_alignment(flags, align, size);
size = ALIGN(size, align);
flags = kmem_cache_flags(size, flags, name);
if (flags & SLAB_NEVER_MERGE)
return NULL;
list_for_each_entry_reverse(s, &slab_caches, list) {
if (slab_unmergeable(s))
continue;
if (size > s->size)
continue;
if ((flags & SLAB_MERGE_SAME) != (s->flags & SLAB_MERGE_SAME))
continue;
/*
* Check if alignment is compatible.
* Courtesy of Adrian Drzewiecki
*/
if ((s->size & ~(align - 1)) != s->size)
continue;
if (s->size - size >= sizeof(void *))
continue;
mm/slab: fix unalignment problem on Malta with EVA due to slab merge Unlike SLUB, sometimes, object isn't started at the beginning of the slab in SLAB. This causes the unalignment problem after slab merging is supported by commit 12220dea07f1 ("mm/slab: support slab merge"). Following is the report from Markos that fail to boot on Malta with EVA. Calibrating delay loop... 19.86 BogoMIPS (lpj=99328) pid_max: default: 32768 minimum: 301 Mount-cache hash table entries: 4096 (order: 0, 16384 bytes) Mountpoint-cache hash table entries: 4096 (order: 0, 16384 bytes) Kernel bug detected[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.17.0-05639-g12220dea07f1 #1631 task: 1f04f5d8 ti: 1f050000 task.ti: 1f050000 epc : 80141190 alloc_unbound_pwq+0x234/0x304 Not tainted ra : 80141184 alloc_unbound_pwq+0x228/0x304 Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, threadinfo=1f050000, task=1f04f5d8, tls=00000000) Call Trace: alloc_unbound_pwq+0x234/0x304 apply_workqueue_attrs+0x11c/0x294 __alloc_workqueue_key+0x23c/0x470 init_workqueues+0x320/0x400 do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x23c kernel_init_freeable+0x9c/0x224 kernel_init+0x10/0x100 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c [ end trace cb88537fdc8fa200 ] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b alloc_unbound_pwq() allocates slab object from pool_workqueue. This kmem_cache requires 256 bytes alignment, but, current merging code doesn't honor that, and merge it with kmalloc-256. kmalloc-256 requires only cacheline size alignment so that above failure occurs. However, in x86, kmalloc-256 is luckily aligned in 256 bytes, so the problem didn't happen on it. To fix this problem, this patch introduces alignment mismatch check in find_mergeable(). This will fix the problem. Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Reported-by: Markos Chandras <Markos.Chandras@imgtec.com> Tested-by: Markos Chandras <Markos.Chandras@imgtec.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-11-14 06:19:25 +07:00
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB) && align &&
(align > s->align || s->align % align))
continue;
return s;
}
return NULL;
}
static struct kmem_cache *create_cache(const char *name,
slab, slub: remove size disparity on debug kernel I have noticed on debug kernel with SLAB, the size of some non-root slabs were larger than their corresponding root slabs. e.g. for radix_tree_node: $cat /proc/slabinfo | grep radix name <active_objs> <num_objs> <objsize> <objperslab> <pagesperslab> ... radix_tree_node 15052 15075 4096 1 1 ... $cat /cgroup/memory/temp/memory.kmem.slabinfo | grep radix name <active_objs> <num_objs> <objsize> <objperslab> <pagesperslab> ... radix_tree_node 1581 158 4120 1 2 ... However for SLUB in debug kernel, the sizes were same. On further inspection it is found that SLUB always use kmem_cache.object_size to measure the kmem_cache.size while SLAB use the given kmem_cache.size. In the debug kernel the slab's size can be larger than its object_size. Thus in the creation of non-root slab, the SLAB uses the root's size as base to calculate the non-root slab's size and thus non-root slab's size can be larger than the root slab's size. For SLUB, the non-root slab's size is measured based on the root's object_size and thus the size will remain same for root and non-root slab. This patch makes slab's object_size the default base to measure the slab's size. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180313165428.58699-1-shakeelb@google.com Fixes: 794b1248be4e ("memcg, slab: separate memcg vs root cache creation paths") Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-06 06:21:50 +07:00
unsigned int object_size, unsigned int align,
slab_flags_t flags, unsigned int useroffset,
unsigned int usersize, void (*ctor)(void *),
mm: memcg/slab: use a single set of kmem_caches for all accounted allocations This is fairly big but mostly red patch, which makes all accounted slab allocations use a single set of kmem_caches instead of creating a separate set for each memory cgroup. Because the number of non-root kmem_caches is now capped by the number of root kmem_caches, there is no need to shrink or destroy them prematurely. They can be perfectly destroyed together with their root counterparts. This allows to dramatically simplify the management of non-root kmem_caches and delete a ton of code. This patch performs the following changes: 1) introduces memcg_params.memcg_cache pointer to represent the kmem_cache which will be used for all non-root allocations 2) reuses the existing memcg kmem_cache creation mechanism to create memcg kmem_cache on the first allocation attempt 3) memcg kmem_caches are named <kmemcache_name>-memcg, e.g. dentry-memcg 4) simplifies memcg_kmem_get_cache() to just return memcg kmem_cache or schedule it's creation and return the root cache 5) removes almost all non-root kmem_cache management code (separate refcounter, reparenting, shrinking, etc) 6) makes slab debugfs to display root_mem_cgroup css id and never show :dead and :deact flags in the memcg_slabinfo attribute. Following patches in the series will simplify the kmem_cache creation. Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200623174037.3951353-13-guro@fb.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 13:21:10 +07:00
struct kmem_cache *root_cache)
{
struct kmem_cache *s;
int err;
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2017-06-11 09:50:28 +07:00
if (WARN_ON(useroffset + usersize > object_size))
useroffset = usersize = 0;
err = -ENOMEM;
s = kmem_cache_zalloc(kmem_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!s)
goto out;
s->name = name;
slab, slub: remove size disparity on debug kernel I have noticed on debug kernel with SLAB, the size of some non-root slabs were larger than their corresponding root slabs. e.g. for radix_tree_node: $cat /proc/slabinfo | grep radix name <active_objs> <num_objs> <objsize> <objperslab> <pagesperslab> ... radix_tree_node 15052 15075 4096 1 1 ... $cat /cgroup/memory/temp/memory.kmem.slabinfo | grep radix name <active_objs> <num_objs> <objsize> <objperslab> <pagesperslab> ... radix_tree_node 1581 158 4120 1 2 ... However for SLUB in debug kernel, the sizes were same. On further inspection it is found that SLUB always use kmem_cache.object_size to measure the kmem_cache.size while SLAB use the given kmem_cache.size. In the debug kernel the slab's size can be larger than its object_size. Thus in the creation of non-root slab, the SLAB uses the root's size as base to calculate the non-root slab's size and thus non-root slab's size can be larger than the root slab's size. For SLUB, the non-root slab's size is measured based on the root's object_size and thus the size will remain same for root and non-root slab. This patch makes slab's object_size the default base to measure the slab's size. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180313165428.58699-1-shakeelb@google.com Fixes: 794b1248be4e ("memcg, slab: separate memcg vs root cache creation paths") Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-06 06:21:50 +07:00
s->size = s->object_size = object_size;
s->align = align;
s->ctor = ctor;
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2017-06-11 09:50:28 +07:00
s->useroffset = useroffset;
s->usersize = usersize;
err = __kmem_cache_create(s, flags);
if (err)
goto out_free_cache;
s->refcount = 1;
list_add(&s->list, &slab_caches);
out:
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
return s;
out_free_cache:
kmem_cache_free(kmem_cache, s);
goto out;
}
/**
* kmem_cache_create_usercopy - Create a cache with a region suitable
* for copying to userspace
* @name: A string which is used in /proc/slabinfo to identify this cache.
* @size: The size of objects to be created in this cache.
* @align: The required alignment for the objects.
* @flags: SLAB flags
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2017-06-11 09:50:28 +07:00
* @useroffset: Usercopy region offset
* @usersize: Usercopy region size
* @ctor: A constructor for the objects.
*
* Cannot be called within a interrupt, but can be interrupted.
* The @ctor is run when new pages are allocated by the cache.
*
* The flags are
*
* %SLAB_POISON - Poison the slab with a known test pattern (a5a5a5a5)
* to catch references to uninitialised memory.
*
* %SLAB_RED_ZONE - Insert `Red` zones around the allocated memory to check
* for buffer overruns.
*
* %SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN - Align the objects in this cache to a hardware
* cacheline. This can be beneficial if you're counting cycles as closely
* as davem.
*
* Return: a pointer to the cache on success, NULL on failure.
*/
struct kmem_cache *
kmem_cache_create_usercopy(const char *name,
unsigned int size, unsigned int align,
slab_flags_t flags,
unsigned int useroffset, unsigned int usersize,
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2017-06-11 09:50:28 +07:00
void (*ctor)(void *))
{
struct kmem_cache *s = NULL;
const char *cache_name;
int err;
get_online_cpus();
slab: get_online_mems for kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink} When we create a sl[au]b cache, we allocate kmem_cache_node structures for each online NUMA node. To handle nodes taken online/offline, we register memory hotplug notifier and allocate/free kmem_cache_node corresponding to the node that changes its state for each kmem cache. To synchronize between the two paths we hold the slab_mutex during both the cache creationg/destruction path and while tuning per-node parts of kmem caches in memory hotplug handler, but that's not quite right, because it does not guarantee that a newly created cache will have all kmem_cache_nodes initialized in case it races with memory hotplug. For instance, in case of slub: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- kmem_cache_create: online_pages: __kmem_cache_create: slab_memory_callback: slab_mem_going_online_callback: lock slab_mutex for each slab_caches list entry allocate kmem_cache node unlock slab_mutex lock slab_mutex init_kmem_cache_nodes: for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) allocate kmem_cache node add kmem_cache to slab_caches list unlock slab_mutex online_pages (continued): node_states_set_node As a result we'll get a kmem cache with not all kmem_cache_nodes allocated. To avoid issues like that we should hold get/put_online_mems() during the whole kmem cache creation/destruction/shrink paths, just like we deal with cpu hotplug. This patch does the trick. Note, that after it's applied, there is no need in taking the slab_mutex for kmem_cache_shrink any more, so it is removed from there. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-05 06:07:20 +07:00
get_online_mems();
mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
err = kmem_cache_sanity_check(name, size);
if (err) {
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Refuse requests with allocator specific flags */
if (flags & ~SLAB_FLAGS_PERMITTED) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Some allocators will constraint the set of valid flags to a subset
* of all flags. We expect them to define CACHE_CREATE_MASK in this
* case, and we'll just provide them with a sanitized version of the
* passed flags.
*/
flags &= CACHE_CREATE_MASK;
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2017-06-11 09:50:28 +07:00
/* Fail closed on bad usersize of useroffset values. */
if (WARN_ON(!usersize && useroffset) ||
WARN_ON(size < usersize || size - usersize < useroffset))
usersize = useroffset = 0;
if (!usersize)
s = __kmem_cache_alias(name, size, align, flags, ctor);
if (s)
goto out_unlock;
cache_name = kstrdup_const(name, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cache_name) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_unlock;
}
slab, slub: remove size disparity on debug kernel I have noticed on debug kernel with SLAB, the size of some non-root slabs were larger than their corresponding root slabs. e.g. for radix_tree_node: $cat /proc/slabinfo | grep radix name <active_objs> <num_objs> <objsize> <objperslab> <pagesperslab> ... radix_tree_node 15052 15075 4096 1 1 ... $cat /cgroup/memory/temp/memory.kmem.slabinfo | grep radix name <active_objs> <num_objs> <objsize> <objperslab> <pagesperslab> ... radix_tree_node 1581 158 4120 1 2 ... However for SLUB in debug kernel, the sizes were same. On further inspection it is found that SLUB always use kmem_cache.object_size to measure the kmem_cache.size while SLAB use the given kmem_cache.size. In the debug kernel the slab's size can be larger than its object_size. Thus in the creation of non-root slab, the SLAB uses the root's size as base to calculate the non-root slab's size and thus non-root slab's size can be larger than the root slab's size. For SLUB, the non-root slab's size is measured based on the root's object_size and thus the size will remain same for root and non-root slab. This patch makes slab's object_size the default base to measure the slab's size. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180313165428.58699-1-shakeelb@google.com Fixes: 794b1248be4e ("memcg, slab: separate memcg vs root cache creation paths") Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-06 06:21:50 +07:00
s = create_cache(cache_name, size,
calculate_alignment(flags, align, size),
mm: memcg/slab: use a single set of kmem_caches for all accounted allocations This is fairly big but mostly red patch, which makes all accounted slab allocations use a single set of kmem_caches instead of creating a separate set for each memory cgroup. Because the number of non-root kmem_caches is now capped by the number of root kmem_caches, there is no need to shrink or destroy them prematurely. They can be perfectly destroyed together with their root counterparts. This allows to dramatically simplify the management of non-root kmem_caches and delete a ton of code. This patch performs the following changes: 1) introduces memcg_params.memcg_cache pointer to represent the kmem_cache which will be used for all non-root allocations 2) reuses the existing memcg kmem_cache creation mechanism to create memcg kmem_cache on the first allocation attempt 3) memcg kmem_caches are named <kmemcache_name>-memcg, e.g. dentry-memcg 4) simplifies memcg_kmem_get_cache() to just return memcg kmem_cache or schedule it's creation and return the root cache 5) removes almost all non-root kmem_cache management code (separate refcounter, reparenting, shrinking, etc) 6) makes slab debugfs to display root_mem_cgroup css id and never show :dead and :deact flags in the memcg_slabinfo attribute. Following patches in the series will simplify the kmem_cache creation. Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200623174037.3951353-13-guro@fb.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 13:21:10 +07:00
flags, useroffset, usersize, ctor, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
err = PTR_ERR(s);
kfree_const(cache_name);
}
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex);
slab: get_online_mems for kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink} When we create a sl[au]b cache, we allocate kmem_cache_node structures for each online NUMA node. To handle nodes taken online/offline, we register memory hotplug notifier and allocate/free kmem_cache_node corresponding to the node that changes its state for each kmem cache. To synchronize between the two paths we hold the slab_mutex during both the cache creationg/destruction path and while tuning per-node parts of kmem caches in memory hotplug handler, but that's not quite right, because it does not guarantee that a newly created cache will have all kmem_cache_nodes initialized in case it races with memory hotplug. For instance, in case of slub: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- kmem_cache_create: online_pages: __kmem_cache_create: slab_memory_callback: slab_mem_going_online_callback: lock slab_mutex for each slab_caches list entry allocate kmem_cache node unlock slab_mutex lock slab_mutex init_kmem_cache_nodes: for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) allocate kmem_cache node add kmem_cache to slab_caches list unlock slab_mutex online_pages (continued): node_states_set_node As a result we'll get a kmem cache with not all kmem_cache_nodes allocated. To avoid issues like that we should hold get/put_online_mems() during the whole kmem cache creation/destruction/shrink paths, just like we deal with cpu hotplug. This patch does the trick. Note, that after it's applied, there is no need in taking the slab_mutex for kmem_cache_shrink any more, so it is removed from there. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-05 06:07:20 +07:00
put_online_mems();
put_online_cpus();
slab: fix wrong retval on kmem_cache_create_memcg error path On kmem_cache_create_memcg() error path we set 'err', but leave 's' (the new cache ptr) undefined. The latter can be NULL if we could not allocate the cache, or pointing to a freed area if we failed somewhere later while trying to initialize it. Initially we checked 'err' immediately before exiting the function and returned NULL if it was set ignoring the value of 's': out_unlock: ... if (err) { /* report error */ return NULL; } return s; Recently this check was, in fact, broken by commit f717eb3abb5e ("slab: do not panic if we fail to create memcg cache"), which turned it to: out_unlock: ... if (err && !memcg) { /* report error */ return NULL; } return s; As a result, if we are failing creating a cache for a memcg, we will skip the check and return 's' that can contain crap. Obviously, commit f717eb3abb5e intended not to return crap on error allocating a cache for a memcg, but only to remove the error reporting in this case, so the check should look like this: out_unlock: ... if (err) { if (!memcg) return NULL; /* report error */ return NULL; } return s; [rientjes@google.com: despaghettification] [vdavydov@parallels.com: patch monkeying] Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-01-30 05:05:48 +07:00
if (err) {
if (flags & SLAB_PANIC)
panic("kmem_cache_create: Failed to create slab '%s'. Error %d\n",
name, err);
else {
pr_warn("kmem_cache_create(%s) failed with error %d\n",
name, err);
dump_stack();
}
return NULL;
}
return s;
}
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2017-06-11 09:50:28 +07:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_create_usercopy);
/**
* kmem_cache_create - Create a cache.
* @name: A string which is used in /proc/slabinfo to identify this cache.
* @size: The size of objects to be created in this cache.
* @align: The required alignment for the objects.
* @flags: SLAB flags
* @ctor: A constructor for the objects.
*
* Cannot be called within a interrupt, but can be interrupted.
* The @ctor is run when new pages are allocated by the cache.
*
* The flags are
*
* %SLAB_POISON - Poison the slab with a known test pattern (a5a5a5a5)
* to catch references to uninitialised memory.
*
* %SLAB_RED_ZONE - Insert `Red` zones around the allocated memory to check
* for buffer overruns.
*
* %SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN - Align the objects in this cache to a hardware
* cacheline. This can be beneficial if you're counting cycles as closely
* as davem.
*
* Return: a pointer to the cache on success, NULL on failure.
*/
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2017-06-11 09:50:28 +07:00
struct kmem_cache *
kmem_cache_create(const char *name, unsigned int size, unsigned int align,
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2017-06-11 09:50:28 +07:00
slab_flags_t flags, void (*ctor)(void *))
{
return kmem_cache_create_usercopy(name, size, align, flags, 0, 0,
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2017-06-11 09:50:28 +07:00
ctor);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_create);
slab: remove synchronous rcu_barrier() call in memcg cache release path With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches need to flush all RCU operations before destruction because slab pages are freed through RCU and they need to be able to dereference the associated kmem_cache. Currently, it's done synchronously with rcu_barrier(). As rcu_barrier() is expensive time-wise, slab implements a batching mechanism so that rcu_barrier() can be done for multiple caches at the same time. Unfortunately, the rcu_barrier() is in synchronous path which is called while holding cgroup_mutex and the batching is too limited to be actually helpful. This patch updates the cache release path so that the batching is asynchronous and global. All SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches are queued globally and a work item consumes the list. The work item calls rcu_barrier() only once for all caches that are currently queued. * release_caches() is removed and shutdown_cache() now either directly release the cache or schedules a RCU callback to do that. This makes the cache inaccessible once shutdown_cache() is called and makes it impossible for shutdown_memcg_caches() to do memcg-specific cleanups afterwards. Move memcg-specific part into a helper, unlink_memcg_cache(), and make shutdown_cache() call it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-4-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:14 +07:00
static void slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
memcg: zap memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex mem_cgroup->memcg_slab_caches is a list of kmem caches corresponding to the given cgroup. Currently, it is only used on css free in order to destroy all caches corresponding to the memory cgroup being freed. The list is protected by memcg_slab_mutex. The mutex is also used to protect kmem_cache->memcg_params->memcg_caches arrays and synchronizes kmem_cache_destroy vs memcg_unregister_all_caches. However, we can perfectly get on without these two. To destroy all caches corresponding to a memory cgroup, we can walk over the global list of kmem caches, slab_caches, and we can do all the synchronization stuff using the slab_mutex instead of the memcg_slab_mutex. This patch therefore gets rid of the memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex. Apart from this nice cleanup, it also: - assures that rcu_barrier() is called once at max when a root cache is destroyed or a memory cgroup is freed, no matter how many caches have SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag set; - fixes the race between kmem_cache_destroy and kmem_cache_create that exists, because memcg_cleanup_cache_params, which is called from kmem_cache_destroy after checking that kmem_cache->refcount=0, releases the slab_mutex, which gives kmem_cache_create a chance to make an alias to a cache doomed to be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-11 05:11:47 +07:00
{
slab: remove synchronous rcu_barrier() call in memcg cache release path With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches need to flush all RCU operations before destruction because slab pages are freed through RCU and they need to be able to dereference the associated kmem_cache. Currently, it's done synchronously with rcu_barrier(). As rcu_barrier() is expensive time-wise, slab implements a batching mechanism so that rcu_barrier() can be done for multiple caches at the same time. Unfortunately, the rcu_barrier() is in synchronous path which is called while holding cgroup_mutex and the batching is too limited to be actually helpful. This patch updates the cache release path so that the batching is asynchronous and global. All SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches are queued globally and a work item consumes the list. The work item calls rcu_barrier() only once for all caches that are currently queued. * release_caches() is removed and shutdown_cache() now either directly release the cache or schedules a RCU callback to do that. This makes the cache inaccessible once shutdown_cache() is called and makes it impossible for shutdown_memcg_caches() to do memcg-specific cleanups afterwards. Move memcg-specific part into a helper, unlink_memcg_cache(), and make shutdown_cache() call it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-4-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:14 +07:00
LIST_HEAD(to_destroy);
struct kmem_cache *s, *s2;
memcg: zap memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex mem_cgroup->memcg_slab_caches is a list of kmem caches corresponding to the given cgroup. Currently, it is only used on css free in order to destroy all caches corresponding to the memory cgroup being freed. The list is protected by memcg_slab_mutex. The mutex is also used to protect kmem_cache->memcg_params->memcg_caches arrays and synchronizes kmem_cache_destroy vs memcg_unregister_all_caches. However, we can perfectly get on without these two. To destroy all caches corresponding to a memory cgroup, we can walk over the global list of kmem caches, slab_caches, and we can do all the synchronization stuff using the slab_mutex instead of the memcg_slab_mutex. This patch therefore gets rid of the memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex. Apart from this nice cleanup, it also: - assures that rcu_barrier() is called once at max when a root cache is destroyed or a memory cgroup is freed, no matter how many caches have SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag set; - fixes the race between kmem_cache_destroy and kmem_cache_create that exists, because memcg_cleanup_cache_params, which is called from kmem_cache_destroy after checking that kmem_cache->refcount=0, releases the slab_mutex, which gives kmem_cache_create a chance to make an alias to a cache doomed to be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-11 05:11:47 +07:00
slab: remove synchronous rcu_barrier() call in memcg cache release path With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches need to flush all RCU operations before destruction because slab pages are freed through RCU and they need to be able to dereference the associated kmem_cache. Currently, it's done synchronously with rcu_barrier(). As rcu_barrier() is expensive time-wise, slab implements a batching mechanism so that rcu_barrier() can be done for multiple caches at the same time. Unfortunately, the rcu_barrier() is in synchronous path which is called while holding cgroup_mutex and the batching is too limited to be actually helpful. This patch updates the cache release path so that the batching is asynchronous and global. All SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches are queued globally and a work item consumes the list. The work item calls rcu_barrier() only once for all caches that are currently queued. * release_caches() is removed and shutdown_cache() now either directly release the cache or schedules a RCU callback to do that. This makes the cache inaccessible once shutdown_cache() is called and makes it impossible for shutdown_memcg_caches() to do memcg-specific cleanups afterwards. Move memcg-specific part into a helper, unlink_memcg_cache(), and make shutdown_cache() call it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-4-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:14 +07:00
/*
* On destruction, SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU kmem_caches are put on the
slab: remove synchronous rcu_barrier() call in memcg cache release path With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches need to flush all RCU operations before destruction because slab pages are freed through RCU and they need to be able to dereference the associated kmem_cache. Currently, it's done synchronously with rcu_barrier(). As rcu_barrier() is expensive time-wise, slab implements a batching mechanism so that rcu_barrier() can be done for multiple caches at the same time. Unfortunately, the rcu_barrier() is in synchronous path which is called while holding cgroup_mutex and the batching is too limited to be actually helpful. This patch updates the cache release path so that the batching is asynchronous and global. All SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches are queued globally and a work item consumes the list. The work item calls rcu_barrier() only once for all caches that are currently queued. * release_caches() is removed and shutdown_cache() now either directly release the cache or schedules a RCU callback to do that. This makes the cache inaccessible once shutdown_cache() is called and makes it impossible for shutdown_memcg_caches() to do memcg-specific cleanups afterwards. Move memcg-specific part into a helper, unlink_memcg_cache(), and make shutdown_cache() call it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-4-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:14 +07:00
* @slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy list. The slab pages are freed
* through RCU and the associated kmem_cache are dereferenced
slab: remove synchronous rcu_barrier() call in memcg cache release path With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches need to flush all RCU operations before destruction because slab pages are freed through RCU and they need to be able to dereference the associated kmem_cache. Currently, it's done synchronously with rcu_barrier(). As rcu_barrier() is expensive time-wise, slab implements a batching mechanism so that rcu_barrier() can be done for multiple caches at the same time. Unfortunately, the rcu_barrier() is in synchronous path which is called while holding cgroup_mutex and the batching is too limited to be actually helpful. This patch updates the cache release path so that the batching is asynchronous and global. All SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches are queued globally and a work item consumes the list. The work item calls rcu_barrier() only once for all caches that are currently queued. * release_caches() is removed and shutdown_cache() now either directly release the cache or schedules a RCU callback to do that. This makes the cache inaccessible once shutdown_cache() is called and makes it impossible for shutdown_memcg_caches() to do memcg-specific cleanups afterwards. Move memcg-specific part into a helper, unlink_memcg_cache(), and make shutdown_cache() call it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-4-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:14 +07:00
* while freeing the pages, so the kmem_caches should be freed only
* after the pending RCU operations are finished. As rcu_barrier()
* is a pretty slow operation, we batch all pending destructions
* asynchronously.
*/
mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
list_splice_init(&slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy, &to_destroy);
mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex);
memcg: zap memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex mem_cgroup->memcg_slab_caches is a list of kmem caches corresponding to the given cgroup. Currently, it is only used on css free in order to destroy all caches corresponding to the memory cgroup being freed. The list is protected by memcg_slab_mutex. The mutex is also used to protect kmem_cache->memcg_params->memcg_caches arrays and synchronizes kmem_cache_destroy vs memcg_unregister_all_caches. However, we can perfectly get on without these two. To destroy all caches corresponding to a memory cgroup, we can walk over the global list of kmem caches, slab_caches, and we can do all the synchronization stuff using the slab_mutex instead of the memcg_slab_mutex. This patch therefore gets rid of the memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex. Apart from this nice cleanup, it also: - assures that rcu_barrier() is called once at max when a root cache is destroyed or a memory cgroup is freed, no matter how many caches have SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag set; - fixes the race between kmem_cache_destroy and kmem_cache_create that exists, because memcg_cleanup_cache_params, which is called from kmem_cache_destroy after checking that kmem_cache->refcount=0, releases the slab_mutex, which gives kmem_cache_create a chance to make an alias to a cache doomed to be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-11 05:11:47 +07:00
slab: remove synchronous rcu_barrier() call in memcg cache release path With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches need to flush all RCU operations before destruction because slab pages are freed through RCU and they need to be able to dereference the associated kmem_cache. Currently, it's done synchronously with rcu_barrier(). As rcu_barrier() is expensive time-wise, slab implements a batching mechanism so that rcu_barrier() can be done for multiple caches at the same time. Unfortunately, the rcu_barrier() is in synchronous path which is called while holding cgroup_mutex and the batching is too limited to be actually helpful. This patch updates the cache release path so that the batching is asynchronous and global. All SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches are queued globally and a work item consumes the list. The work item calls rcu_barrier() only once for all caches that are currently queued. * release_caches() is removed and shutdown_cache() now either directly release the cache or schedules a RCU callback to do that. This makes the cache inaccessible once shutdown_cache() is called and makes it impossible for shutdown_memcg_caches() to do memcg-specific cleanups afterwards. Move memcg-specific part into a helper, unlink_memcg_cache(), and make shutdown_cache() call it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-4-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:14 +07:00
if (list_empty(&to_destroy))
return;
rcu_barrier();
list_for_each_entry_safe(s, s2, &to_destroy, list) {
#ifdef SLAB_SUPPORTS_SYSFS
sysfs_slab_release(s);
#else
slab_kmem_cache_release(s);
#endif
}
memcg: zap memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex mem_cgroup->memcg_slab_caches is a list of kmem caches corresponding to the given cgroup. Currently, it is only used on css free in order to destroy all caches corresponding to the memory cgroup being freed. The list is protected by memcg_slab_mutex. The mutex is also used to protect kmem_cache->memcg_params->memcg_caches arrays and synchronizes kmem_cache_destroy vs memcg_unregister_all_caches. However, we can perfectly get on without these two. To destroy all caches corresponding to a memory cgroup, we can walk over the global list of kmem caches, slab_caches, and we can do all the synchronization stuff using the slab_mutex instead of the memcg_slab_mutex. This patch therefore gets rid of the memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex. Apart from this nice cleanup, it also: - assures that rcu_barrier() is called once at max when a root cache is destroyed or a memory cgroup is freed, no matter how many caches have SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag set; - fixes the race between kmem_cache_destroy and kmem_cache_create that exists, because memcg_cleanup_cache_params, which is called from kmem_cache_destroy after checking that kmem_cache->refcount=0, releases the slab_mutex, which gives kmem_cache_create a chance to make an alias to a cache doomed to be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-11 05:11:47 +07:00
}
slab: remove synchronous rcu_barrier() call in memcg cache release path With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches need to flush all RCU operations before destruction because slab pages are freed through RCU and they need to be able to dereference the associated kmem_cache. Currently, it's done synchronously with rcu_barrier(). As rcu_barrier() is expensive time-wise, slab implements a batching mechanism so that rcu_barrier() can be done for multiple caches at the same time. Unfortunately, the rcu_barrier() is in synchronous path which is called while holding cgroup_mutex and the batching is too limited to be actually helpful. This patch updates the cache release path so that the batching is asynchronous and global. All SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches are queued globally and a work item consumes the list. The work item calls rcu_barrier() only once for all caches that are currently queued. * release_caches() is removed and shutdown_cache() now either directly release the cache or schedules a RCU callback to do that. This makes the cache inaccessible once shutdown_cache() is called and makes it impossible for shutdown_memcg_caches() to do memcg-specific cleanups afterwards. Move memcg-specific part into a helper, unlink_memcg_cache(), and make shutdown_cache() call it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-4-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:14 +07:00
static int shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
memcg: zap memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex mem_cgroup->memcg_slab_caches is a list of kmem caches corresponding to the given cgroup. Currently, it is only used on css free in order to destroy all caches corresponding to the memory cgroup being freed. The list is protected by memcg_slab_mutex. The mutex is also used to protect kmem_cache->memcg_params->memcg_caches arrays and synchronizes kmem_cache_destroy vs memcg_unregister_all_caches. However, we can perfectly get on without these two. To destroy all caches corresponding to a memory cgroup, we can walk over the global list of kmem caches, slab_caches, and we can do all the synchronization stuff using the slab_mutex instead of the memcg_slab_mutex. This patch therefore gets rid of the memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex. Apart from this nice cleanup, it also: - assures that rcu_barrier() is called once at max when a root cache is destroyed or a memory cgroup is freed, no matter how many caches have SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag set; - fixes the race between kmem_cache_destroy and kmem_cache_create that exists, because memcg_cleanup_cache_params, which is called from kmem_cache_destroy after checking that kmem_cache->refcount=0, releases the slab_mutex, which gives kmem_cache_create a chance to make an alias to a cache doomed to be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-11 05:11:47 +07:00
{
kasan: drain quarantine of memcg slab objects Per memcg slab accounting and kasan have a problem with kmem_cache destruction. - kmem_cache_create() allocates a kmem_cache, which is used for allocations from processes running in root (top) memcg. - Processes running in non root memcg and allocating with either __GFP_ACCOUNT or from a SLAB_ACCOUNT cache use a per memcg kmem_cache. - Kasan catches use-after-free by having kfree() and kmem_cache_free() defer freeing of objects. Objects are placed in a quarantine. - kmem_cache_destroy() destroys root and non root kmem_caches. It takes care to drain the quarantine of objects from the root memcg's kmem_cache, but ignores objects associated with non root memcg. This causes leaks because quarantined per memcg objects refer to per memcg kmem cache being destroyed. To see the problem: 1) create a slab cache with kmem_cache_create(,,,SLAB_ACCOUNT,) 2) from non root memcg, allocate and free a few objects from cache 3) dispose of the cache with kmem_cache_destroy() kmem_cache_destroy() will trigger a "Slab cache still has objects" warning indicating that the per memcg kmem_cache structure was leaked. Fix the leak by draining kasan quarantined objects allocated from non root memcg. Racing memcg deletion is tricky, but handled. kmem_cache_destroy() => shutdown_memcg_caches() => __shutdown_memcg_cache() => shutdown_cache() flushes per memcg quarantined objects, even if that memcg has been rmdir'd and gone through memcg_deactivate_kmem_caches(). This leak only affects destroyed SLAB_ACCOUNT kmem caches when kasan is enabled. So I don't think it's worth patching stable kernels. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1482257462-36948-1-git-send-email-gthelen@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-25 06:00:05 +07:00
/* free asan quarantined objects */
kasan_cache_shutdown(s);
slab: remove synchronous rcu_barrier() call in memcg cache release path With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches need to flush all RCU operations before destruction because slab pages are freed through RCU and they need to be able to dereference the associated kmem_cache. Currently, it's done synchronously with rcu_barrier(). As rcu_barrier() is expensive time-wise, slab implements a batching mechanism so that rcu_barrier() can be done for multiple caches at the same time. Unfortunately, the rcu_barrier() is in synchronous path which is called while holding cgroup_mutex and the batching is too limited to be actually helpful. This patch updates the cache release path so that the batching is asynchronous and global. All SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches are queued globally and a work item consumes the list. The work item calls rcu_barrier() only once for all caches that are currently queued. * release_caches() is removed and shutdown_cache() now either directly release the cache or schedules a RCU callback to do that. This makes the cache inaccessible once shutdown_cache() is called and makes it impossible for shutdown_memcg_caches() to do memcg-specific cleanups afterwards. Move memcg-specific part into a helper, unlink_memcg_cache(), and make shutdown_cache() call it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-4-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:14 +07:00
if (__kmem_cache_shutdown(s) != 0)
return -EBUSY;
memcg: zap memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex mem_cgroup->memcg_slab_caches is a list of kmem caches corresponding to the given cgroup. Currently, it is only used on css free in order to destroy all caches corresponding to the memory cgroup being freed. The list is protected by memcg_slab_mutex. The mutex is also used to protect kmem_cache->memcg_params->memcg_caches arrays and synchronizes kmem_cache_destroy vs memcg_unregister_all_caches. However, we can perfectly get on without these two. To destroy all caches corresponding to a memory cgroup, we can walk over the global list of kmem caches, slab_caches, and we can do all the synchronization stuff using the slab_mutex instead of the memcg_slab_mutex. This patch therefore gets rid of the memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex. Apart from this nice cleanup, it also: - assures that rcu_barrier() is called once at max when a root cache is destroyed or a memory cgroup is freed, no matter how many caches have SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag set; - fixes the race between kmem_cache_destroy and kmem_cache_create that exists, because memcg_cleanup_cache_params, which is called from kmem_cache_destroy after checking that kmem_cache->refcount=0, releases the slab_mutex, which gives kmem_cache_create a chance to make an alias to a cache doomed to be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-11 05:11:47 +07:00
slab: remove synchronous rcu_barrier() call in memcg cache release path With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches need to flush all RCU operations before destruction because slab pages are freed through RCU and they need to be able to dereference the associated kmem_cache. Currently, it's done synchronously with rcu_barrier(). As rcu_barrier() is expensive time-wise, slab implements a batching mechanism so that rcu_barrier() can be done for multiple caches at the same time. Unfortunately, the rcu_barrier() is in synchronous path which is called while holding cgroup_mutex and the batching is too limited to be actually helpful. This patch updates the cache release path so that the batching is asynchronous and global. All SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches are queued globally and a work item consumes the list. The work item calls rcu_barrier() only once for all caches that are currently queued. * release_caches() is removed and shutdown_cache() now either directly release the cache or schedules a RCU callback to do that. This makes the cache inaccessible once shutdown_cache() is called and makes it impossible for shutdown_memcg_caches() to do memcg-specific cleanups afterwards. Move memcg-specific part into a helper, unlink_memcg_cache(), and make shutdown_cache() call it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-4-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:14 +07:00
list_del(&s->list);
memcg: zap memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex mem_cgroup->memcg_slab_caches is a list of kmem caches corresponding to the given cgroup. Currently, it is only used on css free in order to destroy all caches corresponding to the memory cgroup being freed. The list is protected by memcg_slab_mutex. The mutex is also used to protect kmem_cache->memcg_params->memcg_caches arrays and synchronizes kmem_cache_destroy vs memcg_unregister_all_caches. However, we can perfectly get on without these two. To destroy all caches corresponding to a memory cgroup, we can walk over the global list of kmem caches, slab_caches, and we can do all the synchronization stuff using the slab_mutex instead of the memcg_slab_mutex. This patch therefore gets rid of the memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex. Apart from this nice cleanup, it also: - assures that rcu_barrier() is called once at max when a root cache is destroyed or a memory cgroup is freed, no matter how many caches have SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag set; - fixes the race between kmem_cache_destroy and kmem_cache_create that exists, because memcg_cleanup_cache_params, which is called from kmem_cache_destroy after checking that kmem_cache->refcount=0, releases the slab_mutex, which gives kmem_cache_create a chance to make an alias to a cache doomed to be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-11 05:11:47 +07:00
if (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU) {
slub: fix failure when we delete and create a slab cache In kernel 4.17 I removed some code from dm-bufio that did slab cache merging (commit 21bb13276768: "dm bufio: remove code that merges slab caches") - both slab and slub support merging caches with identical attributes, so dm-bufio now just calls kmem_cache_create and relies on implicit merging. This uncovered a bug in the slub subsystem - if we delete a cache and immediatelly create another cache with the same attributes, it fails because of duplicate filename in /sys/kernel/slab/. The slub subsystem offloads freeing the cache to a workqueue - and if we create the new cache before the workqueue runs, it complains because of duplicate filename in sysfs. This patch fixes the bug by moving the call of kobject_del from sysfs_slab_remove_workfn to shutdown_cache. kobject_del must be called while we hold slab_mutex - so that the sysfs entry is deleted before a cache with the same attributes could be created. Running device-mapper-test-suite with: dmtest run --suite thin-provisioning -n /commit_failure_causes_fallback/ triggered: Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 1572848, async page read device-mapper: thin: 253:1: metadata operation 'dm_pool_alloc_data_block' failed: error = -5 device-mapper: thin: 253:1: aborting current metadata transaction sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/kernel/slab/:a-0000144' CPU: 2 PID: 1037 Comm: kworker/u48:1 Not tainted 4.17.0.snitm+ #25 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-1029P-WTR/X11DDW-L, BIOS 2.0a 12/06/2017 Workqueue: dm-thin do_worker [dm_thin_pool] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5a/0x73 sysfs_warn_dup+0x58/0x70 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x77/0x80 kobject_add_internal+0xba/0x2e0 kobject_init_and_add+0x70/0xb0 sysfs_slab_add+0xb1/0x250 __kmem_cache_create+0x116/0x150 create_cache+0xd9/0x1f0 kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x1c1/0x250 kmem_cache_create+0x18/0x20 dm_bufio_client_create+0x1ae/0x410 [dm_bufio] dm_block_manager_create+0x5e/0x90 [dm_persistent_data] __create_persistent_data_objects+0x38/0x940 [dm_thin_pool] dm_pool_abort_metadata+0x64/0x90 [dm_thin_pool] metadata_operation_failed+0x59/0x100 [dm_thin_pool] alloc_data_block.isra.53+0x86/0x180 [dm_thin_pool] process_cell+0x2a3/0x550 [dm_thin_pool] do_worker+0x28d/0x8f0 [dm_thin_pool] process_one_work+0x171/0x370 worker_thread+0x49/0x3f0 kthread+0xf8/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 kobject_add_internal failed for :a-0000144 with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory. kmem_cache_create(dm_bufio_buffer-16) failed with error -17 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.1806151817130.6333@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Reported-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Tested-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-28 13:26:09 +07:00
#ifdef SLAB_SUPPORTS_SYSFS
sysfs_slab_unlink(s);
#endif
slab: remove synchronous rcu_barrier() call in memcg cache release path With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches need to flush all RCU operations before destruction because slab pages are freed through RCU and they need to be able to dereference the associated kmem_cache. Currently, it's done synchronously with rcu_barrier(). As rcu_barrier() is expensive time-wise, slab implements a batching mechanism so that rcu_barrier() can be done for multiple caches at the same time. Unfortunately, the rcu_barrier() is in synchronous path which is called while holding cgroup_mutex and the batching is too limited to be actually helpful. This patch updates the cache release path so that the batching is asynchronous and global. All SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches are queued globally and a work item consumes the list. The work item calls rcu_barrier() only once for all caches that are currently queued. * release_caches() is removed and shutdown_cache() now either directly release the cache or schedules a RCU callback to do that. This makes the cache inaccessible once shutdown_cache() is called and makes it impossible for shutdown_memcg_caches() to do memcg-specific cleanups afterwards. Move memcg-specific part into a helper, unlink_memcg_cache(), and make shutdown_cache() call it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-4-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:14 +07:00
list_add_tail(&s->list, &slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy);
schedule_work(&slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work);
} else {
memcg: zap memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex mem_cgroup->memcg_slab_caches is a list of kmem caches corresponding to the given cgroup. Currently, it is only used on css free in order to destroy all caches corresponding to the memory cgroup being freed. The list is protected by memcg_slab_mutex. The mutex is also used to protect kmem_cache->memcg_params->memcg_caches arrays and synchronizes kmem_cache_destroy vs memcg_unregister_all_caches. However, we can perfectly get on without these two. To destroy all caches corresponding to a memory cgroup, we can walk over the global list of kmem caches, slab_caches, and we can do all the synchronization stuff using the slab_mutex instead of the memcg_slab_mutex. This patch therefore gets rid of the memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex. Apart from this nice cleanup, it also: - assures that rcu_barrier() is called once at max when a root cache is destroyed or a memory cgroup is freed, no matter how many caches have SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag set; - fixes the race between kmem_cache_destroy and kmem_cache_create that exists, because memcg_cleanup_cache_params, which is called from kmem_cache_destroy after checking that kmem_cache->refcount=0, releases the slab_mutex, which gives kmem_cache_create a chance to make an alias to a cache doomed to be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-11 05:11:47 +07:00
#ifdef SLAB_SUPPORTS_SYSFS
slub: fix failure when we delete and create a slab cache In kernel 4.17 I removed some code from dm-bufio that did slab cache merging (commit 21bb13276768: "dm bufio: remove code that merges slab caches") - both slab and slub support merging caches with identical attributes, so dm-bufio now just calls kmem_cache_create and relies on implicit merging. This uncovered a bug in the slub subsystem - if we delete a cache and immediatelly create another cache with the same attributes, it fails because of duplicate filename in /sys/kernel/slab/. The slub subsystem offloads freeing the cache to a workqueue - and if we create the new cache before the workqueue runs, it complains because of duplicate filename in sysfs. This patch fixes the bug by moving the call of kobject_del from sysfs_slab_remove_workfn to shutdown_cache. kobject_del must be called while we hold slab_mutex - so that the sysfs entry is deleted before a cache with the same attributes could be created. Running device-mapper-test-suite with: dmtest run --suite thin-provisioning -n /commit_failure_causes_fallback/ triggered: Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 1572848, async page read device-mapper: thin: 253:1: metadata operation 'dm_pool_alloc_data_block' failed: error = -5 device-mapper: thin: 253:1: aborting current metadata transaction sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/kernel/slab/:a-0000144' CPU: 2 PID: 1037 Comm: kworker/u48:1 Not tainted 4.17.0.snitm+ #25 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-1029P-WTR/X11DDW-L, BIOS 2.0a 12/06/2017 Workqueue: dm-thin do_worker [dm_thin_pool] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5a/0x73 sysfs_warn_dup+0x58/0x70 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x77/0x80 kobject_add_internal+0xba/0x2e0 kobject_init_and_add+0x70/0xb0 sysfs_slab_add+0xb1/0x250 __kmem_cache_create+0x116/0x150 create_cache+0xd9/0x1f0 kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x1c1/0x250 kmem_cache_create+0x18/0x20 dm_bufio_client_create+0x1ae/0x410 [dm_bufio] dm_block_manager_create+0x5e/0x90 [dm_persistent_data] __create_persistent_data_objects+0x38/0x940 [dm_thin_pool] dm_pool_abort_metadata+0x64/0x90 [dm_thin_pool] metadata_operation_failed+0x59/0x100 [dm_thin_pool] alloc_data_block.isra.53+0x86/0x180 [dm_thin_pool] process_cell+0x2a3/0x550 [dm_thin_pool] do_worker+0x28d/0x8f0 [dm_thin_pool] process_one_work+0x171/0x370 worker_thread+0x49/0x3f0 kthread+0xf8/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 kobject_add_internal failed for :a-0000144 with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory. kmem_cache_create(dm_bufio_buffer-16) failed with error -17 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.1806151817130.6333@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Reported-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Tested-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-28 13:26:09 +07:00
sysfs_slab_unlink(s);
sysfs_slab_release(s);
memcg: zap memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex mem_cgroup->memcg_slab_caches is a list of kmem caches corresponding to the given cgroup. Currently, it is only used on css free in order to destroy all caches corresponding to the memory cgroup being freed. The list is protected by memcg_slab_mutex. The mutex is also used to protect kmem_cache->memcg_params->memcg_caches arrays and synchronizes kmem_cache_destroy vs memcg_unregister_all_caches. However, we can perfectly get on without these two. To destroy all caches corresponding to a memory cgroup, we can walk over the global list of kmem caches, slab_caches, and we can do all the synchronization stuff using the slab_mutex instead of the memcg_slab_mutex. This patch therefore gets rid of the memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex. Apart from this nice cleanup, it also: - assures that rcu_barrier() is called once at max when a root cache is destroyed or a memory cgroup is freed, no matter how many caches have SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag set; - fixes the race between kmem_cache_destroy and kmem_cache_create that exists, because memcg_cleanup_cache_params, which is called from kmem_cache_destroy after checking that kmem_cache->refcount=0, releases the slab_mutex, which gives kmem_cache_create a chance to make an alias to a cache doomed to be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-11 05:11:47 +07:00
#else
slab_kmem_cache_release(s);
#endif
}
slab: remove synchronous rcu_barrier() call in memcg cache release path With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches need to flush all RCU operations before destruction because slab pages are freed through RCU and they need to be able to dereference the associated kmem_cache. Currently, it's done synchronously with rcu_barrier(). As rcu_barrier() is expensive time-wise, slab implements a batching mechanism so that rcu_barrier() can be done for multiple caches at the same time. Unfortunately, the rcu_barrier() is in synchronous path which is called while holding cgroup_mutex and the batching is too limited to be actually helpful. This patch updates the cache release path so that the batching is asynchronous and global. All SLAB_DESTORY_BY_RCU caches are queued globally and a work item consumes the list. The work item calls rcu_barrier() only once for all caches that are currently queued. * release_caches() is removed and shutdown_cache() now either directly release the cache or schedules a RCU callback to do that. This makes the cache inaccessible once shutdown_cache() is called and makes it impossible for shutdown_memcg_caches() to do memcg-specific cleanups afterwards. Move memcg-specific part into a helper, unlink_memcg_cache(), and make shutdown_cache() call it directly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-4-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:14 +07:00
return 0;
memcg: zap memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex mem_cgroup->memcg_slab_caches is a list of kmem caches corresponding to the given cgroup. Currently, it is only used on css free in order to destroy all caches corresponding to the memory cgroup being freed. The list is protected by memcg_slab_mutex. The mutex is also used to protect kmem_cache->memcg_params->memcg_caches arrays and synchronizes kmem_cache_destroy vs memcg_unregister_all_caches. However, we can perfectly get on without these two. To destroy all caches corresponding to a memory cgroup, we can walk over the global list of kmem caches, slab_caches, and we can do all the synchronization stuff using the slab_mutex instead of the memcg_slab_mutex. This patch therefore gets rid of the memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex. Apart from this nice cleanup, it also: - assures that rcu_barrier() is called once at max when a root cache is destroyed or a memory cgroup is freed, no matter how many caches have SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag set; - fixes the race between kmem_cache_destroy and kmem_cache_create that exists, because memcg_cleanup_cache_params, which is called from kmem_cache_destroy after checking that kmem_cache->refcount=0, releases the slab_mutex, which gives kmem_cache_create a chance to make an alias to a cache doomed to be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-11 05:11:47 +07:00
}
slub: use sysfs'es release mechanism for kmem_cache debugobjects warning during netfilter exit: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 4178 at lib/debugobjects.c:260 debug_print_object+0x8d/0xb0() ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x20 Modules linked in: CPU: 6 PID: 4178 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Tainted: G W 3.11.0-next-20130906-sasha #3984 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call Trace: dump_stack+0x52/0x87 warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0 warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50 debug_print_object+0x8d/0xb0 __debug_check_no_obj_freed+0xa5/0x220 debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x15/0x20 kmem_cache_free+0x197/0x340 kmem_cache_destroy+0x86/0xe0 nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list+0x131/0x170 nf_conntrack_pernet_exit+0x5d/0x70 ops_exit_list+0x5e/0x70 cleanup_net+0xfb/0x1c0 process_one_work+0x338/0x550 worker_thread+0x215/0x350 kthread+0xe7/0xf0 ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 Also during dcookie cleanup: WARNING: CPU: 12 PID: 9725 at lib/debugobjects.c:260 debug_print_object+0x8c/0xb0() ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x20 Modules linked in: CPU: 12 PID: 9725 Comm: trinity-c141 Not tainted 3.15.0-rc2-next-20140423-sasha-00018-gc4ff6c4 #408 Call Trace: dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52) warn_slowpath_common (kernel/panic.c:430) warn_slowpath_fmt (kernel/panic.c:445) debug_print_object (lib/debugobjects.c:262) __debug_check_no_obj_freed (lib/debugobjects.c:697) debug_check_no_obj_freed (lib/debugobjects.c:726) kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:2689 mm/slub.c:2717) kmem_cache_destroy (mm/slab_common.c:363) dcookie_unregister (fs/dcookies.c:302 fs/dcookies.c:343) event_buffer_release (arch/x86/oprofile/../../../drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c:153) __fput (fs/file_table.c:217) ____fput (fs/file_table.c:253) task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:125 (discriminator 1)) do_notify_resume (include/linux/tracehook.h:196 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:751) int_signal (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:807) Sysfs has a release mechanism. Use that to release the kmem_cache structure if CONFIG_SYSFS is enabled. Only slub is changed - slab currently only supports /proc/slabinfo and not /sys/kernel/slab/*. We talked about adding that and someone was working on it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_SYSFS=n build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_SYSFS=n build even more] Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Acked-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-05-07 02:50:08 +07:00
void slab_kmem_cache_release(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
mm: slab: free kmem_cache_node after destroy sysfs file When slub_debug alloc_calls_show is enabled we will try to track location and user of slab object on each online node, kmem_cache_node structure and cpu_cache/cpu_slub shouldn't be freed till there is the last reference to sysfs file. This fixes the following panic: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: list_locations+0x169/0x4e0 PGD 257304067 PUD 438456067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 3 PID: 973074 Comm: cat ve: 0 Not tainted 3.10.0-229.7.2.ovz.9.30-00007-japdoll-dirty #2 9.30 Hardware name: DEPO Computers To Be Filled By O.E.M./H67DE3, BIOS L1.60c 07/14/2011 task: ffff88042a5dc5b0 ti: ffff88037f8d8000 task.ti: ffff88037f8d8000 RIP: list_locations+0x169/0x4e0 Call Trace: alloc_calls_show+0x1d/0x30 slab_attr_show+0x1b/0x30 sysfs_read_file+0x9a/0x1a0 vfs_read+0x9c/0x170 SyS_read+0x58/0xb0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 5e 07 12 00 b9 00 04 00 00 3d 00 04 00 00 0f 4f c1 3d 00 04 00 00 89 45 b0 0f 84 c3 00 00 00 48 63 45 b0 49 8b 9c c4 f8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 43 20 48 85 c0 74 b6 48 89 df e8 46 37 44 00 48 8b 53 10 CR2: 0000000000000020 Separated __kmem_cache_release from __kmem_cache_shutdown which now called on slab_kmem_cache_release (after the last reference to sysfs file object has dropped). Reintroduced locking in free_partial as sysfs file might access cache's partial list after shutdowning - partial revert of the commit 69cb8e6b7c29 ("slub: free slabs without holding locks"). Zap __remove_partial and use remove_partial (w/o underscores) as free_partial now takes list_lock which s partial revert for commit 1e4dd9461fab ("slub: do not assert not having lock in removing freed partial") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Suggested-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-18 04:11:37 +07:00
__kmem_cache_release(s);
kfree_const(s->name);
slub: use sysfs'es release mechanism for kmem_cache debugobjects warning during netfilter exit: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 4178 at lib/debugobjects.c:260 debug_print_object+0x8d/0xb0() ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x20 Modules linked in: CPU: 6 PID: 4178 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Tainted: G W 3.11.0-next-20130906-sasha #3984 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call Trace: dump_stack+0x52/0x87 warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0 warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50 debug_print_object+0x8d/0xb0 __debug_check_no_obj_freed+0xa5/0x220 debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x15/0x20 kmem_cache_free+0x197/0x340 kmem_cache_destroy+0x86/0xe0 nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list+0x131/0x170 nf_conntrack_pernet_exit+0x5d/0x70 ops_exit_list+0x5e/0x70 cleanup_net+0xfb/0x1c0 process_one_work+0x338/0x550 worker_thread+0x215/0x350 kthread+0xe7/0xf0 ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 Also during dcookie cleanup: WARNING: CPU: 12 PID: 9725 at lib/debugobjects.c:260 debug_print_object+0x8c/0xb0() ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x20 Modules linked in: CPU: 12 PID: 9725 Comm: trinity-c141 Not tainted 3.15.0-rc2-next-20140423-sasha-00018-gc4ff6c4 #408 Call Trace: dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52) warn_slowpath_common (kernel/panic.c:430) warn_slowpath_fmt (kernel/panic.c:445) debug_print_object (lib/debugobjects.c:262) __debug_check_no_obj_freed (lib/debugobjects.c:697) debug_check_no_obj_freed (lib/debugobjects.c:726) kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:2689 mm/slub.c:2717) kmem_cache_destroy (mm/slab_common.c:363) dcookie_unregister (fs/dcookies.c:302 fs/dcookies.c:343) event_buffer_release (arch/x86/oprofile/../../../drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c:153) __fput (fs/file_table.c:217) ____fput (fs/file_table.c:253) task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:125 (discriminator 1)) do_notify_resume (include/linux/tracehook.h:196 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:751) int_signal (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:807) Sysfs has a release mechanism. Use that to release the kmem_cache structure if CONFIG_SYSFS is enabled. Only slub is changed - slab currently only supports /proc/slabinfo and not /sys/kernel/slab/*. We talked about adding that and someone was working on it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_SYSFS=n build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_SYSFS=n build even more] Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Acked-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-05-07 02:50:08 +07:00
kmem_cache_free(kmem_cache, s);
}
void kmem_cache_destroy(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
int err;
memcg: zap memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex mem_cgroup->memcg_slab_caches is a list of kmem caches corresponding to the given cgroup. Currently, it is only used on css free in order to destroy all caches corresponding to the memory cgroup being freed. The list is protected by memcg_slab_mutex. The mutex is also used to protect kmem_cache->memcg_params->memcg_caches arrays and synchronizes kmem_cache_destroy vs memcg_unregister_all_caches. However, we can perfectly get on without these two. To destroy all caches corresponding to a memory cgroup, we can walk over the global list of kmem caches, slab_caches, and we can do all the synchronization stuff using the slab_mutex instead of the memcg_slab_mutex. This patch therefore gets rid of the memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex. Apart from this nice cleanup, it also: - assures that rcu_barrier() is called once at max when a root cache is destroyed or a memory cgroup is freed, no matter how many caches have SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag set; - fixes the race between kmem_cache_destroy and kmem_cache_create that exists, because memcg_cleanup_cache_params, which is called from kmem_cache_destroy after checking that kmem_cache->refcount=0, releases the slab_mutex, which gives kmem_cache_create a chance to make an alias to a cache doomed to be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-11 05:11:47 +07:00
if (unlikely(!s))
return;
get_online_cpus();
slab: get_online_mems for kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink} When we create a sl[au]b cache, we allocate kmem_cache_node structures for each online NUMA node. To handle nodes taken online/offline, we register memory hotplug notifier and allocate/free kmem_cache_node corresponding to the node that changes its state for each kmem cache. To synchronize between the two paths we hold the slab_mutex during both the cache creationg/destruction path and while tuning per-node parts of kmem caches in memory hotplug handler, but that's not quite right, because it does not guarantee that a newly created cache will have all kmem_cache_nodes initialized in case it races with memory hotplug. For instance, in case of slub: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- kmem_cache_create: online_pages: __kmem_cache_create: slab_memory_callback: slab_mem_going_online_callback: lock slab_mutex for each slab_caches list entry allocate kmem_cache node unlock slab_mutex lock slab_mutex init_kmem_cache_nodes: for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) allocate kmem_cache node add kmem_cache to slab_caches list unlock slab_mutex online_pages (continued): node_states_set_node As a result we'll get a kmem cache with not all kmem_cache_nodes allocated. To avoid issues like that we should hold get/put_online_mems() during the whole kmem cache creation/destruction/shrink paths, just like we deal with cpu hotplug. This patch does the trick. Note, that after it's applied, there is no need in taking the slab_mutex for kmem_cache_shrink any more, so it is removed from there. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-05 06:07:20 +07:00
get_online_mems();
mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
memcg, slab: do not destroy children caches if parent has aliases Currently we destroy children caches at the very beginning of kmem_cache_destroy(). This is wrong, because the root cache will not necessarily be destroyed in the end - if it has aliases (refcount > 0), kmem_cache_destroy() will simply decrement its refcount and return. In this case, at best we will get a bunch of warnings in dmesg, like this one: kmem_cache_destroy kmalloc-32:0: Slab cache still has objects CPU: 1 PID: 7139 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 3.13.0+ #117 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x49/0x5b kmem_cache_destroy+0xdf/0xf0 kmem_cache_destroy_memcg_children+0x97/0xc0 kmem_cache_destroy+0xf/0xf0 xfs_mru_cache_uninit+0x21/0x30 [xfs] exit_xfs_fs+0x2e/0xc44 [xfs] SyS_delete_module+0x198/0x1f0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b At worst - if kmem_cache_destroy() will race with an allocation from a memcg cache - the kernel will panic. This patch fixes this by moving children caches destruction after the check if the cache has aliases. Plus, it forbids destroying a root cache if it still has children caches, because each children cache keeps a reference to its parent. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Glauber Costa <glommer@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 05:39:28 +07:00
s->refcount--;
memcg, slab: do not destroy children caches if parent has aliases Currently we destroy children caches at the very beginning of kmem_cache_destroy(). This is wrong, because the root cache will not necessarily be destroyed in the end - if it has aliases (refcount > 0), kmem_cache_destroy() will simply decrement its refcount and return. In this case, at best we will get a bunch of warnings in dmesg, like this one: kmem_cache_destroy kmalloc-32:0: Slab cache still has objects CPU: 1 PID: 7139 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 3.13.0+ #117 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x49/0x5b kmem_cache_destroy+0xdf/0xf0 kmem_cache_destroy_memcg_children+0x97/0xc0 kmem_cache_destroy+0xf/0xf0 xfs_mru_cache_uninit+0x21/0x30 [xfs] exit_xfs_fs+0x2e/0xc44 [xfs] SyS_delete_module+0x198/0x1f0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b At worst - if kmem_cache_destroy() will race with an allocation from a memcg cache - the kernel will panic. This patch fixes this by moving children caches destruction after the check if the cache has aliases. Plus, it forbids destroying a root cache if it still has children caches, because each children cache keeps a reference to its parent. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Glauber Costa <glommer@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 05:39:28 +07:00
if (s->refcount)
goto out_unlock;
err = shutdown_cache(s);
if (err) {
pr_err("kmem_cache_destroy %s: Slab cache still has objects\n",
s->name);
dump_stack();
}
memcg, slab: do not destroy children caches if parent has aliases Currently we destroy children caches at the very beginning of kmem_cache_destroy(). This is wrong, because the root cache will not necessarily be destroyed in the end - if it has aliases (refcount > 0), kmem_cache_destroy() will simply decrement its refcount and return. In this case, at best we will get a bunch of warnings in dmesg, like this one: kmem_cache_destroy kmalloc-32:0: Slab cache still has objects CPU: 1 PID: 7139 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 3.13.0+ #117 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x49/0x5b kmem_cache_destroy+0xdf/0xf0 kmem_cache_destroy_memcg_children+0x97/0xc0 kmem_cache_destroy+0xf/0xf0 xfs_mru_cache_uninit+0x21/0x30 [xfs] exit_xfs_fs+0x2e/0xc44 [xfs] SyS_delete_module+0x198/0x1f0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b At worst - if kmem_cache_destroy() will race with an allocation from a memcg cache - the kernel will panic. This patch fixes this by moving children caches destruction after the check if the cache has aliases. Plus, it forbids destroying a root cache if it still has children caches, because each children cache keeps a reference to its parent. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Glauber Costa <glommer@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 05:39:28 +07:00
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex);
memcg: zap memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex mem_cgroup->memcg_slab_caches is a list of kmem caches corresponding to the given cgroup. Currently, it is only used on css free in order to destroy all caches corresponding to the memory cgroup being freed. The list is protected by memcg_slab_mutex. The mutex is also used to protect kmem_cache->memcg_params->memcg_caches arrays and synchronizes kmem_cache_destroy vs memcg_unregister_all_caches. However, we can perfectly get on without these two. To destroy all caches corresponding to a memory cgroup, we can walk over the global list of kmem caches, slab_caches, and we can do all the synchronization stuff using the slab_mutex instead of the memcg_slab_mutex. This patch therefore gets rid of the memcg_slab_caches and memcg_slab_mutex. Apart from this nice cleanup, it also: - assures that rcu_barrier() is called once at max when a root cache is destroyed or a memory cgroup is freed, no matter how many caches have SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag set; - fixes the race between kmem_cache_destroy and kmem_cache_create that exists, because memcg_cleanup_cache_params, which is called from kmem_cache_destroy after checking that kmem_cache->refcount=0, releases the slab_mutex, which gives kmem_cache_create a chance to make an alias to a cache doomed to be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-11 05:11:47 +07:00
slab: get_online_mems for kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink} When we create a sl[au]b cache, we allocate kmem_cache_node structures for each online NUMA node. To handle nodes taken online/offline, we register memory hotplug notifier and allocate/free kmem_cache_node corresponding to the node that changes its state for each kmem cache. To synchronize between the two paths we hold the slab_mutex during both the cache creationg/destruction path and while tuning per-node parts of kmem caches in memory hotplug handler, but that's not quite right, because it does not guarantee that a newly created cache will have all kmem_cache_nodes initialized in case it races with memory hotplug. For instance, in case of slub: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- kmem_cache_create: online_pages: __kmem_cache_create: slab_memory_callback: slab_mem_going_online_callback: lock slab_mutex for each slab_caches list entry allocate kmem_cache node unlock slab_mutex lock slab_mutex init_kmem_cache_nodes: for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) allocate kmem_cache node add kmem_cache to slab_caches list unlock slab_mutex online_pages (continued): node_states_set_node As a result we'll get a kmem cache with not all kmem_cache_nodes allocated. To avoid issues like that we should hold get/put_online_mems() during the whole kmem cache creation/destruction/shrink paths, just like we deal with cpu hotplug. This patch does the trick. Note, that after it's applied, there is no need in taking the slab_mutex for kmem_cache_shrink any more, so it is removed from there. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-05 06:07:20 +07:00
put_online_mems();
put_online_cpus();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_destroy);
slab: get_online_mems for kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink} When we create a sl[au]b cache, we allocate kmem_cache_node structures for each online NUMA node. To handle nodes taken online/offline, we register memory hotplug notifier and allocate/free kmem_cache_node corresponding to the node that changes its state for each kmem cache. To synchronize between the two paths we hold the slab_mutex during both the cache creationg/destruction path and while tuning per-node parts of kmem caches in memory hotplug handler, but that's not quite right, because it does not guarantee that a newly created cache will have all kmem_cache_nodes initialized in case it races with memory hotplug. For instance, in case of slub: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- kmem_cache_create: online_pages: __kmem_cache_create: slab_memory_callback: slab_mem_going_online_callback: lock slab_mutex for each slab_caches list entry allocate kmem_cache node unlock slab_mutex lock slab_mutex init_kmem_cache_nodes: for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) allocate kmem_cache node add kmem_cache to slab_caches list unlock slab_mutex online_pages (continued): node_states_set_node As a result we'll get a kmem cache with not all kmem_cache_nodes allocated. To avoid issues like that we should hold get/put_online_mems() during the whole kmem cache creation/destruction/shrink paths, just like we deal with cpu hotplug. This patch does the trick. Note, that after it's applied, there is no need in taking the slab_mutex for kmem_cache_shrink any more, so it is removed from there. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-05 06:07:20 +07:00
/**
* kmem_cache_shrink - Shrink a cache.
* @cachep: The cache to shrink.
*
* Releases as many slabs as possible for a cache.
* To help debugging, a zero exit status indicates all slabs were released.
*
* Return: %0 if all slabs were released, non-zero otherwise
slab: get_online_mems for kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink} When we create a sl[au]b cache, we allocate kmem_cache_node structures for each online NUMA node. To handle nodes taken online/offline, we register memory hotplug notifier and allocate/free kmem_cache_node corresponding to the node that changes its state for each kmem cache. To synchronize between the two paths we hold the slab_mutex during both the cache creationg/destruction path and while tuning per-node parts of kmem caches in memory hotplug handler, but that's not quite right, because it does not guarantee that a newly created cache will have all kmem_cache_nodes initialized in case it races with memory hotplug. For instance, in case of slub: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- kmem_cache_create: online_pages: __kmem_cache_create: slab_memory_callback: slab_mem_going_online_callback: lock slab_mutex for each slab_caches list entry allocate kmem_cache node unlock slab_mutex lock slab_mutex init_kmem_cache_nodes: for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) allocate kmem_cache node add kmem_cache to slab_caches list unlock slab_mutex online_pages (continued): node_states_set_node As a result we'll get a kmem cache with not all kmem_cache_nodes allocated. To avoid issues like that we should hold get/put_online_mems() during the whole kmem cache creation/destruction/shrink paths, just like we deal with cpu hotplug. This patch does the trick. Note, that after it's applied, there is no need in taking the slab_mutex for kmem_cache_shrink any more, so it is removed from there. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-05 06:07:20 +07:00
*/
int kmem_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cachep)
{
int ret;
get_online_cpus();
get_online_mems();
mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free errors. When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE. The object is poisoned and put into quarantine instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated. When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator. From now on the allocator may reuse it for another allocation. Before that happens, it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it retains the allocation/deallocation stacks). When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped. Therefore a use of this object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning. Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place. Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free errors. Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues. When a cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are moved into the global quarantine queue. Whenever a kmalloc call allows memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical memory). As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is increased. Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect incorrect accesses to it. Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. A number of improvements have been suggested by Andrey Ryabinin. [glider@google.com: v9] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-21 06:59:11 +07:00
kasan_cache_shrink(cachep);
ret = __kmem_cache_shrink(cachep);
slab: get_online_mems for kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink} When we create a sl[au]b cache, we allocate kmem_cache_node structures for each online NUMA node. To handle nodes taken online/offline, we register memory hotplug notifier and allocate/free kmem_cache_node corresponding to the node that changes its state for each kmem cache. To synchronize between the two paths we hold the slab_mutex during both the cache creationg/destruction path and while tuning per-node parts of kmem caches in memory hotplug handler, but that's not quite right, because it does not guarantee that a newly created cache will have all kmem_cache_nodes initialized in case it races with memory hotplug. For instance, in case of slub: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- kmem_cache_create: online_pages: __kmem_cache_create: slab_memory_callback: slab_mem_going_online_callback: lock slab_mutex for each slab_caches list entry allocate kmem_cache node unlock slab_mutex lock slab_mutex init_kmem_cache_nodes: for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) allocate kmem_cache node add kmem_cache to slab_caches list unlock slab_mutex online_pages (continued): node_states_set_node As a result we'll get a kmem cache with not all kmem_cache_nodes allocated. To avoid issues like that we should hold get/put_online_mems() during the whole kmem cache creation/destruction/shrink paths, just like we deal with cpu hotplug. This patch does the trick. Note, that after it's applied, there is no need in taking the slab_mutex for kmem_cache_shrink any more, so it is removed from there. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-05 06:07:20 +07:00
put_online_mems();
put_online_cpus();
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_shrink);
bool slab_is_available(void)
{
return slab_state >= UP;
}
#ifndef CONFIG_SLOB
/* Create a cache during boot when no slab services are available yet */
void __init create_boot_cache(struct kmem_cache *s, const char *name,
unsigned int size, slab_flags_t flags,
unsigned int useroffset, unsigned int usersize)
{
int err;
mm, sl[aou]b: guarantee natural alignment for kmalloc(power-of-two) In most configurations, kmalloc() happens to return naturally aligned (i.e. aligned to the block size itself) blocks for power of two sizes. That means some kmalloc() users might unknowingly rely on that alignment, until stuff breaks when the kernel is built with e.g. CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG or CONFIG_SLOB, and blocks stop being aligned. Then developers have to devise workaround such as own kmem caches with specified alignment [1], which is not always practical, as recently evidenced in [2]. The topic has been discussed at LSF/MM 2019 [3]. Adding a 'kmalloc_aligned()' variant would not help with code unknowingly relying on the implicit alignment. For slab implementations it would either require creating more kmalloc caches, or allocate a larger size and only give back part of it. That would be wasteful, especially with a generic alignment parameter (in contrast with a fixed alignment to size). Ideally we should provide to mm users what they need without difficult workarounds or own reimplementations, so let's make the kmalloc() alignment to size explicitly guaranteed for power-of-two sizes under all configurations. What this means for the three available allocators? * SLAB object layout happens to be mostly unchanged by the patch. The implicitly provided alignment could be compromised with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB due to redzoning, however SLAB disables redzoning for caches with alignment larger than unsigned long long. Practically on at least x86 this includes kmalloc caches as they use cache line alignment, which is larger than that. Still, this patch ensures alignment on all arches and cache sizes. * SLUB layout is also unchanged unless redzoning is enabled through CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG and boot parameter for the particular kmalloc cache. With this patch, explicit alignment is guaranteed with redzoning as well. This will result in more memory being wasted, but that should be acceptable in a debugging scenario. * SLOB has no implicit alignment so this patch adds it explicitly for kmalloc(). The potential downside is increased fragmentation. While pathological allocation scenarios are certainly possible, in my testing, after booting a x86_64 kernel+userspace with virtme, around 16MB memory was consumed by slab pages both before and after the patch, with difference in the noise. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/c3157c8e8e0e7588312b40c853f65c02fe6c957a.1566399731.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20190225040904.5557-1-ming.lei@redhat.com/ [3] https://lwn.net/Articles/787740/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: documentation fixlet, per Matthew] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826111627.7505-3-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: "Darrick J . Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-07 07:58:45 +07:00
unsigned int align = ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN;
s->name = name;
s->size = s->object_size = size;
mm, sl[aou]b: guarantee natural alignment for kmalloc(power-of-two) In most configurations, kmalloc() happens to return naturally aligned (i.e. aligned to the block size itself) blocks for power of two sizes. That means some kmalloc() users might unknowingly rely on that alignment, until stuff breaks when the kernel is built with e.g. CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG or CONFIG_SLOB, and blocks stop being aligned. Then developers have to devise workaround such as own kmem caches with specified alignment [1], which is not always practical, as recently evidenced in [2]. The topic has been discussed at LSF/MM 2019 [3]. Adding a 'kmalloc_aligned()' variant would not help with code unknowingly relying on the implicit alignment. For slab implementations it would either require creating more kmalloc caches, or allocate a larger size and only give back part of it. That would be wasteful, especially with a generic alignment parameter (in contrast with a fixed alignment to size). Ideally we should provide to mm users what they need without difficult workarounds or own reimplementations, so let's make the kmalloc() alignment to size explicitly guaranteed for power-of-two sizes under all configurations. What this means for the three available allocators? * SLAB object layout happens to be mostly unchanged by the patch. The implicitly provided alignment could be compromised with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB due to redzoning, however SLAB disables redzoning for caches with alignment larger than unsigned long long. Practically on at least x86 this includes kmalloc caches as they use cache line alignment, which is larger than that. Still, this patch ensures alignment on all arches and cache sizes. * SLUB layout is also unchanged unless redzoning is enabled through CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG and boot parameter for the particular kmalloc cache. With this patch, explicit alignment is guaranteed with redzoning as well. This will result in more memory being wasted, but that should be acceptable in a debugging scenario. * SLOB has no implicit alignment so this patch adds it explicitly for kmalloc(). The potential downside is increased fragmentation. While pathological allocation scenarios are certainly possible, in my testing, after booting a x86_64 kernel+userspace with virtme, around 16MB memory was consumed by slab pages both before and after the patch, with difference in the noise. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/c3157c8e8e0e7588312b40c853f65c02fe6c957a.1566399731.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20190225040904.5557-1-ming.lei@redhat.com/ [3] https://lwn.net/Articles/787740/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: documentation fixlet, per Matthew] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826111627.7505-3-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: "Darrick J . Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-07 07:58:45 +07:00
/*
* For power of two sizes, guarantee natural alignment for kmalloc
* caches, regardless of SL*B debugging options.
*/
if (is_power_of_2(size))
align = max(align, size);
s->align = calculate_alignment(flags, align, size);
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2017-06-11 09:50:28 +07:00
s->useroffset = useroffset;
s->usersize = usersize;
slab: embed memcg_cache_params to kmem_cache Currently, kmem_cache stores a pointer to struct memcg_cache_params instead of embedding it. The rationale is to save memory when kmem accounting is disabled. However, the memcg_cache_params has shrivelled drastically since it was first introduced: * Initially: struct memcg_cache_params { bool is_root_cache; union { struct kmem_cache *memcg_caches[0]; struct { struct mem_cgroup *memcg; struct list_head list; struct kmem_cache *root_cache; bool dead; atomic_t nr_pages; struct work_struct destroy; }; }; }; * Now: struct memcg_cache_params { bool is_root_cache; union { struct { struct rcu_head rcu_head; struct kmem_cache *memcg_caches[0]; }; struct { struct mem_cgroup *memcg; struct kmem_cache *root_cache; }; }; }; So the memory saving does not seem to be a clear win anymore. OTOH, keeping a pointer to memcg_cache_params struct instead of embedding it results in touching one more cache line on kmem alloc/free hot paths. Besides, it makes linking kmem caches in a list chained by a field of struct memcg_cache_params really painful due to a level of indirection, while I want to make them linked in the following patch. That said, let us embed it. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-13 05:59:20 +07:00
err = __kmem_cache_create(s, flags);
if (err)
panic("Creation of kmalloc slab %s size=%u failed. Reason %d\n",
name, size, err);
s->refcount = -1; /* Exempt from merging for now */
}
struct kmem_cache *__init create_kmalloc_cache(const char *name,
unsigned int size, slab_flags_t flags,
unsigned int useroffset, unsigned int usersize)
{
struct kmem_cache *s = kmem_cache_zalloc(kmem_cache, GFP_NOWAIT);
if (!s)
panic("Out of memory when creating slab %s\n", name);
create_boot_cache(s, name, size, flags, useroffset, usersize);
list_add(&s->list, &slab_caches);
s->refcount = 1;
return s;
}
mm, slab: combine kmalloc_caches and kmalloc_dma_caches Patch series "kmalloc-reclaimable caches", v4. As discussed at LSF/MM [1] here's a patchset that introduces kmalloc-reclaimable caches (more details in the second patch) and uses them for dcache external names. That allows us to repurpose the NR_INDIRECTLY_RECLAIMABLE_BYTES counter later in the series. With patch 3/6, dcache external names are allocated from kmalloc-rcl-* caches, eliminating the need for manual accounting. More importantly, it also ensures the reclaimable kmalloc allocations are grouped in pages separate from the regular kmalloc allocations. The need for proper accounting of dcache external names has shown it's easy for misbehaving process to allocate lots of them, causing premature OOMs. Without the added grouping, it's likely that a similar workload can interleave the dcache external names allocations with regular kmalloc allocations (note: I haven't searched myself for an example of such regular kmalloc allocation, but I would be very surprised if there wasn't some). A pathological case would be e.g. one 64byte regular allocations with 63 external dcache names in a page (64x64=4096), which means the page is not freed even after reclaiming after all dcache names, and the process can thus "steal" the whole page with single 64byte allocation. If other kmalloc users similar to dcache external names become identified, they can also benefit from the new functionality simply by adding __GFP_RECLAIMABLE to the kmalloc calls. Side benefits of the patchset (that could be also merged separately) include removed branch for detecting __GFP_DMA kmalloc(), and shortening kmalloc cache names in /proc/slabinfo output. The latter is potentially an ABI break in case there are tools parsing the names and expecting the values to be in bytes. This is how /proc/slabinfo looks like after booting in virtme: ... kmalloc-rcl-4M 0 0 4194304 1 1024 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 ... kmalloc-rcl-96 7 32 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 1 1 0 kmalloc-rcl-64 25 128 64 64 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 2 2 0 kmalloc-rcl-32 0 0 32 124 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-4M 0 0 4194304 1 1024 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-2M 0 0 2097152 1 512 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-1M 0 0 1048576 1 256 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 ... /proc/vmstat with renamed nr_indirectly_reclaimable_bytes counter: ... nr_slab_reclaimable 2817 nr_slab_unreclaimable 1781 ... nr_kernel_misc_reclaimable 0 ... /proc/meminfo with new KReclaimable counter: ... Shmem: 564 kB KReclaimable: 11260 kB Slab: 18368 kB SReclaimable: 11260 kB SUnreclaim: 7108 kB KernelStack: 1248 kB ... This patch (of 6): The kmalloc caches currently mainain separate (optional) array kmalloc_dma_caches for __GFP_DMA allocations. There are tests for __GFP_DMA in the allocation hotpaths. We can avoid the branches by combining kmalloc_caches and kmalloc_dma_caches into a single two-dimensional array where the outer dimension is cache "type". This will also allow to add kmalloc-reclaimable caches as a third type. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731090649.16028-2-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:05:34 +07:00
struct kmem_cache *
kmalloc_caches[NR_KMALLOC_TYPES][KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1] __ro_after_init =
{ /* initialization for https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42570 */ };
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_caches);
/*
* Conversion table for small slabs sizes / 8 to the index in the
* kmalloc array. This is necessary for slabs < 192 since we have non power
* of two cache sizes there. The size of larger slabs can be determined using
* fls.
*/
static u8 size_index[24] __ro_after_init = {
3, /* 8 */
4, /* 16 */
5, /* 24 */
5, /* 32 */
6, /* 40 */
6, /* 48 */
6, /* 56 */
6, /* 64 */
1, /* 72 */
1, /* 80 */
1, /* 88 */
1, /* 96 */
7, /* 104 */
7, /* 112 */
7, /* 120 */
7, /* 128 */
2, /* 136 */
2, /* 144 */
2, /* 152 */
2, /* 160 */
2, /* 168 */
2, /* 176 */
2, /* 184 */
2 /* 192 */
};
static inline unsigned int size_index_elem(unsigned int bytes)
{
return (bytes - 1) / 8;
}
/*
* Find the kmem_cache structure that serves a given size of
* allocation
*/
struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
{
unsigned int index;
if (size <= 192) {
if (!size)
return ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
index = size_index[size_index_elem(size)];
mm: don't warn about large allocations for slab Slub does not call kmalloc_slab() for sizes > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE, instead it falls back to kmalloc_large(). For slab KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE == KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE and it calls kmalloc_slab() for all allocations relying on NULL return value for over-sized allocations. This inconsistency leads to unwanted warnings from kmalloc_slab() for over-sized allocations for slab. Returning NULL for failed allocations is the expected behavior. Make slub and slab code consistent by checking size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE in slab before calling kmalloc_slab(). While we are here also fix the check in kmalloc_slab(). We should check against KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE rather than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. It all kinda worked because for slab the constants are the same, and slub always checks the size against KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE before kmalloc_slab(). But if we get there with size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE anyhow bad things will happen. For example, in case of a newly introduced bug in slub code. Also move the check in kmalloc_slab() from function entry to the size > 192 case. This partially compensates for the additional check in slab code and makes slub code a bit faster (at least theoretically). Also drop __GFP_NOWARN in the warning check. This warning means a bug in slab code itself, user-passed flags have nothing to do with it. Nothing of this affects slob. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927171502.226522-1-dvyukov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot+87829a10073277282ad1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+ef4e8fc3a06e9019bb40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+6e438f4036df52cbb863@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+8574471d8734457d98aa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+af1504df0807a083dbd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:03:12 +07:00
} else {
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE))
mm: don't warn about large allocations for slab Slub does not call kmalloc_slab() for sizes > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE, instead it falls back to kmalloc_large(). For slab KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE == KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE and it calls kmalloc_slab() for all allocations relying on NULL return value for over-sized allocations. This inconsistency leads to unwanted warnings from kmalloc_slab() for over-sized allocations for slab. Returning NULL for failed allocations is the expected behavior. Make slub and slab code consistent by checking size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE in slab before calling kmalloc_slab(). While we are here also fix the check in kmalloc_slab(). We should check against KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE rather than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. It all kinda worked because for slab the constants are the same, and slub always checks the size against KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE before kmalloc_slab(). But if we get there with size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE anyhow bad things will happen. For example, in case of a newly introduced bug in slub code. Also move the check in kmalloc_slab() from function entry to the size > 192 case. This partially compensates for the additional check in slab code and makes slub code a bit faster (at least theoretically). Also drop __GFP_NOWARN in the warning check. This warning means a bug in slab code itself, user-passed flags have nothing to do with it. Nothing of this affects slob. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927171502.226522-1-dvyukov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot+87829a10073277282ad1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+ef4e8fc3a06e9019bb40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+6e438f4036df52cbb863@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+8574471d8734457d98aa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+af1504df0807a083dbd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:03:12 +07:00
return NULL;
index = fls(size - 1);
mm: don't warn about large allocations for slab Slub does not call kmalloc_slab() for sizes > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE, instead it falls back to kmalloc_large(). For slab KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE == KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE and it calls kmalloc_slab() for all allocations relying on NULL return value for over-sized allocations. This inconsistency leads to unwanted warnings from kmalloc_slab() for over-sized allocations for slab. Returning NULL for failed allocations is the expected behavior. Make slub and slab code consistent by checking size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE in slab before calling kmalloc_slab(). While we are here also fix the check in kmalloc_slab(). We should check against KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE rather than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. It all kinda worked because for slab the constants are the same, and slub always checks the size against KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE before kmalloc_slab(). But if we get there with size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE anyhow bad things will happen. For example, in case of a newly introduced bug in slub code. Also move the check in kmalloc_slab() from function entry to the size > 192 case. This partially compensates for the additional check in slab code and makes slub code a bit faster (at least theoretically). Also drop __GFP_NOWARN in the warning check. This warning means a bug in slab code itself, user-passed flags have nothing to do with it. Nothing of this affects slob. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927171502.226522-1-dvyukov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot+87829a10073277282ad1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+ef4e8fc3a06e9019bb40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+6e438f4036df52cbb863@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+8574471d8734457d98aa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+af1504df0807a083dbd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:03:12 +07:00
}
mm, slab: combine kmalloc_caches and kmalloc_dma_caches Patch series "kmalloc-reclaimable caches", v4. As discussed at LSF/MM [1] here's a patchset that introduces kmalloc-reclaimable caches (more details in the second patch) and uses them for dcache external names. That allows us to repurpose the NR_INDIRECTLY_RECLAIMABLE_BYTES counter later in the series. With patch 3/6, dcache external names are allocated from kmalloc-rcl-* caches, eliminating the need for manual accounting. More importantly, it also ensures the reclaimable kmalloc allocations are grouped in pages separate from the regular kmalloc allocations. The need for proper accounting of dcache external names has shown it's easy for misbehaving process to allocate lots of them, causing premature OOMs. Without the added grouping, it's likely that a similar workload can interleave the dcache external names allocations with regular kmalloc allocations (note: I haven't searched myself for an example of such regular kmalloc allocation, but I would be very surprised if there wasn't some). A pathological case would be e.g. one 64byte regular allocations with 63 external dcache names in a page (64x64=4096), which means the page is not freed even after reclaiming after all dcache names, and the process can thus "steal" the whole page with single 64byte allocation. If other kmalloc users similar to dcache external names become identified, they can also benefit from the new functionality simply by adding __GFP_RECLAIMABLE to the kmalloc calls. Side benefits of the patchset (that could be also merged separately) include removed branch for detecting __GFP_DMA kmalloc(), and shortening kmalloc cache names in /proc/slabinfo output. The latter is potentially an ABI break in case there are tools parsing the names and expecting the values to be in bytes. This is how /proc/slabinfo looks like after booting in virtme: ... kmalloc-rcl-4M 0 0 4194304 1 1024 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 ... kmalloc-rcl-96 7 32 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 1 1 0 kmalloc-rcl-64 25 128 64 64 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 2 2 0 kmalloc-rcl-32 0 0 32 124 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-4M 0 0 4194304 1 1024 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-2M 0 0 2097152 1 512 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-1M 0 0 1048576 1 256 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 ... /proc/vmstat with renamed nr_indirectly_reclaimable_bytes counter: ... nr_slab_reclaimable 2817 nr_slab_unreclaimable 1781 ... nr_kernel_misc_reclaimable 0 ... /proc/meminfo with new KReclaimable counter: ... Shmem: 564 kB KReclaimable: 11260 kB Slab: 18368 kB SReclaimable: 11260 kB SUnreclaim: 7108 kB KernelStack: 1248 kB ... This patch (of 6): The kmalloc caches currently mainain separate (optional) array kmalloc_dma_caches for __GFP_DMA allocations. There are tests for __GFP_DMA in the allocation hotpaths. We can avoid the branches by combining kmalloc_caches and kmalloc_dma_caches into a single two-dimensional array where the outer dimension is cache "type". This will also allow to add kmalloc-reclaimable caches as a third type. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731090649.16028-2-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:05:34 +07:00
return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index];
}
mm, slab: make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names Patch series "mm, slab: Make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names", v6. There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA. The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name, but the names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically generated by kmalloc_cache_name(). Patch1 predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save the time spent dynamically generating names. These changes make sense, and the time spent by new_kmalloc_cache() has been reduced by approximately 36.3%. Time spent by new_kmalloc_cache() (CPU cycles) 5.3-rc7 66264 5.3-rc7+patch 42188 This patch (of 3): There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA. The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name, but the names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically generated by kmalloc_cache_name(). This patch predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save the time spent dynamically generating names. Besides, remove the kmalloc_cache_name() that is no longer used. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1569241648-26908-2-git-send-email-lpf.vector@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Pengfei Li <lpf.vector@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-01 08:49:21 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_ZONE_DMA
#define INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(__size, __short_size) \
{ \
.name[KMALLOC_NORMAL] = "kmalloc-" #__short_size, \
.name[KMALLOC_RECLAIM] = "kmalloc-rcl-" #__short_size, \
.name[KMALLOC_DMA] = "dma-kmalloc-" #__short_size, \
.size = __size, \
}
#else
#define INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(__size, __short_size) \
{ \
.name[KMALLOC_NORMAL] = "kmalloc-" #__short_size, \
.name[KMALLOC_RECLAIM] = "kmalloc-rcl-" #__short_size, \
.size = __size, \
}
#endif
/*
* kmalloc_info[] is to make slub_debug=,kmalloc-xx option work at boot time.
* kmalloc_index() supports up to 2^26=64MB, so the final entry of the table is
* kmalloc-67108864.
*/
mm, slab: rename kmalloc-node cache to kmalloc-<size> SLAB as part of its bootstrap pre-creates one kmalloc cache that can fit the kmem_cache_node management structure, and puts it into the generic kmalloc cache array (e.g. for 128b objects). The name of this cache is "kmalloc-node", which is confusing for readers of /proc/slabinfo as the cache is used for generic allocations (and not just the kmem_cache_node struct) and it appears as the kmalloc-128 cache is missing. An easy solution is to use the kmalloc-<size> name when pre-creating the cache, which we can get from the kmalloc_info array. Example /proc/slabinfo before the patch: ... kmalloc-256 1647 1984 256 16 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 124 124 828 kmalloc-192 1974 1974 192 21 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 94 94 133 kmalloc-96 1332 1344 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 42 42 219 kmalloc-64 2505 5952 64 64 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 93 93 715 kmalloc-32 4278 4464 32 124 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 36 36 346 kmalloc-node 1352 1376 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 43 43 53 kmem_cache 132 147 192 21 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 7 7 0 After the patch: ... kmalloc-256 1672 2160 256 16 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 135 135 807 kmalloc-192 1992 2016 192 21 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 96 96 203 kmalloc-96 1159 1184 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 37 37 116 kmalloc-64 2561 4864 64 64 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 76 76 785 kmalloc-32 4253 4340 32 124 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 35 35 270 kmalloc-128 1256 1280 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 40 40 39 kmem_cache 125 147 192 21 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 7 7 0 [vbabka@suse.cz: export the whole kmalloc_info structure instead of just a name accessor, per Christoph Lameter] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/54e80303-b814-4232-66d4-95b34d3eb9d0@suse.cz Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170203181008.24898-1-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 06:41:05 +07:00
const struct kmalloc_info_struct kmalloc_info[] __initconst = {
mm, slab: make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names Patch series "mm, slab: Make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names", v6. There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA. The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name, but the names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically generated by kmalloc_cache_name(). Patch1 predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save the time spent dynamically generating names. These changes make sense, and the time spent by new_kmalloc_cache() has been reduced by approximately 36.3%. Time spent by new_kmalloc_cache() (CPU cycles) 5.3-rc7 66264 5.3-rc7+patch 42188 This patch (of 3): There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA. The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name, but the names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically generated by kmalloc_cache_name(). This patch predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save the time spent dynamically generating names. Besides, remove the kmalloc_cache_name() that is no longer used. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1569241648-26908-2-git-send-email-lpf.vector@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Pengfei Li <lpf.vector@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-01 08:49:21 +07:00
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(0, 0),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(96, 96),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(192, 192),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(8, 8),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(16, 16),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(32, 32),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(64, 64),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(128, 128),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(256, 256),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(512, 512),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(1024, 1k),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(2048, 2k),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(4096, 4k),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(8192, 8k),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(16384, 16k),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(32768, 32k),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(65536, 64k),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(131072, 128k),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(262144, 256k),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(524288, 512k),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(1048576, 1M),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(2097152, 2M),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(4194304, 4M),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(8388608, 8M),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(16777216, 16M),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(33554432, 32M),
INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(67108864, 64M)
};
/*
slab: correct size_index table before replacing the bootstrap kmem_cache_node This patch moves the initialization of the size_index table slightly earlier so that the first few kmem_cache_node's can be safely allocated when KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE is large. There are currently two ways to generate indices into kmalloc_caches (via kmalloc_index() and via the size_index table in slab_common.c) and on some arches (possibly only MIPS) they potentially disagree with each other until create_kmalloc_caches() has been called. It seems that the intention is that the size_index table is a fast equivalent to kmalloc_index() and that create_kmalloc_caches() patches the table to return the correct value for the cases where kmalloc_index()'s if-statements apply. The failing sequence was: * kmalloc_caches contains NULL elements * kmem_cache_init initialises the element that 'struct kmem_cache_node' will be allocated to. For 32-bit Mips, this is a 56-byte struct and kmalloc_index returns KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW (7). * init_list is called which calls kmalloc_node to allocate a 'struct kmem_cache_node'. * kmalloc_slab selects the kmem_caches element using size_index[size_index_elem(size)]. For MIPS, size is 56, and the expression returns 6. * This element of kmalloc_caches is NULL and allocation fails. * If it had not already failed, it would have called create_kmalloc_caches() at this point which would have changed size_index[size_index_elem(size)] to 7. I don't believe the bug to be LLVM specific but GCC doesn't normally encounter the problem. I haven't been able to identify exactly what GCC is doing better (probably inlining) but it seems that GCC is managing to optimize to the point that it eliminates the problematic allocations. This theory is supported by the fact that GCC can be made to fail in the same way by changing inline, __inline, __inline__, and __always_inline in include/linux/compiler-gcc.h such that they don't actually inline things. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sanders <daniel.sanders@imgtec.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 06:55:57 +07:00
* Patch up the size_index table if we have strange large alignment
* requirements for the kmalloc array. This is only the case for
* MIPS it seems. The standard arches will not generate any code here.
*
* Largest permitted alignment is 256 bytes due to the way we
* handle the index determination for the smaller caches.
*
* Make sure that nothing crazy happens if someone starts tinkering
* around with ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN
*/
slab: correct size_index table before replacing the bootstrap kmem_cache_node This patch moves the initialization of the size_index table slightly earlier so that the first few kmem_cache_node's can be safely allocated when KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE is large. There are currently two ways to generate indices into kmalloc_caches (via kmalloc_index() and via the size_index table in slab_common.c) and on some arches (possibly only MIPS) they potentially disagree with each other until create_kmalloc_caches() has been called. It seems that the intention is that the size_index table is a fast equivalent to kmalloc_index() and that create_kmalloc_caches() patches the table to return the correct value for the cases where kmalloc_index()'s if-statements apply. The failing sequence was: * kmalloc_caches contains NULL elements * kmem_cache_init initialises the element that 'struct kmem_cache_node' will be allocated to. For 32-bit Mips, this is a 56-byte struct and kmalloc_index returns KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW (7). * init_list is called which calls kmalloc_node to allocate a 'struct kmem_cache_node'. * kmalloc_slab selects the kmem_caches element using size_index[size_index_elem(size)]. For MIPS, size is 56, and the expression returns 6. * This element of kmalloc_caches is NULL and allocation fails. * If it had not already failed, it would have called create_kmalloc_caches() at this point which would have changed size_index[size_index_elem(size)] to 7. I don't believe the bug to be LLVM specific but GCC doesn't normally encounter the problem. I haven't been able to identify exactly what GCC is doing better (probably inlining) but it seems that GCC is managing to optimize to the point that it eliminates the problematic allocations. This theory is supported by the fact that GCC can be made to fail in the same way by changing inline, __inline, __inline__, and __always_inline in include/linux/compiler-gcc.h such that they don't actually inline things. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sanders <daniel.sanders@imgtec.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 06:55:57 +07:00
void __init setup_kmalloc_cache_index_table(void)
{
unsigned int i;
BUILD_BUG_ON(KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE > 256 ||
(KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE & (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE - 1)));
for (i = 8; i < KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE; i += 8) {
unsigned int elem = size_index_elem(i);
if (elem >= ARRAY_SIZE(size_index))
break;
size_index[elem] = KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW;
}
if (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE >= 64) {
/*
* The 96 byte size cache is not used if the alignment
* is 64 byte.
*/
for (i = 64 + 8; i <= 96; i += 8)
size_index[size_index_elem(i)] = 7;
}
if (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE >= 128) {
/*
* The 192 byte sized cache is not used if the alignment
* is 128 byte. Redirect kmalloc to use the 256 byte cache
* instead.
*/
for (i = 128 + 8; i <= 192; i += 8)
size_index[size_index_elem(i)] = 8;
}
slab: correct size_index table before replacing the bootstrap kmem_cache_node This patch moves the initialization of the size_index table slightly earlier so that the first few kmem_cache_node's can be safely allocated when KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE is large. There are currently two ways to generate indices into kmalloc_caches (via kmalloc_index() and via the size_index table in slab_common.c) and on some arches (possibly only MIPS) they potentially disagree with each other until create_kmalloc_caches() has been called. It seems that the intention is that the size_index table is a fast equivalent to kmalloc_index() and that create_kmalloc_caches() patches the table to return the correct value for the cases where kmalloc_index()'s if-statements apply. The failing sequence was: * kmalloc_caches contains NULL elements * kmem_cache_init initialises the element that 'struct kmem_cache_node' will be allocated to. For 32-bit Mips, this is a 56-byte struct and kmalloc_index returns KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW (7). * init_list is called which calls kmalloc_node to allocate a 'struct kmem_cache_node'. * kmalloc_slab selects the kmem_caches element using size_index[size_index_elem(size)]. For MIPS, size is 56, and the expression returns 6. * This element of kmalloc_caches is NULL and allocation fails. * If it had not already failed, it would have called create_kmalloc_caches() at this point which would have changed size_index[size_index_elem(size)] to 7. I don't believe the bug to be LLVM specific but GCC doesn't normally encounter the problem. I haven't been able to identify exactly what GCC is doing better (probably inlining) but it seems that GCC is managing to optimize to the point that it eliminates the problematic allocations. This theory is supported by the fact that GCC can be made to fail in the same way by changing inline, __inline, __inline__, and __always_inline in include/linux/compiler-gcc.h such that they don't actually inline things. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sanders <daniel.sanders@imgtec.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 06:55:57 +07:00
}
mm, slab/slub: introduce kmalloc-reclaimable caches Kmem caches can be created with a SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT flag, which indicates they contain objects which can be reclaimed under memory pressure (typically through a shrinker). This makes the slab pages accounted as NR_SLAB_RECLAIMABLE in vmstat, which is reflected also the MemAvailable meminfo counter and in overcommit decisions. The slab pages are also allocated with __GFP_RECLAIMABLE, which is good for anti-fragmentation through grouping pages by mobility. The generic kmalloc-X caches are created without this flag, but sometimes are used also for objects that can be reclaimed, which due to varying size cannot have a dedicated kmem cache with SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT flag. A prominent example are dcache external names, which prompted the creation of a new, manually managed vmstat counter NR_INDIRECTLY_RECLAIMABLE_BYTES in commit f1782c9bc547 ("dcache: account external names as indirectly reclaimable memory"). To better handle this and any other similar cases, this patch introduces SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT variants of kmalloc caches, named kmalloc-rcl-X. They are used whenever the kmalloc() call passes __GFP_RECLAIMABLE among gfp flags. They are added to the kmalloc_caches array as a new type. Allocations with both __GFP_DMA and __GFP_RECLAIMABLE will use a dma type cache. This change only applies to SLAB and SLUB, not SLOB. This is fine, since SLOB's target are tiny system and this patch does add some overhead of kmem management objects. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731090649.16028-3-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:05:38 +07:00
static void __init
new_kmalloc_cache(int idx, enum kmalloc_cache_type type, slab_flags_t flags)
{
mm, slab: make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names Patch series "mm, slab: Make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names", v6. There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA. The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name, but the names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically generated by kmalloc_cache_name(). Patch1 predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save the time spent dynamically generating names. These changes make sense, and the time spent by new_kmalloc_cache() has been reduced by approximately 36.3%. Time spent by new_kmalloc_cache() (CPU cycles) 5.3-rc7 66264 5.3-rc7+patch 42188 This patch (of 3): There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA. The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name, but the names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically generated by kmalloc_cache_name(). This patch predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save the time spent dynamically generating names. Besides, remove the kmalloc_cache_name() that is no longer used. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1569241648-26908-2-git-send-email-lpf.vector@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Pengfei Li <lpf.vector@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-01 08:49:21 +07:00
if (type == KMALLOC_RECLAIM)
mm, slab/slub: introduce kmalloc-reclaimable caches Kmem caches can be created with a SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT flag, which indicates they contain objects which can be reclaimed under memory pressure (typically through a shrinker). This makes the slab pages accounted as NR_SLAB_RECLAIMABLE in vmstat, which is reflected also the MemAvailable meminfo counter and in overcommit decisions. The slab pages are also allocated with __GFP_RECLAIMABLE, which is good for anti-fragmentation through grouping pages by mobility. The generic kmalloc-X caches are created without this flag, but sometimes are used also for objects that can be reclaimed, which due to varying size cannot have a dedicated kmem cache with SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT flag. A prominent example are dcache external names, which prompted the creation of a new, manually managed vmstat counter NR_INDIRECTLY_RECLAIMABLE_BYTES in commit f1782c9bc547 ("dcache: account external names as indirectly reclaimable memory"). To better handle this and any other similar cases, this patch introduces SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT variants of kmalloc caches, named kmalloc-rcl-X. They are used whenever the kmalloc() call passes __GFP_RECLAIMABLE among gfp flags. They are added to the kmalloc_caches array as a new type. Allocations with both __GFP_DMA and __GFP_RECLAIMABLE will use a dma type cache. This change only applies to SLAB and SLUB, not SLOB. This is fine, since SLOB's target are tiny system and this patch does add some overhead of kmem management objects. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731090649.16028-3-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:05:38 +07:00
flags |= SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT;
mm, slab: make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names Patch series "mm, slab: Make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names", v6. There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA. The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name, but the names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically generated by kmalloc_cache_name(). Patch1 predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save the time spent dynamically generating names. These changes make sense, and the time spent by new_kmalloc_cache() has been reduced by approximately 36.3%. Time spent by new_kmalloc_cache() (CPU cycles) 5.3-rc7 66264 5.3-rc7+patch 42188 This patch (of 3): There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA. The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name, but the names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically generated by kmalloc_cache_name(). This patch predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save the time spent dynamically generating names. Besides, remove the kmalloc_cache_name() that is no longer used. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1569241648-26908-2-git-send-email-lpf.vector@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Pengfei Li <lpf.vector@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-01 08:49:21 +07:00
kmalloc_caches[type][idx] = create_kmalloc_cache(
kmalloc_info[idx].name[type],
kmalloc_info[idx].size, flags, 0,
kmalloc_info[idx].size);
}
slab: correct size_index table before replacing the bootstrap kmem_cache_node This patch moves the initialization of the size_index table slightly earlier so that the first few kmem_cache_node's can be safely allocated when KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE is large. There are currently two ways to generate indices into kmalloc_caches (via kmalloc_index() and via the size_index table in slab_common.c) and on some arches (possibly only MIPS) they potentially disagree with each other until create_kmalloc_caches() has been called. It seems that the intention is that the size_index table is a fast equivalent to kmalloc_index() and that create_kmalloc_caches() patches the table to return the correct value for the cases where kmalloc_index()'s if-statements apply. The failing sequence was: * kmalloc_caches contains NULL elements * kmem_cache_init initialises the element that 'struct kmem_cache_node' will be allocated to. For 32-bit Mips, this is a 56-byte struct and kmalloc_index returns KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW (7). * init_list is called which calls kmalloc_node to allocate a 'struct kmem_cache_node'. * kmalloc_slab selects the kmem_caches element using size_index[size_index_elem(size)]. For MIPS, size is 56, and the expression returns 6. * This element of kmalloc_caches is NULL and allocation fails. * If it had not already failed, it would have called create_kmalloc_caches() at this point which would have changed size_index[size_index_elem(size)] to 7. I don't believe the bug to be LLVM specific but GCC doesn't normally encounter the problem. I haven't been able to identify exactly what GCC is doing better (probably inlining) but it seems that GCC is managing to optimize to the point that it eliminates the problematic allocations. This theory is supported by the fact that GCC can be made to fail in the same way by changing inline, __inline, __inline__, and __always_inline in include/linux/compiler-gcc.h such that they don't actually inline things. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sanders <daniel.sanders@imgtec.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 06:55:57 +07:00
/*
* Create the kmalloc array. Some of the regular kmalloc arrays
* may already have been created because they were needed to
* enable allocations for slab creation.
*/
void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags)
slab: correct size_index table before replacing the bootstrap kmem_cache_node This patch moves the initialization of the size_index table slightly earlier so that the first few kmem_cache_node's can be safely allocated when KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE is large. There are currently two ways to generate indices into kmalloc_caches (via kmalloc_index() and via the size_index table in slab_common.c) and on some arches (possibly only MIPS) they potentially disagree with each other until create_kmalloc_caches() has been called. It seems that the intention is that the size_index table is a fast equivalent to kmalloc_index() and that create_kmalloc_caches() patches the table to return the correct value for the cases where kmalloc_index()'s if-statements apply. The failing sequence was: * kmalloc_caches contains NULL elements * kmem_cache_init initialises the element that 'struct kmem_cache_node' will be allocated to. For 32-bit Mips, this is a 56-byte struct and kmalloc_index returns KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW (7). * init_list is called which calls kmalloc_node to allocate a 'struct kmem_cache_node'. * kmalloc_slab selects the kmem_caches element using size_index[size_index_elem(size)]. For MIPS, size is 56, and the expression returns 6. * This element of kmalloc_caches is NULL and allocation fails. * If it had not already failed, it would have called create_kmalloc_caches() at this point which would have changed size_index[size_index_elem(size)] to 7. I don't believe the bug to be LLVM specific but GCC doesn't normally encounter the problem. I haven't been able to identify exactly what GCC is doing better (probably inlining) but it seems that GCC is managing to optimize to the point that it eliminates the problematic allocations. This theory is supported by the fact that GCC can be made to fail in the same way by changing inline, __inline, __inline__, and __always_inline in include/linux/compiler-gcc.h such that they don't actually inline things. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sanders <daniel.sanders@imgtec.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 06:55:57 +07:00
{
int i;
enum kmalloc_cache_type type;
slab: correct size_index table before replacing the bootstrap kmem_cache_node This patch moves the initialization of the size_index table slightly earlier so that the first few kmem_cache_node's can be safely allocated when KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE is large. There are currently two ways to generate indices into kmalloc_caches (via kmalloc_index() and via the size_index table in slab_common.c) and on some arches (possibly only MIPS) they potentially disagree with each other until create_kmalloc_caches() has been called. It seems that the intention is that the size_index table is a fast equivalent to kmalloc_index() and that create_kmalloc_caches() patches the table to return the correct value for the cases where kmalloc_index()'s if-statements apply. The failing sequence was: * kmalloc_caches contains NULL elements * kmem_cache_init initialises the element that 'struct kmem_cache_node' will be allocated to. For 32-bit Mips, this is a 56-byte struct and kmalloc_index returns KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW (7). * init_list is called which calls kmalloc_node to allocate a 'struct kmem_cache_node'. * kmalloc_slab selects the kmem_caches element using size_index[size_index_elem(size)]. For MIPS, size is 56, and the expression returns 6. * This element of kmalloc_caches is NULL and allocation fails. * If it had not already failed, it would have called create_kmalloc_caches() at this point which would have changed size_index[size_index_elem(size)] to 7. I don't believe the bug to be LLVM specific but GCC doesn't normally encounter the problem. I haven't been able to identify exactly what GCC is doing better (probably inlining) but it seems that GCC is managing to optimize to the point that it eliminates the problematic allocations. This theory is supported by the fact that GCC can be made to fail in the same way by changing inline, __inline, __inline__, and __always_inline in include/linux/compiler-gcc.h such that they don't actually inline things. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sanders <daniel.sanders@imgtec.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 06:55:57 +07:00
mm, slab/slub: introduce kmalloc-reclaimable caches Kmem caches can be created with a SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT flag, which indicates they contain objects which can be reclaimed under memory pressure (typically through a shrinker). This makes the slab pages accounted as NR_SLAB_RECLAIMABLE in vmstat, which is reflected also the MemAvailable meminfo counter and in overcommit decisions. The slab pages are also allocated with __GFP_RECLAIMABLE, which is good for anti-fragmentation through grouping pages by mobility. The generic kmalloc-X caches are created without this flag, but sometimes are used also for objects that can be reclaimed, which due to varying size cannot have a dedicated kmem cache with SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT flag. A prominent example are dcache external names, which prompted the creation of a new, manually managed vmstat counter NR_INDIRECTLY_RECLAIMABLE_BYTES in commit f1782c9bc547 ("dcache: account external names as indirectly reclaimable memory"). To better handle this and any other similar cases, this patch introduces SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT variants of kmalloc caches, named kmalloc-rcl-X. They are used whenever the kmalloc() call passes __GFP_RECLAIMABLE among gfp flags. They are added to the kmalloc_caches array as a new type. Allocations with both __GFP_DMA and __GFP_RECLAIMABLE will use a dma type cache. This change only applies to SLAB and SLUB, not SLOB. This is fine, since SLOB's target are tiny system and this patch does add some overhead of kmem management objects. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731090649.16028-3-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:05:38 +07:00
for (type = KMALLOC_NORMAL; type <= KMALLOC_RECLAIM; type++) {
for (i = KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW; i <= KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH; i++) {
if (!kmalloc_caches[type][i])
new_kmalloc_cache(i, type, flags);
mm, slab/slub: introduce kmalloc-reclaimable caches Kmem caches can be created with a SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT flag, which indicates they contain objects which can be reclaimed under memory pressure (typically through a shrinker). This makes the slab pages accounted as NR_SLAB_RECLAIMABLE in vmstat, which is reflected also the MemAvailable meminfo counter and in overcommit decisions. The slab pages are also allocated with __GFP_RECLAIMABLE, which is good for anti-fragmentation through grouping pages by mobility. The generic kmalloc-X caches are created without this flag, but sometimes are used also for objects that can be reclaimed, which due to varying size cannot have a dedicated kmem cache with SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT flag. A prominent example are dcache external names, which prompted the creation of a new, manually managed vmstat counter NR_INDIRECTLY_RECLAIMABLE_BYTES in commit f1782c9bc547 ("dcache: account external names as indirectly reclaimable memory"). To better handle this and any other similar cases, this patch introduces SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT variants of kmalloc caches, named kmalloc-rcl-X. They are used whenever the kmalloc() call passes __GFP_RECLAIMABLE among gfp flags. They are added to the kmalloc_caches array as a new type. Allocations with both __GFP_DMA and __GFP_RECLAIMABLE will use a dma type cache. This change only applies to SLAB and SLUB, not SLOB. This is fine, since SLOB's target are tiny system and this patch does add some overhead of kmem management objects. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731090649.16028-3-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:05:38 +07:00
/*
* Caches that are not of the two-to-the-power-of size.
* These have to be created immediately after the
* earlier power of two caches
*/
if (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE <= 32 && i == 6 &&
!kmalloc_caches[type][1])
new_kmalloc_cache(1, type, flags);
if (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE <= 64 && i == 7 &&
!kmalloc_caches[type][2])
new_kmalloc_cache(2, type, flags);
}
}
/* Kmalloc array is now usable */
slab_state = UP;
#ifdef CONFIG_ZONE_DMA
for (i = 0; i <= KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH; i++) {
mm, slab: combine kmalloc_caches and kmalloc_dma_caches Patch series "kmalloc-reclaimable caches", v4. As discussed at LSF/MM [1] here's a patchset that introduces kmalloc-reclaimable caches (more details in the second patch) and uses them for dcache external names. That allows us to repurpose the NR_INDIRECTLY_RECLAIMABLE_BYTES counter later in the series. With patch 3/6, dcache external names are allocated from kmalloc-rcl-* caches, eliminating the need for manual accounting. More importantly, it also ensures the reclaimable kmalloc allocations are grouped in pages separate from the regular kmalloc allocations. The need for proper accounting of dcache external names has shown it's easy for misbehaving process to allocate lots of them, causing premature OOMs. Without the added grouping, it's likely that a similar workload can interleave the dcache external names allocations with regular kmalloc allocations (note: I haven't searched myself for an example of such regular kmalloc allocation, but I would be very surprised if there wasn't some). A pathological case would be e.g. one 64byte regular allocations with 63 external dcache names in a page (64x64=4096), which means the page is not freed even after reclaiming after all dcache names, and the process can thus "steal" the whole page with single 64byte allocation. If other kmalloc users similar to dcache external names become identified, they can also benefit from the new functionality simply by adding __GFP_RECLAIMABLE to the kmalloc calls. Side benefits of the patchset (that could be also merged separately) include removed branch for detecting __GFP_DMA kmalloc(), and shortening kmalloc cache names in /proc/slabinfo output. The latter is potentially an ABI break in case there are tools parsing the names and expecting the values to be in bytes. This is how /proc/slabinfo looks like after booting in virtme: ... kmalloc-rcl-4M 0 0 4194304 1 1024 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 ... kmalloc-rcl-96 7 32 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 1 1 0 kmalloc-rcl-64 25 128 64 64 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 2 2 0 kmalloc-rcl-32 0 0 32 124 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-4M 0 0 4194304 1 1024 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-2M 0 0 2097152 1 512 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-1M 0 0 1048576 1 256 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 ... /proc/vmstat with renamed nr_indirectly_reclaimable_bytes counter: ... nr_slab_reclaimable 2817 nr_slab_unreclaimable 1781 ... nr_kernel_misc_reclaimable 0 ... /proc/meminfo with new KReclaimable counter: ... Shmem: 564 kB KReclaimable: 11260 kB Slab: 18368 kB SReclaimable: 11260 kB SUnreclaim: 7108 kB KernelStack: 1248 kB ... This patch (of 6): The kmalloc caches currently mainain separate (optional) array kmalloc_dma_caches for __GFP_DMA allocations. There are tests for __GFP_DMA in the allocation hotpaths. We can avoid the branches by combining kmalloc_caches and kmalloc_dma_caches into a single two-dimensional array where the outer dimension is cache "type". This will also allow to add kmalloc-reclaimable caches as a third type. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731090649.16028-2-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:05:34 +07:00
struct kmem_cache *s = kmalloc_caches[KMALLOC_NORMAL][i];
if (s) {
mm, slab: combine kmalloc_caches and kmalloc_dma_caches Patch series "kmalloc-reclaimable caches", v4. As discussed at LSF/MM [1] here's a patchset that introduces kmalloc-reclaimable caches (more details in the second patch) and uses them for dcache external names. That allows us to repurpose the NR_INDIRECTLY_RECLAIMABLE_BYTES counter later in the series. With patch 3/6, dcache external names are allocated from kmalloc-rcl-* caches, eliminating the need for manual accounting. More importantly, it also ensures the reclaimable kmalloc allocations are grouped in pages separate from the regular kmalloc allocations. The need for proper accounting of dcache external names has shown it's easy for misbehaving process to allocate lots of them, causing premature OOMs. Without the added grouping, it's likely that a similar workload can interleave the dcache external names allocations with regular kmalloc allocations (note: I haven't searched myself for an example of such regular kmalloc allocation, but I would be very surprised if there wasn't some). A pathological case would be e.g. one 64byte regular allocations with 63 external dcache names in a page (64x64=4096), which means the page is not freed even after reclaiming after all dcache names, and the process can thus "steal" the whole page with single 64byte allocation. If other kmalloc users similar to dcache external names become identified, they can also benefit from the new functionality simply by adding __GFP_RECLAIMABLE to the kmalloc calls. Side benefits of the patchset (that could be also merged separately) include removed branch for detecting __GFP_DMA kmalloc(), and shortening kmalloc cache names in /proc/slabinfo output. The latter is potentially an ABI break in case there are tools parsing the names and expecting the values to be in bytes. This is how /proc/slabinfo looks like after booting in virtme: ... kmalloc-rcl-4M 0 0 4194304 1 1024 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 ... kmalloc-rcl-96 7 32 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 1 1 0 kmalloc-rcl-64 25 128 64 64 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 2 2 0 kmalloc-rcl-32 0 0 32 124 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-4M 0 0 4194304 1 1024 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-2M 0 0 2097152 1 512 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-1M 0 0 1048576 1 256 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 ... /proc/vmstat with renamed nr_indirectly_reclaimable_bytes counter: ... nr_slab_reclaimable 2817 nr_slab_unreclaimable 1781 ... nr_kernel_misc_reclaimable 0 ... /proc/meminfo with new KReclaimable counter: ... Shmem: 564 kB KReclaimable: 11260 kB Slab: 18368 kB SReclaimable: 11260 kB SUnreclaim: 7108 kB KernelStack: 1248 kB ... This patch (of 6): The kmalloc caches currently mainain separate (optional) array kmalloc_dma_caches for __GFP_DMA allocations. There are tests for __GFP_DMA in the allocation hotpaths. We can avoid the branches by combining kmalloc_caches and kmalloc_dma_caches into a single two-dimensional array where the outer dimension is cache "type". This will also allow to add kmalloc-reclaimable caches as a third type. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731090649.16028-2-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-27 05:05:34 +07:00
kmalloc_caches[KMALLOC_DMA][i] = create_kmalloc_cache(
mm, slab: make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names Patch series "mm, slab: Make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names", v6. There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA. The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name, but the names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically generated by kmalloc_cache_name(). Patch1 predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save the time spent dynamically generating names. These changes make sense, and the time spent by new_kmalloc_cache() has been reduced by approximately 36.3%. Time spent by new_kmalloc_cache() (CPU cycles) 5.3-rc7 66264 5.3-rc7+patch 42188 This patch (of 3): There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA. The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name, but the names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically generated by kmalloc_cache_name(). This patch predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save the time spent dynamically generating names. Besides, remove the kmalloc_cache_name() that is no longer used. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1569241648-26908-2-git-send-email-lpf.vector@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Pengfei Li <lpf.vector@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-01 08:49:21 +07:00
kmalloc_info[i].name[KMALLOC_DMA],
kmalloc_info[i].size,
usercopy: mark dma-kmalloc caches as usercopy caches We have seen a "usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to SLUB object 'dma-kmalloc-1 k' (offset 0, size 11)!" error on s390x, as IUCV uses kmalloc() with __GFP_DMA because of memory address restrictions. The issue has been discussed [2] and it has been noted that if all the kmalloc caches are marked as usercopy, there's little reason not to mark dma-kmalloc caches too. The 'dma' part merely means that __GFP_DMA is used to restrict memory address range. As Jann Horn put it [3]: "I think dma-kmalloc slabs should be handled the same way as normal kmalloc slabs. When a dma-kmalloc allocation is freshly created, it is just normal kernel memory - even if it might later be used for DMA -, and it should be perfectly fine to copy_from_user() into such allocations at that point, and to copy_to_user() out of them at the end. If you look at the places where such allocations are created, you can see things like kmemdup(), memcpy() and so on - all normal operations that shouldn't conceptually be different from usercopy in any relevant way." Thus this patch marks the dma-kmalloc-* caches as usercopy. [1] https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1156053 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/bfca96db-bbd0-d958-7732-76e36c667c68@suse.cz/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/CAG48ez1a4waGk9kB0WLaSbs4muSoK0AYAVk8=XYaKj4_+6e6Hg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@kernel.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Cc: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7d810f6d-8085-ea2f-7805-47ba3842dc50@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-02 11:45:43 +07:00
SLAB_CACHE_DMA | flags, 0,
kmalloc_info[i].size);
}
}
#endif
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_SLOB */
gfp_t kmalloc_fix_flags(gfp_t flags)
{
gfp_t invalid_mask = flags & GFP_SLAB_BUG_MASK;
flags &= ~GFP_SLAB_BUG_MASK;
pr_warn("Unexpected gfp: %#x (%pGg). Fixing up to gfp: %#x (%pGg). Fix your code!\n",
invalid_mask, &invalid_mask, flags, &flags);
dump_stack();
return flags;
}
/*
* To avoid unnecessary overhead, we pass through large allocation requests
* directly to the page allocator. We use __GFP_COMP, because we will need to
* know the allocation order to free the pages properly in kfree.
*/
void *kmalloc_order(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned int order)
{
mm, sl[ou]b: improve memory accounting Patch series "guarantee natural alignment for kmalloc()", v2. This patch (of 2): SLOB currently doesn't account its pages at all, so in /proc/meminfo the Slab field shows zero. Modifying a counter on page allocation and freeing should be acceptable even for the small system scenarios SLOB is intended for. Since reclaimable caches are not separated in SLOB, account everything as unreclaimable. SLUB currently doesn't account kmalloc() and kmalloc_node() allocations larger than order-1 page, that are passed directly to the page allocator. As they also don't appear in /proc/slabinfo, it might look like a memory leak. For consistency, account them as well. (SLAB doesn't actually use page allocator directly, so no change there). Ideally SLOB and SLUB would be handled in separate patches, but due to the shared kmalloc_order() function and different kfree() implementations, it's easier to patch both at once to prevent inconsistencies. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826111627.7505-2-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: "Darrick J . Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-07 07:58:42 +07:00
void *ret = NULL;
struct page *page;
if (unlikely(flags & GFP_SLAB_BUG_MASK))
flags = kmalloc_fix_flags(flags);
flags |= __GFP_COMP;
mm: charge/uncharge kmemcg from generic page allocator paths Currently, to charge a non-slab allocation to kmemcg one has to use alloc_kmem_pages helper with __GFP_ACCOUNT flag. A page allocated with this helper should finally be freed using free_kmem_pages, otherwise it won't be uncharged. This API suits its current users fine, but it turns out to be impossible to use along with page reference counting, i.e. when an allocation is supposed to be freed with put_page, as it is the case with pipe or unix socket buffers. To overcome this limitation, this patch moves charging/uncharging to generic page allocator paths, i.e. to __alloc_pages_nodemask and free_pages_prepare, and zaps alloc/free_kmem_pages helpers. This way, one can use any of the available page allocation functions to get the allocated page charged to kmemcg - it's enough to pass __GFP_ACCOUNT, just like in case of kmalloc and friends. A charged page will be automatically uncharged on free. To make it possible, we need to mark pages charged to kmemcg somehow. To avoid introducing a new page flag, we make use of page->_mapcount for marking such pages. Since pages charged to kmemcg are not supposed to be mapped to userspace, it should work just fine. There are other (ab)users of page->_mapcount - buddy and balloon pages - but we don't conflict with them. In case kmemcg is compiled out or not used at runtime, this patch introduces no overhead to generic page allocator paths. If kmemcg is used, it will be plus one gfp flags check on alloc and plus one page->_mapcount check on free, which shouldn't hurt performance, because the data accessed are hot. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a9736d856f895bcb465d9f257b54efe32eda6f99.1464079538.git.vdavydov@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-07-27 05:24:24 +07:00
page = alloc_pages(flags, order);
mm, sl[ou]b: improve memory accounting Patch series "guarantee natural alignment for kmalloc()", v2. This patch (of 2): SLOB currently doesn't account its pages at all, so in /proc/meminfo the Slab field shows zero. Modifying a counter on page allocation and freeing should be acceptable even for the small system scenarios SLOB is intended for. Since reclaimable caches are not separated in SLOB, account everything as unreclaimable. SLUB currently doesn't account kmalloc() and kmalloc_node() allocations larger than order-1 page, that are passed directly to the page allocator. As they also don't appear in /proc/slabinfo, it might look like a memory leak. For consistency, account them as well. (SLAB doesn't actually use page allocator directly, so no change there). Ideally SLOB and SLUB would be handled in separate patches, but due to the shared kmalloc_order() function and different kfree() implementations, it's easier to patch both at once to prevent inconsistencies. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826111627.7505-2-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: "Darrick J . Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-07 07:58:42 +07:00
if (likely(page)) {
ret = page_address(page);
mod_lruvec_page_state(page, NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B,
PAGE_SIZE << order);
mm, sl[ou]b: improve memory accounting Patch series "guarantee natural alignment for kmalloc()", v2. This patch (of 2): SLOB currently doesn't account its pages at all, so in /proc/meminfo the Slab field shows zero. Modifying a counter on page allocation and freeing should be acceptable even for the small system scenarios SLOB is intended for. Since reclaimable caches are not separated in SLOB, account everything as unreclaimable. SLUB currently doesn't account kmalloc() and kmalloc_node() allocations larger than order-1 page, that are passed directly to the page allocator. As they also don't appear in /proc/slabinfo, it might look like a memory leak. For consistency, account them as well. (SLAB doesn't actually use page allocator directly, so no change there). Ideally SLOB and SLUB would be handled in separate patches, but due to the shared kmalloc_order() function and different kfree() implementations, it's easier to patch both at once to prevent inconsistencies. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826111627.7505-2-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: "Darrick J . Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-07 07:58:42 +07:00
}
kasan, mm: change hooks signatures Patch series "kasan: add software tag-based mode for arm64", v13. This patchset adds a new software tag-based mode to KASAN [1]. (Initially this mode was called KHWASAN, but it got renamed, see the naming rationale at the end of this section). The plan is to implement HWASan [2] for the kernel with the incentive, that it's going to have comparable to KASAN performance, but in the same time consume much less memory, trading that off for somewhat imprecise bug detection and being supported only for arm64. The underlying ideas of the approach used by software tag-based KASAN are: 1. By using the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) arm64 CPU feature, we can store pointer tags in the top byte of each kernel pointer. 2. Using shadow memory, we can store memory tags for each chunk of kernel memory. 3. On each memory allocation, we can generate a random tag, embed it into the returned pointer and set the memory tags that correspond to this chunk of memory to the same value. 4. By using compiler instrumentation, before each memory access we can add a check that the pointer tag matches the tag of the memory that is being accessed. 5. On a tag mismatch we report an error. With this patchset the existing KASAN mode gets renamed to generic KASAN, with the word "generic" meaning that the implementation can be supported by any architecture as it is purely software. The new mode this patchset adds is called software tag-based KASAN. The word "tag-based" refers to the fact that this mode uses tags embedded into the top byte of kernel pointers and the TBI arm64 CPU feature that allows to dereference such pointers. The word "software" here means that shadow memory manipulation and tag checking on pointer dereference is done in software. As it is the only tag-based implementation right now, "software tag-based" KASAN is sometimes referred to as simply "tag-based" in this patchset. A potential expansion of this mode is a hardware tag-based mode, which would use hardware memory tagging support (announced by Arm [3]) instead of compiler instrumentation and manual shadow memory manipulation. Same as generic KASAN, software tag-based KASAN is strictly a debugging feature. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kasan.html [2] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html [3] https://community.arm.com/processors/b/blog/posts/arm-a-profile-architecture-2018-developments-armv85a ====== Rationale On mobile devices generic KASAN's memory usage is significant problem. One of the main reasons to have tag-based KASAN is to be able to perform a similar set of checks as the generic one does, but with lower memory requirements. Comment from Vishwath Mohan <vishwath@google.com>: I don't have data on-hand, but anecdotally both ASAN and KASAN have proven problematic to enable for environments that don't tolerate the increased memory pressure well. This includes (a) Low-memory form factors - Wear, TV, Things, lower-tier phones like Go, (c) Connected components like Pixel's visual core [1]. These are both places I'd love to have a low(er) memory footprint option at my disposal. Comment from Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>: Looking at a live Android device under load, slab (according to /proc/meminfo) + kernel stack take 8-10% available RAM (~350MB). KASAN's overhead of 2x - 3x on top of it is not insignificant. Not having this overhead enables near-production use - ex. running KASAN/KHWASAN kernel on a personal, daily-use device to catch bugs that do not reproduce in test configuration. These are the ones that often cost the most engineering time to track down. CPU overhead is bad, but generally tolerable. RAM is critical, in our experience. Once it gets low enough, OOM-killer makes your life miserable. [1] https://www.blog.google/products/pixel/pixel-visual-core-image-processing-and-machine-learning-pixel-2/ ====== Technical details Software tag-based KASAN mode is implemented in a very similar way to the generic one. This patchset essentially does the following: 1. TCR_TBI1 is set to enable Top Byte Ignore. 2. Shadow memory is used (with a different scale, 1:16, so each shadow byte corresponds to 16 bytes of kernel memory) to store memory tags. 3. All slab objects are aligned to shadow scale, which is 16 bytes. 4. All pointers returned from the slab allocator are tagged with a random tag and the corresponding shadow memory is poisoned with the same value. 5. Compiler instrumentation is used to insert tag checks. Either by calling callbacks or by inlining them (CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE flags are reused). 6. When a tag mismatch is detected in callback instrumentation mode KASAN simply prints a bug report. In case of inline instrumentation, clang inserts a brk instruction, and KASAN has it's own brk handler, which reports the bug. 7. The memory in between slab objects is marked with a reserved tag, and acts as a redzone. 8. When a slab object is freed it's marked with a reserved tag. Bug detection is imprecise for two reasons: 1. We won't catch some small out-of-bounds accesses, that fall into the same shadow cell, as the last byte of a slab object. 2. We only have 1 byte to store tags, which means we have a 1/256 probability of a tag match for an incorrect access (actually even slightly less due to reserved tag values). Despite that there's a particular type of bugs that tag-based KASAN can detect compared to generic KASAN: use-after-free after the object has been allocated by someone else. ====== Testing Some kernel developers voiced a concern that changing the top byte of kernel pointers may lead to subtle bugs that are difficult to discover. To address this concern deliberate testing has been performed. It doesn't seem feasible to do some kind of static checking to find potential issues with pointer tagging, so a dynamic approach was taken. All pointer comparisons/subtractions have been instrumented in an LLVM compiler pass and a kernel module that would print a bug report whenever two pointers with different tags are being compared/subtracted (ignoring comparisons with NULL pointers and with pointers obtained by casting an error code to a pointer type) has been used. Then the kernel has been booted in QEMU and on an Odroid C2 board and syzkaller has been run. This yielded the following results. The two places that look interesting are: is_vmalloc_addr in include/linux/mm.h is_kernel_rodata in mm/util.c Here we compare a pointer with some fixed untagged values to make sure that the pointer lies in a particular part of the kernel address space. Since tag-based KASAN doesn't add tags to pointers that belong to rodata or vmalloc regions, this should work as is. To make sure debug checks to those two functions that check that the result doesn't change whether we operate on pointers with or without untagging has been added. A few other cases that don't look that interesting: Comparing pointers to achieve unique sorting order of pointee objects (e.g. sorting locks addresses before performing a double lock): tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout in drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c pipe_double_lock in fs/pipe.c unix_state_double_lock in net/unix/af_unix.c lock_two_nondirectories in fs/inode.c mutex_lock_double in kernel/events/core.c ep_cmp_ffd in fs/eventpoll.c fsnotify_compare_groups fs/notify/mark.c Nothing needs to be done here, since the tags embedded into pointers don't change, so the sorting order would still be unique. Checks that a pointer belongs to some particular allocation: is_sibling_entry in lib/radix-tree.c object_is_on_stack in include/linux/sched/task_stack.h Nothing needs to be done here either, since two pointers can only belong to the same allocation if they have the same tag. Overall, since the kernel boots and works, there are no critical bugs. As for the rest, the traditional kernel testing way (use until fails) is the only one that looks feasible. Another point here is that tag-based KASAN is available under a separate config option that needs to be deliberately enabled. Even though it might be used in a "near-production" environment to find bugs that are not found during fuzzing or running tests, it is still a debug tool. ====== Benchmarks The following numbers were collected on Odroid C2 board. Both generic and tag-based KASAN were used in inline instrumentation mode. Boot time [1]: * ~1.7 sec for clean kernel * ~5.0 sec for generic KASAN * ~5.0 sec for tag-based KASAN Network performance [2]: * 8.33 Gbits/sec for clean kernel * 3.17 Gbits/sec for generic KASAN * 2.85 Gbits/sec for tag-based KASAN Slab memory usage after boot [3]: * ~40 kb for clean kernel * ~105 kb (~260% overhead) for generic KASAN * ~47 kb (~20% overhead) for tag-based KASAN KASAN memory overhead consists of three main parts: 1. Increased slab memory usage due to redzones. 2. Shadow memory (the whole reserved once during boot). 3. Quaratine (grows gradually until some preset limit; the more the limit, the more the chance to detect a use-after-free). Comparing tag-based vs generic KASAN for each of these points: 1. 20% vs 260% overhead. 2. 1/16th vs 1/8th of physical memory. 3. Tag-based KASAN doesn't require quarantine. [1] Time before the ext4 driver is initialized. [2] Measured as `iperf -s & iperf -c 127.0.0.1 -t 30`. [3] Measured as `cat /proc/meminfo | grep Slab`. ====== Some notes A few notes: 1. The patchset can be found here: https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype/tree/khwasan 2. Building requires a recent Clang version (7.0.0 or later). 3. Stack instrumentation is not supported yet and will be added later. This patch (of 25): Tag-based KASAN changes the value of the top byte of pointers returned from the kernel allocation functions (such as kmalloc). This patch updates KASAN hooks signatures and their usage in SLAB and SLUB code to reflect that. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aec2b5e3973781ff8a6bb6760f8543643202c451.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 15:29:37 +07:00
ret = kasan_kmalloc_large(ret, size, flags);
/* As ret might get tagged, call kmemleak hook after KASAN. */
kmemleak_alloc(ret, size, 1, flags);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_order);
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
void *kmalloc_order_trace(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned int order)
{
void *ret = kmalloc_order(size, flags, order);
trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret, size, PAGE_SIZE << order, flags);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_order_trace);
#endif
mm: reorganize SLAB freelist randomization The kernel heap allocators are using a sequential freelist making their allocation predictable. This predictability makes kernel heap overflow easier to exploit. An attacker can careful prepare the kernel heap to control the following chunk overflowed. For example these attacks exploit the predictability of the heap: - Linux Kernel CAN SLUB overflow (https://goo.gl/oMNWkU) - Exploiting Linux Kernel Heap corruptions (http://goo.gl/EXLn95) ***Problems that needed solving: - Randomize the Freelist (singled linked) used in the SLUB allocator. - Ensure good performance to encourage usage. - Get best entropy in early boot stage. ***Parts: - 01/02 Reorganize the SLAB Freelist randomization to share elements with the SLUB implementation. - 02/02 The SLUB Freelist randomization implementation. Similar approach than the SLAB but tailored to the singled freelist used in SLUB. ***Performance data: slab_test impact is between 3% to 4% on average for 100000 attempts without smp. It is a very focused testing, kernbench show the overall impact on the system is way lower. Before: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 49 cycles kfree -> 77 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 51 cycles kfree -> 79 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 53 cycles kfree -> 83 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 62 cycles kfree -> 90 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 81 cycles kfree -> 97 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 98 cycles kfree -> 121 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 95 cycles kfree -> 122 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 96 cycles kfree -> 126 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 140 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 149 cycles kfree -> 171 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 69 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 73 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 72 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 71 cycles After: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 57 cycles kfree -> 78 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 61 cycles kfree -> 81 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 76 cycles kfree -> 93 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 83 cycles kfree -> 94 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 106 cycles kfree -> 107 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 118 cycles kfree -> 117 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 114 cycles kfree -> 116 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 118 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 147 cycles kfree -> 131 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 214 cycles kfree -> 161 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 65 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 64 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 67 cycles Kernbench, before: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 101.873 (1.16069) User Time 1045.22 (1.60447) System Time 88.969 (0.559195) Percent CPU 1112.9 (13.8279) Context Switches 189140 (2282.15) Sleeps 99008.6 (768.091) After: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.47 (0.562732) User Time 1045.3 (1.34263) System Time 88.311 (0.342554) Percent CPU 1105.8 (6.49444) Context Switches 189081 (2355.78) Sleeps 99231.5 (800.358) This patch (of 2): This commit reorganizes the previous SLAB freelist randomization to prepare for the SLUB implementation. It moves functions that will be shared to slab_common. The entropy functions are changed to align with the SLUB implementation, now using get_random_(int|long) functions. These functions were chosen because they provide a bit more entropy early on boot and better performance when specific arch instructions are not available. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464295031-26375-2-git-send-email-thgarnie@google.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-07-27 05:21:56 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
/* Randomize a generic freelist */
static void freelist_randomize(struct rnd_state *state, unsigned int *list,
unsigned int count)
mm: reorganize SLAB freelist randomization The kernel heap allocators are using a sequential freelist making their allocation predictable. This predictability makes kernel heap overflow easier to exploit. An attacker can careful prepare the kernel heap to control the following chunk overflowed. For example these attacks exploit the predictability of the heap: - Linux Kernel CAN SLUB overflow (https://goo.gl/oMNWkU) - Exploiting Linux Kernel Heap corruptions (http://goo.gl/EXLn95) ***Problems that needed solving: - Randomize the Freelist (singled linked) used in the SLUB allocator. - Ensure good performance to encourage usage. - Get best entropy in early boot stage. ***Parts: - 01/02 Reorganize the SLAB Freelist randomization to share elements with the SLUB implementation. - 02/02 The SLUB Freelist randomization implementation. Similar approach than the SLAB but tailored to the singled freelist used in SLUB. ***Performance data: slab_test impact is between 3% to 4% on average for 100000 attempts without smp. It is a very focused testing, kernbench show the overall impact on the system is way lower. Before: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 49 cycles kfree -> 77 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 51 cycles kfree -> 79 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 53 cycles kfree -> 83 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 62 cycles kfree -> 90 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 81 cycles kfree -> 97 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 98 cycles kfree -> 121 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 95 cycles kfree -> 122 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 96 cycles kfree -> 126 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 140 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 149 cycles kfree -> 171 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 69 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 73 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 72 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 71 cycles After: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 57 cycles kfree -> 78 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 61 cycles kfree -> 81 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 76 cycles kfree -> 93 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 83 cycles kfree -> 94 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 106 cycles kfree -> 107 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 118 cycles kfree -> 117 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 114 cycles kfree -> 116 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 118 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 147 cycles kfree -> 131 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 214 cycles kfree -> 161 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 65 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 64 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 67 cycles Kernbench, before: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 101.873 (1.16069) User Time 1045.22 (1.60447) System Time 88.969 (0.559195) Percent CPU 1112.9 (13.8279) Context Switches 189140 (2282.15) Sleeps 99008.6 (768.091) After: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.47 (0.562732) User Time 1045.3 (1.34263) System Time 88.311 (0.342554) Percent CPU 1105.8 (6.49444) Context Switches 189081 (2355.78) Sleeps 99231.5 (800.358) This patch (of 2): This commit reorganizes the previous SLAB freelist randomization to prepare for the SLUB implementation. It moves functions that will be shared to slab_common. The entropy functions are changed to align with the SLUB implementation, now using get_random_(int|long) functions. These functions were chosen because they provide a bit more entropy early on boot and better performance when specific arch instructions are not available. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464295031-26375-2-git-send-email-thgarnie@google.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-07-27 05:21:56 +07:00
{
unsigned int rand;
unsigned int i;
mm: reorganize SLAB freelist randomization The kernel heap allocators are using a sequential freelist making their allocation predictable. This predictability makes kernel heap overflow easier to exploit. An attacker can careful prepare the kernel heap to control the following chunk overflowed. For example these attacks exploit the predictability of the heap: - Linux Kernel CAN SLUB overflow (https://goo.gl/oMNWkU) - Exploiting Linux Kernel Heap corruptions (http://goo.gl/EXLn95) ***Problems that needed solving: - Randomize the Freelist (singled linked) used in the SLUB allocator. - Ensure good performance to encourage usage. - Get best entropy in early boot stage. ***Parts: - 01/02 Reorganize the SLAB Freelist randomization to share elements with the SLUB implementation. - 02/02 The SLUB Freelist randomization implementation. Similar approach than the SLAB but tailored to the singled freelist used in SLUB. ***Performance data: slab_test impact is between 3% to 4% on average for 100000 attempts without smp. It is a very focused testing, kernbench show the overall impact on the system is way lower. Before: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 49 cycles kfree -> 77 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 51 cycles kfree -> 79 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 53 cycles kfree -> 83 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 62 cycles kfree -> 90 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 81 cycles kfree -> 97 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 98 cycles kfree -> 121 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 95 cycles kfree -> 122 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 96 cycles kfree -> 126 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 140 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 149 cycles kfree -> 171 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 69 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 73 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 72 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 71 cycles After: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 57 cycles kfree -> 78 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 61 cycles kfree -> 81 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 76 cycles kfree -> 93 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 83 cycles kfree -> 94 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 106 cycles kfree -> 107 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 118 cycles kfree -> 117 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 114 cycles kfree -> 116 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 118 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 147 cycles kfree -> 131 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 214 cycles kfree -> 161 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 65 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 64 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 67 cycles Kernbench, before: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 101.873 (1.16069) User Time 1045.22 (1.60447) System Time 88.969 (0.559195) Percent CPU 1112.9 (13.8279) Context Switches 189140 (2282.15) Sleeps 99008.6 (768.091) After: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.47 (0.562732) User Time 1045.3 (1.34263) System Time 88.311 (0.342554) Percent CPU 1105.8 (6.49444) Context Switches 189081 (2355.78) Sleeps 99231.5 (800.358) This patch (of 2): This commit reorganizes the previous SLAB freelist randomization to prepare for the SLUB implementation. It moves functions that will be shared to slab_common. The entropy functions are changed to align with the SLUB implementation, now using get_random_(int|long) functions. These functions were chosen because they provide a bit more entropy early on boot and better performance when specific arch instructions are not available. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464295031-26375-2-git-send-email-thgarnie@google.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-07-27 05:21:56 +07:00
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
list[i] = i;
/* Fisher-Yates shuffle */
for (i = count - 1; i > 0; i--) {
rand = prandom_u32_state(state);
rand %= (i + 1);
swap(list[i], list[rand]);
}
}
/* Create a random sequence per cache */
int cache_random_seq_create(struct kmem_cache *cachep, unsigned int count,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct rnd_state state;
if (count < 2 || cachep->random_seq)
return 0;
cachep->random_seq = kcalloc(count, sizeof(unsigned int), gfp);
if (!cachep->random_seq)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Get best entropy at this stage of boot */
prandom_seed_state(&state, get_random_long());
freelist_randomize(&state, cachep->random_seq, count);
return 0;
}
/* Destroy the per-cache random freelist sequence */
void cache_random_seq_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep)
{
kfree(cachep->random_seq);
cachep->random_seq = NULL;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM */
#if defined(CONFIG_SLAB) || defined(CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG)
#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
#define SLABINFO_RIGHTS (0600)
#else
#define SLABINFO_RIGHTS (0400)
#endif
static void print_slabinfo_header(struct seq_file *m)
{
/*
* Output format version, so at least we can change it
* without _too_ many complaints.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB
seq_puts(m, "slabinfo - version: 2.1 (statistics)\n");
#else
seq_puts(m, "slabinfo - version: 2.1\n");
#endif
seq_puts(m, "# name <active_objs> <num_objs> <objsize> <objperslab> <pagesperslab>");
seq_puts(m, " : tunables <limit> <batchcount> <sharedfactor>");
seq_puts(m, " : slabdata <active_slabs> <num_slabs> <sharedavail>");
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB
seq_puts(m, " : globalstat <listallocs> <maxobjs> <grown> <reaped> <error> <maxfreeable> <nodeallocs> <remotefrees> <alienoverflow>");
seq_puts(m, " : cpustat <allochit> <allocmiss> <freehit> <freemiss>");
#endif
seq_putc(m, '\n');
}
void *slab_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
return seq_list_start(&slab_caches, *pos);
}
void *slab_next(struct seq_file *m, void *p, loff_t *pos)
{
return seq_list_next(p, &slab_caches, pos);
}
void slab_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
{
mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex);
}
static void cache_show(struct kmem_cache *s, struct seq_file *m)
{
struct slabinfo sinfo;
memset(&sinfo, 0, sizeof(sinfo));
get_slabinfo(s, &sinfo);
seq_printf(m, "%-17s %6lu %6lu %6u %4u %4d",
s->name, sinfo.active_objs, sinfo.num_objs, s->size,
sinfo.objects_per_slab, (1 << sinfo.cache_order));
seq_printf(m, " : tunables %4u %4u %4u",
sinfo.limit, sinfo.batchcount, sinfo.shared);
seq_printf(m, " : slabdata %6lu %6lu %6lu",
sinfo.active_slabs, sinfo.num_slabs, sinfo.shared_avail);
slabinfo_show_stats(m, s);
seq_putc(m, '\n');
}
static int slab_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
{
struct kmem_cache *s = list_entry(p, struct kmem_cache, list);
if (p == slab_caches.next)
print_slabinfo_header(m);
cache_show(s, m);
return 0;
}
mm: oom: show unreclaimable slab info when unreclaimable slabs > user memory The kernel may panic when an oom happens without killable process sometimes it is caused by huge unreclaimable slabs used by kernel. Although kdump could help debug such problem, however, kdump is not available on all architectures and it might be malfunction sometime. And, since kernel already panic it is worthy capturing such information in dmesg to aid touble shooting. Print out unreclaimable slab info (used size and total size) which actual memory usage is not zero (num_objs * size != 0) when unreclaimable slabs amount is greater than total user memory (LRU pages). The output looks like: Unreclaimable slab info: Name Used Total rpc_buffers 31KB 31KB rpc_tasks 7KB 7KB ebitmap_node 1964KB 1964KB avtab_node 5024KB 5024KB xfs_buf 1402KB 1402KB xfs_ili 134KB 134KB xfs_efi_item 115KB 115KB xfs_efd_item 115KB 115KB xfs_buf_item 134KB 134KB xfs_log_item_desc 342KB 342KB xfs_trans 1412KB 1412KB xfs_ifork 212KB 212KB [yang.s@alibaba-inc.com: v11] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507656303-103845-4-git-send-email-yang.s@alibaba-inc.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507152550-46205-4-git-send-email-yang.s@alibaba-inc.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.s@alibaba-inc.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-16 08:32:07 +07:00
void dump_unreclaimable_slab(void)
{
struct kmem_cache *s, *s2;
struct slabinfo sinfo;
/*
* Here acquiring slab_mutex is risky since we don't prefer to get
* sleep in oom path. But, without mutex hold, it may introduce a
* risk of crash.
* Use mutex_trylock to protect the list traverse, dump nothing
* without acquiring the mutex.
*/
if (!mutex_trylock(&slab_mutex)) {
pr_warn("excessive unreclaimable slab but cannot dump stats\n");
return;
}
pr_info("Unreclaimable slab info:\n");
pr_info("Name Used Total\n");
list_for_each_entry_safe(s, s2, &slab_caches, list) {
if (s->flags & SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT)
mm: oom: show unreclaimable slab info when unreclaimable slabs > user memory The kernel may panic when an oom happens without killable process sometimes it is caused by huge unreclaimable slabs used by kernel. Although kdump could help debug such problem, however, kdump is not available on all architectures and it might be malfunction sometime. And, since kernel already panic it is worthy capturing such information in dmesg to aid touble shooting. Print out unreclaimable slab info (used size and total size) which actual memory usage is not zero (num_objs * size != 0) when unreclaimable slabs amount is greater than total user memory (LRU pages). The output looks like: Unreclaimable slab info: Name Used Total rpc_buffers 31KB 31KB rpc_tasks 7KB 7KB ebitmap_node 1964KB 1964KB avtab_node 5024KB 5024KB xfs_buf 1402KB 1402KB xfs_ili 134KB 134KB xfs_efi_item 115KB 115KB xfs_efd_item 115KB 115KB xfs_buf_item 134KB 134KB xfs_log_item_desc 342KB 342KB xfs_trans 1412KB 1412KB xfs_ifork 212KB 212KB [yang.s@alibaba-inc.com: v11] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507656303-103845-4-git-send-email-yang.s@alibaba-inc.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507152550-46205-4-git-send-email-yang.s@alibaba-inc.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.s@alibaba-inc.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-16 08:32:07 +07:00
continue;
get_slabinfo(s, &sinfo);
if (sinfo.num_objs > 0)
pr_info("%-17s %10luKB %10luKB\n", s->name,
mm: oom: show unreclaimable slab info when unreclaimable slabs > user memory The kernel may panic when an oom happens without killable process sometimes it is caused by huge unreclaimable slabs used by kernel. Although kdump could help debug such problem, however, kdump is not available on all architectures and it might be malfunction sometime. And, since kernel already panic it is worthy capturing such information in dmesg to aid touble shooting. Print out unreclaimable slab info (used size and total size) which actual memory usage is not zero (num_objs * size != 0) when unreclaimable slabs amount is greater than total user memory (LRU pages). The output looks like: Unreclaimable slab info: Name Used Total rpc_buffers 31KB 31KB rpc_tasks 7KB 7KB ebitmap_node 1964KB 1964KB avtab_node 5024KB 5024KB xfs_buf 1402KB 1402KB xfs_ili 134KB 134KB xfs_efi_item 115KB 115KB xfs_efd_item 115KB 115KB xfs_buf_item 134KB 134KB xfs_log_item_desc 342KB 342KB xfs_trans 1412KB 1412KB xfs_ifork 212KB 212KB [yang.s@alibaba-inc.com: v11] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507656303-103845-4-git-send-email-yang.s@alibaba-inc.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507152550-46205-4-git-send-email-yang.s@alibaba-inc.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.s@alibaba-inc.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-16 08:32:07 +07:00
(sinfo.active_objs * s->size) / 1024,
(sinfo.num_objs * s->size) / 1024);
}
mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex);
}
mm, memcg: fix build error around the usage of kmem_caches When I manually set default n to MEMCG_KMEM in init/Kconfig, bellow error occurs, mm/slab_common.c: In function 'memcg_slab_start': mm/slab_common.c:1530:30: error: 'struct mem_cgroup' has no member named 'kmem_caches' return seq_list_start(&memcg->kmem_caches, *pos); ^ mm/slab_common.c: In function 'memcg_slab_next': mm/slab_common.c:1537:32: error: 'struct mem_cgroup' has no member named 'kmem_caches' return seq_list_next(p, &memcg->kmem_caches, pos); ^ mm/slab_common.c: In function 'memcg_slab_show': mm/slab_common.c:1551:16: error: 'struct mem_cgroup' has no member named 'kmem_caches' if (p == memcg->kmem_caches.next) ^ CC arch/x86/xen/smp.o mm/slab_common.c: In function 'memcg_slab_start': mm/slab_common.c:1531:1: warning: control reaches end of non-void function [-Wreturn-type] } ^ mm/slab_common.c: In function 'memcg_slab_next': mm/slab_common.c:1538:1: warning: control reaches end of non-void function [-Wreturn-type] } ^ That's because kmem_caches is defined only when CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM is set, while memcg_slab_start() will use it no matter CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM is defined or not. By the way, the reason I mannuly undefined CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM is to verify whether my some other code change is still stable when CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM is not set. Unfortunately, the existing code has been already unstable since v4.11. Fixes: bc2791f857e1 ("slab: link memcg kmem_caches on their associated memory cgroup") Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1580970260-2045-1-git-send-email-laoar.shao@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-02 11:06:30 +07:00
#if defined(CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM)
int memcg_slab_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
{
/*
* Deprecated.
* Please, take a look at tools/cgroup/slabinfo.py .
*/
return 0;
}
#endif
/*
* slabinfo_op - iterator that generates /proc/slabinfo
*
* Output layout:
* cache-name
* num-active-objs
* total-objs
* object size
* num-active-slabs
* total-slabs
* num-pages-per-slab
* + further values on SMP and with statistics enabled
*/
static const struct seq_operations slabinfo_op = {
.start = slab_start,
.next = slab_next,
.stop = slab_stop,
.show = slab_show,
};
static int slabinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &slabinfo_op);
}
static const struct proc_ops slabinfo_proc_ops = {
proc: faster open/read/close with "permanent" files Now that "struct proc_ops" exist we can start putting there stuff which could not fly with VFS "struct file_operations"... Most of fs/proc/inode.c file is dedicated to make open/read/.../close reliable in the event of disappearing /proc entries which usually happens if module is getting removed. Files like /proc/cpuinfo which never disappear simply do not need such protection. Save 2 atomic ops, 1 allocation, 1 free per open/read/close sequence for such "permanent" files. Enable "permanent" flag for /proc/cpuinfo /proc/kmsg /proc/modules /proc/slabinfo /proc/stat /proc/sysvipc/* /proc/swaps More will come once I figure out foolproof way to prevent out module authors from marking their stuff "permanent" for performance reasons when it is not. This should help with scalability: benchmark is "read /proc/cpuinfo R times by N threads scattered over the system". N R t, s (before) t, s (after) ----------------------------------------------------- 64 4096 1.582458 1.530502 -3.2% 256 4096 6.371926 6.125168 -3.9% 1024 4096 25.64888 24.47528 -4.6% Benchmark source: #include <chrono> #include <iostream> #include <thread> #include <vector> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> const int NR_CPUS = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN); int N; const char *filename; int R; int xxx = 0; int glue(int n) { cpu_set_t m; CPU_ZERO(&m); CPU_SET(n, &m); return sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpu_set_t), &m); } void f(int n) { glue(n % NR_CPUS); while (*(volatile int *)&xxx == 0) { } for (int i = 0; i < R; i++) { int fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); char buf[4096]; ssize_t rv = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); asm volatile ("" :: "g" (rv)); close(fd); } } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 4) { std::cerr << "usage: " << argv[0] << ' ' << "N /proc/filename R "; return 1; } N = atoi(argv[1]); filename = argv[2]; R = atoi(argv[3]); for (int i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++) { if (glue(i) == 0) break; } std::vector<std::thread> T; T.reserve(N); for (int i = 0; i < N; i++) { T.emplace_back(f, i); } auto t0 = std::chrono::system_clock::now(); { *(volatile int *)&xxx = 1; for (auto& t: T) { t.join(); } } auto t1 = std::chrono::system_clock::now(); std::chrono::duration<double> dt = t1 - t0; std::cout << dt.count() << ' '; return 0; } P.S.: Explicit randomization marker is added because adding non-function pointer will silently disable structure layout randomization. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes] Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200222201539.GA22576@avx2 Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-07 10:09:01 +07:00
.proc_flags = PROC_ENTRY_PERMANENT,
.proc_open = slabinfo_open,
.proc_read = seq_read,
.proc_write = slabinfo_write,
.proc_lseek = seq_lseek,
.proc_release = seq_release,
};
static int __init slab_proc_init(void)
{
proc_create("slabinfo", SLABINFO_RIGHTS, NULL, &slabinfo_proc_ops);
return 0;
}
module_init(slab_proc_init);
mm, memcg: add a memcg_slabinfo debugfs file There are concerns about memory leaks from extensive use of memory cgroups as each memory cgroup creates its own set of kmem caches. There is a possiblity that the memcg kmem caches may remain even after the memory cgroups have been offlined. Therefore, it will be useful to show the status of each of memcg kmem caches. This patch introduces a new <debugfs>/memcg_slabinfo file which is somewhat similar to /proc/slabinfo in format, but lists only information about kmem caches that have child memcg kmem caches. Information available in /proc/slabinfo are not repeated in memcg_slabinfo. A portion of a sample output of the file was: # <name> <css_id[:dead]> <active_objs> <num_objs> <active_slabs> <num_slabs> rpc_inode_cache root 13 51 1 1 rpc_inode_cache 48 0 0 0 0 fat_inode_cache root 1 45 1 1 fat_inode_cache 41 2 45 1 1 xfs_inode root 770 816 24 24 xfs_inode 92 22 34 1 1 xfs_inode 88:dead 1 34 1 1 xfs_inode 89:dead 23 34 1 1 xfs_inode 85 4 34 1 1 xfs_inode 84 9 34 1 1 The css id of the memcg is also listed. If a memcg is not online, the tag ":dead" will be attached as shown above. [longman@redhat.com: memcg: add ":deact" tag for reparented kmem caches in memcg_slabinfo] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190621173005.31514-1-longman@redhat.com [longman@redhat.com: set the flag in the common code as suggested by Roman] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627184324.5875-1-longman@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190619171621.26209-1-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 10:56:38 +07:00
#endif /* CONFIG_SLAB || CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG */
static __always_inline void *__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size,
gfp_t flags)
{
void *ret;
size_t ks;
ks = ksize(p);
mm: slub: add kernel address sanitizer support for slub allocator With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated by slub. Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as redzone. Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by caller number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object (including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (inaccessible). We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object. There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire size of really allocated area. Such callers could validly access whole allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible. Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 05:39:42 +07:00
if (ks >= new_size) {
kasan, mm: change hooks signatures Patch series "kasan: add software tag-based mode for arm64", v13. This patchset adds a new software tag-based mode to KASAN [1]. (Initially this mode was called KHWASAN, but it got renamed, see the naming rationale at the end of this section). The plan is to implement HWASan [2] for the kernel with the incentive, that it's going to have comparable to KASAN performance, but in the same time consume much less memory, trading that off for somewhat imprecise bug detection and being supported only for arm64. The underlying ideas of the approach used by software tag-based KASAN are: 1. By using the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) arm64 CPU feature, we can store pointer tags in the top byte of each kernel pointer. 2. Using shadow memory, we can store memory tags for each chunk of kernel memory. 3. On each memory allocation, we can generate a random tag, embed it into the returned pointer and set the memory tags that correspond to this chunk of memory to the same value. 4. By using compiler instrumentation, before each memory access we can add a check that the pointer tag matches the tag of the memory that is being accessed. 5. On a tag mismatch we report an error. With this patchset the existing KASAN mode gets renamed to generic KASAN, with the word "generic" meaning that the implementation can be supported by any architecture as it is purely software. The new mode this patchset adds is called software tag-based KASAN. The word "tag-based" refers to the fact that this mode uses tags embedded into the top byte of kernel pointers and the TBI arm64 CPU feature that allows to dereference such pointers. The word "software" here means that shadow memory manipulation and tag checking on pointer dereference is done in software. As it is the only tag-based implementation right now, "software tag-based" KASAN is sometimes referred to as simply "tag-based" in this patchset. A potential expansion of this mode is a hardware tag-based mode, which would use hardware memory tagging support (announced by Arm [3]) instead of compiler instrumentation and manual shadow memory manipulation. Same as generic KASAN, software tag-based KASAN is strictly a debugging feature. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kasan.html [2] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html [3] https://community.arm.com/processors/b/blog/posts/arm-a-profile-architecture-2018-developments-armv85a ====== Rationale On mobile devices generic KASAN's memory usage is significant problem. One of the main reasons to have tag-based KASAN is to be able to perform a similar set of checks as the generic one does, but with lower memory requirements. Comment from Vishwath Mohan <vishwath@google.com>: I don't have data on-hand, but anecdotally both ASAN and KASAN have proven problematic to enable for environments that don't tolerate the increased memory pressure well. This includes (a) Low-memory form factors - Wear, TV, Things, lower-tier phones like Go, (c) Connected components like Pixel's visual core [1]. These are both places I'd love to have a low(er) memory footprint option at my disposal. Comment from Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>: Looking at a live Android device under load, slab (according to /proc/meminfo) + kernel stack take 8-10% available RAM (~350MB). KASAN's overhead of 2x - 3x on top of it is not insignificant. Not having this overhead enables near-production use - ex. running KASAN/KHWASAN kernel on a personal, daily-use device to catch bugs that do not reproduce in test configuration. These are the ones that often cost the most engineering time to track down. CPU overhead is bad, but generally tolerable. RAM is critical, in our experience. Once it gets low enough, OOM-killer makes your life miserable. [1] https://www.blog.google/products/pixel/pixel-visual-core-image-processing-and-machine-learning-pixel-2/ ====== Technical details Software tag-based KASAN mode is implemented in a very similar way to the generic one. This patchset essentially does the following: 1. TCR_TBI1 is set to enable Top Byte Ignore. 2. Shadow memory is used (with a different scale, 1:16, so each shadow byte corresponds to 16 bytes of kernel memory) to store memory tags. 3. All slab objects are aligned to shadow scale, which is 16 bytes. 4. All pointers returned from the slab allocator are tagged with a random tag and the corresponding shadow memory is poisoned with the same value. 5. Compiler instrumentation is used to insert tag checks. Either by calling callbacks or by inlining them (CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE flags are reused). 6. When a tag mismatch is detected in callback instrumentation mode KASAN simply prints a bug report. In case of inline instrumentation, clang inserts a brk instruction, and KASAN has it's own brk handler, which reports the bug. 7. The memory in between slab objects is marked with a reserved tag, and acts as a redzone. 8. When a slab object is freed it's marked with a reserved tag. Bug detection is imprecise for two reasons: 1. We won't catch some small out-of-bounds accesses, that fall into the same shadow cell, as the last byte of a slab object. 2. We only have 1 byte to store tags, which means we have a 1/256 probability of a tag match for an incorrect access (actually even slightly less due to reserved tag values). Despite that there's a particular type of bugs that tag-based KASAN can detect compared to generic KASAN: use-after-free after the object has been allocated by someone else. ====== Testing Some kernel developers voiced a concern that changing the top byte of kernel pointers may lead to subtle bugs that are difficult to discover. To address this concern deliberate testing has been performed. It doesn't seem feasible to do some kind of static checking to find potential issues with pointer tagging, so a dynamic approach was taken. All pointer comparisons/subtractions have been instrumented in an LLVM compiler pass and a kernel module that would print a bug report whenever two pointers with different tags are being compared/subtracted (ignoring comparisons with NULL pointers and with pointers obtained by casting an error code to a pointer type) has been used. Then the kernel has been booted in QEMU and on an Odroid C2 board and syzkaller has been run. This yielded the following results. The two places that look interesting are: is_vmalloc_addr in include/linux/mm.h is_kernel_rodata in mm/util.c Here we compare a pointer with some fixed untagged values to make sure that the pointer lies in a particular part of the kernel address space. Since tag-based KASAN doesn't add tags to pointers that belong to rodata or vmalloc regions, this should work as is. To make sure debug checks to those two functions that check that the result doesn't change whether we operate on pointers with or without untagging has been added. A few other cases that don't look that interesting: Comparing pointers to achieve unique sorting order of pointee objects (e.g. sorting locks addresses before performing a double lock): tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout in drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c pipe_double_lock in fs/pipe.c unix_state_double_lock in net/unix/af_unix.c lock_two_nondirectories in fs/inode.c mutex_lock_double in kernel/events/core.c ep_cmp_ffd in fs/eventpoll.c fsnotify_compare_groups fs/notify/mark.c Nothing needs to be done here, since the tags embedded into pointers don't change, so the sorting order would still be unique. Checks that a pointer belongs to some particular allocation: is_sibling_entry in lib/radix-tree.c object_is_on_stack in include/linux/sched/task_stack.h Nothing needs to be done here either, since two pointers can only belong to the same allocation if they have the same tag. Overall, since the kernel boots and works, there are no critical bugs. As for the rest, the traditional kernel testing way (use until fails) is the only one that looks feasible. Another point here is that tag-based KASAN is available under a separate config option that needs to be deliberately enabled. Even though it might be used in a "near-production" environment to find bugs that are not found during fuzzing or running tests, it is still a debug tool. ====== Benchmarks The following numbers were collected on Odroid C2 board. Both generic and tag-based KASAN were used in inline instrumentation mode. Boot time [1]: * ~1.7 sec for clean kernel * ~5.0 sec for generic KASAN * ~5.0 sec for tag-based KASAN Network performance [2]: * 8.33 Gbits/sec for clean kernel * 3.17 Gbits/sec for generic KASAN * 2.85 Gbits/sec for tag-based KASAN Slab memory usage after boot [3]: * ~40 kb for clean kernel * ~105 kb (~260% overhead) for generic KASAN * ~47 kb (~20% overhead) for tag-based KASAN KASAN memory overhead consists of three main parts: 1. Increased slab memory usage due to redzones. 2. Shadow memory (the whole reserved once during boot). 3. Quaratine (grows gradually until some preset limit; the more the limit, the more the chance to detect a use-after-free). Comparing tag-based vs generic KASAN for each of these points: 1. 20% vs 260% overhead. 2. 1/16th vs 1/8th of physical memory. 3. Tag-based KASAN doesn't require quarantine. [1] Time before the ext4 driver is initialized. [2] Measured as `iperf -s & iperf -c 127.0.0.1 -t 30`. [3] Measured as `cat /proc/meminfo | grep Slab`. ====== Some notes A few notes: 1. The patchset can be found here: https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype/tree/khwasan 2. Building requires a recent Clang version (7.0.0 or later). 3. Stack instrumentation is not supported yet and will be added later. This patch (of 25): Tag-based KASAN changes the value of the top byte of pointers returned from the kernel allocation functions (such as kmalloc). This patch updates KASAN hooks signatures and their usage in SLAB and SLUB code to reflect that. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aec2b5e3973781ff8a6bb6760f8543643202c451.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 15:29:37 +07:00
p = kasan_krealloc((void *)p, new_size, flags);
return (void *)p;
mm: slub: add kernel address sanitizer support for slub allocator With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated by slub. Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as redzone. Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by caller number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object (including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (inaccessible). We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object. There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire size of really allocated area. Such callers could validly access whole allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible. Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 05:39:42 +07:00
}
ret = kmalloc_track_caller(new_size, flags);
if (ret && p)
memcpy(ret, p, ks);
return ret;
}
/**
* krealloc - reallocate memory. The contents will remain unchanged.
* @p: object to reallocate memory for.
* @new_size: how many bytes of memory are required.
* @flags: the type of memory to allocate.
*
* The contents of the object pointed to are preserved up to the
* lesser of the new and old sizes. If @p is %NULL, krealloc()
* behaves exactly like kmalloc(). If @new_size is 0 and @p is not a
* %NULL pointer, the object pointed to is freed.
*
* Return: pointer to the allocated memory or %NULL in case of error
*/
void *krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, gfp_t flags)
{
void *ret;
if (unlikely(!new_size)) {
kfree(p);
return ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
}
ret = __do_krealloc(p, new_size, flags);
if (ret && kasan_reset_tag(p) != kasan_reset_tag(ret))
kfree(p);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(krealloc);
/**
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 13:18:13 +07:00
* kfree_sensitive - Clear sensitive information in memory before freeing
* @p: object to free memory of
*
* The memory of the object @p points to is zeroed before freed.
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 13:18:13 +07:00
* If @p is %NULL, kfree_sensitive() does nothing.
*
* Note: this function zeroes the whole allocated buffer which can be a good
* deal bigger than the requested buffer size passed to kmalloc(). So be
* careful when using this function in performance sensitive code.
*/
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 13:18:13 +07:00
void kfree_sensitive(const void *p)
{
size_t ks;
void *mem = (void *)p;
ks = ksize(mem);
if (ks)
memzero_explicit(mem, ks);
kfree(mem);
}
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 13:18:13 +07:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
/**
* ksize - get the actual amount of memory allocated for a given object
* @objp: Pointer to the object
*
* kmalloc may internally round up allocations and return more memory
* than requested. ksize() can be used to determine the actual amount of
* memory allocated. The caller may use this additional memory, even though
* a smaller amount of memory was initially specified with the kmalloc call.
* The caller must guarantee that objp points to a valid object previously
* allocated with either kmalloc() or kmem_cache_alloc(). The object
* must not be freed during the duration of the call.
*
* Return: size of the actual memory used by @objp in bytes
*/
size_t ksize(const void *objp)
{
mm/kasan: add object validation in ksize() ksize() has been unconditionally unpoisoning the whole shadow memory region associated with an allocation. This can lead to various undetected bugs, for example, double-kzfree(). Specifically, kzfree() uses ksize() to determine the actual allocation size, and subsequently zeroes the memory. Since ksize() used to just unpoison the whole shadow memory region, no invalid free was detected. This patch addresses this as follows: 1. Add a check in ksize(), and only then unpoison the memory region. 2. Preserve kasan_unpoison_slab() semantics by explicitly unpoisoning the shadow memory region using the size obtained from __ksize(). Tested: 1. With SLAB allocator: a) normal boot without warnings; b) verified the added double-kzfree() is detected. 2. With SLUB allocator: a) normal boot without warnings; b) verified the added double-kzfree() is detected. [elver@google.com: s/BUG_ON/WARN_ON_ONCE/, per Kees] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627094445.216365-6-elver@google.com Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199359 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626142014.141844-6-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 10:54:18 +07:00
size_t size;
/*
* We need to check that the pointed to object is valid, and only then
* unpoison the shadow memory below. We use __kasan_check_read(), to
* generate a more useful report at the time ksize() is called (rather
* than later where behaviour is undefined due to potential
* use-after-free or double-free).
*
* If the pointed to memory is invalid we return 0, to avoid users of
* ksize() writing to and potentially corrupting the memory region.
*
* We want to perform the check before __ksize(), to avoid potentially
* crashing in __ksize() due to accessing invalid metadata.
*/
if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !__kasan_check_read(objp, 1))
mm/kasan: add object validation in ksize() ksize() has been unconditionally unpoisoning the whole shadow memory region associated with an allocation. This can lead to various undetected bugs, for example, double-kzfree(). Specifically, kzfree() uses ksize() to determine the actual allocation size, and subsequently zeroes the memory. Since ksize() used to just unpoison the whole shadow memory region, no invalid free was detected. This patch addresses this as follows: 1. Add a check in ksize(), and only then unpoison the memory region. 2. Preserve kasan_unpoison_slab() semantics by explicitly unpoisoning the shadow memory region using the size obtained from __ksize(). Tested: 1. With SLAB allocator: a) normal boot without warnings; b) verified the added double-kzfree() is detected. 2. With SLUB allocator: a) normal boot without warnings; b) verified the added double-kzfree() is detected. [elver@google.com: s/BUG_ON/WARN_ON_ONCE/, per Kees] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627094445.216365-6-elver@google.com Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199359 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626142014.141844-6-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 10:54:18 +07:00
return 0;
size = __ksize(objp);
/*
* We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
* so we need to unpoison this area.
*/
kasan_unpoison_shadow(objp, size);
return size;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
/* Tracepoints definitions. */
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL(kmalloc);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_node);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_node);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL(kfree);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_free);
mm: make should_failslab always available for fault injection should_failslab() is a convenient function to hook into for directed error injection into kmalloc(). However, it is only available if a config flag is set. The following BCC script, for example, fails kmalloc() calls after a btrfs umount: from bcc import BPF prog = r""" BPF_HASH(flag); #include <linux/mm.h> int kprobe__btrfs_close_devices(void *ctx) { u64 key = 1; flag.update(&key, &key); return 0; } int kprobe__should_failslab(struct pt_regs *ctx) { u64 key = 1; u64 *res; res = flag.lookup(&key); if (res != 0) { bpf_override_return(ctx, -ENOMEM); } return 0; } """ b = BPF(text=prog) while 1: b.kprobe_poll() This patch refactors the should_failslab implementation so that the function is always available for error injection, independent of flags. This change would be similar in nature to commit f5490d3ec921 ("block: Add should_fail_bio() for bpf error injection"). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180222020320.6944-1-hmclauchlan@fb.com Signed-off-by: Howard McLauchlan <hmclauchlan@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <jweiner@fb.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-06 06:23:57 +07:00
int should_failslab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags)
{
if (__should_failslab(s, gfpflags))
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION(should_failslab, ERRNO);