linux_dsm_epyc7002/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c

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/*
* BPF JIT compiler for ARM64
*
* Copyright (C) 2014-2016 Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "bpf_jit: " fmt
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
net: bpf: arm64: address randomize and write protect JIT code This is the ARM64 variant for 314beb9bcab ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). Thanks to commit 11d91a770f1f ("arm64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX support") which added necessary infrastructure, we can now implement RO marking of eBPF generated JIT image pages and randomize start offset for the JIT code, so that it does not reside directly on a page boundary anymore. Likewise, the holes are filled with illegal instructions: here we use BRK #0x100 (opcode 0xd4202000) to trigger a fault in the kernel (unallocated BRKs would trigger a fault through do_debug_exception). This seems more reliable as we don't have a guaranteed undefined instruction space on ARM64. This is basically the ARM64 variant of what we already have in ARM via commit 55309dd3d4cd ("net: bpf: arm: address randomize and write protect JIT code"). Moreover, this commit also presents a merge resolution due to conflicts with commit 60a3b2253c41 ("net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only") as we don't use kfree() in bpf_jit_free() anymore to release the locked bpf_prog structure, but instead bpf_prog_unlock_free() through a different allocator. JIT tested on aarch64 with BPF test suite. Reference: http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2014-09-16 14:48:50 +07:00
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
net: bpf: arm64: address randomize and write protect JIT code This is the ARM64 variant for 314beb9bcab ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). Thanks to commit 11d91a770f1f ("arm64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX support") which added necessary infrastructure, we can now implement RO marking of eBPF generated JIT image pages and randomize start offset for the JIT code, so that it does not reside directly on a page boundary anymore. Likewise, the holes are filled with illegal instructions: here we use BRK #0x100 (opcode 0xd4202000) to trigger a fault in the kernel (unallocated BRKs would trigger a fault through do_debug_exception). This seems more reliable as we don't have a guaranteed undefined instruction space on ARM64. This is basically the ARM64 variant of what we already have in ARM via commit 55309dd3d4cd ("net: bpf: arm: address randomize and write protect JIT code"). Moreover, this commit also presents a merge resolution due to conflicts with commit 60a3b2253c41 ("net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only") as we don't use kfree() in bpf_jit_free() anymore to release the locked bpf_prog structure, but instead bpf_prog_unlock_free() through a different allocator. JIT tested on aarch64 with BPF test suite. Reference: http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2014-09-16 14:48:50 +07:00
#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include "bpf_jit.h"
#define TMP_REG_1 (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 0)
#define TMP_REG_2 (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 1)
#define TCALL_CNT (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 2)
#define TMP_REG_3 (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 3)
/* Map BPF registers to A64 registers */
static const int bpf2a64[] = {
/* return value from in-kernel function, and exit value from eBPF */
[BPF_REG_0] = A64_R(7),
/* arguments from eBPF program to in-kernel function */
[BPF_REG_1] = A64_R(0),
[BPF_REG_2] = A64_R(1),
[BPF_REG_3] = A64_R(2),
[BPF_REG_4] = A64_R(3),
[BPF_REG_5] = A64_R(4),
/* callee saved registers that in-kernel function will preserve */
[BPF_REG_6] = A64_R(19),
[BPF_REG_7] = A64_R(20),
[BPF_REG_8] = A64_R(21),
[BPF_REG_9] = A64_R(22),
/* read-only frame pointer to access stack */
[BPF_REG_FP] = A64_R(25),
/* temporary registers for internal BPF JIT */
[TMP_REG_1] = A64_R(10),
[TMP_REG_2] = A64_R(11),
[TMP_REG_3] = A64_R(12),
/* tail_call_cnt */
[TCALL_CNT] = A64_R(26),
/* temporary register for blinding constants */
[BPF_REG_AX] = A64_R(9),
};
struct jit_ctx {
const struct bpf_prog *prog;
int idx;
int epilogue_offset;
int *offset;
__le32 *image;
u32 stack_size;
};
static inline void emit(const u32 insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx->image != NULL)
ctx->image[ctx->idx] = cpu_to_le32(insn);
ctx->idx++;
}
bpf, arm64: optimize 32/64 immediate emission Improve the JIT to emit 64 and 32 bit immediates, the current algorithm is not optimal and we often emit more instructions than actually needed. arm64 has movz, movn, movk variants but for the current 64 bit immediates we only use movz with a series of movk when needed. For example loading ffffffffffffabab emits the following 4 instructions in the JIT today: * movz: abab, shift: 0, result: 000000000000abab * movk: ffff, shift: 16, result: 00000000ffffabab * movk: ffff, shift: 32, result: 0000ffffffffabab * movk: ffff, shift: 48, result: ffffffffffffabab Whereas after the patch the same load only needs a single instruction: * movn: 5454, shift: 0, result: ffffffffffffabab Another example where two extra instructions can be saved: * movz: abab, shift: 0, result: 000000000000abab * movk: 1f2f, shift: 16, result: 000000001f2fabab * movk: ffff, shift: 32, result: 0000ffff1f2fabab * movk: ffff, shift: 48, result: ffffffff1f2fabab After the patch: * movn: e0d0, shift: 16, result: ffffffff1f2fffff * movk: abab, shift: 0, result: ffffffff1f2fabab Another example with movz, before: * movz: 0000, shift: 0, result: 0000000000000000 * movk: fea0, shift: 32, result: 0000fea000000000 After: * movz: fea0, shift: 32, result: 0000fea000000000 Moreover, reuse emit_a64_mov_i() for 32 bit immediates that are loaded via emit_a64_mov_i64() which is a similar optimization as done in 6fe8b9c1f41d ("bpf, x64: save several bytes by using mov over movabsq when possible"). On arm64, the latter allows to use a single instruction with movn due to zero extension where otherwise two would be needed. And last but not least add a missing optimization in emit_a64_mov_i() where movn is used but the subsequent movk not needed. With some of the Cilium programs in use, this shrinks the needed instructions by about three percent. Tested on Cavium ThunderX CN8890. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-15 04:22:32 +07:00
static inline void emit_a64_mov_i(const int is64, const int reg,
const s32 val, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
u16 hi = val >> 16;
u16 lo = val & 0xffff;
if (hi & 0x8000) {
if (hi == 0xffff) {
emit(A64_MOVN(is64, reg, (u16)~lo, 0), ctx);
} else {
emit(A64_MOVN(is64, reg, (u16)~hi, 16), ctx);
if (lo != 0xffff)
emit(A64_MOVK(is64, reg, lo, 0), ctx);
}
} else {
emit(A64_MOVZ(is64, reg, lo, 0), ctx);
if (hi)
emit(A64_MOVK(is64, reg, hi, 16), ctx);
}
}
static int i64_i16_blocks(const u64 val, bool inverse)
{
return (((val >> 0) & 0xffff) != (inverse ? 0xffff : 0x0000)) +
(((val >> 16) & 0xffff) != (inverse ? 0xffff : 0x0000)) +
(((val >> 32) & 0xffff) != (inverse ? 0xffff : 0x0000)) +
(((val >> 48) & 0xffff) != (inverse ? 0xffff : 0x0000));
}
static inline void emit_a64_mov_i64(const int reg, const u64 val,
struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
bpf, arm64: optimize 32/64 immediate emission Improve the JIT to emit 64 and 32 bit immediates, the current algorithm is not optimal and we often emit more instructions than actually needed. arm64 has movz, movn, movk variants but for the current 64 bit immediates we only use movz with a series of movk when needed. For example loading ffffffffffffabab emits the following 4 instructions in the JIT today: * movz: abab, shift: 0, result: 000000000000abab * movk: ffff, shift: 16, result: 00000000ffffabab * movk: ffff, shift: 32, result: 0000ffffffffabab * movk: ffff, shift: 48, result: ffffffffffffabab Whereas after the patch the same load only needs a single instruction: * movn: 5454, shift: 0, result: ffffffffffffabab Another example where two extra instructions can be saved: * movz: abab, shift: 0, result: 000000000000abab * movk: 1f2f, shift: 16, result: 000000001f2fabab * movk: ffff, shift: 32, result: 0000ffff1f2fabab * movk: ffff, shift: 48, result: ffffffff1f2fabab After the patch: * movn: e0d0, shift: 16, result: ffffffff1f2fffff * movk: abab, shift: 0, result: ffffffff1f2fabab Another example with movz, before: * movz: 0000, shift: 0, result: 0000000000000000 * movk: fea0, shift: 32, result: 0000fea000000000 After: * movz: fea0, shift: 32, result: 0000fea000000000 Moreover, reuse emit_a64_mov_i() for 32 bit immediates that are loaded via emit_a64_mov_i64() which is a similar optimization as done in 6fe8b9c1f41d ("bpf, x64: save several bytes by using mov over movabsq when possible"). On arm64, the latter allows to use a single instruction with movn due to zero extension where otherwise two would be needed. And last but not least add a missing optimization in emit_a64_mov_i() where movn is used but the subsequent movk not needed. With some of the Cilium programs in use, this shrinks the needed instructions by about three percent. Tested on Cavium ThunderX CN8890. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-15 04:22:32 +07:00
u64 nrm_tmp = val, rev_tmp = ~val;
bool inverse;
int shift;
if (!(nrm_tmp >> 32))
return emit_a64_mov_i(0, reg, (u32)val, ctx);
inverse = i64_i16_blocks(nrm_tmp, true) < i64_i16_blocks(nrm_tmp, false);
shift = max(round_down((inverse ? (fls64(rev_tmp) - 1) :
(fls64(nrm_tmp) - 1)), 16), 0);
if (inverse)
emit(A64_MOVN(1, reg, (rev_tmp >> shift) & 0xffff, shift), ctx);
else
emit(A64_MOVZ(1, reg, (nrm_tmp >> shift) & 0xffff, shift), ctx);
shift -= 16;
while (shift >= 0) {
if (((nrm_tmp >> shift) & 0xffff) != (inverse ? 0xffff : 0x0000))
emit(A64_MOVK(1, reg, (nrm_tmp >> shift) & 0xffff, shift), ctx);
shift -= 16;
}
}
bpf, arm64: optimize 32/64 immediate emission Improve the JIT to emit 64 and 32 bit immediates, the current algorithm is not optimal and we often emit more instructions than actually needed. arm64 has movz, movn, movk variants but for the current 64 bit immediates we only use movz with a series of movk when needed. For example loading ffffffffffffabab emits the following 4 instructions in the JIT today: * movz: abab, shift: 0, result: 000000000000abab * movk: ffff, shift: 16, result: 00000000ffffabab * movk: ffff, shift: 32, result: 0000ffffffffabab * movk: ffff, shift: 48, result: ffffffffffffabab Whereas after the patch the same load only needs a single instruction: * movn: 5454, shift: 0, result: ffffffffffffabab Another example where two extra instructions can be saved: * movz: abab, shift: 0, result: 000000000000abab * movk: 1f2f, shift: 16, result: 000000001f2fabab * movk: ffff, shift: 32, result: 0000ffff1f2fabab * movk: ffff, shift: 48, result: ffffffff1f2fabab After the patch: * movn: e0d0, shift: 16, result: ffffffff1f2fffff * movk: abab, shift: 0, result: ffffffff1f2fabab Another example with movz, before: * movz: 0000, shift: 0, result: 0000000000000000 * movk: fea0, shift: 32, result: 0000fea000000000 After: * movz: fea0, shift: 32, result: 0000fea000000000 Moreover, reuse emit_a64_mov_i() for 32 bit immediates that are loaded via emit_a64_mov_i64() which is a similar optimization as done in 6fe8b9c1f41d ("bpf, x64: save several bytes by using mov over movabsq when possible"). On arm64, the latter allows to use a single instruction with movn due to zero extension where otherwise two would be needed. And last but not least add a missing optimization in emit_a64_mov_i() where movn is used but the subsequent movk not needed. With some of the Cilium programs in use, this shrinks the needed instructions by about three percent. Tested on Cavium ThunderX CN8890. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-15 04:22:32 +07:00
/*
* Kernel addresses in the vmalloc space use at most 48 bits, and the
* remaining bits are guaranteed to be 0x1. So we can compose the address
* with a fixed length movn/movk/movk sequence.
bpf, arm64: optimize 32/64 immediate emission Improve the JIT to emit 64 and 32 bit immediates, the current algorithm is not optimal and we often emit more instructions than actually needed. arm64 has movz, movn, movk variants but for the current 64 bit immediates we only use movz with a series of movk when needed. For example loading ffffffffffffabab emits the following 4 instructions in the JIT today: * movz: abab, shift: 0, result: 000000000000abab * movk: ffff, shift: 16, result: 00000000ffffabab * movk: ffff, shift: 32, result: 0000ffffffffabab * movk: ffff, shift: 48, result: ffffffffffffabab Whereas after the patch the same load only needs a single instruction: * movn: 5454, shift: 0, result: ffffffffffffabab Another example where two extra instructions can be saved: * movz: abab, shift: 0, result: 000000000000abab * movk: 1f2f, shift: 16, result: 000000001f2fabab * movk: ffff, shift: 32, result: 0000ffff1f2fabab * movk: ffff, shift: 48, result: ffffffff1f2fabab After the patch: * movn: e0d0, shift: 16, result: ffffffff1f2fffff * movk: abab, shift: 0, result: ffffffff1f2fabab Another example with movz, before: * movz: 0000, shift: 0, result: 0000000000000000 * movk: fea0, shift: 32, result: 0000fea000000000 After: * movz: fea0, shift: 32, result: 0000fea000000000 Moreover, reuse emit_a64_mov_i() for 32 bit immediates that are loaded via emit_a64_mov_i64() which is a similar optimization as done in 6fe8b9c1f41d ("bpf, x64: save several bytes by using mov over movabsq when possible"). On arm64, the latter allows to use a single instruction with movn due to zero extension where otherwise two would be needed. And last but not least add a missing optimization in emit_a64_mov_i() where movn is used but the subsequent movk not needed. With some of the Cilium programs in use, this shrinks the needed instructions by about three percent. Tested on Cavium ThunderX CN8890. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-15 04:22:32 +07:00
*/
static inline void emit_addr_mov_i64(const int reg, const u64 val,
struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
u64 tmp = val;
int shift = 0;
emit(A64_MOVN(1, reg, ~tmp & 0xffff, shift), ctx);
while (shift < 32) {
tmp >>= 16;
shift += 16;
emit(A64_MOVK(1, reg, tmp & 0xffff, shift), ctx);
}
}
static inline int bpf2a64_offset(int bpf_to, int bpf_from,
const struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
int to = ctx->offset[bpf_to];
/* -1 to account for the Branch instruction */
int from = ctx->offset[bpf_from] - 1;
return to - from;
}
net: bpf: arm64: address randomize and write protect JIT code This is the ARM64 variant for 314beb9bcab ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). Thanks to commit 11d91a770f1f ("arm64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX support") which added necessary infrastructure, we can now implement RO marking of eBPF generated JIT image pages and randomize start offset for the JIT code, so that it does not reside directly on a page boundary anymore. Likewise, the holes are filled with illegal instructions: here we use BRK #0x100 (opcode 0xd4202000) to trigger a fault in the kernel (unallocated BRKs would trigger a fault through do_debug_exception). This seems more reliable as we don't have a guaranteed undefined instruction space on ARM64. This is basically the ARM64 variant of what we already have in ARM via commit 55309dd3d4cd ("net: bpf: arm: address randomize and write protect JIT code"). Moreover, this commit also presents a merge resolution due to conflicts with commit 60a3b2253c41 ("net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only") as we don't use kfree() in bpf_jit_free() anymore to release the locked bpf_prog structure, but instead bpf_prog_unlock_free() through a different allocator. JIT tested on aarch64 with BPF test suite. Reference: http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2014-09-16 14:48:50 +07:00
static void jit_fill_hole(void *area, unsigned int size)
{
__le32 *ptr;
net: bpf: arm64: address randomize and write protect JIT code This is the ARM64 variant for 314beb9bcab ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). Thanks to commit 11d91a770f1f ("arm64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX support") which added necessary infrastructure, we can now implement RO marking of eBPF generated JIT image pages and randomize start offset for the JIT code, so that it does not reside directly on a page boundary anymore. Likewise, the holes are filled with illegal instructions: here we use BRK #0x100 (opcode 0xd4202000) to trigger a fault in the kernel (unallocated BRKs would trigger a fault through do_debug_exception). This seems more reliable as we don't have a guaranteed undefined instruction space on ARM64. This is basically the ARM64 variant of what we already have in ARM via commit 55309dd3d4cd ("net: bpf: arm: address randomize and write protect JIT code"). Moreover, this commit also presents a merge resolution due to conflicts with commit 60a3b2253c41 ("net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only") as we don't use kfree() in bpf_jit_free() anymore to release the locked bpf_prog structure, but instead bpf_prog_unlock_free() through a different allocator. JIT tested on aarch64 with BPF test suite. Reference: http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2014-09-16 14:48:50 +07:00
/* We are guaranteed to have aligned memory. */
for (ptr = area; size >= sizeof(u32); size -= sizeof(u32))
*ptr++ = cpu_to_le32(AARCH64_BREAK_FAULT);
}
static inline int epilogue_offset(const struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
int to = ctx->epilogue_offset;
int from = ctx->idx;
return to - from;
}
/* Stack must be multiples of 16B */
#define STACK_ALIGN(sz) (((sz) + 15) & ~15)
/* Tail call offset to jump into */
#define PROLOGUE_OFFSET 7
static int build_prologue(struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool ebpf_from_cbpf)
{
const struct bpf_prog *prog = ctx->prog;
const u8 r6 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_6];
const u8 r7 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_7];
const u8 r8 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_8];
const u8 r9 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_9];
const u8 fp = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_FP];
const u8 tcc = bpf2a64[TCALL_CNT];
const int idx0 = ctx->idx;
int cur_offset;
/*
* BPF prog stack layout
*
* high
* original A64_SP => 0:+-----+ BPF prologue
* |FP/LR|
* current A64_FP => -16:+-----+
* | ... | callee saved registers
* BPF fp register => -64:+-----+ <= (BPF_FP)
* | |
* | ... | BPF prog stack
* | |
* +-----+ <= (BPF_FP - prog->aux->stack_depth)
* |RSVD | padding
* current A64_SP => +-----+ <= (BPF_FP - ctx->stack_size)
* | |
* | ... | Function call stack
* | |
* +-----+
* low
*
*/
/* Save FP and LR registers to stay align with ARM64 AAPCS */
emit(A64_PUSH(A64_FP, A64_LR, A64_SP), ctx);
emit(A64_MOV(1, A64_FP, A64_SP), ctx);
/* Save callee-saved registers */
emit(A64_PUSH(r6, r7, A64_SP), ctx);
emit(A64_PUSH(r8, r9, A64_SP), ctx);
emit(A64_PUSH(fp, tcc, A64_SP), ctx);
/* Set up BPF prog stack base register */
emit(A64_MOV(1, fp, A64_SP), ctx);
if (!ebpf_from_cbpf) {
/* Initialize tail_call_cnt */
emit(A64_MOVZ(1, tcc, 0, 0), ctx);
cur_offset = ctx->idx - idx0;
if (cur_offset != PROLOGUE_OFFSET) {
pr_err_once("PROLOGUE_OFFSET = %d, expected %d!\n",
cur_offset, PROLOGUE_OFFSET);
return -1;
}
}
ctx->stack_size = STACK_ALIGN(prog->aux->stack_depth);
/* Set up function call stack */
emit(A64_SUB_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx);
return 0;
}
static int out_offset = -1; /* initialized on the first pass of build_body() */
static int emit_bpf_tail_call(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
/* bpf_tail_call(void *prog_ctx, struct bpf_array *array, u64 index) */
const u8 r2 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_2];
const u8 r3 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_3];
const u8 tmp = bpf2a64[TMP_REG_1];
const u8 prg = bpf2a64[TMP_REG_2];
const u8 tcc = bpf2a64[TCALL_CNT];
const int idx0 = ctx->idx;
#define cur_offset (ctx->idx - idx0)
#define jmp_offset (out_offset - (cur_offset))
size_t off;
/* if (index >= array->map.max_entries)
* goto out;
*/
off = offsetof(struct bpf_array, map.max_entries);
emit_a64_mov_i64(tmp, off, ctx);
emit(A64_LDR32(tmp, r2, tmp), ctx);
bpf, arm64: fix out of bounds access in tail call I recently noticed a crash on arm64 when feeding a bogus index into BPF tail call helper. The crash would not occur when the interpreter is used, but only in case of JIT. Output looks as follows: [ 347.007486] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffb850e96492510 [...] [ 347.043065] [fffb850e96492510] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 347.050205] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [...] [ 347.190829] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 347.196128] x11: fffc047ebe782800 x10: ffff808fd7d0fd10 [ 347.201427] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 347.206726] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 001c991738000000 [ 347.212025] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 000000000000ba5a [ 347.217325] x3 : 00000000000329c4 x2 : ffff808fd7cf0500 [ 347.222625] x1 : ffff808fd7d0fc00 x0 : ffff808fd7cf0500 [ 347.227926] Process test_verifier (pid: 4548, stack limit = 0x000000007467fa61) [ 347.235221] Call trace: [ 347.237656] 0xffff000002f3a4fc [ 347.240784] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 347.244260] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 347.248694] SyS_bpf+0x77c/0x1110 [ 347.251999] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 347.255564] Code: 9100075a d280220a 8b0a002a d37df04b (f86b694b) [...] In this case the index used in BPF r3 is the same as in r1 at the time of the call, meaning we fed a pointer as index; here, it had the value 0xffff808fd7cf0500 which sits in x2. While I found tail calls to be working in general (also for hitting the error cases), I noticed the following in the code emission: # bpftool p d j i 988 [...] 38: ldr w10, [x1,x10] 3c: cmp w2, w10 40: b.ge 0x000000000000007c <-- signed cmp 44: mov x10, #0x20 // #32 48: cmp x26, x10 4c: b.gt 0x000000000000007c 50: add x26, x26, #0x1 54: mov x10, #0x110 // #272 58: add x10, x1, x10 5c: lsl x11, x2, #3 60: ldr x11, [x10,x11] <-- faulting insn (f86b694b) 64: cbz x11, 0x000000000000007c [...] Meaning, the tests passed because commit ddb55992b04d ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") was using signed compares instead of unsigned which as a result had the test wrongly passing. Change this but also the tail call count test both into unsigned and cap the index as u32. Latter we did as well in 90caccdd8cc0 ("bpf: fix bpf_tail_call() x64 JIT") and is needed in addition here, too. Tested on HiSilicon Hi1616. Result after patch: # bpftool p d j i 268 [...] 38: ldr w10, [x1,x10] 3c: add w2, w2, #0x0 40: cmp w2, w10 44: b.cs 0x0000000000000080 48: mov x10, #0x20 // #32 4c: cmp x26, x10 50: b.hi 0x0000000000000080 54: add x26, x26, #0x1 58: mov x10, #0x110 // #272 5c: add x10, x1, x10 60: lsl x11, x2, #3 64: ldr x11, [x10,x11] 68: cbz x11, 0x0000000000000080 [...] Fixes: ddb55992b04d ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-02-23 07:03:43 +07:00
emit(A64_MOV(0, r3, r3), ctx);
emit(A64_CMP(0, r3, tmp), ctx);
bpf, arm64: fix out of bounds access in tail call I recently noticed a crash on arm64 when feeding a bogus index into BPF tail call helper. The crash would not occur when the interpreter is used, but only in case of JIT. Output looks as follows: [ 347.007486] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffb850e96492510 [...] [ 347.043065] [fffb850e96492510] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 347.050205] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [...] [ 347.190829] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 347.196128] x11: fffc047ebe782800 x10: ffff808fd7d0fd10 [ 347.201427] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 347.206726] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 001c991738000000 [ 347.212025] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 000000000000ba5a [ 347.217325] x3 : 00000000000329c4 x2 : ffff808fd7cf0500 [ 347.222625] x1 : ffff808fd7d0fc00 x0 : ffff808fd7cf0500 [ 347.227926] Process test_verifier (pid: 4548, stack limit = 0x000000007467fa61) [ 347.235221] Call trace: [ 347.237656] 0xffff000002f3a4fc [ 347.240784] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 347.244260] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 347.248694] SyS_bpf+0x77c/0x1110 [ 347.251999] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 347.255564] Code: 9100075a d280220a 8b0a002a d37df04b (f86b694b) [...] In this case the index used in BPF r3 is the same as in r1 at the time of the call, meaning we fed a pointer as index; here, it had the value 0xffff808fd7cf0500 which sits in x2. While I found tail calls to be working in general (also for hitting the error cases), I noticed the following in the code emission: # bpftool p d j i 988 [...] 38: ldr w10, [x1,x10] 3c: cmp w2, w10 40: b.ge 0x000000000000007c <-- signed cmp 44: mov x10, #0x20 // #32 48: cmp x26, x10 4c: b.gt 0x000000000000007c 50: add x26, x26, #0x1 54: mov x10, #0x110 // #272 58: add x10, x1, x10 5c: lsl x11, x2, #3 60: ldr x11, [x10,x11] <-- faulting insn (f86b694b) 64: cbz x11, 0x000000000000007c [...] Meaning, the tests passed because commit ddb55992b04d ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") was using signed compares instead of unsigned which as a result had the test wrongly passing. Change this but also the tail call count test both into unsigned and cap the index as u32. Latter we did as well in 90caccdd8cc0 ("bpf: fix bpf_tail_call() x64 JIT") and is needed in addition here, too. Tested on HiSilicon Hi1616. Result after patch: # bpftool p d j i 268 [...] 38: ldr w10, [x1,x10] 3c: add w2, w2, #0x0 40: cmp w2, w10 44: b.cs 0x0000000000000080 48: mov x10, #0x20 // #32 4c: cmp x26, x10 50: b.hi 0x0000000000000080 54: add x26, x26, #0x1 58: mov x10, #0x110 // #272 5c: add x10, x1, x10 60: lsl x11, x2, #3 64: ldr x11, [x10,x11] 68: cbz x11, 0x0000000000000080 [...] Fixes: ddb55992b04d ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-02-23 07:03:43 +07:00
emit(A64_B_(A64_COND_CS, jmp_offset), ctx);
/* if (tail_call_cnt > MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT)
* goto out;
* tail_call_cnt++;
*/
emit_a64_mov_i64(tmp, MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT, ctx);
emit(A64_CMP(1, tcc, tmp), ctx);
bpf, arm64: fix out of bounds access in tail call I recently noticed a crash on arm64 when feeding a bogus index into BPF tail call helper. The crash would not occur when the interpreter is used, but only in case of JIT. Output looks as follows: [ 347.007486] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffb850e96492510 [...] [ 347.043065] [fffb850e96492510] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 347.050205] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [...] [ 347.190829] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 347.196128] x11: fffc047ebe782800 x10: ffff808fd7d0fd10 [ 347.201427] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 347.206726] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 001c991738000000 [ 347.212025] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 000000000000ba5a [ 347.217325] x3 : 00000000000329c4 x2 : ffff808fd7cf0500 [ 347.222625] x1 : ffff808fd7d0fc00 x0 : ffff808fd7cf0500 [ 347.227926] Process test_verifier (pid: 4548, stack limit = 0x000000007467fa61) [ 347.235221] Call trace: [ 347.237656] 0xffff000002f3a4fc [ 347.240784] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 347.244260] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 347.248694] SyS_bpf+0x77c/0x1110 [ 347.251999] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 347.255564] Code: 9100075a d280220a 8b0a002a d37df04b (f86b694b) [...] In this case the index used in BPF r3 is the same as in r1 at the time of the call, meaning we fed a pointer as index; here, it had the value 0xffff808fd7cf0500 which sits in x2. While I found tail calls to be working in general (also for hitting the error cases), I noticed the following in the code emission: # bpftool p d j i 988 [...] 38: ldr w10, [x1,x10] 3c: cmp w2, w10 40: b.ge 0x000000000000007c <-- signed cmp 44: mov x10, #0x20 // #32 48: cmp x26, x10 4c: b.gt 0x000000000000007c 50: add x26, x26, #0x1 54: mov x10, #0x110 // #272 58: add x10, x1, x10 5c: lsl x11, x2, #3 60: ldr x11, [x10,x11] <-- faulting insn (f86b694b) 64: cbz x11, 0x000000000000007c [...] Meaning, the tests passed because commit ddb55992b04d ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") was using signed compares instead of unsigned which as a result had the test wrongly passing. Change this but also the tail call count test both into unsigned and cap the index as u32. Latter we did as well in 90caccdd8cc0 ("bpf: fix bpf_tail_call() x64 JIT") and is needed in addition here, too. Tested on HiSilicon Hi1616. Result after patch: # bpftool p d j i 268 [...] 38: ldr w10, [x1,x10] 3c: add w2, w2, #0x0 40: cmp w2, w10 44: b.cs 0x0000000000000080 48: mov x10, #0x20 // #32 4c: cmp x26, x10 50: b.hi 0x0000000000000080 54: add x26, x26, #0x1 58: mov x10, #0x110 // #272 5c: add x10, x1, x10 60: lsl x11, x2, #3 64: ldr x11, [x10,x11] 68: cbz x11, 0x0000000000000080 [...] Fixes: ddb55992b04d ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-02-23 07:03:43 +07:00
emit(A64_B_(A64_COND_HI, jmp_offset), ctx);
emit(A64_ADD_I(1, tcc, tcc, 1), ctx);
/* prog = array->ptrs[index];
* if (prog == NULL)
* goto out;
*/
off = offsetof(struct bpf_array, ptrs);
emit_a64_mov_i64(tmp, off, ctx);
bpf, arm64: fix faulty emission of map access in tail calls Shubham was recently asking on netdev why in arm64 JIT we don't multiply the index for accessing the tail call map by 8. That led me into testing out arm64 JIT wrt tail calls and it turned out I got a NULL pointer dereference on the tail call. The buggy access is at: prog = array->ptrs[index]; if (prog == NULL) goto out; [...] 00000060: d2800e0a mov x10, #0x70 // #112 00000064: f86a682a ldr x10, [x1,x10] 00000068: f862694b ldr x11, [x10,x2] 0000006c: b40000ab cbz x11, 0x00000080 [...] The code triggering the crash is f862694b. x1 at the time contains the address of the bpf array, x10 offsetof(struct bpf_array, ptrs). Meaning, above we load the pointer to the program at map slot 0 into x10. x10 can then be NULL if the slot is not occupied, which we later on try to access with a user given offset in x2 that is the map index. Fix this by emitting the following instead: [...] 00000060: d2800e0a mov x10, #0x70 // #112 00000064: 8b0a002a add x10, x1, x10 00000068: d37df04b lsl x11, x2, #3 0000006c: f86b694b ldr x11, [x10,x11] 00000070: b40000ab cbz x11, 0x00000084 [...] This basically adds the offset to ptrs to the base address of the bpf array we got and we later on access the map with an index * 8 offset relative to that. The tail call map itself is basically one large area with meta data at the head followed by the array of prog pointers. This makes tail calls working again, tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8. Fixes: ddb55992b04d ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") Reported-by: Shubham Bansal <illusionist.neo@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-11 06:53:15 +07:00
emit(A64_ADD(1, tmp, r2, tmp), ctx);
emit(A64_LSL(1, prg, r3, 3), ctx);
emit(A64_LDR64(prg, tmp, prg), ctx);
emit(A64_CBZ(1, prg, jmp_offset), ctx);
/* goto *(prog->bpf_func + prologue_offset); */
off = offsetof(struct bpf_prog, bpf_func);
emit_a64_mov_i64(tmp, off, ctx);
emit(A64_LDR64(tmp, prg, tmp), ctx);
emit(A64_ADD_I(1, tmp, tmp, sizeof(u32) * PROLOGUE_OFFSET), ctx);
emit(A64_ADD_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx);
emit(A64_BR(tmp), ctx);
/* out: */
if (out_offset == -1)
out_offset = cur_offset;
if (cur_offset != out_offset) {
pr_err_once("tail_call out_offset = %d, expected %d!\n",
cur_offset, out_offset);
return -1;
}
return 0;
#undef cur_offset
#undef jmp_offset
}
static void build_epilogue(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
const u8 r0 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_0];
const u8 r6 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_6];
const u8 r7 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_7];
const u8 r8 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_8];
const u8 r9 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_9];
const u8 fp = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_FP];
/* We're done with BPF stack */
emit(A64_ADD_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx);
/* Restore fs (x25) and x26 */
emit(A64_POP(fp, A64_R(26), A64_SP), ctx);
/* Restore callee-saved register */
emit(A64_POP(r8, r9, A64_SP), ctx);
emit(A64_POP(r6, r7, A64_SP), ctx);
/* Restore FP/LR registers */
emit(A64_POP(A64_FP, A64_LR, A64_SP), ctx);
/* Set return value */
emit(A64_MOV(1, A64_R(0), r0), ctx);
emit(A64_RET(A64_LR), ctx);
}
/* JITs an eBPF instruction.
* Returns:
* 0 - successfully JITed an 8-byte eBPF instruction.
* >0 - successfully JITed a 16-byte eBPF instruction.
* <0 - failed to JIT.
*/
static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx,
bool extra_pass)
{
const u8 code = insn->code;
const u8 dst = bpf2a64[insn->dst_reg];
const u8 src = bpf2a64[insn->src_reg];
const u8 tmp = bpf2a64[TMP_REG_1];
const u8 tmp2 = bpf2a64[TMP_REG_2];
const u8 tmp3 = bpf2a64[TMP_REG_3];
const s16 off = insn->off;
const s32 imm = insn->imm;
const int i = insn - ctx->prog->insnsi;
const bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_ALU64 ||
BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP;
bpf, arm64: implement jiting of BPF_XADD This work adds BPF_XADD for BPF_W/BPF_DW to the arm64 JIT and therefore completes JITing of all BPF instructions, meaning we can thus also remove the 'notyet' label and do not need to fall back to the interpreter when BPF_XADD is used in a program! This now also brings arm64 JIT in line with x86_64, s390x, ppc64, sparc64, where all current eBPF features are supported. BPF_W example from test_bpf: .u.insns_int = { BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MOV, R0, 0x12), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, R10, -40, 0x10), BPF_STX_XADD(BPF_W, R10, R0, -40), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, R0, R10, -40), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, [...] 00000020: 52800247 mov w7, #0x12 // #18 00000024: 928004eb mov x11, #0xffffffffffffffd8 // #-40 00000028: d280020a mov x10, #0x10 // #16 0000002c: b82b6b2a str w10, [x25,x11] // start of xadd mapping: 00000030: 928004ea mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffd8 // #-40 00000034: 8b19014a add x10, x10, x25 00000038: f9800151 prfm pstl1strm, [x10] 0000003c: 885f7d4b ldxr w11, [x10] 00000040: 0b07016b add w11, w11, w7 00000044: 880b7d4b stxr w11, w11, [x10] 00000048: 35ffffab cbnz w11, 0x0000003c // end of xadd mapping: [...] BPF_DW example from test_bpf: .u.insns_int = { BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MOV, R0, 0x12), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, R10, -40, 0x10), BPF_STX_XADD(BPF_DW, R10, R0, -40), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, R0, R10, -40), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, [...] 00000020: 52800247 mov w7, #0x12 // #18 00000024: 928004eb mov x11, #0xffffffffffffffd8 // #-40 00000028: d280020a mov x10, #0x10 // #16 0000002c: f82b6b2a str x10, [x25,x11] // start of xadd mapping: 00000030: 928004ea mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffd8 // #-40 00000034: 8b19014a add x10, x10, x25 00000038: f9800151 prfm pstl1strm, [x10] 0000003c: c85f7d4b ldxr x11, [x10] 00000040: 8b07016b add x11, x11, x7 00000044: c80b7d4b stxr w11, x11, [x10] 00000048: 35ffffab cbnz w11, 0x0000003c // end of xadd mapping: [...] Tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8, test suite results after the patch: No JIT: [ 3751.855362] test_bpf: Summary: 311 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [0/303 JIT'ed] With JIT: [ 3573.759527] test_bpf: Summary: 311 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [303/303 JIT'ed] Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-01 07:57:20 +07:00
const bool isdw = BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW;
u8 jmp_cond, reg;
s32 jmp_offset;
#define check_imm(bits, imm) do { \
if ((((imm) > 0) && ((imm) >> (bits))) || \
(((imm) < 0) && (~(imm) >> (bits)))) { \
pr_info("[%2d] imm=%d(0x%x) out of range\n", \
i, imm, imm); \
return -EINVAL; \
} \
} while (0)
#define check_imm19(imm) check_imm(19, imm)
#define check_imm26(imm) check_imm(26, imm)
switch (code) {
/* dst = src */
case BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X:
emit(A64_MOV(is64, dst, src), ctx);
break;
/* dst = dst OP src */
case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X:
emit(A64_ADD(is64, dst, dst, src), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_SUB | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X:
emit(A64_SUB(is64, dst, dst, src), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_AND | BPF_X:
emit(A64_AND(is64, dst, dst, src), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_OR | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_OR | BPF_X:
emit(A64_ORR(is64, dst, dst, src), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_XOR | BPF_X:
emit(A64_EOR(is64, dst, dst, src), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_MUL | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MUL | BPF_X:
emit(A64_MUL(is64, dst, dst, src), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X:
switch (BPF_OP(code)) {
case BPF_DIV:
emit(A64_UDIV(is64, dst, dst, src), ctx);
break;
case BPF_MOD:
emit(A64_UDIV(is64, tmp, dst, src), ctx);
emit(A64_MUL(is64, tmp, tmp, src), ctx);
emit(A64_SUB(is64, dst, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
}
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_LSH | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_LSH | BPF_X:
emit(A64_LSLV(is64, dst, dst, src), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_RSH | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_RSH | BPF_X:
emit(A64_LSRV(is64, dst, dst, src), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH | BPF_X:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ARSH | BPF_X:
emit(A64_ASRV(is64, dst, dst, src), ctx);
break;
/* dst = -dst */
case BPF_ALU | BPF_NEG:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_NEG:
emit(A64_NEG(is64, dst, dst), ctx);
break;
/* dst = BSWAP##imm(dst) */
case BPF_ALU | BPF_END | BPF_FROM_LE:
case BPF_ALU | BPF_END | BPF_FROM_BE:
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
if (BPF_SRC(code) == BPF_FROM_BE)
goto emit_bswap_uxt;
#else /* !CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN */
if (BPF_SRC(code) == BPF_FROM_LE)
goto emit_bswap_uxt;
#endif
switch (imm) {
case 16:
emit(A64_REV16(is64, dst, dst), ctx);
/* zero-extend 16 bits into 64 bits */
emit(A64_UXTH(is64, dst, dst), ctx);
break;
case 32:
emit(A64_REV32(is64, dst, dst), ctx);
/* upper 32 bits already cleared */
break;
case 64:
emit(A64_REV64(dst, dst), ctx);
break;
}
break;
emit_bswap_uxt:
switch (imm) {
case 16:
/* zero-extend 16 bits into 64 bits */
emit(A64_UXTH(is64, dst, dst), ctx);
break;
case 32:
/* zero-extend 32 bits into 64 bits */
emit(A64_UXTW(is64, dst, dst), ctx);
break;
case 64:
/* nop */
break;
}
break;
/* dst = imm */
case BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_K:
emit_a64_mov_i(is64, dst, imm, ctx);
break;
/* dst = dst OP imm */
case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_K:
emit_a64_mov_i(is64, tmp, imm, ctx);
emit(A64_ADD(is64, dst, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_SUB | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_K:
emit_a64_mov_i(is64, tmp, imm, ctx);
emit(A64_SUB(is64, dst, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_AND | BPF_K:
emit_a64_mov_i(is64, tmp, imm, ctx);
emit(A64_AND(is64, dst, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_OR | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_OR | BPF_K:
emit_a64_mov_i(is64, tmp, imm, ctx);
emit(A64_ORR(is64, dst, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_XOR | BPF_K:
emit_a64_mov_i(is64, tmp, imm, ctx);
emit(A64_EOR(is64, dst, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_MUL | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MUL | BPF_K:
emit_a64_mov_i(is64, tmp, imm, ctx);
emit(A64_MUL(is64, dst, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K:
emit_a64_mov_i(is64, tmp, imm, ctx);
emit(A64_UDIV(is64, dst, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K:
emit_a64_mov_i(is64, tmp2, imm, ctx);
emit(A64_UDIV(is64, tmp, dst, tmp2), ctx);
emit(A64_MUL(is64, tmp, tmp, tmp2), ctx);
emit(A64_SUB(is64, dst, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_LSH | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_LSH | BPF_K:
emit(A64_LSL(is64, dst, dst, imm), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_RSH | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_RSH | BPF_K:
emit(A64_LSR(is64, dst, dst, imm), ctx);
break;
case BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ARSH | BPF_K:
emit(A64_ASR(is64, dst, dst, imm), ctx);
break;
/* JUMP off */
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JA:
jmp_offset = bpf2a64_offset(i + off, i, ctx);
check_imm26(jmp_offset);
emit(A64_B(jmp_offset), ctx);
break;
/* IF (dst COND src) JUMP off */
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JLT | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JLE | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JNE | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSGT | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSLT | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSGE | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSLE | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JEQ | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JGT | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JLT | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JGE | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JLE | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JNE | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSGT | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSLT | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSGE | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSLE | BPF_X:
emit(A64_CMP(is64, dst, src), ctx);
emit_cond_jmp:
jmp_offset = bpf2a64_offset(i + off, i, ctx);
check_imm19(jmp_offset);
switch (BPF_OP(code)) {
case BPF_JEQ:
jmp_cond = A64_COND_EQ;
break;
case BPF_JGT:
jmp_cond = A64_COND_HI;
break;
case BPF_JLT:
jmp_cond = A64_COND_CC;
break;
case BPF_JGE:
jmp_cond = A64_COND_CS;
break;
case BPF_JLE:
jmp_cond = A64_COND_LS;
break;
case BPF_JSET:
case BPF_JNE:
jmp_cond = A64_COND_NE;
break;
case BPF_JSGT:
jmp_cond = A64_COND_GT;
break;
case BPF_JSLT:
jmp_cond = A64_COND_LT;
break;
case BPF_JSGE:
jmp_cond = A64_COND_GE;
break;
case BPF_JSLE:
jmp_cond = A64_COND_LE;
break;
default:
return -EFAULT;
}
emit(A64_B_(jmp_cond, jmp_offset), ctx);
break;
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_X:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSET | BPF_X:
emit(A64_TST(is64, dst, src), ctx);
goto emit_cond_jmp;
/* IF (dst COND imm) JUMP off */
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JLT | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JLE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JNE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSGT | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSLT | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSGE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSLE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JGT | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JLT | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JGE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JLE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JNE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSGT | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSLT | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSGE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSLE | BPF_K:
emit_a64_mov_i(is64, tmp, imm, ctx);
emit(A64_CMP(is64, dst, tmp), ctx);
goto emit_cond_jmp;
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSET | BPF_K:
emit_a64_mov_i(is64, tmp, imm, ctx);
emit(A64_TST(is64, dst, tmp), ctx);
goto emit_cond_jmp;
/* function call */
case BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL:
{
const u8 r0 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_0];
bool func_addr_fixed;
u64 func_addr;
int ret;
ret = bpf_jit_get_func_addr(ctx->prog, insn, extra_pass,
&func_addr, &func_addr_fixed);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
emit_addr_mov_i64(tmp, func_addr, ctx);
emit(A64_BLR(tmp), ctx);
emit(A64_MOV(1, r0, A64_R(0)), ctx);
break;
}
/* tail call */
case BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL:
if (emit_bpf_tail_call(ctx))
return -EFAULT;
break;
/* function return */
case BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT:
/* Optimization: when last instruction is EXIT,
simply fallthrough to epilogue. */
if (i == ctx->prog->len - 1)
break;
jmp_offset = epilogue_offset(ctx);
check_imm26(jmp_offset);
emit(A64_B(jmp_offset), ctx);
break;
/* dst = imm64 */
case BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW:
{
const struct bpf_insn insn1 = insn[1];
u64 imm64;
imm64 = (u64)insn1.imm << 32 | (u32)imm;
emit_a64_mov_i64(dst, imm64, ctx);
return 1;
}
/* LDX: dst = *(size *)(src + off) */
case BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W:
case BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H:
case BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B:
case BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW:
emit_a64_mov_i(1, tmp, off, ctx);
switch (BPF_SIZE(code)) {
case BPF_W:
emit(A64_LDR32(dst, src, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_H:
emit(A64_LDRH(dst, src, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_B:
emit(A64_LDRB(dst, src, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_DW:
emit(A64_LDR64(dst, src, tmp), ctx);
break;
}
break;
/* ST: *(size *)(dst + off) = imm */
case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W:
case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H:
case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B:
case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW:
/* Load imm to a register then store it */
emit_a64_mov_i(1, tmp2, off, ctx);
emit_a64_mov_i(1, tmp, imm, ctx);
switch (BPF_SIZE(code)) {
case BPF_W:
emit(A64_STR32(tmp, dst, tmp2), ctx);
break;
case BPF_H:
emit(A64_STRH(tmp, dst, tmp2), ctx);
break;
case BPF_B:
emit(A64_STRB(tmp, dst, tmp2), ctx);
break;
case BPF_DW:
emit(A64_STR64(tmp, dst, tmp2), ctx);
break;
}
break;
/* STX: *(size *)(dst + off) = src */
case BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W:
case BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H:
case BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B:
case BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW:
emit_a64_mov_i(1, tmp, off, ctx);
switch (BPF_SIZE(code)) {
case BPF_W:
emit(A64_STR32(src, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_H:
emit(A64_STRH(src, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_B:
emit(A64_STRB(src, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
case BPF_DW:
emit(A64_STR64(src, dst, tmp), ctx);
break;
}
break;
/* STX XADD: lock *(u32 *)(dst + off) += src */
case BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_W:
/* STX XADD: lock *(u64 *)(dst + off) += src */
case BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_DW:
if (!off) {
reg = dst;
} else {
emit_a64_mov_i(1, tmp, off, ctx);
emit(A64_ADD(1, tmp, tmp, dst), ctx);
reg = tmp;
}
if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_HAS_LSE_ATOMICS)) {
emit(A64_STADD(isdw, reg, src), ctx);
} else {
emit(A64_LDXR(isdw, tmp2, reg), ctx);
emit(A64_ADD(isdw, tmp2, tmp2, src), ctx);
emit(A64_STXR(isdw, tmp2, reg, tmp3), ctx);
jmp_offset = -3;
check_imm19(jmp_offset);
emit(A64_CBNZ(0, tmp3, jmp_offset), ctx);
}
bpf, arm64: implement jiting of BPF_XADD This work adds BPF_XADD for BPF_W/BPF_DW to the arm64 JIT and therefore completes JITing of all BPF instructions, meaning we can thus also remove the 'notyet' label and do not need to fall back to the interpreter when BPF_XADD is used in a program! This now also brings arm64 JIT in line with x86_64, s390x, ppc64, sparc64, where all current eBPF features are supported. BPF_W example from test_bpf: .u.insns_int = { BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MOV, R0, 0x12), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, R10, -40, 0x10), BPF_STX_XADD(BPF_W, R10, R0, -40), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, R0, R10, -40), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, [...] 00000020: 52800247 mov w7, #0x12 // #18 00000024: 928004eb mov x11, #0xffffffffffffffd8 // #-40 00000028: d280020a mov x10, #0x10 // #16 0000002c: b82b6b2a str w10, [x25,x11] // start of xadd mapping: 00000030: 928004ea mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffd8 // #-40 00000034: 8b19014a add x10, x10, x25 00000038: f9800151 prfm pstl1strm, [x10] 0000003c: 885f7d4b ldxr w11, [x10] 00000040: 0b07016b add w11, w11, w7 00000044: 880b7d4b stxr w11, w11, [x10] 00000048: 35ffffab cbnz w11, 0x0000003c // end of xadd mapping: [...] BPF_DW example from test_bpf: .u.insns_int = { BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MOV, R0, 0x12), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, R10, -40, 0x10), BPF_STX_XADD(BPF_DW, R10, R0, -40), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, R0, R10, -40), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, [...] 00000020: 52800247 mov w7, #0x12 // #18 00000024: 928004eb mov x11, #0xffffffffffffffd8 // #-40 00000028: d280020a mov x10, #0x10 // #16 0000002c: f82b6b2a str x10, [x25,x11] // start of xadd mapping: 00000030: 928004ea mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffd8 // #-40 00000034: 8b19014a add x10, x10, x25 00000038: f9800151 prfm pstl1strm, [x10] 0000003c: c85f7d4b ldxr x11, [x10] 00000040: 8b07016b add x11, x11, x7 00000044: c80b7d4b stxr w11, x11, [x10] 00000048: 35ffffab cbnz w11, 0x0000003c // end of xadd mapping: [...] Tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8, test suite results after the patch: No JIT: [ 3751.855362] test_bpf: Summary: 311 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [0/303 JIT'ed] With JIT: [ 3573.759527] test_bpf: Summary: 311 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [303/303 JIT'ed] Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-01 07:57:20 +07:00
break;
default:
pr_err_once("unknown opcode %02x\n", code);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
static int build_body(struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool extra_pass)
{
const struct bpf_prog *prog = ctx->prog;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
const struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
int ret;
ret = build_insn(insn, ctx, extra_pass);
if (ret > 0) {
i++;
bpf, arm64: fix jit branch offset related to ldimm64 When the instruction right before the branch destination is a 64 bit load immediate, we currently calculate the wrong jump offset in the ctx->offset[] array as we only account one instruction slot for the 64 bit load immediate although it uses two BPF instructions. Fix it up by setting the offset into the right slot after we incremented the index. Before (ldimm64 test 1): [...] 00000020: 52800007 mov w7, #0x0 // #0 00000024: d2800060 mov x0, #0x3 // #3 00000028: d2800041 mov x1, #0x2 // #2 0000002c: eb01001f cmp x0, x1 00000030: 54ffff82 b.cs 0x00000020 00000034: d29fffe7 mov x7, #0xffff // #65535 00000038: f2bfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #16 0000003c: f2dfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #32 00000040: f2ffffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #48 00000044: d29dddc7 mov x7, #0xeeee // #61166 00000048: f2bdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #16 0000004c: f2ddddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #32 00000050: f2fdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #48 [...] After (ldimm64 test 1): [...] 00000020: 52800007 mov w7, #0x0 // #0 00000024: d2800060 mov x0, #0x3 // #3 00000028: d2800041 mov x1, #0x2 // #2 0000002c: eb01001f cmp x0, x1 00000030: 540000a2 b.cs 0x00000044 00000034: d29fffe7 mov x7, #0xffff // #65535 00000038: f2bfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #16 0000003c: f2dfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #32 00000040: f2ffffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #48 00000044: d29dddc7 mov x7, #0xeeee // #61166 00000048: f2bdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #16 0000004c: f2ddddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #32 00000050: f2fdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #48 [...] Also, add a couple of test cases to make sure JITs pass this test. Tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8. The added test cases all pass after the fix. Fixes: 8eee539ddea0 ("arm64: bpf: fix out-of-bounds read in bpf2a64_offset()") Reported-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-03 01:34:54 +07:00
if (ctx->image == NULL)
ctx->offset[i] = ctx->idx;
continue;
}
bpf, arm64: fix jit branch offset related to ldimm64 When the instruction right before the branch destination is a 64 bit load immediate, we currently calculate the wrong jump offset in the ctx->offset[] array as we only account one instruction slot for the 64 bit load immediate although it uses two BPF instructions. Fix it up by setting the offset into the right slot after we incremented the index. Before (ldimm64 test 1): [...] 00000020: 52800007 mov w7, #0x0 // #0 00000024: d2800060 mov x0, #0x3 // #3 00000028: d2800041 mov x1, #0x2 // #2 0000002c: eb01001f cmp x0, x1 00000030: 54ffff82 b.cs 0x00000020 00000034: d29fffe7 mov x7, #0xffff // #65535 00000038: f2bfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #16 0000003c: f2dfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #32 00000040: f2ffffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #48 00000044: d29dddc7 mov x7, #0xeeee // #61166 00000048: f2bdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #16 0000004c: f2ddddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #32 00000050: f2fdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #48 [...] After (ldimm64 test 1): [...] 00000020: 52800007 mov w7, #0x0 // #0 00000024: d2800060 mov x0, #0x3 // #3 00000028: d2800041 mov x1, #0x2 // #2 0000002c: eb01001f cmp x0, x1 00000030: 540000a2 b.cs 0x00000044 00000034: d29fffe7 mov x7, #0xffff // #65535 00000038: f2bfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #16 0000003c: f2dfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #32 00000040: f2ffffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #48 00000044: d29dddc7 mov x7, #0xeeee // #61166 00000048: f2bdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #16 0000004c: f2ddddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #32 00000050: f2fdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #48 [...] Also, add a couple of test cases to make sure JITs pass this test. Tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8. The added test cases all pass after the fix. Fixes: 8eee539ddea0 ("arm64: bpf: fix out-of-bounds read in bpf2a64_offset()") Reported-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-03 01:34:54 +07:00
if (ctx->image == NULL)
ctx->offset[i] = ctx->idx;
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
static int validate_code(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->idx; i++) {
u32 a64_insn = le32_to_cpu(ctx->image[i]);
if (a64_insn == AARCH64_BREAK_FAULT)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static inline void bpf_flush_icache(void *start, void *end)
{
flush_icache_range((unsigned long)start, (unsigned long)end);
}
struct arm64_jit_data {
struct bpf_binary_header *header;
u8 *image;
struct jit_ctx ctx;
};
struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
struct bpf_prog *tmp, *orig_prog = prog;
net: bpf: arm64: address randomize and write protect JIT code This is the ARM64 variant for 314beb9bcab ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). Thanks to commit 11d91a770f1f ("arm64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX support") which added necessary infrastructure, we can now implement RO marking of eBPF generated JIT image pages and randomize start offset for the JIT code, so that it does not reside directly on a page boundary anymore. Likewise, the holes are filled with illegal instructions: here we use BRK #0x100 (opcode 0xd4202000) to trigger a fault in the kernel (unallocated BRKs would trigger a fault through do_debug_exception). This seems more reliable as we don't have a guaranteed undefined instruction space on ARM64. This is basically the ARM64 variant of what we already have in ARM via commit 55309dd3d4cd ("net: bpf: arm: address randomize and write protect JIT code"). Moreover, this commit also presents a merge resolution due to conflicts with commit 60a3b2253c41 ("net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only") as we don't use kfree() in bpf_jit_free() anymore to release the locked bpf_prog structure, but instead bpf_prog_unlock_free() through a different allocator. JIT tested on aarch64 with BPF test suite. Reference: http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2014-09-16 14:48:50 +07:00
struct bpf_binary_header *header;
struct arm64_jit_data *jit_data;
bool was_classic = bpf_prog_was_classic(prog);
bool tmp_blinded = false;
bool extra_pass = false;
struct jit_ctx ctx;
int image_size;
net: bpf: arm64: address randomize and write protect JIT code This is the ARM64 variant for 314beb9bcab ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). Thanks to commit 11d91a770f1f ("arm64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX support") which added necessary infrastructure, we can now implement RO marking of eBPF generated JIT image pages and randomize start offset for the JIT code, so that it does not reside directly on a page boundary anymore. Likewise, the holes are filled with illegal instructions: here we use BRK #0x100 (opcode 0xd4202000) to trigger a fault in the kernel (unallocated BRKs would trigger a fault through do_debug_exception). This seems more reliable as we don't have a guaranteed undefined instruction space on ARM64. This is basically the ARM64 variant of what we already have in ARM via commit 55309dd3d4cd ("net: bpf: arm: address randomize and write protect JIT code"). Moreover, this commit also presents a merge resolution due to conflicts with commit 60a3b2253c41 ("net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only") as we don't use kfree() in bpf_jit_free() anymore to release the locked bpf_prog structure, but instead bpf_prog_unlock_free() through a different allocator. JIT tested on aarch64 with BPF test suite. Reference: http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2014-09-16 14:48:50 +07:00
u8 *image_ptr;
if (!prog->jit_requested)
return orig_prog;
tmp = bpf_jit_blind_constants(prog);
/* If blinding was requested and we failed during blinding,
* we must fall back to the interpreter.
*/
if (IS_ERR(tmp))
return orig_prog;
if (tmp != prog) {
tmp_blinded = true;
prog = tmp;
}
jit_data = prog->aux->jit_data;
if (!jit_data) {
jit_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*jit_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!jit_data) {
prog = orig_prog;
goto out;
}
prog->aux->jit_data = jit_data;
}
if (jit_data->ctx.offset) {
ctx = jit_data->ctx;
image_ptr = jit_data->image;
header = jit_data->header;
extra_pass = true;
image_size = sizeof(u32) * ctx.idx;
goto skip_init_ctx;
}
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.prog = prog;
ctx.offset = kcalloc(prog->len, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctx.offset == NULL) {
prog = orig_prog;
goto out_off;
}
/* 1. Initial fake pass to compute ctx->idx. */
/* Fake pass to fill in ctx->offset. */
if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass)) {
prog = orig_prog;
goto out_off;
}
if (build_prologue(&ctx, was_classic)) {
prog = orig_prog;
goto out_off;
}
ctx.epilogue_offset = ctx.idx;
build_epilogue(&ctx);
/* Now we know the actual image size. */
image_size = sizeof(u32) * ctx.idx;
net: bpf: arm64: address randomize and write protect JIT code This is the ARM64 variant for 314beb9bcab ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). Thanks to commit 11d91a770f1f ("arm64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX support") which added necessary infrastructure, we can now implement RO marking of eBPF generated JIT image pages and randomize start offset for the JIT code, so that it does not reside directly on a page boundary anymore. Likewise, the holes are filled with illegal instructions: here we use BRK #0x100 (opcode 0xd4202000) to trigger a fault in the kernel (unallocated BRKs would trigger a fault through do_debug_exception). This seems more reliable as we don't have a guaranteed undefined instruction space on ARM64. This is basically the ARM64 variant of what we already have in ARM via commit 55309dd3d4cd ("net: bpf: arm: address randomize and write protect JIT code"). Moreover, this commit also presents a merge resolution due to conflicts with commit 60a3b2253c41 ("net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only") as we don't use kfree() in bpf_jit_free() anymore to release the locked bpf_prog structure, but instead bpf_prog_unlock_free() through a different allocator. JIT tested on aarch64 with BPF test suite. Reference: http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2014-09-16 14:48:50 +07:00
header = bpf_jit_binary_alloc(image_size, &image_ptr,
sizeof(u32), jit_fill_hole);
if (header == NULL) {
prog = orig_prog;
goto out_off;
}
/* 2. Now, the actual pass. */
ctx.image = (__le32 *)image_ptr;
skip_init_ctx:
ctx.idx = 0;
net: bpf: arm64: address randomize and write protect JIT code This is the ARM64 variant for 314beb9bcab ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). Thanks to commit 11d91a770f1f ("arm64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX support") which added necessary infrastructure, we can now implement RO marking of eBPF generated JIT image pages and randomize start offset for the JIT code, so that it does not reside directly on a page boundary anymore. Likewise, the holes are filled with illegal instructions: here we use BRK #0x100 (opcode 0xd4202000) to trigger a fault in the kernel (unallocated BRKs would trigger a fault through do_debug_exception). This seems more reliable as we don't have a guaranteed undefined instruction space on ARM64. This is basically the ARM64 variant of what we already have in ARM via commit 55309dd3d4cd ("net: bpf: arm: address randomize and write protect JIT code"). Moreover, this commit also presents a merge resolution due to conflicts with commit 60a3b2253c41 ("net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only") as we don't use kfree() in bpf_jit_free() anymore to release the locked bpf_prog structure, but instead bpf_prog_unlock_free() through a different allocator. JIT tested on aarch64 with BPF test suite. Reference: http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2014-09-16 14:48:50 +07:00
build_prologue(&ctx, was_classic);
if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass)) {
net: bpf: arm64: address randomize and write protect JIT code This is the ARM64 variant for 314beb9bcab ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). Thanks to commit 11d91a770f1f ("arm64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX support") which added necessary infrastructure, we can now implement RO marking of eBPF generated JIT image pages and randomize start offset for the JIT code, so that it does not reside directly on a page boundary anymore. Likewise, the holes are filled with illegal instructions: here we use BRK #0x100 (opcode 0xd4202000) to trigger a fault in the kernel (unallocated BRKs would trigger a fault through do_debug_exception). This seems more reliable as we don't have a guaranteed undefined instruction space on ARM64. This is basically the ARM64 variant of what we already have in ARM via commit 55309dd3d4cd ("net: bpf: arm: address randomize and write protect JIT code"). Moreover, this commit also presents a merge resolution due to conflicts with commit 60a3b2253c41 ("net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only") as we don't use kfree() in bpf_jit_free() anymore to release the locked bpf_prog structure, but instead bpf_prog_unlock_free() through a different allocator. JIT tested on aarch64 with BPF test suite. Reference: http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2014-09-16 14:48:50 +07:00
bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
prog = orig_prog;
goto out_off;
}
build_epilogue(&ctx);
/* 3. Extra pass to validate JITed code. */
if (validate_code(&ctx)) {
bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
prog = orig_prog;
goto out_off;
}
/* And we're done. */
if (bpf_jit_enable > 1)
bpf_jit_dump(prog->len, image_size, 2, ctx.image);
bpf_flush_icache(header, ctx.image + ctx.idx);
net: bpf: arm64: address randomize and write protect JIT code This is the ARM64 variant for 314beb9bcab ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). Thanks to commit 11d91a770f1f ("arm64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX support") which added necessary infrastructure, we can now implement RO marking of eBPF generated JIT image pages and randomize start offset for the JIT code, so that it does not reside directly on a page boundary anymore. Likewise, the holes are filled with illegal instructions: here we use BRK #0x100 (opcode 0xd4202000) to trigger a fault in the kernel (unallocated BRKs would trigger a fault through do_debug_exception). This seems more reliable as we don't have a guaranteed undefined instruction space on ARM64. This is basically the ARM64 variant of what we already have in ARM via commit 55309dd3d4cd ("net: bpf: arm: address randomize and write protect JIT code"). Moreover, this commit also presents a merge resolution due to conflicts with commit 60a3b2253c41 ("net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only") as we don't use kfree() in bpf_jit_free() anymore to release the locked bpf_prog structure, but instead bpf_prog_unlock_free() through a different allocator. JIT tested on aarch64 with BPF test suite. Reference: http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2014-09-16 14:48:50 +07:00
if (!prog->is_func || extra_pass) {
if (extra_pass && ctx.idx != jit_data->ctx.idx) {
pr_err_once("multi-func JIT bug %d != %d\n",
ctx.idx, jit_data->ctx.idx);
bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
prog->bpf_func = NULL;
prog->jited = 0;
goto out_off;
}
bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro(header);
} else {
jit_data->ctx = ctx;
jit_data->image = image_ptr;
jit_data->header = header;
}
prog->bpf_func = (void *)ctx.image;
prog->jited = 1;
prog->jited_len = image_size;
if (!prog->is_func || extra_pass) {
bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo(prog, ctx.offset);
out_off:
kfree(ctx.offset);
kfree(jit_data);
prog->aux->jit_data = NULL;
}
out:
if (tmp_blinded)
bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, prog == orig_prog ?
tmp : orig_prog);
return prog;
}
void *bpf_jit_alloc_exec(unsigned long size)
{
return __vmalloc_node_range(size, PAGE_SIZE, BPF_JIT_REGION_START,
BPF_JIT_REGION_END, GFP_KERNEL,
PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC, 0, NUMA_NO_NODE,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
void bpf_jit_free_exec(void *addr)
{
return vfree(addr);
}