2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* fs/verity/enable.c: ioctl to enable verity on a file
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "fsverity_private.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <crypto/hash.h>
|
fs-verity: implement readahead of Merkle tree pages
When fs-verity verifies data pages, currently it reads each Merkle tree
page synchronously using read_mapping_page().
Therefore, when the Merkle tree pages aren't already cached, fs-verity
causes an extra 4 KiB I/O request for every 512 KiB of data (assuming
that the Merkle tree uses SHA-256 and 4 KiB blocks). This results in
more I/O requests and performance loss than is strictly necessary.
Therefore, implement readahead of the Merkle tree pages.
For simplicity, we take advantage of the fact that the kernel already
does readahead of the file's *data*, just like it does for any other
file. Due to this, we don't really need a separate readahead state
(struct file_ra_state) just for the Merkle tree, but rather we just need
to piggy-back on the existing data readahead requests.
We also only really need to bother with the first level of the Merkle
tree, since the usual fan-out factor is 128, so normally over 99% of
Merkle tree I/O requests are for the first level.
Therefore, make fsverity_verify_bio() enable readahead of the first
Merkle tree level, for up to 1/4 the number of pages in the bio, when it
sees that the REQ_RAHEAD flag is set on the bio. The readahead size is
then passed down to ->read_merkle_tree_page() for the filesystem to
(optionally) implement if it sees that the requested page is uncached.
While we're at it, also make build_merkle_tree_level() set the Merkle
tree readahead size, since it's easy to do there.
However, for now don't set the readahead size in fsverity_verify_page(),
since currently it's only used to verify holes on ext4 and f2fs, and it
would need parameters added to know how much to read ahead.
This patch significantly improves fs-verity sequential read performance.
Some quick benchmarks with 'cat'-ing a 250MB file after dropping caches:
On an ARM64 phone (using sha256-ce):
Before: 217 MB/s
After: 263 MB/s
(compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 357 MB/s)
In an x86_64 VM (using sha256-avx2):
Before: 173 MB/s
After: 215 MB/s
(compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 223 MB/s)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200106205533.137005-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-01-07 03:55:33 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/mount.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-07 03:54:10 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Read a file data page for Merkle tree construction. Do aggressive readahead,
|
|
|
|
* since we're sequentially reading the entire file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static struct page *read_file_data_page(struct file *filp, pgoff_t index,
|
|
|
|
struct file_ra_state *ra,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long remaining_pages)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct page *page;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
page = find_get_page_flags(filp->f_mapping, index, FGP_ACCESSED);
|
|
|
|
if (!page || !PageUptodate(page)) {
|
|
|
|
if (page)
|
|
|
|
put_page(page);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
page_cache_sync_readahead(filp->f_mapping, ra, filp,
|
|
|
|
index, remaining_pages);
|
|
|
|
page = read_mapping_page(filp->f_mapping, index, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(page))
|
|
|
|
return page;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PageReadahead(page))
|
|
|
|
page_cache_async_readahead(filp->f_mapping, ra, filp, page,
|
|
|
|
index, remaining_pages);
|
|
|
|
return page;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int build_merkle_tree_level(struct file *filp, unsigned int level,
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
u64 num_blocks_to_hash,
|
|
|
|
const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
|
|
|
|
u8 *pending_hashes,
|
|
|
|
struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-01-07 03:54:10 +07:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop;
|
2020-01-07 03:54:10 +07:00
|
|
|
struct file_ra_state ra = { 0 };
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned int pending_size = 0;
|
|
|
|
u64 dst_block_num;
|
|
|
|
u64 i;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE)) /* checked earlier too */
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (level < params->num_levels) {
|
|
|
|
dst_block_num = params->level_start[level];
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(num_blocks_to_hash != 1))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
dst_block_num = 0; /* unused */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-07 03:54:10 +07:00
|
|
|
file_ra_state_init(&ra, filp->f_mapping);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_blocks_to_hash; i++) {
|
|
|
|
struct page *src_page;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((pgoff_t)i % 10000 == 0 || i + 1 == num_blocks_to_hash)
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("Hashing block %llu of %llu for level %u\n",
|
|
|
|
i + 1, num_blocks_to_hash, level);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (level == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Leaf: hashing a data block */
|
2020-01-07 03:54:10 +07:00
|
|
|
src_page = read_file_data_page(filp, i, &ra,
|
|
|
|
num_blocks_to_hash - i);
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(src_page)) {
|
|
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(src_page);
|
|
|
|
fsverity_err(inode,
|
|
|
|
"Error %d reading data page %llu",
|
|
|
|
err, i);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
fs-verity: implement readahead of Merkle tree pages
When fs-verity verifies data pages, currently it reads each Merkle tree
page synchronously using read_mapping_page().
Therefore, when the Merkle tree pages aren't already cached, fs-verity
causes an extra 4 KiB I/O request for every 512 KiB of data (assuming
that the Merkle tree uses SHA-256 and 4 KiB blocks). This results in
more I/O requests and performance loss than is strictly necessary.
Therefore, implement readahead of the Merkle tree pages.
For simplicity, we take advantage of the fact that the kernel already
does readahead of the file's *data*, just like it does for any other
file. Due to this, we don't really need a separate readahead state
(struct file_ra_state) just for the Merkle tree, but rather we just need
to piggy-back on the existing data readahead requests.
We also only really need to bother with the first level of the Merkle
tree, since the usual fan-out factor is 128, so normally over 99% of
Merkle tree I/O requests are for the first level.
Therefore, make fsverity_verify_bio() enable readahead of the first
Merkle tree level, for up to 1/4 the number of pages in the bio, when it
sees that the REQ_RAHEAD flag is set on the bio. The readahead size is
then passed down to ->read_merkle_tree_page() for the filesystem to
(optionally) implement if it sees that the requested page is uncached.
While we're at it, also make build_merkle_tree_level() set the Merkle
tree readahead size, since it's easy to do there.
However, for now don't set the readahead size in fsverity_verify_page(),
since currently it's only used to verify holes on ext4 and f2fs, and it
would need parameters added to know how much to read ahead.
This patch significantly improves fs-verity sequential read performance.
Some quick benchmarks with 'cat'-ing a 250MB file after dropping caches:
On an ARM64 phone (using sha256-ce):
Before: 217 MB/s
After: 263 MB/s
(compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 357 MB/s)
In an x86_64 VM (using sha256-avx2):
Before: 173 MB/s
After: 215 MB/s
(compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 223 MB/s)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200106205533.137005-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-01-07 03:55:33 +07:00
|
|
|
unsigned long num_ra_pages =
|
|
|
|
min_t(unsigned long, num_blocks_to_hash - i,
|
|
|
|
inode->i_sb->s_bdi->io_pages);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Non-leaf: hashing hash block from level below */
|
|
|
|
src_page = vops->read_merkle_tree_page(inode,
|
fs-verity: implement readahead of Merkle tree pages
When fs-verity verifies data pages, currently it reads each Merkle tree
page synchronously using read_mapping_page().
Therefore, when the Merkle tree pages aren't already cached, fs-verity
causes an extra 4 KiB I/O request for every 512 KiB of data (assuming
that the Merkle tree uses SHA-256 and 4 KiB blocks). This results in
more I/O requests and performance loss than is strictly necessary.
Therefore, implement readahead of the Merkle tree pages.
For simplicity, we take advantage of the fact that the kernel already
does readahead of the file's *data*, just like it does for any other
file. Due to this, we don't really need a separate readahead state
(struct file_ra_state) just for the Merkle tree, but rather we just need
to piggy-back on the existing data readahead requests.
We also only really need to bother with the first level of the Merkle
tree, since the usual fan-out factor is 128, so normally over 99% of
Merkle tree I/O requests are for the first level.
Therefore, make fsverity_verify_bio() enable readahead of the first
Merkle tree level, for up to 1/4 the number of pages in the bio, when it
sees that the REQ_RAHEAD flag is set on the bio. The readahead size is
then passed down to ->read_merkle_tree_page() for the filesystem to
(optionally) implement if it sees that the requested page is uncached.
While we're at it, also make build_merkle_tree_level() set the Merkle
tree readahead size, since it's easy to do there.
However, for now don't set the readahead size in fsverity_verify_page(),
since currently it's only used to verify holes on ext4 and f2fs, and it
would need parameters added to know how much to read ahead.
This patch significantly improves fs-verity sequential read performance.
Some quick benchmarks with 'cat'-ing a 250MB file after dropping caches:
On an ARM64 phone (using sha256-ce):
Before: 217 MB/s
After: 263 MB/s
(compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 357 MB/s)
In an x86_64 VM (using sha256-avx2):
Before: 173 MB/s
After: 215 MB/s
(compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 223 MB/s)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200106205533.137005-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-01-07 03:55:33 +07:00
|
|
|
params->level_start[level - 1] + i,
|
|
|
|
num_ra_pages);
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(src_page)) {
|
|
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(src_page);
|
|
|
|
fsverity_err(inode,
|
|
|
|
"Error %d reading Merkle tree page %llu",
|
|
|
|
err, params->level_start[level - 1] + i);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, src_page,
|
|
|
|
&pending_hashes[pending_size]);
|
|
|
|
put_page(src_page);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
pending_size += params->digest_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (level == params->num_levels) /* Root hash? */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pending_size + params->digest_size > params->block_size ||
|
|
|
|
i + 1 == num_blocks_to_hash) {
|
|
|
|
/* Flush the pending hash block */
|
|
|
|
memset(&pending_hashes[pending_size], 0,
|
|
|
|
params->block_size - pending_size);
|
|
|
|
err = vops->write_merkle_tree_block(inode,
|
|
|
|
pending_hashes,
|
|
|
|
dst_block_num,
|
|
|
|
params->log_blocksize);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
fsverity_err(inode,
|
|
|
|
"Error %d writing Merkle tree block %llu",
|
|
|
|
err, dst_block_num);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dst_block_num++;
|
|
|
|
pending_size = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
|
|
|
|
return -EINTR;
|
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2020-01-07 03:54:10 +07:00
|
|
|
* Build the Merkle tree for the given file using the given parameters, and
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
* return the root hash in @root_hash.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The tree is written to a filesystem-specific location as determined by the
|
|
|
|
* ->write_merkle_tree_block() method. However, the blocks that comprise the
|
|
|
|
* tree are the same for all filesystems.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-01-07 03:54:10 +07:00
|
|
|
static int build_merkle_tree(struct file *filp,
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
|
|
|
|
u8 *root_hash)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-01-07 03:54:10 +07:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
u8 *pending_hashes;
|
|
|
|
struct ahash_request *req;
|
|
|
|
u64 blocks;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int level;
|
|
|
|
int err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (inode->i_size == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Empty file is a special case; root hash is all 0's */
|
|
|
|
memset(root_hash, 0, params->digest_size);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-01 00:55:45 +07:00
|
|
|
/* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */
|
|
|
|
req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(params->hash_alg, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
pending_hashes = kmalloc(params->block_size, GFP_KERNEL);
|
2020-01-01 00:55:45 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!pending_hashes)
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Build each level of the Merkle tree, starting at the leaf level
|
|
|
|
* (level 0) and ascending to the root node (level 'num_levels - 1').
|
|
|
|
* Then at the end (level 'num_levels'), calculate the root hash.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
blocks = (inode->i_size + params->block_size - 1) >>
|
|
|
|
params->log_blocksize;
|
|
|
|
for (level = 0; level <= params->num_levels; level++) {
|
2020-01-07 03:54:10 +07:00
|
|
|
err = build_merkle_tree_level(filp, level, blocks, params,
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
pending_hashes, req);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
blocks = (blocks + params->hashes_per_block - 1) >>
|
|
|
|
params->log_arity;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(root_hash, pending_hashes, params->digest_size);
|
|
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
kfree(pending_hashes);
|
2020-01-01 00:55:45 +07:00
|
|
|
fsverity_free_hash_request(params->hash_alg, req);
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int enable_verity(struct file *filp,
|
|
|
|
const struct fsverity_enable_arg *arg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
|
|
|
|
const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop;
|
|
|
|
struct merkle_tree_params params = { };
|
|
|
|
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc;
|
2019-07-22 23:26:23 +07:00
|
|
|
size_t desc_size = sizeof(*desc) + arg->sig_size;
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
struct fsverity_info *vi;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Start initializing the fsverity_descriptor */
|
|
|
|
desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!desc)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
desc->version = 1;
|
|
|
|
desc->hash_algorithm = arg->hash_algorithm;
|
|
|
|
desc->log_blocksize = ilog2(arg->block_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get the salt if the user provided one */
|
|
|
|
if (arg->salt_size &&
|
2020-01-01 00:54:08 +07:00
|
|
|
copy_from_user(desc->salt, u64_to_user_ptr(arg->salt_ptr),
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
arg->salt_size)) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
desc->salt_size = arg->salt_size;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-22 23:26:23 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Get the signature if the user provided one */
|
|
|
|
if (arg->sig_size &&
|
2020-01-01 00:54:08 +07:00
|
|
|
copy_from_user(desc->signature, u64_to_user_ptr(arg->sig_ptr),
|
2019-07-22 23:26:23 +07:00
|
|
|
arg->sig_size)) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
desc->sig_size = cpu_to_le32(arg->sig_size);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
desc->data_size = cpu_to_le64(inode->i_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare the Merkle tree parameters */
|
|
|
|
err = fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(¶ms, inode,
|
|
|
|
arg->hash_algorithm,
|
|
|
|
desc->log_blocksize,
|
|
|
|
desc->salt, desc->salt_size);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Start enabling verity on this file, serialized by the inode lock.
|
|
|
|
* Fail if verity is already enabled or is already being enabled.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
inode_lock(inode);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_VERITY(inode))
|
|
|
|
err = -EEXIST;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
err = vops->begin_enable_verity(filp);
|
|
|
|
inode_unlock(inode);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Build the Merkle tree. Don't hold the inode lock during this, since
|
|
|
|
* on huge files this may take a very long time and we don't want to
|
|
|
|
* force unrelated syscalls like chown() to block forever. We don't
|
|
|
|
* need the inode lock here because deny_write_access() already prevents
|
|
|
|
* the file from being written to or truncated, and we still serialize
|
|
|
|
* ->begin_enable_verity() and ->end_enable_verity() using the inode
|
|
|
|
* lock and only allow one process to be here at a time on a given file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("Building Merkle tree...\n");
|
|
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(desc->root_hash) < FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
|
2020-01-07 03:54:10 +07:00
|
|
|
err = build_merkle_tree(filp, ¶ms, desc->root_hash);
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d building Merkle tree", err);
|
|
|
|
goto rollback;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("Done building Merkle tree. Root hash is %s:%*phN\n",
|
|
|
|
params.hash_alg->name, params.digest_size, desc->root_hash);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Create the fsverity_info. Don't bother trying to save work by
|
|
|
|
* reusing the merkle_tree_params from above. Instead, just create the
|
|
|
|
* fsverity_info from the fsverity_descriptor as if it were just loaded
|
|
|
|
* from disk. This is simpler, and it serves as an extra check that the
|
|
|
|
* metadata we're writing is valid before actually enabling verity.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
vi = fsverity_create_info(inode, desc, desc_size);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(vi)) {
|
|
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(vi);
|
|
|
|
goto rollback;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-22 23:26:23 +07:00
|
|
|
if (arg->sig_size)
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("Storing a %u-byte PKCS#7 signature alongside the file\n",
|
|
|
|
arg->sig_size);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Tell the filesystem to finish enabling verity on the file.
|
|
|
|
* Serialized with ->begin_enable_verity() by the inode lock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
inode_lock(inode);
|
|
|
|
err = vops->end_enable_verity(filp, desc, desc_size, params.tree_size);
|
|
|
|
inode_unlock(inode);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
fsverity_err(inode, "%ps() failed with err %d",
|
|
|
|
vops->end_enable_verity, err);
|
|
|
|
fsverity_free_info(vi);
|
|
|
|
} else if (WARN_ON(!IS_VERITY(inode))) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
fsverity_free_info(vi);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Successfully enabled verity */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Readers can start using ->i_verity_info immediately, so it
|
|
|
|
* can't be rolled back once set. So don't set it until just
|
|
|
|
* after the filesystem has successfully enabled verity.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
fsverity_set_info(inode, vi);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
kfree(params.hashstate);
|
|
|
|
kfree(desc);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rollback:
|
|
|
|
inode_lock(inode);
|
|
|
|
(void)vops->end_enable_verity(filp, NULL, 0, params.tree_size);
|
|
|
|
inode_unlock(inode);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* fsverity_ioctl_enable() - enable verity on a file
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Enable fs-verity on a file. See the "FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY" section of
|
|
|
|
* Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
|
|
|
|
struct fsverity_enable_arg arg;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg.version != 1)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg.__reserved1 ||
|
|
|
|
memchr_inv(arg.__reserved2, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved2)))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg.block_size != PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-10 01:31:43 +07:00
|
|
|
if (arg.salt_size > sizeof_field(struct fsverity_descriptor, salt))
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
return -EMSGSIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-22 23:26:23 +07:00
|
|
|
if (arg.sig_size > FS_VERITY_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE)
|
|
|
|
return -EMSGSIZE;
|
2019-07-22 23:26:22 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Require a regular file with write access. But the actual fd must
|
|
|
|
* still be readonly so that we can lock out all writers. This is
|
|
|
|
* needed to guarantee that no writable fds exist to the file once it
|
|
|
|
* has verity enabled, and to stabilize the data being hashed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (IS_APPEND(inode))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
|
|
return -EISDIR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
|
|
|
|
if (err) /* -EROFS */
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = deny_write_access(filp);
|
|
|
|
if (err) /* -ETXTBSY */
|
|
|
|
goto out_drop_write;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = enable_verity(filp, &arg);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto out_allow_write_access;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Some pages of the file may have been evicted from pagecache after
|
|
|
|
* being used in the Merkle tree construction, then read into pagecache
|
|
|
|
* again by another process reading from the file concurrently. Since
|
|
|
|
* these pages didn't undergo verification against the file measurement
|
|
|
|
* which fs-verity now claims to be enforcing, we have to wipe the
|
|
|
|
* pagecache to ensure that all future reads are verified.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
|
|
|
|
invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* allow_write_access() is needed to pair with deny_write_access().
|
|
|
|
* Regardless, the filesystem won't allow writing to verity files.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
out_allow_write_access:
|
|
|
|
allow_write_access(filp);
|
|
|
|
out_drop_write:
|
|
|
|
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_ioctl_enable);
|